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THE

POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS
AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY

BY

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VOLUME III
TWO ESSAYS
BOOKS III, IV, AND V—TEXT AND NOTES

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PREFACE

TO THE THIRD AND FOURTH VOLUMES.

My first words must be words of regret. The lamented death of Professor Susemihl not many months ago, which no one deplores more than I do, leaves a great gap in the ranks of Aristotelian scholars. His learning, his industry and powers of work, his thoroughness, and his acuteness will long be missed. The students of Aristotle's writings have abundant cause to be grateful to him, and none more so than myself. Even when I have differed from him most, I have always found his views suggestive and instructive. It was from him that I first learnt what the close study of a work of Aristotle's meant.

Of the friends who gave me assistance in the revision of the proofs of my first two volumes three—Mr. Alfred Robinson, Mr. R. L. Nettleship, and Mr. Evelyn Abbott—are, to my deep regret, no more. I have especially often missed the valued help of Mr. Alfred Robinson, whose death several years ago was a great loss to many besides myself.

Owing to weak health, the Warden of Wadham, Mr. G. E. Thorley, has, unfortunately for me, been unable to give me the assistance which he kindly gave me in the revision of the proofs of the first two volumes. Professor Bywater's suggestions have been but few—far fewer than I could have wished—but, on the other hand, I have gained a new and very valuable ally in Mr. Herbert Richards, whose Greek scholarship needs no
commendation from me, and who has most kindly found time to peruse all the proofs of the explanatory notes contained in the third and fourth volumes and to give me the benefit of his comments on them, which have been, I need not say, of great use to me, though I am alone responsible for the views expressed in this work. The references in the General Index under the name of Mr. Richards will suffice to show how many valuable suggestions I owe to him. For emendations of the text and transpositions not explicitly attributed to him I am responsible.

In five or six of the Additions and Corrections to Vols. I, II, and III placed at the end of Vol. III I have profited by some remarks on my commentary on the first two Books kindly sent me by Prof. Robinson Ellis in 1888 shortly after its appearance.

To all who have assisted me with information or suggestions in the correction of the proofs, and among them to the readers of the Press, my best thanks are due.

To Mr. F. G. Kenyon I am greatly indebted for the collation of MS. Harl. 6874 which I publish in an Appendix to my third volume. Many students have had cause to testify to his unvarying kindness and readiness to assist, and I can add my emphatic testimony to theirs.

I have not carried my collation of the Politics in O (MS. 112, Corpus Christi College, Oxford) beyond the first two Books, but I have completed my collation of MS. Phillipps 891 (z), a manuscript of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation which, as will be seen from my critical notes (see for instance those on 1306 a 24 and 1315 b 31), occasionally offers excellent readings, found in no other MS. of the Latin Translation hitherto collated. It is throughout akin to a, though it sometimes differs from a, but the original reading of a has often been erased by a corrector, and where this has happened, the original
reading of z commonly remains intact and furnishes a probable clue to the original reading of a. I have again to thank the owner of the Phillipps Library, Cheltenham, for giving me every facility for the collation of this MS.

A list of the symbols and abbreviations used in the work will be found at the end of the fourth volume.

In my third and fourth volumes I have been able to refer to the English translation by Messrs. Costelloe and Muirhead of the volume of Zeller's Philosophie der Griechen which relates to Aristotle, and to the English translation by Messrs. Brooks and Nicklin of the first volume of Gilbert's Handbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer. The first volume of Gerth's edition of the Syntax of Kühner's Greek Grammar did not appear till my revision of the proofs of the third volume was almost completed. My references to Dittenberger's Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum are for a similar reason mostly to the first edition. The references in the first two volumes to Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften are to the first edition of the work, those in the third and fourth to the second edition, published in 1888.

November, 1901.
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**Additions and Corrections to Vols. I, II, and III**
ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE POLITICS AND THE LATIN TRANSLATION OF WILLIAM OF MOERBEKE. II.

The following remarks are in continuation of those contained in vol. ii. p. xli sqq. My object in them has especially been to study the characteristics of the two families into which the MSS. of the Politics fall and the errors to which they are most liable, and also to throw light on the methods of translation adopted in the vetus versio, in the hope that these inquiries may help us to discover the true reading in the many cases in which the MSS. of the two families offer different readings.

It has long been observed (see vol. ii. p. lvii) that the MSS. of the first family (Π1) are prone to omit both sentences and words. These omissions occur less often in some Books than in others. They are less numerous in the Sixth (old Fourth), the Seventh (old Fifth), and the Eighth (old Sixth) than in the other Books. Very few omissions occur between 1326 b and 1330 a (inclusive of these columns), none in 1332 b and 1333 a, 1334 a, 1338 a, and 1340 a.

Sentences are omitted in Π1 owing to a similarity of ending in 1253 b 25, 1275 a 28, 1287 b 38, 1337 a 29, b 25, and 1299 a 8, owing to a similarity of the beginning in 1324 b 28 and 1311 b 37, and for no clear reason in 1275 a 11 and 1331 a 21.

Single words are still more often omitted in Π1, and
especially small words, as I have pointed out in *Class. Rev.* 7. 305 (1893). Out of 184 omissions in Π¹ 117 are omissions of words of one syllable. ‘If I do not err, *καλ* is omitted in Π¹ twenty-four times in the course of the Politics, *μεν* eight and *δέ* nine times, *τοι* and its parts six times, *ειναι* five times, *ἀν* five times, and *εκ* thrice. Μοι Π¹ omit the article thirty-five times, and *τε* eight times, and very possibly I did the like, though of this we cannot be sure, for the Vetus Interpres seldom renders *τε*, and, writing in Latin, of course seldom renders the article’ (*Class. Rev.* ibid.). Π¹ are particularly prone to omit *ἡ*, *καλ*, and the article, where these small words are repeated near together. See as to *ἡ* 1268 a 6, 1282 a 17, 1324 b 30, 1298 b 32, and 1305 a 32 (it is in these passages only that *ἡ* is omitted in Π¹); as to *καλ* 1253 a 1, 25, 1255 a 5, 1259 b 31, 1260 b 17, 1263 a 23, 1264 a 16, 1317 b 6; as to the article 1265 a 12, 1266 b 3, 1268 a 17, 1269 a 38, 1272 b 28, 1279 a 34, 1282 a 40, 1285 a 6, 1325 a 8, 1331 b 5, 8, 1332 a 22, 1316 a 36.

Nor is it only sentences and words that Π¹ are apt to omit. These MSS. often omit syllables, mostly the first or last syllables of words—the first in 1262 a 30, 1273 a 10, 1283 a 11 (here, however, the *ἀν* of *ἀνισότητα* is omitted because *πάσαν* precedes), 1285 b 36, 1342 b 32, and 1298 a 31; the last in 1268 b 16, 1276 b 20, 1278 b 40, 1283 b 20, 1287 b 19, 1335 b 35, and 1315 a 15. In 1336 b 20 and 1300 b 28 the first two syllables are omitted in Π¹. In 1335 b 4 and 1317 a 36 a syllable or more than a syllable is omitted from the middle of the word. The first letter of a word is clearly omitted in Π¹ in 1324 b 30 and 1315 b 18, and probably in 1265 b 19, 1297 b 7, and 1320 a 29; the last letter often disappears, especially when it is a *ν* or *ς* (see 1255 a 39, 1265 b 21, 1267 b 40, 1337 b 41, 1297 a 17, 1300 a 32, 1308 b 25, and 1309 a 31). On the other hand, two or three words are repeated in Π¹ in 1333 b 38 and 1297 a 24.

Omissions, etc. in Π². Many omissions occur in Π² also, and some of them are omissions of a sentence or of more sentences than one.
Such omissions occur in 1334 a 37, 1337 b 16-20, 34-35, 1298 a 6, 1301 a 30-31, 1307 b 32-34, but they are easily explained, for they are caused by a similarity of ending. In 1292 b 32, if \( \Pi^2 \) are wrong in omitting the sentence omitted, they have not this excuse. In 1336 b 18 the words omitted by \( \Pi^2 \) are probably rightly omitted. Omissions of two words occur in 1285 b 16 (\( \alpha i \) \( \pi \alpha \tau \rho i o i \)), 1326 b 32 (\( \tau o v \) \( \delta \rho o v \)), and 1335 a 37 (\( \delta e i \) \( \chi \rho \eta \sigma \theta \alpha i \)): at least it seems likely that \( \Pi^2 \) are wrong in omitting these words. Omissions of a single word occur in 1259 a 37 (\( \mu \epsilon \rho \eta \)), 1276 a 33 (\( \epsilon \theta \nu o s \)), 1288 b 16 (\( \varepsilon \rho \gamma o v \)), 27 (\( \alpha \gamma a \theta \delta \nu \)), 1306 a 6 (\( \epsilon \theta \theta \upsilon s \)), and perhaps in 1304 b 6, where \( a i t i a i \) may have dropped out after \( \alpha i \). Omissions of small words, and especially of \( \kappa a i \) and the article, are frequent in \( \Pi^2 \), though not nearly as frequent as in \( \Pi^1 \). Omissions of a syllable occur in \( \Pi^2 \) in 1294 b 26 (\( \alpha \delta \eta \lambda o s \) for \( \delta \alpha \delta \eta \lambda o s \)), 1314 b 7 (\( \delta \beta \zeta e i \) for \( \delta \delta \beta \zeta e i e n \)), and 1320 a 38 (\( \sigma \nu a \beta \rho o i \zeta o n \) \( \Pi^1 \), \( \alpha \beta \rho o i \zeta o n \) \( \Pi^2 \)). It is not often that \( \Pi^2 \) can clearly be shown to omit a letter.

We note in \( \Pi^2 \) a certain tendency to substitute \( o \) for \( \omega \) (e.g. in 1269 a 23, 1274 b 13, 1286 a 37, 1294 b 38, 1302 b 6, and 1317 a 39), and these MSS. substitute \( o v \) for \( \omega \) in 1273 a 9 and 1314 a 18, and \( \omega \) for \( o v \) in 1301 a 38 and 1307 a 38.

In five passages \( \Pi^2 \) have the aorist infinitive, while \( \Pi^1 \) (or at any rate \( M^* P^1 \), for the reading of \( \Gamma \) is uncertain) have the present infinitive. These passages are 1260 b 36, 1267 a 35, 1284 a 5, 1332 b 1, and 1317 a 36.

Some errors in the MSS. go back to an early date; thus Errors of transcrip- tion of errors of the errors of \( \phi i \Lambda \iota i a \) for \( \phi i \Delta \iota i a \) in \( \Pi^1 \) (1271 a 27, 1272 a 2, b 34), of \( \Omega \nu i o \nu \), \( \Omega \nu i a i \) for \( \Omega \nu i o \nu \), \( \Omega \nu i a i \) in \( \Pi^1 \) (1285 b 10, 16), and of \( \Delta e i \) for \( \iota \)\( \Lambda e i \) in \( \Pi \) (1296 b 7) no doubt originated in days when uncials were in use.

Errors shared by all the MSS. and the Vetus Interpres must also have originated early. Under this head fall—

\[
\begin{align*}
1274 b & \quad 7, \, \varepsilon \pi \alpha k e \psi \iota n \text{ for } \varepsilon \pi \alpha k e \psi \iota n \\
1275 b & \quad 39, \, \kai \text{ for } \kappa \upsilon \\
1276 b & \quad 9, \, \lambda \gamma o \mu e n \text{ for } \lambda \gamma o \mu e n \text{ (or has } \alpha \upsilon \text{ been omitted?)}
\end{align*}
\]
ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE

1278 a 34, αὐτῶν for ἀστῶν (αὐτῶν ΠII, but ἀστῶν Vat. Pal. and Codex Hamilton)
1280 b 4, ἀδικήσωσιν for ἀδικήσουσιν
1287 a 4, βασιλείας for πολιτείας (Julian seems to have read βασιλείας: see critical note)

Errors which we find in all extant MSS., though they were probably not present in the Greek text used by the Vetus Interpres, will also be of early date. Under this head fall—

1260 b 41, ἵστης for εἰς ὅ τις
1266 b 2, δῆ or δὲ for δ᾽ ἢ δὴ
1278 b 20, περί for παρά
1283 a 7, ὑπερέχειν for ὑπερέχει.

Confusions of letters.

The mistakes which have given rise to these erroneous readings are mistakes easily made, and they frequently recur in the MSS. of the Politics. We often note a confusion of ε and η (as in 1274 b 7), of ι and ει (as in 1260 b 41), of ω and ου (as in 1280 b 4), of παρά and περί (as in 1278 b 20), of πόλις, πολίτης, and πολιτεία (as in 1296 a 9), of πολέμως and πολέμιος (as in 1327 a 21). For the interchange of καν and καὶ reference may be made to 1282 b 8 and 1290 a 1, for that of ο and οι in 1276 b 9 to 1271 a 40 and to Vat. Pal. in 1275 b 10, and for that of καλῶς and κακῶς to 1294 a 7, while the change of ἀστῶν into αὐτῶν, of Σώμον into Σόμον, and of ἐτι into ἐπί needs no explanation. The substitution of ὑπάρχον for ὑπάρχοντα is probably due to the omission of a τ over the last syllable of ὑπάρχον. That of δεσπόζον for δεσποστόν appears to point to a confusion of στ and ζ. The erroneous readings in the four

1 This error may probably be due to the misreading of a contraction.
remaining passages (1287 a 4, 1300 a 2, 1266 b 2, 1283 a 7) are easily explainable.

Among other confusions of letters which are of frequent occurrence in the Politics may be mentioned those of α with αι (1290 b 19, 1309 b 37, 1318 a 3, 1322 b 37), of αι with οι (1268 a 11, 1274 b 14, 1285 a 24, b 5, 1339 a 1, 1294 a 37, 1313 b 39), of ου with ου (1274 a 4, 1280 a 29, 1338 a 31), of ους with ους (1292 b 16, 1309 b 14) and perhaps with ου (1272 a 29, b 16, 1302 b 30), of α with ε, which occurs in 1288 a 15 not only in Π2, but also in Vat. Pal., and of η with ει and ο with ου, which are too common to need illustration.

The variations of reading hitherto noticed have been due to errors of transcription, but many variations of reading in the MSS. are evidently due not to this cause, but to the occasional use in the MSS. copied by the scribes, or perhaps in the archetype, of ambiguous contractions or contractions easily misread or misinterpreted. Just as in the first of the four handwriting of the papyrus of the "Αθηναίων Πολιτεία" written above the line stands indiscriminately for -οι -ου -ου -οις and -ος (see Sandys, "Ath. Pol. p. xxxvi), so in the MSS. from which the existing MSS. of the Politics were copied the terminations of words, and especially of common words like the cases of αυτός and αυτός, were probably often represented by ambiguous contractions.

In 1337 a 28, where the true reading is αυτόν, M* has àv with τ added over it, and it is very likely that the Vetus Interpres found the same contraction in the Greek text used by him and took it to represent αυτόν, for his rendering is ἵπσορυμ. The next word in the same line is variously given by Π2 Π3 as αυτόν, by M* as αυτόν, and by Γ Π1 as αυτόν, the fact probably being that the writers of all these MSS. had before them an ambiguous contraction (perhaps α with τ over it). So in 1312 b 9 Π2, 3 have αν with τ over it, and the other MSS. make more or less successful attempts to interpret this contraction, Γ Π1 having αυτής rightly, M* αυτής, Π4 Ald. αυτόν, and so forth. The same
thing holds of ὄντος. In 1297 a 1 M⁸ has τοῦ with τ over it, Γ¹ τούτω, and the rest rightly τούτους, the ambiguous contraction reproduced in M⁸ being interpreted with varying success by the rest.

In 1283 b 9 M⁸ has ἑπαρ' with χ added over ρ', P¹ ἑπάρχει, the rest rightly ἑπάρχη: in 1307 b 12 M⁸ has χειροτονησαν with τ over a and P¹ χειροτονήσαται, the true reading being χειροτονήσατα: in 1335 a 27 M⁸ has πλή with θ' over η, which Vet. Int. perhaps interprets, though wrongly, by his rendering multum: in 1303 b 33 M⁸ has a symbol for the termination of the word which Vet. Int. renders Estiaeis: in 1309 b 28 P³ has ποη with σ over η and M⁸ pr. P² ποιήσῃ, the true reading being ποιήσει. It is probably owing to the use of an ambiguous contraction for πάντος that many MSS. have πάν in 1286 a 25, and we may explain in a similar way the frequent interchange in the MSS. of πόλις πολίτης and πολιτεία (see for instance Suselmihl's apparatus criticus in 1326 b 5, 1304 a 17, and 1318 a 9), and the false reading ἐπαυφίμευ in place of ἐπαυφίσων which we find in Π¹ in 1289 a 1 (cp. 1267 a 25, where M⁸ has ἐπιθυμόκεν in place of ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, the reading of P¹, and ἐπιθυμησόσων, the reading of Γ Π², and 1258 b 4, where Π¹ have ἐπιρωσάμεθα and Π² ἐπιρωθεὶ). The divergence of the MSS. in 1282 a 27, where P² ³ etc. have μέγιστον, M⁸ μέγιστοι, P¹ ⁴ μέγισται, and Γ μέγιστα, may also be thus explained. For other possible instances of the same thing see the passages referred to in vol. ii. p. 1, note 2.

That errors may have arisen from this cause at a very early date is clear from the fact that the papyrus of the Ἀθηναῶν Πολιτεία is full of contractions, though, according to Mr. Kenyon (Palaeography of Greek Papyri, p. 92), it is 'highly probable' that it was 'written not very far from the year 90'. If the writers of the MSS. of the Politics which have come down to us, or the writers of the MSS. they copied, have had to any large extent to expand contractions of the kind described above, skill will have been needed by them in the discharge of their function no less than fidelity. We must bear this in mind in reference to
the question of the comparative claims of the two families of MSS. There can be little doubt that they both descend from an archetype in which ambiguous contractions were occasionally, and perhaps frequently, used, and the question evidently arises, which set of copyists, those of the first or those of the second family, was the more successful in expanding these ambiguous contractions. This is a question which it is not easy to answer positively, but the presumption is in favour of the more careful copyists, and, if we may judge by a comparison of omissions, the copyists to whom we owe the MSS. of the second family did their work more carefully than those to whom we owe the MSS. of the first. It would be rash, however, to dogmatize as to the superiority of either of the two families of MSS. in passages which are likely to have been affected by this source of error.

So far we have been concerned with variations of reading of a more or less minute kind. In not a few cases, however, the readings offered by Π¹ diverge widely from those offered by Π². The following list comprises most of the more marked and less easily explicable of these divergences:

**Book I.**

| 1254 a 15, δὲ | Π¹  | Π²  |
| 1255 a 24, δόλος (Π¹ Ρ  Μb  Τb  Λb) | δέ | ἄμα  |
| 32, ἐξ ἀρχῆς | πανταχοῦ  |
| b 26, τούτων | τῶν τοιούτων  |
| 1256 b 1, κομίζονται | πορίζονται  |
| 1258 b 27, τέταρτον | τρίτον  |

**Book II.**

| 1260 b 28, τίς (Γ?) | Π¹  | Π²  |
| 1261 b 2, τότε δὲ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν | ἦ | ἐν τούτοις δὲ μιμεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν  |
| μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἰκεῖν | μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἰκεῖν (or  |
| τὸ δ' (τὰ δ') ὡς ὁμοίους | ὡς ὁμοίους (or ὁμοίως) |
| εἶναι ἐξ ἀρχῆς | οἰκεῖν (or οἰκεῖος) |
| 1264 b 31, δὲ | τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς  |
|  | γὰρ  |
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<td>1337 a 36, διὰ</td>
<td>περὶ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b 22, εἰρήνηι (Γ?)</td>
<td>ἐλέχθη</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Π¹

1339 b 21, γὰρ
1340 b 7, δὲ
1341 b 1, ὶαμβὸι
1342 b 32, διάνουν

Π²

γόνυ
γὰρ
σαμβόκκοι
παιδείαν οἶνον

Book VI (IV).

1289 a 5, ἦ
8, γὰρ οὐ γὰρ δὴ
1292 a 17, ὁ δῆμος οὐτος
1293 a 21, ἦ οἴ
24, πολλῶν
b 24, ἀποδοθειός
1294 a 36, ἄ
1298 b 13, τρόπων
1300 b 30, παράντι

Book VII (V).

1301 b 26, πανταχοῦ Π¹ Π²
πάντων
1308 b 17, οὔτω ῥυθμίζειν
1310 b 17, αἱ τυραννίδες
1315 a 38, ἀφαίρεσιν (Γ;)
παραίρεσιν οὐ παραίρεσιν

Book VIII (VI).

1317 b 17, τοιοῦτων
1319 a 7, τοῖς παλαιοῖς
1320 a 4, μηδὲ
b 9, τὴν ταραντίνων Π¹, τὴν ταραντίνων followed by a
lacuna Μ, τὴν ταραντίνων
1321 a 5, μᾶλιστα
κάλλιστα

Of the above sixty-two divergences twelve are due to a source of error which—and this has not, I think, been hitherto pointed out—especially affects the first family of MSS. I refer to the tendency of these MSS. to introduce a word into the text which they repeat from a neighbouring line, often the preceding or following line, the word thus
repeated sometimes extruding another word from the text and sometimes not doing so. Thus in Π¹—

in 1255 a 24 ἄμα is displaced by ἀδώς probably repeated from 21;
in 1255 a 32 πανταχῶτις is displaced by ἐξ ἀρχής repeated from 30 sq.;
in 1265 a 35 χρήσις is displaced by ἐξις probably repeated from ἐξις;
in 1266 a 37 ἀναγκαίον is added after εἰςαν, being repeated from ἀναγκάζων in the preceding line;
in 1272 a 35 ἐκ τῶν is displaced by ἐκ τίνων repeated from the preceding line;
in 1326 a 21 μορίον is displaced by μερῶν probably repeated from μέρος in the preceding line;
in 1328 a 14 ἱπτολαμβάνοντι is displaced by νομίζοντι repeated from νομίζουσαι in the following line;
in 1329 a 20 γένος is displaced by μέρος perhaps repeated from 23;
in 1289 a 5 τὸῦ is displaced by Ὑ repeated from the preceding line;
in 1298 b 13 διορισμῶν is displaced by τρόπων repeated from the preceding line;
in 1320 a 4 ἧ διαγαρχεῖσθαι is displaced by μηθοὶ διαγαρχεῖσθαι repeated from μηθοὶ διαγαρχεῖσθαι in 2.

In 1268 b 5 Π² appear to fall into a similar error, δίκης being displaced in these MSS. by κρίσεως repeated from the preceding line.

Occasionally all the MSS., and not those of the first or second family only, may be reasonably suspected of this error. Thus in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 39, where all the MSS. except Γ have δῆλον δὲ καὶ (Γ omits καὶ) τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλομείνης Εὐνομίας, the words καὶ τοῦτο are probably repeated by mistake from the preceding line. So again it is possible that in 2. 5. 1263 a 13, where almost all the MSS. have λαμβάνοντας, and in 2. 6. 1265 b 2, where all have περὶ τὰς πόλεις, they have suffered in a similar way, λαμβάνοντας being repeated from λαμβάνοντι in the following line and περὶ τὰς πόλεις from περὶ τὰς πόλεις in the preceding line. The same thing may have happened to all the MSS. in 2. 7. 1267 a 8, where ἐπιθυμοῖν may have taken the place of ἀδικοῖν through repetition from ἐπιθυμῶν, 6 (see explanatory note
POLITICS AND THE VETUS VERSIO. II. xvii

on 1267 a 5), in 2. 8. 1268 b 1, where γεωργήσει may have displaced some other word owing to the presence of γεωργοῦτας in the preceding line, and in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 14, where πολιτείαν may be a repetition of πολιτείαν in 1329 a 12 and may have pushed out some other and more appropriate word (see explanatory note on 1329 a 13).

Γ Μ are sometimes affected by this cause of error when P1 escapes. Thus in 2. 6. 1265 b 11 ἄλλως repeated from ἄλλων in the preceding line has displaced πλείσταις in Γ Μ, in 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 3 βελτιόν from the preceding line has displaced κάλλιον in Μ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. melius), and in 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 25 τρόπον from the preceding line has displaced χρόνον in Γ Μ.

The MSS. of the second family are not free from this kind of error, though they have suffered much less from it than those of the first. We have already seen that in 1268 b 5 κρίσεως repeated from the preceding line probably takes the place of δίκης in Π. So again in 2. 4. 1262 b 33 Π2 prefix εἰς to τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας because εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας occurs in the preceding line, and in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 35 Π2.3 add τὸ πλήθος after δὲ ποιεῖν because δὲ ποιεῖν τὸ πλήθος occurs in the following line.

Twelve, then, of the sixty-two variations of reading which have been enumerated may be thus accounted for. Five others (1255 b 26, 1330 b 14, 1332 b 40, 1292 a 17, 1317 b 17) are due to an interchange of οὗτος and τοιοῦτος, four (1264 b 31, 1329 b 13, 1340 b 7, 1289 a 8) to an interchange of δὲ and γὰρ (the contractions being somewhat similar), and the eleven following to an interchange of not very dissimilar words—

1256 b 1, κομίζονται and πορίζονται
1282 b 5, διαφίσκαται and δηλώσαται
1285 a 12, γὰρ and γοῖν
1339 b 21, γὰρ and γοῖν
1287 a 31, διαφθείρες and διαστρέφειν
1341 b 1, ἐμμησαὶ and συμβικαὶ
1293 a 24, πολλῶν and ἄλλων

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1293 b 24, ἀποδοθείσας and ἀπ’ ῥήθεισας
1300 b 30, παρώντι and παντί
1319 a 7, τὸις παλαιοῖς and τοῖς πολλοῖς
1321 a 5, μάλιστα and κάλλιστα.

In two other passages (1271 b 28 and 1308 b 17) a gloss has probably displaced the true reading in Π¹, and in three (1335 b 4, 1336 b 20, and 1342 b 32) one or more syllables have been omitted in Π¹. The variations of reading in 1267 b 26 and 1269 b 21 are probably due to the tendency of Π¹ to omit words. In 1286 a 25 the substitution of πάνω for πάντας, and in 1301 b 26 that of πάντων for πανταχοῦ, may well be due to ambiguous contractions. In 1258 b 27 the substitution of τέσσαρον for τρίτον, though wrong, is natural enough, τρίτον having occurred in 25. In 1330 b 21 the substitution in Π¹ of οἰκεῖον for ὀἶον is explained in the critical note on the passage. In 1282 a 32 the interchange of μειζόνων and μεγάλων resembles that of πλείους and πολλοὺς in 1290 b 2, that of βέλτιστων and βέλτιτων in 1333 b 7, and that of φανερωτάτη and φανερω-τέρα in 1293 b 32. As to 1261 b 2 and 1273 a 41 something has already been said in vol. ii. pp. 234 sq. and iv.

The following variations of reading remain, sixteen in number:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Π¹</th>
<th>Π²</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1254 a 15, ὅν</td>
<td>δέ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1260 b 28, τίς (Γ?)</td>
<td>ἡ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1265 a 4, εἴς (Γ?)</td>
<td>πρός</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1281 a 17</td>
<td>δεῖ (Γ?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1335 b 28</td>
<td>χρή</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1281 a 28, σπουδαῖα</td>
<td>δικαία</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1326 a 25, οὕ μὴν ἄλλὰ</td>
<td>ἄλλα μὴν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1328 b 15</td>
<td>ὃν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1294 a 36</td>
<td>περὶ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1335 b 39, καὶ</td>
<td>ἰ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1337 a 36, ἄλα</td>
<td>ἐλέχθη</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b 22, εἰρησάμ (Γ?)</td>
<td>εἰ μὲν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1293 a 21, ἦ εἰ</td>
<td>τῶν τυραννίδων</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1310 b 17, αἱ τυραννίδες</td>
<td>παραίρεσιν οὐ παραίρεσιν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1315 a 38, ἀφαιρέσων (Γ?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In seven of these passages (1260 b 28, 1265 a 4, 1281 a 17, 1335 b 28, 1281 a 28, 1335 b 39, 1337 b 22) words not themselves similar, but of similar meaning are interchanged, and in an eighth (1315 a 38) the interchange of ἀφαίρεσιν and παραίρεσιν may well be the result of accident. The divergences in the remaining eight (1254 a 15, 1236 a 25, 1328 b 15, 1294 a 36, 1337 a 36, 1293 a 21, 1310 b 17, 1320 b 9) are less easily explained.

A certain number of variations of reading are probably due, as has been said already in vol. ii. p. liii, to grammatical revisers of the text. Thus, while both families use the nominative μονάρχος (1292 a 11, 15 and 1313 b 39), not μονάρχης, Π² use the oblique cases of μονάρχος, Π¹ almost always those of μονάρχης.¹ So again Mˢ P¹ and possibly Π have διψοποιητική in 1255 b 26, while Π² have διψοποιή, and in 1256 a 6 Mˢ P¹ and possibly Π have κερκίδοποιητική, while Π² have κερκίδοποιή. In 1289 b 32, again, Mˢ P¹ and possibly Π have ἀποπλοῦ, Π² ἀνεπλοῦ. These differences of reading seem to be due to intentional correction, but others which are at first sight of a similar nature are probably due to accidental causes. Thus Π¹ inherit the form φιλίτια and Π² the form φιδίτια, the rival forms originating at the outset no doubt in the resemblance of Α and Δ. It is probably also owing to accident that in 1280 a 29 Π² have εἰσενέγκαντα and Mˢ P¹ (we cannot be certain as to Π) εἰσενεγκόντα, in 1283 b 14 Π² δοξαίεν and Mˢ P¹ δόξαιεν, in 1285 a 24 and b 5 Π² πάτριαι and ἐκουσίαι τε καὶ πάτριαι and Mˢ P¹ πάτριοι καὶ ἐκουσίοι τε καὶ πάτριοι, in 1292 b 9 Π² εἰπαμεν and Mˢ P¹ εἰπομεν, in 1302 b 4 Π² διὰ μικρότητα καὶ Mˢ P¹ διὰ σμικρότητα, in 1307 a 31 Π² ἐδύναντο

¹ In 1312 a 29, however, P¹ has τοῖς μονάρχοις with Π², while Π Mˢ have τοῖς μονάρχαις. See also Additions and Corrections.
and Μ₁ P₁ ὅδυναυτό, and in 1311 b 14 Π² vίλε and Μ₁ P₁ vίλα. It is easy to confuse av and ov, ai and αι, a and o, ε and η. If in 1338 b 23 M₁ P₁ L₈ Ald. have ληστρικά and Π² (except L₈ Ald.) ληστρικά, we remember that τ and τρ are easily confused, and that in 1336 b 30 Π² have θεατών and Π₁ θεάτρων.

In cases in which the two families of MSS. offer different readings I am still of opinion, as I have been from the first, that the MSS. of the second family deserve our confidence more often than those of the first. The comparative merits of the readings offered by the two families vary from Book to Book, and in no Book does the first family stand the comparison as well as in the Second, yet even there it seems to me that the second family has the advantage. My reasons for so thinking have been given in an article which appeared in the Classical Review in July, 1893 (7. 304 sqq.).

Even where the readings of the first family receive the support of the Vatican Palimpsest, they are not always to be adopted. This will be evident on a reference to 1287 a 32, b 41, and 1288 a 13.

It has been pointed out in vol. ii. p. lix that not much weight attaches to readings supported by M₁ P₁ against the consent of Γ Π², or to those supported by Γ M₁ against the consent of Π¹ Π³. On the other hand (and this has not as yet, I think, been pointed out) readings supported by Γ P₁ against the consent of M₁ Π² are very often correct. This will be found to be the case in the following passages:—

1261 a 14, διελεῖν Γ P₁, διελθεῖν the rest;
1270 a 13, αὔτης Γ P₁, αὔτην the rest;
1276 b 33, where Γ P₁ add a sentence missing in the other MSS., except that in two it is added by correctors;
1282 a 32, ἄρχουσιν Γ P₁, ἄρχωσιν M₁, ἄχωσιν Π²;
1285 b 22, ἀριστεῖν οι Γ P₁, ἀριστεῖν Π₁, πλεῖωνοι Π₁, πλεῖωνοι the rest;
1327 b 34, om. καὶ Γ P₁, not so the rest;
1334 a 37, Γ P₁ add a sentence missing in the rest;
1335 b 11, ἐλευθεροθείν Γ P₁, ἐλευθερίων the rest;
For passages in which the accentuation is corrected in \( \Gamma \text{P} \)
see critical note on 1293 a 28. It has already been remarked
(vol. ii. p. xlviii, note 3) that Demetrius Chalcondylas, the
scribe of \( \text{P} \), was a learned scholar and that many of the
good readings peculiar to \( \text{P} \) are probably emendations of
his, and the question might be asked whether the good
readings which \( \text{P} \) shares with \( \Gamma \) were not suggested to
Demetrius by a study of the vetus versio. How far it is
likely that Demetrius would study the vetus versio, I am
unable to say, but I doubt whether he owes these readings to
it, for it is evident from passages like 1280 b 6, where
the true reading is \( \delta\alpha\sigma\kappa\omicron\sigma\kappa\omicron\sigma\omega\nu\) and \( \text{P} \) has \( \delta\alpha\kappa\omicron\kappa\omicron\sigma\sigma\dot{\nu}\omega\nu\),
while \( \Gamma \text{M} \) have \( \delta\iota\alpha\kappa\omicron\kappa\omicron\nu\delta\omegav\), that \( \text{P} \) has a good independent
tradition of its own. In 1297 a i and (if Sus.\(^1\) is right, for
in Sus.\(^2\) 3 4 the erroneous reading is ascribed to \( \Gamma \text{M}\)) in
1261 b 27 \( \Gamma \text{P} \) agree in a false reading which \( \text{P} \) is not likely
to have borrowed from the vetus versio.

In some passages of the Politics the true reading is
preserved by one MS. only and in not a few by two or
three: thus it is preserved by \( \Gamma \) in 1260 b 41, 1266 b 2,
1283 a 7 etc., by \( \Gamma \text{M} \) in 1299 a 1, by \( \Gamma \text{P} \) \( \text{L} \) in 1299 a 2, by
\( \Gamma \) Ald. corr.\(^1\) \( \text{P} \) in 1332 a 33, by \( \text{P} \)\(^2\) \( \text{Vat. Pal.} \) in 1278 b 30,
by \( \text{P} \)\(^3\) and a correction in \( \text{P} \)\(^2\) in 1304 b 28, by \( \text{P} \)\(^4\) Ald. in
1286 b 33. We sometimes owe the true reading to quite
inferior MSS. (e.g. in 1275 b 39, 1284 b 40, 1295 a 28,
1296 b 31, 1308 b 15, 1317 a 12, 1318 b 17, 1320 a 16).

Not a few good readings are due to the Latin translation
of Aretinus (Lionardo Bruni of Arezzo, who was born in
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1369 and died in 1444). They are probably conjectural emendations of his. Among them the following may be mentioned:

1264 a 19, ὑπομενοῦσα (Γ II ὑπομένουσα);
1337 a 14, παυδεύσθαι (Γ II παυδεύσθαι);
1339 a 20, ἐπικρ (Γ II οἶκος);
1296 a 9, πολιτών (Γ II πολιτών);
1299 a 14 (with 'ut videtur, corr.1 P,' says Sus.1, and corr.1 P1 means Demetrius Chalcondylas), πολιτείας (Γ II πολιτείας);

b 36, αὖται αἱ (αὖται αἱ Π2, αἱ αὖται Π1);
1300 b 4, τὸ τε (the rest τὸ δὲ or τὸ ἄριστον δὲ or τὸ τέ δὲ);
1311 a 10, τὸ τὸ (the rest τὸ τὸ or τὸ);
1317 b 41, ἔτι (Γ II ἔτι).

That the Fifth (old Eighth) and the Eighth (old Sixth) Books are incomplete, we have seen already (vol. ii. p. xxxix). It is probable that something is wanting at the end of the Seventh (old Fifth) Book also. The question, however, to what extent ordinary lacunae occur in the text of the Politics is one of a different kind. That a small lacuna exists in the best MSS. in 1285 a 19 has already been noticed (vol. ii. p. lxvi). A somewhat larger one appears to occur in Γ II in 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 4 after the word ἀρετῶν (see explanatory note on 1334 a 41). It seems likely that several omissions occur in the passage 1300 a 23–b 5. Words appear to have fallen out of the text in 1301 a 6, 1307 a 31, and 1320 b 35 also.

In two instances the transposition of passages has seemed to me to be called for: I have suggested the transposition of 7 (5). 3. 1303 b 3, στασιάζοντα—7, ὅτες to after στασιάζονται in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39, and of 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 17, μάλιστα δὲ—20, ἐπιθέσεις to after μεθύοντα in 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 6.

Traces of the handiwork of an editor piecing together disquisitions originally unconnected appear to be especially visible in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (see explanatory notes on 1289 b 27 and 1290 b 21–24). Prof. W. Christ remarks in the preface to his edition of the Metaphysics of Aristotle (p. xviii), 'Philosophus iis quae chartae iam
A few remarks may be added to what has already been said with regard to the translation of the Vetus Interpres in vol. ii. p. xli sqq. A further study of this translation has confirmed my impression (see vol. ii. p. lxiv) that he often misread his Greek text; thus for example in 1285 b 7 he renders πορίσαεi emerunt, probably misreading it as πράσαει, in 1286 a 35 he renders ὅργισθήναι impetu ferri, misreading it apparently as ὀρμηθήναι, in 1330 a 11 he appears to misread πᾶλιν as πᾶς, in 1341 b 31 τύπονς as τρόπονς, in 1291 a 11 κομψός as κούφος, in 1319 a 24 θυρανλεῖν as θηρεῦειν. It would be easy to add many other instances.

It should be pointed out that the Vetus Interpres often uses two different Latin words to render the same Greek word when it is repeated close together; thus in 1338 b 28 he renders τῷ μόνον μὴ πρῶς ἁςκόντας ἁςκεῖν eo somt quod ad eos qui non studierant conabatūr, in 1295 b 30 his equivalent for ἐπιθυμοῦσαν is desiderant and in 31 concupiscunt, in 1295 b 32 μη' ἐπιθυμεύεσθαι μη' ἐπιθυμεύειν is rendered neque insidias patiuntur neque fraudes molestur: see also his renderings in 1303 b 14, 15 (διάστασιν), 1304 a 19, 20, 25 (εἴδοκυμήσαι), 1321 a 21, 22 (καθιστάναι), and several other passages. This is not always so: thus in 1299 b 13 he translates ἀρχάς and ἀρχὴν occurring in the same line principatus and principatum. On the other hand, he often uses one Latin word in rendering two Greek words occurring close together; thus in 1303 a 35, 36 he translates ἐισδέξαμενοι and ὑποδεξάμενοι susciptentes, in 1304 a 21–24 he translates both συντονοτέραν and ἴσχυροτέραν fortiorum, in 1304 b 30, 33 both συντάντες and ἀδροσθέντες are represented by coadunati, in 1305 a 39, 40 praeses represents
προστάτης and praesidem τῶν ἡγεμόνα, and in 1306 a 5, 6 conatus est represents εὐεργεσίας and conantur εὐεργεσίαν.

In rendering Greek words he often selects, if he can, a Latin word connected in meaning with the Greek; thus his equivalent for δῆμος is populatio in 1298 a 6, for συμμαχία compugnatio in 1298 a 4, 26, for ἐλαττομένον minorata in 1319 a 3, for διστυγείτονας municipales vicinos in 1330 a 17.

He sometimes retains the case of the Greek in his rendering, notwithstanding that in Latin it is wrong: so in 1299 b 33 we have populi praeconsiliari for τοῦ δήμου προσβολεῶν, in 1304 a 31 habebat politiae for εἴχετο τῆς πολιτείας, and in 1304 b 11, 12 voluntariorum transmutant politiam and detinent involuntariorum for ἐκώντων μεταβάλλοντι τῆς πολιτείας and κατέχοντων ἄκόντων: but this he does not always do.

In addition to the inexactnesses in translation mentioned in vol. ii. p. lxiii it may be noted that the Vetus Interpres often renders a verb as passive where it should be rendered as middle1, and often renders the present tense by the future2 and a future participle by a present participle3. He also sometimes renders the singular by the plural4 and the plural by the singular, the comparative by the positive,5 the superlative by the positive7 or the comparative8, and the positive by the comparative9 or the superlative10.

1 E.g. in 1332 a 27, 1288 b 31, 1289 a 14, 1290 b 4, 1297 b 8, 1298 b 27, 1305 a 16.
2 E.g. in 1281 a 19, 1287 a 32, 1313 b 15, 16.
3 E.g. in 1291 a 7 and 1298 a 19.
4 E.g. in 1287 a 27 (dant for δίδωσιν), 1307 b 33 (φαρναί εξενσαί for το μικρόν δαπάνημα), 1321 a 40 (εξενσαραύμ for τῆς δαπάνης), 1322 a 19 (διβίσι συντ for δηνοται).
5 E.g. in 1338 b 11 (speciem for τὰ εἴδη), 1296a 34, 35 (democratiam and oligarchiam for δημοκρατίας and ἀλγαρχίας), 1303 a 14 (verecundiam for τῆς εὐρείας), 1310 b 34 (beneficium for εὐεργεσία).
6 E.g. in 1283 a 35 (generosi for γενναίοτερον, 1287 b 9 (multos for πλείονας), 1331 a 30 (eminenter for ἐργανωτέρως), 1333 b 10 (supergressivas for πλεονεκτικωτέρας), 1298 a 36 (mediocribus for μετριωτέρω), 1299 b 12 (facile for μόνον).
7 E.g. in 1276 a 19 (superficialis for επισκαλοτάτη).
8 E.g. in 1315 a 26 (ampliori for πλειοτάτη).
9 E.g. in 1330 a 41 (recentiores for εὐχύμεροι, 1293 a 30 (plus for πολύ).
10 E.g. in 1292 b 29 (necessariissimas for ἀναγκαίας).
Since I wrote in vol. ii. p. lvi that, as Vet. Int. has *qui mutaverit* in 1269 a 18, he may have found not *κωνίασας*, but *ὁ κωνίάσας* in his Greek text, I have discovered that *qui mutaverit* there probably stands simply for *κωνίασας* (see critical note on 1340 b 24).

It has already been pointed out (vol. ii. p. lxiv) that the Vetus Interpres sometimes seeks to mend defects in his Greek text by slight conjectural alterations: to the cases already noticed may be added 1284 a 19 (where, finding ὄκονιβι omitted in his Greek text, as in M*P*, and being consequently unable to make sense of the passage, he translates ὄκονιβι as if it were διώκοντι) and 1329 a 17, where for a similar reason he adds *videtur*.

Here and there in the MSS. of the *vetus versio*, as in those of the Politics, words find their way into the text from an adjacent line: thus in Sus.1 p. 536. 3 *quod* is wrongly added after *aristocratiae*, being evidently derived from the following line (see also the readings of a in Sus.1 pp. 296. 5 and 300. 4). Sometimes two alternative equivalents for a word stand together in the text of the translation: thus in 1283 a 9 two equivalents for *κρείττον*, *melior* and *valentior*, both appear in the text; the same thing perhaps happens in 1285 a 10 also, where ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ is rendered *promptus potens lege*, the two words *promptus* and *potens* being probably alternative renderings of ἐγκειρὸς.

It is often difficult to decide whether false renderings in the *vetus versio* are due to error on the part of the translator—for instance, to a misreading or mistranslation of the Greek text—or to corruption in the MSS. of the *vetus versio*. That they are sometimes due to the latter cause will be seen from the critical note on 1338 a 28. Corruption of the text may be suspected in 1270 a 35, *traiebant* (*tradebant?*), *politiam* (*μετέδιδοσαν τὴς πολιτείας*), 1275 a 20, *adiectionem* (*ἐγκλημα: objectionem?*), 1331 a 2, *insultus* (*tàs πολιορκίαι*), 1335 a 16, *lexatur* (*ἐπιχωρίαζεται*), 1305 b 17, *invalescens* (*ἐπιθέμενος*), 1318 b 3, *permittere* (*συμπείσαι: persuadere?*) and elsewhere.
ON THE CONTENTS OF THE THIRD, FOURTH (SEVENTH), AND FIFTH (EIGHTH) BOOKS.

The Third Book

The Third Book is addressed to a wider class than the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth). It is addressed to the framers of all States, the Fourth and Fifth only to the framers of the 'best State'. Aristotle's aim in the Third Book is to point out how the State should be organized if its constitution is to be just, in the Fourth and Fifth how it should be organized if it is to be happy and to live the most desirable life.

The first five chapters of the Third Book are introductory to the rest. They are designed to show, (1) what is the minimum amount of rights which a citizen must possess if he is to be a citizen at all, and what further rights he will possess if he is to be a citizen in the fullest sense (cp. c. 5. 1278 a 35, λέγεται μάλιστα πολίτης δ' μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν); (2) that each constitution awards these rights to different persons, that a democracy, for instance, awards them to a wider class than an oligarchy or an aristocracy, so that, while a citizen in a democracy may be a day-labourer lacking the virtue of a citizen, or even a person of illegitimate or semi-alien birth, a citizen under the best constitution will possess, if a ruler, the full virtue not only of a good citizen, but also of a good man. Thus there are many kinds of citizen; the citizen varies with the constitution and rises and falls as it rises and falls. And as the citizen rises and falls, so the polis rises and falls, for the polis is an aggregate of citizens.

Thus these five chapters prepare the way for the study
of the best constitution, to which we pass in the last chapter of the Third Book. They would, however, have been in fuller harmony with the remainder of the Book, if in the account which they give of the citizen the fact had been kept in view that the polis may be ruled by a king or a few 'best men'. We hear nothing in these chapters of the citizen of a kingship or of an aristocracy in which a few 'best men' rule. They imply that a citizen shares both in ruling and in being ruled, but is this true of the citizen of a kingship or of an aristocracy of the kind just mentioned? We might have expected the study of the citizen which they contain to include not only a study of the citizen in a State consisting of men more or less alike and equal, but also a study of the citizen in a State ruled by a king or a few 'best men'. In this expectation we are disappointed.

At the beginning of the Sixth Chapter we pass from the citizen and the polis to the constitution, the main subject of the Book, and indeed of the Politics. The question is now asked (1278 b 6) 'whether we are to hold that one constitution exists or more than one' (a question already answered by implication in c. 1. 1275 a 38 sqq. and c. 5. 1278 a 15), 'and, if more than one, what and how many there are and what differences exist between them'. In answer to this question we have first the division of constitutions into normal forms and deviation-forms, and then in c. 7. 1279 a 22 the question is again raised, 'how many constitutions there are and what they are', and we are told to study the normal constitutions first, for the deviation-forms will be manifest when these have been distinguished, the answer to the question how many constitutions there are coming in the shape of an enumeration of six constitutions.

Of this classification of constitutions something has already been said in vol. i. pp. 214-225. Reference may also be made to Class. Rev. 6. 289 sqq., where I have pointed out that, though Aristotle has before him Plato's classification of constitutions in Polit. 297,301 sqq., there are important differences between the two classifications. The
six constitutions of the Politicus, if we omit the best, are marked off from each other by their observance or non-observance of law, whereas the six constitutions of the Politics are distinguished by a different test, their aim; the three good constitutions make their aim the common advantage of the citizens, while the three bad ones aim at the advantage of the ruling individual or class. Aristotle’s classification implies that this difference of aim suffices to make one constitution different in kind from another.

It is open to objection on more grounds than one. In the first place, it leaves out of sight the possibility that the One, Few, or Many, or two of them, may share supremacy (see note on 1279 a 27). Again, in 8 (6). i. 1316 b 39 sqq. we find that constitutions exist which are partly aristocratic, partly oligarchical, and others which are partly polities, partly democracies. These constitutions will be partly normal and partly deviation-forms; they do not, therefore, fall under any of the six heads. Thus the classification is not exhaustive. Again, we can conceive the existence of constitutions under which rule is exercised for the advantage of the rulers, but yet for the common advantage, or partly for the one end, partly for the other (see note on 1279 a 17). These also fall outside the classification. And then again we might ask whether a constitution which, while it aims at the common advantage, takes a low view of that common advantage, construing it for instance as the acquisition of wealth or empire, should not also be treated as a distinct constitution from one which seeks the common advantage and studies it in a nobler way. Aristotle would perhaps reply that a constitution of this kind does not really study the common advantage. Still it cannot be said to study the advantage of a section of the citizens only, and thus it appears to escape enumeration.

But in fact, as has been pointed out in vol. i. pp. 217–220, Aristotle tends on fuller consideration to rest the distinction between constitutions not on the number of rulers or the aim with which they rule, but rather on the attribute—virtue, wealth, free birth, etc.—which they raise to supremacy.
Even this basis of classification, however, proves hardly satisfactory, for the absolute kingship and the true aristocracy raise the same attribute—fully equipped virtue—to supremacy (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 sq.), and oligarchy and tyranny both do homage to wealth (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 10). Yet Aristotle distinguishes between the absolute kingship and the true aristocracy, and also between oligarchy and tyranny.

Passing on to the Eighth Chapter, we are told in c. 8. C. 8. 1279 b 11 sq. that it is necessary to state at slightly greater length 'what each of these constitutions is', the constitutions referred to being apparently the three deviation-forms. Little is said of tyranny in what follows, but the nature of oligarchy and democracy is more fully explained, and we learn that the distinction between them is to be found not so much in the comparative number of those who rule in each as in the fact that the rich rule in the one and the poor (or the free-born) in the other.

The Ninth Chapter is closely connected with the Eighth. C. 9. It throws further light on the nature of oligarchy and democracy by examining the version of justice which underlies each of these constitutions and showing its inadequacy. The one claims more than its due for a superiority in wealth, and the other claims more than its due for an equality in free birth, neither wealth nor free birth being the end for which the polis is formed. The end for which the polis is formed is, in fact, good life, and those who contribute most to it have a better right to supreme power in the polis than the wealthy and free-born, if the two last-named classes are inferior in virtue. Thus the Ninth Chapter is a natural sequel to the Eighth, carrying its investigation of the nature of oligarchy and democracy further and using the conclusions as to the nature of these two constitutions arrived at in the Eighth; it also, however, forms an introduction to the discussions which follow, preparing the way for the inquiries of cc. 10-13 on the subject, 'what ought to be the supreme authority of the polis'?
This question, the central question in any inquiry respecting constitutions, for the main business of a constitution is to determine the supreme authority of the *polis* (c. 6. 1278 b 9 sq.), is discussed in the Tenth and Eleventh Chapters, and the conclusion is arrived at in c. 11. 1282 b 1-13 that the supreme authority in a *polis* should be rightly constituted laws, or in other words laws adjusted to the normal constitutions (for such laws will be just), the magistrate or magistrates being supreme only in respect of matters which the law owing to its generality cannot regulate aright. We might suppose that the question 'what ought to be the supreme authority of the *polis* ' was now finally answered,

but two chapters follow, the Twelfth and Thirteenth, which upset or greatly modify the conclusion arrived at in c. 11, for they decide that in a certain case the supreme authority should not be laws of any kind, but the will of an absolute king raised above law.

There is much in these two chapters to suggest a doubt whether they were placed where they stand by Aristotle. They make an important modification in the conclusion arrived at in c. 11, and yet do not do this explicitly. Again, the transition from c. 11 to c. 12 is very abrupt. Then again, the two chapters are not heralded by any previous announcement, nor are they closed with any recapitulation of their results. This is suspicious, for previous announcements and recapitulations are often wanting in the Politics in the case of chapters or passages which look like subsequent additions or interpolations (e.g. i. 11: 2. 12. 1274a 22-26: 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 34-35). On the other hand, there are arguments to be urged in their favour. Some of these have been noticed in vol. i. Appendix C. The following may be added. The conclusion in favour of law arrived at in c. 11, which is upset or seriously modified by cc. 12 and 13, can hardly represent Aristotle's final and matured opinion, for it conflicts as much with the contents of c. 17 as with those of cc. 12 and 13. In both places we find a full recognition of the legitimacy under certain circumstances of an absolute kingship uncontrolled by law. We need
not, therefore, be surprised that the conclusions of c. 11 are modified in cc. 12 and 13. Then again, the mode in which cc. 12 and 13 refute the claims to exclusive supremacy preferred by the rich, the free-born, the good, and the many closely resembles that in which similar claims are refuted in the preceding chapters. Aristotle’s plan throughout the Third Book is to refute exclusive claims to supremacy by arraying superior claims in opposition to them; thus in the Ninth Chapter he refutes the claims of the rich and the free-born by setting up against them those of the good, and in the Eleventh he refutes those of the few best by setting up against them those of the many. In just the same way in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters he refutes the claims of the rich, the free-born, the good, and the many to exclusive supremacy by setting up against them those of a single individual of surpassing wealth, nobility, or virtue. Thus the method followed in these two chapters closely resembles that which has been followed in the chapters which precede them. As to the absence in them of a preliminary announcement and a recapitulation, the same thing is true of 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5–1334 a 10. We are not prepared by any preliminary announcement for the transition in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., nor indeed for that in 4 (7). 15. 1330 a 34 sqq. On the whole I still incline to think that the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters were placed where they stand by Aristotle.

Their teaching is important. We learn from them a lesson which we have not been taught before, and which Aristotle appears to have been the first to teach. This is that the same constitution is not in place under all circumstances. If the constitution is to be just, the supreme authority which it sets up ought not only to be one which will rule for the common advantage, but also that which justice requires to exist in the particular case, looking to the distribution among the members of the community of the attributes which contribute to the being or well-being of the polis (virtue, wealth, free birth, etc.). If the distribution of virtue and political capacity in a given
community is such as to call for an absolute kingship, an aristocracy or polity would be out of place in it, though both of these are normal constitutions, constitutions in which rule is exercised for the common advantage. And so again, if the distribution of virtue, wealth, free birth, etc., is such as to make a constitution just in which all classes share in rule, an absolute kingship would be out of place under those circumstances.

Another lesson which is especially insisted on in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters is that a bare superiority in one only of the attributes which contribute to the being or well-being of the polis does not confer a right to exclusive supremacy. Nothing but a transcendent superiority in virtue and political capacity does so. We remember that Aristotle has rested natural slavery in a similar way on a vast disparity between master and slave (1. 5. 1254 b 16 sqq.: cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sqq.). Where this great disparity does not exist, and the good, the rich, and the free-born coexist in a community, and the many taken as a whole are superior to the few, the constitution must allow a fair share of power to all these classes (3. 13. 1283 b 40 sqq.). Aristotle goes so far as to say (3. 13. 1283 a 26 sqq.) that a constitution which gives exclusive supremacy to those possessed of a bare superiority in one attribute only is a deviation-form, and this he would apparently say even if the one attribute were virtue 1. In the Seventh Chapter constitutions have been said to be deviation-forms in which the rulers rule with a view to their own advantage; now we are told that a constitution is a deviation-form in which the rulers claim exclusive supremacy on the strength of a bare superiority in one attribute only. Aristotle's account of a deviation-form in the Thirteenth Chapter is evidently not quite the same as that which he gives in the Seventh. According to the Thirteenth Chapter even an aristocracy may be a deviation-

1 Yet it is allowed in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sqq. that those who excel in virtue have a plausible claim to be considered absolutely unequal.
form if the superiority in virtue to which it awards supremacy is a bare superiority only.

The discussion of kingship which follows in cc. 14-17 contains a passage, 1288 a 6-15, which may be intrusive or a subsequent addition, but it seems to be otherwise in correct order. We might have expected that more would be said about kingship than is said, and that Aristotle would follow up his study of it with a study of aristocracy. The kinds of kingship have been clearly distinguished, and why should not those of aristocracy be similarly enumerated? This is not done; on the contrary, Aristotle passes on to inquire in c. 18 which is the best of the normal constitutions, and he finds that the best is kingship or aristocracy, whence he infers that, as the citizen of the 'best State' is a good man, the citizen of a kingship or an aristocracy will be a good man, and a kingship or aristocracy will be brought into being by the education which produces good men. We expect him to proceed at once to inquire what education produces good men, but this, as has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 293 sq., he does not do till the Thirteenth Chapter of the Fourth (old Seventh) Book. The drift of the Eighteenth Chapter of the Third Book evidently is that if we wish to study how a kingship or an aristocracy is to be brought into being, we shall best do so by studying how the best constitution is to be brought into being (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 31 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 2 sq., 31 sqq.). The chapter is apparently intended to account for the absence of an inquiry how a kingship or an aristocracy is to be brought into being and for the substitution in its place of an inquiry how the best constitution is to be brought into being and instituted. It evidently prepares the way for a study of the 'best State', though possibly for a different study of it from that which we possess in the Fourth and Fifth Books (the old Seventh and Eighth).

Aristotle's main aim in the Third Book is to correct and broaden the conceptions of justice on which Greek consti.
tutions were based, just as in the Fourth and Fifth (the old Seventh and Eighth) he seeks to correct and broaden Greek conceptions of happiness. He rises in the Third above the one-sidedness of oligarchy and democracy, just as in the Fourth and Fifth he rises above the one-sidedness of the Lacedaemonian State.

A marked characteristic of the Third Book is its union of tolerance for imperfect types of political organization with a clear recognition of what is best. Aristotle accepts the lower forms of the citizen and the constitution, but he also sets before us their higher forms. A defective citizen does not cease to be a citizen, nor a defective constitution to be a constitution. Any man is a citizen who possesses certain political rights, whether he is fit to have them or not, and any ‘ordering of the supreme authority’ is a constitution, even if it gives power to the wrong persons. Not only is the citizen not identical with the good man, but even the good citizen is not necessarily so. There are many grades of citizens and constitutions. As Aristotle holds that the polis exists to realize good life, we might have expected him to say that only those are citizens who are able and purposed to realize it, and only that a constitution which gives rule to those who will rule with a view to the realization of good life, but this he does not do. His wish evidently is not to deny the names of citizen and constitution to any type of citizen and constitution to which these names were given in the ordinary use of language, and yet to point to the type of citizen and constitution which best deserved the name.

The reasons why the old Seventh and Eighth Books should be placed after the Third have been adequately stated by Zeller (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 504) and others. The object of the Second Book, as we are told in its opening sentences, is to prepare the way for the inquiry what constitution is the best, and though, as has been already pointed out (vol. i. p. 226), the Third Book addresses itself to a different and
wider question, the inquiry what each constitution is, it prepares the way for the study of the best constitution (vol. i. p. 291), and its last chapter concludes with the words, 'we must now attempt to state with respect to the best constitution, in what way it comes into being and how it should be instituted', and with an unfinished fragment of the sentence with which the old Seventh Book begins. The inference is obvious that the old Seventh Book originally followed the Third in the MSS. It is not likely that Aristotle, after reaching the threshold of the inquiry as to the best constitution, and indeed actually beginning it, drew back again, and postponed its treatment till he had dealt in three Books (the old Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth) with the polity and the deviation-forms and with changes of constitution, thus parting this inquiry by a long interval from the Second and Third Books, with which it is so closely connected. The old Fourth Book, in fact, speaks of the inquiry into the best constitution as already over (6 (4), 2. 1289 a 30 sqq.), and though the inquiry on the subject which we possess may not have been written at the time when these words were penned, there seems to me to be little doubt that Aristotle intended to take up and deal with the question of the best constitution immediately after the Third Book.

It has, indeed, been suggested that the old Seventh and Eighth Books are an independent treatise, not originally designed to form part of the Politics, but the links between the old Seventh Book and the Second and Third are too numerous to allow of this supposition (see Class. Rev. 6. 291 sqq.). No doubt, as has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 292 sqq., the Third and the old Seventh Books do not dovetail into each other with perfect exactness. The transition from the one to the other leaves something to be desired, and the old Seventh Book is not quite in all respects what the Third Book leads us to expect it to be. To the defects of harmony to which reference has been made in vol. i. p. 292 sqq. this may be added, that while the opening chapters of the Third Book define the citizen
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as one who has access to deliberative and judicial office, the younger citizens of the State sketched in the old Seventh Book have no share in deliberative and judicial functions. A difference appears also to exist between the best constitution as sketched in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, which must evidently be an aristocracy, and the account of aristocracy given in the Third Book. For though both in the best constitution of the former Book and in the aristocracy of the latter the rulers are a comparatively small number of men of high virtue, the reason why their rule is willingly accepted by the ruled is different in the two cases. In the one case it is willingly accepted because the ruled are men fitted to be ruled by rulers of this type as freemen should be ruled (3. 17. 1288 a 9 sq.), whereas in the other it is willingly accepted because the rulers are older men, and because the ruled will become rulers in their turn on attaining a certain age. We hear nothing in the Third Book of the plan by which rule falls to men of superior age and is acquired by the ruled on the attainment of a certain age, nothing of these precautions for securing the willing submission of the ruled. The Fourth (old Seventh) Book appears to be written with a closer regard to what is practicable than the Third. It is conceivable that, as has been suggested in vol. ii. p. xxxxi, note 2, the sketch of the 'best State' contained in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book is a second edition of an earlier sketch which was more completely in harmony with the teaching of the Third Book. But perhaps it is more likely that, some interval of time having elapsed between the composition of the two Books, Aristotle saw, when he came to depict the 'best State' in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book, that some things of which he had dreamed in the Third were but dreams. Thus the absolute kingship of which we hear so much in the Third is dismissed in the Fourth as no longer practicable, and the aristocracy described in the Third assumes a more practicable form in the Fourth.

1 See the late Prof. H. Sidgwick's remarks in Class. Rev. 6. 143, and my own in 6. 291 sq.
In writing the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books Aristotle has three States especially before him, the weak points of which he does his best to avoid. These are the two ideal States sketched by Plato in his Republic and Laws and the Lacedaemonian State. The main differences between Aristotle's 'best State' and these three States have already been pointed out in the first volume and our recapitulation of them here need only be a brief and summary one.

Aristotle's first objection to the State of the Republic is that it does not realize happiness. None of its citizens are truly happy. The most desirable life is not realized in it, the life of fully equipped virtuous activity, for though the first or ruling class has virtue, it has not the equipment which is needed for virtuous action. How can it practise liberality, for instance, if it has no property? Another weak point of Plato's State is that the members of the second and third classes, though called citizens, are not really so, for they have no share in ruling. The citizens of the 'best State', according to Aristotle, should be 'able and purposed to rule' and be ruled with a view to the life in accordance with virtue', and this the second and third classes of Plato's State are not. The citizens of the 'best State', again, should be men of full virtue, and this cannot be said of the members of Plato's third class, even if it can be said of those of his second. Another weak point dwelt on by Aristotle is that the second class will be discontented with its position, as it is permanently excluded from rule. Aristotle further objects to the communism of the Republic. He wishes the land of his 'best State' to be owned by the men of full virtue who are its citizens, though they will freely share the use of it and of all their property with their fellow-citizens and with others. In these and in other points his 'best State' diverges from the State of the Republic.

It stands in marked contrast to the State of the Laws also. Its citizen-body and its territory are smaller. The life lived by its citizens is a more ideal life. It is not
simply 'temperate', but 'temperate and liberal', and its supreme end is not work, but leisure and contemplation, the diagógé which is the best employment of leisure. Its constitution differs from that of the State of the Laws. It is an aristocracy, not a polity inclining to oligarchy. It will not covertly favour the wealthier class in elections to offices. It will take stricter precautions against pauperism than the State of the Laws, placing a limit on the procreation of children, not merely on the number of the citizens.

To the Lacedaemonian State Aristotle's 'best State' stands in a relation of far more decided contrast. Plato in the Republic and Laws had sought happiness in the right direction, though in Aristotle's opinion he had failed to secure it for his citizens. The Lacedaemonian State did not do so; it sought happiness in empire, and valued virtue not for its own sake, but only as a means to empire and external goods. This error led it into a further error; its laws and training developed only one kind of virtue, that through which empire is won, military virtue. A third error was that it failed to train its citizens to make a right use of leisure and to live for diagógé as well as work. All these errors will be avoided in Aristotle's 'best State'. It will be a State living for the highest end, for leisure and diagógé more than for work, for peace more than for war, for things noble rather than for things necessary or useful. Its education will be a preparation for a life of this kind; it will develop the virtues of justice, temperance, and wisdom as well as military virtue, and it will develop military virtue better than the Lacedaemonian education did, for it will not brutalize the young by an over-laborious gymnastic training. The dependent classes of the State, unlike those of the Lacedaemonian State, will be organized aright. Its slave-system will be so constituted as to secure the efficiency and submissiveness of the slaves. Its women will not be uncontrolled and uneducated, nor will they be allowed to rule the men. Its citizens will be neither too few nor too many, their numbers being kept at the proper level by a wise regulation of marriage and the procreation
of children and of the right to buy and sell, give and bequeath; there will be no extremes of wealth and poverty within their ranks, no undue love of honour or money; the State will be ruled by its best men, not by persons of no special excellence, and by statesmen who make peace rather than war their end, and who are not only men of action, but also men of philosophical aptitude, not by mere soldiers to whom war is the one thing worth living for. There will be no senate organized in a narrow oligarchical way, no ephorate with over-great powers. On minor contrasts we need not dwell.

Our knowledge of Aristotle's views on the subject of education is imperfect. Education, according to him, should vary with the constitution (i. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq. : 5 (8). i. 1337 a 14 sqq.), yet the only scheme of education he gives us is that which is intended for the 'best State', so that we know little or nothing as to the kind of education which he would recommend under other forms of constitution than the best. That he wishes the State to concern itself with education in all forms of constitution is clear from 5 (8). i. 1337 a 12 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.), where we are told that if the ethos which is appropriate to each constitution is not developed in the citizens—that is, the ethos which tends to the maintenance of each—the constitution will not last. The 'best State' for which his scheme of education is designed is a State very unlike those of the present day, for under Aristotle's best constitution the citizens are withdrawn from 'necessary activities' —the activities of agriculture, trade, and industry—in a way in which the men of modern States are not, and then again, a far longer gymnastic training was required in youth with a view to military efficiency in the Greece of Aristotle's day than is required in modern times. Thus we must be prepared to find much in Aristotle's scheme of education which is unsuitable to the present day. Still the broad principles on which it rests are not without interest even for ourselves.
We notice that his scheme includes no arrangements for the education of women and girls, notwithstanding what is said in 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq., or for the education of the non-citizen classes, notwithstanding what is said in 2. 5. 1264 a 36 sqq. The due regulation of education involves, in Aristotle's opinion, the regulation of marriage and of the rearing of infant children during the years in which education in the strict sense of the word cannot be said to have begun, and this is fully kept in view by Aristotle, but when school-training has commenced for the child, Aristotle confines his attention to it, though we learn from Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 325 C sqq. that there are many influences not included in school-training which then promote a child's growth in virtue. Aristotle does not attempt to direct or regulate these.

His scheme of education for the 'best State' represents to a large extent a reaction against prevailing notions of education. In his criticism of the actual education of Greece he distinguishes between the States which paid special attention to the education of the young and undertook the direction of it, and the majority of States, which left its direction to the parent and allowed the child to be taught what the parent pleased in the way he thought best.

In the latter class of States, to which Athens belonged, education was little better than a chaos. The parent's caprice was to a certain extent controlled by the general acceptance of four subjects of education—reading and writing, gymnastic, music, and drawing—but each parent was free to educate his children apart from the rest and to give a special prominence in their education to whichever of these subjects he preferred, so that there was no security for an identity of training, no enforcement of the principle that the citizen belongs to the State and not to himself, nor again was any care taken that the education given to children was in harmony with the constitution and favourable to its maintenance.

Marriage was left to a great extent unregulated, with the
result that children were often the offspring of over-young or over-old parents. The rearing of infancy was also left unregulated, nor were children's minds sufficiently protected from evil influences in the earlier years of life, the years in which, according to Aristotle, permanent tastes are formed. Not only were the games and nursery-tales of infancy often, other than they should be, but children were allowed to be too much in the company of slaves and were too much exposed to hearing indecent language and seeing indecent pictures and statues. Boys and youths were allowed freely to witness the performance of iambi and comedy. The subjects chosen for youthful study were studied with a wrong aim and in a wrong way. Reading, writing, and drawing were studied merely for their utility, and music for the pleasure it gave. Music was often studied in too technical a fashion with a view to the attainment of a skill in execution suitable rather to virtuosi than to citizens. The only subject studied with a view to virtue was gymnastic, which was thought to produce courage. We do not hear of any studies by which it was sought to develope other virtues. Education in these States was evidently too utilitarian and too narrow in its aim; it needed to be made more capable of influencing the character as a whole and the reason.

The States, on the other hand, which paid special attention to the education of the young and made it a matter of public concern erred in a somewhat different way. The

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1 This would only be true of the children of the better-to-do citizens, for we gather from 8 (6). 8. 1333 a 5 sq. that the poorer citizens had no slaves.

2 Aristotle's feeling as to utilitarianism in education may be gathered from his remark (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 1 sq.) that the aim in the education of the young should be to fit them to do both work which is necessary and useful and work which is noble, but the latter more than the former. He treats as vulgar (φαρσίκαν) the preference of 'virtues thought to be useful and more productive of gain' to virtues of a higher kind (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 9 sq.). In 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 37 sqq. he hints, not without some quiet sarcasm, that reading and writing should not be studied with a merely utilitarian aim, but rather because studying them enables us to master other studies, and that drawing should not be studied to save us from being cheated in the purchase of household utensils, but because the study of it makes us scientific observers of physical beauty, adding that 'to seek what is useful everywhere does not at all befit great-souled and free-spirited men'.
Lacedaemonian State was one of them. We do not learn from Aristotle whether more care was taken at Sparta than elsewhere to regulate marriage and the rearing of infants and to protect early childhood from corrupting influences, but we know that, at any rate after a certain age, the State took the education of the young into its own hands, withdrawing it from the control of the parent, and educating the boys together and in the same way and with a view to the welfare of the whole State, severing them to a great extent from home and from contact with slaves. So far it did well, but its gymnastic training was too severe and laborious, and here again, as elsewhere, the education given was too narrow, failing to train the whole man, and also too utilitarian, though it studied that which was useful to the State rather than that which was useful to the individual. Its aim was to develope the more utilitarian virtues (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 9 sq.), the virtues which favour the acquisition of empire, not to develope all the virtues nor to develope virtue for its own sake. The Lacedaemonian training was not even the best training for war or the winning of empire; much less was it the best for the preservation of empire when won, for it did not develope justice or temperance or the intellectual excellence which enables men to use aright the leisure which follows the acquisition of empire, and saves them from degenerating under the influence of ease and plenty and peace. It was based on a systematic preference of that which is useful to that which is noble, of that which is lower to that which is higher, of that which is only a means to that which is the end. It taught men to prefer external goods and empire to virtue, the lower kinds of virtue to the higher, war to peace, and work to leisure.

Aristotle’s aim in education is to develope the whole man—the body, the appetites (ἀρέξεις, including θυμός, ἐπιθυμία, and βούλησις: see note on 1334 b 19), and the reason—in such a way as to harmonize the three elements in a willing co-operation for the best end, a life spent in the exercise of all the virtues, moral and intellectual, and
especially the highest of them, those connected with the right use of leisure. In Aristotle's view he is a truly educated man who has learnt from youth upwards to love virtue for its own sake, and virtue not of one kind only, but of all, whose youthful love of virtue has been crowned with reason, and in whom reason, fully developed both on its practical and on its contemplative side and working for the best end, is mated with appetites which take pleasure in obeying it and with a body well prepared for the service of both. Aristotle's conception of education agrees with his conception of the man of full virtue (συνοδαίος) as a man in whom many excellences are combined (3. 11. 1281 b 10 sqq.).

We would not be satisfied with an education which merely brought the body and the lower appetites under the control of some higher appetite, such as the love of the good; the appetites must, indeed, be trained to love what is good, but that is not enough; they must be brought under the control of reason fully developed and directed to the best end.

As the body develops before the soul and the appetites of the soul before reason, the education of the body should come first, then that of the appetites, and then that of the reason, but the body must be so trained as to subserve the development of the soul, and the appetites so trained as to subserve the development of the reason. The body and the appetites are apparently conceived by Aristotle as trained by habituation (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 4 sq.), or in other words by a repetition of acts resulting in a formed habit, whereas the reason is mainly trained by instruction (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 15 sq.: Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10 sq.).

Thus training by habituation comes first, training by reason later (Pol. 5 (8). 3. 1338 b 4 sq.). We have been already told in the Nicomachean Ethics (10. 10. 1179 b 23 sqq.) that training by habituation must precede training by

\[^1\] We miss in Aristotle's scheme of education any training specially designed to develop activity in accordance with virtue, though he lays stress on this as an element in happiness (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 22, 40 sqq.).
teaching, but the cause assigned there for this is not that reason develops later than the body and the appetites, but that training by teaching will not be effectual in producing virtue if it is not preceded by a long course of habituation beginning in childhood.

The education of the body must, in Aristotle's view, be such as to make it a fit instrument for the soul; its growth must not be stunted nor its beauty impaired (5(8). 4. 1338 b 9 sqq.), it must not be subjected in early youth to toils so excessive as to enfeeble it for the work of after-years (5(8). 4. 1338 b 40 sqq.) or to brutalize the character (5(8). 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.), nor must hard work be imposed on the body and mind simultaneously (5(8). 4. 1339 a 7 sqq.), nor again must the training of the body be such as to unfit it for subsequent studies or to produce βαναντία (5(8). 6. 1341 a 6 sqq.).

The education of the appetites—i.e. of θυμός, ἐπιθυμία, and βουλήσεις—must be such as to lead them to love the noble qualities of character which reason will later on give them additional reasons for loving, and thus to prepare them to render a willing obedience to reason when it develops. The appetites must, therefore, be habituated to take pleasure in the right things; the child must be watched and guided in its pleasures from infancy. A well-ordered gymnastic training must follow, not too laborious in early youth, and, midway in this, three years devoted to the study of reading, writing, drawing, and music. The musical training of the young should be such as to lead them to love ennobling melodies and the reproductions of mildness, courage, temperance, and other virtues which melodies contain, and so eventually to love these virtues themselves. Music should be the ally and precursor of reason, preparing the way for her before she appears, and beginning the wholesome discipline of the likings which she will later on carry to completion. No attempt must be made to hasten the development of reason, but, on the other hand, there must be nothing in the musical training of youth which will not be favourable to it; the use of the pipe (αὐλός) in
education, for instance, is not favourable to it (5(8). 6. 1341 b 6), and therefore must be rejected.

So important a part of youthful education is the training of the appetites to feel pleasure in the right things represented by Aristotle to be, that we might be tempted to take it for the whole. But the training of the body and the reason are also essential parts of youthful education; indeed, Aristotle sometimes distinguishes παιδεία from habituation (e.g. in 3. 18. 1288 b 1 and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16), or in other words from the training of the appetites.

The direct education of the reason, which is to follow the education of the appetites, is not dealt with in the Politics as it has come down to us, though we may infer from 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 24 sqq. that it will be directed to the development both of the practical and of the contemplative reason, and will make the development of the latter its supreme end.

Aristotle's conception of education commends itself to us more than the scheme by which he seeks to realize it.

The amount of time which he devotes to gymnastic training appears to us to be disproportionately large. He surrenders to it all the years from seven to twenty-one with the exception of three. He does so partly because in ancient Greece, as we have seen, a long gymnastic training in youth was essential to full military efficiency, partly because without a suitably developed body neither the appetites nor the reason can be all that they should be, and partly because, as hard mental and bodily work must not be required of the young simultaneously, and bodily exercise is indispensable in youth for the growth and development of the body, mental work in youth must necessarily be confined within narrow limits. He is thus led greatly to shorten the amount of time devoted in youth to the work to which he attaches so much importance—that of training the appetites to take pleasure in the right things. For this kind of training he relies mainly on the study of music, and yet he allots to this study only a very small part of the first twenty-one years of life—
a fraction of the three years after puberty which he gives up to other studies than gymnastic. Does he not hope too much from this brief musical training? Can it do all that he expects it to do for the moral improvement of the boys who are to receive it? It may be doubted, indeed, whether it is by a study of particular subjects, such as music, that a love of what is noble is instilled into the young. Is it not rather by intercourse with a parent or teacher or friend whose example and influence win the heart to a love of goodness? Then again, does not Aristotle underrate the extent to which the reason is susceptible of cultivation in boyhood? He admits in \textit{i. 13. 1260 a 13 sq.} that boys possess the deliberative element of the soul, though in an imperfect form. Why then should not this element receive more cultivation in youth than Aristotle provides for it? Some kinds of mental work, again, fall well within the range of the boyish mind; yet Aristotle makes no provision for the training of those intellectual aptitudes which boys may well possess. Is it quite clear that even in the education of the body and the appetites training by habituation will suffice by itself without an admixture of training by reason? Another question may well be asked. Does Aristotle's scheme of education call for enough effort from the young? Is not their 'distaste for everything unsweetened' too much studied in it? Would not a training which gave them more difficulties to face and to conquer develop in them more force of will and be more really useful to them? Does not education largely consist in acquiring the power and the will to do that which is distasteful to us, when it ought to be done?
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ'.

Τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἐκάστη καὶ 1274 b 32
ποία τις, σχεδὸν πρῶτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, τῷ ποτὲ
ἐστίν ἢ πόλις· νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες
τὴν πόλιν πεπραχέναι τὴν πρᾶξιν, οἱ δ’ ὦ τὴν πόλιν ἄλλα 35
τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὸν τύραννον τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ
νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὅρμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὕσαν περὶ πόλιν·
2 ἢ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων ἐστὶ τάξις τις. ἐπεὶ
δ’ ἢ πόλις τῶν συγκειμένων, καθάπερ ἄλλο τὸ τῶν ὅλων
μὲν συνεστῶτων δ’ ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, δὴ λογὶ πρῶτον 40
ὁ πολίτης ζητητέος· γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πληθῶς ἐστιν,
ὅτα τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τὸς ὁ πολίτης ἐστι, σκε- 1275 a
πτέον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολλάκις· οὐ
γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ὀμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην· ἐστὶ γὰρ
τὶς δὲ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὃν ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πολλάκις
3 οὐκ ἐστὶ πολίτης. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλους πὼς ὑπεχανόνται 5
ταύτῃ τῇς προσθερίας, οὗν τοὺς ποιητοὺς πολίτας, ἀφε-
τέον· ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν ποιν πολίτης ἐστιν (καὶ
4 γὰρ μετοικοὶ καὶ δοῦλοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκήσεως), οὐδ’ οἱ
τῶν δικαίων μετέχουσες οὕτως ὡστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ
dικαζέσθαι (τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοι- 10
νονόνωσιν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει· πολλαχοῖ ἡμὲν ὅνων
οὐδὲ τούτων τελέως οἱ μετοικοὶ μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ νέμειν
5 ἀνάγκη προστάτην, ὡστε ἄτελῶς πὼς μετέχουσι τῇς τοιαύτῃς
κοινωνίας), ἀλλὰ καθάπερ καὶ παίδας τούς μῆτω δὲ ἡλι-
κιάν ἐγγεγραμμένους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας τοὺς ἀφειμένους 15
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φατέον εἶναι μὲν πῶς πολίτας, οὐχ ἄπλως δὲ λίαν ἀλλὰ προστιθέντας τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς τοὺς δὲ παρηκμακότας ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερον (οὖδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει· δὴλον γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον). ἤτοιμον γὰρ τὸν ἄπλως πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα 20 τοιοῦτον ἐγκλῆμα διορθώσεως δεδομένου, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων καὶ φυγάδων ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ διαπορεῖ καὶ λύειν. πολίτης δ' ἄπλως οὐδεὶς τῶν ἄλλων ὄριζεται μᾶλ-6 λον ᾗ τῷ μετέχει τρίσεως καὶ ἄρχῃς. τῶν δ' ἄρχῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ διηρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, ὡστ' ἐνίας μὲν ὅλως δῖς 25 τῶν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τινῶν ὄρισμένων χρό-νων· ὁ δ' ἀόριστος, οἷον ὁ δικαστὴς καὶ ἐκκλησιαστής. τάχα 7 μὲν οὖν ἂν φαίη τις οὖδ' ἄρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς τοιοῦτους, οὐδὲ μετέχειν διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρχῃς· καὶ τοίοι γελοῦν τοὺς κυριωτάτους ἀποστερεῖν ἄρχῃς. ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω μηδὲν· περὶ ὑδόματος 30 γὰρ ὁ λόγος· ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ, τὸ δὲ ταῦτ' ἀμφοὶ καλεῖν. ἐστω δὴ διορισμοῦ χάριν ἀόριστος ἄρχῃ. τίθεμεν δὴ πολίτας τοὺς οὕτως μετε-8 χοντας. ὁ μὲν οὖν μάλιστ' ἂν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς λεγομένους πολίτας σχεδὸν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν· δεὶ δὲ 35 μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν δὶς τὰ ὑποκέιμενα διαφέρει τοῦ εἴδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρῶτον τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν ἐστιν, ἢ τοιαύτα, τὸ κοινὸν, ἢ γλυκάρως. τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρώμεν 9 εἴδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν υστέρας τὰς δὲ 1275 b προτέρας οὕσας· τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας καὶ παρεκβεβηκιάς ἀναγκαίον υστέρας εἶναι τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων (τὰς δὲ παρεκ- βεβηκιάς πῶς λέγομεν, ὅστεν ἐσται φανεροῦν). ἢςτε καὶ τὸν πολίτην ἐτέρων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἐκάστην πολι- 5 τείαν, διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστ' ἐστὶ 10 πολίτης, ὑν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδεχεται μὲν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγκαῖον. (ἐν) ἐνίας γὰρ οὐκ ἐστι δήμος, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν ἄλλα συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δικας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος, οἰον ἐν Δακεδαίμονι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν
1275 a 16—1276 a 3.

εφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς φωνικὰς, ἑτέρα 10
11 δ’ ἰσως ἀρχὴ τις ἑτέρας. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀρχὴν τὸν πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαῖ τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας. ἀλλ’ ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμὸς: ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἀρχῶν ἐκκλησιαστικὴς ἐστι καὶ δικαστικὴς, ἀλλὰ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὀρισμένος 15 τούτων γὰρ ἡ πάσην ἣ τιαίν ἀποδέδοται τὸ Βουλευσθαί καὶ δικασθῆ η ἤ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν. τὸς οὖν οἰς ἐστὶν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ὃ γὰρ ἔξοντα κοινωνεῖν ἀρχὴς βουλευτικῆς ἡ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἢ δὲ λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης ἤς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἵκανον πρὸς 20 αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ὀρίζονται δὲ πρὸς 2 τὴν ἥρσιν πολίτην τὸν ἐς ἀμφοτέρων πολίτων καὶ μὴ βατέρου μόνον, οἴον πατρὸς ἢ μητρὸς· οἱ δὲ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπὶ πλέον χτυποῦν, ἐπὶ πάππους δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλείους. οὕτω δὲ ὀρισμένων πολιτικῶς καὶ ταχέως, ἀποροθῆς τίνες τὸν 25 τρότων ἑκείνων ἢ τέταρτον, πῶς ἔσται πολιτῆς. Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Δεοντίνος, τὰ μὲν ἰσως ἄπορων τὰ δ’ εἰρωνεύμενος, ἐφ’ ἀλλὰ ἐκαθάπερ θλίμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλμοποίους πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Δαμιαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημουργῶν πε- 30 ποιημένους, εἶναι γὰρ τινας Δαμιαποιους· ἐστι δ’ ἀπλοῖν· 30 εἰ γὰρ μετείχον κατὰ τὸν ὑβέντα διορισμὸν τῆς πολιτείας, ἦσαν πολίται· καὶ γὰρ οὕδε δυνατὸν ἐφαρμότευε τὸ ἐκ πολίτου ἡ ἐκ πολιτικῶς ἐπὶ τῶν πρῶτων ὀλκησάντων ἢ κτι- σάντων. ἀλλ’ ίσως ἐκείνῳ μᾶλλον ἔχει ἀπορίαν, ὡσοι μετέχουν μεταβολῆς γενομένης πολιτείας, οἶον Ἀθηναίαις 35 ἐποίησε Kleisthenēs μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολήν· πολ- λοὺς γὰρ ἐφιλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δύολους μετοίκους. τὸ δ’ ἀμ- φιθήκημα πρὸς τούτον ἐστὶν οὐ τῆς πολιτείας, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως. καὶ τοις καὶ τούτῳ τις ἐτι προσαπορῆσειν, ἀρ’ εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολιτείας, οὐ πολιτείας, ὡς ταύτῳ δυναμένου 1276 a 5 τοῦ τ’ ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς. ἐπεὶ δ’ ὀρόμεν καὶ ἀρχατά σ 31 τινας ἀδίκως, οὐς ἀρχεῖν μὲν φήσομεν ἀλλ’ οὐ δικαίως, ὁ
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ'. 2-4.

de πολιτής ἀρχή τυλί διωρισμένος ἐστίν (ὁ γὰρ κοινωνῶν τῆς
5 τοιάσθε ἀρχής πολιτής ἐστίν, ὡς ἐφαμεν), δῆλον ὅτι πολι-
3 τας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ἡ
μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφι-
βήτησιν, ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες πῦθ᾽ ἡ πόλις ἑπραξὲ καὶ πότε
οὐχ ἡ πόλις, οὖν ὅταν εἴξ ὀλυγαρχίας ἡ τυραννίδος γενηται
10 δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλανα ἐνιοῦ βουλοῦται 2
διαλύειν, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος,
οὔτ᾽ ἀλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτειῶν τῇ
κρατεῖν οὖσας, ἀλλὰ οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον, εἰπέρ οὖν
καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται τινες κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τούτον, ὁμιῶς
15 τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι ταύτης τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης
πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλυγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.
εἰσκε δ᾽ ὦκείος ὁ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς 3
ποτὲ χρη λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἡ μὴ τὴν
αὐτήν ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέραν, ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτολαιοιτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας
20 ζήτησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστὶν· ἐνδεχεται
γὰρ διαζευχθῆναι τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ τοὺς
μὲν ἑτερον τοὺς δ᾽ ἑτερον οἶκησαι τότον. ταύτην μὲν οὖν 4
πρατέραν θετέον τὴν ἀπορίαν (πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως
λεγομένης ἐστὶ πως εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζήτησεως) ὁμιῶς
25 δὲ καὶ τῶν τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικοῦντων ἀνθρώπων πότε δεὶ
νομίζειν μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τείχεσιν 5
εἰη γὰρ ἀν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβαλεῖν ἐν τείχος. τοιαύτη
δ᾽ ἵως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλῶν καὶ πάσα ἡτις ἔχει περιγραφῆν
μᾶλλον ἐθνὸς ἡ πόλεως· ἡ γε φασιν ἐαλωκυίας τρίτην
30 ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθέσθαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλὰ περὶ 6
μὲν ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καὶρῶν χρήσιμος ἡ σκέ-
ψις· περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τὸ τε πόσον καὶ
πότερον ἐθνὸς ἐν ἡ πλείω συμφέρει, δεὶ μὴ λανθάνειν τὸν
πολιτικὸν· ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικοῦντων τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων,
35 πότερον ἐως ἄν ἢ τὸ γένος ταύτῳ τῶν κατοικοῦντων, τὴν
αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ αἰεὶ τῶν μὲν φθειρομέ-
1276 a 4—1276 b 29.

νων τῶν δὲ γυνομένων, ὡσπερ καὶ ποταμοὺς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρῆνας τὰς αὐτὰς, καίπερ ἂν τοῦ μὲν ἐπι-
γυνομένου νάματος τοῦ δ' ὑπεξίόντος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους 
φατέον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ ἐτέραν ἡ πόλις, ἐστὶ δὲ 1276 b 
κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γεγονόμενης ἐτέρας τῇ ἐδείκ
και διαφεροῦσθης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι δόξειν ἂν 
καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, ὡσπερ γε καὶ χρόνον ὅτε μὲν κωμικὸν ὅτε δὲ τραγικὸν ἐτέρων εἶναι φαμέν, τῶν 5 
ἀυτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πάσαν ἅλλην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐτέραν, ἂν εἴδος ἐτέρων ἢ τῆς 
συνθέσεως, οἷον ἀρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθόγγον ἐτέραν εἶναι 
λέγομεν, ἂν ὅτε μὲν ἢ Δώριος ὅτε δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὴ 
τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερὸν ὅτι μᾶλλον λεκτέων τῇν 10 
αὐτὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας· ὁνομα δὲ κα-
κεῖν ἐτέρων ἡ ταύτων ἐξεστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικοῦντων 
αὐτὴν καὶ πάμπαν ἐτέρων ἀνθρώπων. εἰ δὲ δίκαιον δια-
λύειν ἡ μὴ διαλύειν, ὅταν εἰς ἐτέραν μεταβάλῃ πολιτείαν 
ἡ πόλις, λόγος ἐτερος. 

Τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων ἐχόμενον ἐστὶν ἐπισχέσασθαι 4 
πότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνδρὸς ἁγαθοῦ καὶ πολιτῶν 
σπουδαίον θετέον, ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτήν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ γε τοῦτο 
τυχεῖν δὲ ζητῆσεως, τὴν τοῦ πολίτου τύπῳ τοι̊ πρότον 
ληπτέων, ὡσπερ οὖν ὁ πλωτήρ εἰς τοῖς τῶν κοινοιῶν ἐστίν, 20 

2 αὐτῶ καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν φαμέν. τῶν δὲ πλωτήρων καίπερ 
ἀνομοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐρέτης, ὁ δὲ 
κυβερνήτης, ὁ δὲ προφετής, ὁ δ' ἄλλην τῶν ἔχων τοιαύτην 
ἐπωνυμίαν) δὴλον ώς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβέστατος ἐκάστου λόγος 
ἰδιος ἐσται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινὸς τις ἐφαρμόσει 25
πᾶσιν. ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἐργον ἐστιν αὐτῶν 

3 πάντων· τοῦτον γὰρ ἐκάστον ὁρεύεται τῶν πλωτήρων. ὁμοίως 
τοῖς καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἡ σωτηρία 
τῆς κοινωνίας ἐργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δ' ἐστιν ἡ πολιτεία.
30 διδ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. εἴπερ οὖν ἐστὶ πλεῖστο τοῦ πολίτεως εἰδὴς, δήλου ὡς οὐκ ἐνδεχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν. τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φανερὸν· ὅπερ οὖν ἐνδεχεται πολὺ μὴ σπουδαῖον

35 μὴ κεκτήσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἑαυτῷ λόγῳ περὶ τῆς ἀριστης πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον εὖ ἀπάντων σπουδαίων οὐκ εἶναι πόλιν, δεὶ δ' ἐκαστὸν τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἐργὸν εὖ ποιεῖν, τούτῳ δὲ ἀρετὴς.

40 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀδύνατον ὁμοίως εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ ἂν 1277 εἴη μία ἀρετὴ πολίτου καὶ ἄνδρος ἁγαθοῦ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου δεῖ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὕτω γὰρ ἀριστῆν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἄνδρος τοῦ ἁγαθοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαίοις ἁγαθοὶ εἶναι τοῖς ἐν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλιις, ἐτα ἑπεὶ ἐξ ἀνομοιῶν ἢ πόλισι, ὥσπερ ἑξ' ὧν εὐθὺς ἐκ πυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως καὶ οἰκίας ἐξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ κτῆσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δουλοῦ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πόλις ἐξ ἀπάντων τε τούτων καὶ πρὸς τούτως ἐξ ἄλλων ἀνομοιῶν

10 συνεστηκεν εἰδῶν, ἀνάγκη μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν πάντων ἀρετὴν, ὥσπερ οὖν τῶν χρεωτῶν κορυφαῖον καὶ παραστάτου, διότι μὲν τούτων ἀπόλος οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ, φανερὸν 7 ἐκ τούτων· ἄλλως ἄρα ἐσταὶ τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ ἄνδρος σπουδαίου; φαμέν δὴ τὸν ἀρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς 8 ἐτέραν εἶναι λέγουσι τινες ἀρχοντος ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλεῶν υἱεῖς ἱππικήν καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδευόμενοι, καὶ Ἕρωτιδῆς φησὶ "μὴ μοι τὰ κόμψα, ἄλλως ὃν πόλει" 20 δει," ὡς οὐδέν τινα ἀρχοντος παιδείαν. εἴ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ 9 ἀρχοντός τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἄνδρος ἁγαθοῦ, πολιτείας δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπολῶς ἢ εἰη πολίτου καὶ ἄνδρος,
1276 b 30—1277 b 16.

tινῶς μέντοι πολίτου· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρχουτος καὶ πολίτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ’ ἵσως Ἰάσων ἐφη πεινήν, ὅτε μὴ τυραννοὶ, ὡς
10 οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖται γε τὸ 25 δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι, καὶ πολίτου δοκίμον (δοκεῖ) ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι καλῶς. εἰ
οὖν τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικήν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ
11 πολίτου ἁμφῶ, οὐκ ἂν εἰῇ ἁμφῶ ἐπαινετὰ ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ οὖν
ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἔτερα καὶ οὐ ταυτὰ δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα μαν-30
θάνειν καὶ τὸν ἄρχομενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἁμφότερ’ ἐπὶ-
στασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἁμφοῖν, τούτων θεῖον ἀν κατίδοι τις.
ἔστι γὰρ ἁρχή δεσποτική· ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τάναγκαία
λέγομεν, ἀ ποιεῖν ἐπιστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντ’ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον,
ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδες. 35

12 λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακοινικὰς
πράξεις. δούλου δ’ εἰδὴ πλείω λέγομεν’ αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι
πλείους. ὅν ἐν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χερνῆτες’ οὕτω δ’
eἰσίν, ὡσπερ σημαίνει καὶ τοῦν’ αὐτούς, οἱ ξίνειαν ἀπὸ
tῶν χειρῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ βάναυσος τεχνῆτις ἔστιν. διὸ παρ’ 1277 b
ἐνίοις οὐ μετέχουν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιόν ἁρχῶν, πρὶν

13 δήμον γενεάθαι τὸν ἐσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἁρχο-
μένων οὕτως οὐ δεὶ τὸν ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐδὲ τῶν
πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν μανθάνειν, εἰ μὴ ποτὲ χρείας χάριν 5
αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτῶν’ οὐ γὰρ ἐτί συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὸν μὲν
δεσπότην τὸν δὲ δούλον· ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ τις ἁρχή καθ’ ἦν ἁρχεῖ

14 τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ταύτην γὰρ
λέγομεν εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἁρχήν, ἢ δεὶ τὸν ἁρχοντα
ἀρχόμενον μαθεῖν, οἰον ἱππαρχεῖν ἱππαρχηθέντα, στρατηγεῖν 10
στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιарχῆσαντα καὶ λοχαγῆσαντα. διὸ
λέγεται καὶ τούτο καλῶς, ὡς οὖν ἐστιν εὗ ἁρξαί μη

15 ἁρχηθέντα. τούτων δὲ ἁρετή μὲν ἔτερα, δεὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην
tὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπιστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἁρχεσθαι καὶ
ἀρχεῖ, καὶ αὐτὴ ἁρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων 15

16 ἁρχῆν ἐπιστασθαι ἐτ’ ἁμφότερα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἁγαθοῦ
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ’. 4–5.

άμφω, καὶ εἰ ἔτερον εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικής, καὶ γὰρ ἄρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ, δηλον ὅτι οὐ μία ἀν εἰ ὁ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ἄρετή, οἶδον δικαιοσύνη, ἄλλ’ εἶδο

20 ἐγγύασα καθ’ ἀ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὡσπερ ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικὸς ἐτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἄνδρια (δόξαι γὰρ ἄν εἶναι 17 δειλὸς ἀνήρ, εἰ οὕτως ἄνδρείος εἰ ὡσπερ γυνὴ ἄνδρεια, καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἰ ὡσπερ ὁ ἄνὴρ ὁ ἄγαθος), ἔπει καὶ οἰκονομία ἐτέρα ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικὸς (τοῦ μὲν

25 γὰρ κτάσθαι, τῆς δὲ φυλάττει ἔργον ἔστιν): ἢ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ιδίος ἄρετή μόνη: τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἐοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἄρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἄρχοντων, ἄρχομένου δὲ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρετή φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα 18 ἀληθής: ὡσπερ αὐλοποίος γὰρ ὁ ἄρχομενος, ὁ δ’ ἄρχων

30 ἀναλητῆς ὁ χρόνιονος. πότερον μὲν οὖν ἢ αὐτὴ ἄρετὴ ἄνδρος ἄγαθος καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος ἢ ἐτέρα, καὶ πᾶς ἢ αὐτή καὶ πᾶς ἐτέρα, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων.

5 Περὶ δὲ τῶν πολιτείων ἐτὶ λείπεται τις τῶν ἄπορων. ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πότερον πολιτείας ἐστὶν ὃ κοινωνεῖ εξεστιν

35 ἀρχῆς, ἢ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολιτείας θετέων; εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτως θετεόν οἷς µὴ µέτεστιν ἄρχων, οὐχ οὖν τε παντὸς εἶναι πολιτεία τὴν τοιαύτην ἄρετήν (οὕτως γὰρ πολιτείας): εἰ δὲ µηδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων πολιτείας, ἐν τίνι µέρει θετεός ἐκαστος; οὐδὲ γὰρ µέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος. ἢ διὰ γε τούτων ἰὸν 2

1278 α γον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἀτοπων; οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν εἰρηµένων οὐδέν, οὐδ’ οἱ ἀπελεύθεροι, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, ὅς οὐ πάντας θετεόν πολίτας ὅν ἀνευ οὐκ ἄν εἰ ἐη πόλις, ἐπει οὐδ’ οἱ παῖδες ὡς αὐτῶς πολίται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες, ἄλλ’ 5 οἱ µὲν ἀπλῶς οἱ δ’ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως πολίται µὲν γὰρ εἰσιν, ἄλλ’ ἀπελεύθ., ἐν µὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοι χρόνοις παρ’ ἐνοίοις 3 ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάναυσον ἢ ἑνικὸν διότι οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῦν· ἢ δὲ βελτιστή πόλις οὐ ποιητεί βάναυσον πολίτην, εἰ δὲ καὶ οὕτως πολιτείας, ἄλλα πολίτων ἄρετὴν ἢν εἰπομεν 10 λεκτέος οὐ παντός, οὐδ’ ἔλευθέρου μόνον, ἄλ’ ὅσοι τῶν ἔργων
4 εἰσίν ἀφειμένοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τῶν δ᾿ ἄναγκαίων οἱ μὲν ἐνὶ λειτουργοῦντες τὰ τοιαύτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινῇ βάναυσοι καὶ θήτες. φανερῶν δὲ ἐντεῦθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεφτηκέναι πῶς ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ γὰρ φανερὸν τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ
5 δὴλον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ πλείους εἰσίν αἱ πολιτείαι, καὶ εἰδὴ πο-15 λίτων ἀναγκαίων εἶναι πλεῖον, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἄρχομένου πολέτου, ὡστὶ ἐν μὲν τινὶ πολιτείᾳ τὸν βάναυσον ἀναγκαίον εἶναι καὶ τὸν θῆτα πολίτας, ἐν τισὶ δ᾿ ἀδύνατον, οὖν εἰ τίς ἑστὶν ἢν καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ᾗ κατ᾿ ἄρετὴν αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ᾿ ἀξίᾳν᾿ οὐ γὰρ ὅπο ὀὖν τ᾿ ἐπιτηδεύ-20 σαι τὰ τῆς ἄρετης ἔσωτα βίων βάναυσον ἡ θητικὼν. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις θῆτα μὲν οὐκ ἐνδεχεται εἶναι πολίτην (ἀπὸ τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρῶν αἱ μεθέχεις τῶν ἄρχων), βάναυσον δ᾿ ἐνδεχεται πλούσιοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν 7 τεχνιτῶν. ἐν Θῆβαις δὲ νόμοι ἦν τῶν δέκα ἑτῶν μὴ ἀπε-25 σχημένοι τῆς ἄγορᾶς μὴ μετέχειν ἄρχης. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ πολιτείαις προσεφέλκεται καὶ τῶν ἑξῶν ὁ νόμος· ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολίτιδος ἐν τισὶ δημοκρατίαις πολίτης ἑστίν τῶν αὐτῶν
8 δὲ τρόπων ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόβους παρὰ πολλοίς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνδειαν τῶν γνησίων πολιτῶν ποιοῦται 30 πολίτας τοὺς τοιούτους (διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγαρχοῦσιν οὕτω χρῶται τοῖς νόμοις), εὐποροῦντες δ᾿ ὀχλού κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦν-ται τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρῶτον ἢ δούλης, εἰτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, 9 τέλος δὲ μένον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν αὐτῶν πολίτας ποιοῦσιν. ὅτι μὲν οὐν εἰδὴ πλεῖον πολίτου, φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέ-35 γεται μάλιστα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὡσπερ καὶ ὁμηρος ἐποίησεν "ὡσεὶ τινὶ ἀτιμητὸν μετανάστην". ὡσπερ μέτοικος γὰρ ἑστὶν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. ἀλλ᾿ ὅπου τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκριμένον ἑστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοι-10 κόινουν ἑστίν. πότερον μὲν οὐν ἑτέραν ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν θετέον 40 καθ᾿ ἢν ἀνήρ ἀγαθὸς ἑστι καὶ πολιτής σπουδαῖος, δὴλον ἐκ 1278 b
tῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τινὸς δ᾿ ἑτερος, κάκεινοι οὐ πάς ἀλλ᾿ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ κύριος ἢ δυνάμενος
ἐίναι κύριος, ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων, τῆς τῶν κοινῶν
5 ἐπιμελείας·
6 Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτα διώρισται, τὸ μετὰ ταύτα σκεπτέον
πότερον μίαν θετέον πολιτείαν ἡ πλείος, κἀν εἰ πλείος,
tίνες καὶ πόσαι, καὶ διαφορὰ τίνες αὐτῶν εἰσίν. ἔστι δὲ
πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἄρχων καὶ μάλιστα
10 τῆς κυρίας πάντων κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολι-
tεσμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτεμμα 8' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία· λέγω 2
8' οὖν ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαίς κύριος ὁ δήμος, οἱ δ' ὁλίγοι
tοῦν αὐλίτων ἐν ταῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις· φαμέν δὲ καὶ
πολιτείαιν ἔτεραν εἶναι τούτων. τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων ἐρῶμεν
15 λόγον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὑποβεβεόν δὴ πρῶτον τίνος
χάριν συνεστήκη πόλις, καὶ τῆς άρχῆς εἰδὴ πόσα τῆς περὶ
ἀνθρωπων καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς. εἰρήται δὴ κατὰ 3
τοὺς πρῶτους λόγους, ἐν ὂς περὶ οἰκονομίας διωρίζῃ καὶ δι-
εποτείας, καὶ ὅτι φύσει μὲν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπως ἔκοινον πολιτικὸν,
20 διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεδόμενοι τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας [οὐκ
ἐλαττον] ὁρέγονται τοῦ συζήνην οὐ μὴν ἅλλα καὶ τὸ κοινῷ
συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ
ξῆνι καλῶς. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τέλος, καὶ κοινῇ 4
πάσι καὶ χωρίς· συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ξῆν ἐνεκεν αὐτοῦ
25 καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἵσως γὰρ ἐνεστὶ τι
τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ξῆν αὐτὸ μόνον, ἀν μὴ τοῖς
χαλεποῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλῃ λίαν. δὴ λοιπὸν 8' ὡς 5
καρτεροῦσι πολλὴν κακοπάθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
γλισάμενοι τοῦ ξῆν, ὅς ἐνοικεῖς τινὸς ἐνμερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ
30 γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς άρχῆς γε τοὺς
λεγομένους τρόπους ράδιν διελεύνω καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἔξωτε-
ρικοῖς λόγοις διαρίζεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ 6
δεσποτεία, καὶπερ ὄντος κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὸ τε φύσει δούλῳ
καὶ τὸ φύσει δεσπότη ταύτῳ συμφέροντος, ὡμοὶ ἀρχεῖ
35 πρὸς τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον οὐδὲν ἦττον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τοῦ
dούλου κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρομένου τοῦ
7 δούλου σώζεσθαι τὴν δεσποτείαν. ἢ δὲ τέκνων ἁρχῇ καὶ
γυναικὸς καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης, ἢν δὴ καλοῦμεν ὦκονομικῆν,
ἤτοι τῶν ἁρχομένων χάριν ἑστὶν ἡ κοινὸς τινὸς ἀμφοῖν, καθʼ
αὐτὸ μὲν τῶν ἁρχομένων, ὥσπερ ὄρῳς καὶ τὰς ἄλλας 40
tέχνας, οἷον ιατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικήν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 1279 a
de καὶ αὐτῶν εἰς οὐδὲν γὰρ κολύει τὸν παιδότριβην ἐνα
tῶν γυμναζομένων ἑνὸτ, εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν, ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερ-
8 νήτης εἰς ἑστὶν ἀεὶ τῶν πλωτήρων. ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδότριβης
ἡ κυβερνήτης σκοπεῖ τὸ τῶν ἁρχομένων ἁγάθων· ὅταν δὲ 5
tοῦτων εἰς γένηται καὶ αὐτὸς, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχει
τῆς ὀφελείας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πλωτήρ, ὁ δὲ τῶν γυμναζομέ-
9 νων εἰς γίνεται παιδότριβης ὁν. διὸ καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς
ἀρχὰς, ὅτι κἂν ἱσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκύια καὶ
καθʼ ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιοῦσιν ἁρχεῖν, πρότερον μὲν, 10
ἡ πέρικεν, ἀξιοῦντες ἐν μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινὰ
πάλιν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἁγάθων, ὥσπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἁρχῶν ἐκκό-
10 πεῖ τὸ ἐκεῖνὸν συμφέρον. νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰς ὀφελείας τὰς
ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἁρχῆς βούλονται συνεχῶς
ἁρχεῖν, οἷον εἰ συνεβαίνειν ὑγιαίνειν ἀεὶ τοῖς ἁρχοῦσι νοσα-15
κεροῖς οὖσιν· καὶ γὰρ ἄν οὕτως ὑσώμεθα, τὰς ἁρχὰς.
11 φανερῶν τούτων ὡς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖας τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον
σκοπούσιν, αὐτὰ μὲν ὄρθαι τυγχάνουσιν ὅσαι καὶ τὸ
ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσαι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον μόνον τῶν ἁρχῶν, τῶν, ἡμαρτημέναι καὶ πάσαι παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν' 20
despotikai γάρ, ἢ δὲ πόλεις κοινωνία τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἑστὶν.

Διορισμένων δὲ τοῦτων ἑξόμευνων ἐστὶ τὰς πολιτείας 7
ἐπισκέψασθαι, πόσα τὰν ἁριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσι, καὶ πρώ-
tον τὰς ὄρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις ἐσοῦται
2 φανερὰ τοῦτων διορισθεῖσών· ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ 25
πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταύτων, πολίτευμα δὲ ἑστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν
πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δὲ εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἐνα ἢ ὅλους ἢ τοὺς
πολλοὺς, ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἰς ἢ οἱ ὅλοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ
κοινὸν συμφέρον ἁρχοῦσι, ταύτας μὲν ὄρθᾶς ἀναγκαῖοι εἶναι
30 τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἵδιον ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλιγῶν ἢ τοῦ πλῆθους παρεκβάσεις· ἡ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέον εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἡ δὲι κοινωνεῖ τοῦ συμφέροντος. καλεῖν δ’ εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέποσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν πλείονον δὲ ἐνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἡ διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀρίστους ἀρχεῖν, ἡ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς’ ἄτιν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύσαι συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὅνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. συμβαίνει δ’ εὐλόγως’ ἔνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν 4 κατ’ ἁρετὴν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δὲ ἥδη χαλεπῶν κατ’ ἡκριβώθωσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἁρετὴν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικὴν’ αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλῆθει γίγνεται. διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὁπλα. παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρήνης 5 μὲν των τυραννιῶν μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατία, δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχῶντος, ἡ δ’ ὀλγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τῶν ἀπόρων πρὸς δὲ τὸ κοινὸ λυσιτελοῦν 10 οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.

8 Δεῖ δὲ μικρὸ διὰ μακροτέρων εἰπεῖν τὸν ἐκάστη τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστὶν· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τινας ἀπορίας, τῷ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδὲ 15 τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἐκαστὸν ἀλλήλειαν, ἐστὶ δὲ τυραννίς μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἰρηται, δεσποτικὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὀλγαρχία δ’ ὅταν ὁσιότητα κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας ὁ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχουσετε, δημοκρατία δὲ τοῦναντίον ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλῆθος οὐσίας ἀλλ’ ἀποροὶ. 20 πρῶτῃ δ’ ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστὶν. εἶ γὰρ εἰς ὀλίγους ὄντες εὐπόροι κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ’ ἐστὶν ὅταν ἡ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν κἂν εἴ ποι Ἴ συμ
1279 a 30—1280 a 15.

βαίνητ' τοὺς ἀπόρους ἑλάττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν εὐτόρων, κρεῖττους δὲ ὁντας κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅτου δὲ ὀλίγον κύριον πλῆθος, ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναι φασίν, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δύξειν 25 ὁμοφράσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτείων. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἂν τις συνθεῖς τῇ μὲν εὐπορίᾳ τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῇ δ' ἀπορίᾳ τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω προσαγορεύῃ τὰς πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν μὲν ἐν ἡ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οἱ εὐτόροι ὀλίγοι τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, δημοκρατίαν δὲ ἐν ἡ οἱ ἀποροὶ πολλοί τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, ἀλλὰ 30 ἀποριαν ἔχει. τίνας γάρ ἐρόθυμεν τὰς ἀρτὶ λεχθεῖσας πολιτείας, τὴν ἐν ἡ πλείους εὐτόροι καὶ ἐν ἡ ἑλάττους οἱ ἀποροὶ, κύριοι δ' ἐκάτεροι τῶν πολιτείων, εἴπερ μηθείματι

6 ἀλλὰ πολιτεία παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας ἐστίν; ἐοικε τοῦν ὁ λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀλίγον ή πολλοῦ εἶναι κυ-35 ρίους συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, τὸ μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τὸ δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν εὐτόρους ὀλίγους, πολλοὺς δ' εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους πανταχοῦ (διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει τὰς 7 ῥηθέσας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορᾶς), οὐ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἡ τε δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πενία καὶ πλοῦτος 40 ἐστίν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, ὅτου ἀρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον ἀν 1280 41' ἑλάττους ἄν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπων 8 δ' οἱ ἀποροὶ, δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴπο-μεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς· εὐτόροοι μὲν γάρ ὀλίγοι, τῆς δὲ ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες· δ' ἀς 5 αἰτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας.

Αἵττεον δὲ πρώτον τίνας ὄρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας 9 καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τῷ τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. πάντες γὰρ ἀποτίναι δικαῖοι τινὸς, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγοντες οὐ πάν τὸ κυρίον το δίκαιον. οἷον δοκεῖ ἂς οὐ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' 2 οὐ πάσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἰσοῖς· καὶ τὸ ἀνίσον δοκεῖ δικαῖον εἶναι, καὶ γάρ ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις. οἱ δὲ τούτ' ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ' ἀίτιον 9 ὁτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις· σχέδον δ' οἱ πλείστοι φαιλοὶ 15
κριται περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. ὡστ' ἔπει τὸ δίκαιον τιςίν, καὶ 3 δῆρηται τῶν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς, καθάπερ εἰρήται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἥθικοις, τὴν μὲν τοῦ 
πράγματος ἴσοτητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, 20 μᾶλλον μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ἁρτί, διότι κρίνονσι τὰ περὶ 
αὐτῶς κακῶς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὸς ἐκα-
τέρως δίκαιον τι νομίζουσι δίκαιον λέγειν ἀπλῶς. οἱ μὲν 4 
γὰρ ἂν κατὰ τὰ ἄνισοι ὀσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, ὁλως ὁνται 
ἀνισοὶ εἰναι, οἰ δ' ἂν κατὰ τ̣ ἵσοι, οἷον ἑλευθερία, ὅλως 25 ἵσοι. 
τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον ὡς λέγονσι εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτή-5 
μάτων χάριν ἐκοινώνησαν καὶ συνήλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι 
τῆς πόλεως ὅσονπερ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, ὡσθ' ἐ τῶν ὀλγαρ-
χικῶν λόγος δόξειν ἂν ἴσχυει (οἷὰ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἵσον 
μετέχειν τῶν ἐκατόν μνῶν τοῖς ἐσενέγκαντα μίαν μνᾶς τῷ 
30 δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πάν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγνο-
μένων) εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζητῶν μόνον ἐνεκεν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ 6 
eὐ ζητ (καὶ γὰρ ἃν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζητῶν ἢν πό-
λις νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ 
toῦ ζητ κατὰ προαιρεσιν), μήτε συμμαχίας ἐνεκεν, ὅπως 
35 ὑπὸ μηθεως ἀδικωνται, μήτε διὰ τᾶς ἄλλαγας καὶ τὴν 
χρῆσιν τὴν πρὸς ἄλλους καὶ γὰρ ἂν Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρ-
χιδῶνοι, καὶ πάντες οἴς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἄλλους, ὅς 
μᾶς ἂν πολίται πόλεως ἥσαν. εἰσὶ γοιν αὐτοῖς συνθέκαι 7 
περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν 
40 καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας. ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἄρχαι πάσιν ἐπὶ 1280 b τούτοις κοιναὶ καθεστάσιν, ἀλλ' ἔτεραι παρ' ἐκατέρως, οὔτε 
toῦ ποιῶν τινὰς εἶναι δεὶ φροντίζουσι ἀτεροὶ τοῦς ἐτέρους, 
οὐδ' ὅπως μηδὲς ἀδίκοις ἐσται τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκας μηδὲ 
μοχθηρίαν ἔξει μηθεμαί, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδικη-
5 σουσιν ἄλλους. περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς 8 
dιασκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας, ἧ καὶ φαινόν 
ὅτι δεὶ περί ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖ εἶναι τῇ γ' ὡς ἄληθως ὄνομα-
ξομένη πόλει, μὴ λόγου χάριν. γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία
συμμαχία τῶν ἄλλων τόπων διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἀποθεν συμμάχων, καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καὶ, καθάπερ ἔφη Δύνοντοι τὸ σοφιστής, ἐγγυηθησθαι ἄλληλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἄλλιος ὁχὶ ὁδὸς ποιεῖν ἀγαθοῦς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας. ὁτι δὲ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερῶν. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ συναγάγων τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἐν, ἀπεσταθαί τῇ Μεγαρέων πόλιν καὶ Κορινθίων τοῖς τείχεσιν, ὅμως οὐ μία πόλις. οὐδ' εἰ πρὸς ἄλληλους ἐπιγαμίας ποιήσαιντο· καίτοι τοῦτο τῶν ἱδίων ταῖς πόλεις κωινωνιμάτων εστίν. ὡμοίως δ' οὐδ' εἰ τινες οἰκονεῖ χωρίς μέν, μη μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἀποθεν ὄστε μη κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰςαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μη σφάς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὰς μεταδόσεις, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν εἰς τέκτων ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς ὁ δὲ σκυπτόμος ο δ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰς μύριοι, μη μέντοι κοινωνοῖν ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἡ τῶν τοιοῦτων, οἷον ἀλλαγής καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδ' οὕτω ποιό πόλις. διὰ τίνα δὴ ποτ' αἰτίαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μη σύνεγγυς τῆς κοινωνίας. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνέλθοιεν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, ἔκαστος μὲντοι χρῆτο τῇ ἱδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὥσπερ πόλει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὕτης βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μόνον, οὐδ' οὕτως ἀν εἴναι δόξει πόλις τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἰπερ ὡμοίως ὁμολογεῖν συνελθοῦντες καὶ χωρίς, φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία τόπον καὶ τοῦ μη ἀδικεῖν σφάς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν, εἰπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μην οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων τοῦτων ἀπάντων ἢ ἄλλη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦ εὖ ζην κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ὡς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. οὐκ ἔσται καὶ μέντοι τοῦτο μη τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐνεῖ δεκαοκτὼν τὸπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίας. διὸ κηδεία τ' ἐγένουτο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φρατρίαι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ διαγογαῖ τοῦ συζήν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἐργὸν· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζήν προαίρειοι φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενών καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ὡς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν, ὡς 1281 a
πολιτικῶν ἑ. 9–11.

φαμέν, τὸ ἔνην εὐθαμάνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων χάριν θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦ συζῆν. διότερ ὁδοὶ συμβάλλονται πλείστον εἰς τὴν 15 τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλείον ἢ τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἔλευθεραν καὶ γένος ἱσοίς ἢ μείζοις κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἁρέτην ἀνέσοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπε-ρέχουσι κατ' ἁρέτην ὀ' ὑπερεχομένοις. ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτείων ἀμφισβητοῦντες μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου 10 λέγουσιν, φανερῶν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων·

10 "Εξεῖ δ' ἀπορίαν, τὶ δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως, ἢ γὰρ τοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, ἢ τὸν βέλτιστον ἐνα πάντων, ἢ τύραννον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχει φαίνεται δυσκόλιαν. τὶ γὰρ; ἀν οἱ πένθεις διὰ τὸ 15 πλείους εἶναι διάνεμονται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τούτ' οὖν ἄδικον ἔστιν; ἐνδοξάζε γὰρ νὴ Δία τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίως. τὴν οὖν ἀδικίαν 2 τὶ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν ἐσχάτην; πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων, οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἑλπίτων ἀν διανέμονται, φανερῶν ὅτι φθείρουσι τὴν πόλιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖν ἢ γ' ἁρέτη φθείρει τὸ 20 ἔχον αὐτήν, οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν· ὡστε ὅλων ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὖν ὅν τ' εἶναι δίκαιον. ἐτι καὶ 3 τὰς πράξεις ὅσα τὸ τύραννος ἐπράξει, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάσος δικαιάς· βιάζεται γὰρ ὃν κρείττων, ὅσπερ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τοὺς πλουσίους. ἀλλ' ἡρα τοὺς ἑλάττους δίκαιον 25 ἀρχεῖν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἀν οὖν κάκειοι ταῦτα ποιῶσι καὶ διαρτάξωσι καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἁφαίρωνται τὸν πλῆθους, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ δίκαιων; καὶ θάτερον ἁρα. ταῦτα μὲν τοῦτον ὅτι πάντα 4 φαύλα καὶ οὐ δίκαια, φανερῶν· ἀλλα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἀρχεῖν δεῖ καὶ κυρίους εἶναι πάντων; οὐκοῦν ἁνάγκη τοὺς ἄλλους 30 ἀτίμους εἶναι πάντας, μὴ τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρ- χαίς· τιμᾶς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀρχόντων δ' αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους. ἀλλ' 5 ἔνα τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἀρχεῖν βέλτιον; ἀλλ' ἐτι τοῦτο ὅλω- γαρχικότερον οἱ γὰρ ἄτιμοι πλείους. ἀλλ' ἵσως φαίνει τὶς
Δν τὸ κύριον ὀλὸς ἀνθρωπὸν εἶναι ἄλλα μὴ νόμον φαίλον, 35 ἔχοντα γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἂν οὖν ἢ νόμος μὲν ὁλιγαρχικὸς δὲ ἡ δημοκρατικὸς, τί διὸισε περὶ τῶν ἤπορμημένων; συμβῆσαται γὰρ ὁμοῖος τὰ λεχθέντα πρότερον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀλλων ἐστω τις ἐτερος λόγος; 11 ὅτι δὲ δὲι κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους 40 μὲν ὀλίγους δὲ, δόξει εἰν αν λύσσαι καὶ τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν,

2 τάχα δὲ καὶ ἀληθείαν. τοὺς γὰρ πολλοὺς, ἃν ἐκαστὸς ἐστὶν οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ, ὄμοιος ἐνδέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βέλ-

1281 b τίων ἐκείνων, οὕτως ἐκαστὸν ἄλλ' ὡς σύμπανται, ὡς γὰρ συμφορτὰ δείναι τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς διαπάνης χαρηγηθέντων· πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἐκαστὸν μόριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων ὧσπερ ἕνα ἀνθρωπον 5 τὸ πλῆθος πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχοντι

3 αἰσθήσεις, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἡθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ καὶ κρίνονσιν ἀμέινον οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰς μοὐσικὰς ἔργα καὶ
tὰ τῶν ποιητῶν· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλο τι μόριον, πάντα δὲ

4 πάντες. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὸ ἐκάστος τῶν πολλῶν, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοὺς καλοὺς

φασὶ καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνήχθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἐν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων

γε κάλλως ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τοῦδε μὲν τῶν ὀφθαλ-

5 μῶν, ἐτέρου δὲ τινος ἐτερος μόριον. εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ πάντα 15 δήμων καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος ἐνδέχεται ταύτην εἶναι τὴν
dιαφορὰν τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὀλίγους σπουδαῖους, ἀδηλοῦν,

Ἤςως δὲ νῆ Διά δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίον ἀδύνατον (ὁ γὰρ

αὐτῶς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἀρμόσει λόγος· κατοί τί δια-

φέρουσιν ἐνίοι τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν;), ἀλλὰ περὶ τι 20

6 πλῆθος οὐδὲν εἶναι κολύει τὸ λεχθέν ἀληθές. διὸ καὶ τὴν

πρότερον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσσειν ἂν τις διὰ τούτων καὶ
tὴν ἐχομένην αὐτῆς, τίνων δὲι κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους

cαὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν (τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν ὡςοι μῆτε

7 πλούσιοι μῆτε ἁξίωμα ἐχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηθέν) τὸ μὲν γὰρ 25

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μετέχειν αὐτούς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὓς ἀσφαλές (διὰ τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δὲ ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἂδικεῖν ἄν τὰ δὲ ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτούς), τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερὸν· ὅταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχον, πολεμίων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην. λείπεται δὴ τοῦ βουλευόσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς. 8 διότερ καὶ Σέλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετῶν τάττουσιν ἐπὶ τε τὰς ἀρχαιεσιάς καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχεῖν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἔσοιν· εἰπτεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσιν. 9 συνελθόντες ἰκανὴν αἰσθήσιν, καὶ μεγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίωσι τὰς πόλεις ὀφελοῦσιν, καθάπερ ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφὴ μετὰ τῆς καθαρᾶς τὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλύνης· χωρὶς δ’ ἔκαστος ἀτελὴς περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἑστὶν. ἔχει 10 δ’ ἡ τάξις αὐτῆς τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πράττειν μὲν ὦτι δόξειν ἀν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρίναί τίς ὀρθῶς ἱστρευκείν, οὔπερ καὶ τὸ ἱστρεύσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ὑγία τῶν κάμυντα τῆς νόσου τῆς παρούσης· ὁδοὺς δ’ ἔστιν ἱστρός. ὀμοίως δὲ τούτο καὶ 1282α περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. ὀσπερ ὅπως ἱστρόν δεῖ διδάσκαι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἱστροῖς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τοῖς ὀμοίωσι. Ἰστρός δ’ ὃ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχιτεκτονῶν- 11 κόσ καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαθεμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰσὶ γὰρ τινὲς τοιούτοι καὶ περὶ πάσας ὁς εἰπέν τὰς τέχνας, ἀποδίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν ὑπὲν ἠττῶν τοῖς πεπαθεμένοις ἡ τοῖς εἰδόθην. ἔσπειτα καὶ περὶ τὴν ἁμεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἄν δὲ δόξειν ἔχειν τρόπον· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλέοσθαι ὀρθῶς τῶν εἰδότων ἔργων ἑστὶν, ὅν γεωμέτρητην τε τῶν γεωμετρικῶν καὶ 10 κυβερνήτην τῶν κυβερνητικῶν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἔνιον ἔργων καὶ τεχνῶν μετέχουσα καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τινές, ἀλλ’ οὗ τι τῶν εἰδότων γε μᾶλλον. ὡστε κατὰ μὲν τούτων τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἂν εἰ ὅ το πλήθος ποιητέων κύριον οὔτε τῶν ἀρχαιεσιῶν οὔτε τῶν εὐθυνῶν, ἀλλ’ ἵσως οὗ πάντα ταῦτα λέγεται καλὸς· 14 διά τε τῶν πάλαι λόγων, ἄν ἦ τὸ πλήθος μὴ λίαν ἄνδραποδώδες (ἔστι ταύτα ἐκαστοὺς μὲν χεῖρων κριτής τῶν εἰδότων,
1281 b 26—1282 b 8.

απαντες δὲ συνελθόντες ἢ βελτίως ἢ οὐ χείρονς), καὶ ότι
περὶ ἐνίον οὔτε μόνον ὁ ποιήσας οὔτ' ἀριστ' ἀν κρίνειεν,
ὅσον τάργα γεγυμώσκουσι καὶ οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες τὴν τέχνην, οἶον
οἰκίαν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ γνώναι τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλ— 20
τιον ὁ χρώμειος αὐτὴ κρίνει (χρῆται δ' ὁ οἰκονόμοι), καὶ
πηθάλιον κυβερνήτης τέκτονοι, καὶ θούνην ὁ δαίτυμων ἀλλ' 15
οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος. ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν τάχα δόξειε
τις ἀν οὔτω λύειν ἰκανῶς· ἀλλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἱχομένη ταύτης.
δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀποτοῦν εἶναι τὸ μειζόνον εἶναι κυρίους τοὺς 25
φαύλους τῶν ἐπιείκων, αἱ δ' εὐθυναί καὶ αἱ τῶν ἄρχων
αἱρέσεις εἰσὶ μέγιστον· ἂς ἐν ἐνίαυς πολιτείαις, ὡσπερ εἰρηταί,
τοῖς δήμοις ἀποδιδόσιαν· ἡ γὰρ ἐκκλησία κυρία πάντων τῶν
τοιούτων ἐστίν. καὶ τοις τῆς μὲν ἐκκλησίας μετέχουσι καὶ 16
βουλεύουσι καὶ δικάξουσιν ἀπὸ μικρῶν τιμημάτων καὶ τῆς 30
τυχούσης ἡλικίας, ταμιεύουσι δὲ καὶ στρατηγούσι καὶ τὰς
μεγίστας ἄρχας ἀρχουσιν ἀπὸ μεγάλων· ὡμίων δὴ τις ἀν
λύειε καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν· ἵσως γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταύτ' 17
ὁρθῶς. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς οὐδ' ὁ βουλευτὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐκκλη-
σιαστὴς ἄρχων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ 35
ὁ δήμος· τῶν δὲ ρήθεντον ἐκαστος μόριον ἐστὶ τοῦτων (λέγω
δὲ μόριον τὸν βουλευτὴν καὶ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστὴν καὶ τὸν δικα-
στὴν)· ὡστε δικαίως κύριον μειζόνων τὸ πλῆθος· ἐκ γὰρ πολ-
λῶν ὁ δήμος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον. καὶ τὸ τίμημα
δὲ πλείων τὸ πάντων τοῦτων ἢ τὸ τῶν καθ' ἐνα καὶ κατ' 40
ὁλίγους μεγάλας ἄρχας ἄρχωντων. ταύτα μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω
τοῦτων τῶν τρόπων· ἢ δὲ πρῶτη λεχθείσα ἀπορία ποιεῖ φα− 1282 b
νερὸν οὐδὲν οὕτως ἔπεσεν ὅπε ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυρίους
κειμένους ὁρθῶς, τὸν ἀρχοντα δὲ, ἀν τε εἰς ἀν τε πλείους
ώσι, περὶ τοῦτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὅσων ἐξαπουτοῦσιν οἱ
νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι καθόλου διορι− 5
20 σαὶ περὶ πάντων. ὁποίοις μέντοι τινὰς εἶναι δε τοὺς ὁρθῶς
κειμένους νόμους, οὐδέν πω δῆλον, ἀλλ' ἔτι μένει τὸ πάλαι
diaporbēn. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ὡμίων ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη

C 2
καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαίλουσι ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι καὶ δικαίους ἢ
10 ἀδίκους. πλὴν τοῦτο γε φανερὸν, ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κεῖσθαι τοὺς νόμους. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαίον εἶναι δικαίους, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκυῖας οὐ δικαίους.

12 Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυριωτάτῃ πασῶν, αὐτὴ δ’ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις, ἔστι δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινὴ σύμφερον, δοκεῖ δὲ πάνω ἵσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι γέ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγους, ἐν οἷς διάφοροι τῆς ἡθικῆς (τὶ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ δεῖ τοῖς ἵσοις ἵσον εἶναι φασι) ποιῶν δ’ ἵσοτης ἐστὶ καὶ 2 ποιῶν ἀνίσοτης, δεὶ μὴ λανθάνειν· ἔχει γὰρ τούτ’ ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν. ἵσως γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις κατὰ παντὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθὸν δεῖν ἀνίσως νενεμήσθαι τὰς ἁρΧὰς, εἰ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ μιθὲν διαφέροιν ἄλλ’ ὁμοὶ τυγχάνοιες οὕτε τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρονσιν ἐτερον εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτ’ ἄληθές, ἔσται 3 καὶ κατὰ χρῶμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθ’ ὁπίον τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλεονεξία τις τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαίων τοῖς ὑπερε- 25 χουσιν. ἢ τοῦτο ἐπιστήμαιον τὸ ψεῦδος; φανερὸν δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν 4 ἀλλων ἐπιστήμων καὶ δυνάμεων· τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν τὴν τέχνην οὐ δοτέον πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν τοῖς εὐγενεστέροις οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐλήσουσι βέλτιον, δεὶ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἐργὸν ὑπερέχοντι διδόναι καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τῇ ὑπεροχὴν. εἰ 30 χοσιν. ἢ τοῦτο ἐπιστήμαιον τὸ ψεῦδος; φανερὸν δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν 4 ἀλλων ἐπιστήμων καὶ δυνάμεων· τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν τὴν τέχνην οὐ δοτέον πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν τοῖς εὐγενεστέροις οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐλήσουσι βέλτιον, δεὶ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἐργὸν ὑπερέχοντι διδόναι καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τῇ ὑπεροχήν. εἰ 35 δὲ μῆπο δῆλον τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐτεί μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγαγοῦσιν ἐσται φανερὸν. εἰ γὰρ εἰς τις ὑπερέχον μὲν κατὰ 5 τὴν αὐλητικὴν, πολὺ δ’ ἐλλείποι τοῖς εὐγένειαις ἢ κάλλος, εἰ καὶ μεῖζον ἐκαστὸν ἑκείνων ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς (λέγω δὲ τῇ τ’ εὐγένειαι καὶ τῷ κάλλος), καὶ κατὰ 40 τὴν ἀναλογίαν ὑπερέχουσι πλέον τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ ἑκείνων κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν, διότι τούτῳ δοτέον τοὺς διαφέροντας
τῶν αὐλῶν ἐς γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἑργόν συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν ὑπεροχήν καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῆς εὐγενείας, συμβάλλονται—1283 a

6 οὖν. ἔτι κατὰ γε τοῦτον τῶν λόγων πάν ἄγαθον πρὸς πᾶν ἄν εἰς συμβλητῶν. εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τι μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως ἄν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον εἰς καὶ πρὸς πλούτον καὶ πρὸς 5 ἐλευθερίαν. ὡστ' εἰ πλείων ὀδοι διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ἡ ὀδι κατ' ἀρετῆν, καὶ πλείων ὑπερέχει ὅλως ἀρετῆς μέγεθος, εἰς ἄν συμβλητά πάντα τοσόνδε γὰρ [μέγεθος] εἰ

7 κρείττον τοσόνδε, τοσόνδε δήλον ὡς ἱσον. ἔτει δὲ τοῦτ ἀδύνατον, δήλον ὡς καὶ ἔτι τῶν πολιτικῶν εὐλόγως οὐ κατὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀνισότητι ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἄρχων (εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν βραδεῖς οἱ δὲ ταχεῖς, οὖν διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τούτων μὲν πλείων τούτω δὲ ἐλαττών ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγώσιν ἡ

8 τούτων διαφορὰ λαμβάνει τὴν τιμὴν), ἀλλ' εὖ ὃν πόλις συνετηκεν, ἐν τούτῳ ἀναγκαίον ποιεῖται τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν. 15 διόστε εὐλόγως ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τιμῆς οἱ εὐγενεῖς καὶ ἐλευθεροὶ καὶ πλοῦσιοι. δεῖ γὰρ ἐλευθεροὺς τ' εἶναι καὶ τίμημα φέροντας (οὐ γὰρ ἄν εἰς πόλις εὖ ἀπόρου πάντων, ὡστε

9 οὐδ' ἐκ δούλων). ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ δεῖ τούτων, δήλον ὃτι καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῆς πολεμικῆς ἀρετῆς· οὐδ' γὰρ ἄνευ 20 τούτων οἰκείσθαι πόλιν δυνατόν, πλὴν ἄνευ τῶν προτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς, πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἣ πάντα ἡ ἐνιὰ γε τούτων ὥρθος ἀμφισβητεῖν, πρὸς μέντοι ζωῆς ἄγαθην ἢ παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἀρετή μάλιστα δικαίως ἂν ἀμφισβητοῦσι, καθὼς ἐπίκαιρος καὶ πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐτὲ πάντων ἵσον ἔχειν δεὶ τοὺς ἵσος ἐν τι μόνον ὄντας οὕτε ἀνίσον τοὺς ἀνίσον καθ' ἐν, ἀνάγκη πᾶσας εἶναι τὰς 2 τοιαύτα. πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις. ἐπίκαιρος μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερον ὃς διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τινὰ δικαίως πάντες, 30 ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ πάντες δικαίως, οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν ὃς τι πλείου μέτεστι τῆς χάρας αὐτοῖς, ἡ δὲ χάρα κοινών, ἢτι πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῦν· οἱ δ' ἐλευ-
θεροὶ καὶ εὐγενεῖς ός ἐγγὺς ἄλληλων (πολίται γὰρ μάλλον
35 οἱ γενναῖοτεροί τῶν ἄγεννῶν, ἡ δὲ εὐγένεια παρὰ ἑκάστοις
οίκοι τίμιοι. ἐτί διότι βελτίως εἰκὸς τούς ἐκ βελτιῶνων, 3
εὐγένεια γὰρ ἐστὶν ἁρτῆ γένους). ὁμοίως δὴ φήσομεν
δικαίως καὶ τὴν ἁρτῆν ἀμφισβητεῖν· κοινωνικὴν γὰρ ἁρτῆν
ἐιναι φαμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ἢ πάσας ἀναγκαίων ἀκολουθεῖν
40 τὰς ἄλλας. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους πρὸς τοὺς ἔλαττους· 4
καὶ γὰρ κρείττους καὶ πλουσιότεροι καὶ βελτίως εἰσίν, ὡς
λαμβανομένων τῶν πλείουν πρὸς τοὺς ἔλαττους. ἄρ' οὖν
1283 b εἰ πάντες εἶν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει, λέγω δ' οἶον οἴ τ' ἀγαθοὶ
καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἐτι δὲ πλῆθος ἀλλο τι πολι-
τικὸν, πότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν ἐσται τίνας ἀρχεῖν δεῖ, ὡς
ἐσται; καθ' ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων 5
5 ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κρίσις τίνας ἀρχεῖν δεῖ (τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις
dιαφέρουσιν ἄλληλων, οἶον ἡ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἡ δὲ τῷ
dίᾳ τῶν σπουδαίων ἄνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη
tῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων): ἀλλ' ὄμως σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν ταῖθ' ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον, πῶς διοιριστέων. εἰ δὴ τὸν 6
10 ἀριθμὸν εἶν ὅληγοι πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἁρτῆν ἔχοντες, τίνα
dει διελεῖν τρόπον; ὥς τὸ ὅληγοι πρὸς τὸ ἐργὸν δεῖ σκοπεῖν,
εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος ὡστ'
eῖναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; ἐστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἀπαντᾶς
tοὺς διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν. δόξαιν 7
15 γὰρ (ἄν) οὐδὲν λέγειν δίκαιοι οἱ διὰ τὸν πλουτὸν ἀξιοῦντες
ἀρχεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος: δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ τὸς
πόλιν εἰς πλουσιότερος ἀπάντων ἐστὶ, δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ
tὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον τοῦτον ἀρχεῖν τὸν ἕνα ἀπάντων δεῖσαι,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενεία διαφέροντα τῶν ἀμφισβητοῦν-
20 τῶν δ' ἐλευθερίαν. ταῦτα δὲ τοῦτο ἱσώς συμβῆσεται καὶ 8
περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατιάς ἐπὶ τῆς ἁρτῆς: εἴ γὰρ τις εἰς ἀμεῖ-
νον ἁνὴρ εἰ ὅλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων ὄντων, τοῦτον εἶναι δεὶ κύριον κατὰ ταῦτα δίκαιον. οὕκοιν εἰ
καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι γε δεὶ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰσὶ τῶν
ολίγων, καν εἰς ἡ πλείους μὲν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν 25 πολλῶν κρείττους δαμ τῶν ἄλλων, τούτους ἀν δὲ ὅπιος ἐναι 9 μᾶλλον ἡ τὸ πλῆθος. πάντα δὴ ταῦτ' ἔοικε φανερῶν 10 ποιεῖν ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὅρων οὐδεὶς ὥρθος ἐστι, καθ' ὅν ἀξιοῦσιν αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ὑπὸ σφῶν ἄρχε- 11 σθαί πάντας, καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατ' ἄρετὴν 30 ἀξιοῦντας κυρίους εἰναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ πλοῦτον, ἔχοιεν ἄν λέγειν τὰ πλῆθη λόγον τινά δίκαιον: οὐδέν γὰρ κωλύει ποτὲ τὸ πλῆθος εἰναι βέλτιον τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ πλούσιωτέρων, οὐχ ὡς καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἄλλ' ὡς ἀθρόους. διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἦν ἢπτοῦσι καὶ προβάλ- 35 λουσί τινες, ἐνδέχεται τούτοις τὸν πρῶτον ἀπαίτων· ἀποροῦσι 10 γὰρ τινες πότερον τῷ νομοβετην νομοθετητον, βουλομένως τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιώνοιν συμφέρον ἡ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλείωνON, ὡτ' συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεύθην. 12 τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἰσως· τὸ δ' ἰσως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς 40 πόλεως ὄλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν πολι- τῶν· πολέτης δὲ κοινὴ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρ- χεσθαί ἐστι, καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἐτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν 1284 a ἀράστην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν ἀρτήριας τὸν κατ' ἄρετὴν, εἰ δὲ τίς ἔστιν εἰς τοσοῦτον 13 διαφέρων κατ' ἄρετὴν ὑπερβολήν, ἡ πλείους μὲν ἐνὸς μὴ μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλῆρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως, ὡστε μὴ 5 συμβλητήν εἰναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν ὀλύμμασιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἕκεινων, εἰ πλείους, εἰ δ' εἰς, τὴν ἐκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θετείν τούτους μέρος 14 πόλεως· ἄδικησσον γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἰσων, ἀνίκητο τοσοῦ- τον κατ' ἄρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ὀλύμμαν· ὅσπερ γὰρ 10 θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἰναι τὸν τοσοῦτον, δὲν δὴλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθετίαν ἀναγκαίον εἰναι περὶ τοὺς ἰσως καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ ὀλύμμαι· κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοσοῦτον οὐκ ἔστι νόμος· αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶ νόμος. καὶ γὰρ γελοίοις ἂν εἰη νομοθετείν τις πειρόμενοι κατ' αὐτῶν· λέγοιεν γὰρ ἄν ἰσως ἀπερ 'Αντι. 15
σθένης ἐφι τοὺς λέοντας δημηγοροῦντων τῶν δασυπόδων καὶ τὸ ἵππον ἄξιοντων πάντας ἔχειν. διὸ καὶ τίθενται τὸν ὀστρα-κοῦν αἱ δημοκρατοῦμεναι πόλεις, διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· αὐται γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν τὴν ἀιστήτα μάλιστα πάντων, ὡστε τοὺς δοκοῦσας ὑπέρεχειν δυνάμει διὰ πλούτου ἢ πολυ-φιλίαν ἢ τινα ἀλλήν πολιτικήν ἵσχυν ὀστράκιζον καὶ με-θύσασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως χρόνους ὀρισμένους. μυθολογεῖται 16 δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀργοναύτας τὸν Ἡρακλέα καταλιπεῖν διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄγειν τὴν Ἀργώ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς υπερβάλλοντα πολὺ τῶν πλωτήρων. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου Ἐρασυβοῦλφο συμβουλίαν οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμᾶν (φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περιάνδρον εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πεμ-17 φέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας, ἀφαιροῦντα δὲ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν σταχυῶν ὁμαλῶν τὴν ἄρουραν· θεοὶ ἀγνοοῦντο μὲν τοῦ κήρυκος τοῦ γυνομένου τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀπαγο-γελαντὸς δὲ τὸ συμπεσόν, συνυπόσα τὸν Ἐρασυβοῦλον διὶ δεῖ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἀνδρας ἀναιρεῖν). τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ μόνον 18 συμφέρει τοῖς τυράννοις, οὔδὲ μόνον οἱ τύραννοι ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ὀμοίως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δη-μοκρατίας· γὰρ ὀστρακισμὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν πρόποιν τινὰ τὸ κολοῦν τῶν ὑπερέχοντας καὶ φυγαδεύειν. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη ποιοῦσιν 19 κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ Ἀθηναίοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίους καὶ 40 Χίους καὶ Δεσσάιους (ἐπεὶ γὰρ βάττων ἐγκρατῶς ἔσχον τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐταπείνωσαν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τὰς συνθῆκας), ὁ δὲ Περ-1284 βὸν βασιλέως Μῆδος καὶ Βαβυλωνίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐπ' ἄρχης ἐπε-κοπτε πολλάκις. τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα καθόλου περὶ πάσας 20 ἐστὶ τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὀρθᾶς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβε-βηκυῖαι πρὸς τὸ ἐδιον ἀποσκοποῦσα τοῦτο δρώσων, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς τὸ κοινῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐπισκοποῦσα τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχει τρόπον. δὴλον δὲ τούτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν 21
καὶ ἐπιστημών· οὐτε γὰρ γραφεῖς ἐάσειν ἂν τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ἄφον, οὐδ' εἰ διαφέροι τὸ κάλλος, οὐτε ναυπηγὸς πρόμνιαν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι μορίων τῶν τῆς νεώς, οὐδὲ δὴ χοροδιδάσκαλος τὸν μείζον καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χοροῦ φθεγγόμενον ἔάσει συγ-χορεύει. ὡστε διὰ τούτο μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει τοὺς μονάρχους συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὀφελίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὕσης τούτο δρόσων. διό κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογού-15 μένας ὑπεροχὰς ἔχει τι δίκαιον πολιτικὸν ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ 22 τὸν ὀστρακισμὸν. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην εὖ ἀρχῆς οὕτω συντήσας τὴν πολιτείαν ὡστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης ἰατρείας· δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἣν συμβῇ, πειράσθαι τοιοῦτο τινὶ διορθώματι διορθοῦν. ὅπερ οὖν ἐγήγεντο περὶ τὰς πόλεις· 20 οὐ γὰρ ἐβλεπον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς οἰκείας συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ στασιαστικὸς ἐχρῶντο τοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβληκότις πολιτείαις ὡστε μὲν ἴδια συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον ἐστὶ, φανερόν, ἵσως δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, καὶ τούτο φανερόν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας 25 ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἁγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, οὐκ ἵσχυος καὶ πλοῦτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλ' 25 ἀν τις γέννηται διαφέρον κατ' ἀρετὴν, τί χρή ποιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ φαίειν ἃν δεῖν ἐκβάλλει καὶ μεθιστάναι τὸν τοιοῦ-τον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιοῦτοι· παραπλῆσιον 30 γὰρ κἂν εἶ τοῦ Δίδω ἄρχειν ἄξιοιν, μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς. λείπεται τοῦτον, ὅπερ ἐοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πάντας ἀσμένως, ὡστε βασιλεὰς εἶναι τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀδίδους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

"Ἰσος δὲ καλῶς ἔχει μετὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους με-14 ταβῆναι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ βασιλείας· φαμὲν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτείων μίαν εἶναι ταύτην. σκεπτέον δὲ πότερον συμφέρει τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς οἰκήσεσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρα βασιλεύεσθαι, ἥν οὖ, ἀλλ' ἀλλ' τις πολιτεία μᾶλ-2 λον, ἥ τις μὲν συμφέρει τισὶ δ' οὐ συμφέρει. δεῖ δὲ 40
πρῶτον διελέσθαι πότερον ἐν τῷ γένοι ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἢ πλείους

1285 ἂ ἔχει διαφοράς. ῥάδιον δὴ τούτῳ γε καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι πλεῖὼ

τε γένη περιέχει καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶν οὐχ εἰς

πασῶν. ἢ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Δακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι 3

βασιλεία μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ νόμον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάν-

των, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐξέλθη τῇ χώρᾳ, ἤγεμόνων ἔστι τῶν πρὸς

tὸν πόλεμον ἐτί δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἀποδέδωται τοῖς

βασιλείοις. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία οἴον στρατηγία τις 4

αὐτοκρατόρων καὶ αἴδιος ἐστὶν κτείναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ

μὴ ἐν τινὶ βασιλείᾳ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν ταῖς

10 πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ. δηλοῖ δ' Ὅμηρος: ὁ

γὰρ Ἀγαμέμνων κακῶς μὲν ἁκοίνων ἁνειχέτο ἐν ταῖς ἐκ-

κλησίαις, ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτείναι κύριος ἦν. λέγει γοῦν 5

"ὅν δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης, οὐ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσείται

φυγεῖν κύνας ἢ ὧν οἰόνους ἃ παρ' γὰρ ἐμοὶ βάνατος." ἐν μὲν

15 οὖν τούτ' εἰδῶς βασιλείαι, στρατηγία διὰ βιοῦ, τοῦτων δ' αἱ

μὲν κατὰ γένοις εἰσίν, αἱ δ' αἱρετά' παρὰ ταύτην δ' ἀλλὸ 6

μοναρχίαι εἰδὼς, οὐκει παρ' εἰναίς εἰσὶ βασιλεῖαι τῶν βαρ-

βάρων. ἔχουσι δ' αὐταὶ τὴν δύναμιν πάσαι παραπλησίαν

tυραννίσαι, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικά: διὰ γὰρ

20 τὸ δουλικότερον εἶναι τὰ ἣδη φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν

'Ἐλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περί τῇ Ἀσίᾳ τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἑυρώπην,

ὑπομένουσι τῇ δεσποτικῇ ἀρχῇ οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες.

tυραννικά μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰσών, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ 7

τὸ πάτρια καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βα-

25 σιλικὴ καὶ οὐ τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν' οἱ γὰρ πο-

λέται φυλάττουσιν δὴποιος τοὺς βασιλεῖς, τους δὲ τυράννους

ἔενικόν' οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἐκότων, οἱ δ' ἀκόν-

των ἁρχουσιν, ὡςδ' οἱ μὲν παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ δ' ἐπὶ
tοὺς πολίτας ἐχουσί τῇ φυλακίν. δύο μὲν οὖν εἰδὴ ταῦτα 8

30 μοναρχίας, ἐτερον δ' ὅπερ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖοι Ἐλληνσιν, οὕς

καλοῦσιν αἰσχμήτας. ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦθ' ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰσεῖν αἱρετὴ
tυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ
9 νόμον ἀλλὰ τῷ µή πάτριος εἶναι µόνον. ἥρχον δ' οἱ µὲν διὰ βίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οἱ δὲ µέχρι τινῶν φρισµένων χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, οὗν εἰλούτο ποτε Μιτυληναῖοι Πιττα-35 κόν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ὄν προειστήκεσαν Ἀντιµενίδης καὶ
10 Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. δηλοὶ δ' Ἀλκαῖος ὅτι τύραννον εἰλούτο τὸν Πιττακὸν ἐν τινὶ τῶν σκολιῶν µελῶν ἐπιτιµά γὰρ ὅτι "τὸν κακοπάτριδα Πιττακὸν πόλεως τὰς ἀχόλω καὶ
11 βαρυδαίμονος Ἑστάσαντο τύραννον µέγ' ἐπαινεύοντες ἀολ.-1285 b
12 λέει." αὕται µὲν οὖν εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἤσαν διὰ µὲν τὸ δεσποτικαὶ
eῖναι τυραννικαῖ, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἴρεται καὶ ἐκῶντων βασιλικαῖ·
tέταρτον δ' εἴδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς αἰ κατὰ τοὺς ἡρωῖ-
κοὺς χρόνους ἐκουσαί τε καὶ πάτριαι γιγνόµεναι κατὰ νόµον·
13 διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλῆθους εὑρεγέτας
cατὰ τέχνας ἢ πόλεµον, ἡ δὲ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι
χώραν, ἐγίγνοντο βασιλεῖς ἐκῶντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαµβά
νουσι πάτριοι. κύριοι δ' ἤσαν τῆς τε κατὰ πόλεµον ἡγε-
µονίας καὶ τῶν θυσίων, ὡσα µὴ ἱερατικαί, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις
tας δίκας ἐκριµον. τούτῳ δ' ἐποίουν οἱ µὲν οὖν ὀµνύνοντες,
οἱ δ' ὀµνύνοντες· ὁ δ' ὁρκος ἦν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἑπανάτασις.
14 οἱ µὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν
cαὶ τὰ ἐνδηµα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια συνεχῶς ἥρχον· ὡστερὸν
dὲ τὰ µὲν αὐτῶν παριέντων τῶν βασιλέων, τὰ δὲ τῶν ὄχλων
tαραρουµένων, ἐν µὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν αἱ πάτριαι ὑπε
κατελεύθησαν τοὺς βασιλεὺς µόνον, ὅτου δ' ἀξίων εἰσεπ
εῖναι βασιλεύαν, ἐν τοῖς ὑπερόριοις τῶν πολεµικῶν τὴν
ἡγεµονία µόνον εἴχον.
15 Βασιλείας µὲν οὖν εἰδὴ ταύτα, τέτταρα τῶν ἀριθµῶν, 20
µία µὲν ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωίκους χρόνους (αὕτη δ' ἦν ἐκῶντων
µὲν, ἐπὶ τισὶ δ' ὀµισµένοις· στρατηγὸς γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικα-
στής ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος), δευτέρα
δ' ἡ βαρβαρική (αὕτῃ δ' ἦστιν ἐκ γένους ἁρχὴ δεσποτική
cατὰ νόµον), τρίτη δὲ ἦν αἰσθηµνητείαν προσαγορεύουσιν 25
(αὕτη δ' ἦστιν αἴρετη τυραννίσ), τετάρτη δ' ἡ Δακωνικὴ

tούτων (αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς στρατηγία κατὰ γένος ἁίδιος)· αὕται μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν τρόπων διαφέρουσιν 15 ἀλλήλων, πέμπτον δ’ εἴδος βασιλείας, ὅταν ἣ πάντων 30 κύριος εἰς ὅν, ὡσπερ ἐκαστὸν ἥθνος καὶ πόλις ἑκάστη τῶν κοινῶν, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν· ὡσπερ γὰρ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἡ βασιλεία 15 πόλεως καὶ ἥθνους ἑνὸς ἡ πλείωνοι οἰκονομία. σχεδὸν δὴ δύο ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν εἰδὴ βασιλείας περὶ δὲν σκέπτεόν, αὕτη 35 τε καὶ ἡ Δακονική· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων αἱ πολλαὶ μεταξὺ τούτων εἰσὶν, ἔλαστῶν μὲν γὰρ κύριοι τῆς παμβασιλείας, πλείων 8’ εἰσὶ τῆς Δακονικῆς. ὡστε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν 2 περὶ δυοῖν ἐστὶν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσι στρατηγὸν ἁίδιον εἶναι, καὶ τούτων ἡ κατὰ γένος ἡ κατὰ μέρος, ἡ οὖ συμφέρει· ἐν δὲ πότερον ἕνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἡ οὖ συμφέρει. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἴδος ἡ πολιτείας (ἐν ἀπάσαισ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι τοῦτο ταῖς πολιτείαις), 5 ὡστ’ ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην. 6 δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασι- 3 λείας πολιτείας εἴδος ἐστὶν, ὡστε περὶ τούτου δεῖ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνοῦσας. ἀρχὴ δ’ ἐστὶ τῆς ζητῆσεως αὕτη, πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἄνδρος ἀρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀριστῶν νόμων. δοκοῦσι δὴ τοῖς 4 νομίζουσι συμφέρειν βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ καθόλου μόνον οἱ νόμοι λέγειν, ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν, ὡστ’ ἐν ὅποιαν τέχνῃ τὸ κατὰ γράμματ’ ἀρχεῖν ἡλίθιον καὶ ἐν Ἀγύπτῳ μετὰ τὴν τετρήμερον κινεῖν ἔξεστι τοῖς ἑαυτοῖς, ἐὰν δὲ πρότερον, ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ κινδύνῳ. φανερῶν τούν ὢς 15 οὐκ ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους ἀρίστη πολιτεία διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἴτιαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κάκευν δεὶ ὑπάρχειν 5 τῶν λόγων τὸν καθόλου τοῖς ἀρχουσιν· κρείττον δ’ ἡ μὴ πρόσεσθι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἡ δ’ συμφυής. τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ τούτῳ οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ’ ἀνθρωπίνην ἀνάγκη τούτ’ 20 ἔχειν πάσαν. ἀλλ’ ἔσως ἄν φαίνῃ τις ὡς ἀντὶ τούτου βου-
6 λεύσεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστα κάλλιον. ὅτι μὲν τούν ἀνάγκη νομοθέτην αὐτῶν εἶναι, δὴ λοιπον καὶ κείσθαι νόμους, ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων εἶναι δεὶ κυρίους· ὅσα δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν τὸν νόμον κρίνειν ἢ ὅλως ἢ εὖ, πότερον ἕνα τὸν ἀριστον δεί ἄρχειν ἢ πάντας; 25
7 καὶ γὰρ νῦν συνιόντες δικάζουσι καὶ βουλεύονται καὶ κρίνουσιν, αὐτοῖ δ' αἱ κρίσεις εἰσὶ πάσαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστον. καθ' ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὅσον συμβαλλόμενος ὀστισοῦν ἵσως χείρων· ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἐστίσισι συμφορήτος καλλίων μιᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τούτο καὶ κρίνει ἀμείνων 30 ὃ χλὸς πολλὰ ἢ εἰς ὀστισοῦν. ἐτὶ μᾶλλον ἀδιάφόρον τὸ πολύ, καθάπερ ὑδρο τὸ πλείον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἄδιαφροτέρον· τοῦ δ' ἐνδὸς ὑπ' ὄργης κρατηθέντος ἢ τινος ἐτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάραι τὴν κρίσιν, ἐκεῖ δ' ἐργὸν ἀμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν. 35
9 ἐστὸ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράσσοντες, ἀλλὰ ἡ περὶ ὅν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τούτῳ μὴ βάδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους εἶν ἄγαθοι καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολιταί, πότερον ὡς ἄδιαφροτέρος ἄρχον, ἢ μάλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἄγαθον 40 δὲ πάντες; ἢ δὴ λοιπὸν ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάζουσιν, 1286 b
10 ὡς δὲ εἰς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺ' ἀντιθέτον ἵσως ὅτι σπουδαίοι τὴν ψυχήν, ὡσπερ κάκεινος ὁ εἰς. εἰ δὴ τῇ τῆς μὲν τῶν πλείονων ἄρχην ἄγαθῶν δ' ἄνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρατίαι δετέον, τῇ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός βασιλείαν, ἀριστότερον ἂν εἰπταίς 5 πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρίς 11 δυνάμεως οὕσης τῆς ἄρχης, ἀν ἢ λαβεῖν πλείους ὁμοίους. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἵσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἂν εὑρεῖν ἄνδρας πολὺ διαφέροντας κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τὸτε μικράς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις. ἐτὶ δ' ἀπ' ἐνέργειαις καθίστασαν τοὺ' τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ἐργὸν τῶν ἄγαθῶν ἄνδρῶν, ἐπεὶ δὲ συνεβαίνει γίγνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον ἀλλ' ἐξήτου κοινῶν τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν.
30 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Γ’. 15–16.

ἐπεὶ δὲ χείρος γιγνόμενοι ἑξηρμηνεύοντο ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, 12
15 ἐνεπειθὲν τοθεν εὐλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὁλιγαρχίας· ἔντιμον
γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον. ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρῶτων εἰς τυραν-
νίδας μετέβαλλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννίδων εἰς δημοκρατίαν,
αιεῖ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἀγοντες δὲ ἀισχροκέρδειαν ἱσχυρότε-
ρον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὡστ’ ἐπιθέσατο καὶ γενέσθαι
20 δημοκρατίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μεῖξον εἶναι συμβεβηκε τὰς 13
πόλεις, ἰσως οὐδ’ ράδιον ἐτι γίγνεσθαί πολιτείαν ἐτέραν παρὰ
dημοκρατίαν. εἰ δὲ δὴ τις ἀριστὸν θείᾳ τὸ βασιλεύσει σα
ταῖς πόλεσι, πῶς ἔξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ
tὸ γένος δεὶ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γιγνομένων ὅποιοι τινες
25 ἐτυχον, βλαβερὸν. ἀλλ’ οὐ παραδώσει κύριος ὧν τοῖς 14
τέκνοις. ἀλλ’ οὐκέτι τοῦτο ράδιον πιστεύσαι χαλεπὸν γάρ,
καὶ μεῖξον ἀρετῆς ἢ κατ’ ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν. ἔχει δὲ
ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πότερον ἐξείν δεὶ τὸν
μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ἵσχυν τινα περὶ αὐτῶν, ἢ δυνηθεσται
30 βιάζεσθαι τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν, ἢ πῶς ἐνδεχεται
τὴν ἀρχὴν διουκειν; εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἰη κύριος, μη- 15
δὲν πράττων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅμως
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν, ἢ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους.
tάχα μὲν οὖν τὰ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ χαλεπὸν 16
35 διορίσαι (δει γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἵσχυν, εἰναι δὲ τοσαυτὴν τὴν
ἰσχὺν ὅστε ἐκάστου μὲν καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ συμπλειώνων κρέατο
τοῦ δὲ πλῆθους ἢπτω, καθάπερ οἱ τ’ ἀρχαῖοι τὰς φιλακὰς
ἐδίδοσαν, ὅτε καθισταίειν τινα τῆς πόλεως ὅν ἐκάλουν αἰσιμ-
νήτην ἢ τύραννον, καὶ Διονυσίῳ τίς, ὥτ’ ἦτε τοὺς φιλακάς,
40 συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακοσίοις διδόναι τοσοῦτον τοὺς φιλακάς).

1287a. 16 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βουλήσιν πάντα
πράττοντος δ’ τ’ ἐθύγος ἐφέστηκεν νῦν καὶ ποιητέον τὴν σκέ-
ψιν. ὦ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἐστὶν
ἐίδος, καθάπερ εἰπομεν, πολιτείας (ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ὑπάρ-
5 χειν ἐνδεχεται στρατηγιαν ἀλίβιον, οἶδον ἐν δημοκρατία καὶ
ἀριστοκρατία, καὶ πολλοί ποιοῦσιν ἕνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως·
τοιαύτη γάρ ἄρχη τίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμμον, καὶ περὶ 2 Ὀποίνιον δὲ κατὰ τι μέρος ἔλαττον; περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβα-
σιλείας καλομενής, αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ’ ἢν ἄρχει πάντα κατὰ τὴν ἐναυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεὺς—δοκεῖ δὲ τις εἰδέ κατὰ 10
φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅπως
συνέστηκεν ἐξ ὀμοίων ἢ πόλις τοῖς γάρ ὀμοίως φύει τὸ
αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὴν αὕτην ἀξίαν κατὰ φύσιν
eἶναι, ὅστ’ εἶπεν καὶ τὸ ἱστὸν ἔχει τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφὴν ἢ
ἐσθήτα βλαβερὸν τοῖς σάμασιν, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς
3 τιμάς, ὁμοίως τοῖς καὶ τὸ ἀνίσου τοὺς έσσους. διὸσπερ οὐδὲν
μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἀρχέσθαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος τῶν
φασάτως. τοῦτο δ’ ἢδη νόμος· ἡ γὰρ τάξις νόμος. τὸν
ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετῶτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνα
4 τιμά, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγου τοῦτον, κἂν εἰ τίνας ἄρχειν 20
βέλτιον, τούτους καταστατέων νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς
νόμοις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναι τίνας ἄρχας, ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐνα τοῦ-
τον εἶναι φασὶ δίκαιον ὀμοίων γε δυτῶν πάντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν
ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὕτ’ ἀνθρωπὸς
5 ἀν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ’ ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος 25
ἐφίστηζ ἡ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν
tοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἐτί δ’ ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν, ὅ τι ἀν δόξῃ
πειραμένοις ἀμείνοι εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον
κελεύον ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νόμον
μόνον, ὁ δ’ ἀνθρωπον κελεύον προστίθησι καὶ θηρίων· ἢ τε 30
γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ
tοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας. διὸσπερ ἀνευ ὃρέξιον νοὸς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν.
6 τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεύδος, οτι τὸ
κατὰ γράμματα ἱατρεύεσθαι φασίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰρετῶτερον
7 χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φι- 35
λιαν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἄριστα διὰ τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς
κάμνοντας ὑγιάσαντες· οἱ δ’ ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἄρχαῖς
πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθαι πράττειν, ἐπει καὶ
tοὺς ἱατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύσαι πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἔχθροῖς δια-
40 φθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπεῖαν ἡτήσαιεν ἀν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονται γ' ἐφ' ἐαυτοῦς 8

1287 b οἱ ἰατροὶ κάμπνοις ἀλλούς ἰατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυ- 

μναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τε οἰκεῖον καὶ εἰν πάθει ὄντες. ὥστε δήλου οτι τὸ δίκαιον ξητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ξητοῦσιν' ὁ γὰρ νόμος τὸ
5 μέσον. ἔτι κυρίωτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμ- 

ματα νόμοι οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσίν, ὥστε εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμ- 

ματα ἀνθρωπος ἁρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔδε βάδιον ἐφορᾶν πολλὰ τῶν ἐνα' δεήσει ἀρα πλείονας εἰναι τοὺς ὅπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας,
10 ὥστε τι διαφέρει τοῦτο εξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἐνα 

καταστήσαται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, δ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον 10 ἔστιν, εἰπερ ὁ ἀνήρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἁρχείν δι- 

καιος, τοῦ δὲ ἐνος οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίων τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι τὸ 

"σὺν τε δὺ ἐρχομένῳ" καὶ εἰ ἐκχ. τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, "τοιοῦ-
15 τοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες." εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνών αἱ ἀρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνειν, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ δὲν ὁ νόμος ἀδυνατεί διαρίζειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ δὲν γε δυνάτος, οὔδεις ἀμφισβή- 

τεῖ περὶ τούτων ὥς οὐκ ἀν ἁριστα ὁ νόμος ἁρχεῖε καὶ κρίνειεν. 

ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοὺς νόμους τὰ 11
20 δὲ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ποιεῖ διαπορείν καὶ ξητεῖν πότερον 

tὸν ἁριστὸν νόμον ἁρχεῖν αἰρετῶτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἁρι- 

στὸν περὶ δὲν γὰρ βουλεύονται νομοθετῆσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων κρίνην. οὐ τούν τοῦτο γ' ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἁναγκαίον ἁν-

θρωπον εἶναι τὸν κρινοῦτα περὶ τοῦτον τον τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ 

25 ἕνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς. κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἀρχων πεπαι- 

12 δευμένοι ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἀτοπῶν τ' ἱσος ἂν εῖναι 

dοξεῖν εἰ βελτίον ἵδοι τις δυνών ὑμμασε καὶ δυσίν ἁκοαίς 

κρίνων, καὶ πράττων δυσὶ ποσὶ καὶ χερσίν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολ-

λοις, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὁφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μύναρχοι ποιοῦσιν 

30 αὐτῶν καὶ ὅτα καὶ χείρας καὶ πόδας' τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἁρχῇ καὶ 

αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες 13
οὐ ποιήσουι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαίρεσιν· εἰ δὲ φίλοι
cάκεινου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὃ γε φίλος ἰσος καὶ ὁμοίως, ὥστ' εἰ
tούτους οἴηται δεῖν ἀρχεῖν, τοὺς ἰσούς καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οἴηται
dεῖν ὁμόλογοι. ἂ μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν ἔ
λειν λέγουσιν, σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ἰσος ταῦτ' ἐπὶ μὲν 17
τινών ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἐπὶ δὲ τινῶν οὐχ οὕτως. ἐστὶ
gάρ τι φύσει διέσπαστόν καὶ ἄλλο βασίλευτόν καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικὸν καὶ
dίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον τυραννικὸν δ' οὖν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ὁσαὶ παρεκβάσεις εἰσίν' 40
2 ταῦτα γὰρ γίγνεται παρὰ φύσιν. ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων
gε ἱσερνεύν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἰσοίς οὔτε συμφέρον 1288 a
ἐστίν οὔτε δίκαιον ἐκάρυσιν εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ νόμον δι-
tων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὅντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμον ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν
οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθῶν, οὔδ' ἂν κατ' ἀρετὴν
3 ἀμείων ἵ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τὶς δ' ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέων· 5
eἰρηται δὲ ποι ἤδη καὶ πρότερον. πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ
βασιλεύτων καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικὸν.
4 βασιλεύτων μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔστι πλῆθος δ' πέφυκε φέρειν
gένους ὑπέρεχον κατ' ἀρετὴν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικὴν, ἀρισ-
tοκρατικὸν δὲ πλῆθος δ' πέφυκε φέρειν πλῆθος ἄρχεσθαι το
dυνάμενον τήν τῶν ἑλεύθερων ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν
ἡγεμονικὸν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν, πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος ἐν
d' πέφυκεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικὸν, δυνάμενον ἄρ-
χεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμοντα
5 τοῖς εὐποροῖς τὰς ἄρχας. ὅταν οὖν ἡ γένους ὄλον ἡ καὶ τῶν 15
ἀλλών ἑνα τινὰ συμβῆ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν
τοσούτον ὅσθ' ὑπερέχειν τήν ἐκεῖνον τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων,
tότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τούτο βασιλικόν καὶ κύριον πάντων
δ καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἑνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ εἰρήται πρότερον,
οὐ μόνον οὔτους ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὁ προφέρειν εἰσάθασιν 20
οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες, οἱ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς καὶ
οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίκας καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικὰς (πάντη
gάρ καὶ ὑπέρσχεν ἀξιόουσιν, ἀλλ' ὑπέρσχεν οὐ τὴν αὐτῆν),
πολιτικών Γ’. 17–18—Δ’ (Η’). 1.

άλλα καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν. οὐτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἦ 7
25 φυγαδεύειν οὐδ’ ὀστρακίζειν δὴ που τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἔστιν,
οὔτ’ ἄξιον ἀρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος’ οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος
ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τῇ τηλικαύτῃ ὑπερβολῇ
ἔχοντι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ὅστε λειπέται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ 8
τοιοῦτῳ, καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος τούτον ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς.
30 περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας, τίνας ἦχει διαφόρας, καὶ πότερον
οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ συμφέρει, καὶ τίς, καὶ πῶς,
18 διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς φαμέν ἐναὶ τὰς
ὁρᾶσι πολιτείας, τούτων δ’ ἀναγκαῖον ἀρίστην εἶναι τῆν ὑπὸ
tῶν ἀρίστων οἰκονομομένην, τοιαύτη δ’ ἐστὶν ἐν ἧ συμβέβη-
35 κεν ἡ ἐνα τινὰ συμπάντων ἡ γένος ὄλην ἢ πλῆθος ὑπερέχου
εἶναι κατ’ ἀρετὴν, τῶν μὲν ἀρχεσθαι δυναμένων τῶν δ’ ἀρχειν
πρὸς τὴν αἱρετωσάμην ζοφὴν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρότεσι ἐδείχθη λόγοι
ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ πολιτῶν
τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸν τούτον τρόπον καὶ
40 διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἄνηρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν συντή-
σεις ἀν τὶς ἀριστοκρατομένην ἡ βασιλευμένη, ἣς’ ἐσται
καὶ παιδεία καὶ θῆς ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον
ἀνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν.

διωρισμε- 2

νον δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἢ ὅτι πειρατέον λέγειν τῆς
ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπων καὶ κακίστασθαι πῶς.
5 [ἀνάγκη δῆ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσή-
κουσαν σκέψιν]

Δ’ (Η’).

ἀνάγκη δῆ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν
1323α14 προσήκουσαν σκέψιν [περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα
15 ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκη] διορίσασθαι
πρῶτον τῆς αἱρετώσατος βίος. ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦτον καὶ
tῆς ἀρίστης ἀναγκαίον ἀδήλον εἶναι πολιτείαν’ ἀριστα γὰρ
πράττειν προσήκει τὸς ἀριστα πολιτευμένου ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρ-
2 χόντων αυτῶν, έαν μή τι γίγνηται παράλογον. διό δεῖ πρῶτον διδολογεῖσθαι τῖς οἱ πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν αἱρετώτατος βίος, μετὰ 20 δὲ τούτῳ πότερον κοινὴ καὶ χωρίς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἔτερος. νομίσαντας οὖν ικανός πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης δοσίς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέων αυτῶς.

3 ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὖδεὶς ἀμφισβητήσῃ τινὰ ν ὁ ὁ τῶν οὐ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν 25 τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ πάντα ταῦτα ὡπάρχειν 4 τοῖς μακαρίους χρή. οὖδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακάριον τὸν μηδὲν μόριον ἤχοντα ἀνδρίας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης μηδὲ φρονίσεως, ἀλλὰ δεδίδοτα μὲν τὰς παραπετομένας μιᾶς, ἀπεχθὲμεν ἃε μηδενός, ἂν ἐπιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἃ 30 πείν, τῶν ἑσχάτων, ἑνεκά τε τεταρτημορίου διαφελοῦσα τοὺς φιλήτατον φίλους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὗτος ἄφρον καὶ διενευμένον ὡσπερ τι παιδίον ἢ μαινό- 5 μενον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγομεν ὡσπερ πάντες ἃν συγ- χωρήσειαν, διαφέρονται δ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαίσι. 35 τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἤχειν ικανόν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ὄποσοιν, πλούτου δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ πάν- 6 των τῶν τοιούτων εἰς ἀπειρον ἕτούσι τὴν ὑπερβολῆν. ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτῶς ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ράβδον μὲν περὶ τούτων καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔργων διαλαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, ὀρῶντας ὅτι κτώνται καὶ 40 φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἤκεινα ταῦται, καὶ τὸ ̣ζένεν εὐδαιμόνες, εἰτ' ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἰτ' ἐν ἀρετῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τῷ ̣ ἡδον μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολῆν, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἐξο κτήσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν, ἢ τοῖς ἤκεινα μὲν κεκτημένοις πλεῖον τῶν χρησίμων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις 5 ἐλλείπουσιν οὐ μήν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοπουμένοις 7 εὐθυνόττον ἐστιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἤχει πέρας, ὡσπερ ὄργανον τι' πάν δὲ τὸ χρησίμων ἐστὶν, δόν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἡ βλάπτειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηδὲν ὁφελος εἶναι αὐτῶν τοῖς ἤχουσιν τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆν ἐκαστὸν ἀγαθῶν, ὅσον περ ἀν 10
πολιτικῶν ἄρει (Ἡ'). 1–2.

ὑπερβάλλῃ, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον χρήσιμον εἶναι, εἰ δὲι καὶ τούτος ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον. ὅλως τε δὴν ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστον πράγματος πρὸς ἀλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, ἵνατε ἐξεῖπή διάστασιν δῶν φαμέν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας. ὥστε ἐπερ ἐστίν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος τιμιώτερον καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀνάγκῃ καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστοτε ἀνάλογον τοῦτων ἔχειν. ἐτί δέ 9 τῆς ψυχῆς ἔνεκεν ταύτα πέφυκεν αἱρετὰ καὶ δὲι πάντας 20 αἱρείσθαι τοὺς εὗ φρονοῦντας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνον ἔνεκεν τὴν ψυχήν. οτι μὲν οὖν ἐκάστῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλει τοσοῦ- 10 τὸν ὅσον περ ἁρτήσης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, ἐστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμε- νοῖς, οὐς εὐδαιμόνες μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριοι, δὲ οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν 25 ἐξωτερικῶν ἁγαθῶν ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτῶν αὐτῶς καὶ τῷ ποιὸς τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν' ἐπει καὶ τὴν εὐνυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταύτ' ἀναγκαίον ἐτέραν εἶναι (τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἁγαθῶν 20 τῆς ψυχῆς αἵτων ταυτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη, δίκαιος δ' οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ σώφρον ἀπὸ τὺχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἑστὶν): ἐχόμενον 11 δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονία 25 τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν τοὺς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν' οὐδὲν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον οὔτ' ἀνδρὸς οὔτε πόλεως χωρίς ἁρτήσης καὶ φρονήσεως' ἀνδρία 12 δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει 35 δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, ὅν μετασχῶν ἐκαστὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγειν δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταύτα 13 μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐστὼ πεφροιμισμένα τὸ λόγῳ (οὔτε γὰρ μὴ θυγαγάνειν αὐτῶν δυνάτον, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξελθεῖν ἑνδέχεται λόγους οὔτε ἐτέρας γάρ ἐστὶν ἐργὸν σχολῆς) 40 ταύτα' νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἀριστός, καὶ χωρίς ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῆ ταῖς πόλεσι, ὁ μετὰ ἁρτής κεχο- 1324 ά ῥηημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὅστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἁρτήν πρά- ἐσων, πρὸς δέ τούς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐάσαντας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν 14
μεθόδου, διασκεπτέων ύστερον, εἰ τις τοὺς εἰρημένους τυγχάνει μη πειθόμενος).

Πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἐνὸς τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν, λοιπὸν ἐστίν εἰσεῖν. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἡ ὁμολογήσεια εἶναι τὴν αὐτήν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν πλοῦτῳ τὸ ζῆν εἰ τίθενται ἐφ’ ἐνός, οὕτω καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, ἕαν ἢ πλουσία, μακριζόσων· ὅσοι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τιμῶσιν, 10 οὕτω καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστοιν ἄρχουσαν εὐδαιμονεστάτην ἂν εἶναι φαίνετι εἰ τέ τις τὸν ἑα δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀποδέχεται,

3 καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιότεραν. ἀλλὰ ταύτ’ ἂν δοῦ ἐστὶν ἂς δεῖται σκέψεως, ἐν μὲν πότεροι αἱρε- τάτεροι βίοι, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως 15 ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ἱενικός καὶ τής πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολευ- μένος, ἦτο δὲ τίνα πολιτείαν θετέων καὶ ποίαν διάδεσιν πόλεως ἀρίστην, εἴτε πάσιν ὄντος αἱρετοῦ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως 4 εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τής πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας ταύτ’ ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλ’ οὖ τὸ περὶ 20 ἐκαστὸν αἱρετῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προηρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ πάρεργον ἂν εἰς τούτο δὲ ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου 5 ταυτῆς· ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτείαν ἀρίστην ταὐτήν καθ’ ἂν τάξιν κάν ὁστισοῦν ἀρισταὶ πράττοι καὶ ἵπποι μακριῶς, φανερῶν ἐστὶν’ ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρ’ αὐτῶν τῶν 25 ὁμολογοῦντων τῶν μετ’ ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίων αἱρετῶσιν, πότερον ὁ πολιτικός καὶ πρακτικός βίος αἱρέτως ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολευμένος, οὗν θεωρητικὸς τις, ὃν 6 μὸν ὁμιλεῖς φασίν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτους τοὺς δύο βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ φιλοτιμότατοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν 30 φαίνονται προαρισκοῦντες, καὶ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τῶν νῦν’ λέγω δὲ δύο τῶν τε πολιτικῶν καὶ τῶν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ μικρὸν ποτέρως ἔχει τὸ ἀληθὲς· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν γε εὑροῦντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίων σκοπὸν συντάττεσθαι καὶ τῶν 7 ἀνθρώπων ἐκαστόν καὶ κοινῆ τῆς πολιτείαν. νομίζουσι δ’ οἱ 35
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Δ’ (Η’). 2–3.

μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικὸς μὲν γιγνόμενον μετ’ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἄρχειν τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικώς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον ὑπὸ τῆς ἄρχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἄρχειν τῇ πρὸι αὐτῶν εὐημερίας τοῦτων δ’ ὁσπερ εἰς ἐναντίας ἐτέρων τυγχάνουσιν δοξάζοντες, μόνον 40 γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικὸν, ἡς ἐκάστης γὰρ ἀρετής ὑπὸ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἰδιόταισιν θῶς τὰ κοινὰ πράστουσι καὶ πολιτευόμενοι. οἱ μὲν οὖν 8 οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνονσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸν δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εὐδαιμονάς φασιν. παρ’ ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οὕτως ὅροι καὶ τῶν νόμων, ὅπως 5 δεσπόζοσι τῶν πέλασι. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδης 9 ὃς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὃμως εἶ ποι τι πρὸς ἐν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσιν, τοῦ κρατεῖν στοχάζονται πάντες, ὡσπερ ἐν Δακεδαίμοι καὶ Κρήτη πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντετάκται σχεδὸν ἡ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος. ἔτι δ’ ἐν 10 10 τοῖς ἐθνεσὶ πάσι τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν ἡ τοιαύτη τετίμηται δύναμις, οὗν ἐν Σκύθαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Θρᾴκι καὶ Κελτοῖς· ἐν ἐνίοις γὰρ καὶ νόμοι τίνες εἰσὶ παραξύνωντες πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασι τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμων λαμβάνειν ὅσα ἀν στρατεύσων- 15 ται στρατείας· ἦν δὲ ποτε καὶ περὶ Μακεδονίαν νόμους τὸν 11 μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότα πολέμου ἄνδρα περιεξόσθαι τὴν φορ- βείαν· ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἔχειν πίνειν ἐν ἑρτῇ τινὶ σκύφων περιφερόμενον τὸ μηδένα ἀπεκταγκότα πολέμου· ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἰβηροί, ἐθνεὶ πολεμικῷ, τοσούτους τὸν ἄριθμον ὅβελισκον 20 καταπηγνύσι περὶ τὸν τάφον ὅσους ἀν διαφθείρῃ τῶν πολεμιῶν καὶ ἑτερα δὴ παρ’ ἑτέρωι ἐστὶ τοιαύτα πολλά, 12 τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἐθεσίων. καὶ τοῖς δέχεσθαι ἀν ἄγαν ἀτόπον ἴσως εἶναι τοῖς βουλομένωι ἐπίσκοπεῖν, εἰ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἐργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἄρχη 25 καὶ δεσποτίκη τῶν πλησίον καὶ βουλομένων καὶ μὴ βουλομένων. πῶς γὰρ ἐν εἰς τοῦτο πολιτικὸν ἡ νομοθετικόν, ὃ γε μηδὲ 13 νόμιμον ἔστιν· οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως ἄλλα
καὶ ἄδικος ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν δ’ ἐστι καὶ μὴ δικαίως. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαὶς ἐπιστήμαις τούτῳ ὄρφιεν· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ιατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνῆτος ἔργων ἐστὶ τὸ ἢ πείσαι ἢ βιά— 30 σασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτήρας.

14 ἀλλ’ ἐοίκασιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν οἴεσθαι ἐναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς ἔκαστοι οὐ φασιν ἐναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ συμφέρον, τοῦτ’ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκοῦντες· αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ παρ’ αὐτοῖς τὸ δικαίως ἄρχειν ζητοῦσι, πρὸς 35 δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἀτοπον δὲ εἰ μὴ φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσποτῶν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ οὐ δεσποτῶν, ὥστε εἰπέρ ἔχει τὸν πρόπον τούτον, οὗ δεὶ πάντων πειρᾶσθαι δεσποζείν, ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποτῶν, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ βοίνην ἢ θυ- σίαν ἀνθρώπως, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρεύτων· ἐστὶ δὲ θη- 40 ρεντὸν δ’ ἂν ἄγριον ἢ ἐδεστὸν ζῷον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰῃ γ’ ἄν καὶ καθ’ ἐαυτὴν μία πόλις εὐδαίμοναν, ἢ πολιτεύεται δηλονότητι 1325 καλῶς, εἰπέρ ἐνδέχεται πόλιν οἰκεῖσθαι ποι βαθ’ ἐαυτὴν νό- μοις χρωμένην σπουδαίος, ἡς τῆς πολιτείας ἡ σύνταξις οὐ πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἔσται τῶν πολεμίων.

15 μηδὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιοῦτον. δῆλον ἀρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς 5 πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλὰς μὲν θετέων, οὕδ’ ὃς τέλος δὲ πάντων ἀκρότατον, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνου χάριν ταῦτας. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίον ἐστὶ τὸ θεάσασθαι πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς πώς

16 μεθέξουσι καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίας. διοίσει 10 μέντοι τῶν τατομέων ἐνα νομίμων καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομο- θετικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδείν, ἐὰν τινας ὑπάρχωσι γειτινώντες, ποια πρὸς ποίους ἀσκητέοι ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἐκάστους χρη- στέον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν κἂν υστερον τούχοι τῆς προσηκούσης σκέψεως, πρὸς τὶ τέλος δεὶ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συντείνειν’ 15 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν τὸν μετ’ ἀρετῆς εἰναι βίον 3 αἰρετότατον, διαφερομένους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, λε- κτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφότερος αὐτοῦ (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμά- ζουσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἄρχας, νομίζοντες τὸν τε τοῦ ἐλευθέρου
20 βίον ἔτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἱρετῶτατον, οἷς ὡς τούτους ἀριστοὺς· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τῶν μηδὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὗ, τῆς δὲ εὐπραγίαν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι ταύτων) ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀμφότεροι λέγουσιν ὅρθως ὑπὲρ τὰς δὲ οὐκ ὅρθως, οἷς μὲν ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ ἀμείνων τούτῳ 25 γὰρ ἀληθῶς οὖν ὥστε τὸ γε δοῦλος ή δοῦλος, ξηρῆσαι γεμών τὸν ἀρχήν εἶναι δεσποτεῖαν οὐκ ὅρθως· οὐ γὰρ ἐλάττων διεστηκεν τῆς ἐλευθέρου ἀρχῆς τῆς τῶν δούλων οὗτοι τὸ φύσει ἐλεύθερον τοῦ 30 φύσει δούλου, διάφριται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἰκανός εἰς τοῖς πράxeισι λόγοις. τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν τοῦ πράττειν ὧν ἀληθῶς· ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πράξεις ἐστιν. ἐτεί πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν δικαίων καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις. κακοὶ ταῖς ἀν υπολάβου τις τούτων οὕτω διώρισα 35 μένων ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἀριστοῦ· οὕτω γὰρ ἄν πλείονται καὶ καλλίστον κύριος εἰ ἐξεῖνεν. ὡστε οὐ δεὶ 4 τῶν ὑπάρχων ἀρχεῖν παρεῖναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀφαιρέσθαι, καὶ μῆτε πατέρα παιδῶν μῆτε παιδὰς πατρὸς μήθ᾽ ὁλος φίλον φίλον μηδένα ὑπολογίζειν μηδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο 40 φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἀριστοῦν αἱρετῶτατον, τὸ δὲ εὗ πράττειν ἀριστοῦ. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ίσως λέγουσιν, εἰπὲν ὑπάρ. 1325 ἐξει τοὺς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένους τὸν ὅντων αἱρέτων τατον· ἀλλ᾽ ἵσως οὖν ὅν τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑποτίθενται τοῦτο τοῖς 5 πολλοὶ θεοὺς οὐ γὰρ ἐτι καλὸς τὰς πράξεις εὐδέχεται εἶναι τῷ μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσοι ἀνήρ γυναικὸς ή πατὴρ 5 τέκνων ή δεσπότης δούλων· ὡστε ὁ παραβαίνων οὐδὲν ἃν τηλικοῦντα κατορθώσειν ὑστερον ὅσον ἔδη παρεκβεβήκε τῆς ἀρετῆς. τοῖς γὰρ ὅμοιοι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ πάκαλον εἶν τῷ (ἐν) μέρει, τοῦτῳ γὰρ ἵσων καὶ ὅμοιως· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἵσων τοῖς ἵσοις ἐκαὶ τὸ μὴ ὅμοιον τοῖς ὅμοιοι παρὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν 10 παρὰ φύσιν καλὸν. διὸ κἀκεῖνος τίς κρείττων κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀριστῶν, τοῦτο
7 καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. δεῖ δ' οὖν μόνον ἄρετὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθ' ἦν ἐσται πρακτικός. ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐθαμομοίαν εὐπραγιὰν θετέον, καὶ κοινῆ πάσης πόλεως ἄν εἰη καὶ καθ'

8 ἐκαστὸν ἄριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἔτερους, καθάπερ οἴονταί τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς διανοιὰς εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαίνοντων χάριν γιγνομένας ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἑνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ διανοή-20 σεις. ή γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὡστε καὶ πράξις τις μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίος καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοιαῖς ἀρχιτέκτονας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖν ἀπρακτεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς καθ' αὐτὰς πόλεις ἰδρυμένας καὶ ζῆν οὕτω προηρημέναις ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τούτῳ 25 συμβαίνειν· πολλαὶ γὰρ κοινωνίας πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς μέ·

10 ρετὶ τῆς πόλεως εἰσίν. ὅμοιος δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ καθ' ἐνὸς ὑπονόην τῶν ἀνθρώπων· σχολὴ γὰρ ἄν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλὸς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, οἷς οὐκ εἰσίν ἐξωτερικὰ πράξεις παρὰ τὰς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν. ότι μὲν οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν βιόν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τὸν ἄριστον ἐκάστῳ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεις καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, φανερὸν ἐστὶν·

'Ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφρομιάστατι τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περί αὐτῶν, 4 καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἡμῖν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, ἀρχὴ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰπέων πρῶτον πολία τινὰς δεῖ τὰς ὑποθέ-35 σεις εἰσὶν περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχὴν συνεστάναι πόλεως·

2 οὐ γὰρ οἶνον τε πολιτείαν γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην ἀνευ συμμε-τροῦ χορηγίας. διὸ δεὶ πολλὰ προὐποτεθείσθαι καθάπερ εὐχόμενος, εἰναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον. λέγω δὲ

3 οἶνον περὶ τε πλῆθους πολιτών καὶ χώρας. ὁσπερ γὰρ καὶ 40 τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς, οἶνον υφάντη καὶ ναυπηγοῦ, δεὶ τὴν ὑλὴν ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδεύειν οὕτων πρὸς τὴν ἑργασίαν (ὅσον 1326 a γὰρ ἄν αὕτη τυγχάνῃ παρεσκευασμένη βέλτιον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἰναι κάλλιον), οὕτω καὶ
τὸ πολιτικό καὶ τὸ νομοθέτη δεῖ τὴν οἰκείαν ὑλὴν ὑπάρχειν 5 ἐπιτηδείως ἔχουσαν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρώτον τὸ τε πλήθος τῶν ἄνδρων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεὶ φύσει, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ὀσαύτως, ὡσην τε εἶναι καὶ ποίαι τινὰτ ταὐτὴν, οἴονται μὲν οὖν οἱ πλείστοι προσήκειν μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν ευδαίμονα πόλιν, εἰ δὲ τούτ' ἀληθές, ἀγνοοοῦσι ποία μεγάλη καὶ ποία μικρὰ πόλις, κατ' 5 ἄριθμον γὰρ πλήθος τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων κρίνουσι τὴν μεγάλην, δεὶ δὲ μᾶλλον μη εἰς τὸ πλήθος εἰς δὲ δύναμιν ἀποβλέπειν. ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον, ὡστε τὴν δυναμένην τούτῳ μᾶλλον ἀποτελεῖν, ταὐτὴν οἰστέων εἶναι μεγάλην, οἷον Ἰπποκράτην οὐκ ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ ἱατρὸν εἶναι μείζον φύσειν ἀν τις τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος, οὐ 6 μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ δὲ κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ πλήθος ἀποβλέποντας, οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλήθος τούτῳ ποιητέον (ἀναγκαίων γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἱσως ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἄριθμον πολλῶν 20 καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων), ἀλλὰ οὕτω πόλεως εἰσὶ μέρος καὶ ἐξ ὦν συνίσταται πόλις οἰκείων μορίων, ἢ γὰρ τούτων ὑπεροχὴ τοῦ πλῆθους μεγάλης πόλεως σημεῖον, ἐξ ἃς δὲ βάναυσοι μὲν ἐξερχονται πολλοί τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὑπῆρξει δὲ ὁλγοι, ταὐτήν ἄδυναν εἶναι μεγάλην οὐ γὰρ ταύτῃν μεγάλη τε 25 πόλις καὶ πολυάνθρωπος. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τούτῳ γε ἐκ τῶν 7 ἔργων φανερῶν ὅτι χαλεπόν, ἱσως δὲ ἄδυναν, εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπον. τῶν γούν δοκοῦσών πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς οὐδεμιᾶν ὑρῶμεν οὕτως ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος, τούτῳ δὲ δήλον καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστεως. ὃ τε γὰρ 30 νόμος τάξεις τίς ἔστι, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαίον εὐτάξιαν εἶναι, ὃ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβᾶλλων ἄριθμος οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως: θείας γὰρ δὴ τούτῳ δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἣτις καὶ τὸ ὅσε ὑπέχει τὸ πάντει τοῦ τε καὶ μεγέθει εἰσθε γίνεσθαι, διὸ καὶ πόλις ἦς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς 35 ὁρος ὑπάρχει, ταὐτὴν εἶναι καλλιστὴν ἀναγκαίοιτ. ἀλλ' ἐστι τι καὶ πόλεως μεγέθους μέτρον, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάν-
1326 a 4—1326 b 28.

10 των, ζώων φυτῶν ὄργανω καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἔκαστον οὔτε λίαν μικρῶν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἔξει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύνα-

μιν, ἀλλ’ ὅτε μὲν ὁλως ἐστηρμένον ἔσται τῆς φύσεως, ὅτε δὲ φαύλως ἔχον, οἷον πλοίοι σπιθαμιαίοι μὲν οὐκ ἔσται 40 πλοίοι ὁλως, οὔτε δυοὶ σταδίοι, εἰς δὲ τι μέγεθος ἐλθὼν ὅτε μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα φαύλην ποιῆσε τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ὅτε δὲ ἔνα πλοῖο ἢ τότε.

11 διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, ὦμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις ἢ μὲν ἐξ ὁλίγων λιαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης (ἡ δὲ πόλις αὐτάρκες), ἢ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἀγαν ἐν τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ὁπερ ἐθνος, ἀλλ’ οὐ πόλις: πολιτείαι γάρ οὐ βάθιον ὑπάρχειν τίς γὰρ στρατη-

5 γὸς ἐσται τοῦ λιαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλῆθους, ἢ τίς κήρυξ μὴ Ἐπιτείρειος; διὸ πρὸτῆν μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαίον τὴν ἐκ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος οὗ πρῶτον πλῆθος αὐτάρκες πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν

12 ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν ταυτὴν ὑπερβάλλον κατὰ πλῆθος εἶναι μείζων πόλιν, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡσπερ εἰπομεν, ἀφίσσιν. τὸς δ’ ἐστιν ὁ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὀρος, ἐκ τῶν ἐργὴν ἰδεῖν βάθιον. εἰς γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ’ ἀρχομένων,

13 ἀρχόντως δ’ ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσεις ἐργον πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανέμειν κατ’ ἀξίαν ἀναγκαίον γνωρίζειν ἄλληλους, ποιοὶ τινὲς εἰσί, τοὺς πολίτας, ὡς ὅτου τούτω μὴ συμβαίνει γέγονεν δι’ ὅτι 

15 ἀνάγκη γέγονεν τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς κρίσεις, περὶ ἀρμότερα γὰρ οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδίαζεν, ὑπ’ εὐ.

14 τῇ πολιονθροπίᾳ τῇ λιαν ὑπάρχει φανερώς. ἔτι δὲ ἔνοις καὶ μετοίκος ράθιον μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς πολιτείας οὐ γὰρ 

15 χαλέπος τὸν λανθάνειν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ πλῆθους. δῆ-

λον τούσιν ὡς οὕτως ἐστὶ πόλεως ὁρος ἀριστος, ἡ μεγίστη τοῦ 

πλῆθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ᾗς εὐσύνοπτος. περὶ 

μὲν οὖν μεγέθους πόλεως διωρίσθω τῶν τρόπων τοῦ:

25 Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας ἔχει. περὶ 

5 μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποίαν τινά, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν αὐτάρκεστάτην πᾶς 

τίς ἀν ἐπαινέσειν· τοιαύτην δ’ ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τὴν παν-
τοφόρον· τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς
30 αὐτάρκεις. πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει τοσαύτην ὡστε δύνασθαι
tοὺς οἰκούντας ἦν σχολάζοντας ἑλευθερίως ἀμα καὶ σω-
φρόνως. τούτων δὲ τὸν δρόνον εἰ καλῶς ἡ μὴ καλῶς λέγομεν, 2
ὐστερον ἐπισκεπτέων ἀκριβέστερον, ὅταν ὅλως περὶ κτή-
σεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας συμβαίνῃ ποιεῖσθαι
35 μνείαν, πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπων ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν
αὐτῶν· πολλαὶ γὰρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην εἰσίν ἀμφι-
βητήσεις διὰ τοὺς ἐλκοντας ἐφ' ἐκατέραν τοῦ βίου τὴν
ὑπερβολὴν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλυσχρότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν
τρυφήν. τὸ δ' εἴδος τῆς χώρας οἳ χαλεπῶν εἰπεῖν (δεῖ δ' ἐνια 3
40 πεῖθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν στρατηγικὰν ἐμπείροις), ὅτι χρή
μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον, αὐτοῖς δ' εὐέξοδον.
1327 α ἔτι δ' ὄσπερ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐσύνοτον ἔφα-
μεν εἶναι δεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν· τὸ δ' εὐσύνοτον τὸ
εὐβοηθητὸν εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἑστιν. τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν
εἰ χρῆ ποιεῖν κατ' εὐχήν, πρὸς τε τὴν θάλασσαν προσήκει
5 κεῖσθαι καλῶς πρὸς τε τὴν χώραν. εἰς μὲν οὖν ὁ λεχθεὶς 4
δρος· δεὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἐκβοθείας κοινὴν εἶναι τῶν τόπων
ἀπάντων· ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν
παραστήμασιν, ἔτι ἐπὶ τῆς περὶ ἴζαλα ὕλης, καὶ εἰ τινὰ
ἀλλήν ἐργασίαν ἢ χώρα τυγχάνοι κεκτημένη τοιαύτην,
10 εὐπαρκήμιστον.
6 Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν κοινωνίας, πότερον
ὡφέλιμος ταῖς εὐνομομέναις πόλεσιν ἢ βλαβερά, πολλὰ
τυγχάνουσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντες· τὸ τε γὰρ ἐπιζευγόνθεται τίνας
ἐν ἄλλοις τεθραμμένοι νόμοι ἀσύμφορον εἶναι φασὶ πρὸς
15 τὴν εὐνομίαν, καὶ τὴν πολυνομίστοιο γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ
ἐκ τοῦ χρήσιμον τῇ θαλάσσῃ διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχόμενοι
ἐμπόρον πλῆθος, ὑπεναντίαν δ' εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι
καλῶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, βέλτιον καὶ 2
πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαῖων μετέ-
20 ἄειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν τῆς θαλάσσης, οὐκ ἄδηλον.
3 καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ βρόντον φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους εὐβοηθήτους ἐίναι δεὶ κατ’ ἀμφότερα τοὺς σοδησομένους, καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν· καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι τοὺς ἐπιτιθεμένους, εἰ μὴ κατ’ ἀμφόθεν δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἀμφοτέρων μετέχουσιν. ὅσα τ’ ἀν μὴ τυγχάνῃ 25 παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὄντα, δέξασθαι ταῦτα καὶ τὰ πλεονάζοντα ἡμῶν γιγνομένων ἐκπέμψασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἑστίν· αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορικῆ, ἀλλ’ ὦ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεὶ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν· οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες σφάς αὐτοῦς πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν προσόδου χάριν ταῦτα πράττοντοι· ἢν δὲ μὴ δεὶ πόλιν τοιαύτης 30 μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, οὐδ’ ἐμπόριοι δεὶ κεκτήσθαι τοιούτων.

5 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὀρῷμεν πολλαὶς ὑπάρχοντα καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφώς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὡστε μὴτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστιν μήτε τόρρῳ λιαν, ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τείχεσι καὶ τοιούτοις ἄλλοις ἐρύμασι, 35 φανερὸν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἁγαθὸν τι συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τούτο τὸ ἁγαθὸν, εἰ δὲ τι βλαβερὸν, φυλάξασθαι ἐρᾶδιον τοῖς νόμοις φράζοντας καὶ διορίζοντας τίνας οὐ δεὶ καὶ τίνας ἐπιμίσγεσθαι δεὶ 6 πρὸς ἄλληλους. περὶ δὲ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι μὲν μονὴ βελτιστὸν ὑπάρχειν μέχρι τῶν πλήθους, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ μόνον αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πλησίων τισὶ δεὶ καὶ φοβεροὺς 1327 b εἶναι καὶ δύνασθαι βοθεῖν, ὡσπερ κατὰ γῆν, καὶ κατὰ 7 θάλασσαν· περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἦδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀποσκεπτέων τῆς πόλεως· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζήσεται βίον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταύτι· 5 τὴν τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις σύμμετρον. τὴν δὲ πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γιγνομένην περὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν ὅχλον οὐκ ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν γὰρ 8 αὐτοῦς μέρος εἶναι δεὶ τῆς πόλεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατικὸν ἐλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζευκῶν ἑστὶν, ὡς κύριον ἐστι καὶ 10 κρατεῖ τῆς ναυτιλίας· πλήθους δὲ ὑπάρχοντος περιοίκοις καὶ τῶν τὴν χώραν γεωργοῦντων, ἄφθονιαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
καὶ ναυτῶν. ὃρῳμεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν ὑπάρχον τισιν, ὁδὸν τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦμεν·

15 τριήρεις κεκτημένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν ἐτέρων ἐμμελεστήραν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν χόρας καὶ λιμένων καὶ πόλεων καὶ θαλάσσης καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἐστώ διαφερόμενα τῶν τρόπων τούτων· περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλῆθους, τίνα μὲν δὲν ὑπάρχειν χρή, πρότερον εἴπομεν, ποίους δὲ τίνας τὴν

20 φύσιν εἶναι δεῖ, νῦν λέγωμεν. σχεδὸν δὴ κατανοήσειν ἄν tis toûtó ge, βλέπασι ἐπί τε τὰς πόλεις τὰς εὐδοκιμοῦσας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, ὡς διεἰλη-

πται τοὺς ἔθνες· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχρῶι τόποις ἐθνὶς 2

καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἑπώπην θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ πλῆρη, διανοίας

25 δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ μάλλον, ἀπολίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίον ἄρχειν οὐ δυνά-

μενα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ
tὴν ψυχῆν, ἀθύμα δὲ, διόπερ ἄρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα

diατελεῖ τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὡσπερ μεσεῖε κατὰ 3

τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφὸν μετέχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐνθυμοῦν καὶ
dιανοητικῶν ἐστὶν· διόπερ ἐλεύθερον τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλ-

τιστα πολιτευόμενο καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς

tυγχάνον πολιτείας, τὴν αὐτὴν δ᾽ ἔχει διαφοράν καὶ τὰ 4
tῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐθνὶς [καὶ] πρὸς ἀλλήλα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει

35 τὴν φύσιν μονόκολον, τὰ δὲ εὖ [τε] κέκραται πρὸς ἀμφο-
tέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὅτι δεῖ δια-

νοητικοὺς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς ἐμληνο-

τας εὐαγγέλους ἐξεσθαί τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν. ὁπερ γὰρ 5

φασὶ τινες δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοὺς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικοῦς μὲν

40 εἶναι τῶν γνορίμων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄγνοιας ἄγριας, ὁ θυμὸς

ἐστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικὸν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς

1328 α δύναμις ἡ φιλοῦμεν. σημεῖον δὲ· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις

καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μάλλον ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἄγνοιας,

ὄλγορείσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος προσθήκησες 6

toῖς φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμὸν.
συ γάρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχεο.
καὶ τὸ ἀρχὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταῖς ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν ἀρχικῶν γάρ καὶ ἀ农贸ὴν οἱ θυμός.
οὐ καλῶς δὲ ἦχει λέγειν χαλεποὺς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας· πρὸς οὐδένα γάρ εἶναι χρή τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲ εἰσὶν οἱ μεγαλόμυχοι τὴν φύσιν ἀγριοί, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικούντας. τοῦτο δὲ ἰο μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πᾶσχοιν, ὅπερ εἰρήται πρότερον, ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίσωσιν. καὶ τούτο συμβαίνει κατὰ λόγον παρ’ οἷς γὰρ ὀφείλεσθαι δεῖν τὴν εἰρετικόν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς τὸ βλάβει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι νομίσωσι· ὅδεν εἰρήται "χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν" καὶ "οἱ τοι πέρα στέρξαντες, οἴδε καὶ πέρα μισοῦσιν."

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευμένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν ἔδει καὶ ποιοῦν τινάς τὴν φύσιν, ἐτί δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσην τε τινα καὶ ποίαιν τινά, διώρισται σχέδων (οὐ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεῖ ξητεῖν διὰ τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν 20 γιγνομένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθητοκρατίας); ἐπεὶ δ’ ὠσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτων οὐ ταυτά ἐστι μόρια τῆς ὅλης συνστάσεως, δόν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἰχή, δήλου ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέων ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαίοι ὑπάρχειν, οὐδ’ ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς, ἕξ ἂς ἐν τῷ το ἱενος. ἐν γάρ 25 τι καὶ κοινὸν εἶναι δεὶ καὶ ταύτῳ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, ἂν τε ἵσον ἄν τε ἀνίσων μεταλαμβάνουσι, οἷον ἐτέρτροφο τοὐτῷ ἐστιν 3 ἐπτε χώρας πλῆθος εἰτ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶν· ὅταν δ’ ἦ τὸ μὲν τούτου ἐνεκέρ τὸ δ’ οὖ ἐνεκέρ, οὐδὲν ἐν γε τούτω κοινῶν ἄλλη ’ ἢ τὸ μὲν ποιήσαι τὸ δὲ λαβεῖν’ ἰσχύο γ’ οἶνον 30 ὀργάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ἐργὸν καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς’ οἰκία γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμου οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ γίνεται κοινῶν,

5 ἄλλη ’ ἐστι τῆς οἰκίας χάριν ἢ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέχνης. διὸ κτήσεως μὲν δεὶ τοῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ’ ἐστιν ἢ κτήσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως. πολλὰ δ’ ἐμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεως ἐστιν. ἢ δ’ 35 πόλεις κοινωνία τῆς ἐστὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐνεκέρ δὲ ἵσος τῆς ἐνδε-5 χομένης ἀρίστης. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστίν εὐθαμονία τὸ ἀριστόν, αὐτὴ δὲ
άρετής ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως ὡστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς, τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἢ μηδέν, δῆλον ὡς τοῦτο ἀίτιον τοῦ γέγονεσθαι πόλεως εἰδή καὶ διαφοράς καὶ πολιτείας πλείουσα. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ ἄλλων ἐκαστοῦ τοῦτο θηρεύοντες τοὺς τε βίους ἔτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταυτὶ ἦστιν 5 ὃν ἀνευ τόλισ ὡς ἀν εἰή καὶ γὰρ ἄ λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως, ἐν τούτοις ἀν εἰή (ἀ) ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν. ληπτέον 6 τούτων τῶν ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἦστα δῆλον. πρώτον μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχει δεὶ τροφῆν, ἐπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν 7 γὰρ ὄργανων δεῖται τῷ ζήν), τρίτον δὲ ὀπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινονοῦντας ἀναγκαίον καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν ὄπλα πρὸς τῇ τίν ἄρχην, τῶν ἀπειθοῦντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξωθέν ἀδικεῖν 8 ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἐτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ’ αὐτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρώτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμέλειαν, ἦν καλούσιν ἱερατεῖαν, ἔκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαιοῦσαν κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων τῶν πρὸς 10 ἀλλήλους. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτα ἦστιν τὸν δεῖται πάσα 15 πόλις ὡς εἰπεῖν (ἡ γὰρ πόλις πλήθος ἦστιν οὐ τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζωῆς αὐταρκεῖ, ὡς φαμέν, εἰνά καὶ τι τυχαγχανή τούτων ἐκκλείσῃν, ἀδύνατον ἀπλῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοινονίαν εἶναι ταύτην) ἀνάγκη τούτων κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας 9 20 ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν δεὶ ἁρὰ γεωργῶν τ’ εἶναι πλήθος, οἱ παρασκευάσοντοι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τεχνῖτας καὶ τὸ μάχημον καὶ τὸ εὔπορον καὶ ἱερέως καὶ κριτᾶς τῶν ἀναγκαιῶν καὶ συμφερόντων. 9 Διωρισμένοι δὲ τούτων λοιπῶν σκέψασθαι πότερον πάσι 25 κοινωνητέου πάντων τούτων (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοὺς αὐτούς ἀπαντασ εἶναι καὶ γεωργῶς καὶ τεχνῖτας καὶ τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ δικάζοντας) ἢ καθ’ ἐκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρήμενον ἄλλους ὑποθετεῖν, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἔδα τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶν. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταύτῃ πολιτείᾳ. καθάρπερ γὰρ εἰπομεν, 2
1328 a 38—1329 a 21.

ἐνδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων, καὶ μὴ πάντας 30
πάντων ἀλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πο-
lιτεῖας ἐτέρας· ἐν µὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι
3 πάντες πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς διλιγαρχίαις τούναντιον. ἐπεὶ
dὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη
dὲ ἐστὶ καθ’ ἣν ἡ πόλις ἀν εἰπ’ µάλιστ’ εὐθαίρων, τήν δ’ 35
εὐθαίρων ὅτι χαρίς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἰρήται
πρότερον, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὡς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτει-
μένη πόλει· καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίως ἀνδρὰς ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ
µὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὔτε βάναυσον βίων οὔτ’ ἁγοραίον δεῖ
ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννής γὰρ ὁ τοιούτος βίος καὶ πρὸς 40
ἀρετῆν ὑπεναντίοις), οὐδὲ δὴ γεωργοὺς εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας
ἐσεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ σχολὴς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς 1329 a
καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικὰς). ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πο-
λεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ
κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ µέρη φαίνεται τῆς
πόλεως µάλιστα ὅτα, πότερον ἑτερα καὶ ταῦτα θετέον ἦ 5
τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἀµφότεροι ἤµιος; φανερὸς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, διότι
τρόπον µὲν τίνα τοῖς αὐτοῖς, τρόπον δὲ τίνα καὶ ἐτέρωι.
ἡ µὲν γὰρ ἐτέρας ἀκµῆς ἐκάτερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ µὲν
dεῖται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάµεως, ἐτέρωι· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἄδυ-
νατῶν ἐστὶ τοὺς δυναµένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ κωλύειν, τούτους ἱο
ὑποµένειν ἀρχοµένους αἱ, ταῦτῃ δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς· οἱ γὰρ τῶν
ὄπλων κύριοι καὶ µένειν ἡ µὴ µένειν κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας.
6 λείπεται τοῖς τούτοις αὐτοῖς µὲν ἀµφότεροις ἀποδιδόναι τὴν
πολιτείαν ταὐτὴν, µὴ ἄµα δὲ· ἀλλ’, ὡσπερ πέφυκεν, ἡ
µὲν δύναµις ἐν νεωτέροις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις 15
ἐστὶν, οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀµφοῖν νενεµήσθαι συµφέρει καὶ δικαίον
7 εἴναι· ἐχεῖ γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαϊρέσις τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ
µὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεί (ἐναὶ) περὶ τούτοις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ
ὑπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολίται δὲ οὕτωι. τὸ γὰρ
βάναυσον οὐ µετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὐδ’ ἀλλὸ οὐδὲν γένος ὁ 20
µὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δηµιουργῶν ἐστὶν. τούτο δὲ ἔδηλον ἐκ τῆς
VOL. III. E
υποθέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαιμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτής, ἀλλὰ εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολῖτας. 
25 φανέρων δὲ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων, εἰπὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἡ βαρβάρους [ἥ] περιοικούς. Λοιπὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ιερέων γένος. φανέρα δὲ καὶ ἢ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε 9 βάναυσον ιερέα καταστατέον· ύπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει 30 τιμάσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς· εὔπλοι δὲ διηρήτως τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο μέρη, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ τὰς ὀπλιτικὰς καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν, πρέπει δὲ τὴν τεθεραπείαν ἀποδίδουσιν τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτῶν τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκώς, τούτοις ἄν εἰπό τὰς αἱρετικὰς ἀποδοτεῖν. δὲν μὲν τοῖς ἄνευ 10 πόλεως οὐ συνίσταται, καὶ ὅσα μέρη πόλεως, εἴρηται (γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνίται καὶ πάντων οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὸ τὰς ὀπλιτικὰς καὶ βουλευτικὰς, καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἐκαστῶν, τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος).

10 ἴνα οὐδὲ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τούτ' εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι δεῖ διηρήσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη 1329 b τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ τε μάχιμον ἔτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν· ἐν Αἰγυπτῷ τὸ γὰρ ἔχει τῶν τρόπων τούτων ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν, τα τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην, τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Αἰγυπτον Σεσώστριος, ὡς φασίν, οὔτω νομοθετήσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ 5 περὶ Κρήτην. ἄρχαία δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ 2 τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τούτων. φασὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τῶν ἔκει κατοικοῦντων Ἰταλίων 3 τις γενέσθαι βασιλέα τῆς Οἰνωτριάς, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ τε ὅνομα 10 μεταβαλόντας Ἰταλοῦς ἀντὶ Οἰνωτρών κληθῆναι καὶ τὴν ἀκτῆν ταύτην τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἰταλίαν τούνομα λαβεῖν, ὅση τετυχείκεν ἐντὸς οὗσα τοῦ κόλπου τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Δαμητικοῦ· ἀπέχει γὰρ ταύτα ἀπὸ ἀλλήλων ὅσοι ἡμι-
4 σεις ἡμέρας. τούτων δὴ λέγουσι τὸν Ἰταλὸν νομάδας τοὺς Ὁλυστρούς ὅντας ποιήσαι γεωργούς, καὶ νόμους ἄλλους τε ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέσθαι καὶ τὰ συναιτία καταστῆσαι πρῶτον. διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐτί τῶν ἀπ’ ἑκείνου τινὲς χρῶται τοῖς συσσιτίοις
5 καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις, ὅψκον δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρη-
νίαν Ὄπικοι καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν καλούμενοι τὴν ἐπούν-
μίαν Ἀὔσονες, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰαπνύγιαν καὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον 20
Χώνες, τὴν καλομείγνην Σιρίτιν ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χώνες.
6 Ὁλυστροὶ τὸ γένος. ἢ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων τάξις ἐντεῦθεν γέγονε πρῶτον, ὃ δὲ χωρισμός ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ
πλῆθους ἐξ Ἀἰγύπτου πολλῇ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει τοῖς χρόνοις τὴν
7 Μίνω βασιλείαν ἡ Σεσώτριος, σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ 25
άλλα δὲν νομίζειν εὐρήσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ,
μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπειράκις τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρείαν
dιδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτῆς, τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιο-
σίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἐδίω τούτων εὐλογὸν λαμβάνειν τὴν αὐξη-
σιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἰς ὅσθαν δεὶ τὸν αὐτὸν
8 ἔχειν τρόπον ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαία, σημεῖον τὰ περὶ
Αἰγύπτου ἐστίν οὗτοι γὰρ ἀρχαιότατοι μὲν δοκοῦσι εἶναι,
νόμων δὲ τετυχήκασι καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεὶ τοὺς
μὲν εἰρημένους ἰκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παραλειμμένα
περισσάντας ἦσθιν.
35
9 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεὶ τὴν χώραν εἶναι τῶν ὀπλα κεκτημένων καὶ
tῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων, εἰρήσται πρῶτερον, καὶ
dιὸτι τοὺς γεωργοῦντας αὐτῶν ἐτέρους εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ
πόσην τινὰ χρῆ καὶ ποιαν εἶναι τὴν χώραν. περὶ δὲ τῆς
διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργοῦντων, τῖνας καὶ ποίους εἶναι χρῆ, 40
λεκτέων πρῶτων, ἐπειδὴ οὖτε κοινὴν φαίμεν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν
κτήσιν, ὥσπερ τινὰς εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ χρῆσιν φιλικῶς 1330 a
γινομένην κοινὴν, οὕτ' ἀπορεῖν οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν τροφῆς.
10 περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκεῖ πάσι χρήσιμον εἶναι ταῖς ἐν
κατεσκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν· δι' ἕν γάρ αἰτίαν συν-
dοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν, ὑπετερον ἐροῦμεν. δεῖ δὲ τούτων κοινωνεῖν 5
E 2
πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὓς ῥᾴδιον δὲ τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδιῶν τε εἰσφέρειν τὸ συντεταγμένον καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἀλ-λήν ὀφθαλμ. ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα κοινὰ πάσης τῆς πόλεως ἔστιν. ἀναγκαίον τοῖνυν εἰς δύο μέρη 11
dημηρίθησαι τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι κοινὴν τὴν δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, καὶ τοὺτων ἐκατέραν διηρήσθαι δίχα πάλιν, τῆς μὲν κοινῆς τὸ μὲν ἐτερον μέρος εἰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ ἐτερον εἰς τὴν τῶν συστιτῶν δαπάνην, τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τὸ ἐτερον μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχατίας, 15 ἐτερον δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἵνα δύο κλῆροι ἐκάστῳ νεμηθέντων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχασιν τὸ τε γὰρ ἵνα οὕτως ἐχεῖ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυ-γείτονας πολέμους ὁμονοητικότερον. ἓπον γὰρ ἐγὼ τούτον 12 ἐχεῖ τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν ὀλγιοφοροῦσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους 20 ἔχθρας, οἱ δὲ λιαν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν. διὸ παρ’ ἐνοίς νόμοις ἐστὶ τοὺς γειτνιώντας τοὺς ὁμόρους μὴ συμ-μετέχει τοὺς βουλής τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, ὡς διὰ τὸ ἰδιὸν οὐκ ἂν δυναμένους βουλεύσασθαι καλῶς. τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν 13 ἀνάγκη διηρήσθαι τὸν τρόπον τούτον διὰ τὰς προειρημένας 25 αἰτίας τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας μάλιστα μὲν, εἰ δεῖ κατ’ εὐχὴν, δοῦλους εἶναι, μήτε ὄμοφύλους πάντων μήτε θυμοειδῶν (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πρὸς τε τὴν ἐργασίαν εἰπὶ χρήσιμοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεστερίζεις ἀσφαλεῖς), δεύτερον δὲ βαρ-βάρους περιοίκους παραπλησίους τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν φύσιν. 30 τοῦτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν [ἰδίους] ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι ἰδίους τῶν κε-14 κτημάτων τὰς ὁσίας, τοὺς δ’ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινοῦς. τῶν ἔ δε δεῖ τρόπον χρησθαι δούλους, καὶ διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι τοῖς δοῦλοις ἀθλον προκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὑστερον ἐροῦμεν. 11 Τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅτι μὲν δεὶ κοινὴν εἶναι τῆς ἥπερον τε 35 καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῆς χώρας ἀπάσης ὀμοίως ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, εἰρηται πρότερον αὐτὴς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν θέσιν εὐχεσθαι δεὶ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέποντας, πρότον μὲν, ὡς ἀναγκαίον, πρὸς ὑγίειαν (αὖ τε 2
γὰρ πρὸς ἑώ τὴν ἐγκλίσιν ἐχοσαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ πνεύματα τὰ πνεύματα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνάτολῆς ὑγειεντορεῖ, δεύτερον δὲ 40 κατὰ βορέαν ἐυχείμεροι γὰρ αὐτῷ μᾶλλον’ τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρὸς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλὸς 1330 b 3 ἔχειν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτῶς μὲν εὐέξοδον εἶναι χρῆ, τοῖς δὲ ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσδοκον καὶ δυσπερίληπτον, ὑδάτων τε καὶ ναμάτων μάλιστα μὲν ὑπάρχειν πλῆθος οἰκεῖον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τούτῳ γε εὑρηταὶ διὰ τοῦ κατασκευάζων 5 ὑποδοχὰς ὁμβρίοις ὑδασιν ἀφθόνους καὶ μεγάλας, ὡστε μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας διὰ τὸ πόλεμον. 4 ἔπει δὲ δεὶ περὶ ὑγείας φροντίζειν τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων, τότε 8 ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κείσθαι τὸν τόπον ἐν τε τοιοῦτῳ καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον καλὸς, δεύτερον δὲ ὑδασιν ὑγειευνὸς χρῆσθαι, καὶ 10 τοῦτο τῆς ἐπιμελείαν ἔχειν μὴ παρέγγυος. οἷς γὰρ πλείστοις χρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλειστάκις, ταῦτα πλείστον συμβάλλεται πρὸσ τὴν ὑγείαν’ ἡ δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ 5 πνεύματος δύναμις τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν. διόστε ἐν ταῖς εὐ φρονούσαις δεὶ διωρίσθαι πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ πάνθ’ 15 ὀμοια μὴτ’ ἀφθονία τοιοῦτον ἢ ναμάτων, χωρὶς τα τε εἰς τροφὴν ὑδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν. περὶ δὲ τῶν τῶν ἔρυμνων, οὐ πάσαις ὁμοίως ἔχει τοῦ συμφέρον ταῖς πολιτείαις’ ὀνον ἀκρόπολις ὀλγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχικὸν, δημοκρατικὸν ὀ’ ὑμαλότης, ἀριστοκρατικὸν ὀ’ οὐδέτερον, 20 6 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἵσχυροι τόποι πλείους. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσις ἡδίων μὲν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμωτέρα πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, ἀν εὐτομος ὡς καὶ κατὰ τὸν νεότερον καὶ τῶν Ἰπποδαμείον τρόπων, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς ἀσφαλείας τοιναντίον, ὥσ εἰχον κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον χρόνον’ 25 δυσεξοδὸς γὰρ ἐκεῖνη τοῖς ἔξενοις καὶ δυσεξερεύνητος τοῖς 7 ἐπιτιθεμένοις. διὸ δεὶ τοῦτον ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν (ἐνδέχε- ται γὰρ, ἀν τις οὗτος κατασκευάζῃ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωρ- γοῖς ἃς καλοῦσι τίνες τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας) καὶ τὴν μὲν ὀληθὲν μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν εὐτομον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τῶπους. 30
οὖτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον ἔξει καλῶς.

περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, καὶ ταῦθ' ὥραντες ἐλεγχομένας ἔργῳ τὰς ἐκεῖνως καλλω-35 πισαμένας. ἦστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῶν 9 πλῆθει διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειρᾶσθαι σάξεσθαι διὰ τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρυμότητος· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται πλεῖον τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιστῶν καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλέγοις ἀρετῆς, εἰ δεὶ 40 σάξεσθαι καὶ μὴ πάσχειν κακῶς μὴ δὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι, τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμότητα τῶν τειχῶν οἰητέν ἐστι πολε-1331 μικρότατην, ἀλλοι τε καὶ νῦν ἐυρημένων τῶν περὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς εἰς ἀκρίβειαν πρὸς τὰς πολιορκίας. ὁμοίον γὰρ τὸ τείχη μὴ περιβάλλει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄξιον 10 καὶ τὸ τὴν χώραν εὐέμβολον ζητεῖν καὶ περαιρέσιν τοὺς 5 ὀρεινοὺς τόπους, ὁμοίος δὲ καὶ ταῖς οἰκῆσιν ταῖς ἰδίαις μὴ περιβαλλέει τοῖς οὕς ἀνάνδρων ἐσομένων τῶν κατοικοῦν- 10 τον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τούτῳ γε δεὶ λανθάνειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν 11 περιβεβλημένοις τείχη περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔξεστιν ἄμφοτέρως χρῆσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ ὦς ἐχοῦσαι τείχη καὶ ὁς μὴ ἐξουσίας, ταῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημέναις οὐκ ἔξεστιν. εἰ δὲ τούτων ἔχει τῶν τρόπον, οὐχ οὐ τείχη μόνον περιβλητευόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον, ὅπως καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔχει τῇ πόλει πρεπόντως καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας, τὰς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας. ὀσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπιτε-12 15 θεμένοις ἐπιμελέστες ἦστι δὲ ὅν τρόπον πλεονεκτήσουσιν, οὐτω τὰ μὲν εὑρηταί τὰ δὲ δεῖ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ τοὺς φυλαττόμενους· ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐπιτίθεσθαι τοῖς εἰ παρεσκευασμένοις.

12 Ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν συσσι-20 τίοις κατανεμήσθαι, τὰ δὲ τείχη διειλήφθαι φυλακτή-ρίοις καὶ πύργοις κατὰ τόπους ἑπικαίρους, δῆλον ὅτι αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται παρασκευάζειν ἐν εἰς τῶν συσσιτίων ἐν τούτοις
1330 b 31—1331 b 14.

2 τὸς φυλακηρίως. καὶ ταύτα μὲν δὴ τούτον ἂν τις δια-κοσμήσει τῶν τρόπον, τὰς δὲ τοῖς θείοις ἀποδεδομένας οἰκή-σεις καὶ τὰ κυριότατα τῶν ἀρχείων συσσίτια ἀρμόττει 25 τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τε ἔχειν καὶ τὸν αὐτόν, ὡσα μὴ τῶν ἱερῶν ὁ νάμος ἀφορίζει χωρᾶς ἦ τι μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθόρη-

3 στον. εἰ δ' ἂν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος δότις ἐπιφανείαν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιώντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρμηνευτέρως. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τούτον 30 τὸν τόπον τοιαύτης ἀγορᾶς εἶναι κατασκευὴν οἰκῶν καὶ περὶ

4 Θεταλίαν ὀνομάζουσιν, ἥν ἐλευθέραν καλοῦσιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἢν δέi καθαράν εἶναι τῶν ὀνίων πάντων, καὶ μήτε βάναυσαν μήτε γεωργὸν μήτ' ἀλλον μηδένα τοιοῦτον παρα-

βάλλει τοῖς μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων (εἰ δ' ἂν 35 εὐχαρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων

5 ἔχω τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα· πρέπει γὰρ διηρησθαι κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τούτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεωτέ-

ροις ἀρχούσας τινας διατρίβειν, τοῦς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ
toῖς ἀρχουσι· ἢ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων παρου· 40 σία μάλιστα ἐμποιεῖ τὴν ἀλήθινην αἴδῳ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἔλευ-

6 θέρων φόβων· τῆς δὲ τῶν ὀνίων ἀγορὰν ἐτέραν τε δει ταύ· 1331 b
tῆς εἶναι καὶ χωρᾶς, ἔχουςαν τὸν εὐσυνάγονον τοῖς τε ἀπὸ τῆς βαλάντης περιτομένους καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας πάσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ † πλῆθος † διαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἱερεῖς,
eis ἀρχουσας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν συσσίτια περὶ τῆς τῶν 5

7 ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν. τῶν δ' ἀρχείων ὡσα

περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, περὶ τε γρα-

φάς δικῶν καὶ τὰς κλήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τοιαύτην
dιοίκησιν, ἐτι δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀγορανομίαν καὶ τὴν καλομένην

ἀστυνομίαν, πρὸς ἀγορὰ μὲν δὲι καὶ συνόδῳ τινὶ κοινῇ κα- 10
tεσκευάσθαι, τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀναγκαῖαν ἀγορᾶν ἐστι
tότος· ἐναχολάζει μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἄνω τίθεμεν, ταύτην δὲ
8 πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις. νενεμήσθαι δὲ χρῆ τὴν εἰρη-

μένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοῖς
15 Ἀρχοῦσιν, οὐς καλοῦσιν οἱ μὲν ὑλοφόροι οἱ δὲ ἀγροῦμοι, καὶ
φυλακτήρια καὶ συστίτικα πρὸς φυλακήν ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρ-
χειν, ἐτί δὲ ἰερὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἶναι νενεμημένα, τὰ
μὲν θεοῖς τὰ δὲ ἢρωσιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβο-9
λογουμένους καὶ λέγοντας περὶ τῶν τουιτῶν ἀργὸν ἑστιν.
20 οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαύτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιήσαι
μᾶλλον τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἑστι, τὸ δὲ συμ-
βῆναι τύχης. διὸ περὶ μὲν τῶν τοιούτων τὸ γε ἐπὶ πλεῖον
ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν,
13 Περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τίνων καὶ ἐκ ποιῶν
25 δεῖ συνειστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἐσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίως καὶ
πολιτεύσησθαι καλῶς, λεκτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ δὲν ἐστὶν ἐν ὧς 2
γίγνεται τὸ εὐ πάσι, τούτων δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν μὲν ἐν τῷ τῶν
σκοπῶν κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶς, ἐν δὲ τάς
πρὸς τὸ τέλος φεροῦσα πράξεις εὐφρίσκειν (ἐνδεχεται γὰρ
30 ταύτα καὶ διαφωτεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμφωνεῖν ἐνίοτε γὰρ
ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς ἐκκεῖται καλῶς, ἐν δὲ τῷ πράττειν τοῦ τυ-
χείν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσιν, ὅτε δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ τέλος
πάντων ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ τέλος ἔβεντο φαῦλον, ὅτε
δὲ ἐκατέρου διαμαρτάνουσιν, οἷον περὶ ἱεροκῆν οὔτε γὰρ
35 ποίων τι δεῖ τὸ ὑγιαίνον εἶναι σῶμα κρύνουσιν ἐνίοτε καλῶς,
οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὀρνὶν τυγχάνουσιν τῶν ποιη-
τικῶν. δεῖ δὲ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις ταύτα ἀμ-
φότερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις
40· ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὐ ἐξί καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφείσται 3
πάντες, φανερῶν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον τοῖς μὲν ἐξουσίᾳ τυγχάνειν,
τοῖς δὲ οὐ, διὰ τινα φύσιν ἢ τύχην (δεῖται γὰρ καὶ χο-
1332 ἀρηγίας τινὸς τὸ ἔξιν καλῶς, τοῦτον δὲ ἐλάττουσιν μὲν τοῖς
ἀμείνου διακείμενοι, πλείονοι δὲ τοῖς χείρον), οἱ δὲ εὖθες οὐκ 4
ὄρθως ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχοῦσας. ἐπεὶ
δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ἐστὶ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὐτὴ δὲ
5 ἐστὶ καθ’ ἣν ἀριστ’ ἄν πολιτεύοιτο πόλις, ἀριστα δὲ ἄν πολι-
τεύοιτο καθ’ ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα ἐνδεχεται τὴν πόλιν,
δήλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖ, τί ἐστι, μὴ λαυθάνειν. φαμέν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἰ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὥφελος, ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρήσιν ἀρετῆς τελεῖαν, καὶ ταύτην
6 οὐκ ἔξ ὑποθέσεως ἅλλ' ἀπλῶς. λέγω δ' ἔξ ὑποθέσεως τάναγκαια, τὸ δ' ἀπλῶς τὸ καλῶς· οἴον τὰ περὶ τὰς δι-καίας πράξεις αἰ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' ἀρε-τῆς μὲν εἰσιν, ἀναγκαῖαι δὲ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαῖως ἔχουσιν (αἱρετῶτερον μὲν γὰρ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν τοιοῦτων μῆτε τῶν ἄνδρα μῆτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμᾶς καὶ 15
7 τὰς εὐπορίας ἀπλῶς εἰσὶ καλλισται πράξεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτερον κακοῦ τινὸς αἱρεσίας ἐστιν, αἱ τοιαύται δὲ πράξεις τούναντὶν κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ γεννήσεις.
χρήσατο δ' ἀν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνήρ καὶ πενίᾳ καὶ νόσῳ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τὐχαις ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μακάριον 20 ἐν τοῖς ἑναντίοις ἐστίν. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διορίστατα κατὰ τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος, φ' διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐστι τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ, δήλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαίως σπουδαίας καὶ καλῶς εἶναι ταύτας ἀπλῶς. διὸ καὶ νομίζομει ἀνθρωποὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αὕτια 25 τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὡσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμ-πρόν καὶ καλῶς αἰτίῳ τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης. ἀναγκαίων τοῖνυν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάσαι τῶν νομοθέτην. διὸ κατ' εὐχὴν εὐχόμεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν, ὅν ἡ τύχη κυρία· κυρίαν γὰρ 30 ὑπάρχειν τίθεμεν· τὸ δὲ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν οὐκετί τύχης ἔργον, ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἀλλὰ μὴν σπουδαία γε πόλις ἐστὶ τῷ τοὺς πολῖτας τοὺς μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίους· ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολίται
9 μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας. τούτ' ἄρα σκεπτόμεν, πῶς ἀνήρ γ' 35 νεται σπουδαῖος, καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίοις εἶναι, μὴ καθ' ἐκαστὸν δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἱρετῶτερον· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἐκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας. ἀλλὰ μὴν
11 ἀγαθοὶ γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίγνονται διὰ τριῶν. τὰ τρία δὲ
40 ταύτα ἐστὶ φύσις ἔθος λόγος, καὶ γὰρ φύσιν ἔχει πρῶτον οἶνον ἀνθρώπων ἄλλα μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῷων, οὕτω καὶ ποιῶν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχήν. ἐνιαὶ τε οὐδὲν ὀφέλος

1332 b φύσιν· τα γὰρ ἐθῆ μεταβαλεῖν ποιεῖ· ἐναὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν θηῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χείρων καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μάλιστα μὲν 12 τῇ φύσει ζῇ, μικρὰ δ’ ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἐθεσιν, ἀνθρώπος δὲ 5 καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον. ὡστε δὲ ταύτα συμφωνεῖν ἄλλῃςοις· πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἐθεσιοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττοντι διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον. τὴν μὲν τοῖνυν φύσιν οἷς εἶναι δέ τους μέλλουν-13 τας εἰχείρισθως ἔσσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρὸτερον,

10 τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἡδὴ παιδείας· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθικόμενοι μανθάνουσι, τὰ δ’ ἀκούωντες.

14 Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνεστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων, τότε δὴ σκεπτέον, εἰ ἔτεροι εἶναι δεὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ βιῶν· δήλου γὰρ ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοῖνυν εἶσαιν τοσοῦτον 2 διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἣρωας ἡγούμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὐθὺς πρῶτον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλὴν ἔχουσα ὑπερβολὴν, εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ὀστε ἀναμφισβήτητον εἶναι καὶ φανερὰν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, δὴλον ὅτι βέλτιον ἀεὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ’ ἀρχεθαι καθάπαξ· ἐπεὶ δὲ τούτ’ οὐ βέλδιον λαβεῖν οὐδὲ ἐστὶν ὀσπερ 3 ἐν Ἰνδοῖς φησί Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας τοσοῦτον δια-

15 φέροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας ἀναγκαίον πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν καὶ ἀρχεθαι. τὸ τε γὰρ ἵσον ταύτων τοῖς ὁμοίως, καὶ χαλεπῶν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκυίαν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον, μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑπάρχοντι νεοτερίζειν 4

20 τὸν ἐπὶ πάντας οἱ κατὰ τὴν χάραν τοσοῦτος τε εἶναι

25 βουλόμενοι πάντες τοῖς κατὰ τὴν χάραν τοσοῦτος τε εἶναι
τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτείματι τὸ πλήθος ὅστ' εἶναι κρείττους πάντων τούτων, ἐν τῷ ἀδυνάτῳ ἑστὶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γε τοῖς ἄρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἄρχομένων, ἀναμφισβήτητην. πῶς οὖν ταῦτ' ἔσται καὶ πῶς μεθέξουσι, δει σκέ-
ψασθαι τὸν νομοθέτην. εἰρηται δὲ πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. 35 ἢ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαίρεσιν, ποιήσασα αὐτὸ τῷ γένει ταύτῳ τὸ μὲν νεότερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὅπως μὲν ἄρχεσθαι πρέπει, τοῖς δ' ἄρχειν ἀγανακτεῖ δεὲ οὐδεὶς καθ' ἡλικίαν ἄρχομενος, οὐδὲ νουμίζει εἶναι κρείττων, ἄλλος τε καὶ μέλλων ἀντιλαμβάνειν τούτων τὸν ἔρανον, ὅταν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ 40

6 ἵκνουμένης ἡλικίας. ἔστι μὲν ἁρὰ ὅς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἑτέρους. ὡστε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ἔστιν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαίον, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἑτέρων εἶναι. τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἄρχονται ἀφασί δεῖν πρότον. ἔστι δὲ ἄρχη, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἰρή
tαι λόγοις, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἄρχοντος χάριν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἄρχομένου.

7 τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν δεσποτικὴν εἶναι φαμεν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἔλευ-5θέρων. διαφέρει δ' ἐνα τῶν ἑπταστατομένων οὖ τοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλὰ τῷ τίνος ἑνεκα. διὸ πολλά τῶν εἶναι δοκοῦντων δια
cοκικῶν ἐργον καὶ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἐλευθεροῖς καλῶν διακο
νεῖν πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ μῆ καλὸν οὐχ ὡστα δια
fέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις καθ' αὐτὰς ὡς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ 10

8 τίνως ἑνεκεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολίτου καὶ ἄρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἄριστου ἀνδρός, τὸν δ' αὐτὸν ἄρχομενον τε δεῖν γίγνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄρχοντα ύστερον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἰ ἡ τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως ἄνδρες ἀγα
thοι γίγνονται, καὶ δὴ τίνων ἐπιτηθουμάτων, καὶ τι τῷ 15

9 τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς. διήρηται δὲ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅν τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθ' αὐτὸ, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὐτό, λόγος δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον. ὅν φαμεν τᾶς ἀρε
tᾶς εἶναι καθ' ἃς ἀνήρ ἁγαθὸς λέγεται πως. τούτων δ' ἐν 20

ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον τὸ τέλος, τοῖς μὲν οὕτω διανοοῦν ὡς ἡμεῖς

10 φαμεν οὐκ ἄδηλου πῶς λεκτέον. αἰεὶ γὰρ τὸ χείρον τοῦ
Βελτιώνος ἐστιν ἑνεκεν, καὶ τούτο φανερὸν ὡμοιὸς ἐν τε τοῖς
cατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν, βέλτιον δὲ τὸ λόγον
ἐχον' διηρήται τε διιχ' καθ' ὄνπερ εἰώθαμεν τρόπον διαί-
25 ρείν' ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικὸς ἐστι λόγος ὁ δὲ θεωρητικὸς.
ὡσαντὸς οὖν ἀνάγκη διηρήσατι καὶ τούτῳ τὸ μέρος δηλοῦντι τὸς
καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ' ἀνάλογον ἐροῦμεν ἐχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς
τοῦ φύσει βελτίωνος αἴρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγ-
χάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυνοῖν αἰεί γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τοῦθ' αἴρε-
30 τότατον, οὐ τυχεῖν ἐστίν ἀκροτάτον. διηρήσατι δὲ καὶ πᾶς
ὁ βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ εἰς σχολὴν καὶ πόλεμον καὶ
eιρήνην, καὶ τὸν πρακτὸν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαία καὶ
χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλὰ. περὶ ὧν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν
13 αἴρεσιν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεις
35 συν αὐτῶν, πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς,
tὰ δ' ἀναγκαία καὶ χρήσιμα τῶν καλῶν ἑνεκεν. πρὸς
πάντα μὲν τοῖν ὑπὸ πολιτικῷ βλέποντι νομοθετήτων,
kαὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις
αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίων καὶ τὰ τέλη. τὸν
40 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοῦ βίου καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμά-
tων διαιρέσεις δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ πο-

1333 b λεμέων, μᾶλλον δ' εἰρήνην ἄγειν καὶ σχολάζειν, καὶ τά-
ναγκαίαι καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δὲ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ δεῖ
μᾶλλον. ὅστε πρὸς τοῦτον τοὺς σκοποὺς καὶ παίδας ἐτί
ντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἥλικιας, ὅσα δέονται
5 παιδείας. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἀριστὰ δοκοῦντες πολιτεύεσθαι τῶν
15 Ἑλλήνων, καὶ τῶν νομοθέτων οἱ ταύταις καταστήσατες τὰς
πολιτείας, οὕτω πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαν-
tες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὕτε πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς
tῶν νόμων καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτίκως ἀπέκλιναν
10 πρὸς τὰς χρησίμους εἶναι δοκοῦσας καὶ πλεονεκτικῶτερας.
παραπλησίως δὲ τούτως καὶ τῶν ὕπερθυν τινὲς γραψάντων
16 ἀπεφήναντο τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν' ἐπαινοῦντες γὰρ τὴν Δακε-
δαμονίων πολιτείαν ἀγανταὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου τῶν σκοπῶν, ὅτι
πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν· ἀκαὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐστὶν εὑρελγκτα καὶ τὸς ἐργοὺς ἐγε-15
17 λήλεγκται νῦν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζηλοῦσι τὸ πολλῶν δεσπόζειν, ὡσ τολμὴ χρησίγα γίγνεται τῶν εὐτυχισμάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θίβρων ἀγάμενος φαίνεται τὸν τῶν Δακώνων νομοθέτην, καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἐκαστὸς τῶν γρα-φόντων περὶ (τῆς) πολιτείας αὐτῶν, ὦτι διὰ τὸ γεγομένασθαί 20
18 πρὸς τοὺς κυνόνους πολλῶν ἤρχον· καίτοι δῆλον ὡς ἐπειδὴ νῦν γε οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει τοῖς Δάκωσι τὸ ἄρχειν, οὐκ εὐφαί-μονος, οὐδέ ὁ νομοθέτης ἐγαθός. ἔτι δὲ τούτῳ γελοῖον, εἰ μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμπιστοῦντος πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζῆν κα-25
19 λῶς. οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢν δεί τιμῶντα φαίνεσθαι τοῦ νομοθέτην τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικὸς ἄρχειν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετ' ἀρετῆς. ἔτι δὲ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δεὶ τὴν πόλιν εὐφαίμονα νομί-ζειν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπανεῖν, ὦτι κρατεῖν ἤσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ 30 τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν· ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλην ἔχει βλάβην.
20 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ δυναμένῳ τοῦτο πε-ρατέοι διάκειν, ὡπως διύνηται τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἄρχειν· ὥσπερ ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ Δάκωνες Παυσανία τῷ βασιλεῖ, κα-25
21 ταῦτα γὰρ ἀριστα καὶ ἱδία καὶ κοινῆ, τῶν (τὲ) νομοθέτην ἐμποιεῖν δεὶ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὴν τε τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀσκησὶν οὖτο τοῦτο χάριν δεὶ μελετῶν, ἵνα κατα-25
22 δουλώσονται τοὺς ἀναξίους, ἀλλ' ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὶ μὴ 40 δουλεύσωσιν ἐτέροις, ἐσείτα ὅπως ἐπὶ τὴν ἤγεμονίαν τῆς ὀψελείας ἔνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων δεσπο-1334
λόγους· αἱ γὰρ πλείσται τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι
μὲν σώζουντα, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται.
τὴν γὰρ βαφῆν ἀφίασιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἀγον-
tες. αἴτιος δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχο-
λάξεων.

15 Ἐσεὶ δὲ τὸ αὕτω τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῆ καὶ
ἴδια τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερῶν ὅτι
dei τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἁρετὰς ὑπάρχειν τέλος γὰρ.
15 ὥσπερ εἰρήται πολλάκις, εἰρήνη μὲν πολέμου, σχολὴ δὲ
ἀσχολίας. χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἁρετῶν εἰς πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν 2
καὶ διαγωγῆς, ὅτι τὸν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὅτι ἐν τῇ
ἀσχολίᾳ. δει γὰρ πολλά τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν, ὅπως
ἐξῆ σχολάξεων· διὸ σώφρονα τὴν πόλιν εἶναι προσήκει
20 καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερικὴν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ
σχολὴ δουλοῖς, οὐ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κινδυνεύειν ἀνδρείαις
dουλοί τῶν ἐπιόντων εἰσίν. ἀνδρείας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας 3
dei πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν,
σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμφότεροις τοῖς χρό-

25 νοις, καὶ μᾶλλον εἰρήνην ἄγουσι καὶ σχολάξουσι· ὃ μὲν
γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἢ δὲ
τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις καὶ τὸ σχολάξεως μετ᾽ εἰρήνης
ὑβριστῶς ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. πολλῆς οὖν δεὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ 4
πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἁριστὰς δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ
30 πάντων τῶν μακριξομένων ἀπολαύουσας, οἷον εἰ τῶν ἐλευθερολόγων, ἀκροβατικῶν, νήσων. μᾶλλον γὰρ οὕτω δεχόμεθα φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δι-
καιοσύνης, ὡς μᾶλλον σχολάξουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων
ἀγαθῶν. διὸτι μὲν οὖν τὴν μέλλουσαν εὐδαιμονήσειν καὶ 5
35 σπουδαίαν ἐσεσθαι πόλιν τοῦτον δει τῶν ἁρετῶν μετέχειν,
φανερῶν, αἰσχροὶ γὰρ ἐντὸς μη δύνασθαι χρήσθαι τοῖς
ἀγαθοῖς, ἐτί μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῷ σχολάξειν
χρήσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀσχολοῦντας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαινεσθαι
1334 a 6–1334 b 30.

άγαθούς, εἰρήμην δ' ἀγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀνδραποδώ—
6 δεις. διὸ δεῖ μὴ καθάπερ ἡ Δακεδαιμονίων πόλις τὴν ἀρε—
τὴν ἀσκείν. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταῦτη διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλ-
λων, τῷ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν 1334 b
ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γενέσθαι ταῦτα μᾶλλον διὰ τινὸς ἀρε-
τῆς. ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζῳ τε ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν
tὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἄρετῶν . . . καὶ ὅτι δὲ αὐτῆς, φανερῶν
eκ τούτων, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τούτῳ δὴ θεωρήτειν. 5
7 τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὁτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους
cαι λόγου δεὶ. τούτων δὲ ποίους μὲν τινὰς εἶναι χρή τὴν
φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρήσαι πρότερον παι-
dευτέρου τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ δεὶ
πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνῶν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐνδέχεται—
tαι γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑπο-
8 θέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἑδῶν ὁμοίων ἡχθαί. φανερὸν δὴ τοῦτό
ye πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὥς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ' ἄρχης ἡτὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τινὸς ἄρχης ἄλλου τέλους, ο
ἠ λόγος ἡμῖν καὶ ο νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὡστε πρὸς 15
tούτων τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἑδῶν δεὶ παρασκευάζειν
9 μελέτην, ἑπειτα ὡσπερ ψυχῆ καὶ σώμα δ' ἡτὶ, οὕτω
καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρφεον δύο μέρη, τὸ τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ
λόγον ἔχουν, καὶ τὰς ἐξεις τὰς τούτων δύο τῶν ἀριθμῶν,
ὁν τὸ μὲν ἡτὶν ὀρέξει τὸ δὲ νοῦς ὡσπερ δὲ τὸ σώμα 20
πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τοῦ
10 λόγου ἔχουσον. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βού-
λησις, ἐτι δὲ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένους εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς
παιδίοις, ο δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ο νοῦς προϊόψιν ἐγγίγνεσθαι
πέφυκεν. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σῶματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν 25
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἑπειτα τὴν
tῆς ὀρέξεως, ἐνεκα μὲντοι τοῦ νοοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ
tοῦ σῶματος τῆς ψυχῆς.

Εἰπερ οὖν ἄπ' ἄρχης τὸν νομοθέτην ὅραν δεῖ ὅπως 16
βέλτιστα τὰ σῶματα γέννηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν 30
64 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Δ' (Η'). 16.

ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὄντας χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἄλληλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμολογίαν. δεῖ δ’ 2 ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταύτῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τε καὶ τῶν τοῦ ἔχου ὄρχον, ὡς συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς ἡλικίασ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ καὶ μὴ διαφωνῶσιν αἰ δυνάμεις τοῦ μὲν ἐτι δυναμένου γεννάν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης, ἡ ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δ’ ἄνδρος μὴ (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἄλλους καὶ διαφοράς) ἐπειτα καὶ πρὸς τῶν τῶν τέκνων διαδοχῆν, δεὶ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν ὑπολείπονται ταῖς 3 40 ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρεσβυτέροις ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἡ δὲ παρὰ τῶν 1335 α’ πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις), οὔτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἰναι (πολλὴν γὰρ ἔχει δυσχέρειαν ἡ τε γὰρ αἰῶν ἔττον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τοιούτοις ὃσπερ ἡλικίασται, καὶ περὶ τῆς οἰκονομίας ἐγκληματικόν τὸ πάρεγγυς). ἔτι δ’, ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι δεύορ 4 5 μετέβημεν, ὅπως τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων ὑπάρχη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν. σχεδὸν δὴ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀριστά τέλος 5 τῆς γεννήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον εἰπεὶν ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ τῶν ἔβδομήκοντα ἑτὼν ἀριθμὸς ἔσχατος, πεντήκοντα δὲ 10 γυναιξίν, δεὶ τὴν ἄρχην τῆς συζεύξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν εἰς τῶν χρόνων καταβαίνειν τούτως. ἐστὶ δ’ ὁ τῶν νέων συν- 6 δυσμήν δαίλως πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἐν γὰρ πάσι ἐς ὧδε ἀτέλῆ τὰ τῶν νέων ἐκγονα καὶ θηλυτόκα μάλλων καὶ μικρά τὴν μορφῆν, ὡστ’ ἀναγκαίον ταῦτα τοῦτο συμβαίνειν καὶ 15 ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμήριον δ’ ὑπὲρ ὅσας γὰρ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζεται τὸ νέον συζευγνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτέλειας καὶ μικροῦ τὰ σώματά εἰσιν. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόκοις 7 αἱ νέαι πονοῦσι τε μάλλον καὶ διαφθείρονται πλείους. διδ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων γενέσθαι τινές φασί διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν 20 τοῖς Τροιζηνίοις, ὡς πολλῶν διαφθειρόμενων διὰ τὸ γαμήσκειται τὰς νεοτέρας, ἀλλ’ οὗ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κομιδήν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην συμφέρει τὰς ἑκάδε-
σεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέροις· ἀκολαστότερα γὰρ εἶναι δο-
κοῦσι νέαι χρησάμεναι ταῖς συνουσίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων
δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν, ἐὰν ἐτί τοῦ 35
σπέρματος αὐξανομένου ποιῶνται τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ γὰρ
τοῦτον τις ἀρισμένος χρόνος, ἐν ὁμίχυ υπερβαίνει πληθύν ἐτί
9 (ἡ μικρὸν). διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρμότετει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα
ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν συζευγώναι, τοὺς δὲ ἐπέτα καὶ τριάκοντα [, ἡ
μικρὸν]· ἐν τοσοῦτο γὰρ ἀκμάζουσι τε τοῖς σώματι σύζευξις 30
ἔσται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν παύλαν τῆς τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβῆσεται
10 τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαίρως· ἐτί δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς
μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς ἀκμής, ἐὰν γίγνηται κατὰ λόγον
εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἡδη καταλεπτομένης τῆς ἡλικίας
πρὸς τῶν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμῶν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ 35
πότε δὲ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σύζευξιν, εἰρήνηται, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν
倥αν χρόνοις δὲι χρῆσθαι οἶδαι πολλοὶ χρωνίτης κακὸς καὶ
νῦν, ὄρισαντες κειμένος τὴν συναισθανομένη ταυτήν.
11 δὲ δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦς ἡδη θεωρεῖν πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποίην τὰ τε
παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν φυσικῶν 40
οἱ τε γὰρ ἱατροὶ τοὺς καιροῦς τῶν σωμάτων ἰκανῶς λέγουσι,
καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοὶ, τὰ βόρεια τῶν νοτίων 1335 b
12 ἐπανούντες μᾶλλον. ποιῶν δὲ τινῶν τῶν σωμάτων ὑπα-
χόντων μᾶλιστ' (αὐ) ὁφελοὶ εἶ ὁῃ τοῖς γεννομένοις, ἐπιστή-
σασι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέων ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονυμίας,
τόπῳ δὲ ἰκανὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν. ὦτὲ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν 5
χρήσιμοι ἐξίς πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐδέξιαν οὖδὲ πρὸς υγείαν
καὶ τεκνοποίηαν, ὦτὲ ἡ θεραπευτικὴ καὶ κακοπονητικὴ λίαν,
13 ἀλλ' ἡ μέση τούτων. πεποιημένην μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν
ἐξίς, πεποιημένην δὲ πῶνοις μὴ βιαίοις, μηδὲ πρὸς ἑνά
μόνον, ἀπόπερ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἐξίς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ἱο
ἐλευθέρων πράξεις. ὁμοίως δὲ δεί ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν ἀνδράσι
14 καὶ γυναιξίν. χρῆ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐγκύους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν
σωμάτων, μὴ ραθυμούσας μηδ' ἀραιε τροφὴ χρωμένας.
τοῦτο δὲ ράδιον τῷ νοµοβέτῃ ποιήσαι προστάξαντι καθ'
15 ἡμέραν τινα ποιεῖσθαι πορείαν πρὸς θεοῦ ἀποθεραπεῖαν τῶν εἰληχώτων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμήν. τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν τοῦναντίον τῶν σωμάτων ῥήμασιν ἁρμόττει διάγειν ἀπολαύοντα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ γεννώμενα τῆς ἐχώσης ὡσπερ τὰ φυσικά τῆς γῆς. περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ 16 τροφῆς τῶν γιγνομένων, ἐστὸ νῦν ὁμοιὸ πεπηρομένου τρέφειν, διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων, ἐὰν ἡ τάξει τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύῃ, μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων ὠρίσθαι γὰρ δεὶ τῆς τεκνοποίας τὸ πλῆθος, ἐὰν δὲ τισὶ γίγνεται παρά ταῦτα συνδιασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθήσῃ ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ἡ ὑπέρ τροπαίαν τὸ γὰρ ὅσον καὶ τὸ μὴ διορισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν 16 ἀρχὴ τῆς ἡλικίας ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ διάφωστα, πότε ἀρχεσθαί χρὴ τῆς συζεύξεως, καὶ πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἀρμόττει πρὸς τεκνοποίαν ὀρίσθων τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων 30 ἐγχόνα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, ἀτελῇ γίνεται καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ ταῖς διανοίασι, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγηρακότων ἁσθενῆ. διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοὶς ἀκμῆν ἄυτῇ δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς 17 πλεῖστοις ἡπείροι τῶν ποιητῶν τινὲς εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἐβδομάδας τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τῶν χρόνων τῶν τῶν πεντῆ- 35 κοῦτα ἐτῶν. ὅστε τέτταριν ἡ πέντε ἐτεσίν ὑπερβάλλοντα τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην ἀφείσθαι δεὶ τῆς νὰ φανερῶν γεννήσεως τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑγιείας χάριν ἡ τίνος ἀλλὰς τοιαύτης αἰτήσας φαίνεσθαι δεὶ ποιομένους τὴν ὠμίλιαν. περὶ δὲ 18 τῆς πρὸς ἀλλὴν ἡ πρὸς ἄλλου, ἐστὶν μὲν ἀπλῶς μὴ καλῶν 40 ἀποτύμουνον φαίνεσθαι μηθαμῆ μηθαμῶ, οταν ἢ καὶ προσαγορευθῇ πόσις, περὶ δὲ τῶν χρόνων τὸν τῆς τεκνοποίας 1336 εὰν τις φαίνεται τοιοῦτον τὶ δρόων, ἀτιμία ζημιούσθω προπούσῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀμαρτίαν.

17 Γεγομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων οἶς θανάτῳ διάφορον πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν τὴν τροφήν, ὅπως 5 τις ἢ, φαίνεται τε διὰ τε τῶν ἀλλῶν ἧπων ἐπισκοπούσι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔθνων ὅς ἐπιμελεῖ ἐστὶν ἄγειν τὴν
κρήτης, ου γάλακτος πλήθουσα τροφὴ μάλιστ' 2 οἰκεία τοῖς σώμασιν, οἰνοτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ κινήσεις ὡσα εὐδέχεται ποιεῖσθαι τηλικούτων συμ-
φέρει. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δι' ἀπαλο- 10 τητα χρώντα καὶ νῦν ἔνα τῶν ἐθνῶν ὑγιάνως τισὶ μη-
χανικοῖς, ἀ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀστραβῆς. συμ-
φέρει δ' εὖθυς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψυχὴ συνεθίζειν ἐκ μικρῶν
παίδων τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς
3 πράξεις εὐχρηστῶταν. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστὶ τῶν βαρ- 15 βάρων ἔδος τοῖς μὲν εἰς ποταμὸν ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γιγνό-
μενα ψυχρῶν, τοῖς δὲ σκέπασμα μικρὸν ἀμπίσχεων, οἷον
Κελτοῖς. πάντα γὰρ ὃσα δυνατῶν ἑβίζειν, εὖθυς ἀρχο-
μένων βέλτιον μὲν ἑβίζειν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς δ' ἑβίζειν
εὐφυὴς δ' ἡ τῶν παίδων ἔξις διὰ θερμότητα πρὸς τὴν τῶν 20
ψυχρῶν ἄσκησιν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρῶτην συμφέρει
ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τοιαύτην τε καὶ τὴν ταύτην παραπλη-
σίαν τὴν δ' ἐχομένην ταύτης ἡλικίαν μέχρι πέντε ἑτῶν,
ἡν οὔτε πω πρὸς μάθησιν καλῶς ἔχει προσάγειν οὐδεμίαν
οὔτε πρὸς ἀναγκαῖοις πόνους, ὅποιο οὐκ ἡ τὴν αὔξησιν ἐμποδί- 25
ζωσιν, δεὶ δὲ τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως ὥστε διαφεύγειν
τὴν ἁργίαν τῶν σωμάτων. ἣν χρὴ παρασκευάζειν καὶ δ' 5
4 ἀλλων πράξεων καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδίας. δεὶ δὲ καὶ τὰς
παιδίας εἶναι μήτε ἀνελευθέρους μήτε ἐπιτόνους μήτε ἄνε-
μένας. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινὰς ἀκούειν δεὶ 30
tούς τηλικούτως, ἐπιμελεῖς ἐστο τοῖς ἀρχούσιν οὕς καλοῦσι
παιδονόμους. πάντα γὰρ δεὶ τὰ τοιαύτα προοδοποιεῖν πρὸς
τὰς ύστερον διατριβᾶς. διὸ τὰς παιδίας εἶναι δεὶ τὰς πολ-
6 λὰς μιμήσεις τῶν ύστερον σπουδασμένοιν. τὰς δὲ διατά-
σεις τῶν παιδῶν καὶ κλαυθμοὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ 35
κωλύντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὔξησιν
γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ
tοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεῖ τὴν ἱσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, δὲ
7 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινομένοις. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ
40 τοῖς παιδονόμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν τὴν τ' ἀλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἡμιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. ταῦτην γὰρ τὴν ἡλι-
1336 βίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτά ἑτῶν, ἀναγκαίον ὀκίοι τὴν τρο-
φὴν ἔχειν. εὐλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὄραμάτων ἀνελευθερίας καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας, ὄλως 8 μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πάλεως, ὠσπερ ἄλλο τι, δεὶ 5 τῶν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὅτι οἱ τῶν αἰσχρῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς), μᾶλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὥσπερ μήτε λέγων μήτε ἀκούσαι μη-
δεν τοιοῦτον· ἐὰν δὲ τις φαίνεται τι λέγων ἡ πράττων τῶν 9 ἀπηγορευμένων, τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως 10 ἡξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συνιστοῖς ἀτιμίας κολάζειν καὶ πλη-
γαίς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτης ἀτιμίας ἀνελευθερίας ἀνδραποδώδαις χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἡ 
γραφᾶς ἡ λόγους ἀσχήμονας. ἐπιμελές μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς 10 ἐρχομῃ μηδὲν μήτε ἀγαλμα μήτε γραφήν εἶναι τοιούτων πράξεων μίμησιν, εἰ μὴ παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς τοιούτοις οἷς καὶ τὸν ταθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος· πρὸς δὲ τοῖτοις ἀφίησιν ὁ νόμος [τοὺς τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντας ἔτι τὴν ἰκνουμένην] καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς.
20 τοὺς δὲ νεώτερους οὐτ' ἱάμβων οὔτε κωμῳδίας θεατὰς νομοθε-
τείχεν, πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ἓ καὶ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρξει κοινοείν ἡδὶ καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων γνωμομένης βλάβης ἀπαθεῖς ἢ παιδεία ποιήσει πάντας. νῦν μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐν παραδρομῇ πεποιήμεθα τὸν λόγον· 12 25 οὗτον δ' ἐπιστῆσαντας δεὶ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἰτε μὴ δεὶ πρῶτον εἰτε δεὶ διαποστάσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεὶ· κατὰ δὲ τῶν παρόντων καιρόν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον. ἦςος γὰρ οὗ 13 κακῶς ἔλεγε τὸ τοιοῦτον Θεόδωρος ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑπο-
κριτής· οὐδὲν γὰρ πῶποτε παρῆκαν ἑαυτοῦ προεισάγειν, 30 οὔδὲ τῶν εὐτελῶν ὑποκριτῶν, ὡς οἰκειομένων τῶν θεατῶν 
tαῖς πρόταται ἀκοῶς. συμβαίνει δὲ ταῦτα τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς
1336 a 40—1337 a 23.

τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων
14 πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρώτα μᾶλλον, διδ δεὶ τοὺς νέοις πάντα ποιεῖν ξένα τὰ φαύλα, μάλιστα δ’ αὐτῶν ὡσα ἔρχεται ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἡ δυσμένειαν. διελθόντων δὲ τῶν πέντε ἐτῶν τὰ δύο μέχρι τῶν ἐπτὰ δεὶ θεωροῦν ἡδὴ γέγυνεσθαι
15 τῶν μαθήτων, ἃς δεὴσει μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς. δῦο δ’ εἰσιν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ὃς ἀναγκαῖον διηρήσθαι τὴν παιδείαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπτὰ μέχρι ἡβής. καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν ἀφ’ ἡβής μέχρι τῶν ἐνῶς καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἔβδομαι
16 σεως ἀναπληρῶν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέων εἰ ποιητέον
tάξιν τινὰ περὶ τοὺς παῖδας, ἐπειτα πότερον συμφέρει κοινῆ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἡ κατ’ ἱδιον τρόπον (δ’ 5 γίγνεται καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων), τρίτον δὲ ποιαν τινὰ δεὶ ταύτην.

Ε’ (Θ’).

"Οτι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθετητὶ μάλιστα πραγματευτέον περὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὐδὲον ἀν ἀμφισβήτησειν, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γιγνόμενον τοῦτο βλάπτει τὰς πο-2 λιτείας (δεὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύσεσθαι τὸ γὰρ ἢδος τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φιλάττεις ἐσθη ἐν τὴν 15 πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἶνον τὸ μὲν δημοκρα-τικὸν δημοκρατίαν, τὸ δ’ ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν οἴει δὲ τὸ βέλτιστον ἢδος βελτίων οἰκείων πολιτείας), ἐπὶ δὲ πρὸς πάσας δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας ἐστὶν δὲ δεὶ προπαιδεύσεσθαι καὶ προεθέξεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστων ἐργασίας, ὡστε δὴλον 20 3 ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐν τὸ τέλος τῇ πόλει πάσῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέ-
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Ε' (Θ'). 1-3.

λειαν εἶναι κοινῆν καὶ μῆ κατ' ἱδίαν, ὅπως τρόπον νῦν ἐκα-
25 στος ἑπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἱδίας τε καὶ μάθησιν ἱδίαν, ἣν ἀν δόξης, διδάσκων. δεὶ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀσκησιν. ἵμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρῆ νομίζειν 4 αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινὰ εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως, μόριον γὰρ ἐκαστὸς τῆς πόλεως· ἡ δ' ἐπιμέλεια 30 πέφυκεν ἐκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοὺς ὀλὸν ἐπιμέ-
λειαν. ἐπαινέσειε δ' ἂν τὶς καὶ τούτῳ Δακεδαιμονίου· καὶ γὰρ πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ κοινὴν ταύτην. ὅτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετήσεων περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην 2 κοινῆν ποιητέων, φανερῶν· τίς δ' ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία, καὶ πῶς 35 χρῆ παιδεύεσθαι, δεὶ μὴ λανθάνειν. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖ-
tαι περὶ τῶν ἔργων· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι δεῖν μανθᾶνειν τοὺς νέους οὕτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὕτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἀριστον, οὐδὲ φανερῶν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱθος· ἐκ τε τῆς ἐμ- 2 40 ποδῶν παιδείας παραχώδης ἡ σκέψις, καὶ δὴλον οὕδεν πό-
tερον ἁπείρων δεὶ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ περιττὰ (πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κρι-
1337b τὰς τινας)· περὶ τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐδὲν ἔστιν ὁμολογούμε-
nον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες τιμῶ-
σιν, ὡστ' εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀσκησιν αὐτῆς). ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαία δεὶ διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων, 3 5 οὐκ ἄδηλον· ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρῥημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων ἐργῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, φανερῶν ὅτι τῶν τοιοτῶν δεὶ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποίησε τῶν μετέχοντα μὴ βάναυσον. βάναυσον δ' ἐργον εἶναι δεὶ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ 4 τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσα πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ 10 τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀχρηστόν ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχήν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ 5 τὰς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσα τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χείρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν καὶ τὰς μυσταρι-
κὰς ἐργασίας· ἀσχολοῦν γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τα-
πεινήν. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν μέχρι μὲν 15
tων ἐνίων μετέχειν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον, τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν λίαν
6 πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἐνοχὸν ταῖς εἰρήμεναι βλάβαις. ἔχει δὲ
πολλήν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τίνος ἐνεκεν πράττει τις ἡ μαν-
θάνει' τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φιλον ἢ δὲ ἀρετὴν οὐκ
ἀνελεύθερον, ὃ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττων πολλάκις δὲ ἄλλους 20
θητικὸν καὶ δουλικὸν δόξειν ἄν πράττειν. ἂι μὲν οὖν κα-
tαβεβηλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρὸτερον,
ἐπαμφιστέριζουσι' ἐστὶ δὲ τέταρτα σχέδων ἡ παιδεύειν εἰώ–3
θασί, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τέταρ-
tον ἔνιοι γραφήματι καὶ γραφικὴν 25
ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὕσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ
γυμναστικήν ὡς συντεινοῦσαν πρὸς ἀνδρίαν' τὴν δὲ μουσικήν
2 ἢ δὲ διαπορθείσειν ἃν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονής χάριν οἱ
πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐταξαν ἐν παι-
δεία διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὀπερ πολλὰκις εἰρή-30
tαι, μὴ μόνον ἁγιολείν ὅρθως ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν ὑπο-
νασθαί καλῶς· ἀυτὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ἰνα καὶ πάλιν
3 εἶπομεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἄμφος μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ
ἀρέτῶν τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἁγιολίας καὶ τέλος, ζητητέον
δ' τι ποιοῦντας δεῖ σχολάζειν. οὓ γὰρ δὴ παίζουσας· τέλος
35 ἣ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ βίου τὴν παιδίαν ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο
ἀδύνατον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἁγιολίαις χρηστέον ταῖς
παιδίαις (ὁ γὰρ πονῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ἢ δὲ παι-
δία χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἔστιν· τὸ δ' ἁγιολείν συμβαίνει
μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ παιδίας εἰσαγε–40
σθαί καιροφυλακοῦντας τὴν χρῆσιν, ὡς προσάγοντας φαρ-
μακείας χάριν· ἀνεσίς γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς,
καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀνάπαυσις· τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν ἐξεῖν 1338 a
αὐτὸ δοκεῖ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ ζῆν
5 μακράως. τοῦτο δ' οὖ τοῖς ἁγιολούσιν ὑπάρχει ἀλλὰ τοῖς
σχολάζουσιν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἁγιολῶν ἐνεκά τινος ἁγιολεῖ
tέλων ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχουσιν, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία τέλος ἐστίν, ἣν 5
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Ε΄ (Θ’). 3–4.

οὐ μετὰ λύτης ἄλλα μεθ’ ἡδονής οἴονται πάντες εἰναι, ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονήν οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν τιθέασιν, ἄλλα καθ’ ἐαυτοὺς ἐκαστὸς καὶ τὴν ἐξίν τὴν αὐτῶν, ὅ δ’ ἀριστος τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. ὡστε φανερὸν ὅτι 6 10 δεὶ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν μανθάνειν ἄττα καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τὰ παιδεύματα καὶ ταύτας τὰς μαθήσεις ἐαυτῶν εἰναι χάριν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἁσχολίαν ὡς ἀναγκαίας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων. διὸ καὶ τὴν 7 μουσικὴν οἱ πρότεροι εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον 15 (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει τοιοῦτον) οὖδ’ ὡς χρήσιμον, ἀδιπερ τὰ γράμματα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν καὶ πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις πολλάς’ δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραφικὴ χρήσιμος εἰναι πρὸς τὸ κράνειν τὰ τῶν τεχνιτῶν ἔργα κάλλιον’ οὖθ’ αὐτ καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστική πρὸς 20 υγίειαν καὶ ἄλλην (οὐδέτερον γὰρ τούτων ὅρωμεν γιγνόμενον ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς)’ λείπεται τοινῦν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν, εἰς ὅπερ καὶ φαίνονται παράγοντες αὐτὴν’ ἦν γὰρ οἴονται διαγωγήν εἰναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάττουσιν. διόπερ ὁμηρος οὕτως ἐποίησεν 25 ἀλλ’ οἶον ὃ μὲν ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίτα θαλεῖν, καὶ οὕτω προετῶν ἐτέρους τινάς, “οἱ καλέουσιν ἄοιδόν,” φη- σιν, “ὁ κεν τέρπησιν ἀπαντάς.” καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησιν (ὁ) ‘Οδυσσέως ταύτην ἀρίστην εἰναι διαγωγήν, ὅταν εὐφραινομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων “δαιτυμόνες δ’ ἀνά δώματ’ ἀκούαξών-30 ται ἄοιδον ἡμενοι ἐξεῖης.” ὅτι μὲν τοινῦν ἐστὶ παιδεία τις ἡν οὐχ ὡς χρήσιμην παιδευτέον τοὺς νιέις οὐδ’ ὡς ἀναγκαίων ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐλευθερίου καὶ καλῆν, φανερῷ ἐστιν πῦτερον δὲ μία τῶν ἁριμῶν ἡ πλείους, καὶ τίνες αὕται καὶ πῶς, ὤστε- ρον λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἰναι πρὸ 35 οὗ ζηγονεν, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἑχομέν τινα μαρτυρίαν ἐκ τῶν καταβεβλημένων παιδευμάτων ἢ γὰρ μουσική τοῦτο ποιεὶ δήλων. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρήσιμον ὅτι 30 τινὰ παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον,
οινον την των γραμμάτων μάθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολλὰς
12 ἐνδέχεσθαι γίγνεσθαι δι’ αὐτῶν μαθήσεις ἐτέρας, ὁμοίως 40
de καὶ τήν γραφικήν οὐχ ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὀνόμασι μὴ δια-
μαρτάνωσιν, ἀλλ’ ὡςιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν
ἀνώς τε καὶ πράσιν, ἢ μᾶλλον ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ 1338 b
περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρη-
σιμὸν ἡκιστα ἀρμότει τοῖς μεγαλοφύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευ-
13 θέροις. ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν πρότερον τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἢ τῷ λόγῳ
παιδευτέον εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἢ τῇ διά-
νοιαν, δῆλον ἐκ τούτων ὅτι παραδότεον τοὺς παῖδας γυμνα-
στικῆ καὶ παιδοτριβικῆ τοῦτον γὰρ ἢ μὲν ποιάν τίνα ποιεῖ
tῆν ἔξω τῶν σώματος, ἢ δὲ τὰ ἔργα.

Νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπίμε- 4
λείσθαι τῶν παίδων αἱ μὲν ἀδιδηστικὴν ἔξω ἐμποιοῦσι, λω- 10
βῶμενα τὰ τε εἰδή καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ
dὲ Δάκωνες τάυτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θη-
ρίωδεις δ’ ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὅς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδράιν
2 μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἰρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε
πρὸς μιᾶν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα τάυτην βλέποντα ποιητέον 15
tὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἰ τε καὶ πρὸς τάυτην, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐξευρί-
σκουσιν οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔνδοις οὔτ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνθων
ὅρων τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ
3 μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέοις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἠθεσιν. πολλὰ
δ’ ἐστὶ τῶν ἐνθῶν ἢ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρω- 20
ποφαγίαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον
Ἀχαίαν τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι καὶ τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν ἔτερα,
tὰ μὲν ὀμοίως τοῦτοι τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἡ λιστρικὰ μὲν ἐστιν,
4 ἀνδρίας δ’ οὕτως τοῦς Δάκωνας ἵσσε, ἐπὶ δ’ αὐτοῦς τοὺς
ὅτι μὲν προσήθηκεν ταῖς φιλοπονίαις, ὡπε- 25
ῥέχοντας τῶν ἄλλων, νῦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἄγωσι καὶ
tοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειτομένους ἔτερον, οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νέους
γυμνάζειν τῶν τρόπων τούτων διεφερον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μόνον μὴ
5 πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν, ὡστε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ θηριῶδες
30 δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων ἀγωνίσατο ἀν οὐδένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μάλλον ἀνήρ ἀγαθὸς. οἱ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέντες τοὺς παῖδας, καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγώγους ποιήσαντες, βαναύσους κατεργάζονται κατὰ γε τὸ ἀλήθες, πρὸς ἐν τὲ μόνον ἔργον τῇ 35 πολιτικῇ χρησίμους ποιήσαντες, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο χείρον, ὡς φησὶν οἱ λόγοις, ἔτέρων. δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων 7 κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἐχουσί, πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἰχον. ὦτὶ μὲν οὖν χρηστέουν τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστέου, ὁμολογούμενον ἐστὶν 40 (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβης κοινότερα γυμνασία προσοιτεῖσ, τὴν βίαιον τροφήν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπείροντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν αὐξήσιν σημείων γὰρ οὕ8 1339 α μικρὸν ὅτι δύνανται τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν, εὐ γὰρ τοῖς ὀλυμπιονίκαις δύο τις ἀν ἢ τρεῖς εὗροι τοὺς αὐτοὺς νευκηκότας ἀνδρας τε καὶ παιδας, διὰ τὸ νέους ἀσκοῦντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων· ὅταν δ' ἀφ' 9 5 ἡβης ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους μαθήμασι γένονται, τότε ἀρµότει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις καταλαµβάνειν τὴν ἐχοµένην ἡλικίαν, ἀμα γὰρ τῇ τε διανοίᾳ καὶ τῷ σώµατι διαπονεῖν οὐ δει, τούναντιον γὰρ ἐκάτερος ἀπεργαζόεσθαι πέρικε τῶν πόνων, ἐμπόδιζον τὸ μὲν τοῦ 10 σώµατος πόνους τὴν διανοίαν, ὁ δὲ ταύτης τὸ σῶμα·)

5 Περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς ἔννοι μὲν διηπορήκαμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ πρότερον, καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας αὐτὰ προσαγαγείν, ἵνα ὐσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται τοῖς λόγοις οὕς ἢ τὸς εἰπεῖν ἄποφαίομενα περὶ αὐτῆς· οὔτε γὰρ τών 2 15 ἔχει δύναμιν ῥαδίων περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖν, οὔτε τίνος δεὶ χάριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον παιδίας ἑνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύ-

10 σεσως, καθάπερ ὑπὸνοι καὶ μέθησι (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἀμα παῦει μέ-

20 ριμνα, ὡς φησὶν Εὐριπίδης· διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ 3
1338 b 30—1339 b 11.

τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὀρχήσιν ἐν τούτοις, ἡ μάλλον οἰητέον πρὸς ἀρετὴν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικὴν, ὡς δυναμενὴν, καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα ποιών τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ἦδος ποιῶν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθύγχουσαν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς, ἡ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς 25 φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων). ὅτι μὲν οὖν δὲ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδίας ἕνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· οὐ γὰρ παίζουσι μανθάνοντες· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ μάθησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖθε διαγωγὴν γε παιῶν ἀρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδίδοναι ταῖς τοιαύταις· οὐδεὶ γὰρ 30 ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος. ἀλλ' ἵσως ἄν δόξειν ἢ τῶν παιδών σπουδὴ παιδίας εἶναι χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ τελειωθείσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνος ἂν ἐνεκα δεόι μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ Μῆδων βασιλέως, δὲ ἄλλων αὐτὸ ποιῶντων μεταλαμβάνειν 35

6 τῆς ἠδονῆς καὶ τῆς μαθήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον βέλτιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην τῶν τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἐπιμελουμένων ὑπὸ πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον, εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα διαπονεῖν αὐτοὺς, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅψων πραγματείαν αὐτοὺς ἄν δεόι παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλ' 40

7 ἀποτον. τὴν δ' αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἦθη βελτίων ποιεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ τί δὲι μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐτέρων ἀκούοντας ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, 1339 b φόσπερ οἱ Δάκωνες· ἐκείνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὅμως δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὡς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μῆ 4

8 χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος κἂν εἰ πρὸς εὐημερίαν καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθερίου χρηστέον αὐτή· τί δὲι μαν—5 ὥραν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν; σκοπεῖν δ' ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἡν ἑχομεν περὶ τῶν θέων· οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἄειδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ 9 ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος· ἀλλ' ἵσως περὶ μὲν 10 τούτων ὑστερον ἐπισκέπτειν, ἡ δὲ πρώτῃ ὦτησίς ἐστι πότε—
ρον οὗ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἢ θετέον, καὶ τί δύναται τῶν διαπορθηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδιὰν ἢ διαγωγήν. εὐλόγως δὲ εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ 15 φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἢ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστι, τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἤδειαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ιατρεία τίς ἐστιν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἅλλα καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν εξ ἀμφοτέρων τοῦτων ἐστίν).

20 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναι φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψιλὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελοφίας (φησὶ γοῦν καὶ Μουσαίος εἶναι "βροτοῖς ἡδίστον ἀδείδειν"). διὸ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνυσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνουσιν αὐτὴν ὃς δυναμένην εὐφραίνειν), ὡστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἄν τις ὑπολάβησεν παιδεύσας δὲίν δείν αὐτὴν τοὺς νεωτέρους. ὅσα γὰρ ἀβλαβῆς τῶν ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἀρμόττει πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἅλλα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὑλιγάκις γίνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ ἄναπαύονται καὶ χρῶνται ταῖς παιδιαίς οἷς ὅσον ἐπὶ πλέον ἅλλα καὶ 25 διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, χρήσιμον ἅν εἰς διαναπαύειν ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ ταύτης ἡδοναῖς. συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος. ἡμῖν γὰρ ἴσως ἡδονήν τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἅλλ' ὅ τι τὴν τυχόσαν, ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην, λαμβάνουσιν ὅσ ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων 30 ἡμῶν ὑμώμαμα τι, τό τε γὰρ τέλος οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐσομένων χάριν αἴρετον, καὶ αἰ τοιαύτα τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐδενὸς εἰς τῶν ἐσομένων ἔσκεν, ἀλλ' τῶν γεγονότων, οἰον πόνων καὶ λύπης. δὲ οὖν ἄν αἰτίαν ζητοῦσι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ γίγνε- 35 σθαι διὰ τοῦτον τῶν ἡδονῶν, ταύτην ἄν τις εἰκότως ὑπο- λάβοι τῷ αἰτίαν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην, ἅλλα καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ἀναπαύσεις, ὡς ἐοικε- 40 νὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις. καὶ ταύτην ἄλλα περὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην, ἅλλα καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι. 15 1340 αὐτὴς ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρείαν, καὶ δεὶ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς
1339 b 12—1340 a 35.

... ήδονής μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτής, ἦς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθησιν (ῄσχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἠδονήν φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πάσιν ἢθεσιν ἡ χρήσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφθέλης), ἀλλ' ὅραν εἶ πη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν. 16 τούτῳ δ' ἀν εἶη δῆλον, εἰ ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἦθη γιγνόμεθα δι' αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γιγνόμεθα ποιοὶ τινες, φανερὸν διὰ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἐτέρων, οὐχ ἢκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν Ὁλύμπου ποιεῖ ταῦτα γὰρ ὀμολογομένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς ἐνθουσιαστικάς, δ' ἐνθουσιασμὸς τόπον περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἦθους πάθος ἐστίν. ἦτι δὲ ἀκροφόμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρίς τῶν ρυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν. ἦτη δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἰναὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡθῶν, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὅρθως καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, 15 δεὶ δηλοῦντι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεβήκεσθαι μεθὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ κρίμεν ὅρθως καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπισκέψεων ἦθους καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεως, ἦτι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ρυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσι δρυγῆς καὶ πραότητος, ἦτι δ' ἀνδρίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τοῦτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν (δὴλον δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἐργῶν μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροφόμενοι 19 τοιούτων), δ' ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίως θυσίας τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν ἐγγύσ ἐστὶ τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχεων τρόπων (οἶνος εἰ τὸ χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεῶμενος μὴ 25 δι' ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἄλλα διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτῆς, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν θεωρίαν, οὐ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ, 20 ἡθείαν εἶναι), συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμοιῶμα τοῖς ἦθεσιν, οἶνον ἐν τοῖς ἄπτοις καὶ τοῖς γενετοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὀρατοῖς ἢρέμα 30 (σχήματα γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρὸν, καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ ὡς ἐστὶ ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἦθῶν, ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰ γιγνόμενα 21 σχήματα καὶ χρώματα τῶν ἦθῶν, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὑπὶ τοῦ σῶματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὦ μὴν ἄλλα ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ 35
περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεὶ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνῶτον κἂν εἰ τὶς ἀλλὸς τῶν γρα-φέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστὶν ἥτικός), ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεις αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν. καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστι φανε-22
40 ρών εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἄρμονίων διέστηκε φύσις, ὡστε ἀκούον- 
tας ἀλλὸς διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐξειν τρόπων πρὸς ἐκάστῳ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνιάς ὀδυρτικωτέρως
1340 b καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἶον πρὸς τὴν μιξολυδιστὶ καλομένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἶον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μᾶλιστα πρὸς ἐτέραν, οἶον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ δωριστὶ μονὴ τῶν ἄρμονίων, ἐνδο- 
5 σιαστικοὺς δ’ ἢ φρυγιστὶ. ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ 23 
tὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφήκοτες. λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ 
μαρτυρία τῶν λόγων ἢ αὐτῶν τῶν ἑργῶν τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ 
τρόπων ἐξεῖ καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ρυθμοὺς οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἦδος 
ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικοί, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν 
10 φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθερωτέρας. ἐκ 24 
μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερὸν ὃτι δύναται ποιεῖν τὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ 
δος ἡ μουσικὴ παρασκευάζειν καὶ ἐτέραν, διήλον ὃτι προσακτέον καὶ παιδευτέον ἐν αὐτῇ τοῖς νέοις. 
ἐστι δὲ ἀρμόττουσα πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τὴν τηλικαύτην ἡ δι-25 
15 δασκαλία τῆς μουσικῆς οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἥλικιαν 
ἀνήδυνον οὐκ ὑπομένουσιν ἐκόντες, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει 
tῶν ἡδομένων ἐστὶν. καὶ τὸς πλούσιον τῆς ἀρμονίας 
καὶ τοῖς ρυθμοῖς εἶναι διὸ πολλοὶ φασὶ τῶν σοφῶν οἱ 
μὲν ἄρμονίαι εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, οἱ δ’ ἔχουσιν ἀρμονίαν.
6 Πότερον δὲ δεὶ μαυθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἄδουτάς τε καὶ χει- 
ρουργούντας ἢ μή, καθάπερ ἦπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον. 
οὔκ ἄδηλον δὴ ὃτι πολλῆς ἐξεῖ διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ γέγονε- 
σθαι ποιοὺς τινας, εὰν τὶς αὐτὸς κοινοῦ ἡ τῶν ἑργῶν. ἐν 
γὰρ τὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ χαλεπῶν ἐστὶ μὴ κοινούσσαντας 
25 τῶν ἑργῶν κρίτας γενέσθαι σπουδαίος. ἀμα δὲ καὶ δεὶ τοὺς 2 
παιδας ἐξεῖν τινὰ διατριβήν, καὶ τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλαταγήν
οίεσθαί γενέσθαι καλῶς, ἢν διδόσαι τοῖς παιδίοις ὡς χρόμενοι ταύτη μηδὲν καταγνώσῃ τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν· ὦ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἰσουχάζειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἔστι τοῖς νήπιοις ἀρμόττουσα τῶν παιδίων, ἢ δὲ παιδεία πλαταγή. 30

3 τοῖς μείζοσι τῶν νέων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μουσικὴν οὕτως ὥστε καὶ κουνωνεῖν τῶν ἑργῶν, φανερῶν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων· τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ μὴ πρέπον ταῖς ἥλικίαις οὐ καλεσάν διόρισαι, καὶ λύσαι πρὸς τοὺς φάσκοντας βάναυσον·

4 οὐ εἶναι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ, ἐπεὶ τοῦ κρίνειν 35 χάριν μετέχειν δεῖ τῶν ἑργῶν, διὰ τούτο χρή νέους μὲν ὡς τοὺς χρήσθαι τοῖς ἑργοῖς, πρεσβυτέρους δὲ γινομένους τῶν μὲν ἑργῶν ἀφεῖσθαι, δύνασθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ καθίσμα ὅρθως διὰ τὴν μάθησιν τὴν γενομένην ἐν τῇ νεότητι·

5 περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως ἦν τινες ἐπιτιμῶσιν ὡς ποιουσίς ἀρχικῆς μουσικῆς βασικοῦ, οὐ καλεσάν λύσαι σκεφταμένους μέχρι τοὺς πόσου τῶν ἑργῶν κουνωνεῖον τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδευμένους πολιτικῆς, καὶ ποιών μελῶν καὶ ποιῶν ῥυθμῶν κουνωνητέον, ἐτὶ δὲ ἐν ποίοις ὄργανοι τὴν μάθησιν 6 ποιητέον, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρειν εἰκός. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἡ λύσις ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιτιμήσεως· οὐδὲν γὰρ κολύει τρόπους τινὰς τῆς μουσικῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθὲν. φανερῶν τούπων ὡς 5 δεῖ τὴν μάθησιν αὐτῆς μήτε ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς ὑστερον πράξεις, μήτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βάναυσον καὶ ἀχρηστὸν πρὸς τὰς πολιμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὑστερον. συμβαίνουι δὲ ἀν περὶ τὴν μάθησιν, εἰ μήτε τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγώνας τοὺς τεχνικοὺς συντείνοντα διαπονοίειν, μήτε τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἑργῶν, ἀ νῦν ἐλλήλουεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγώνας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν 8 ἀγώνων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα μέχρι περ ἀν δύνασθαι χαιρέων τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσι καὶ ρυθμοῖς, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὀσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ἔνια ἡμῶν, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ πλῆθος ἀνδρατῶν καὶ παιδίων. δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποίοις ὄργανοι χρηστέον.
oúte γὰρ αὐλοὺς εἰς παιδείαν ἀκτέον οὔτ' ἄλλο τεχνικὸν 9 ὅργανον, οὐδ' κιθάραν καὶ ἐὰν τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερον ἔστιν, ἄλλα 20 ὥσπερ ποιήσει αὐτῶν ἀκροατάς ἁγαθοὺς ἡ τῆς μουσικῆς παι- δείας ἡ τῆς ἀλλᾶς: ἐτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἡθικὸν ἄλλα μᾶλλον ὁργιαστικὸν, ἀπόλεσ τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῶ Καιροὺς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἡ μά- θησιν. προσθάμεν δὲ ὅτι συμβέβηκεν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ πρὸς 10 25 παιδείαν καὶ τὸ καλύπτον τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι τὴν αὐθηνίαν. διὸ καλῶς ἀπεδοκίμασαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πρότερον τὴν χρησίν ἐκ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερῶν, καίτερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρώ- τον αὐτῷ. σχολαστικότεροι γὰρ γιγνομένοι διὰ τὰς εὐπο- 11 ρίας καὶ μεγαλοφυικότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἔτι τε πρότερον 30 καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηθικὰ φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἑργῶν, πάσης ἡπτοντο μαθῆσεως, οὐδὲν διακρίνοντες ἀλλ' ἐπιζη- τοῦντες. διὸ καὶ τὴν αὐλητικὴν ἡγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθῆσεις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Δακεδαίμονὶ τις χορηγὸς αὐτὸς ἡλίσθε τῷ 12 χορῷ, καὶ περὶ Ἀθηνᾶς οὐτῶς ἐπεχώριασεν ἀπὸ σχέδου οἱ 35 πολλοὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μετείχον αὐτῆς δήλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πίνακος ὅν ἀνέθηκε Θράσιππος Ἐκφαντίδη χορηγήσας. ὅστερον δ' ἀπεδοκιμάσθη διὰ τῆς πείρας αὐτῆς, βέλτιον δυναμένων κρᾶνεν τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν συντείνουν' ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ὁργάνων τῶν ἀρχαίων, 13 40 οὐδὲν πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἱδονὴν συντείνοντα τοῖς ἀκούσαι τῶν χρωμένων, ἐπτάγονα καὶ τρίγονα καὶ 1341 b σαμβυκαί, καὶ πάντα τὰ δεόμενα χειρουργικὴς ἐπιστήμης, εὑλόγωσ δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν ὅπδ' τῶν ἀρχαίων μεμυθολογημένων' φασὶ γὰρ δὴ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν εὐροῦσαν ἀπο- βαλεῖν τοὺς αὐλοὺς; οὐ κακῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει φάναι καὶ διὰ 14 5 τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην τοῦ προσώπου τούτο ποιῆσαι δυσχεράνασαν τὴν θεόν' οὐ μὴν ἄλλα μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ὅτι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδὲν ἐστιν ἡ παιδεία τῆς αὐλῆσεως' τῇ δὲ Ἀθηνᾶ τήν ἐπι- στήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὅργα- 15 νων καὶ τῆς ἐργασίας ἀποδοκιμάζομεν τὴν τεχνικὴν παϊ-
δείαν, τεχνικήν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγώνας (ἐν ταύτηι 10 γὰρ ὁ πρᾶττον οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκούόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης, φορτικῆς, διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἰναι τὴν ἐργασίαν, ἀλλὰ
16 θητικώτεραν καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι: πο
υρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὑμᾶς ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος: ὁ γὰρ 15
θεατὴς φορτικὸς ὁμ ἡμαρβάλλειν εἰσὶ τὴν μουσικῆν, ὡστε
καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας τὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτοὺς τε
ποιοῦσ τινας ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις).

Σκεπτέον δὲ ἐτί περί τε τὰς ἀρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ρυθμοὺς, 7
[kαὶ πρὸς παιδείαν] πότερον πάσαις χρηστέοις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις 20
καὶ πάσι τοὺς ρυθμοὺς ἢ διαμετέον, ἐπειτά τοῖς πρὸς παι-
δείαν διαπονοοῦσι πότερον τὸν αὐτὸν διορισμὸν θήσομεν ἢ
† τρίτον δὲ τινὰ ἕτερον, ἐπειδή † τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὅρωμεν
διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ρυθμῶν ὑόσαν, τούτων δὲ ἐκάτερον οὐ δεὶ
λεληθέναι τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν πρὸς παιδείαν, καὶ πότερον 25
προαιρετέον μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμελὴ μουσικῆν ἢ τὴν εὐρυθύμον.

2 νομίζοντες οὖν πολλὰ καλῶς λέγειν περί τούτων τῶν τε νῦν
μουσικῶν ἔνιοι καὶ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὅσοι τυγχάνοντιν
ἐμπείρως ἔχοντες τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας, τὴν μὲν
καθ' ἐκαστον ἀκριβολογίαν ἀποδώσωμεν ζητέων τοῖς θεὸν- 30
μένοις παρ' ἐκείνον, νῦν δὲ νομικῶς διέλοιμον, τοὺς τύπους
3 μὸνον ἐσπόντες περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδε
χόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσι τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ,
tὰ μὲν ἡθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθυσιαστικὰ τιθέντες,
καὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν τῆς φύσιν πρὸς ἐκαστα τούτων οἴκειαν 35
ałaν πρὸς ἀλλο μέρος τιθέασι, φαμέν δ' οὐ μίας ἐνεκεν
ὁφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρήσθαι δείν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλειόνων χά-
ριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἐνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τι δὲ λέ-
γομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ
ποιητικῆς ἐρούμεν σαφέστερον—τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγήν, 40
πρὸς ἀνεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν),
φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὔ τὸν 1342 a
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αυτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσας χρηστείας, ἄλλα πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἢθικωτάταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἐτέρων χειρουργοῦντος καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. 5 γὰρ περὶ ἐνάσι συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῆς ἱσχυρός, τούτῳ ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἦττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἐτὶ δ' ἐνθουσιασμὸς. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχυμοι τινὲς εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν ὀρῶμεν τούτοις, ὥσταν χρῆσωμαι τοῖς ἐξοργία-10 ζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὀσπερ ἱστρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. ταύτῳ δὴ τοῦτῳ ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν 5 καὶ τοὺς ἑλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὄλους παθητικούς, τούς δ' ἄλλους καθ᾽ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἑκάστος, καὶ πάσι γίγνεσθαι τινα καθάρσιν καὶ κοινφιέσθαι 15 μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς. ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρτικά παρέχει χαρὰν ἀβλαβῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις 6 ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι (χρῆσθαι) θετέν τοὺς τὴν [θεατρικήν] μουσικὴν μεταχειριζομένους ἀγωνιστάς (ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ θεατὴς δυστός, ὃ μὲν ἑλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὃ δὲ 20 φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγκείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἀγώνας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν· εἰσὶ δ' ὀσπερ αὐτῶν ἀν ψυχὶ παρε-7 στραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξως, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἀρμονίων παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακ-25 χρωσμένα, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐκάστος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκείων διόπερ ἀποδοτέον ἐξουσίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζόμενοι πρὸς τὸν θεατὴν τῶν τοιούτων τοιούτῳ τινὶ χρῆσαι τῷ γένει τῆς μουσικῆς) πρὸς δὲ παιδείαν, ὀσπερ εἰρήται, τοὺς ἡθικοῖς τῶν 8 μελῶν χρηστείας καὶ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις. τοιαύτη 30 δ' ἡ δωριστὴ, καθάπερ εἶπομεν πρότερον ἄμεσθαι δὲ δεῖ κάν τινα ἅλλην ἡμῖν δοκιμάζωσιν οἱ κοινωνικὲς τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας. ὃ 9 δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρυγιατί μόνην καταλείπει μετὰ τῆς δωριστῆς, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάζας
1342 a 2—1342 b 34.

τῶν ὀργάνων τῶν αὐλόν. ἔχει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν 1342 b ἡ φρυγιστὶ τῶν ἁρμονίων ἵπτερ αὐλὸς ἐν τοίς ὀργάνοις. 10 ἀμφός γὰρ ὀργιαστικὰ καὶ παθητικά. δηλοὶ δ’ ἡ ποίησις πάσα γὰρ βακχεία καὶ πάσα ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις μάλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἐστίν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς, τῶν 8’ ἁρμο-5 νίων ἐν τοῖς φρυγιστὶ μέλεσι λαμβάνει ταύτα τὸ πρέπον, οἶνον ὃ διθυραμβὸς ὀμολογουμένως εἶναι δοκεῖ Φρύγιον. 11 καὶ τούτου πολλὰ παραδείγματα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνε-σιν ταύτην ἀλλα τε, καὶ διότι Φιλόξενος ἐγχειρήσας ἐν τῇ δωριστὶ ποιήσας διθυραμβὸν τούς Μυσοὺς οὐχ οἶός τ’ ἤν, 10 ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὴν φρυγιστὶ τὴν 12 προσήκουσαν ἁρμονίαν πάλιν. περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες ὀμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὕση καὶ μάλιστ’ ἢδος ἐχούσης ἁνδρείον. έτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν τῶν ὑπερβολῶν ἐπαινούμεν καὶ χρὴναι διώκειν φαμέν, ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ ταύτην 15 ἔχει τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἁρμονίας, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ 13 Δόρια μέλη πρέπει παιδευέσθαι μάλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις. εἰσὶ δὲ δύο σκοποὶ, τὸ τε δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ γὰρ τὰ δυνατὰ δεί μεταχειρίζεσθαι μάλλον καὶ τὰ πρέποντα ἐκά-στοις. έστι δὲ καὶ ταύτα ὀρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, οἷον τοῖς 20 ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνον οὐ βάδιον ξέδει τὰς συντόνους ἁρμο-νίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνεμένας ἡ φύσις ὑποβάλλει τοῖς τηλικού-τοις. διὸ καλὸς ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ τούτο (τῷ) Σωκράτει τῶν περὶ τὴν μοσικήν τινες, ὃτι τὰς ἀνεμένας ἁρμονίας ἀποδοκι-μάσειν εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ὡς μεθυστικὰς λαμβάνων αὐτάς, 25 οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν (βακχευτικὸν γὰρ ἡ γε μέθη ποιεῖ μάλλον) ἀλλ’ ἀπειρηκυνίας. ὡστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, τὴν τῶν προσβυτέρων, δεί καὶ τῶν τοιού-14 τῶν ἁρμονίων ἀπτεσθαι καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιούτων. ἐτὶ 8’ εἰ τίς ἔστι τοιαύτη τῶν ἁρμονίων ἡ πρέπει τῇ τῶν παι-30 δῶν ἡλικία διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τ’ ἔχειν ἁμα καὶ παιδείαν, οἶνον ἡ λυδιστὶ φαίνεται πεπουθενάι μάλιστα τῶν ἁρμονίων . . . δήλον ὅτι τούτους ὅρους τρεῖς ποιήτεον εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, τὸ τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ πρέπον . . .

G 2
CRITICAL NOTES.

BOOK III.

1274 b 33. Vet. Int. renders *note* by *quidem*, as in 1276 a 18 and 1286 a 1. 40. Vet. Int. has *et* for *de*, as in 1291 b 40, *Brady* *de*.


1275 b 7. I follow Coray and Sus. in adding *ἐν* before *ἐνίας*: op. c. 11. 1282 a 27, ὡς ἐν ἐνίας πολιτείαις, where M8 Π1 and possibly Γ omit ἐν, and 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 27, ἡ κατασκευάσαντας ἀρχείον οἷον ἐν ἐνίας πολιτείαις ἔστιν, where Π2 om. ἐν. 13. ἀλλὰ . . γὰρ] Vet. Int. *sed*, but this stands for ἀλλὰ γὰρ here, as in 1282 b 8 and 1323 b 36. Γὰρ om. Π1 Πb and over an erasure Π1. 16. ἀποδέδοται Π: Vet. Int. *attribuitur*, as in 1299 a 26. In 1285 a 6 ἀποδέδοται is rendered *attributa sunt*, but it is doubtful whether Vet. Int. found
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ἀποδίδοται in Γ in the passage before us and in 1299 a 26, for he renders πέπονθε by palitum in 1294 b 17. 17. Ms P\textsuperscript{1} omit the second περὶ, but see critical note on 1331 b 24 and explanatory note on 1284 a 35. 21. δὲ] δὴ Π Vet. Pal. Bekk.: all MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined but three (h k z) have etiam, which stands for δὴ in 1277 b 16 and 1292 b 10; h k z have autem. I follow Sus. in reading δὲ. πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν] Vet. Int. secundum usum: did he find κατὰ in Γ? 25. δὲ Π\textsuperscript{2} Sus.: δὴ Π\textsuperscript{3} Π\textsuperscript{1} Bekk.

26. ἕκεινα] Vet. Int. hunc (τοῦτον Γ?). 30. εἶναι γὰρ τινὰς λαρμο-
σιών (ἐιναι γὰρ τινας λαρμασιών ΓΠ Vet. Pal.) is bracketed by Ridgeway and Sus., and Camerarius (Interp. p. 112) would read λαρμασιών in place of λαρμασιών. See explanatory note on 1275 b 26. 32. ἡσαν Π\textsuperscript{1} Ald. Vet. Pal. Sus. and over an erasure Π\textsuperscript{1}: ἂν Π\textsuperscript{2} etc. Bekk. καὶ γὰρ οὖδὲ Μ\textsuperscript{8} Π\textsuperscript{33} Vet. Pal. etc. Sus.\textsuperscript{4}: καὶ γὰρ οὖδὲ Π\textsuperscript{4} etc. Bekk.: Vet. Int. neque enim, which perhaps represents καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ. 33. ἐκ om. Π\textsuperscript{1} and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. quod ex cive mare aut femina). 34. ἕκεινα Victorius et vir doctus in marg. Aldinae Monacensis ... ἕκειναι aut ἕκεινα Μ\textsuperscript{1}, ἕκεινα Π\textsuperscript{2} etc. et pr. Π\textsuperscript{1} (rasura super ei) et pr. Π\textsuperscript{4} et corr. Π\textsuperscript{3}, ἕκεινα pr. Π\textsuperscript{3} (ut videtur) et editores inde a Victorio et Morelio posteaque ἐξαισιατικοί eidem editores,' Sus.\textsuperscript{5}, who reads ἔκεινα and ἔκεινα. Π Sus. illi magis habent. 35. Richards would add ως after οὖν, a suggestion which well deserves to be recorded, though I am not sure that any change should be made in the text. 39. καὶ Π Bekk.\textsuperscript{8} Sus.: καὶ Π Bekk.\textsuperscript{1} It is not easy to say what Vet. Int. found in his Greek text, for he has equidem et cum hoc ad hoc alique dubitabit: perhaps καὶ τοῦ Π τῶν τινος τις ἢτοι προσερφόρησεν. As to the omission of ἀν by ΓΠ see critical note on 1283 b 14. τοῦτο Λ\textsuperscript{6} Ald. pr. Μ\textsuperscript{8} Bekk. Sus., τοῦτο Π Π\textsuperscript{3} Π\textsuperscript{33} Π\textsuperscript{4}.

1276 a 4. τῆς om. Μ\textsuperscript{8} Π\textsuperscript{1}: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. 5. ἐφαμὲν Π\textsuperscript{1} Π\textsuperscript{2} Bekk. Sus.: φαμὲν Γ Μ\textsuperscript{8}. 14. καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται των] Vet. Int. in democratiam versae fuerunt (or fuerint) guaedam, a rendering which it is hard to explain. We cannot be sure that καὶ was omitted in Γ, for Vet. Int. often fails to render καὶ: in may, however, stand for κατὰ installed in the place of καὶ. Does versae fuerunt stand for ἐτράπωντο repeated from τῶν τρόπων τοῦτον? 21. Sus. brackets τῶν τόπων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, but compare the similar repetition of τῶν χῶραν in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 33 (where Sus. brackets τῶν χῶραν), and of τῶν ἡθῶν in 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 33 sq. (where Sus. brackets the first τῶν ἡθῶν). 25. τῶν αὐτῶν]
1275 b 17—1277 a 39.

τον αυτον τοπον P* Bekk, and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. quendem locum).
As to additions of this kind in P* see critical note on 1329 a 1.
33. ἐδοσ om. Π² and in a lacuna P¹.

30. δι Π¹ Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus.: διόπερ Γ Μ⁵. 33. τον ἐ' ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα φαμέν κατὰ μᾶν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν is found only in Γ P¹ Ar., corr.³ Π² (in paler ink than the MS.), and marg. P¹: τὴν, however, is omitted in pr. P¹ and supplied by the scribe in the same ink as the MS.; it is also written above the line in marg. P¹: we cannot be sure that it was added in Γ. 36. ἀλλὰ om. Μ⁵ Vat. Pal. pr. Π¹, but not Γ (as Sus. says), for Vet. Int. has quin immo, which represents οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ in 1278 b 21 and 1323 b 6.
39. αὐτὸν Π² Bekk., αὐτὸν Vat. Pal., αὐτῶν Γ (Vet. Int. ipsum): εἰσιν Π¹ Sus. 40. ἐπεὶ δὲ Π² Vat. Pal. Ar., ἐπεὶ δὲ Bekk., ἐπείδη δὲ P¹, ἐπείδη Γ Μ⁵ Sylburg, Thuot, Sus.: Thuot and Sus., however, place ἐπείδη ... τολίτας before δὲ, 38.

1277 a 8. κτήσει is bracketed by Bernays. See explanatory note. 12. ἀπλῶς om. Π¹. 17. ἄρχοντος] τοῦ ἄρχοντος Π³ Bekk. φαίνονται παδευνόμενοι] Vet. Int. videntur erudiri, which stands for φαίνονται παδευνόμενοι: cp. 1338 a 20 and 1339 a 2. 20. δὲ Π² Bekk.: δὴ Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. itaque). Vat. Pal. has εἰδεαυτη. 24. ἵσως om. Π¹. τυράννοι] τυράννει Μ⁵ Π¹ pr. Π² (corrected in the same ink as the MS.): Vet. Int. has quando non tyrannizat, which probably represents ὅτε μὴ τυράννει. 26. After or (with Bernays) before δοκίμον we should probably supply δοκεῖ: compare the omission of δοκοῦσιν before διώκειν in Π¹ in 3. 13. 1284 a 19. I prefer this change to Dr. Jackson's ingenious suggestion of δοκεῖ τον in place of δοκίμον (adopted by Sus.³a). 30. ἐτέρα Coray: ἀμφότερα Γ Π: ἀμφω ἐτέρα Bernays, who translates 'Beide müssten Verschiedenes (lernen).' ἀμφότερα from the next line, however, may perhaps have taken the place of ἐτέρα. 32. τολύνειθεν Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk., κατέθεν Γ Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. et hinc), κατέθεν Μ⁵. 34. λέγομεν, ἀ Lamb.: λέγομεν Γ Π. Heylbut in his report of the readings of Vat. Pal. (Rhein. Mus. 42. 103) does not note any variation in 34 from the reading of Sus.³ (λέγομεν, ἀ), but this may be an oversight. Sus.³a takes the reading of Vat. Pal. here to be that of ΓΠ, λέγομεν. 39. αὐτοῦς] See explanatory note on 1277 a 38.
CRITICAL NOTES.

1277 b 2. πρὶν δὴμον γενέσθαι] Vet. Int. antiquam fuisse demus. 

γενέσθαι is rendered by fuisse in 1239 b 9 and by esse in 1288 a 16, just as ἐγένετο is rendered by fuit in 1297 b 16, 1303 b 38, and 1304 a 5. 

14. ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν Π² Bekk.: ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι Π¹ Sus. See critical note on 1288 a 13. The words are found in both orders (see e.g. 1284 a 2, 1317 b 2, 1277 a 26 sq., b 20). 


23. λάλος Π¹ Bekk., ἀλλος P²⁻³ etc., ἀλλος Ald., ἀλλος P⁴. See explanatory note on 1277 b 22. 

κοσμία] z has ornata without any erasure (with ch k l m n and rec. a), which is probably right, for κοσμεῖν is rendered by ornare in Vet. Int. in 1323 b 3, 1314 b 37, and (in z) 1321 a 37: b g Sus. ordinata. 

29. ὡσπερ αὐλοποίοις γὰρ Π² Bekk.: ὡσπερ γὰρ αὐλοποίοις Π¹ Sus. 

Π² are probably right, for in 1278 a 37 Γ Π have ὡσπερ μέτωκοι γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μη μετέχων. A similar variation occurs in 1293 b 17, where Π² have εἰς ἀρέτην τε καὶ δῆμον καὶ Μ⁸ Π¹ (Γ ?) εἰς τε ἀρέτην καὶ δῆμον, and in 1302 a 31, where Π² have περὶ δὲν δὲ, and Μ⁸ Π¹ (Γ ?) περὶ δὲ δὲν. See critical note on 1300 b 17 and cp. also 1326 b 4, where Μ⁸ Π¹ and possibly Γ have ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις, and P²⁻³ ἐν τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαίοις. 


12. κομὴ Π¹ Sus.: κομοὶ Π² Bekk. 

26. μὴ μετέχειν ἀρχής] μὴ μετέχειν ἀρέτης Γ M⁸. Vet. Int. has non participare virtute, but in a z the words principatu fortes interpres are added after virtute. It has not been pointed out that the three words are probably a corruption of 'principatu fortasse' interpres, a suggestion by the translator that principatu should be read in place of virtute, in which he was undoubtedly right. 

32. Vet. Int. does not translate δὲ. 

Vat. Pal. has δοχλων with Π. παραφροῦται] Vet. Int. eligunt, which probably represents προαφροῦται (cp. 1325 b 25 and 1341 b 26). 

Vet. Int. may have found this reading in Γ; it is more likely, however, that he misread his Greek text. 

34. αὐτῶν Vet. Pal., αὐτῶν codex Hamilton collated by Dr. H. Rabe, confirming a conjecture of Perizonius (ad Ael. Var. Hist. 6. 10), αὐτῶν Γ Π. The two words are often confused in the MSS.: thus Π¹ have αὐτῶν in place of αὐτῶν in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 32, and in Oecon. 2. 1346 b 27 the MSS. have αὐτῶν in place of αὐτῶν. 

36. Sus.a 2. ὡσπερ ... 38, μετέχων post 40, εἰσὶν Vaticanum et pr. P¹ et corr. P¹, 37, ὡσει ... 38, μετέχων ibidem Π² Ar., 37, ὡσπερ ... μετέχων ibidem Γ M⁸, verum ordinem restituit corr. P¹ (i.e. Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of Π¹, in the same ink as the MS.). 

37. ὡσει] Vet. Int. ac si,
just as he has ac si for ὄσπερ κἂν in 1312 a 26. 40. Schneider (followed by Sus.) may well be right in adding ἄρετὰν after τὴν αὐτὴν (cp. c. 4. 1277 a 20, where Π² omit ἄρετὰ after ἡ αὐτή), but ἄρετὰν is omitted in 1. 13. 1260 a 24 and 3. 13. 1283 a 40.

1278 b 1. έκ τῶν εἰρημένων om. Π¹, but Vat. Pal. agrees with Π² in adding the words. 3. κάκεινος Γ Μ⁸ Π² Vat. Pal. (Vet. Int. et ille): Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of Π¹, has first written κάκεινος and then corrected it to κάκεινης, adding, however, o above η (see Sus.²). Π¹ Sus. add δ' after κάκεινος or κάκεινης. η δυνάμενος εἶναι κύριος is added by Π² P² Vat. Pal., but omitted by pr. P³⁴ (add. marg. P³⁴). 7. κἂν εἰ Π² Vat. Pal. (κἂν εἰ πλεῖον om. Μ⁸): κἂν εἰ Π¹ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. et si plures), but et si appears to represent κἂν εἰ in 1326 a 17, 1340 a 37, and 1341 a 19. 12. δημοκρατικάι] z has democratiiς: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. democraticis. 14. τούτων] z has horum: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. corum. 15. δὴ] δὲ pr. Q¹ Bekk. 17. δὴ Π² (except Π¹), Bekk.: δὲ Π¹ Π⁴ Sus. Vat. Pal. has δὴ. κατὰ] καὶ κατὰ Π¹ corr. Π⁴ Bekk. 19. καὶ οὐ Π Vat. Pal. Sus., δὲ Bekk.: Vet. Int. fails to render καὶ, but this he often fails to do (see vol. ii. p. lxiii). ὁ is added before ἀνθρώπος in Μ⁸ Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. homo leaves the reading of Γ uncertain): om. Π² Vat. Pal.: see critical note on 1253 a 2, and Stallbaum on Plato, Rep. 619 b, γίγνεται ἀνθρώπος. 20. παρ' ἀλλήλων] παρ' ἀλλήλων Γ (Vet. Int. ab invicem): περὶ ἀλλήλων Μ⁸ Π² and pr. Π¹, also Vat. Pal. βοήθειας] πολιτείας Γ Μ⁸ Vat. Pal. Π¹ Vat. Pal. omit οὐκ ἔλαστον and are probably right: see Heylbut in Rhein. Mus. 42. 108, who urges that the meaning intended to be expressed by οὐκ ἔλαστον here is always expressed by οὐ ς ἡπτὸν, οὐδὲν ἡπτὸν, in Aristotle's writings (e.g. in 2. 6. 1265 a 26, 3. 11. 1282 a 6 etc.), while ἔλαστον on the contrary always means what is smaller in number, time, or space. 25. καὶ συνέχονται τὴν πολιτικῆν κοινωνίαν] These words are placed after αὐτὸν by Π¹ Vat. Pal., but after μόριον by Π². Bekker's text is συνέχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζήν ἐνεκεν αὐτοῦ (телей γὰρ ἐνεκεῖ τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον) καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικῆν κοινωνίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόριον κ.τ.λ. 27. ὑπερβάλλῃ Μ⁸: ὑπερβάλη Π²³ etc. Vat. Pal.: ὑπερβάλλει Π¹⁴: it is uncertain what reading Vet. Int. found in his Greek text, for his rendering is exceedatur. 30. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς γς] z adds et before principatus, thus giving an equivalent for καὶ, which the other MSS. of Vet. Int. do not. γς add. P²³ Vat. Pal. 40. ὄσπερ] ὡς Μ⁸ Π¹ Sus. The reading of Γ is uncertain (Vet. Int. uI). Vat. Pal. has ὄσπερ. Π¹ often omit
small words, and these MSS. (or at any rate Ms P¹) omit περ also in 1317 κα 23.

1279 a 2. ἐνα] ἐναι Π¹, but not Vat. Pal. 3. ἐναι om. Π¹, but not Vat. Pal. 12. αὐτῶ Π¹ Ald. Bekk. Sus.: the other MSS. and ἐναι αὐτῶ. 20. καὶ after πᾶσα Π² Bekk., but see explanatory note on 1281 Π². 25. τὸ πολιτεύμα Ms P¹ Vat. Pal. Sus.: Π² Bekk. omit τὸ: the reading of Π is uncertain. 27. ὀλίγου] ζ has paucos, but paucum, the reading of the other MSS. of Vet. Int., may perhaps be right, for Ms has ὀλίγον. 34. τῶν before ὀλίγων om. Ms P¹ and possibly Π, but not Vat. Pal. 37. πολιτεύμα] Vet. Int. vivit (politice vivit?): cp. 1267 b 29, 1255 b 37.

1279 b 15. τὶ om. Π¹, but Π¹ often omit τὶς and its parts (see critical note on 1288 a 16). 22. τοι) συμβαίνη] συμβαίνη Ms P² etc.: συμβαίνη Vat. Pal.: συμβαίνη Bekk.¹: συμβαίνει P¹⁴ Bekk.² Sus. (compare the reading of these two MSS. in 1278 b 27). Vet. Int. accidit, which might stand for either reading (see critical notes on 1253 a 22, b 26). See explanatory note on 1260 b 31. Meister (Das Colonialrecht von Naupaktos, p. 291 sqq.) defends the use of αλ with the subjunctive (αλ ἀνχορέει = αλ ἀνχορεύγ) in a Locrian inscription from Naupactus (Hicks, Manual, No. 63: Cauer, Delectus Inscr. Gr., ed. 2, No. 229), but the verb is there used, as he remarks, in a future sense, which is hardly the case here, and even if this were otherwise, the difference of dialect would have to be taken into account. 26. κἀν τὶς Π¹ Ms Vat. Pal. Bekk.: κἀν τὶς Ms: Vet. Int. si quis, which may represent either κἀν τὶς or κἀν τὶς, for si stands for κἀν in 1282 b 8, 1298 b 23, and 1309 b 9: κἀν εἰ τὶς Sus. 28. προσαγορεύει Morelius Bekk.: προσαγορεύει Vat. Pal. Qb Tb Ald.: προσαγορεύει Ms P¹²³ etc. Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. appellet what was the reading of Π. 32. Sylburg and Bekker add οἱ before εὑροῦ. 38. Sus. adds διὰ after συμβαίνει and reads διαφοράς in place of διαφορᾶς in 39, but see explanatory note. 39. γίνεσθαι Π: γίνεσθαι Vat. Pal.

1280 a 15. φαίλοι κραται Π² Vat. Pal.: κραται φαίλοι Π¹. See explanatory note on 1275 a 32. For similar transpositions cp. 1277 a 1 (ἀρέτη μία Π¹: μία ἀρέτη Π² Vat. Pal.), 1281 a 27 (φαίλοι πάντα Π¹: πάντα φαίλα Π² Vat. Pal.), 1323 b 19 (ἀρέτη πέφυκε ταῦτα Π¹: ταῦτα πέφυκεν ἀρέτα Π²), 1326 b 8 (ἐν Π¹: ἐν Π²), 1290 b 8 (μόρια πλείονα Π¹: πλείαν μόρια Π² Vat. Pal.), 1294 a 22 (ἀρέτη καὶ πλούτος ἀρχαίος Π¹: ἀρχαίος πλούτος καὶ ἀρέτη Π²), 1320 a 23 (ἐκκλησίας ὀλίγας Π¹: ὀλίγας ἐκκλησίας Π²).
substantive before the adjective (ἐν σχῆματι δὲ μείζονι Π²: ἐν μείζονι δὲ σχῆματι Π¹). See critical note on 1282 a 40, and cp. 1311 a 22, where Π² have τῶν ἱππεύουσα τῶν πολιτῶν (except Π¹, which omits τῶν), and Π¹ τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν ἱππεύουσα. 24. ἐλευθερία] ἐλευθερία Μ⁸, ἐλευθερία or ἐλευθερία Γ (Vet. Int. secundum libertatem, and secundum pecunias in 1280 a 23 represents χρήμασιν), ἐλευθερία Π², ἐλευθερία with the first ι above the line Vet. Pal., ἐλευθερία Π¹. Sus. ascribes the introduction of ἐλευθερία into the text to Vict., whose first edition appeared in 1552, but Sepulveda's translation, which appeared in 1548, already has the rendering ut libertate (p. 83 b).


1262 a 29, where, however, Vat. Pal. should have been stated to have 
apotev here, not apotev. 19. εἰπεν P¹ Val. Pal.: ei ήσαν the other MSS. and ι (Vet. Int. si esset). 23. ποι Π Val. Pal. and probably ι (Vet. Int. quidem, which represents 

1281 a 3. χάρυν Π² Val. Pal. Bekk.: om. ι Μ⁶ pr. P¹. Sus. brackets it. 16. γὰρ P¹ Π² Val. Pal. Bekk. Sus.: γὰρ ἄν Γ Μ⁶ (z omits utique representing ἄν, but probably wrongly). 17. χρη Π² Val. Pal. Bekk.: δὲi Ms Π¹ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. oportet which reading he found in his Greek text, for in 1263 b 30 and 1289 a 1 oportet represents χρη and in 1342 b 15 oportere represents χρηναι, while oportet often elsewhere represents δὲi (e.g. in 1262 b 2–7). In 1335 b 28 again Ms P¹ and possibly ι have δὲi and Π² χρη. λυθεθέντων ΓΠ (Vet. Int. acceptis): λευθεθέντων Vat. Pal. 21. τοῦτον ΓΠ: τοῦτον Vat. Pal. 25. ταῦτα] ταῦτα ΓΠ: Vat. Pal. does not give breathing or accent. Sus. ascribes the reading ταῦτα to Vict. and Lamb. followed by Montecatino, and it is true that Vict. and Lamb. have haec eadem and Montecatino (vol. iii. p. 138) eadem, but I find the rendering ‘li medesimi danni’ (‘the same losses’) in Bernardo Segni’s Italian translation of the Politics (p. 147, ed. 1549), which was published before either of Victorius’ editions or the translation by Lambinus appeared. 27. πάντα φαιλα Π² Val. Pal. Bekk.: φαιλα πάντα Π¹ Sus. See critical note on 1280 a 15. 28. δικαία Π² Val. Pal. Bekk. Sus.: σπουδαία Π¹. 36. ἔχοντα γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τῆν ψυχῆν] These words are placed after ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαιλον in P¹ Π² Val. Pal. Bekk., but before these words in Γ Μ⁶. Sus.³a (1894) places the words in the following order—ἀλλὰ ἵνας φαίνει τὸ τοῦ κύριου δὲις ἀνθρωπον εἶναι φαιλον ἔχοντα γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθη περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον. But the order of Π¹ Π² Val. Pal. seems to me preferable. No doubt it interposes ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαιλον between ἀνθρωπον and ἔχοντα, but as to that see explanatory note on 1276 a 28. 41. δόξειν ἄν λέεσθαι κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note on 1281 a 40.

1281 b 1. οὐ Π¹ P⁴, ὀ P²³ etc. 5. συνεκλώτων Π¹ pr. Π²³ Sus., συνεκλωτας P⁴ etc., corr.¹ P²³ (same ink as MSS.), Bekk. 7. τὰ
περὶ τὰ ἦθη Π in place of περὶ τὰ ἦθη (Vet. Int. quae circa mores). περὶ is added before τὴν διάνοιαν by Ms and perhaps by Π (Vet. Int. circa intellectum), but this is not certain, for Vet. Int. often repeats prepositions (see critical note on 1253 a 36). 8. κρίσουσαν] κρίσις Π. 13. κεχωρισμένον] κεχωρισμένον Π (Vet. Int. separatum), καὶ κεχωρισμένον Π. 25. μηδὲν] μηδὲ εἶναι suggested by Sus. with a query, μηδὲ ἐν Π, μηδὲν Π, μηδὲν Π, μηδὲνειν Π. 30. πολεμίων] Vet. Int. seditionis. 42. ὁ is added before ἑπτὸς in Π followed by Sus.: the reading of Π is uncertain (Vet. Int. iset autem est medicus). Ms Π are probably wrong: see explanatory note on 1253 b 11 and Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq., and cp. c. 4. 1277 b 15, αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολῖτος, and 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32, αὕτη γὰρ ἄρχῃ πάντων.

1282 a 5. καὶ is placed not after but before ταῦτα in Ms Π, followed by Sus.: Vet. Int. does not render it in either place. The authority of Ms Π unsupported by Π is small, and it is probably better to follow Π and to place καὶ after ταῦτα, taking it to mean ‘in connexion with wellnigh all the arts, as well as in connexion with the medical art.’ 7. καὶ om. Π, but καὶ is very frequently omitted in Π. 10. εἰ γὰρ καὶ] Vet. Int. et enim si, which probably stands for εἰ γὰρ καὶ and not for καὶ γὰρ εἰ, for εἰ si stands for εἰ καὶ in 1282 b 38 and 1322 b 8. 11. As to οὗ τι see explanatory note on 1282 a 10. 17. Π om. ἦν before θελτόν, but these MSS. are apt to omit ἦν when it is followed by a second η, as in the passage before us. This happens in 1268 a 6, 1324 b 30, 1298 b 32, and 1305 a 32, as well as here. The same thing holds also of καὶ. See also critical note on 1331 b 24. 18. μόνον Π: μόνος Π (Vet. Int. solus). Sus. 12 μόνος, Sus. 54 μόνον. I incline to retain μόνον: cp. c. 13. 1284 a 34, εἰδῆ μόνον οἱ τύραννοι παῖδον. 21. κρανεί] κρανεῖ Π. 27. μέγιστον Π, μέγιστον Π, μέγιστα τις Sus. (Vet. Int. maxima). ἐν om. Ms Π and possibly Π, though Vet. Int. has in quibusdam politiss (see critical note on 1275 b 7). 32. ἀρχουσιν Π, ἀρχουσιν Ms: ἔχοντα στοι (so in 41 Π have ἔχοντας for ἀρχοντος). μεγάλων Π Βέκκ., μεγάλων Π Π Sus. 40. τὸ before πάντων om. Ms, and probably also Π, for Vet. Int. does not render it, though he renders τὸ before τῶν. πάντων τοίτων Π Βέκκ.: τοίτων πάντων Π Sus. So in 1332 b 31 Π Π have πάντων τοῖτων: Π Π τοίτων πάντων. πάντων τοῖτων is the more usual and less emphatic order (see Class. Rev. 10. 106), but Π 1 have a leaning.
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to inversions of this kind (see critical note on 1280 a 15). **Tαύτα** πάντα (‘every one of these things’) is used when emphasis is called for (e.g. in 1268 b 3, 1281 a 13, 1291 a 16, 1309 a 39, 1321 b 38), which does not seem to be the case in the passage before us.

1282 b 5. **διαφήμισις** Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. determinare): δηλώσων Π² Bekk. Π¹ are probably right: cp. 1287 b 16 sq. 8. καὶ Π² Bekk., καῦ Μ⁸ P¹ Sus.: Vet. Int. *si* (which however a b z Alb. omit) may perhaps stand for καῦ, as in 1279 b 26, 1298 b 23, and 1309 b 9.

1283 a 4. **μᾶλλον**] See explanatory note. 7. **ὑπερέχει** corr. Π¹ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *excdit*): ὑπερέχειν the rest. But the addition of a final ν is a common error of the MSS. (see critical notes on 1280 b 4 and 1286 a 30). 8. I follow Sus. in bracketing μέγεθος: see explanatory note on 1283 a 6. 10. καὶ om. Π¹, but see critical note on 1282 a 7. 11. **ἀνισότητι** Π², except Π¹ (which has ἀνισότητα), ἵσωτη Μ⁸, ὀσότητα pr. Π¹ (corrected in a paler ink), ἰσότητα or ἰσότητα Γ (Vet. Int. *aequalitatem*). 17. τ' om. Μ¹ Π¹ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. does not render τε, but then he seldom does so). 27. ἵσων Π¹, ἵσων Π² (‘ut videtur,’ Sus.¹) Π³ etc. 32. τα om. Μ⁸ Π¹: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *ad conventiones* what was the reading in Γ. 36. οἶκοι] Vet. Int. habetur. 37. δὴ Π: of Susemihl’s MSS. of the Vet. Int. only two (g k) have autem representing δῆ, while five have etiam, which stands for δὴ in 1275 b 21, 1277 b 16, and 1292 b 10: z has autem etiam. Sus. seems to go too far in assuming that Γ had δῆ.

1283 b 2. τι om. Π¹, but Π¹ often omit τις and its parts (see critical note on 1288 a 16). 14. δόξανεν γὰρ (ἀν)] δόξανεν γὰρ Π², δόξανεν γὰρ Π¹, δόξασε γὰρ Μ⁸. We cannot tell from Vet. Int. vide-buntur enim whether Γ had δόξανεν γὰρ or δόξασε γὰρ. Δόξανεν may be right, for δόξα (opt. of δοκεῖν) occurs in 3. 4. 1277 b 21, and δόξασε in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 a 1. ἃν om. Γ Π (as in 1275 b 39), add. Coray Bekk.² Sus. Π¹ omit ἃν in 1267 a 40, 1297 a 41, and 1313 a 20; it is not therefore surprising that Γ Π should now and then omit it. See Bon. Ind. 41 b 4 sqq. 20. τοῦτο ἵσως ὅτι τοῦτο ἵσως Π², τοῦτος Π¹, but here Π¹ omit the last syllable, as (e.g.) in 1276 b 20 (κοινὸν for κοινωνίου) and 1335 b 35 (ὡς for ὅτε).

1284 a 5. **παρασχέσθω** Π² Bekk., παρέχεσθαι Μ⁸ Π¹ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *exhiberi* what was the reading in Γ. For other variations of a similar nature see Susemihl’s *apparatus criticus* on 1260 b 36, 1267 a 35, 1332 b 1, and 1317 a 36. 19. αὐταί
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γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν Π², αὐτὰ γὰρ δὴ διώκειν Μ⁹, and probably Γ, though Vet. Int. has hae enim utique persecuntur, ταύτας γὰρ δεῖ διώκειν Π¹, where ταύτας and δεῖ are in all likelihood conjectural emendations of Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of the MS., intended to remedy the flaw caused by the omission of δοκοῦσι in the archetype of Π¹. 37. τὸ Π¹ 23, τὸ the other MSS. and Γ (Vet. Int. scilicet prohibere). καλοῦειν Π¹ and marg. Π²: καλοῦειν the rest and Γ. 41. παρὰ Π¹ Π⁴, the rest περὶ.


1288 a 6. τού ὡς om. Μ⁹ Π¹: the reading of Γ is uncertain. Π¹ often omit the article. 8. αὐτοκρατόρων Π Bekk.: the translation of Vet. Int. is ducatus quidam exercitus imperialis, and hence Vict. Schn. Bekk.² and Sus. read αὐτοκράτωρ, though it is just possible that imperialis is in the genitive in agreement with exercitus and represents αὐτοκράτωρ. See explanatory note on 1285 a 7. 9. ἐν τῷ βασίλει ἦ [Vet. Int. prompτus potens lege, but ζ and pr. a omit promptus, which is probably an alternative reading for potens, the equivalent for ἐχθρός Γ]. In just the same way in 1283 a 9 two alternative renderings of κρείττον (melior and valentior) have together found their way into the text of Vet. Int. 6 εἰς ταῖς νομικαῖς τοῖς to take their place (Sus.⁴). 10. ἐν χωρίς νόμῳ] Vet. Int. promptus potens lege, but ζ and pr. a omit promptus, which is probably an alternative reading for potens, the equivalent for ἐχθρός Γ. In just the same way in 1283 a 9 two alternative renderings of κρείττον (melior and valentior) have together found their way into the text of Vet. Int. 6 εἰς ταῖς νομικαῖς τοῖς to take their place (Sus.⁴).
π² is probably right, the Agamemnon of the epic being referred to: Bywater adds τοῦ before ἐκτόρος in Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 a 20. Cp. c. 16. 1287 b 14, where Π have τοῦ 'Ἀγαμέμνων. 12. γοῦν Π² Bekk. Sus. (except P¹, which has οὖν), γάρ Π¹. So in 1339 b 21 Π² have γοῦν and Π¹ γάρ. 13. μάχης] νοήσω pr. P¹, μάχης νοήσω corr. ¹ P¹ (in the same ink as the MS.): Vet. Int. quem ego videor fugiement e proelio. Here Π P¹ appear to completely the sense from a gloss. 18. παραπλησίαν] παραπλησίας P⁴ etc. pr. P². 19. τυραννίσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ Sus., τυραννίσι καὶ κατὰ Π M⁸, τυραννίσι κατὰ P¹ and a corrector of P² in paler ink than the MS., τυραννι and after a lacuna κατὰ P³ pr. P², τυραννικήν εἰσὶ δ' δῆμοι κατὰ P⁴ L⁷ Q M⁸ Ub (as to these MSS. see critical note on 1253 a 12), τυραννική, εἰσὶ δ' δῆμοι κατὰ Ald. Bekk. A short lacuna evidently existed in the archetype of the best MSS., and this has been filled up (perhaps conjecturally) in P⁴ L⁷ Q M⁸ Ub. 20. ἤθη] ἤθη Π². 24. πάτρωι Π² Bekk.: πάτρωι M⁸ Π¹ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. patria which reading he found in Π. See critical note on 1285 b 5. 25. τὴν αὐτὴν Π: τοιαύτην or τὴν τοιαύτην Γ (Vet. Int. talem). 35. μυτιληναῖοι Π. The MSS. have μυτιλήνη, μυτιληναῖοι in almost every passage of Aristotle's writings in which these words occur: Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 b 12, however, is an exception, for there the best MSS. have μυτιληναῖοι. Pr. P³ has μυτιλήνην in 1304 a 4. Πιττακῶν] φιττακῶν Π¹ and also in 38 and 39. In 1274 b 18 all MSS. have πιττακῶς. The form ΦΙΤΤΑΚΟΣ appears on imperial coins of Mytilene (Head, Hist. Num. p. 488). 1 sometimes takes the place of Π in Attic inscriptions; thus in some of them we find the form φαρθένος in place of παρθένος (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 79). As to the same confusion in MSS. see Mr. T. W. Allen in Journ. Hell. Studies, 15. 290. 36. φυγάδας] The reading profugas in Vet. Int. is probably right, for a stands alone in reading profugas (z has profugas): cr. 1303 a 35. 39. τοῦ κακοπάτριδα Πιττακῶν κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note.

1285 b 2. διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τυραννικά] So Sus. after Sepulveda: διὰ μὲν τὸ τυραννικὸν εἶναι δεσποτικὰ Π. Sepulveda's note is (p. 99), 'herilia, quoniam tyrannica. Sic legitur in graecis exemplaribus quaequecumque mihi videre contigit, sed lectio videtur esse transposita, quae commodius habitura videtur, si sic esse—tyrannica, quoniam herilia.' There is little doubt that he is right: compare the corresponding sentence 1285 a 23 sq. and also 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 15 sqq. 5. ἐκούσια τε καὶ πάτρωι Π² Bekk.: ἐκούσια τε
(Ms ἐκούσιοι τε) καὶ πάτρωι Ms P¹ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. voluntariae et patriae which reading he found in it. The fem. form ἐκούσιοι is more commonly used in Aristotle’s writings than ἐκωσία (in 1313 a 5 all MSS. have ἐκωσίαν ἀρχήν), and this is the case in Greek literature generally (Kühner, Ausf. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, i. 537), but K¹ has ἐκωσία in Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 b 24, and ai κακία ἐκωσίαν ἂν εἴην, and the fem. ἐκωσία occurs in Plato, Rep. 603 c, and ἐκωσία in Plato, Laws 925 A. The fem. form πατρίω is also less often used in Aristotle’s writings than πάτρως (in 1285 a 33 all MSS. have πάτρως), but in 7 (5). 1305 a 28 all MSS. have τῆς πατρίας δημοκρατίας. Plato uses the fem. πάτρως in Laws 759 A. 7. πατρίας] Vet. Int. eternunt, which probably represents πρίανθαι, a misreading or mistake in it for πορίσαι.

10. θυσίων ὄνοσίων Π¹, and so in 16 οὐσία Π¹ for θυσία, readings which indicate that the archetype of these MSS. was written in uncial characters (see Sus.¹ p. xiv, and critical notes on 1271 a 27 and b 25). 12. ἐπανατασις P² Ald. corr. P³, ἐπανατασις Ms P¹⁴ pr. P³: we cannot be sure from Vet. Int. elevatio which reading he found in it, but perhaps he may have found ἐπανάτασις, for in 1302 b 33 he renders ἐπανάτασις insurrectio. 13. καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλεις] See explanatory note. 16. Ms adds ai πάτρωι and P¹ ai πάτρωι before οὐσία, which wrongly takes the place of θυσία in Π¹, and Vet. Int. has patriae substantiae: ai πάτρωι (or πάτρωι) is omitted in Π² Bikk. That the ἄρχων βασιλεύς at Athens, who was more or less the representative of the ancient kings, had to do with πάτρωι θυσία, we see from 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 57: cp. Plato, Polit. 290 E. But whether these two words are rightly added by Π¹ before θυσία is doubtful. The language of Plutarch in Quaest. Rom. c. 63 makes rather in favour of their omission—ἐπεὶ δ’ οὐκ ἐμπράζων (οἱ βασιλεῖς) ἄλλ’ ἦσαν ὑπερήφανοι καὶ βαριές, τῶν μὲν Ἐλλήνων οἱ πλείστοι τὴν ἐξοσίαν αὐτῶν περιεκλέμονες μόνον τοῦ ἄνδρος τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπελευσον—but Π² occasionally omit words or parts of words wrongly (these MSS., for instance, are undoubtedly wrong in omitting μὴ in 1335 b 25 and in reading ai for αὐτία in 1304 b 6), and I incline on the whole to accept the reading of Π¹ here, though it is no doubt possible that ai πάτρωι is a gloss. 22. ἀφαιρεμένωι Γ Π¹, the rest ἀφαιρεμένων. τε is added after στρατηγὸς in Ms P¹, and possibly was added in it also, but this is uncertain, for, as usual, Vet. Int. gives no rendering for it. 33. πλείονοι Γ Π¹ corr.¹ P² in the same ink as the MSS.): πλείονοι Ms Π². 36. παραβασιλείας] βασιλείας Π¹, but Π¹ occasionally omit the first
syllable of words, e.g. in 1342 b 32 (διάνοιαν for σαιδεῖαν οἶον) and 1273 a 10 (τάξαντα for τὰ δόξαντα).

1285 b 39' (Bon. Ind. 456 a 24).

1286 a 1. ποτέ is added after πότερον in Π1 (Vet. Int. guidem, which represents ποτέ, for πώς ποτέ is rendered qualiiter guidem in 1276 a 17). It is probably a blundered dittography of πότερον.
9. δοκοῦσι the third Basle edition of Aristotle, followed by Bekker: δοκεῖ Γ Π Σus., who prefers (with Göttling) to correct εἰ νόμοι, the reading of Γ Π in the next line, to ὁ νόμος. Either change may be right: that of Bekker avoids the transition from νόμοι, 9, to ὁ νόμος, 10, and then back to νόμους in 15, but it may be urged on the other hand that there is a similar transition from νόμοι to νόμος in 1292 a 32 sq.
12. καὶ] καὶ πώς Γ Π1 Sus., καὶ πῶς Μ5. Is not πῶς; a marginal query by some perplexed reader which has crept into the text?

10. τετράμερον Π1 Π2 Bekk., τράμερον Γ Μ5 Σus. In 1304 b 12 and 1305 b 27 Π1 wrongly substitute τρακοσίων and τρακοσίων for τετρακοσίων and τετρακοσίων, an error which occurs also in the MSS. of Lysias Or. 30. 8 and elsewhere. On the other hand, in 1258 b 27 Π1 have τέταρτον in place of τρίτον. In Hist. An. 5. 19. 553 a 10 all Bekker's MSS. have the form τετράμερον.
14. αὕτοῦ Γ Σus. (Vet. Int. in suo periculo), αὐτῶ Μ5, αὑτοῦ the rest and Bekker.
25. πάντας Π1 Π4: πάνυ Π2 36. 30. κρίνει] κρίνειν Μ5 Π3. See critical notes on 1280 b 4 and 1283 a 7. 35. ὀργισθήναι] Vet. Int. improetum ferri. He may have misread ὀργισθήναι as ὀρμισθήναι (see Schn.).
38. εἰ δὲ δὴ] Vet. Int. si autem, which may possibly stand for εἰ δὲ δὴ: cp. 1292 b 32 and 1295 a 34. τοῦτο μὴ Π2 Bekk.: μὴ τοῦτο Π3 Sus. See critical note on 1280 a 15.

10. ὀικούσας] Vet. Int. habitation, but Vet. Int. sometimes substitutes the indicative for the participle, e.g. in 1329 b 4, where he has lege statuit for νομοθέτησατος, in 1333 a 18, where he has poietis for δωμαίειν, and in 1305 a 24, where he has seditionem movit for στασιάσας. 14. γεγονόμενοι] γεγονόμενοι Μ5 Π1: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. facti whether Π had γεγονόμενοι or γεγονόμενοι.

25. τοις om. Julian. 29. αυτῶν the third Basle edition of Aristotle, αὐτῶν π τ. η], η Π 4, η Βατ. Παλ., η the rest. 31. καὶ is added before κατὰ in Π, but omitted in Π 1 Βατ. Παλ. 32. αὐτῶν γ Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. έκατὰ voluntatem), αὐτῶν Π.

33. φιλάξει Π 4 Αld., φιλάξεται Π 4 Π, φιλάξει Π 3 etc. Βατ. Παλ.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. custodiei whether he found φιλάξει or φιλάξεται in Π, for τοὺς φυλαττομένους in 1331 a 16 is rendered custodientes by Vet. Int., while in 1285 a 26 φιλάττομεναι is rendered custodiant. 38. ἐκάστον] Vet. Int. εν quae singularum, where singularum may possibly represent ἐκάστων, not ἐκάστου, for singularum represents ἐκάστων in 1337 a 20 and singulis ἐκάστοις in 1295 a 38. Did Vet. Int. find τίν added before ἐκάστον (or ἐκάστου) in Π? 40. συγκοσίους Βατ. Παλ.: συγκοσίους all other MSS. except Π, which has συγκόσιοι. In Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 b 16 Άε has συγκοσίους (συγκοσίους Υ 9 Z 5, συγκόσιους Q). In Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 38, however, all MSS. have συγκόσιοι, and in 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 8 the MSS. have συγκούσιοι, except pr. Π, which has συγκάσιοι. We know from inscriptions (Meisterhans, pp. 21, 75, ed. 2) and from coins that Συγκόσιοι is the correct form.

not once rendered by Vet. Int. institutere in the Politics (it is rendered insistere in 1336 b 25). Tò καθόλου may probably have been a gloss in Γ (Sus.3); the words ἐπίθηκας παιδείωσας were either wanting in Γ or left untransliterated by Vet. Int. 27. Vet. Int. adds omnia before his equivalent for ἐπανορθοῦσα. He has δανὶ for διδώσων and may have found διδώσων in his Greek text, but he is not always faithful to the number which he finds in his Greek text (e.g. in 1338 b 11 and 1296 a 34, 35). ὅ τι ἃν δόξῃ] Vet. Int. quodcunque videbitur, as in 1318 a 28. The more usual equivalent is quodcunque videatur. 28. Π Βατ. Pal. have ὃ μὲν ὁν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους. Vet. Int. qui guidem intellectum iubet principari videtur iubere principari deum et leges (thus he fails to render ὁν and seems to have found νοῦν in Γ in the place of νόμον). The Vossian MS. of Julian has ὃ μὲν ὁν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοὺν μόνον: thus it wrongly omits δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν and has (no doubt rightly) τὸν νοὺν μόνον in place of τοὺς νόμους. 30. ἦ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίᾳ κ. τ. λ.] Vet. Int. quando enim concupiscens sita et furor principatum habuerit (or habuiri), tandem et optimos viros interimel, representing possibly ὅτε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τοιοῦτον καὶ ὡς θυμὸς ἄρχον, τέλος καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας διαφερέι (or διαφενεί, for Vet. Int. sometimes renders the present by the future, e.g. in 1281 a 19). Μο has ὅ τε in place of ἦ τε, as Γ apparently had ὅτε. See next note. 31. ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας Π. Βατ. Pal. Bekk.: ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας διαφερεῖ. Μο Π (except that pr. Π has φεινεί) Sus. As to Vet. Int. see preceding note. In 1336 a 10 the correct reading διαστρέφεσθαι has been corrupted in Π into διαφέρεσθαι, and διαστρέφει appears to have been corrupted in these MSS. here in a somewhat similar way. Julian has καὶ ὃ θυμὸς διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας, omitting ἄρχοντας, but otherwise agreeing with Π. 32. νοῦς ὁ νόμος Π: ὁ νοῦς νόμος Μο Βατ. Pal. Julian pr. Π : we cannot be sure from Vet. Int. intellectus lex est which reading he found in Γ. 34. καὶ om. Βατ. Pal. possibly rightly: it is bracketed by Sus. But see explanatory note. 35. ἐπιτίθειαν] Vet. Int. affectum. He does not understand the word. In Rhet. 2, 2, 1378 b 14, 18 and 2, 4, 1382 a 2 ἐπιτερασμὸς is rendered epireasmus, and in Rhet. 2, 2, 1378 b 17 ὁ ἐπιτεραῖος qui epireavit. 39. πιστευόντας Π Βατ. Pal. Bekk.1: πιστεύοντας Schn. Bekk.2 Sus. and perhaps Γ. Vet. Int. has persuasos ab inimicis for πιστευόντας τοῖς ἐξθοίσις, and this probably represents πιστεύοντας τοῖς ἐξθοίσις, for
ποιεθήναι is represented elsewhere in the Politics by creditis (1305a 22, 28) or creditibles facti (1310b 16), and nowhere by persuasi, while πεισθῶν is represented by persuadeantur in 1332b 7.


18. ὡς—κρύνει is placed in Π2 wrongly before ἐπεί, 17. 19. ἐπείδη Π2 Vat. Pal. Bekk.: ἐπεί M8 P: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. quoniam which reading he found in Π. 22. νομοθετήσας Π Vat. Pal. Bekk.: νομοθετήσας Coray and possibly Π (Vet. Int. legi statuta esse), but this is not certain, for Vet. Int. often renders the active by the passive. 26. τ᾽ ἵσος Π1 Vat. Pal. Sus.; δ᾽ ἵσος Π2 Bekk. 27. δυνατόν] See explanatory note. 29. μῦθαρχος Π2 Vat. Pal. Bekk.: μυθάρχαι Π1 Sus. 30. αὐτῶν Morelius, Bekk., Sus., and perhaps Π (Vet. Int. sibi): αὐτῶν Π. τῇ ἄρχῃ] τῆς ἄρχῃς Casaubon, Richards, probably rightly (cp. 33). 31. αὐτοῦ Sus., αὐτοῦ Π Bekk., αὐτοὺ Bekk. The Aldine edition of the Scholia Graeca in Aristophanem, in quoting ἄποιον, 26—συνάρχον, 31, on Acharn. 92 (ed. Didot, p. 390), gives αὑροῖς, but this quotation may have been interpolated by the editor of the Aldine, the Cretan Marcus Musurus, as to whose interpolations in these Scholia see Dindorf's preface in Didot's edition of them, p. iv. In that case this reading would no doubt be a conjectural emendation by Musurus. As io αὐτοῦ, see explanatory note. 38. δεσποτῶν Sylburg, Bekk.: δεσποτῶν Π2 Vat. Pal.: δεσποτικῶν Π3 Sus. (two MSS. of the Vet. Int., however, a 2, have despotum). Compare 1324b 39, where Π4 Π8 have δεσποτικῶν and the other MSS. despotōn, the true reading being despotōn. καὶ ἄλλο βασιλευτῶν Π2 Vat. Pal. Bekk.: om. Π1 (καὶ ἄλλο βασιλευτῶν Sus.). 39. Richards would add τοῦτο after δικαίων. 41. τὰ is added before παρὰ φύσιν in Π1 Vat. Pal. (Vet. Int. quae præter naturam).

1288 a 6. ἤδη om. Π1, but these MSS. occasionally omit ἤδη: see critical note on 1268b 21. 9. z has aristocratia autem multitudine for ἄριστοκρατικῶν δὲ πλῆθος (with rec. b), whereas all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined have aristocratia. 10. Vict. and Bekk. bracket πλῆθος δὲ τέφυκε φύρεω, but then the
rulers in an aristocracy cease to be a part of τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν πλῆθος. Sus. prefers to bracket πλῆθος ἀρχεσθαι διώκειν, but this course is open to the same objection. In reality the ἀριστοκρατικὸν πλῆθος includes both rulers and ruled, as we see from c. 18. 1288 a 35 sqq. 12. ἡγεμόνικων] Vet. Int. praesidibus, which stands for ἡγεμόνων (see 1303 b 28, 1305 a 40, 1313 b 29, and 1316 b 18), but it is possible that Vet. Int. mistook the reading in Ῥ and that this was ἡγεμόνικων, not ἡγεμόνων. 13. Π² add καὶ ἐν before ἐγγίνεσθαι, but Π¹ Vat. Pal. Sus. omit καὶ ἐν, Vat. Pal. reading εγγίνεσθαι. Bekk.¹ brackets καὶ ἐν, and Spengel and Bekk.² bracket πλῆθος ἐν ὁ πέφυκε καὶ ἐν ἐγγίνεσθαι, but a πλῆθος which is a fit subject for Polity is not necessarily exclusively composed of πολεμικὸι: it is rather under the sway of πολεμικὸι (cp. c. 7. 1279 b 2, διότερον κατὰ ταύτην τῆν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ πολεμικὸν). Καὶ ἐν (ἐν;) is probably an intimation that the copyist found ἐγγίνεσθαι in the text which he was copying in addition to ἐγγίνεσθαι. πολεμικὸι Π² Bekk. Sus., πολιτικῶν Π¹ Vat. Pal. Politikon probably comes from the preceding line. ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk., ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι Γ Π¹ Sus., καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι Μ². See critical note on 1277 b 14. 15. εὐπόροι Π¹ Bekk. Sus., ἐπάρσεις Π² Vat. Pal. ἡ γένος Π¹ Π² Bekk.: ἡ γένος Γ Μ²: ἡ γένος Sus. τῶν ἄλλων should probably follow, not precede, ἐνα τινα: the two words may, however, have been placed where they stand in order to avoid the hiatus in ἡ καὶ ἐνα τινα τῶν ἄλλων, or they may be repeated (a common blunder) from τῶν ἄλλων, 17. 16. τινὰ om. Π¹, but see critical notes on 1273 b 27, 1279 b 15, 1283 b 2, 1284 b 11, and 1324 a 37. 22. πάντῃ Π¹, if Vet. Int. penitus stands for πάντῃ, πάντῃ Vat. Pal., πάντῃ Sus.: πάντες Π² Bekk. 24. ἄλλα καὶ Γ Schn. Sus. (Vet. Int. immo, which represents ἄλλα καὶ in 1282 a 20—a fact which has hitherto escaped notice): ἄλλα Μ² Π² Vat. Pal. 27. τῦν om. Μ² Π⁴ Q² Tb and possibly Γ, followed by Bekker. 29. τοῦτον om. Π¹, but see critical note on 1257 b 24. 39. τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἄριστης Π² Vat. Pal.: τῆς ἄριστης πόλεως Μ² Π¹ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. optimae civitatis). So in 1260 b 23 Π² have τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἄριστης, while Μ² Π¹ and probably Γ have τῆς ἄριστης πολιτείας, and in 1331 a 5 Π² have ταῖς οἰκήσεις ταῖς ιδίαις, while Μ² Π¹ and probably Γ have ταῖς ιδίαις οἰκήσεις. It should be noticed that in 1288 b 3 Π Vat. Pal. have περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἤδη περιτοίκων λέγει τῆς ἄριστης. 40. διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν z has per eadem rightly (with g alone of the MSS. of Vet. Int. collated by Sus.): all the other MSS. have per eadem.
BOOK IV (VII).

1288 b 5. See critical note at the close of the Third Book.

1232 a 16. πρώσων P1 π2 Bekk.: πρόσερον γ Μ4 Sus. 20. ὁμολογεῖον Π: Vet. Int. confessum esse, but he may probably have found ὁμολογεῖον, not ὁμολογεῖον, in his Greek text (compare his renderings in 1262 b 6, where he has arbitratus est for οίνεαν, and 1273 b 39). 27. χρή om. Π2. 29. παραπεταμένας] Vet. Int. volantes, but this may probably stand for παραπεταμένας, not παραπεταμένας, for he has dicens for προεινον in 1338 a 26, pastentes for ἐνεκόμοντας in 1305 a 26, peccare for διαμαρτάνειν in 1338 a 41, 1288 b 37, and 1297 a 7, laborare for διοποιεῖν in 1339 a 8 and 1341 b 22, and labores for φιλοποιεῖν in 1338 b 25, to mention no other examples. 30. τοῦ is added after η in Μ6P1; we cannot tell from Vet. Int. comedere vel bibere whether he found this τοῦ in γ. 32. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὖν ἄφονα] Vet. Int. similitur autem et quaer circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant sic imprudentem, where Sus. thinks that the translator has rendered a gloss. 40. διαλαμβάνεν P2 Bekk.: διαβαίνειν Π1 (Vet. Int. provenire should probably be pervenire, the reading of Sus., which no doubt stands for διαβαίνειν, though διαβάδηκεν in 1272 b 21 is rendered transitum): λαμβάνειν Lamb. Bekk.2 Sus. See explanatory note on 1323 a 39.

1283 b 6. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γ (Vet. Int. quin immo) Π2: οὐ μὴν Μ3 pr. P1. 8. ἰδιον] Vet. Int. eorum, which perhaps should be eorum quorum, or simply quorum. 9. αὐτῶν om. Π1. Αὐτοῖς is omitted by Π1 in 1301 a 8. 15. αἱληφε P2 Bekk.: αἱλήχε Π1 Bekk.2 Sus. 17. τιμώτερον] Vet. Int. pretiosior: see critical note on 1267 b 1. 23. συνομολογημένον] z has confessum with all the MSS. of Vet. Int. except a, and this is probably the correct
CRITICAL NOTES.

reading: Sus. follows a, which has concessum. See critical note on 1330 a 20. 27. τοις Γ in place of ταιρ', the reading of Π (Vet. Int. hoc). 41. ἐκάστῳ P² Bekk.: ἐκάστου the rest, except that P¹ Vb Ald. and pr. P³ Sb omit καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστου (or ἐκάστῳ): ἐκάστου Sus. 1324 a 10. ὅσοι τε] All the MSS. of Vet. Int. except z have quicunque: z quicunque autem. See critical notes on 1330 b 4, 1332 a 42, and 1336 a 5. 12. εἰ τέ τις] Vet. Int. si etiam aliqua, where τε is rendered (it is not often rendered by Vet. Int.) and rendered by etiam, as in 1327 a 25. 14. πότερος] πότερον Γ (Vet. Int. utrum): M⁸ has a contraction which may represent πότερον (see Sus.¹). 22. γὰρ is omitted in Π⁴ L⁸ Bekk. See critical note on 1272 b 36. 31. λέγω δὲ δίῳ] We expect λέγω δὲ τοὺς δίῳ (cp. 1307 a 10, λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο δήμοι καὶ διληγαρχ[αί]). The natural meaning of λέγω δὲ δίῳ surely is ‘and I call the political and the philosophical lives two.’ There was a question whether these lives were two or only one (cp. 28 sq. and Plato, Gorg. 500 D), but this can hardly be Aristotle’s meaning here. Should τοὺς be added before δίῳ? 33. γε Spengel Sus., τε M⁸ Π³ Bekk. Vet. Int., as usual, does not render τε. 35. ἐκαστον and τὴν πολιτείαν Π² Bekk., ἐκάστῳ and τῇ πολιτείᾳ Π¹ Sus. 37. τινὸς om. Π¹, but see critical note on 1288 a 16. 1324 b 3. παρ’ ἐνῶς κ.τ.λ.] Π² omit καὶ before τῶν νόμων, which I add with Congreve (P⁴⁶ omit ὅρος also): παρ’ ἐνῶς δ’ ὀντος καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρος Γ M⁸ Sus.: παρ’ ἐνῶς δ’ ὀντος καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρος τῶν νόμων Π¹. 8. πολέμους Π² Bekk. Sus.: πολεμίους Π¹. 16. ἀπεκταγκότα and 18. ἀπεκτακότα] In 16 Π¹⁵ have ἀπεκτανότα, pr. P³ (correxit margo recens) ἀπεκτακώτα, Π⁴⁶ ἀπεκτακότα, M⁸ ἀπεκτακότα, and in 18 M⁸ Π¹⁴ ἀπεκτακότα, pr. P³ (correxit recens) ἀπεκτακότα, Π⁵ ἀπεκτανότι: Π² has the forms given in the text (Sus.³). It is not absolutely certain that ἀπεκτακώτα and ἀπεκτακότα should not be read, for we find ἀπεκτακότες in Polyb. 11. 18. 10 and ἀπεκτακόως in some MSS. in Polyb. 3. 86. 10, but the authority of Π² is in favour of ἀπεκτακότα and ἀπεκτακότα, and ἀπεκτάγκασι occurs in Menand. Μισοῦμενος, Fragm. 8 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 173) and ἀπεκταγκόως in some MSS. (followed by Hultsch) in Polyb. 3. 86. 10 (see Kühner, Ausf. gr. Gr., ed. Blass, 2. 468, and Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, p. 395). Cp. Moeris (ed. Bekk. p. 189), ἀπέκτωνεν Ἀττικῆ, ἀπέκταγεν Ἔλληνες. 20. καταπηνύουσι] Vet. Int. commassant, which probably represents κατασακυνούσι: he may have misread καταπηγύουσι. 28. άλλα . . . ὄρωμεν om. Π¹. 30. τὸ ἡ πέσαι ἡ βιασασθεὶ Π², τὸ πέσαι ἡ τὸ
Mισαθν MS P¹ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. suasisse aut sanasse); but see critical notes on 1282 a 17 and 1298 b 32.

37. δεσπότος and οὐ δεσπότων Π Bekk. Giph. (p. 893) δεσπότων and οὐ δεσποτών: Stahr, Sus. δεσποτών and οὐ δεσποτών, probably rightly.

39. δεσποτῶν Lamb. (also a recent correction in P⁵, but this corrector probably reproduces the conjecture of Lamb: cp. 1332 a 41): Sepulveda had already translated the words iiis dumtaxat qui talim imperio sunt idonei, and Segni, à chi è atto à servire: δεσποτικῶν Π⁴⁶

1325 a 5. δὴλων ἅρα οτι P⁴ Bekk. Sus.: δὴλον ὡτι άρα P¹²³ Sh Vb, δηλονότι ἅρα MS, and these MSS. may possibly be right; I would follow them if I was aware of any parallel to this use of δηλονότι.

8. τοῦ before σπουδαίου om. MS P¹ and possibly Γ. 18. ἀποθεο-κωιμώσοντι γι' has reproduit, not reprobant as Sus. (is this a misprint?).

25. το P³ Bekk. Sus., το MS P¹²⁴, το Ald.

28. δεσποτεινων δεσποτικῶν P¹ and possibly Γ, for a c have despotica, 2 despoticiam, and b despociam: despociaca, however, represents despoeia in 1253 b 19.

29. αὐτὸ τὸ corr.¹ P² (i.e. the scribe of P² in the same ink as the MS.), αὐτὸ το Γ P¹⁴, αὐτὸ MS Ald., αὐτὸ P³ pr. P².

36. ἀστε οὐ δεὶ] Sus. reads ε conj. δεὶν in place of δεὶ, but cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 5, where the indirecta oratio is similarly abandoned, though Aristotle is the views of others.

39. ὑπολογίζειν, the third Basle edition of Aristotle, followed by Sus. Sh, a MS. of very little authority, which Bekker follows, has ὑπολογεῖν: all the other MSS. ὑπολογεῖν. The existence of the word ὑπολογεῖν is doubtful, for in Theopomp. Com., Inc. Fab. Fragm. 31 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 822 : 5. cxx) the true reading is not ὑπολογεῖν but ὑπολέγειν. The active ὑπολογίζειν is, however, extremely rare (see Liddell and Scott, s.v.). Richards doubts ὑπολογίζειν, especially with a genitive, and suggests that ὑπολογοῖν ἔχειν should be read in place of it.

1325 b 3. ψεῦδος is not rendered by Vet. Int.

7. ἐν is added before μέρι by Thurot and Sus.


37. γενέσθαι] Vet. Int. fore, but this probably stands for γενέσθαι, as esse stands for genésthai in 1288 a 16. ζυμίτρου] Vet. Int. moderata: elsewhere σύμμετρον is rendered by commensuratus (1327 b 6, 1298 b 25). Συμμετρία is always rendered by commensuratio. Moderatus represents μέτρον in 1267 b 13, moderatius metriōtēron in 1313 a 20, and moderate metriōs in 1315 b 15, so that
moderata may stand for μετρίας here, though μέτρος is more usually rendered by mediocris. 38. προκαταβεβλαθαί] Vet. Int. praecipuum, just as he renders διήρησαν by dividii in 1330 a 24, διώρισαν by distinguii in 1330 b 15, and κατασκευάσαν by constitui in 1331 b 10. 1326 a 2. αὐτὴ Π¹ Sus.: αὐτῇ Π² Bekk. 6. πάσους τε] Vet. Int. quos quos, but perhaps two alternative readings have here together found their way into the text. 7. διὰν Π Bekk.¹ (Vet. Int. quantum may stand for either ὁσην or πόσην): πόσην Sylburg, Bekk.², Sus.: see explanatory note on 1326 a 5. 10. ποιὰ is added before μικρά in τὸ Π² Bekk. Sus.: om. Π¹ Π². 11. οἴητεν om. Π¹. 18. ποιητέων Camerarius (Interp. p. 279), Bekk.², Sus.: οἴητεν Γ Π. 21. μερῶν Π² Bekk.: μερῶν Μ⁸ Π¹ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. partibus which reading he found in Γ. Μερῶν in Μ⁸ Π¹ may be repeated from μέρος in the preceding line: this kind of error occurs not infrequently in Π¹. 25. ἀλλὰ μὴν Π² Bekk.: ὁν μὴν ἀλλὰ Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. non solum sed). 29. τε om. Π² Π¹: the reading in Γ is uncertain, for Vet. Int. seldom translates τε. 34. πόλεις Π¹ Π²: πόλων Γ Μ⁸ Bekk. Sus. See explanatory note. 36. πόλεως Π¹ Sus.: πόλεωι Π² Bekk. 1326 b 4. ἐν τοῖς μὲν Π² 34 etc. Bekk.: ἐν μὲν τοῖς Μ⁸ Π¹ Ald. Sus. 12. ρήδανον] All MSS. of Vet. Int. but z have facile est, but z omits est. 19. ἐν τῇ πολιοναθρωπίᾳ τῇ λιαν] Vet. Int. in ea quae valde multorum hominum (ἐν τῇ πολιοναθρωπίᾳ τῇ λιαν Γ?). I doubt, however, whether Vet. Int. found in his Greek text a different reading from that which we have in the MSS., for in 1302 b 28 he has eos qui sine ordine et sine principatu for τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ ἀναρχίας, and in 1310 b 21 he has condiles populi et prospectores for τὰς δημουργίας καὶ τὰς βεβρίας. He seems now and then to allow himself a little laxity in his rendering of substantives in -ia. 32. τὸν ὄρον om. Π² 4 pr. Π², but erroneous omissions occur occasionally in the MSS. of the second family (e.g. of μή in 1335 b 25 and of ὥρνον in 1288 b 16), though not so often as in those of the first family, and here τὸν ὄρον can hardly be spared, for it would be difficult to supply it from 23. 34. συμβαίνῃ] z has accidit probably rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have accidet. 36. αὐτήν] Richards suggests whether αὐτής should not be read, but perhaps αὐτήν is defensible: see explanatory note on 1326 b 35. 1327 a 5. μὲν] μὲν οὖν Schn. Sus. See, however, explanatory note. 12. πολλὰ] πολλοὶ Camerarius (Interp. p. 283) and perhaps Μ⁸ and pr. Π¹ (see Sus.,) followed by Bekk.² Sus., πολλὰ Γ Π² Bekk.

32. ἐπεί δὲ Π Bekk. Sus.: ἐπεὶ δὴ Π². ὑπάρχουσα καὶ Welldon, Sus.: ὑπάρχουσα Congreve, ὑπάρχου καὶ Π Bekk.¹, ὑπάρχει καὶ Schn. Bekk.²

34. τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἀστυ Μ² Π¹ Π² Bekk. Sus.³, except that Π⁴ has αὐτὸν: νέμειν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀστυ Ρ Sus.¹² (Vet. Int. ut neque occupetur ipsisum municipium).

1327 b 11. τῆς ναυτιλίας] Vet. Int. navigium, though elsewhere he rightly translates the word navigatio. 13. καὶ before τοῦτο om. Π¹ Sus., but the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions, and especially in omissions of καὶ. 14. Ἀρκαλεωτῶν] See explanatory note.

15. κεκτημένοι τὸ μεγαλεῖ πόλεων ἑτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν] Vet. Int. aedificata civeitate magnitude alis contractiore (z artiore), which appears to represent κεκτημένης πόλεως τὸ μεγαλεῖ ἑτέρων ἐμμελεστέρας. 16. πόλεων Π Π Π Bekk.¹: πόλεως Congreve, Sus. Bekk.² brackets καὶ πόλεων.

17. διωρισμένα] διωρισμένον L² P⁴ Ald. corr. P⁴, Bekk.²: for the reading of pr. Π⁴ see Sus.¹ and Sus.⁴: but these MSS. have little authority. For ἔστω διωρισμένα cp. Ι. ΙΙ. 1258 b 39, ἐπεί δ᾽ ἐστίν ἐνίοτε γεγραμμένα περί τοῦτων. 28. Π¹ add μὲν after ἀρχόμενα, probably repeated from the preceding line. 31. βδιστίτα τα Π: Vet. Int. maxime. 34. Μ² Π² Bekk. add καὶ before πρὸς ἄλληλα: Γ Π¹ omit it, probably rightly. Sus. brackets it. 35. τε Π²: τε Bekk.¹: om. Μ² Π¹ Bekk.²: Sus. brackets it: the reading of Π is uncertain, for Vet. Int. seldom translates τε. But the authority of Π¹ in omissions of τε is weak, for these MSS. often omit it. Τε may be merely a blundered dittography of the first syllable of the next word κέραστα. It can hardly be accounted for here in the way in which Stallbaum accounts for its presence in Plato, Meno 72 E, Phaedo 63 C, and Hipp. Maj. 282 B.

1328 a 2. ἀρπαί] z tollitur: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. attollitur. But I doubt whether z is right here. 5. σὺ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχεο: So Bergk, probably rightly, though Π Π have οὐ in place of σὺ and all MSS. but Γ Π⁵ have περί in place of παρὰ: ἀπάγχεο P²³ L⁶ Ald. Bekk., ἀπάγχετο P⁴, ἀπάγχει Π Sus., ἀπάγχει Μ², a lanceis perforationes Vet. Int., whatever that may represent (z has alancenis perforat omnes with a dot under the second n of alancenis to expunge it). Vet. Int. has enim here for γὰρ δὴ, as in 1284 b 29.
13. δειν Π, δει Μ, δε pr. P: Vet. Int. does not render it.
14. ὑπολαμβάνωσι τ² Bekk. Sus.: νομίζουσι Μ² P¹ and probably Π (Vet. Int. pulant, which is his equivalent for νομίζωσι in 1302 a 25): νομίζουσι has evidently slipped in from here in the line below and displaced ὑπολαμβάνουσι. 15. χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν Π, Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 5. 480 D, Sus. (πολέμων in place of πόλεμοι Π): χαλεποὶ γὰρ πόλεμοι ἀδελφῶν Π² Bekk. In 1338 a 25 Π give an unmetrical version, and in 1253 b 36 Μ². 16. πέρα Π² Bekk.: πέραν Μ² P¹ Sus.: the reading of Π is uncertain. oide Gomperz, Sus.³: οἷς δὲ Γ Π Bekk. (except that P¹ omits δ'). 18. ὑπὸσην Μ² P¹ and possibly Π, perhaps rightly (see critical note on 1326 a 7): the rest πόσην. 22. ταυτά Π² Bekk. Sus., ταυτά Μ² P¹, ταυτά Bekk.¹ 26. δει Π¹ P¹, δὴ the rest. ταυτό Π² Bekk. Sus., τοῦτο Π. 28. δ' ἴ π¹, δ' ἴ Bekk. Sus., δῇ Π². 40. τοῦ Π² Bekk., and probably Π: τὸ Μ² P¹, τῷ Sus.: Vet. Int. palam quod hoc causa quare fiunt civilis species, which probably represents δῆλον ὡς τούτ' αἰτίων τοῦ (not τῷ) γίνεσθαι πόλεως εἰς (cp. 1305 a 10, where αἰτίων δὲ τοῦ τότε μὲν γίνεσθαι is rendered causa autem quare tunc quidem fiebant).

1328 b 4. εν τούτοις ἄν εἰ (ά) ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν] εν τούτοις ἄν εἰ ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν Π² Bekk.: εν τούτοις ἄν εἰ, δὲ ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν Μ² P¹ Sus., who, however, marks a lacuna after δὲ: ἐν τούτοις ἄν εἰ δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαίον ὑπάρχειν probably Π, for Vet. Int. has in his utique crunt, properterea quod necessarium existere. Cp. 1333 b 20, where properterea quod exercitati fuerunt represents δὲ τὸ γεγυμνᾶται. 1282 b 5, 1338 a 39, 1339 b 34, 41, 1295 a 15, and many other passages. Vet. Int. renders δὲ by propter quod, not properterea quod. I supply δὲ before ἀναγκαίων, which might easily drop out: δὲ τὸ is of course impossible and δὲ seems to me unsatisfactory.

11. Schn. Bekk.² Sus. add τὰς before πολεμικὰς, but see explanatory note.
21. παρασκευάζουσι P² Bekk. and perhaps Π (Vet. Int. qui praeparat): παρασκευάζουσι Μ² P¹ Π² Sus. 22. ἀναγκαίων] See explanatory note on 1328 b 22. 29. ταυτὸ Sus.: τοῦτο Γ Π Bekk. 32. μὲν om. Π¹, but these MSS. often omit μὲν. 41. τὴν ἄρετὴν Μ² P¹ Sus.: ἄρετὴν Π² Bekk.: the reading of Π is uncertain. Μ² P¹ may be right, for in 1329 a 1 Π have τὴς ἄρετῆς. See critical note on 1332 a 22. ουδὲ δὴ Π² Bekk.: οὔδὲ δὲι Π¹ Sus. On οὐδὲ δὴ see Eucken, De Partic. Usu. p. 45.

1329 a 1. P¹ Lᵃ Ald. add πολιτάς after ἐσεθάνει, but these MSS. have little authority. For similar additions in them intended to complete the sense see critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1303 b 35.
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1304 a 15, and 1332 a 30. 6. δὲ Π² Bekk. Sus.: δὴ Π¹. 11. τοὺς αὐτοὺς Bekk. Sus.: τοὺς αὐτοὺς Γ Π. Camerarius, commenting on τοὺς αὐτοὺς, remarks (Interp. p. 295), ἡλεπτικῶς, scilicet εἰναι δὲν. Eosdem esse oportet utroque, id est quibus ambo munera mandentur. Καταλληλότερον esset, si scriberetur τοῖς αὐτοῖς, nimirum ἀποδοτέον, quod supra autor communiter posuerat’ If τοὺς αὐτοὺς were retained, I should prefer to supply, not εἰναι δὲν (with Camerarius), but θετέων τοὺς προπολεμοῦντας καὶ τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ κρίνοντας (cp. 5). 13. τὴν πολιτείαν τοῦτον] See explanatory note. 16. ἐστίν] Lamb. Bekk. would exchange the places of this ἐστίν and εἰναι, 17. εἰναι is transferred by Camerarius to after τοῦτος, 18, and by Sus. to after δὲν, 18. ἑτερ τοιοῦτοι] Vet. Int. adds videtur after his rendering for εἰναι, but it is not likely that he found δὲνει in his Greek text; he sometimes seeks to mend defects in it by conjectures (see vol. ii. p. lxiv): cp. also his addition of vivere in 1263 a 34. Welldon reads δικαίων ἐστίν, perhaps rightly. 18. δὲν (εἰναι)] Vet. Int. oportet esse (δὲν εἰναι Γ Π?): δὲν without εἰναι Π. Bekker adds εἰναι. See explanatory note on 1329 a 17. 20. γένος Π² Bekk., μέρος Π¹ Sus. Μέρος may possibly come from 23, μέρος τι. 26. ἤ before περιοικόν is found in Γ Π, but Sus. is probably right in bracketing it: cp. c. 10. 1330 a 28 sq. 27. ἐρεύον Γ Λ⁸ Ald., ἐρεύων the rest: ἐρεύων Bekk. Sus. 33. αὐτοῖς] Sus. αὐτοῖς? There is something to be said for this suggestion (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 24, τιμᾶς ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀνεπανετέει πορίζοντες μεθ’ ἡδονῆς), but on the whole I incline to retain αὐτοῦς. 34. τοῦτοι δὲν εἰν τὰς ἱεροσυνάς ἀποδείκτεον] τοῦτοι Γ Bekk.: τοῦτοι nearly all other MSS., so far as they have been examined. Ῥαῖς ἱεροσυνάς Γ Π Bekk. Bekker may be right in reading τοῦτος and ταῖς ἱεροσυνάς: sc. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 16, δὲν τοῖς μὲν τοιοῦτοι ἄρρητοι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεισθε θεῖον τοῖς τῶν [θεατρικῆς] μουσικῆς μεταχειρισμένως ἀγωνιστάς, where, however, ἥρθαν should probably be added before θεῖον, and Isocr. Busir. § 15, τοῖς μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ἱεροσυνάς κατάστησα. But as almost all MSS. have τοῦτοι, not τοῦτος, it seems better to substitute τῶν ἱεροσυνάς for ταῖς ἱεροσυνάς: ἀποδείκτεον thus regains its usual meaning. 38. δὴ Γ Π Bekk., δὲ Schn. Sus. 1329 b 2. δὲ is added after ἐτί in Π¹. 4. νομοθετήσαντος] Vet. Int. lege statuit, but see critical note on 1286 b 10. 10. μεταβαλόντας] Vet. Int. transsumentes, which represents μεταλαμβάνοντας (cp. 1326 b 21, 1328 a 27, and 1339 a 35). 13. γὰρ Π² Bekk.: δὲ Π¹ Sus. 18. τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν] Vet. Int. quod quidem apud
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Tyrreniam, which may possibly represent τὸ μὲν πρὸς τῇ / Naval, for ἀπὸ represents πρὸς with the dative in 1331 b 10 and 1322 a 26. As to / Naval see critical note on 1280 a 36. 21. Χῶνες Π¹, / Naval etc. The name of the race is Χῶνες and the name of / Naval in Strabo, p. 255: cp. Χῶνες, Strabo, p. 264, / Naval, Strabo, p. 654, and Lycophron, Alex. 983. Σφίτων / Naval Gotting, Bekk.², Sus.: σφίτων Μᵉ P¹ ² ⁴ etc.: σφίτων pr. P³, Syrtem / Naval Vet. Int. 'It seems certain that we should read Σφίτων for Σφίτων: / Naval Lycophr. Alex. 983' (the late Sir E. H. Bunbury in Dict. of Greek / Naval and Roman Geography, Art. Chones). 30. καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολι- / Naval τίας] z has et quae (should be quae) circa politias: all / Naval Susemihl's MSS. of the Vet. Int. have et circa politias. 34. εἰρημένων] See / Naval explanatory note on 1329 b 33.

1330 a 1. τῇ χρήσει] z has usu, perhaps rightly: the other MSS. / Naval of Vet. Int. have usu. 2. γινωμένην] See explanatory note on / Naval 1330 a 1. 10. τῶν ἱδιωτῶν] Vet. Int. propriam (Idiaw Γ?). 14. τὰς ἐσχατὰς] Vet. Int. proprias necessitates. 20. διὸ παρ' Π² Bekk. / Naval Sus., διόπερ Μᵉ P¹, διὸ or διόπερ Γ (Vet. Int. propter quod). 22. τῶν / Naval πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων] Vet. Int. corum quae ad ipsos proeliorum; πολέμος is rendered by proelium in 1297 b 19 also. 28. διάτερον δὲ] z has / Naval secundo autem: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. et secundo autem. 30. τούτων δὲ τούς μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἱδίως εἶναι ἱδίως P⁴ L⁸ probably rightly. Almost all other MSS. as well as Γ add ἱδίως before ἐν τοῖς ἱδίως: Γ / Naval omits ἱδίως after εἶναι. 36. αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν θέσιν εἰχεσθαι δέι καταγεχέναι] See explanatory note. 37. πρὸς om. Π¹, / Naval δὴ om. Π² Bekk. 38. αἱ τε P¹ Ald. etc., ἂν P³ etc., αἱ Μᵉ P¹ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. quae), but Vet. Int. rarely renders τε. 41. Coray and Sus. add αἱ before κατὰ Βορέαν, but see explanatory notes / Naval on 1330 a 40 and 1330 b 10. εἰχεσθαι] Vet. Int. recentiores.

1330 b 2. μὲν after αὐτοῖς om. Π¹. 4. τε] Vet. Int. autem (δὲ Γ?). The same thing occurs in 1336 a 5 and 1332 a 42 (see also critical / Naval note on 1324 a 10). 6. ὀμβρίους P⁵ Sᵇ and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. / Naval per praeparationem susceptorilorum aquarum imbruim), ὀμβρίους Μᵉ / Naval P¹ ² ³ ⁴ etc. ὑδατιν] ὑδατος P². 7. πολέμου] Vet. Int. multitudinem: did he misread πολέμου as πλῆθος, or did he find πλῆθος in Γ? / Naval 12. χρώμεθα] Vet. Int. utatur. 14. τοιαῦτα P² Bekk.: τοιαῦτα / Naval Π¹ Sus. 16. μὴ Π Bekk. Sus., μὴ Coray. See critical notes on / Naval 1257 b 12 and 1293 a 9. τοιούτων Π¹ P⁶ L⁸ Bekk.² Sus.: τοιούτων the rest, followed by Bekk.¹ 18. τῶν om. Μᵉ P¹: the reading of Γ is / Naval of course uncertain. 21. ἱδίων] οἰκείων Π¹ (Vet. Int. familiarium,
which no doubt represents oikeiōn, as in 1336 a 8 and 1312 b 13): oikeiōn, however, is probably a corruption of oikioν, an alternative reading for oikēstos, which has displaced idios. 22. μεν om. P1, as often elsewhere. 23. καὶ om. P1 Sus., but the authority of P1 is very weak in omissions and especially in omissions of καὶ. 24. ἵπποδάμειον M See Bdkk. Sus.: ἵπποδάμον P3: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. domatium eumorum which reading he found in Γ. P3 have ὄρνουs wrongly for ὀρεινοῦs in 1331 a 5. 27. τοῦτων ἀμφοτέρων P3 Bekk. (cp. c. 13. 1331 b 37 and 2. 7. 1266 a 33): ἀμφοτέρων τοῦτων P1 Sus. (cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 19). 28. γεωργιαῖς See explanatory note. 31. καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον P3: P1 add πρὸς before κόσμον, but wrongly in all probability: cp. Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 23, καὶ πρὸς ῥαστώναν καὶ διαγωγήν, and Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 22, καὶ εἰς τὰς συμνοιας καὶ διαγωγάς, and 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 18, καὶ ἕπερ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυνακῶν, and see explanatory note on 1284 a 35. See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 451. 1. 32. τὰς τὴς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιομένας πόλεις] z has virtuii contrafactas civilitates: perhaps contrafactos (Sus.) is a misprint.

1331 a 2. πρὸς τὰς πολιορκίας] Vet. Int. ad insultus, yet in 1267 a 37 he translates τῆς πολιορκίας correctly by obsidione. Insultus, if right, will therefore hardly represent πολιορκίας, but what it represents is doubtful. 5. ὀρεινοῦs M P1: ὀρνοῦs P3: the reading of Γ is uncertain. ταῖς οἰκήσει ταῖς ἰδίᾳς P2 Bekk.: ταῖς ἰδίας οἰκήσει M P1 and probably Γ (Vet. Int. propriis habitationibus). See critical note on 1288 a 39. 10. ταῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημέναις Π Bekk.: τοῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένοις Aretinus' translation, followed by Bekk.2 and Sus. But it is more natural to speak of cities as κεκτημέναι τείχη than of peoples: cp. 9, ἔχουσαι, and 1330 b 32 sq. 21. δῆλον... φυλακτηρίων om. P3. αὐτὰ P3 Bekk. (it forms part of the passage which P3 omit): αὐτὸ Bonitz, Sus. 24. θείος Γ P (except P4, which has θεῖος), Bekk.1: θεῖος Bekk.2 Sus., who says however in Qu. Crit. p. 409 n. 'at forsiat θείος servare liceat.' 25. ἄρχειον] ἄρχειον P4 L8 Ald., ἄρχειον the rest, except P5, which has ἄρχειον. 30. ἐρυμυστηρίων] Vet. Int. eminenter, but Vet. Int. often renders the comparative by the positive (e.g. in 1283 a 35, 1287 b 9, 1333 b 10, and 1340 a 42). 32. δυναμάζουσιν Γ Π Bekk.: νομίζουσιν Lamb. Bekk.2 Sus. and apparently Bonitz (Ind. 487 b 51). See however explanatory note on 1331 a 31. 34. τοιούτων M P5 etc. Bekk.: τῶν τοιοῦτον P1 and possibly Γ, for a z have talium, though the seven other MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined have
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*talem.* Sus. reads τῶν τοιούτων, against the weight of MS. authority, it would seem. See critical notes on 1336 b 8 and 1314 b 26. 39. τοῦ δὲ πρεσβυτέρου Π1 Π2, τὰ δὲ πρεσβύτερα Μ3, τὰς δὲ πρεσβυτέρας Γ? (Vet. Int. matronas autem).

1331 b 4. ἔπληθος. Should προεστὸς be read? Cp. Plato, Rep. 428 E, τῷ προεστῶτι καὶ ἄρχοντι, and 564 D, τῷ προεστῶ ἀυτῆς (i.e. τῆς πόλεως). eis iereis, eis ἄρχοντας] Schneider and Bekk.2, following others, add καὶ before the second eis, perhaps rightly (cp. c. 14. 1333 a 30). Welldon reads καὶ in place of the second eis. But, if πλῆθος is retained, some further change would appear to be necessary—the substitution (with Sus.) of ὁπλίτας or στρατιώτας for the second eis, or the addition of καὶ ὁπλίτας (with Welldon) after καὶ ἄρχοντας. Perhaps, however, πλῆθος should be προεστὸς, and the classes referred to by Aristotle are those at the head of the State, which do not include the hoplites. 5. καὶ τῶν ἱερεῶν συνεχείτα] Should τὰ be added before τῶν? See, however, explanatory note on 1285 b 12, τοῦ σκηντροῦ ἑπανάταις. τῶν om. Ms P1 and probably Γ, but the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions, and especially in omissions of the article. 8. τῶν after ἄλλων om. Ms P1: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. 13. νευμήσθαι Π1 corr. P2 Bekk.1 Sus., νενεμήσθαι over an erasure P1, μεμήσθαι P3 pr. P2 etc. Bekk.2 16. ἀναγκαίων] Ζ has necessarium: is necessarium in Sus. a misprint? 24. ἐκ before ποιῶν om. Π1 Bekk.2 Sus. So in 1275 b 17 Ms P1 have ἂν περὶ πάντων ἂν τινῶν, where the rest have ἂν περὶ πάντων ἂν περὶ τινῶν, and in 1275 b 32 P1 and perhaps Γ have τὸ ἐκ πολίτου ἐκ πολίτων, where the rest have τὸ ἐκ πολίτου ἐκ πολίτων: so again in 1271 a 17, διὰ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηστίαν, Ms and perhaps Γ omit the second διὰ, in 1336 a 14, καὶ πρὸς ἐγκάδων καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰ πράξεις, Ms P1 omit the second πρὸς, and in 1340 a 6, ἐὰν καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἢδος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν, Ms P1 omit the second πρὸς. See also the readings in 1322 b 32, where Π1 omit περὶ. See critical note on 1282 a 17. The first family of MSS. have little authority in omissions, and especially in the omission of small words. 26. πολιτεύσθαι Coray Bekk.2 Sus. probably rightly: πολιτεύσθαι Π. Vet. Int. has civitatem quae debet esse beata et politissare bene, which leaves it uncertain what reading he found in Γ. The letter σ is easily added or omitted between two vowels in verbs (see critical notes on 1255 b 24, 1274 a 5, 1298 b 20), as well as at the end of words. See Mr. T. W. Allen in Journ. Hellenic Studies, 15. 278, 281, 296, and 297. 27. εὕ τῷ τῶν σκοπῶν κείσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος
1331 a 39—1332 a 33.

\[\text{\textup{τῶν πράξεων ὑπὸδος} z has in eo quod est intentionem et finem actionum pomi recte, which is probably correct: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. omit est. 31. \textit{excevit} z has tacet rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. lateri. \textup{kαλὸς M\textsuperscript{5} P\textsuperscript{2}: kαλὸς r P\textsuperscript{1} (Vet. Int. bona). Sus.\textsuperscript{3} ascribes the reading \textup{kαλὸς to r M\textsuperscript{8}, but this is probably a misprint for r P\textsuperscript{1} (see Sus.\textsuperscript{12,4})}. 32. \textit{óte} P, except P\textsuperscript{4}, which has \textit{óte}, and P\textsuperscript{3}, which has \textit{éiote} and is followed by Bekker. 34. \textit{γάρ} om. P\textsuperscript{1}, but probably wrongly: see critical note on 1272 b 36, and compare the omission of \textit{γάρ} by r P\textsuperscript{16} L\textsuperscript{8} in 1324 a 22. 41. \textit{τύχην ἡ φύσων} P\textsuperscript{2} and perhaps M\textsuperscript{8}, followed by Bekker: \textit{φύσων ἡ τύχην} r P\textsuperscript{1} Sus., an order which suits \textit{δείται γάρ} k. r. l. well, though on the other hand in Plato, Laws 747 C (which is probably present to Aristotle’s memory here) we have \textit{éiē τά χαλεπὰ τύχη προσεποίησα} \textit{éiē καὶ φύσει ἄλλης τις τοιαῦτη}. For a similar interchange in the order of two words see critical notes on 1333 b 36 and 1318 b 4. 1332 a 4. \textit{τὴν} om. M\textsuperscript{8} P\textsuperscript{1} and possibly r, but omissions of the article in these MSS. have little weight. 8. καὶ \textit{ἐν τοῖς ἡδικοῖς} P\textsuperscript{2} Bekk.: καὶ διωρίσμεθα \textit{ἐν τοῖς ἡδικοῖς} P\textsuperscript{1} Sus., but see explanatory note on 1332 a 7. 13. καὶ is added before \textit{ἀναγκαίων} in r M\textsuperscript{8}. 17. \textit{αὕρεις}\. See explanatory note on 1332 a 16. 22. \textit{τὴν} before \textit{ἀρετὴν} om. M\textsuperscript{8} P\textsuperscript{1} and possibly r: contrast the reading of these MSS. in 1328 b 41. Their authority in omissions of the article is small. 23. \textit{τὰ} before \textit{ἀγάθα} is bracketed by Reiz and Sus., and omitted by Bekk.\textsuperscript{2} Sus. places a full stop after \textit{ἀπλῶς ἀγάθα} and reads \textit{δῆλον δῆ} in place of \textit{δῆλον δ’, but not, I think, rightly. \textit{Δῆλον δὲ} . . . \textit{ἀπλῶς} is part of the paragraph introduced by καὶ \textit{γάρ}, 21}. 29. καὶ \textit{ἔχειν} Π Bekk., \textit{καταμυχεῖν} Cor. Sus. 30. \textit{αὐτὴν} is added after \textit{γάρ} in P\textsuperscript{4} L\textsuperscript{8} Bekk., but see critical note on 1329 a 1. 32. M\textsuperscript{8} P\textsuperscript{1} add \textit{τῆς} before \textit{τύχης}: we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found \textit{τῆς} in r. \textit{See} critical note on 1270 b 19. In 30 we have \textit{ἡ} \textit{τύχη} (as in c. i. 1323 b 28 and Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 18), but in c. i. 1331 b 21 sq. we have \textit{τύχησ} (ἐργον), not \textit{τῆς τύχης}, and in 1273 b 21 r have \textit{ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τύχης ἐργεῖν, not \textit{τῆς τύχης}}. It is unlikely therefore that M\textsuperscript{8} P\textsuperscript{1} are right. The best MSS. omit τῆς before \textit{τύχης} in 1258 b 36. Cp. also 1323 b 27—29. 33. M\textsuperscript{8} P\textsuperscript{1} are probably right in adding \textit{γε} after \textit{σπουδά}ia: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. \textit{at vero} whether he found \textit{ἀλλὰ μὴν} or \textit{ἀλλὰ μὴν} . . . \textit{γε} in his Greek text, for he renders both the one and the other by \textit{at vero} (see e. g. 1286 a 16 and 1287 a 41). \textit{τῷ} r Ald. corr.\textsuperscript{1} P\textsuperscript{2} (i. e. a correction in P\textsuperscript{2} in the same ink as the MS.) : Vet. Int. VOL. III. I}
at vero studiosa civitas est in cives participantes politia studiosos esse: the rest τὸ.

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π² Bekk.: βεβητητων π¹ Sus. 8. τάσις om. π¹. 15. εὖλεγεται.

z has facile et redarguibilis: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. facile arguibilis. The addition of et in z is wrong, but redarguibilis may well be right, for ἐξελήγεται immediately after is rendered und redargula and in 133b 34 ἐλεγχομένας is rendered redargulas, though in 1308 a 1 ἐξελέγχεται is rendered argumentur. 16. νῦν om. π¹.

17. ξηλο_ins Π²: ξηλο_ins Camotius, Bekker (approved by Sus.), but see explanatory note. τὸ Π¹ P² Sus., τῶν Π² Bekk. 18. θιβρῶν Π² Bekk.: θιμβρῶν π¹ Sus. ‘Praestare videtur forma 

θιβρός, qua usus est Nicander, Alex. 568 . . . Eandem varietatem in scriptura nominis proprii θιμβρῶν et θιβρῶν deprehendās’ (Meineke, Analecta Alexandrina, p. 128). See also Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 65, who finds only the form θιβρῶν in Attic Inscriptions. For the frequent interchange of βρ and μβρ in MSS. see Mr. T. W. Allen in Journ. Hell. Studies 15. 275.

20. Schneider, Bekker.² and Sus. are probably right in adding τῦς before πολυτείας. 21. ἐπείδη νῦν γε Π² Bekk.Sus.(Vet. Int. quoniam nunc quidem): ἐπείδη γε νῦν Mᵃ P¹. 30. τὸ Π² Bekk.¹ Sus.: τὸ Scaliger, Bekk.³ τ probably had τὸ, for Vet. Int. translates ad principari super vicinos, whereas he commonly translates ēnī with the dative by in or super. 33. διώκειν] z has persequi probably rightly, for this is the word by which Vet. Int. renders διώκειν: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have prosequi. 36. λόγον (om. P²) καὶ νόμων Π² Bekk.: νόμων καὶ λόγων π¹ Sus. See critical note on 1331 b 41. 37. ταῦτα P² etc. Bekk. Sus., ταῦτα Π¹ P¹ etc. τῶν (τὲ) νομόβετρη[ν] I follow Thurot and Sus. in adding (τὲ) after τῶν. 41. ξηλο_ins] Vet. Int. selent (ξηλο_ins τ;)?

1334 a 3. ἐπῶ ... 4, σχολάζεων om. Ῥ M³, and Vet. Int. seeks to heal the defect by rendering τὰ ὄνομα ordinis (see vol. ii. p. lxiv sq.). 8. ἀφιάσων Π² Bekk. Sus., ἀνὰσων M³ and also P¹, if Sus.² and the 1882 edition of Sus.³, confirmed by St. Hilaire in his edition of the Politics published in 1837 (vol. ii. p. 94), are to be trusted, though the 1894 reprint of Sus.³ ascribes the reading ἀνὰσως to Ῥ M³ only. It is difficult to tell from Vet. Int. rubiginem contrahunt what reading he found in his Greek text; he may possibly have found ἀφιάσως, for in 1278 a 27 προσεβλέκται is rendered contrahitur. There is much to be said for ἀνὰσως: cp. Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 14, ὅπρικα δὲ ὦτος οὐ προμελαβάτι τῆς πενίας, αὐτοὶ δὲ βαφύς ἁνήτι τῆς πάτρου πενίαν: Pollux 1. 44, ἵστι δὲ ἐπίσω καὶ ἀνεῖσατ βαμφή: and Theophr. Hist. Plant. 5. 5. 1, τὰ δὲ μοχθηρὰ σιδήρα δίωναι τέμνειν τὰ σκληρὰ (sc.

I 2
116 CRITICAL NOTES.

tón ἐὐλογοῖς μᾶλλον τῶν μαλακῶν, ἀνήσια γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μαλακοῖς ὀστερ ἐλέχη
περὶ τῆς φιλόρασ, παρακονδὲ δὲ μᾶλλοντα ταῦτα. But the weight of MS.
authority appears to be on the side of φιλάσων. 14. ὑπάρχειν Γ Π
Bekk.: ὑπάρχειν Sus. not, I think, rightly. 19. σώφρονα is bracketed
by Sus., and it is true that Aristotle adds no proof of the indis-
penisability of σώφροσύνη in the acquisition of necessaries, as he does
in regard to ἀνδρία and καρπεία, but that it is indispensable we have
seen in the explanatory note on 1334 a 19 (cp. also 1334 a 24).
28. πολλῆς οὖν κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note. 30. ἀπολαίπωνας
Vet. Int. frui (ἀπολαίπειν Γ?). 36. τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς om. pr. P3: τοῖς
... 38, χρῆσθαι om. Ms: ἐτι ... 38, χρῆσθαι om. P3. Γ P1 omit
nothing, but pr. P1 has τῶ μη in 37 in place of τὸ μη. Bekker
omits τὸ.

1334 b 2. γινέσθαι] See explanatory note on 1334 a 41 sub fin.
Vet. Int. adds before haec, his equivalent for ταῦτα, the words quae
belli, which represent ἥ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, and Ms has τὰ πολέμου
in the same place, but here a gloss has crept into the text of
Γ Ms, for P2 gives in red ink the gloss τὰ πολεμικὰ. 12. ἐδὼν
om. Γ Ms pr. P1. ὀμοίων Γ Ms P2 3 4 pr. P1: ὀμοῖος two or three
inferior MSS. and marg. P1, followed by Bekk. Sus. 23. καῖ is
added after δὲ in Ms P1 Sus.: om. P2 Bekk. and perhaps Γ, for z
and almost all the MSS. of Vet. Int. consulted by Sus. omit et.
27. τὴν δὲ τοῦ σῶματος τῆς ψυχῆς Π2 Bekk. Sus., τοῦ δὲ σῶματος τῆς
ψυχῆς Π1, τοῦ δὲ τοῦ τρίτου τῆς ψυχῆς Ms: Vet. Int. huius autem eorum
quae animae = τοῦ δὲ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς. 30. γένηται Π2 Bekk.: γένηται
Ms Π1 Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. fiant which reading he
found in his text, for fiant stands for γίνεσθαι in 1303 b 20. See

1335 a 2. γὰρ after τε om. P1. 5. μετέθημεν] Vet. Int. deveni-
mus. 12. τὴν before τεκνοποιῶν om. Π8 P5 Bekk., but probably
wrongly: cp. 31, 39, 1335 b 23, 41, 1265 a 40, b 7, 1270 a 40.
The article is absent only in 1335 b 7, 29. 13. ἐγγονα Ms Π1
Bekk. Sus.: we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found ἐγγονα or ἐγγονος
in his text: ἐγγονα Π2 Bekk.1, but in 1335 b 30 all MSS. have ἐγγονα,
and the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of the form
ἡγγονος, though many of ἡγγονος, from the genuine writings of
Aristotle. See Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 83,
on the two forms: the form ἡγγονος is the more common in Attic
inscriptions. 14. ταῦτα τοῦτο Π2 Bekk.: αὐτὸ τοῦτο Ms Π1 Sus.,
to vò to avò perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. hoc ipsum).

16. ἐπιχωραίζεται Π² Bekk. probably rightly (see explanatory note), ἐπιχωραίζει Μ⁸ Sus. and after a lacuna pr. P¹. Vet. Int. has lexatar (ζ et laxant: pr. α ἀλατορ); possibly allocatur or allaudatur (’is allowed’) is the true reading, representing ἐπιχωραίζεται. 18. αἱ νεαί Π² Bekk. Sus.: ἐναι Π Γ Μ⁸ pr. P¹. πονοῦσι τε Π² Bekk. Sus.: τε πονοῦσι Μ⁸ P¹: the reading of Γ is uncertain, for, as usual, Vet. Int. does not translate τε. 23. εἰναι om. Π¹, but these MSS. occasionally omit εἰναι. 25. δὲ om. Π¹, but these MSS. often omit δὲ. 26. στερματος] See explanatory note on 1335 a 24. 27. πληθεῖον] Μ⁸ has a contraction which perhaps stands for πλήθος, and Vet. Int. has multum (= πολύ). Götting and Sus. are probably right in transposing ἣ μικρόν, 29, to after ἐτι, 27. 29. As to [ἃ μικρόν] see on 27. 30. τοσοῦτο Π¹ P³, followed by Bekk. Sus.: τούτω the rest. 32. τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἐσταὶ τῆς ἁκμῆς Μ⁸ P¹ Π² Sus.: Vet. Int. his guidem erit inchoante akmes, which probably stands for τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένης ἐσταὶ τῆς ἁκμῆς, and this is Bekker’s reading. Sus. believes ἀρχομένης to be right, though he leaves ἀρχομένοις in his text. 37. δὲ χρήσιας οἷς Π² Sus. (χράσθαι in place of χρήσθαι Μ⁸ P¹): ὡς in place of δὲ χρήσθαι οἷς Π² Bekk. The reading of Π¹ may be no more than an explanatory gloss on ὡς which has crept into the text and taken the place of ὡς, a thing which sometimes happens to this family of MSS. (see critical note on 1325 b 12), but it is also true that Π² occasionally omit, though less often than Π¹, and I incline on the whole to think that Π² are in fault here. 39. δὲ Π¹ Sus.: ᾧ altered into ὧν P³, ὧν the rest followed by Bekker. 1335 b 38. μᾶλιστη (ἄν)] μᾶλιστα ἂν Μ (if Schoell, who collated M⁸ for Susemihl, is right): μᾶλιστα Γ Π¹ P² Bekk.¹: μᾶλιστα ἂν Cor. Bekk.² Sus. ¹ In Graecis codicibus non rare scribuit vitiose ἤκιστα, μᾶλιστα pro ἤκιστ’ ἂν, μᾶλιστ’ ἂν (Madvig, Adversaria Critica, 1. 41). 4. παιδομοιας Π² Bekk. Sus.: παιδείας Π Γ Μ⁸ pr. P¹. 5. Sus. adds δὲ before εἶπεν. 6. oúde Coray, Bekk., Sus.: oβτε Π. See explanatory note on 1327 b 38. 7. κακοποιητικὴ] κακοποιητική Μ⁸ pr. P¹: Vet. Int. male habens (κακεπτικὴ Γ¹?). 10. τῶν ἐλευθερῶν Γ Π¹ Sus.: the rest, followed by Bekk., τῶν ἐλευθερῶν. 11. ταύτα Π² Bekk.: ταύτα Γ Μ⁸ Sus., ταύτῃ P¹. καὶ is added before ἄνδρας in Π¹ Sus. 15. τῶν εἰλη-χότων τὴν ἑπὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμήν] Vet. Int. his quæ sortita sunt eum qui de generatione honorem, but whether he found τῶν εἰληχιαίας in his Greek text is doubtful. 18. τὰ γεννώμενα Π¹ Bekk.² Sus. (Vet. Int. quæ generantur): τὰ γεννώμενα Π² Bekk.¹ See critical note on
1256 b 13. 19. καὶ is added before τὰ φυόμενα in Π² Bekk. 20. γεγομένων Π² Bekk.¹, γεγομένων Μ⁸ Bekk.²: γεγομένων P¹ Sus. The reading of Γ is uncertain (Vet. Int. genitorum). 21. ἐὰν om. Π¹ Sus., but the authority of these MSS. is small in omissions, and especially in omissions of small words. τῶν ἐθῶν] ζ alone of the MSS. of the Vet. Int. which have been examined has suetudinum: all the rest have gentium representing τῶν ἐθῶν, but probably a had suetudinum originally, for its present reading gentium is written over an erasure in a recent hand (see Sus.³). Schn. and Sus. take Leonardus Aretinus to have found ἐθῶν in his Greek text in place of ἐθῶν, but his rendering, as it stands in MS. Ball. 242, is in alīis vero si mores institutaque civilis prohibeant natos exponere, which seems to point to ἐθῶν, not ἐθῶν. 22. καλόν] καλόν P² etc. and a recent hand in Π³ (Bekk. καλόν), καλόν (ut videtur) pr. P³ (Sus.), καλόν Π¹ Sus., but corr.¹ P¹ (i.e. a correction in P¹ in the same ink as the MS.) gives καλόν. ὁρίσθαι Γ, a correction in the margin of Π¹, and corr.¹ P² (i.e. a correction in P² in the same ink as the MS.) Sus., ὁρίσθαι Μ⁸, ὁρίσθηναι pr. P¹, ὁρίσταi the rest followed by Bekker. 23. δεὶ Γ Μ⁸ pr. P¹³ Sus., δῇ the rest followed by Bekker. 24. συνδυασθέντων Π: Vet. Int. combinatis, but it is doubtful whether Γ had συνδυασθέντων, for in 1336 a 9 Vet. Int. renders τηλικοῦντων by tantiillos. 25. μὴ om. Π³. 26. χρή Π² Bekk.: δεὶ Μ⁸ P¹ Sus. and possibly Γ (see however critical note on 1281 a 17). 30. καβάτερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων Π: Vet. Int. sicut et iuniorum: Sus. is inclined therefore to read καβάτερ καὶ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, but see critical notes on 1252 a 25, 1262 a 29, 1264 a 9, and 1284 b 32. 31. τῶν γεγαρακτών Π² Bekk. Sus.: τῶν γεγαρακτών Μ⁸ pr. P¹: Vet. Int. decrēptorum, which probably represents τῶν γεγαρακτών. 35. ὡστε Π² Bekk. Sus.: ὡς Π¹ (Vet. Int. ut... oportet), but a correction in P¹ in the same ink as the MS. gives ὡστε. 39. ἦ Π² Bekk.: καὶ Π¹ Sus. 1336 a 5. φαίνεται τὲ Π¹ ι, φαίνεται τὲ Μ⁸: Vet. Int. apparel autem (φαίνεται δὲ Γ;). But see critical notes on 1324 a 10, 1330 b 4, and 1332 a 42. 6. ἄγειν Μ⁸ P¹ and perhaps Γ, for Vet. Int. has inducere, and though ἄγειν is usually rendered by ducere and sometimes by adducere in Vet. Int., it is rendered by inducere in 1306 a 3. Vict. placed eisάγειν in his text, taking inducere in Vet. Int. to represent εισάγειν, which no doubt it sometimes does (e.g. in 1320 a 14), but it does not always do so. Νο MS. appears to have eisάγειν: Π² etc. have ἦ. *Αγειν may be right: cp.
Aristot. Fragm. 627. 1584 a 16, τόν δὲ ἄρξάμενον τῆς ὁδῆς Ἀριστοτέ-λης Ἀρίωνα φησιν εἶναι, δὲ πρῶτος τῶν κύκλων ήγαγε χρόνιον. Δαβεῖν (Plato, Rep. 591 B) or ἐχεῖν (Phaedr. 268 E), in addition to εἰσάγειν, would be possible alternatives for ἄγειν. 7. πλήθουσα Π, but the word is not included in the Index Aristotelicus and does not appear to occur elsewhere in Aristotle's writings: πλῆ-θουσα Vict. Bekk. and Sus. probably rightly (Sus., however, does not place it in his text). Πλήθειν occurs 'in Attic Prose only in the phrase ἄγοράς πληθούσης, ἐν ἄγορᾷ πληθούσῃ etc.' (Liddell and Scott); it is a poetical word; still it may have been used by Aristotle, for τόσις also (1253 b 6 and 1335 b 41) and τιμαλφεῖν (1336 b 19) are poetical words. 9. τηλικοῦτων Μ� Π1 23 etc. Bekk. Sus.: τηλικοῦτος Π4 L3: Vet. Int. tantillos, but it is doubtful whether he found τηλικοῦτος in Π (see critical note on 1335 b 24). 10. διαστρέφεσθαι Π2 Bekk. Sus., διαφέροντα Π1 (for Vet. Int. has defluere, perhaps should be diuflure), except that pr. Π1 had διαφέρα. See critical note on 1287 a 31. 14. καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς πράξεις Π2 Bekk. Sus.: Μ� Π1 omit the second πρὸς (see critical note on 1331 b 24): about Π we cannot be certain, for Vet. Int. commonly repeats the preposition in sentences of this kind, whether he finds it in the Greek or not (see critical note on 1253 a 36). 17. ψυχρόν is bracketed by Sus., who follows Π1 corr. Π4 in reading ψυχρόν in place of μικρόν. ἀμπισχέω Μ� Π14 Bekk. Sus., ἀμπισχέω Π23. 18. ἀρχο-μένων Π13 Sus.: ἀρχομένω Π23, ἀρχομένῳ Bekk. 20. ἐξίς is here represented by habitedo in Vet. Int., and not, I think, elsewhere in the Politics. 23. ἤλικον] Vet. Int. aetati (ἡλίκιας Γ ?). 24. ἦν] Vet. Int. in qua (ἐν ἦ Γ?): cp. 1336 b 21. 26. δὲ om. Π1 Π4 Bekk. 34. σπουδαιομένων Cor. Sus.: σπουδαιομένων or σπουδαιοθησομένων Γ (Vet. Int. studentorum): σπουδαιομένων Π Bekk. In 1328 b 21 some MSS. have παρασκευάσασθαι and others παρασκευάζοντας, so that σπουδαιομένων might easily take the place of σπουδαιοθησομένων. διατάσεις] Vet. Int. cohibitiones: cp. 39, where διατευνωμένος is rendered qui cohibentur. 35. καὶ Π Bekk.: Vet. Int. in plorabilitus, so that he probably found κατὰ in Π, which Sus. reads instead of καί. τοῖς is added before καλύμμοις in Μ� Π1 Sus.: whether in Π also, is uncertain. 38. τοῖς πνεύμοις] τοῖς πνεύμοις? Ridgeway (see the 1894 edition of Sus.) , a suggestion which I cannot follow Susemihl in adopting. See for the force of τοῖς πνεύμοις explanatory note on 1336 a 37. 1336 b 2. ἀπολαίων Μ� Π1 Sus., ἀπολαβέων Π (Vet. Int. assumere),
3. ἀνελευθερίαν] τῶν ἀνελευθερῶν P5 L5 Ar. Ald. Bekk.2 and pr. P4, τῶν ἀνελευθερῶν corr. P4. Τῶν ἀνελευθερῶν is evidently a correction intended to suit the false reading ἀπελαίνειν. See critical note on 1340 b 14. For καὶ before τηλικοῦτος 2 has eιτια̣m probably rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. et. 8. τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων P5 Bekk.: ἀπηγορευμένων P1 Sus. See critical notes on 1331 a 34 and 1314 b 26. 14. ίστω P1 Ar. Bekk. Sus., εἰστὶ γ Μ5 P5. 18. [τοὺς τὴν ἡλίκιαν έχοντας τι τὴν ἱκνομένην]. These words, which I have bracketed, are found in Μ5 P1 and are inserted by Sus. in his text: Vet. Int. has eοι qui habent actatem amplius prorectam, which probably represents Bekker’s reading, τοὺς έχοντας ἡλίκιαν πλέον προίκουσαν, a reading found only in P5 and there probably adopted from the Vet. Int. (πλέον over an erasure in P5): P5 omit the words, reading πρὸς δὲ τούτους ἀφίησιν ὁ νόμος καὶ ὑπέρ αὐτῶν και τέκνων και γυναικῶν τιμαλφείων τῶν θεῶν, and I incline to think that P5 are right, and that the words added in Μ5 P1 and also those added in γ P5 are merely a gloss intended to complete the sense, which has crept from the margin into the text. The MSS. of the first family occasionally admit glosses into their text (see vol. ii. p. lvii). *Ετι in the reading of Μ5 P1 I do not understand. 19. καὶ γυναικῶν om. γ Μ5 pr. P1. τιμαλφείων P5 Bekk. Sus.: τιμαλφῶν Μ5 P1 and possibly γ. 20. νομοθετέων P5 Bekk., θετέων M5, θετέων γ P1 Sus. (Vet. Int. ponendum): εἶναι εἰσένον conj. Jackson. 24. τούτων] τούτων P4 and after εν παράδομῇ: τούτων before these words P4 Ald.: τούτων after εν παράδομῇ γ Μ5 Ar. Sus., before these words the rest followed by Bekker. 27. ίσως γάρ κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note. 30. θετῶν P5 corr. P1 Bekk.: θετάρων γ Μ5 pr. P1 Sus. See critical note on 1338 b 23. 35. ἡ μορφηρίαν ἡ δυσμένειαν] Vet. Int. infectionem aut inhaesionem, but probably these are two alternative readings, both of them incorrect, which have taken the place of infensionem, the true equivalent for δυσμένεια, while malitiam, the true equivalent for μορφηρία, has been omitted. The original rendering of Vet. Int. probably was aut malitiam aut infensionem. 36. ἡδ ομ. Π1. 38. τὴν before παράδειαν om. Μ5 pr. P1 and possibly γ. μετὰ] See explanatory note on 1336 b 37. 39. μέχρις ἡθης P5 Bekk.: μέχρις ἡθης Μ5 P1 Sus, and possibly γ. In 1319 b 12, on the other hand, Μ5 P1 and possibly γ have μέχρι before a vowel: Π5 μέχρις. In Attic inscriptions μέχρι does not become μέχρι before a vowel (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 180). Phrynichus’
rule is μέχρις καὶ ἀχρὶς σῶν τῶν ἀδόκημα: μέχρι δὲ καὶ ἄχρι λέγε. In the Ἀδ. Πολ. this rule is observed, as will be seen from Dr. Sandys' Index. In Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1149 b 13, however, K b and all the MSS. appear to have μέχρις ενταῦθα.

1337 a 1. κακῶς Muretus, Bekk. 3 Sus.: καλῶς Γ II Bekk. 1 In 1294 a 7 Π ι have καλῶς wrongly in place of κακῶς. 7. δὴ] δεῖ τιν 138
de: Vet. Int. oportet esse (δὲ εἶναι Γ ?).

BOOK V (VIII).

1337 a 14. δὲ γὰρ] Vet. Int. oportet autem (δὲ δὲ Γ ?). παιδεύεσθαι Ar. Sus. (Aretinus' translation being oportet enim ad singula guber-
nandi generae disciplinam accommodari): πολιτεύεσθαι Γ Π Bekk. In 1341 a 1 πολιτευμένους is erroneously read in Γ M s in place of παιδευμένους, and the same mistake appears to occur here. 18. βέλτιστων] βέλτιστον M s Ar. Sus. Bekk. 2: the rest βέλτιστων followed by Bekk. 1 Bonitz (Ind. 403 a 15 sqq.) appears to accept βέλτιστων, comparing Rhet. 1. 7. 1364 b 29 sq. 27. ἀμα δὲ οὖν ἥρη νομίζειν αὐτῶν αὐτοῦ τινά εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν] Vet. Int. simul autem neque oportet pulare civium ipsorum aliquem sibi esse, so that Γ probably had αὐτῶν αὐτῷ in place of αὐτῶν αὐτοῦ. P 1 has αὐτῶν αὐτῷ: M s an am-
biguous contraction in place of αὐτῶν αὐτοῦ. 29. μόριον . . . πόλεως om. Π 1.
34. κοινῷ Π Π Bekk.: κοινῇ Π 1, κοινῇ om. κοινός Γ Ar. (Vet. Int. com-
muniter), κοινῶς M s (Sus. κοινῇ). 36. περὶ Π Π Bekk.: διὰ Γ M s pr.
P 1 Sus. See explanatory note. 40. οὖνδὲ P 3 etc. Bekk.: οὖνδὲ
Π Π Π Sus.

1337 b 5. δὲ δὲ οὖ πάντα κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note. ελε-
θερον] Schneider conjectures ελευθερίων, and perhaps Γ had ελευθερίων, for Vet. Int. has liberalibus. 6. ἀνελευθέρων] ἀνε-
λευθερίων Π 1 and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. illiberalibus, but illiberalis commonly represents ἀνελευθερος). 11. ἦ τὴν ψυχήν is bracketed by Sus., who says in Qu. Crit. p. 418, 'si διάνωα pars animae est, expectas ἡδον pro ψυχή,' but for the use of ψυχή in the sense of ἡδον compare (with Bonitz, Ind. 866 a 3) c. 5. 1340 a 6; cp. also c. 7. 1342 a 22, εἰπὶ δ' ὡστερ αὐτῶν (i. e. τῶν βασιλέων καὶ θητῶν) αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστρεμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξως. An objection to the addition of these words not noticed by Sus. is that there is no reference to them in ΙΙ-Ι5, as there is to τὸ σῶμα and τὴν διάνωαν,
but for a similar inexactness of reference cp. 4 (7). I. 1323 b 33 sqq. and other passages. 12. τε om. M⁸ P¹ and possibly r, but π¹ often omit τε. 16. τὸ δὲ . . . 20, ἀνελευθερον om. P² 36 C⁴ Sb Tb L⁸ Ald. pr. P⁴ (suppl. marg. P⁴), Sus. τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν M⁸ P¹ and possibly r (Vet. Int. assiduare autem): om. pr. P⁵ in a lacuna, προσεδρεύειν δὲ a recent correction in P⁵ followed by Bekker. But P⁵ is a MS. of little or no authority and a recent correction in P⁵ counts for even less than the MS. 17. πρὸς ἀκριβείαν M⁸ P¹ marg. P⁴ Sus.: the words fall within the passage omitted by P²: Vet. Int. ad perfectionem, which may perhaps represent πρὸς ἀκριβείαν (though Vict. and Bekk. take it to represent πρὸς τὸ ἐντελές and adopt this reading), for Vet. Int. translates εἰς ἀκριβείαν by ad certitudinem in 1331 a 2, ἀκριβείαν by certitudinem in 1328 a 20, and τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ by diligentia in 1274 b 7, and he may well have used a third equivalent here. εἰρημέναις ἡθείαις P⁸. 18. ἐνεκεν M⁸ P¹ Sus.: χάρω P³ Bekk.: P² omit 16–20: Vet. Int. gratia may represent either ἐνεκεν or χάρω. 19. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ M⁸ P¹ Sus.: αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ P⁵ Bekk.: Vet. Int. ipsius quidem enim gratia may represent either reading. τὸν is added before φιλῶν in P⁵. 20. αὐτὸ τοῦτο] ταύτω τοῦτο Richards. πράσσων M⁸ P¹ Bekk. Sus.: πράσσων P²: the reading of r is of course uncertain. πολλάκις δὲ ἄλλος P¹ Sus. probably rightly (see explanatory note on 1255 b 2): P² Bekk. have δὲ ἄλλος πολλάκις. 22. ἐλέχθη P² Bekk.: εἰρήται M⁸ P¹ Sus. and probably r (Vet. Int. dictum est). 25. τὴν μὲν . . . γραφικὴν om. r M⁸ pr. P¹. 34. τῆς . . . 35, σχολάζειν om. P¹. τέλος P², except that P⁵ has τελευταίων: ἄλος Vict. Bekk. See explanatory note on 1337 b 34. 36. ἀναγκαῖον] See explanatory note on 1337 b 35. 41. καροφυλακοῦντα P²: καροφυλακοῦντα P¹ Sus.: καροφυλακοῦντα P⁵ Bekk. προσάγοντα P² Bekk.: προσάγοντα P¹ Sus. 1338 a 8. αὐτῶν r and P² (except P⁴ Ald., which have αὐτῶν) Bekk. Sus.: αὐτὴν M⁸ pr. P¹. αὐτῶν a correction in P¹ in the ink of the MS. 10. τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολὴν] See explanatory note on 1338 a 9. 16. καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν is bracketed by Sus., nisi corruptum potius est μάθησιν (Sus.). 25. P¹ place καλεῖν after ἐπὶ διάγραμα. See critical note on 1328 a 15. Vet. Int. translates the line sed est quidem velut ad epulas vocari concaudere. Vocari may well represent καλεῖν (see vol. ii. p. lxiii, note 6), and concaudere probably stands for some corruption of βαλεῖν or else for a marginal gloss συνεφφραίνεσθαι. As to τὸ μὲν † see explanatory note on 1338 a 24. I propose to read μόνον in place of it. 26. οἱ κα-
See explanatory note on 1338 a 24. 27. Ὑ| ὁς Π¹ (Vet. Int. tanguam delectantem omnes): ὅς Π¹. I add ὑ before ὁδονσός because the Homeric Odysseus is referred to. 28. ὅταν κ.τ.λ. Vet. Int. quando gaudentibus hominibus 'congregati super tecta au- diunt philomenam sedentes deinceps,' where congregati should perhaps be convivati, and philomenam philomelam. He appears either to have found ἄριθμος in his Greek text in place of ὁδοῦ or to have misread ὁδοῦ as ἄριθμος. 31. ἄναγκαιον Π¹ Bekk. Sus., ἀναγκαῖον Π². 33. μία Π² Bekk. Sus., μίαν Π¹. τῶν ἄριθμῶν Π² Bekk.: τῶν ἄριθμῶν Μ* Π¹ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. numero), Sus.

1338 b 1. ἢ μᾶλλον] ἄλλα μᾶλλον Reiz, Thurot, Sus.: μᾶλλον ἢ Postgate. See explanatory note. θεωρητικοῖς Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: θεωρη- τικὴν Π². 3. ἄρμότειν Π² Bekk.: ἄρμότειν Π¹ and possibly Γ, Sus. Μ* Π¹ and possibly Α have ἄρμάξουσα in 1288 b 24, where Π² Vat. Pal. have ἄρμόττουσα, and the forms ἄρμότει, ἄρμότεσε are of course used by all MSS., but I have not noticed any other passages in the Politics in which the form ἄρμότειν is not used in all the MSS. 'In Attic inscriptions ἄρμόττω is the only form in use: ἄρμόττω is nowhere found' (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 141). ἐνεβέρευοι] See explanatory note. 4. πρότερον corr.¹ Π¹ (i.e. a correction in Π¹ in the same ink as the MS. and therefore probably by the writer of it, Demetrius Chalcondylas): πρότερον Γ Π. 5. εἶναι om. Π¹, but these MSS. often omit εἶναι, and here the omission of εἶναι suits the erroneous reading πρότερον, 4. 11. τά τε εἶδοι] Vet. Int. et speciem, but see critical note on 1287 a 27. 23. ληστρικά Μ* Π¹ L² Ald. (the reading of Γ is uncertain), ληστρικά Sus.: ληστικά Π², ληστικὰ pr. Π³, ληστικὰ rec. Π³, ληστικὰ Bekk. ληστρικά may be right, for in 1256 b 1, 5 (the only other passages of Aristotle to which the Index Aristotelicus refers for either of these words) the form used is ληστρικός. Τ and τρ are easily confused; thus in 1336 b 30 Π² have δεικτόν and Π¹ δεικτρών, and in 1274 a 39 we find γραφῆν in Π² in place of ταφῆν. On the whole, therefore, I incline to follow Μ* Π¹ and to read ληστρικά. Both forms, however, appear in the text of Thucydides—ληστικός in three passages and ληστρικός in two (see Von Essen’s Index). 26. καὶ τοὺς γυμνοὺς ἄγωνι καὶ τοὺς πολεμικοὺς Π¹ Sus.: καὶ τοὺς γυμνάσιους καὶ τοὺς πολεμικοὺς ἄγωσι Π² Bekk. 28. τῷ μῶν] μῶν Π² Reiz, Richards, but possibly μῶν is here displaced as οὐ μῶν sometimes is, e.g. in De An. 3. 6. 430 b 4 sq. (Bon. Ind. s. v. μῶν). 30. οὐδὲ γὰρ Π¹ Sus.: οὐ γὰρ Π² Bekk. It is more likely that οὐδὲ
has been changed into οὐ than that οὐ has been changed into οὐδὲ. Compare the readings in 1293 a 7 and see critical note on 1261 b 7. οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων βηρίων] Vet. Int. neque aliarum ferarum aliqua, but whether he found τι added in Γ after βηρίων may well be doubted. Vict. and Bekk. add it without necessity. 33. ἀπαθαγώγονος Μesium Π1348 Sb Tb Ald. Sus.: ἀπαθαγώγυτος Π2 Bekk. In Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 11 (the only other reference for either word given in the Index Aristotelicus) all MSS. have ἀπαθαγώγυτος.


1339 b 4. εἰ Π1 Π1, εἴη the rest. 21. γοῦν Π2 Bekk.: γὰρ Π1 Sus.: see critical note on 1285 a 12. 26. Vet. Int. translates ἀλλὰ καὶ by sed, as in 41. 33. δεῖ om. Γ Μesium pr. Π1. 37. οἶνον om. Γ Μesium pr. Π1.

1340 a 6. Μesium Π1 omit the second πρὸς. See critical note on
1331 b 24. 12. Vet. Int. gives no equivalent for ἄκροβραμος, a b m leaving a lacuna before the equivalent for τῶν μαμίθεων: Γ probably omitted ἄκροβραμος in a lacuna, for pr. Ms omits ροϊμπραμος in a lacuna. 13. pr. Ms leaves a lacuna between χωρίς and ῥυθμῶν in which τῶν has disappeared, and there was probably a lacuna in the same place in Γ, for several MSS. of the Vet. Int. leave a lacuna between the equivalents for χωρίς and ῥυθμῶν, but whether Γ omitted τῶν it is impossible to tell from Vet. Int. rythmis. 27. καὶ αὐτήν Π² Bekk.¹ Sus.: καὶ αὐτήν Μ³ P³, καθ αὐτήν Γ (Vet. Int. secundum se). As to αὐτήν ἑκείνην see explanatory note. 31. See explanatory note. 34. ταῦτ’ Π² Bekk.: ταῦτ’ Π¹ Sus. εἶπ Π² Bekk.: ἀπὸ Π¹ Sus. ἐπὶ appears to be right: see Plut. Sympos. 9. 15. 2, quoted in explanatory note on 1340 a 34. 36. πάσωνος Π² Bekk. Sus., πάσωνος Π² 56 6 etc. and pr. P⁴. But in Poet. 2. 1448 a 6 Αε has πάσων and in Metaph. Θ. 8. 1050 a 20, where some MSS. have πάσων or πάσωνος, Ε has πάσωνος. The artist referred to in this passage of the Metaphysics was a sculptor, and Pauson was a painter, but he may have been a sculptor also. For the frequent interchange of α and αν in MSS. see Mr. T. W. Allen in Journ. Hell. Studies, 15. 289. 37. καὶ εἴ] Vet. Int. et si; but see critical note on 1278 b 7. 41. καὶ μὴ] z has et non: all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have sed non.

1340 b 6. παιδείαν Ar. Bekk. Sus., παιδίαν Γ Π. 7. δὲ Π¹ Sus.: γὰρ Π² Bekk. 8. τὰ om. Π³ pr. P¹: Bekk.² brackets it. 10. ἐλευθερωτέρας] Vet. Int. liberiores (ἐλευθερωτέρας Γ?). 11. ποιῶν τι] z has quaem quendam in agreement with morem animae: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have quaem quandam. 14. ἐστὶ or ἐστὶ Γ, ἐστὶ Π¹: ἔχει the rest. ἔρματονατ] ἔρματονan P¹ La Ald. to suit the false reading ἔχει. See critical note on 1336 b 3, where these MSS. similarly correct ἀνελευθερίαν. 16. z has natura rightly for φόσει: is naturae in Sus.¹ a misprint? 17. As to ἡδονήνων see explanatory note on 1340 b 16. 20. τοὺς is wrongly added before αὐτοῖς in Π¹: z has eos for τοὺς αὐτοῖς, but the other MSS. of Vet. Int. are probably right in reading eosdem. 22. δὴ Π¹ 8 3: δὲ the rest (Vet. Int. autem), followed by Bekk. and doubtfully by Sus. 24. μὴ κοινωνήσαντας] Vet. Int. eos qui non communicaverunt, but this may well stand for μὴ κοινωνήσαντας: cp. 1281 a 30, where qui non honoratur stands for μὴ τιμωμένος, 1335 a 24, where quae usae fuerunt stands for χρησάμεναι, 1336 a 39, where pueris qui cohibentur stands for τοῖς παιδίοις διατενωμένοις,
and 1322 a 4, where *qui sustinent* stands for *ὑπομείνατες*. See critical note on 1269 a 18, though I have now little doubt that *qui mutaverit* there stands not for *δι κυνήσας* but for *κυνήσας.* 26. ἄρχοντος ἐνικών Π² Bekk. and a correction in P¹ in the same ink as the MS.: ἄρχοντα M⁴ pr. P¹ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *Archytas* which form he found in his text. It is doubtful whether Aristotle wrote *Ἀρχώτα*, for though in 1311 b 4 all MSS. but one or two have ἄρχα, they have ἄμυναν in the preceding line, and we find ἐνίκην in Rhet. 2. 23, 1398 b 4 and ἐνίκην in Rhet. 2. 23, 1399 a 4. In Pol. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 23, again, all MSS. have χαρώνδου, not χαρώνδα as in Strabo, p. 539. As to the usage in Attic inscriptions Meisterhans (Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 94) reports, 'Foreign personal names ending in -ος as in Athenian public documents of the fifth and fourth century B.C. form the genitive in -ου, not -α (Περδίκκου, Ἀμύντος, Ἀρβίδου, and so forth). On the other hand -α occurs in a private inscription in the name of an Athenian (Χαρέδημον Φιλέα in an Attic inscription of the fifth century B.C.)' On the whole the chances are in favour of ἄρχοντος. In the nominative we have ἄντιμενίδης, not ἄντιμενίδας, in 3. 14. 1285 a 36, and ὀλονοκράτης, not ὀλονοκράτας, in 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 17, though the forms in -ος are the local forms. 32. και om. P¹. 39. γενομένην Π² Bekk. Sus.: γενομένην M⁴ P¹: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *factam* which reading he found in his Greek text, for in 1337 a 13 *factum* stands for γεγομένον.

1341 a 8. πρὸς μὲν κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note on 1341 a 7. 13. καὶ om. P¹ Sus., but the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions and especially in omissions of καὶ. 15. κοινός Π¹ rightly: the rest κοινονδ.’ 18. τι is added in P¹ Sus. after ἄλλο. 19. ἔτερον ἐστιν Π² (except corr. P⁴, ἄλλο ἔτερον ἐστίν) and probably r (Vet. Int. *alterum est*), for Vet. Int. usually renders ἔτερον by *alter* and ἄλλο by *alias*: ἄλλο ἐστιν M⁴ P¹, ἄλλο ἐστιν Sus. ἄλλο is probably repeated from the preceding line. 29. τὴν which Bekker omits before ἀφετήρυ is omitted only in a few MSS. of little authority. 33. αὐτὸς om. P¹. 

1341 b 1. σαμβάκια Gotting, Bekk., Sus.: σαμβάκια Π²: ιαμβοι P¹. 2. εὐλογος] z has *rationabilter* rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *rationalitier*. 3. δὴ om. P¹. 4. Vet. Int. has *enim* for *μὲν* ὁδὲν (or possibly μὲν, for pr. M⁴ omits ὁδὲν in a lacuna), but see critical note on 1252 a 24. 11. αὐτοῦ r (Vet. Int. *sinuet*) Bekk. Sus.: αὐτοῦ Π. 19–26. I retain δ’ after *σκέπτου*, thinking that its
presence in the text is due simply to the fact that owing to the long parenthesis, 10–18, Aristotle has forgotten that his protasis needs an apodosis. I bracket καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν, because, as Bonitz points out (Aristot. Stud. 2 and 3, p. 97 sq.), there is no such limitation in the solution of the problem given in 1342 a 1 sqq. Πρὸς παιδείαν has probably been repeated from the line below. In 12 sqq., ἢ τρίτον δὲ τινὰ ἄτερον, there is much to be said for the emendation of Sus., ἢ τινα ἄτερον, τρίτον δὲ, but if we adopt this reading, it will be necessary, as Sus. sees, in order to obtain an apodosis, to translate καὶ, 25, ‘also,’ or else, which Sus. prefers, to expunge it. I feel inclined to suggest a greater change. Should not τρίτον δὲ be bracketed and ἓτε δὲ be read in place of ὑπειθῇ? Τρίτον δὲ (altered into τρίτον δεῖ) may be nothing more than a marginal gloss which has crept into the text, just as πρὸς τοῦτον μὲν has done in some MSS. in 1265 a 21. I have obelized τρίτον ... ἑπειθῇ to indicate that the soundness of the text is doubtful. I thought better of the state of the text in 19–26 when I wrote vol. i. p. 366, than I do now. 23. z has quoniam autem for ὑπειθῇ (ἐπιὶ δὲ?): the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have quoniam. 36. μέρος ΓΠ Bekk.: μέλος Tyrwhitt, Sus. possibly rightly. 38. καὶ is added after γὰρ in P124. 40. τρίτον δὲ κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note.


CRITICAL NOTES.

1329 a 33): the rest, including probably τ (Vet. Int. per tempus), have χρόνον. Bekk. reads χρόνον, Sus. χρόνον. 23. (τῷ) Σωκράτει] So J. C. Wilson followed by Sus.: σωκράτει Π. We expect τῷ Σωκράτει, as the Socrates of the Republic (398 E) is referred to. If in Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 b 30 we have ὁ γὰρ λέγει Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἑπτάχιον, in Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 b 8 (the same quotation) we have ὁ Σωκράτης. 26. As petulantia impetuosum is the equivalent for βασιλευτικὸν in Vet. Int., the parenthesis in Sus.¹ p. 371 which ends after magis should begin before petulantia, not before impetuosum. 29. Schn. Cor. and Göttling place a colon, not a full stop, after τοιούτων, but see explanatory note. 33. ἦ is added after ἄρμονίων by P¹ and corr.¹ P² (i.e. a correction in P² in the same ink as the MS.), followed by Sus., who however places the mark of a lacuna after ἦ. Göttling reads ἦ in place of ἦ, comparing 2. 10. 1272 b 9. Schn. and Cor. omit ἦ and add οὖν after δῆλον. 34. I follow Vet. Int., Sus., and others in indicating a lacuna after πρέπον: see vol. ii. p. xxix.
NOTES.

BOOK III.

32. ὧ̂ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦτι, καὶ τὸς ἐκάστη καὶ ποία τις. C. 1.
Attention has already been called (above on 1274 b 26) to the absence of any connecting particle. Πολιτείας is probably not the acc. plur., as some take it to be, but the gen. sing. as in 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 29, ἡμιν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας, 4 (7). 10. 1299 a 40, τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν, 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35, τῶν ἀποφαινομένων περὶ πολιτείας, and 2. 12. 1273 b 27, τῶν δὲ ἀποφηματίων τι περὶ πολιτείας: cp. Eth. Nic. io. io. 1181 b 14, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, and Pol. 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 8, ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπισκοποῦμεν. From what has been said at the end of the First and the beginning of the Second Book we expect to be invited here to inquire into the nature of the best constitution, not into the nature of each constitution (see vol. i. p. 226), but the programme of the Politics given at the close of the Nicomachian Ethics contemplates an inquiry into the due structure of each constitution, and it is clear from Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 12, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν πολιτείας, that Aristotle intends to study all constitutions, not the best only.

τὸς ἐκάστη καὶ ποία τις. This inquiry is taken up in the Sixth and following chapters. The question τὸς καὶ ποία τις is characteristic of Science (Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 29, καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὁρθὴν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὥστε τὸ ἐστιν ἡ ποιόν τι' θεατῆς γὰρ τάληθος). The distinction between τὸς and ποία τις recurs in Pol. 6 (4). 1288 b 21 sqq. and 1. 3. 1253 b 7 sq. As to its nature, if we refer to Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1106 a 12, ὃ τι μὲν ὅνων ἐστὶ τῷ γείνει ἡ ὄρετή, εἰρήται· ἐδὲ ἐκ ἡ μὴ μόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιστ., ὅτι ἦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις, we shall be tempted to take τὸς in the passage before us as asking what is the genus, and ποία τις as asking what is the differentia, but it would seem that the answer to τὸς is rather the definition, while the answer to ποία τις is given in further illustrative details, and that the sense

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of the words is 'what is the nature of each and how each may be described.' Cp. Plato, Gorg. 448 E, πωλ. οὖ γὰρ ἀπεκριμήν, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἡ καλλιτήτις; Σωκ. καὶ μᾶλα γε. ἀλλ' οὔδείς εἶρομή, ποία τις εἴη ἡ Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς, καὶ ὅτινα δέοι καλέν τὸν Γοργίαν: Aristot. Metaph. Η. 3. 1043 b 23, ὅτε ἡ ἄπορία ἦν ὅν 'Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὐτοὶ ἀπαίδευτοι ἦπόρον ἐκεῖ τινὰ καιρὸν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἀρίστασθαι (τὸν γὰρ δρόν λόγον εἶναι μακρὸν), ἀλλὰ ποῖον μὲν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ἀφ' ἄρριφα, τί μὲν ἔστιν, οὐ, ὅτι δ' οἶον κατίτερος. Cp. also Plato, Symp. 201 E, Euthyphr. 11 A, Meno 71 B, Rep. 328 E, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 13, τί δ' ἐστίν ἡ ποιών τι (sc. ἡ ἱδιώτη), where Ramsauer thinks that ἡ ποιών τι is added because Aristotle feels that he fails in what follows to give a precise definition of pleasure. In Plato, Rep. 557 B sqq. in answer to the question ποία τις ἡ τοιαύτη πολιτεία a description of a State democratically governed is given.

33. περὶ πόλεως is of course to be taken, not with σκόψεις, but with ἰδεῖς.

34 sqq. Aristotle gives three reasons for inquiring into the nature of the πόλις before passing on to the πολιτεία:—1. The nature of the πόλις is a disputed question. 2. The statesman and the lawgiver are concerned with the πόλις, hence an inquiry into its nature is not only needed but belongs to the province of the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη. 3. The constitution (which is the subject of his treatise) is an ordering of those who dwell in the πόλις. As to the first reason, see c. 3. 1276 a 6 sqq. and notes, and compare also (with Eaton) Thuc. 3. 62. 4 sq. As to the second reason, cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 7 sqq., δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἄλληθεαν πολιτικὸς περὶ τούτων (i.e. τὴν ἀρετὴν) μᾶλλον πεπονήσθαι, where a similar reason is given for the study of virtue. As to the third, we learn from c. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq., 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15 sqq., and 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 7 sqq. what kind of ordering a constitution is (Sus.², note 432 b: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 354). Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of the πόλις and the citizen helps him to answer the question which he takes up later on, what a πολιτεία is, because it discloses that the πόλις is an aggregate of citizens, or in other words of men possessing access to office and therefore either actual or possible rulers, and thus leads on to the conclusion arrived at in c. 6, that the πολιτεία is an ordering of the offices of the πόλις and especially of its supreme office (1278 b 8 sqq.). The fact that the πόλις consists of actual or possible rulers also suggests the further conclusion that it is
3. 1. 1274 b 33—38.

38. ἐπεί δ' ἡ πόλις κ. τ. λ. The πόλις is a compound in the sense of being a whole composed of many parts. Not all compounds are wholes: see Metaph. Z. 17. 1041 b 11 sqq., which, following Grote (Aristotle 2. 348), we may thus paraphrase—

"Compounds are of two sorts—aggregates like a heap (mechanical) and aggregates like a syllable (organic or formal). In these last there are not merely the constituent elements, but something else besides. The syllable ὅ is something more than the letters ὅ and ἄ; flesh is something more than fire and earth, its constituent elements . . . This "something more" is the essence of each compound—the First Cause of existence to each." A whole is a compound of the second kind; in it, as in a syllable, there is over and above the constituent elements an essence which is its First Cause. "Voce ὅ Aristoteles fere significat id quod per certam formam definitum ac consummatum est; cf. Metaph. I. 1. 1052 a 22, τὸ ὅ καὶ ἔχων τίνα μορφήν καὶ εἴδος: Δ. 6. 1016 b 12, ἄν μη τί ὅ, τούτῳ δὲ ἄν μη τὸ εἴδος ἔχη ἐν: M. 2. 1077 a 28: K 2.
M. 8. 1084 b 30' (Bonitz on Metaph. A. i. 1069 a 18). A whole is in fact a kind of ἐν (see the passages referred to in Bon. Ind. 223 a 25 sqq.), and thus, while the πόλις is termed a whole here and in 1. 2. 1253 a 20 and 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., it is termed an ἐν in 2. 2. 1261 a 29. It is implied in the passage before us that there are wholes which are not composed of many parts, or perhaps of parts at all. A monad, a point, and a sound (φθόγγος) are given in Diog. Laert. 3. 107 as instances of things which are not compound. Are these wholes? As to the method of examining the parts in order to learn the nature of the whole, see above on 1252 a 17. The parts of the πόλις are here taken to be citizens: for other uses of the term see vol. i. pp. 98, 495, and Appendix A.

41. ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλήθος ἔστιν. Τι πλήθος is explained in 1275 b 20 by πλήθος ἰκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ός ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν. On this account of the πόλις see vol. i. p. 226 sq., and for other accounts of it given in the Politics, vol. i. p. 283 sq. Compare with the passage before us Justin 2. 12. 14, Themistocles ... persuadet omnibus patriam municipes esse, non moenia, civitatemque non in aedificiis, sed in civibus positam.


3. ἔστι γὰρ τις κ.τ.λ. For instance the βάναυσος, who was not a citizen in the full sense in the Theban oligarchy (c. 5. 1278 a 25: 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 28) or probably in oligarchies based on birth, though he would often be so in oligarchies based simply on a property-qualification (c. 5. 1278 a 21 sqq.).

5. τοὺς μὲν ὕστερ κ.τ.λ. Ἀλλὰς πως, 'in some other sense than the proper one,' opposed to κυρίως or οἰκεῖος: cp. Eth. Eud. i. 5. 1216a 23, ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ποιτικῶν οὐκ ἄλληθρος τυχαίς ἐν προσηγορίαις: οὐ γὰρ εἰσὶ ποιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλληθριαν, and Eth. Nic. i. 4. 1096 b 11, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων (i. e. τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ διωκόμενων καὶ ἀγαπομενῶν) ἡ φύλακτικά πως ἤ τῶν ἐναντίων κοινοτικά διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. Ποιητοὶ πολιται were excluded at Athens from the archonship and from priesthods ([Demosth.] c. Nearer. c. 92), and often did not reside within the State which made them citizens: thus Dion was a ποιητός πολιτῆς of the Lacedaemonian State (Plut. Dion, cc. 17, 49). See as to ποιητοὶ πολιται Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 184 sqq.
To choose, this Dionysodorus, that by aliens as The cause no one, by the Athenian citizen, in these less, expressed residence. Cp. Herondas 2. 94, ἀπαίσι τοῖς οἰκεῖσι τὴν πόλιν ξεῖνοι.

8. οὐδ’ οἱ κ.τ.λ., ‘nor are those citizens who, [as metoeci usually do,] share in political rights to the extent of undergoing trial and suing.’ It would have been more regular if Aristotle had continued οὐδέ τῷ τῶν δικαίων μετέχειν κ.τ.λ.

10. τοῦτο, i.e. τὸ τῶν δικαίων μετέχειν οὕτως ὡστε κ.τ.λ. τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνοῦσιν, who are obviously not citizens of the State in which they possess these rights. Ἀπὸ denotes the cause or origin of the association (Bon. Ind. 77 b 51 sqq.).

11. ταῦτα, i.e. τὸ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι, and so τοῦτον, 12. The parenthetic remark, καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ἐνάρξει, seems needless, but for equally needless parenthetic remarks see c. 11. 1282 a 36 sqq. and c. 12. 1282 b 39.

πολλαχῶ ἡν οὖν κ.τ.λ., ‘nay in many places,’ etc., so that in these places metoeci are still further removed from citizenship than in places in which they completely share in these rights. Μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. It is here used in the sense of ‘nay,’ as in Rhet. 2. 23. 1399 a 15, 23. ‘To what exact extent the resident aliens at Athens were obliged to allow themselves to be represented by their προστάτης we have no means of saying, but it can be shown that they could plead their cause before a judicial tribunal themselves: this is proved by the speech of Demosthenes against Dionysodorus, where the speaker is a resident alien... In Herondas 2, again, the πορνοβοσκός, who pleads in person before a Coan court of justice, is obviously a μετοίκος, vv. 15, 40, 92 sqq.’ (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 170 = Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 177 sqq.).

NOTES.

13. τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας, 'of the kind of association which has just been described,' i.e. of the association which goes no further than a right to sue and be sued.

14. ἄλλα καθάπερ κ.τ.λ., 'but [we may dismiss these from consideration], just as,' etc.

15. ἐγγεγραμμένοις, i.e. at Athens in the ληξιαρχίων γραμματείων, or list of citizens kept by the demarch, as to which see note on 1336 b 37. Boyhood is usually made to cease not, as here, on entry in this list, but at puberty (see note on 1333 b 3).

τόσο γέροντα τοὺς ἄφεμένους. Cp. Plut. Tit. Flaminin., c. 21, ὠσπερ ὑπὸ γῆρως ἀπηρα καὶ κόλουρον ἄφεμένου ζὴν χειροίδη τῶν Λυκίβδου ἀποστειών, and Plato, Rep. 498 C, ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ρώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατευῶν ἐκτὸς γίγνεται, τότε ἤδη ἄφετον νέμεσθαι κ.τ.λ. It would seem that after a certain age old citizens were excused attendance at the assembly and the dicasteries, unless we take Aristotle to refer merely to their exemption from military service, as to which see Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 40 and Diod. 14. 74. i sq. That attendance at the meetings of the assembly was to a certain extent compulsory at Athens, we see from Pollux 8. 104, though the rich seem often to have escaped attendance (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 8). Giphanius (p. 292) compares the 'senes depontani, seu de ponte deiciendi, ut vocabant Romani,' who were excluded from the bridge which led to the Septa, the place where the comitia voted: see as to them Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht 3. 401, 3, and other passages referred to by Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 167, 9.

16. φατέων εἶναι μὲν πως πολίτας, οὖχ ἄπλῶς δὲ λίαν. Λίαν qualifies ἄπλῶς in the sense of 'very' or 'quite': cp. [Plato,] Ἡρω. 393 Ε, ὅπως ἀν βελτισσα λίαν πράττει τὰ τε αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ πράγματα καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων. Λίαν alone (without any ἄπλῶς) stands in contrast to πως in De Part. An. 3. 7. 669 b 36 sqq.

ἄλλα προστιθέντας κ.τ.λ. Supply φατέων εἶναι. For the case of προστιθέντας see Jelf, Gr. Grammar, § 613, Obs. 5, and cp. c. 3. 1276 b 10, 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 21 sqq., and 1324 a 2 sq. In 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 3, however, we have ἐπιστήσασι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέων κ.τ.λ. 'The dative and the accusative of the agent are both allowed with the verbal in -τέω' (Goodwin, Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb, ed. 2, § 926).

17. ἀτελεῖς. Cp. c. 5. 1278 a 4, where οἱ παῖδες are said to be πολίται ἀτελεῖς, and therefore πολίται εἰς ὑποθέσεως.
10. ἵτομεν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Vict. ‘quacrimus enim hie cивem simpliciter, et qui nullam quasi culpam in se contineat, quam oratione corrigere oporteat, ut factum est in superioribus generibus cивium.’ ἕγκλημα must here mean, not ‘accusation,’ but ‘culpa’ (‘defect’: Sus. ‘Mangel’), for if we construe ‘accusation,’ the accusation will be said to ‘need correction,’ which is not the sense required. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) marks off the use of ἕγκλημα in this passage from its ordinary use. ‘Frohberger on Lys. 10. 23 quotes Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 34: Lys. 16. 10: Polyb. 2. 52. 4: Demosth. i. 7, in all which passages ἕγκλημα seems practically to mean ‘offence’ (Richards). Γάρ, 19, probably refers not to what immediately precedes but to the general sense of the preceding passage (like ἐπεῖ… γε in 2. 7. 1267 a 12, where see note), and especially to the clause suppressed in 14 (‘we may dismiss these from consideration’). Οἱ ἀτίμου καὶ φυγάδες are referred to as also being πῶς πολίται, being so far citizens that their disqualification was in the case of some ἀτίμου incomplete, and in the case of all ἀτίμου and φυγάδες reversible (see Schömann, Antiq. Iur. Publ. Graec. pp. 199, 234). For τῶν ἀπλῶν πολίτην cp. Antiphanes, Τραπαγωιστής (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 121), τὴν ἀληθῶς μονακὴν. Καὶ, 20, ‘also,’ not ‘both.’

22. πολίτης δ’ ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ. ‘Ἀπλῶς is to be taken with πολίτης. For τῶν ἀπλῶν πολίτην, 19, followed by πολίτης δ’ ἀπλῶς here, see note on 1276 b 28. As to κρίσεως, see vol. i. p. 230, note i. Κρίσις here seems to mean ἡ τῶν δικαίων κρίσις (Plato, Laws 766 D). A Greek hardly felt himself to be a citizen if he was excluded from all share in judicial functions (Plato, Laws 768 B, ὁ γὰρ ἀκοοῦντος δὸν ἐξουσία τῶν συνδικάζειν ἠγεῖται τὸ παράπαν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος εἶναι). Ἀρχή is a wider term than κρίσις and is made in what follows to include κρίσις (e. g. in 1275 b 18 sq.).

23. τῶν δ’ ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ διηρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, ‘now of magistracies some are severed in point of time,’ i. e. their tenure is severed, they cannot be held continuously. So Bernays, ‘ein Theil der Aemter freilich erleidet zeitliche Unterbrechung.’ For the contrast of διηρημένως and συνεχῆς cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 29, εἶτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἶτε ἐκ διηρημένων, and Phys. 4. 4. 211 a 29. Compare also ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ χρόνον in Metaph. m. 8. 1084 b 14 sqq. Mr. Welldon translates, ‘some offices of State are determinate in point of time,’ but can other passages be produced in which διωρίσθαι bears this meaning? It would be easier to explain the passage thus if we read with Scaliger and Sus. διωρισμέναι in place of διηρημέναι.
NOTES.

24. ὁστ’ ἐνίας μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). i5. 1299 a 37 sq. ἐνίας μὲν should have been followed by ἐνίας δὲ, but it is in fact followed by ἦ, 25: compare the way in which in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 24 ἦ μὲν is followed by ἦ ἔτος, 28, and in Poet. 3. 1448 a 21, 23, ὅτε μὲν is followed by ἦ. See also note on 1338 b 1. The Lacedaemonian admiralship could not be held twice by the same person (Xen. Hell. 2. i. 7), and the same was the case with many offices at Athens (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 62 sub fin.). At Thurii at one time a repeated tenure of the office of stratēgus by the same individual was prohibited except after an interval of five years (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 7). See on this subject Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. i. 206. 1 (= Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 215. 4) and 2. 320. i.

26. ὀ δ’ ἀδριστος. We expect αἱ δ’ ἀδριστοι, but see note on 1258 b 26.

τάχα μὲν ὅν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν ὅν is answered by ἀλλὰ, 29. Οὖν ἄρχοντας, 'not even magistrates, [to say nothing of their being magistrates unlimited in respect of time].' Philocheon in the Vespae of Aristophanes will not hear of the function of dicast not being a magistracy: see Vesp. 548–551 (Didot), 575.

ἀρ’ ὅν μεγάλη τοῦτ’ ἐστ’ ἄρχη καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καταχήνη;

and 619 sqq. Plato in the Laws (767 A: cp. 768 C) holds that if a dicast is not in strictness a magistrate, he is in a sense a magistrate, and an important one too, on the day on which he decides a lawsuit. Cp. Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 233, ἀνὴρ γὰρ ἵδιότης ἐν πόλει δημοκρατουμένη νόμῳ καὶ ψήφῳ βασιλεύει. But dicasts and magistrates were no doubt commonly distinguished: Strabo, for instance (p. 665), speaks of δικασταὶ and ἄρχοντες, and Aristotle himself in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book distinguishes between ἄρχαι and τὸ δικαστικὸν (6 (4). i4. 1297 b 41 sqq.). When he speaks otherwise in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 8 sq., he is referring to oligarchical constitutions in which the judge was really a magistrate. A member of the assembly, on the other hand, would be less likely to claim to be a magistrate. In c. i1. 1282 a 34 Aristotle says that dicasts and members of the Boulê and the assembly are not magistrates, but parts of a magistracy.

27. τοὺς τοιούτους, 'the above-mentioned,' i.e. dicasts and members of the assembly.

28. διὰ ταύτ’, by reason of their being dicasts and members of the assembly.
The page contains a segment of text discussing the nature of names and their use in distinguishing things according to Plato and other philosophers. It includes philosophical arguments and references to works by Plato, Demosthenes, and other ancient authors. The text refers to the use of adjectives and substantives, the distinction between passive and active parts of speech, and the importance of names in distinguishing and ordering things. The passage also touches on the nature of the assembly and its role in decision-making processes.

The text is a part of a larger discourse on the nature of names and their role in philosophy, discussing the definitions and uses of words in distinguishing things, particularly in the context of the assembly and its functions. It highlights the importance of clear and precise language in philosophical argumentation and the role of names in organizing knowledge and thought.
of the citizen which rests on extraction fails to suit persons whom nevertheless all would hold to be citizens (1275 b 32). ἐφαρμόττειν is a word often used by Aristotle, but it would seem to be rather a poetical than a prose word, and it does not appear to occur in Plato, Thucydides, or the Attic orators, nor indeed in Xenophon, unless the Agesilaus is his work.

34. δει δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν... 1275 b 5, πολιτείαν. See vol. i. p. 242 for an interpretation of this passage. The πολιτεία is the ὑποκείμενα of the citizen because they are the 'res ad quas refertur' πολίτων 'notio et a quibus suspensa est' (Bon, Ind. 798 b 59, cp. 799 a 16). I follow the interpretation of Bonitz, as do also Prof. Jowett (Politics, 2. 106) and Prof. J. A. Stewart (Class. Rev. 9. 455 sq.).

35. τῶν πραγμάτων is probably a partitive genitive after ὅστις.


37. ἡ τοιαύτα, i.e. in the case before us 'as citizens.' The citizen of the best constitution and the citizen of an extreme democracy may have much in common with each other as animals, but little or nothing as citizens.

1275 b. 1. τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας κ. τ. λ. Bonitz (Ind. 652 a 51 sqq.) groups with the passage before us Categ. i. 12. i. 4 b 4 sqq. (see Waitz on i. 4 a 26) and Metaph. b. 2. 997 a 12, where προτέρα is conjoined with κυριωτέρα. Cp. also Pol. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 40, τὴν πρώτην καὶ βιοτάτης (πολιτείας), and Plut. Sympos. 2. 3. 3, καὶ λόγον ἐχει τοῦ ἄτελον ψύχει πρότερον εἶναι τὸ τέλειον, ὥς τον ποιηματίου τὸ ὀλίκηρον καὶ τοῦ μέρους τὸ ὅλον.

2. τὰς δὲ παρεκβεβηκυίας κ. τ. λ. Aristotle has, however, already used the term παρεκβάσεις (2. i. 1273 a 3).

5. ὁ λεχθεὶς. Cp. 1275 a 32. 'He who shares in the ἀδριστός ὄρχης of the dicast and the member of the assembly.'

ἐν μὲν δημοκρατία μάλιστα. These words are to be taken together.

7. (ἐν) ἐνίαις γὰρ ὅσκ ἔστι δήμος, sc. πολιτείας. Δήμος appears here to mean 'a people gathered in an assembly,' 'a body of ecclesiai.' (cp. c. i. 1282 a 34 sqq., where ὁ ἐκκλησιαστής is said to be a μόριον of ὁ δήμος), while ἐκκλησία means the institution itself, the assembly.

8. συγκλήτους, such as, for instance, the 5000 at Athens, whom the 400 were to call together whenever they pleased (Thuc. 8.
67. 3). The contrast drawn implies that it was of the essence of an ἐκκλησία to meet at regular intervals, and not merely when the authorities of the State chose to convoke it. Compare the Pregadi at Venice. ‘C'est le nom qu'on donnait aux sénateurs, parce que dans l'origine, alors qu'il n'existait pas de jour fixe pour leurs séances, on allait à domicile prior chaque membre de vouloir bien se rendre au Palais Ducal’ (Yriarte, Vie d'un Patricien de Venise, p. 78). Schömann (Antiqq. Iuris Publ. Graec. p. 82, note 6) refers to the ἐπίκλητοι instituted by Lysimachus at Ephesus (Strabo, p. 640, ἵνα γερουσία καταγραφομένη, τούτοις δὲ συνήθειν ὁ ἐπίκλητοι καλοῦμενοι καὶ διψόκων πάντα), but the nature of these ἐπίκλητοι is obscure. Perhaps we should compare with them the ἐπεισδόκητοι of Ἄθ. Πολ. c. 30. 1. 21 sqq. (ed. Sandys). The members of the council of the Aetolian League were called ἀπόκλητοι (see as to them Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 28. 4). Σύγκλητοι would be officials, not ἄφριτοι ἄρχοντες.

κατὰ μέρος, 'by sections': cp. 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 1, τοσοῦτοι δ' ἔτεροι καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος (τρόποι), opposed τὸ πάντας κρίνειν. Lambinus adopts a different interpretation, 'et lites controversiasque alias aliī cognoscunt ac discemptant,' and so Vict. and Bonitz ('alia amīs magistratus,' Ind. 455 b 7), but this rendering seems inconsistent with 11, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα, for this does not appear to have been the plan followed at Carthage.

9. οἴον ἐν Λακεδαιμονὶ τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας. This is confirmed by Plut. Apophth. Lac. Eurycratidas, διὰ τὶ περὶ τὰ τῶν συμβολαίων δίκαια ἐκάστης ἡμέρας κρίνοντων ὁ ἐφόροι.

10. ἔτερα δ' ἰσως ἄρξῃ τις ἔτερα. E. g. the kings (Hdt. 6. 57, δικάζειν δὲ μούνος τοὺς βασιλείας τοσάδε μοῦνα' πατρούχου τε παρθένου πέρι, ἐὰς τὸν ἰκέστατο έχεν, ἣν μὴ περ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτὴν ἐγγυήσῃ, καὶ ὁδὼν δημοσιεύων πέρι).

11. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κ. τ. λ. See note on 1273 a 19.

13. ἀλλ' ἐχει γάρ κ. τ. λ., 'however-[we need not give up] our definition of a citizen, as it admits of correction' (Mr. Welldon).

14. ταῖς ἀλλαῖς πολιτείαις, i. e. other than democracy, as in 6. Surely, however, an assembly and dicasteries will exist in a polity? An assembly, indeed, appears to have existed in some oligarchies also, though members of it were required to possess a high property-qualification (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq.) or it was made harmless in some way (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 26 sqq.), and not only an
assembly, but dicasteries of which the poor were at any rate nominally members (6 (4). 9. 1294 a 37 sqq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 16 sqq.).

15. ὅ κατὰ τὴν ἄρχην ὁρισμένος, literally 'he who is limited [in point of time] in respect of his office,' i.e. the holder of office for a limited period. Cp. Plut. Pericl. c. 10, ὅ μὲν οὖν ἐξοστρακισμὸς ὁρισμένην ἐίχε νόμῳ διεκατιαν τοὺς φεύγουσιν.

16. τούτων, i.e. τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἄρχην ὁρισμένων.

τισῶν, as at Carthage, so far at least as judicial authority is concerned, a share of deliberative authority was accorded at Carthage to the popular assembly (2. 11. 1273 a 6 sqq.). In many oligarchies, probably, the power of deliberating about all matters and trying all suits was possessed by a part or the whole of the holders of office.

17. περὶ τιμῶν. This would be characteristic of an aristocracy or a polity rather than an oligarchy (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 5 sqq.: 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 13 sqq.).

18. ὅ γάρ ἔξουσία κ.τ.λ. Participation in either deliberative or judicial office is, it would seem, enough to constitute a citizen: thus if, as in some oligarchies, e.g. that of Heracleia on the Euxine (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 34), the dicasteries are recruited from those outside the ruling class, the members of them would be citizens. Aristotle's view that full citizenship is constituted by access to deliberative and judicial office is quite in harmony with his description of the deliberative and judiciary of a State as 'parts of the State in an especial sense' (6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.). In c. 5. 1278 a 35, however, we are told that ὅ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν— not simply ἄρχὴς βουλευτικῆς ἂν κριτικῆς—is ὁ μάλιστα πολίτης. Still it would seem that a man may be a full citizen without access to ἂν ἄρχαι strictly so called, for at Malis ὅτι ὀπλιτευκότες were citizens, though they were not eligible for ἂν ἄρχαι (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 14). Whether the mere right to elect magistrates, which is distinguished from deliberative authority in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 21 sqq., would be sufficient in Aristotle's view to constitute citizenship, may be doubted. We gather from 3. 14. 1285 a 25 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 7 that there are citizens in States ruled by kings, but Aristotle nowhere explicitly takes account of such citizens, nor does he explain their position.

19. ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, 'of the State in which he possesses these rights': cp. c. 3. 1276 a 15 and c. 11. 1281 b 29 sqq.
20. πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς. So too in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 24, cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 16, πρὸς ζωῆν αὐτάρκεια, but in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 8 we have αὐτάρκεια πρὸς τὸ εἶ ἔτη (cp. i. 2. 1252 b 28 sqq. and Oecon. i. 1. 1343 a 10 sq.), and this is the exacter statement.

21. ὁριζόταται δὲ κ.τ.λ. After giving his definition of a citizen C. 2. Aristotle now proceeds to point out the weakness of a rival definition. The citizen was commonly defined as descended from two citizen-parents. Those who defined citizenship thus could appeal to laws existing at Athens (vol. i. p. 227) and Byzantium ([Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1346 b 26 sqq.) and to the general feeling throughout Greece, that those descended from two citizen-parents were γυνήσιοι πολίται (c. 5. 1278 a 30). Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 297. 2) traces this feeling at Oreus, Cos, Rhodes, and elsewhere. Not only citizenship but other things also were held to pass most surely by descent from both parents—e. g. virtue (Eurip. Fragm. 524, ἡγεσάμην οὖν, οἱ παρακείμενοι τὰς χρήσις ποιητῶν λέκτρων, οὐκ ἂν εὐτεκνεῖν, ἐσθλοῖν δ’ ἂν ἀμφαίν ἐσθλοῦ ἄν φύσιν γάρνον), nobility (1. 6. 1255 a 36 sqq.), and physical strength (Xen. Rep. Lac. i. 4, νομίζων ἔξ ἀμφοτέρων ἱσχυρῶν καὶ τὰ ἔγχων ἐρωμενέστεραι γίγνεσθαι).

πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν, in tacit opposition to πρὸς τὴν γυνῶν: cp. i. i. 1258 b 9 sq.

23. οἶον is here explanatory (see above on 1255 b 38).

οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'while others even carry this requirement further, for instance to the extent of two, three, or more ancestors.' Cp. c. 13. 1283 a 33, οἱ δ’ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων πολίται γὰρ μᾶλλον οἱ γενεαότεροι τῶν ἁγενείων. Liddell and Scott compare Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 4. 47, ὅσ οὖδ’ οἷς τρίτον πάππον ἀναγεννεῖν ἔχει τὸ γένος: cp. also Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 4 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 229), ἀριθμοῦσιν τοὺς πᾶππους δόσι. It was usually in connexion with sacred offices that a pedigree of this kind was required (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 321. 1: cp. Dittenberger, Syll.Inscr. Gr., No. 371), but civil offices were sometimes subject to a similar restriction—thus the Thesmothetae at Athens (Aristot. Fragm. 374. 1540 a 39 sqq.) and the τιμοῦχοι at Massalia (a senate of 600 life-members which ruled the State, Strabo, p. 179) were required to be διὰ τριγυνίας ἐκ πολιτῶν γεγονότες—and we learn from the passage before us that some even denied the name of citizen to those who had not these advantages of descent. A still narrower
view prevailed at one time at Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf, and at Thera, where the only persons regarded as ἀλεύθεροι were the descendants of the original settlers (6 (4). 1290 b 9 sqq.). Dio Chrysostom, on the other hand, sensibly remarks (Or. 41, 2. 181 R), τὸ γὰρ ἀπωτέρω δύοις βαθμοῖς (‘further back than one’s grandfather,’ Liddell and Scott) ἥστιν τὸ γένος οὐδαμῶς ἐπιμεῖκες οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτω τὸ γε ἄλλης εἴς οὐδεμίας εὑρίσκεται πόλεως. In a similar spirit a slave of three generations (τρίθουλος, Soph. O. T. 1062 sq., cp. ἐπτάδουλος) was thought to be especially a slave. We read of ὁ ἐκ το[γα]νωρίαν [ὁν] μυροπόλης in Hyperid. c. Athenogen. col. 9. 3.

25. Πολιτικῶς. Cp. Poet. 6. 1450 b 7 and Polyb. 5. 33. 5, οὐδ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον οἱ τὰ κατὰ καιροὺς ἐν ταῖς χρονογραφίαις ὑπομηματιζόμενοι πολιτικῶς εἰς τοὺς τοίχους, where Schweighäuser explains ‘populari, vulgari, simplici ratione, nude, sine arte,’ and [Xen.] Ages. 8. 7, ἀκούσατο δὲ ὃς ἐπὶ πολιτικοῦ κανόνθρου κατήθη εἰς Ὄμικλας ἥ θυγάτηρ αὐτοῦ. ‘Compare also the πολιτικὰ ὀνόματα of Isocr. Evag. § 10’ (Richards).


ἀπορούσι τινὸς τῶν τρίτων ἐκείνων ἢ τέταρτων, ‘some raise a question as to that third or fourth ancestor.’ The ‘third ancestor’ is apparently the great-grandfather. For this ‘anticipatory accusative,’ see Dr. Holden on Xen. Oecon. 18. 9, and other passages. Antisthenes may have been one of these τινες, for we know that his extraction was made a subject of reproach to him, and a rejoinder of this kind would be quite in his vein (compare his rejoinder in Diog. Laert. 6. 4). It is interesting to note that he was a disciple of Gorgias, of whose views we hear in 26 sqq.

26. Γοργίας μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. ‘Gorgias of Leontini, indeed, partly perhaps in a questioning way’ (cp. ἀπορούσι, 25), ‘partly in a spirit of banter, said that as those are mortars which have been made by mortar-makers, so those are Larissaeans who have been made by the handicraftsmen, for that there were certain Larissa-making handicraftsmen; but [there is nothing to raise any question about;] the matter is simple,’ etc. Τῶν δημοιοργῶν must be translated ‘the handicraftsmen’ and δημοιοργοῦσ must be supplied after ἄριστοποιοῦς, and then the added explanation, εἶτα γὰρ τινὰς ἄριστοποιοῦς, which Ridgeway and Sus. would omit, is not otiose. The ‘Larissa-making handicraftsmen’ referred to are of course the magistrates (δημοιοργοί) of Larissa, the word δημοιοργός meaning both ‘handi-
craftsman' and 'magistrate.' We expect Λαρισσαίων in place of Λαρίσσαίων, and Camerarius reads Λαρίσσαίων, but since a city = its citizens, 'Larissa-makers' = 'makers of Larissaeans,' and Λαρισσαίων, which (or rather Λαρισσαίων) is the reading of \( \text{Γ II Vat. Pal.} \), may be used in preference to Λαρισσαίων, partly because it is nearer in form to ὅλμοσιον, and partly to convey a hint that the making of Larissaeans had been on so large a scale that it virtually amounted to a making of Larissa. Gorgias said that every one was a citizen who was made a citizen by the duly empowered magistrates, and thus went to the length of acknowledging all those as citizens who were made citizens by the authorities of the State, whatever the rights conferred on them; Aristotle, on the contrary, looks not merely to the persons who confer citizenship, but also to the rights conferred; if these are the rights which constitute citizenship, the persons made citizens are citizens, but not otherwise. He probably objects to Gorgias' view because according to it ποιητοὶ πολίται would be citizens. But Gorgias' view was in his opinion so far correct that it did not base citizenship on extraction, but traced it to the action of the State. It was quite in the spirit of Gorgias' philosophical teaching to make out that citizens and the State were manufactured, artificial products. He himself was a ξίνος at Larissa, and was no doubt not sorry to banter the Larissaean nobles on their pride of birth (compare Matt. iii. 9, 'And think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father, for I say unto you that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham'). We have seen that the word δημοσιογίδος meant 'handicraftsman' as well as 'magistrate.' A line of Leonidas of Tarentum (Anth. Pal. 6. 305),

\[ \text{έρις Λαρισσαίως κυτταρότορας ἐψητήρας}, \]

lends some colour to the view that a further ἐμφύσει lurks in the saying of Gorgias, and that Λαρισσαίως may well have borne two meanings in the minds of his hearers, 'Larissaeans' and 'pots,' but as the late Dr. Thompson has pointed out (see Prof. Ridgeway, *Camb. Philol. Trans.* 2. 136), it is not clear that Λαρισσαίως without a substantive could mean 'pot,' for it is linked with ἐψητήρ in the epigram, and indeed, if it could, we should expect Λαρισσαίων in the clause which follows: Λαρισσαίων, however, as has been said, is the reading of all the MSS. and of Vet. Int. The saying loses little or nothing, if this additional subtlety is withdrawn from
it. Larissa was oligarchically governed, but it is perhaps hardly likely that even there the demiurgi of the State had the uncontrolled right of admitting citizens; more probably they acted under a commission empowering them to admit to citizenship persons who fulfilled certain conditions prescribed by the State. See Szanto, Das griech. Bürgerrecht, p. 30 sq. Prof. Ridgeway (Journal of Philology, 15. p. 164) makes the not improbable suggestion that the addition to the citizen-roll of Larissa to which Gorgias’ saying was necessitated by the blow which the city received in B.C. 404 from Lycophron of Phereas (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 4). It would seem from 35 that it was not preceded by any change of constitution. Gorgias was well known for his irony (Rhet. 3. 7. 1408 b 19, ἥ δὴ ὅπως δέι ἢ μετ’ εἰρωνείας, ὡσπερ Γοργίας ἔτοει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ). We see from Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 31 that εἰρωνεία implies slight contempt. Whether Meineke, Fragm. Comicorum Anonymorum, 183 (Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 649),

τῶν πολιτῶν ἀνδρῶν ὑμῶν δημουργοὺς ἀποφιμάω,

has anything to do with Gorgias’ saying, is more than I will undertake to decide.

32. καὶ γὰρ οὖδὲ δυνάτων κ.τ.λ., ‘for it is not even possible [much less the fact] that the test of descent from a citizen-father or mother should apply in the case of those who were the first to dwell in the city or to found it,’ and yet these would be citizens in an especial degree: compare 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 12 sq. and an inscription quoted by Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 167. 3, in which a Halicarnassian named Nireus is honoured διά τε τὴν ἀπὸ [τ]ῶν κτιστῶν καὶ τυρα[ν]ων τῆς πόλεως καθ’ έκα[θ]’ έρους τούς [γ]’ οιείς αὐτού εὐγενείαν: also Diod. 14. 98. 1, Εὐαγγέρος ὁ Σαλαμίνος, δε ἢν μὲν εὐγενεῖστατος, τῶν γὰρ κτισάντων τὴν πόλιν ἢν ἀπόγονος. Susemihl translates ‘auf die ersten Ansiedler und Staatsgründer,’ but ἥ appears to distinguish between being the first to dwell in a city and being the first to found it. In 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 38, the only other passage in Aristotle’s writings (except a fragment) to which the Index Aristotelicus gives a reference for the word κτίσεως, κτίσταις is used of kings who founded cities, and I am inclined to think (with Sepulv. Vict. Lamb. and Giph.) that it is used in a similar way in the passage before us of the κτίσται of cities, who, while they would no doubt be themselves among οἱ πρῶτοι οἰκόποι, would be marked off from them by being their chiefs and leaders. Κτισεως is especially used of these κτίσται or οἰκωται, or else of the mother-
city, though it is occasionally used of the whole body of original settlers, as for instance in Thuc. 5. 16. 3. For ὀὐδὲ δυνατῶν, cp. c. 15. 1286 b 21, ὀὐδὲ ῥᾴδιων, and c. 16. 1287 a 10, ὀὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν. I follow Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) in taking ἐφαρμόστεν here as intransitive, as in 1275 a 33, but it is quite possible that Sus., Liddell and Scott, and others are right in taking it as transitive.

34. ἄλλα ἕσως κ.τ.λ., ‘but perhaps this case lends itself more to debate, the case of those who acquired the rights of citizens after a change of constitution, such a creation of citizens, I mean, as that which Cleisthenes enacted at Athens, for he enrolled in the tribes many aliens and slave metoeci.’ The question whether citizens who acquired citizenship after a change of constitution are citizens is a more difficult one than that just discussed, because the new citizens in this case are not made citizens by duly empowered magistrates of the old constitution, but by the introducer of the new one; besides, the citizens admitted by Cleisthenes were aliens and slave metoeci, and aliens and metoeci are the very opposite of citizens (c. 5. 1277 b 39). Euripides had made one of the characters of his Erechtheus say (Fragm. 362. 11 sqq.),

οὐδεὶς δ᾽ ἄν᾽ ἄλλης πόλεως οἰκίζει πόλιν,
ἀρμὸς πονηρὸς ὁσπερ ἐν ἐξίλῳ παγείς,
λόγῳ πολίτης ἐστί, τῶν δ᾽ ἐργασιῶν οὖ.

As to ἐκένω see critical note. For ἔχει ἀπορίαν, cp. Phys. 8. 2. 253 a 7, μάλιστα δ᾽ ἄν δοξεῖ τὸ τρίτον ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, and 1. 3. 186 a 8, μάλλον δ᾽ ὁ Μελισσοῦ (λόγος) φορτικός καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν, ἄλλ᾽ ἐνὸς ἄτοπον 

dοθέντος πάλαι συμβαίνει τούτῳ δ᾽ οὐδὲν χαλεπών: also Pol. 3. 11. 1281 a 41 and 3. 12. 1282 b 22. For ὅν Ὁθήσατο ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 16, ὅν καὶ Σώλων ἐνομοθετήσει, and for ἐποίησε, ἐνacted,’ 2. 12. 1274 b 7. Ὅνο κ.τ.λ. explains μετέχων. A suggestion, however, which well deserves notice, that ὅν should be added after ὅν, has been recorded in the critical note on 1275 b 35. For the plural in τὴν τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολη, cp. Diod. 11. 55, μετὰ τὴν κατάλυσιν τῶν τυράννων τῶν περὶ Πεισίστρατον, Thuc. 8. 68, ἐπειδὴ οἱ τύραννοι κατελύθησαν, Polyb. 3. 22. 1, μετὰ τὴν τῶν βασιλέων κατάλυσιν, and the words μετὰ τὴν κατάλυσιν τῶν ἐν Ἀγίμπτῳ βασιλέων (referring to the dethronement of the Ptolemies) in an inscription found at Philae and published in the Athenaeum for March 14, 1896. The displacement of the dynasty is expressed by the plural, as in ‘pulsis regibus,’ Tac. Hist. 3. 72. This is the sense which

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the plural seems to bear in the passage before us, though οἱ τῶν αἰτών is often loosely used where an act of only one of the tyrants is referred to (e.g. in Ἄθ. Πολ. c. 19. 1. 13 and c. 20. 1. 2, and in Demosth. c. Μίδ. c. 144). Ἐφυλέτευσε is stronger than πολίται ἐποίησατο would have been. As to δούλους μετοίκους see vol. i. p. 231 note. Cp. also [Plato,] Alcib. i. 119 Α, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ἐξών δούλου ἢ ἐλεύθερον εἶπε, ὅστις αὐτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνοικίαν συνότερος γεγονεῖ, where it is implied that the ἐξων include slaves, and Hecataeus, Fragm. 318 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 24). Bernays (Heraklit. Briefe, p. 155) takes ἐξων and δούλους as both of them adjectives and μετοίκους as the substantive common to them, referring to Aristoph. Eq. 347 Didot, ἐὰν ποὺ δικίδιον εἶπας εὖ κατὰ ἐξών μετοίκου, which shows that the term ἐξων μέτοικος was a recognized one, but on the other hand ἐξου and μέτοικοι are often distinguished (e.g. in c. 5. 1277 b 39), and perhaps it is hardly likely that Cleisthenes confined himself to enfranchising resident aliens. His object was to strengthen his own party among the citizens, the democratic party, and this was most effectually done by enrolling aliens and slave metoeci, for they were sure to side with him against the γνώριμοι. At any rate they would not hold with the συνῆθεσι at which he sought to strike a blow (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 26). Towards the close of the Peloponnesian War Athens enrolled not only metoeci but aliens also as citizens (Diod. 13. 97. 1). Not all aliens were absolute aliens; some were sons of a citizen-father by a mother not of citizen-birth, like the ἐξων mentioned in c. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq. Those aliens and metoeci who had a touch of servile blood in their veins would be most unwelcome as citizens, for we learn in c. 5. 1278 a 33 that citizens of servile origin were the first to be extruded when the State could afford to get rid of them. How hateful the measure of Cleisthenes must have been to many, we see from Lycurg. c. Λεοκ. c. 41, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ δεινῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν γυνομένων καὶ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ μέγιστα ἡτυχίσκων, μᾶλις ἃν τε θλήσει καὶ ἐδάκρυσαν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῆς πόλεως συμφοραῖς ἡμῖν ὁπλικῶν ὡς ὡς ὑπὸ τὸν ἰδίνυν ψυφίσαμεν τῶν μὲν δούλων ἐλευθέρους, τῶν δὲ ἐξων Ἀθηναίους, τῶν δ' ἀτίμους ἐντίμους' ὁ πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτόχθων εἶναι καὶ ἐλευθέροις ἐγεμφύσετο. The 'happy city' of Lucian's Hermodimus, in which all are ἐπίθυμοι καὶ ἐξων, αὐθεντεύῃ δὲ οὐδὲ εἰς (c. 24), is in designed contrast to the generally accepted ideal. The making of slaves and aliens citizens was a measure often resorted to by tyrants (see
vol. i. p. 547, note 2: Diod. ii. 72. 3, 14. 7. 4) and by extreme democrats (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 48).

37. τὸ δ' ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους. Cp. c. 16. 1287 b 35.

1. ἀρ' εἰ μὴ δικαιῶς πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, 'whether, if a man is not 1276 a. justly a citizen, he is not in fact no citizen at all.' This Aristotle will not admit: compare the line he takes in Eth. Nic. 3. 6. 1113 a 17 sqq. Cicero, on the contrary, in De Legibus 2. 5. 11-2. 6. 14 denies that faulty laws are laws at all.

ἄς ταῦτα δυναμένου τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ Ψευδόδρου. For the use of τε in sentences of this kind cp. c. 4. 1277 a 20 sq. and 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 1. Cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19, ἵνα τε δειομένη σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν.

4. ἀρχὴ τινὶ, i.e. ἀρχὴ βουλευτικὴ ἢ κριτικὴ (c. 1. 1275 b 18).

7. τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφισβήτησιν, in c. 1. 1274 b 34 sq. C. 3.

The question whether these citizens are justly citizens or not is connected with the question whether they were made citizens by the State or not, a question which some identify with the question whether the constitution under which they have become citizens is based merely on force or exists for the common advantage, and if we deny that the acts of a tyrant or an oligarchy are acts of the State on the ground that the tyranny or oligarchy is based merely on force and does not exist for the common good, we must say the same thing of the acts of any democracy which is in the same position, so that we shall deny that those who are created citizens by a democracy of this kind are justly citizens. Aristotle appears to hint that the democracy introduced by Cleisthenes was a democracy resting on force and not for the common good, and that on the principle laid down by the persons to whom he refers the aliens whom Cleisthenes made citizens were not justly citizens, but he does not adopt the view that the acts of a constitution not for the common good are not acts of the State.

10. τότε γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for then some are not willing to discharge (public) contracts on the plea that the tyrant, not the State, received the loan, or many other obligations of a similar kind, holding that some constitutions are based on superior force and are not for the common advantage, [and that the acts done by the authorities they constitute are consequently not acts of the State].' These persons probably regarded democracies as in an especial degree constitutions for the common advantage: compare Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 76, where it is argued that democracies, unlike
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oligarchies, are governed by laws conceived in the interest of the citizens. Our own use of the words ‘republic’ and ‘commonwealth’ indicates the prevalence of a cognate view (see Sir J. R. Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 173). For an instance in which a public contract ran a risk of being thus repudiated, see vol. i. p. 231 sq. Ὑπ’ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων perhaps refers to the quashing of acts and judicial decisions; this happened after the fall of the Thirty at Athens (Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 39: Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 56: Andoc. De Myst. c. 87). Questions of a similar nature have found their way into modern English law-courts. ‘Given a revolutionary government which has been recognized by foreign States as a government de facto, but which has since been superseded by a more legitimate régime, are its acts and contracts to be held valid or not by the courts of those foreign States, as far as concerns the subjects over which they have jurisdiction?’ This was the issue which Mr. Justice Kay had to decide yesterday in the case of “The Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus” (Times, Feb. 21, 1888, where a report of the case will be found). This case, it will be noticed, applies only to revolutionary governments recognized by foreign States.

12. τῷ κρατεῖν οὖσας. Cp. De Gen. An. i. 18. 723 a 31, εἰ τοῦτο θήσουμεν οὕτως ὦτε οὐ τῷ ἀπελθεῖν ἀπὸ τινος τὸ βῆλυ, and such expressions as φύσει εἶναι or τάς βία πράξεις (Plato, Polit. 280 D).


ὁμοίως κ.τ.λ., ‘we must say that the acts of the authorities set up by this constitution are to just the same extent and no more acts of this State as those proceeding from the oligarchy and the tyranny.’ For ὁμοίως καὶ cp. 2. 8. 1269 a 6, ὁμοίως εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντες καὶ τοὺς ἁναφότους (‘no better than’). Τῆς πόλεως ταύτης, i.e. the State of the times referred to: cp. c.i.i. 1281 b 29, ὅταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ἐπάρχοσι, πολεμιών ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην, and 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 40. For τὰς ἐκ τῆς διλεγαρχίας (πράξεις) see Liddell and Scott s.v. ἐκ iii. 3, and see note on 1302 a 4. Cp. also 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 6, τὰς ἀμαρτίας τὰς παρ’ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν, and Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 76, την ἐκ τῆς διλεγαρχίας ἀδικίαν.
17. ἐὰν οἷκειος δ' ὁ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς ποτὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but the inquiry [to which we have just referred] seems to be cognate to this question, on what principle we ought to say that,' etc. With Sepulveda, Bernays, and Welldon I take πῶς ποτὲ κ.τ.λ. to explain τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, and not ὁ λόγος, as Sus. Looking to τῆς ἀπορίας, 19, this seems to be the more natural interpretation, though it is true that τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης might refer to ἀποροίωσι, 8. Aristotle means that the question whether the contracts of those who are in power under a constitution resting on force and not for the common advantage are acts of the State and should be fulfilled by those who are in power after a change of constitution is cognate to the question under what circumstances the State is to be regarded as the same or not the same. He decides (1276 b 10 sqq.) that after any change of constitution the State is not the same, but that the question as to the fulfilment of contracts is a separate one. As to πῶς ποτὲ, see Liddell and Scott, who refer to Soph. O. T. 1210.

19 sqq. 'The mode of dealing with this problem which lies nearest to hand is in connexion with the site and its inhabitants, for the site and the inhabitants may be divided into two or more sections, and some of the inhabitants may dwell on one site, and some on another.' Μὲν οὖν is taken up by μὲν οὖν, 22, but it is difficult to say where the answering particle is to be found. For ἐπιστάσεως, cp. Rhet. 3. 10. 1410 b 21, διὰ οὗτο τὰ ἐπιστάσεις τῶν ἐνθυμήματος εὐδοκιμεῖ (ἐπιστάσεις γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα καὶ αὶ μηδὲν δεὶ ζητῆσαι) κ.τ.λ. The words ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διαεξευθέντι τῶν τόπων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων have been interpreted in two ways. Vict. explains them, 'contingit enim ut locus distinctus sit, hominesque eodem pacto separati, ita ut hi hance, alií vero aliam sedem habeant.' Mr. Welldon, on the other hand, translates, 'it is possible that the inhabitants should be divorced from the site and should come to dwell in different sites.' Perhaps the former interpretation is to be preferred. As an instance of some inhabitants dwelling on one site and others on another, we may take the διοικείς of Mantinea by the Lacedaemonians (Paus. 8. 8. 9, ὡς δὲ εἶδε τὴν Μαντίνειαν ('Ἀγραπόλεις), ὄλγον μὲν τι κατέληπεν οἰκεῖον, τὸ πλείστον δὲ εἰς ἔθαφος καταβαλὼν αὐτῆς κατὰ κόμας τῶν ἀνθρώπων διώκει). The question then is—will a change of this kind have destroyed the identity of the πόλις? Aristotle's somewhat curt answer is that the word πόλις is used in many different senses, and that it is easy to solve the question if
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that is borne in mind. His meaning perhaps is that if we take πόλις in the sense of 'an aggregate of human beings or citizens,' the Mantinians after the διοίκησις will still constitute the same State as before, but if we take it in the sense of 'an aggregate of human beings or citizens gathered on a given site,' they will no longer do so.

24. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and similarly [one might raise the question] in the case also in which the inhabitants occupy one and the same site, when we ought to consider the πόλις to be one.' Are we to say that it is one, however large the site may be and however varied in race the inhabitants, provided only that it is enclosed within one and the same wall?

26. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς τείχεσιν, 'for surely it is not one πόλις in virtue of its walls.' For γὰρ δὴ, cp. c. 9. 1280 b 24 and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 32.

27. εἶτα γὰρ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβάλειν ἐν τείχοις. Aristotle probably remembers a famous taunt of the Athenians addressed to the Lacedaemonians, which is recorded in the Funeral Oration ascribed to Lysias, c. 44, ὅστερον δὲ Πελοποννήσιον διατείχεσθων τῶν ἵστημών . . . ὀρεισθεῖτε Ἀθηναῖοι συνεβολευμένοι αὐτοῖς, εἶ ταύτην τὴν γνώμην ἐξουσίαν, περὶ ἀπασαν τὴν Πελοπόννησον τείχος περιβάλειν. A line in the Temenidae of Euripides (Fragm. 730) ran,

ἀπασα Πελοπόννησος εὐτυχεὶ πόλις.

Polybius (2. 37. 9 sqq.) implies that in his day Peloponnesus was virtually one city, having the same magistrates, etc., the only want being a common wall.

τοιαύτη, 'like Peloponnesus with a wall round it.' Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 3 sqq.

28. καὶ Βαβυλῶν . . . 30. πόλεως. As to Babylon, see note on 1326 b 3. The walls of Babylon according to Herodotus (1. 178) were 480 stadia in circumference, according to Ctesias (Diod. 2. 7) 360 stadia, and according to Cleitarchus (Diod. ibid.) 365 stadia. A still larger circuit of wall (1500 stadia) was to be found after Aristotle's time at Antiochia Margiana (the modern Merv), if we could trust Strabo (p. 516). Herodotus (1. 191) says that owing to the size of Babylon, when the outer part of it had been taken, the inhabitants of the centre were unaware of the fact and continued to celebrate a festival till they learnt it; he does not mention that the interval amounted to three days. Here, as in 2. 3. 1262 a 18 sqq., 3. 13. 1284 a 26 sqq., and 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 17 sqq. (see notes on these passages), Aristotle mentions a circumstance also mentioned
by Herodotus, but mentions it with a slight variation. He may possibly quote Herodotus from memory. Megalopolis was taken by Cleomenes ‘before the Megalopolitans were aware of the fact’ (Plut. Cleom. c. 23), but then Megalopolis was ‘a great desert’ (Polyb. 2. 55. 2: 5. 93. 5). For the omission of πόλις after πᾶσα see note on 1266 b 1; its omission is facilitated by the occurrence of the word πόλεως in the next line. For the interposition of καὶ πᾶσα ... πόλεως between ἵς and its antecedent βαβυλών, cp. Phys. 8. 6. 259 a 3, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔστι τί δ’ περιέχει, καὶ τούτῳ παρ’ ἐκαστον, ὁ ἐστιν αἰτίων κ.τ.λ., where καὶ τούτῳ παρ’ ἐκαστον is interposed. Τινὸς μὲν τοί πολίτων is interposed in a somewhat similar way in Pol. 3. 4. 1277 a 22 sqq., and καὶ κεκαλλωπισμέναι in Aristoph. Lysistr. 43 Didot,

aὶ καθήμεθ’ ἐξανθασμέναι,

κροκώτα φοροῦσαι καὶ κεκαλλωπισμέναι
καὶ Κιμβερίκ’ ὄρθωστιάδια καὶ περιβαρίδας.

31. εἰς ἀλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος, cp. 7 (5). ΙΙ. 1314 a 4, καὶ χρήσιμοι οἴ πονηροὶ εἰς τὰ πονηρά.

32. περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους ... 34. πολιτικῶν. Supply συμφέρει after τό τε πόσων. The question πότερον ἔθνος ἐν ἡ πλεῖω συμφέρει is probably suggested by the mention of Peloponnesus, of which Herodotus says (8. 73), οἰκεῖοι δὲ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἔθνεα ἑπτά. As to this question see vol. i. p. 295, note 1, where it has been pointed out that it is not dealt with in 4 (7). 4, though the proper size of the πόλις is discussed there. The πόλις consists ἐκ πλείων καμιῶν (1. 2. 1252 b 27), and a question might naturally be raised whether it should not also consist of more ἑθνη than one. The colony of Thurii had been recruited from a variety of sources (Diod. 12. 10. 4: 12. ΙΙ. 3), and Plato had seen advantages in a citizen-body derived from more quarters than one (Laws 708).

34. ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. With the discussion of the question of the identity of the πόλις which commences here should be compared the remarks of Plutarch on the same subject in De Sera Numinis Vindicata, c. 15: Plutarch, however, does not seem to have had this passage of the Politics before him. The question of identity had long been raised in reference to the individual. The speculations of Heraclitus and his doctrine of the flux of all things had drawn attention to this question, and Epicharmus had made a character in one of his comedies point to the increase and decrease in size which takes place in human beings and ask how this increase and
decrease was compatible with personal identity, and how a man whose identity had changed could be called on to pay his debts. See Diog. Laert. 3. 10–11, and Bernays’ essay on ‘Epicharmos und der αἰξανόμενος λόγος’ in his Gesammelte Abhandlungen i. 109–117, and Zeller, Gr. Ph. i. 461.1. Compare also the remarks of Diotima in Plato, Symp. 207 D. Aristotle is concerned in the passage before us not with the question of the identity of the individual, but with the question of the identity of the πόλις. In dealing with this question as with others, he steers a midway course. He agrees neither with Isocrates, who held that States are immortal (De Pace § 120), nor with those who held that change in the individuals composing them destroyed their identity; their identity is according to him destructible, but it is destroyed by a change of constitution, not by a change of individuals.

37. ὀστερ καὶ ποταμοῦς κ.τ.λ. Heraclitus had denied that they were the same (Fragm. 41 Bywater, ποταμοῖς δὶς τούς αὐτοῖς ὅθ' ἔν ἐμβαίνῃ· ἐτέρα γὰρ (καί ἐτέρα) ἐπιρρέει ὕδατα, and Fragm. 81, ποταμοῖς τούς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαίνομεν τε καὶ ὅκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἰμέν τε καὶ ὅκ εἰμέν). But Aristotle holds that the constant change of the watery particles of which a river is composed does not prevent its remaining the same. A river, however, is different from a πόλις. It is not an ὅλον or a σύνθεσις, like a πόλις or an ἀρμονία or a χορός, the identity of which depends on the arrangement of the parts (Metaph. Δ. 26. 1024 a 6, ὕδωρ δὲ καὶ ὤσα ὕγρα καὶ ἀριθμός πᾶν μὲν λέγεται, ὅλος δ' ἀριθμός καὶ ὅλον ὕδωρ ὃν λέγεται, ἀν μὴ μεταφορᾷ). A river will remain the same so long as its particles consist of water, but a πόλις will not remain the same, so long as it consists of men of the same stock, if meanwhile a change should occur in its σύνθεσις or πολιτεία.

40. διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, i.e. διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ γένος ταύτῳ τῶν κατοικούντων.

τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐτέραν, ‘but the State different [if there is a change of polity]’ (Mr. Welldon, following Bernays).

1276 b. 2. κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, ‘a sharing of citizens in a constitution.’ Bekker places a comma after πολιτῶν, but I follow Susemihl’s punctuation: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 36, κοινοιοῦντων ἀπάντων μᾶλλον τῆς πολιτείας ὁμοίως. In c. 4. 1276 b 29 the πολιτεία, not the πόλις, is said to be a κοινωνία (see note on 1276 b 28).

γενομένης ἐτέρας τῷ εἴδει καὶ διαφεροῦσης. We may have here a mere tautology, like those collected by Vahlen in his note on
Poet. i. 1447 a 17, but perhaps it is more likely that διαφερονσης
refers to changes less complete than a change of kind.

3. ἀραγκαίοιν εἶναι δόξειν ἐν κ.τ.λ. The πολιτεία represents the
εἴδος τῆς συνθέσεως (7) in the case of the πόλις and thus constitutes its
identity: compare the passages from the Topics which Bonitz (Ind. 729 a 51 sq.) groups with the passage before us—Top. 6. 13. 150 b 22, ἐτί εἰ μὴ εἰρήκε τῶν τρόπων τῆς συνθέσεως; οὐ γὰρ ἀνταρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ
γνωρίσαν τὸ εἰπτεῖν ἐκ τούτων; οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ἀλλὰ τὸ οὕτως ἐκ
toúτων ἐκάστου τῶν συνθέτων ἡ οὐσία, καθάπερ ἐπὶ οἰκίας; οὐ γὰρ ἄν
ὄπωσον συντεθῇ ταῦτα, οἰκία εἰστίν, and 6. 14. 151 a 23, οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη
tὸ σύνθεσιν εἰπτεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιὰ τες προσθυρωσίων; οὐ γὰρ ὁπωσοὶς
συντεθέντων τούτων σάρξ γίνεται, ἀλλ’ οὕτωσι μὲν συντεθέντων σάρξ,
οὕτωσι δ’ ὁσώσι. For the notion that a change of laws might
Vind. c. 15 the identity of the πόλις remains μέχρις ἃν ἡ ποιοῦσα καὶ
συνθέσωσα ταῖς ἐπίπλοκαις καινωμίᾳ τὴν ἐνότητα διαφυλάττῃ.

4. ὁσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν κ.τ.λ., ‘as we say that a chorus also
appearing at one time as a comic, and at another as a tragic,
chorus is not the same.’ The tragic chorus consisted of three
files (στοίχαι) of five men each and of five ranks (ζυγά) of three
men each; the comic chorus of four files of six men each and of
six ranks of four men each’ (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. 2. 205,
A. Müller, Die gr. Bühnenalt., where Pollux 4. 108–9 is referred to).
Thus the εἴδος τῆς συνθέσεως was different in the case of a tragic
and comic chorus. The numbers of the two kinds of chorus were
also different, and, as Mr. Richards points out, it is remarkable that
Aristotle takes no notice of this. He implies that in a Dorian and
a Phrygian ‘harmony’ the sounds may be the same, but that even
then the εἴδος τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν φθόγγων will be different. It is not
quite clear what this means. Does it mean that the sounds will be
arranged in a different order? It is still less easy to say how
a political constitution is an εἴδος τῆς συνθέσεως of the elements of
the πόλις. Does Aristotle mean that in each constitution the
 citizens of a πόλις are arranged in a different way—that in an
aristocracy the best men are at the head and in an oligarchy or
democracy the rich or the poor? Perhaps so: compare 6 (4). 4.
1290 b 25 sqq. and 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 17, in the latter of which passages
he appears to imply that a constitution is a διάθεσις πόλεως.
5. τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὀντῶν. We expect rather τῶν ἀνθρώπων than ἀνθρώπων, but cp. i. 1. 1252 a 7, ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οὖν οὖν πολιτικοὶ καὶ βασιλικοὶ καὶ οἰκονομικοὶ καὶ δημοτικοὶ εἶναι τῶν αὐτῶν: i. 2. 1252 b 9, ὧς ταῦτα φύσει βαρβαροῦ καὶ δουλοῦ ὡν: i. 8. 1256 a 10, ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὖν οὖν οὖν οὖν ἢ αὐτὴ οἰκονομικὴ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ. Yet in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 20 we have καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ αὐτάλογοι.

6. πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν. Σύνθεσις is the wider term. For πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, cp. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 8, πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν.

7. ἐν εἴδος ἐτεροῦ ἡ τῆς συνθέσεως. Not τὸ εἶδος, for with ἐτεροῦ, as with ὁ αὐτός (see above on 5), the subject of the sentence often is without the article: cp. c. 4. 1277 b 13, 17, 24, 30 sq., and c. 6. 1278 b 13 sq.

9. λέγομεν. See below on 1277 a 37.

10. For λεκτίον ... βλέποντας, see note on 1275 a 16.

11. ὀνομα δὲ καλεῖν κ.τ.λ. According to Thuc. 6. 4. 5 (see however Freeman, Sicily 2. 115 and 486 sqq.), Zancle received the name Messana from Anaxilas of Rhegium when he expelled the Samians and peopled the city afresh. On the other hand, Catana retained its name, when Dionysius the Elder replaced its citizens by Campanians (Diod. 14. 15), and so did the Trachinian Heracleia, though its inhabitants were changed by the Thebans in b. c. 395 (Diod. 14. 82. 6, 7). The name of Corinth was replaced by that of Argos in b. c. 393 during the supremacy of a faction, though the inhabitants were unchanged (Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 6, ὀρὼντες δὲ τοὺς τυραννεύοντας, ἀνθρακοῦντες δὲ ἀρχαῖομένου τῆν πόλιν διὰ τὸ καὶ ὅρον ἀνεπάσαυ καὶ Ἄργος αὐτὶ Κορίνθου τὴν πατρίδα αὐτῶν ὀνομάζεσθαι).
as in correction of the teaching of Socrates that the Fourth Chapter is written. Socrates had taught the unity of virtue, claiming that virtue is one and the same in all who possess it. Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that virtue varies with the work a person has to do, and that, as a citizen's work is relative to the constitution, his virtue varies with the constitution. To identify the virtue of the good citizen with that of the good man is therefore to ignore the difference between one constitution and another. It is also to ignore the difference between the ruling and ruled citizen in the best of constitutions. See vol. i. p. 234 sqq. as to the contents of the Fourth Chapter. Looking to the definition of a citizen which Aristotle has already given, we might expect him to say that the virtue of a citizen consists in the ability to deliberate and judge well, i.e. to rule well. But we learn in the Fourth Chapter that the work of a citizen consists not only in ruling but also in being ruled, and therefore that his virtue consists in knowing not only how to rule but also how to be ruled, with this limitation, however, that the only kind of rule which he needs to know is that which is exercised over freemen. To learn this he must be ruled first and rule afterwards—a principle which is not forgotten when Aristotle comes to construct his 'best State' (4 (7). 14.1333 a 11 sqq.). One remarkable conclusion, it should be noted, results from the Fourth Chapter. This is that the good man cannot be a good citizen (in the sense of contributing to the preservation of the constitution) in any constitution but the best without ceasing to be a good man in the strict sense of the words. The justice of Socrates, for instance, is not the imperfect kind of justice which tends to the preservation of a democracy (7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36 sqq.). But is Aristotle's account of good citizenship correct? Is not he a good citizen whose influence tends to the improvement of a constitution rather than he whose influence tends to its preservation? May not a man be all the better as a citizen because he is morally and intellectually somewhat in advance of the constitution under which he lives? Is a good citizen bound to do what contributes to the preservation of that constitution, even if it is a tyranny or an extreme democracy or oligarchy? See note on 1337 a 27.

18. ἀλλὰ μὴν...γε, 'but certainly': see above on 1271 a 20.
19. For τύπῳ τυνί, 'in some sort of outline,' cp. Plato, Phileb. 61 A, τὸ τοῖνυ ἄγαθον ἢτοι σαφῶς ἢ καὶ τωα τύπων αὐτοῦ λῃστέων, and 32 B,
and Laws 718 C and 802 D sq., and for τύπῳ των ληπτέων, Aristot.
Top. i. 7. 103 a 7, ώς τύπῳ λαβεῖν.
For πρώτοιν in the sense of πρότερον, see below on 1323 a 16.
21. τῶν πλωτήρων is in strictness in the gen. after ἐκάστου, 24.
22. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the relative rank of these personages
cp. Aristoph. Eq. 541 Didot,
καὶ πρὸς τούτους ἔφασκεν
ἐρέτην χρήναι πρώτα γενέσθαι, πρὸν προάλοισ ἐπιχειρεῖν,
καὶ ἐντεῦθεν προφατεύσαι καὶ τοὺς ἀνέμους διαδρῆσαι,
κάτα κυβερνήν αὐτῶν ἐκατότητι,
a passage already referred to by Camerarius (Interp. p. 114). As
to the κυβερνήτης, cp. c. 6. 1279 a 3.
24. δῆλον ὡς κ.τ.λ. Translate, with Bernays (see also Sepulveda’s note on ‘perfectissima cuiusque ratio,’ p. 77 b), ‘it is clear
that the most exact definition of the virtue of each will be special
to the man.’ As to λόγος, ‘definition,’ see Bon. Ind. 434 b 6 sqq.,
where it is pointed out that λόγος is sometimes used in a wider
sense than ὀρισμός, and as to the contrast of ἴδιος and κοινὸς λόγος, see
Bon. Ind. 339 a 55 and vol. i. p. 242 note.
25. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινὸς τίς ἐφαρμόζει πᾶσιν. The phrase recurs
in De An. 2. 3. 414 b 22, γένοιτο δ’ ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος
κοινός, δὲ ἐφαρμόζει μὲν πᾶσιν, ἴδιος δ’ οὐδενὸς ἦσαν σχήματος. ‘Ομοίως
δὲ, ‘but equally.’
νήτης ᾨμα καὶ ναύται τὰς αἰσθήσεις τῷ κυβερνητικῷ νόῳ συγκεκρασάμενοι
σώζοντων αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν μᾶς; and Demosth. Phil. 3. c. 69,
ἔως ἂν σώζηται τὸ σκάφος . . . τότε χρή καὶ ναῦται και κυβερνήτην καὶ
πᾶντ’ ἄνδρα ἔξης προβλέμει ἐναί, καὶ ὅπως μήδ’ ἐκὼν μήδ’ ἄκων μηδεὶς
12. 25. 5.
28. ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἑργὼν ἐστὶ, κοινωνία 5’ ἐστίν ἡ
πολιτεία. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 19 sqq. ‘The safeguarding of the
association’ seems hardly to answer to ‘the safeguarding of the
voyage’; we expect rather ‘the safeguarding of the successful
working of the State’; and though the πολιτικὴ κοινωνία is often, as
here, identified with the πολιτεία (compare for instance 2. 1. 1260 b
27 and 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 35), the πόλις is more usually said to be
the κοινωνία (e.g. in c. 3. 1276 b 1). For the structure of the sen-
tence, in which (with Stahr, Bern., Sus., and others) I take κοινωνία
to be the subject and ἡ πολιτεία the predicate, cp. c. 6. 1278 b 10,
3. 4. 1276 b 21—37.

κύριον μὲν γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὸ πολιτεύμα τῆς πόλεως, πολιτεύμα δὲ ἐστίν ἢ
πολιτεία: c. 7. 1279 a 25 sqq.: and c. 13. 1283 b 41, πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν
tὸ τῶν πολιτῶν: πολιτές δὲ κ.τ.λ. See also note on 1275 a 22.

33. τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα κ.τ.λ. Supply ἀγαθὸν with εἴναι: cp. 35, 
τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ’ ἑν σπουδαῖον ἀνήρ. Compare the line of an unknown 
elegiac poet quoted in Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 b 34,
ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοὶ,
and Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1237 a 30, ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος τέλειος: also Pol. 6 (4).
7. 1293 b 3, τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ
πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄνδρῶν μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρα-
tίαν. Τελεία ἀρετή in the passage before us probably means ἀρετὴ
μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τῶν. It turns out, indeed, on further investigation
(1277 b 18 sqq.), that the virtue of the good man is not strictly one,
but has two forms, the virtue of the ruler and the virtue of the
ruled. As to φαμέων, see below on 1277 a 14.

34. μὲν οὖν is answered by οὐ μὴν ἄλλα, 36, as in 5 (8). 6. 1341 b
4 sqq. (Sus.) Ind. Gramm. s. v. Μέν), and also in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b
1 sqq.

36. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ., 'not but that it is possible in another 
way also to go over the same argument in reference to the best
constitution by raising questions and debating them.' 'In another
way,' because hitherto the best constitution has not been made
the subject of the inquiry. For ἐπελθεῖν τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων, cp. Phys.
8. 5. 256 a 21 (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 267 a 39), ἔτι δὲ καὶ
δὴ τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν λόγων ἐστὶν ἐπελθεῖν. Lamb. translates, 'verun-
tamen etiam alio modo eandem rationem pertractare et persequi
licet de optima reipublicae administrandae forma dubitantibus':
thus he seems to take διαποροῦντας with peri τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας
(as do apparently Stahr and Bernays), but not, I think, rightly.
Διαποροῦντας (here = διερχομένους τὰς ἀπορίας, Bon. Ind. 187 b 11) is
added to indicate to us the mode of investigation which Aristotle
is about to adopt. That Aristotle 'goes over the same argument'
we shall see if we bear in mind that he has just shown that the
good citizen will not necessarily be a good man under any and
every constitution, and now goes on to show that this is true of
the best constitution also. For κατ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον cp. 2. 2. 1261 b
10 and 2. 8. 1269 a 13, and (with Bonitz, Ind. 772 b 19) Meteor.
1. 3. 340 a 15.

37. εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for if it is impossible that a State should
consist of members all of whom are good, and yet each member
must discharge his function well, and this proceeds from virtue, [so that, though all will not be good, all will possess virtue, i.e. the virtue of the citizen.] still, as it is impossible that all the citizens should be alike, there would not be one form of virtue belonging to the good citizen and to the good man; for the virtue of the good citizen ought to belong to all (for it is necessarily only in that way that the State will come to be the best State), but the virtue of the good man cannot possibly belong to all, unless all the citizens in the good State must necessarily be good, [which we have declared to be impossible].’ It is implied that the citizens will not be alike if they all possess the virtue of a citizen, but that they will, if they possess in addition the virtue of a good man. The virtue of the good man is one, whereas the virtue of the good citizen varies with the function discharged. Compare 2. 2. 1261 a 24, όυ γάρ γίνεται πόλις ἐκ δύοιων, a doctrine which may also be traced in 3. 12. 1283 a 18 sq. and 3. 11. 1281 b 34 sqq., and indeed in Fragm. 21 of the Aeolus of Euripides,

\[\text{dókeít' áv oikeín γαιών, ei péntis ápás}
\text{λαός πολιτεύοντο πλουσίων ἄτερ;}
\text{oúk áv γένοιτο χωρίς ἐσθλά καὶ κακά,}
\text{ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τις σύγκρασις, ὡστ' ἤχειν καλῶς,}\]

where Euripides perhaps has before him Heraclitus’ doctrine of the harmony of contraries. But is it Aristotle’s view that the citizens of the ‘best State’ cannot all be good men? This does not seem to be his view in 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq., where we are told that all the citizens of the ‘best State’ will be good men (compare 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 9, where it appears to be implied that there may be States in which all the citizens are good men). Either we must admit a discrepancy between the passage before us and these passages and leave it unexplained, or we may seek to explain it by saying (with Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 209, note 2: see my first volume, p. 236, note 2) that the passage before us is merely aporetic, or by supposing that the word ‘citizen’ is used in the passage before us (as seems sometimes to be the case, see vol. i. Appendix B) in a wider sense than in 4 (7).

13. 1332 a 32 sqq.


1277 a. 5. ἐτι κ.τ.λ. This is a further thrust. In 1276 b 37–1277 a 5 it has been argued that though all the citizens of the best State will
be good citizens, they will not all be good men, but now it is argued that they will not all be good citizens in the same way—one will be a good citizen in the way in which a ruler is a good citizen, and another a good citizen in the way in which a ruled person is a good citizen—and thus the virtue of all the citizens will not be the same, so that if the various forms of the virtue of the citizen are not identical with each other, they cannot all be identical with the virtue of the good man. This argument leads directly up to what follows in 1277 a 12 sqq., and I cannot agree with Susemihl that it ought to be bracketed as an interpolation. I did not see the relation in which 1277 a 5–12 stands to 1276 b 37–1277 a 5 so clearly when I wrote vol. i. p. 236 as I do now. See also Prof. J. A. Stewart’s remarks in defence of the genuineness of 1277 a 5–12 in Class. Rev. 9. 456.

8. κτήσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου. Bernays brackets κτήσις, and I do not feel sure that he is wrong. If we retain the word, Aristotle’s meaning will apparently be that ownership of property consists of master and slave, or in other words implies the existence of an owner and a slave. Surely, however, ownership implies the existence of things owned as well as of persons owned?

9. ἄλλων ἀνομίαν εἶδον, such as ruling and ruled citizens, and soldiers in contrast with deliberators and judges.

11. ὁσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίου καὶ παραστάτου. As the tragic chorus marched into the theatre in its five ranks and three files (see above on 1276 b 4), its left-hand file was turned to the audience and its right-hand file to the stage; the left-hand file was consequently the most conspicuous of the three files. The κορυφαῖος was third in this file, the two παραστάται second and fourth, and the two τριστάται (Metaph. Δ. 11. 1018 b 27) first and fifth. See on this subject C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. 2. 206 sq. (A. Müller, Die gr. Bühnenalt.). For the absence of the article before κορυφαίου see note on 1285 b 12.

12. διότι μὲν τοῖνυν ἀπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ, sc. ἄρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἄνδρος σπουδαίου, for here the question raised in 1276 b 17 receives an answer.

13. ἄλλῳ ἄρα ἐσται τινὸς κ.τ.λ., ‘but will not the virtue of the good citizen and the good man be the same in a particular citizen?’ By τινὸς is evidently meant ἄρχωντος, cp. 20 sqq. For the absence of the article before ἄρετὴ, see note on 1276 b 5.

14. φαμέν δὴ κ.τ.λ., ‘we say that a good ruler (of any kind) is
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good and prudent, and the man who is capable of ruling a State (1278 b 3 sqq.) must necessarily be prudent.' To be ἀγαθὸς is not the same thing as to be φρόνιμος (cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 a 14, ὅ μάλλον ἄν ἐλοιτό ὁ φρόνιμος ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ), though one cannot be φρόνιμος without being ἀγαθὸς (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 a 36), or indeed really ἀγαθὸς without being φρόνιμος (1144 b 16, 31). Cp. c. II. 1281 b 4, ἀρετὴς καὶ φρονήσεως. As to δὴ, see note on 1252 a 24. Φαμέν seems to be used by Aristotle when he recalls some well-known principle of his philosophy (as in 1. 2. 1253 a 9, οὐδὲν γὰρ, ὅσον φαινέν, ματὴν ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ), or repeats what he has already said in the same treatise (as in 3. 18. 1288 a 32) or in another (as in 4. (7). 13. 1332 a 7, φαμέν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἥθελοις), or gives utterance to some generally accepted view. Φαμέν may here possibly refer to i. 13. 1260 a 17, διὸ τῶν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεὶ τὴν ἥθελην ἄρετὴν (i. e. μετὰ φρονήσεως, see note on this passage), where the head of a household is referred to, but the view was a commonly accepted one (Xen. Hipparch. 7. 1, παντὶ μὲν οὖν προσήκει ἄρχοντι φρονίμως εἶναι, where the rule is applied to generals of cavalry: Plato, Rep. 433 C: Isocr. De Anúid. § 71: Xen. Cyrop. i. 6. 22). If every ruler needs to be φρόνιμος, the ruler of a State does so especially; indeed we are told in Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 23 that πολιτικὴ and φρονήσεις are the same habit. Cp. Plut. De Pyth. Orac. c. 22, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν Βάττων ... εἰς Λιβύην ἐπεμψαν οἰκιστὴν, ὥστε τραυλὸς μὲν ἄν καὶ ἀγχύραφος, βασιλικὸς δὲ καὶ πολιτικὸς καὶ φρόνιμος.

16. καὶ τὴν παθεῖαν δ' εὐθὸς κ.τ.λ., 'and indeed the very education of a ruler some make out to be different (from that of a ruled person),' i. e. not only his virtue, but the training by which it is imparted; or possibly not only the virtue of the fully-developed ruler, but his very education, which begins in childhood and is the first step in his development. Aristotle quite agrees that if the rulers are to be throughout life different from the ruled, their education will be different (4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq.), but the rulers of his best State, unless it takes the form of an Absolute Kingship, will be ruled first and rulers afterwards (1332 b 25 sqq.).

17. ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται κ.τ.λ., 'as in fact we see that the sons of kings are taught riding and the art of war.' For καὶ φαίνονται, see note on 1262 a 18. Compare Plut. De Adul. et Amic. c. 16, Καρνεάδος δὲ ἐλέγει ὅτι πλουσίων καὶ βασιλεῶν παῖδες ἵππεσιν μᾶς, ἀλλὰ δὲ οὐδὲν εὖ καὶ καλῶς μαθάνουσι: Strabo p. 730, μένειν τ' Ὄνησίκρατος καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ Δαρείου τάφο γράμμα τεῦ, "φίλος ἦν τοῖς
19. καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶν κ. ὁλ. Occasionally (here for instance and in 1. 13. 1260 a 29), but not always (see 1. 6. 1255 a 36), Aristotle ascribes to the dramatic poet himself a saying placed by him in the mouth of one of his characters. The fragment before us is from the Aeolus and is preserved in a completer form by Stobaeus, Floril. 45. 13 (Eurip. Fragm. 16 Nauck),

λαμπροὶ δ' ἐν αἷμαΐς "Ἀρεώς ἐν τε συλλόγοις
μή μοι τὰ κομψά ποικίλοι γενοίσαι,
ἀλλ' ἕν πόλει δεῖ, μεγάλα βουλεύοντ' ἀεί.

The lines are no doubt spoken by King Aeolus and relate to the princes his sons. Thus they are quite to the point. In τὰ κομψά Euripides probably has in view the varied subtleties which had been introduced into Greek education in the days which followed the repulse of the Persian invasion (5 (8). 6. 1341 a 28 sqq.), whether connected with musical art or with such subjects as geometry and astronomy (for in Xen. Mem. 4. 7 Socrates thinks it necessary to prescribe limits to these studies) and dialectic and philosophy. See note on 1337 a 39. Mr. Richards compares Thuc. 1. 84. 5, μὴ τὰ ἀρχεία ἐυαίσθητοι ἢ ἄγνοι ὅμερες, τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευάσας λόγον καλὸς μεμφόμενος ἀνομοῖος ἔργον ἐπεξείναι. In ἕν πόλει δεῖ κ. ὁλ. Euripides is thinking partly of prowess in arms, cp. Probl. 27. 5. 948 a 31 sqq.: Eurip. Suppl. 855 Bothe, 881 Dindorf,

ὅ δ' ἀδ τρίτος τῶν Ἰππομεδών τοίσοδ' ἐφύν
παίς ὥν ἐτόλμησε εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἡδονᾶς
Μουσῶν τραπέζη ταῦτα πρὸς τὸ μαλακὸν βίον,
ἀγροῖς δὲ ναίων, σκληρὰ τῇ φύσει διδοῦν
ἐχαίρε πρὸς τάνδρειον, ἐστὶν ἄγρα φῶν
ἵπποις τε χαίρετοι, τόξα τ' ἐπετείνουν χερῶν,
πόλει παρασχεῖν σῶμα χρήσιμον θέλων,
Eurip. Fragm. 284. 16 sqq., 362. 25 sqq., and a fragment of the Phaedo or Phaedrias of Alexis (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 497),

μάχημον γὰρ ἀνάμει, χρήσιμος δὲ τῇ πόλει.

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Compare also Antiphon, Tetral. 2. 2. 3, ἑδόκοιν μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε ταῦτα παίδευον τὸν ὦν ἐξ ἕν μᾶλλον τὸ κοινὸν ὀφελεῖται, ἀμφοῖν τι ἣμιν ἄγαθον ἀποβήσεσθαι, where teaching boys how to hurl the dart is referred to. But Euripides probably has especially before him the teaching of Protagoras of Abdera, who claims in Plato, Protag. 318 D sqq. that he does not, like Hippias of Elis, carry boys back to the arts from which they have just escaped and make them study calculation, astronomy, geometry, and music, but teaches εὐθεία to πάντιν τῶν ὀικεῖων, ὅπως ἄν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ ὀικείαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατο ἐν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγεται.

Cp. Gorg. 491 A sq., where Callicles expresses similar views.

20. ἀρχοντος παίδευαν. Cp. 2. 11. 1273 a 31, ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτων.

ἀρετή, not ἤ ἀρετή, see note on 1276 b 5.

23. τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου. See note on 1276 a 28.

24. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ’ ἵσωσ κ.τ.λ. Διὰ τότο, because the virtue of a citizen is different from that of a ruler, a citizen having, at any rate occasionally, to become a private man, a part which Jason did not know how to play. The first question which arises as to this saying of Jason's is as to the meaning of ὅτε μή here. ὅτε μή is used with the optative in Hom. II. 13. 319 and 14. 247 sq., etc. and Odys. 16. 197 in the sense of 'unless,' or, according to Küthen, Ausführ. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 512. 4 b, 'except when,' and Bern. and Sus. render it 'unless' in the passage before us (Bern. 'er habe nichts zu essen, wenn er nicht Tyrann sei': Sus., 'he must starve if he were not on the throne'). But if ὅτε μή meant 'unless' here, should we not have had πεινήν ἄν rather than πεινήν? I incline, therefore, to translate πεινήν ὅτε μή τυραννοῦ either 'he was a starving man except when he was tyrant' or (as Mr. Welldon) 'he was a starving man whenever he was not tyrant' (cp. Thuc. 2. 15. 2, ὅποτε μή τι δεῖσθαι). The second of these two renderings is open to the objection that it implies that Jason was more than once tyrant of Pherae and that his tenure of the tyranny was not continuous, a fact which we do not learn elsewhere, and as the first is less open to this objection and also has the merit of giving the same meaning to ὅτε μή in the passage before us as it bears in Homer, perhaps it is to be preferred. A further question is whether Jason meant by πεινήν literal starvation (his ignorance of the art of being a private man making it impossible for him to maintain himself in that capacity), or starvation in a metaphorical sense (compare such expressions as 'auri sacra fames'). I incline to
the latter view. A man who does not possess the virtue of
an ἀρχήμενος is not thereby incapacitated for earning a living as
a ruled person; he is only incapacitated for τὸ ἀρχεσθαι καλῶς.
As to Jason see vol. i. p. 237, note 1. Isocrates (Philip. § 65)
describes Dionysius the Elder as ‘desiring monarchy in an irra-
tional and frenzied way.’ ‘The Venetian chronicler says of
Giovanni Frangipane,’ who had resigned the position of Count
of Veglia and had retired to Venice, ‘“He was no more able to
live in a free city than night can abide the rising of the sun”’
(T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 3. 135).
δὴ μὴ τυχανοὶ. ‘Ὅτε μὴ is always found in the best authors
with the optative’ (Liddell and Scott s.v. δὴ).

25. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινεῖται γέ κ.τ.λ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γέ, ‘but certainly,’
as elsewhere. Ἐπαινεῖται, ‘id est, virtue est: habitus enim laudabiles
virtutes vocamus, ut ipse ait in fine libri primi Ethicorum’ (Sepul-
veda, who here refers to Eth. Nic. i. 13. 1103 a 9, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τῶν
ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν). Compare also Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1106 a 1
and 2. 7. 1108 a 31, ἣ γὰρ αἰδώς ἀρετή μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ
αιδήμων. Thus the transition from ἐπαινεῖται, 25, to ἡ ἀρετή, 26, is an
easy one. Agesilaus was praised for knowing both how to rule and
how to be ruled (e.g. in Xen. Ages. 2. 16); Lysander, on the
other hand, is described by Plutarch (Lysand. c. 20) as τῶν ὀίκων
ζυγόν οὐ φέρων οὐδ’ ὑπομένων ἀρχεσθαι. Plato had said (Laws 942 C),
tοῦτο καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ μελετητέον εὐθὺς ἐκ τῶν παιδῶν, ἄρχειν τε ἀλλων
ἀρχεσθαι θ’ ὑφ’ ἐτέρων.

26. καὶ πολίτου δοκίμου (δοκεῖ) ἡ ἀρετή εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ
ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι καλῶς. Aristotle here probably has before him
Plato, Laws 643 E, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παιδῶν παιδείαν ποιοῦσαν
ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἑρασθήν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ
ἀρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης. Δόκιμος takes the place of τέλεος
καὶ καλῶς of μετὰ δίκης. As to the insertion of δοκεῖ see critical
note.

28. τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἀμφω, i.e. τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι
καλῶς.

29. οὐκ ἄν εἰς ἄμφω ἐπαινεῖτα ὁμοίως. "Αμφω, the two aptitudes
just referred to. Aristotle hints that the citizen must in fact possess
two different kinds of virtue unequal in praiseworthiness (see vol. i.
p. 237). He here anticipates the conclusion which he is slowly
approaching. So Sepulveda, who has a note on ‘Non eodem
modo utrumque laudabitur,’—‘non erit eadem virtus.’
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ἐπεὶ οὖν ... 32. κατίδοι τις. 'Since then it is occasionally held that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things and not the same, and that the citizen [who is both ruler and ruled] should understand both and share in both, one may see at a glance the further course of the inquiry.' The next step in it is to point out that the citizen should not learn the work of all kinds of ruled persons. Armed with this principle, we are able to reconcile the two contradictory views. Aristotle here, as often elsewhere, sets two conflicting opinions side by side and brings them into collision, in order to show that each contains an element of truth. One view is that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things; the other is that the citizen, who is in part a ruler, should learn both how to rule and how to be ruled, or in other words should learn the same things as the ruled. Both of these views are partly true. Those who hold that the ruler and the ruled should learn different things are so far correct that the citizen-ruler over citizens, and therefore the citizen, should not learn the work of unfreely ruled persons. Those who hold that the ruler and the ruled should learn the same things are so far correct that the citizen-ruler over citizens should learn to be ruled as a freeman is ruled. Thus the truth lies midway, Aristotle thinks, between the two opinions. For τοῦτοιδεν, cp. c. 5. 1278 a 13, ἐντεῦθεν μικρῶν ἐπισκεψαμένοις, and Plato, Symp. 217 E, μέχρι μὲν οὖν δὴ δεύρο τοῦ λόγου καλῶς ἀν ἔχου καὶ πρὸς ἄντικουν λέγειν, τὸ δ' ἐντεῦθεν κ.τ.λ. In Polit. 271 B, τὸ γάρ ἐντεῦθεν, ἀιμα, χρή ξυνοεῖ· ἐχόμενον γὰρ ἐστι κ.τ.λ., it is explained by ἐχόμενον (as in Aristotle. Eq. 131 sq. Didot by μετὰ τοῦτον): cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 6. 1223 a 1 sq.

31. ἀμφότερ' ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν. This reversal in the order of words (a kind of Chiasmus) is not uncommon in the Politics. Compare for instance c. 14. 1285 b 30, ἔκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη: 1. 1. 1252 a 4, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἣ πασῶν κυριωτάτη: 3. 6. 1278 b 11, λέγω δ' οὖν ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς κύριοι ὁ δήμος, οἱ δ' ἀλλοι τοιοῦτον ἐν ταῖς ὑλικαρχίαι: 3. 11. 1281 b 11 sq.: 3. 17. 1288 a 3 sq.: 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 18, ὀσπερ ἐν τοῖς πνεύμασι τῶν μὲν ζέφυρων τοῦ βορείου, τοῦ δὲ νότου τὸν θύρων: 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 19-21: 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 22 sq. See Kaibel, Stil und Text der Πολιτεία 'Αθηναίων des Aristoteles, p. 100, for similar instances from that work. The occasional occurrence in the Politics of this studied arrangement of words affords an argument
33. ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τάναγκαία λέγομεν, 'and by this we mean the kind of rule which obtains in connexion with necessary services.'

Tάναγκαία = τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἔργα, cp. τὸν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολὴν in 2. 9. 1269 a 35. Λέγομεν, in much the same sense as λέγω, 36, though perhaps the 'we' in λέγομεν is the 'we' of a teacher (cp. c. 1. 1275 b 3, 19). The term δεσποτικὴ ἀρχή is not always used by Aristotle in the sense of 'the rule which obtains in connexion with necessary services'; it is not, for instance, in 3. 14. 1285 a 22. It should be noticed that by explaining δεσποτικὴ ἀρχὴ as ἡ περὶ τάναγκαία ἀρχὴ Aristotle is enabled to represent even freemen who do necessary work (e.g. βάναυσοι) as subject to δεσποτικὴ ἀρχὴ, and not merely absolute slaves.

34. ἀ ποιεῖν ἐπιστασθαι τὸν ἀρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ χρήσθαι μᾶλλον. In the case of δεσποτικὴ ἀρχὴ the ruler does not need to know how to do the things that the ruled do, but only how to use their services. Hence in this form of rule he does not need to learn how to be ruled in order to learn how to rule; he does not need to be a slave first in order to be a good master. In the case of πολιτικὴ ἀρχὴ, on the other hand, the ruler does need to know how to do what the ruled does, or in other words how to be ruled, for it is thus that he learns to be a good ruler. In δεσποτικὴ ἀρχὴ all that the ruler needs to know is how to use the services of slaves, and even this he hardly needs to know, for this knowledge has nothing exalted about it (4 (7). 3. 1325 a 24 sqq.: 1. 7. 1255 b 33 sqq.), and a master may dispense with it by employing a steward (1. 7. 1255 b 35 sqq.). But if in δεσποτικὴ ἀρχὴ the ruler does not need to know how to do the things that slaves do, still less does he need to be able to do them for another. Doing them for another stands on a far lower level than merely doing them and is fit only for slaves (cp. 1277 b 5 and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17 sqq.).

37. δούλου δ’ εἶδι πλείω λέγομεν. Δούλου takes up ἀνδραποδόδες, 35. Aristotle adds this in order to show that he regards as ἀνδραποδόδες, not only the work of actual slaves, but also that of βάναυσοι τεχνίται and χερνῖτες generally. Λέγομεν is probably here used in the same sense as in 34, not in that in which it is used in c. 3. 1276 b 9, where it seems to mean 'men commonly say.' The βάναυσοι τεχνίτης and the ὅσι are implied to be closely allied to

38. ὅν κ.τ.λ. Ἄριστος εἰς ἐπίθρασμα λέον σεῖν αὔτόν κατέχοντος. Πάντως, μόνον περὶ τοῦ στίγματος, ἐπίθρασμα λέον σεῖν αὐτόν κατέχοντος, ἄγαθόν εἰς ὄντος ἰδίον ὑποτεθήκη τινί: ἐπίθρασμα λέον σεῖν αὐτόν πιθανόν εἰς ἐναλλαγήν ἀρχαιολογίας ἐστὶν πρὸς τὸν ἂν δεῖκνυμιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῶν ἔργων τῆς πολιτικῆς. 

οὔτος δ᾽ εἰσὶν κ.τ.λ. Μοντέκατίνος τῆς κοινῆς ἀναφοράς οὔτος ἡμᾶς ἐράνως ἐπιτίθεται τῆς ἀναφοράς ἱσαται διὰ τοῦτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπίθρασμα λέον σεῖν αὐτόν κατέχοντος ἰσίερον εἰς ἐναλλαγήν ἀρχαιολογίας. 

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In the passage before us βάναυσος τεκνίτης is included under χερνίτης, whereas in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18–25 το χερνίτικα is distinguished from το περὶ τῶν τέχνας. Aristotle speaks of ὁ βάναυσος τεκνίτης, not simply το τεκνίτης, because not all τεκνίται are χερνίτες. In Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 6 sqq. physicians and generals appear to be included under τεκνίται. He sometimes, however, uses the word τεκνίτης 'ad significandos opifices' (see Bon. Ind. s.v. τεκνίτης).

διὸ παρ᾽ εἴνοις κ.τ.λ. Διὸ, because they are slaves (cp. c. 5. 1278 a 6 sqq.). Kaisling (Tempora und Modis in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia, p. 72) remarks that the use of παρ᾽ here with an infinitive after a negative principal clause is contrary to the general rule. In παρ᾽ εἴνοις Aristotle probably refers especially to Athens. If so, it would seem that handicraftsmen were excluded from office at Athens not only in the early days when it was confined to Eupatridae (Plut. Thes. c. 25: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 8), but even down to the time when the
'ultimate democracy' was introduced (the time of Pericles or later).
According to the 'Aδ. Πολ., c. 13, however, the board of ten
archons appointed in the year after the archonship of Damasias
included two demiurgi. Was Aristotle aware of this? That the
fourth and lowest of the property-classes, τὸ βεττικόν, was excluded
by Solon from office is well known (2. 12. 1274 a 21: Plut.
Solon c. 18). Did handicraftsmen belong to this class under
Solon's legislation, even if they owned land enough to place them
in one or other of the three higher classes? At Ragusa the
artisans 'had no voice at all in the government, and were not
admissible to any office' (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 2. 309).
3. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μέν οὖν here, as in 2. 9. 1270 b 17 and else-
where, is answered by ἀλλά (7). Sus. brackets τὸν ἄγαθόν, and it is
true that the question with which we have been concerned from
1277 a 29 onwards has been what the citizen and ruler should
learn, not what the good man should learn. But the capability
of rendering to another servile service has been said to be ἄνθρα-
ποδείκτης in 1277 a 35, and as the opposite of ὁ ἄνθραποδέικτης is
ὁ ἐπιτευκῆς (Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 17 sqq.: cp. 10. 6. 1177 a 6 sqq.),
Aristotle's first thought is that this capability is not one which
should be acquired by ὁ ἄγαθός, his next that it should not be acquired
by ὁ πολιτικός (who is φρόνιμος, 1277 a 15, and therefore ἄγαθός), and his next that it should not be acquired by the good
citizen. Compare the story of the captive Spartan youth in
Plut. Apophth. Lac. Obscur. Vir. § 35, 234 B, who replied οὐ δουλεύω,
when a specially humiliating service was demanded
of him.
5. εἴ μὴ ποτε κ.τ.λ., 'except occasionally to satisfy some need
arising for him in relation to himself, for then it no longer
happens that the one party (the party to whom the service is
rendered) comes to be a master and the other (the party who
renders the service) a slave.' A man who learns to do servile work
for himself does not learn to do it for a master, and it is to the
good man or good citizen learning to become a slave and to serve
a master that Aristotle objects. 'Si quis usus sui gratia sordidum
opiscium discat, ut Alfonsumus dux Ferrariensis, qui singulari indus-
tria et artificio aenea tormenta bellica conficere sciebat, is, quia
sibi, non alteri, servit, non debet servus more artifcium appellari'
(Sepulveda). So Bern., 'ausser etwa für seinen persönlichen
Bedarf, weil in diesem Falle das Herrn- und Sclavenverhältniss
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nicht mehr stattfindet.’ Vict., however, explains οὗ γὰρ—δοῦλον otherwise, ‘si deberet qui regit haec discere, futurum esse ut distinguishi non posit servus ab ero,’ and so Mr. Welldon, who translates, ‘else the relation of master and slave ceases to exist,’ and Mr. Richards, ‘a citizen should not be thoroughly familiar with the ἔργα of a slave, for then the difference between a master and a slave vanishes.’ I prefer the interpretation of Sepulveda and Bernays. Αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν (a phrase recurring in 7 (5). i. 1302 a 12 and 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 13) is to be taken with χρείας χάριν: cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 10, ἢτι χρημάτων τινά εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ’ αὐτούς χρείας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς. For χρείας χάριν, cp. Thuc. i. 136. 6, καὶ ἀμα αὐτός μὲν ἐκεῖνος χρείας τινὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὸ σῶμα σώζεσθαι ἐναντιώθηναι. For the thought, see note on 1337 b 19, and cp. Rhet. i. 9. 1367 a 31, καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ µη πρὸς ἄλλον ἐς: also Plut. Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 15, ἀλλὰ βοηθεῖ μοι τὸ τῶν Ἀριστίδεων μημονευόμενοι βαμβάσαντος γὰρ τίνος εἰ· δε’ ἄγορας αὐτὸς ἀφεῖ πάρικυς, ἔμαντο γε, εἰπε’ ἐγὼ δ’ ἀνάπταν πρὸς τῶν ἐγκαλοῦντας εἰ κεράμῳ παράστηκα διαμετρουμένῳ . . . οὐκ ἐμαντο γε φημὰ ταῦτ᾽ οἰκονομεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῇ πατρίδῃ, where Plutarch makes a notable advance on the older view. It should be noticed that Aristotle’s language in the passage before us is carefully guarded; the doing of menial work, even for one’s own behoof, is only permitted if it is occasional, not habitual, and in satisfaction of a need.

7. ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ τις ἀρχή κ.τ.λ., ‘but there is a kind of rule which men exercise over those like themselves in birth and free, for it is of this nature that we say the political rule (the rule which obtains between citizens) is, which [unlike the rule over slaves] the ruler ought to learn while being ruled.’ Ἀρχὲς, sc. ὁ ἀρχών. That political rule is exercised over men free and equal, we see from i. 7. 1255 b 20. Citizens are alike in birth, even though some of them are more nobly born than others, but kings are superior in birth to those over whom they rule (3. 13. 1284 a 11 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12), and the master of a slave is of course superior in birth to his slave. When Aristotle says in i. 12. 1259 b 15 that the king is the same τῷ γένει as those over whom he rules, he probably means ‘in race.’ Pericles was already familiar with the contrast between rule over freemen and other kinds of rule (cp. Plut. Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 17, where we read that he said to himself, ἀναλαμβάνων τὴν χλαμύδα, Πράσεχε, Περίκλεις ἐλευθέρων ἀρχεῖς,
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'Ελλήνων ἀρχείς, πολιτῶν 'Αθηναίων), and Lysander also, who said, when the Spartan harmost Callibius raised his staff to strike the athlete Autolycus, that 'he knew not how to rule over freemen' (Plut. Lysand. c. 15).

10. στρατηγεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα. For the absence of καὶ before στρατηγεῖν see critical note on 1260 a 26, and cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 16, μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πλούτου καὶ ἕλευθερίας. Καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα is added to show that one should not only have been under the command of a general before one becomes a general, for this might be said of a private soldier, but should have risen from the rank of a private to that of a lochagus, and from that rank to the rank of a taxiarch (compare the saying ascribed to the comic poet Crates by Aristophanes in Eq. 541 Didot, quoted above on 1276 b 22, and the principle underlying the ordo magistratum at Rome). That the lochagus was subordinate to the taxiarch, we see from 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 1 sqq.: see also Liddell and Scott, s.v. ταξιαρχος.

11. διὸ λέγεται κ. τ. λ. Aristotle probably refers to a saying ascribed to Solon, ἀρχεῖ πρῶτον μαθῶν ἀρχεσθαι (Diog. Laert. 1. 60), which Plato may have before him in Laws 762 E (quoted in vol. i. p. 238, note 1). Cp. also Cic. De Leg. 3. 2. 5 and M. Antonin. Comm. i. 11. 29. Καὶ τοῦτο, 'this also,' for Aristotle has already said that one should learn to rule freemen by being ruled, and now he goes further and says that it is not possible to rule them well without having been ruled. Alcibiades' experience of being ruled was probably far too short, for he figures as a leading statesman at Athens at a comparatively early age. Even good rulers have been thought to have lost somewhat through too rapid a rise in early life. Some traced Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's 'exceeding masterfulness' to this cause. 'He was pushed up the easiest possible incline to almost the top of the ladder of diplomatic rank before he was twenty-four' (S. Lane-Poole, Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 1. 80).

13. τούτων δὲ ἄρετη μὲν ἕτερα κ. τ. λ. Τούτων, i.e. τοῦ ἀρχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀρχομένου τὴν τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἀρχήν. Cp. 1. 13. 1259 b 32 sqq. μὲν, 'while,' as often elsewhere.

14. ἐπιστασθαὶ καὶ δύνασθαὶ. Δύνασθαί is a wider term than ἐπιστασθαί: knowledge is only one of the conditions of capability. Cp. Xen. Cyrop. 3. 2. 25, εἰσὶ δὲ τινες τῶν Χαλδαίων οἱ ληξίμενοι ζώσι
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καὶ οὗτ’ ἀν ἐπίσταυτον ἐργάζεσθαι οὗτ’ ἀν δύναυτο, εἰθισμένοι ἀπὸ πολέμου Βοτανείων.

15. ἀρετή. For the absence of the article before ἀρετή see note on 1253 b 11.

16. ἐν ἀμφότερα, ‘on both sides,’ i.e. both as ruler and as ruled: cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 12. 1143 a 35, καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἔσχάτων ἐν ἀμφότερα, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 18, ἐκουσώνων δὲ οἱ ἑρασται τοῖς παισὶ τῆς δόξης ἐν ἀμφότερα (i.e. both when their repute was bad and when it was good).

καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἄγαθον ἀμφω, i.e. τὸ δύνασθαι ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεῖσθαι τῆς τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἀρχῆς. Thus Aristotle's 'best State,' which is composed of σπουδαίων (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq.), is also composed of men who have learnt to rule well by being ruled (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 2) and who interchanging ruling and being ruled (1332 b 25 sqq.). As to καὶ ... δὴ see above on 1253 a 18.

17. καὶ εἰ κ.τ.λ., 'and if the temperance and justice appropriate to a ruler differ in kind [from the temperance and justice appropriate to a person ruled but free], for the temperance and justice of a person ruled but free are also different in kind [from those of a ruler], it is clear that the good man's virtue, for instance his justice, will be of two kinds,' [for the good man must have the virtue which fits him to rule and also the virtue which fits him to be ruled.] That the virtue of the ruler is different in kind from that of the ruled we have seen in 1. 13. 1259 b 32—1260 a 24, a passage with which that before us is nearly connected. For the suppression in 17 of 'from the temperance and justice appropriate to a person ruled but free,' cp. 1277 a 16, καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δῦνον ἑτέραν ἐμαυ δέχονται τινες ἄρχοντοι, where 'from that of the ruled' is suppressed, and [Plut.] Consol. ad Apollonium, c. 23, ἀγνοοῦστε ὅτι ὁ ἄφορος βάναυτος, ἢς πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει (sc. τοῦ ἁραίου). For the ellipse in καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἑλευθέρου δὲ see the examples collected by Bonitz, Ind. s.v. γάρ (146 a 50 sqq.), and especially Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 21, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἱδίας τῶν ἑδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ πολλαχῶς ἀμαρτάνουσιν τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λειτουργεῖν (sc. πολλοὶ ἀμαρτάνουσιν) ἥ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δει κ.τ.λ. So here with καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἑλευθέρου δὲ we must supply ἑτέρων ἐστίν εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, or possibly, as Mr. Richards suggests, ἐστὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη. For the absence of the article before ἀρετή in τοῦ ἄγαθου ἀρετή, see note on 1285 b 12, τοῦ σκύπτρου ἐπανάστασιν. Aristotle had assumed for a moment in an aporetic
argument (1276 b 33) that the virtue of the good man is of one kind only, but he now arrives at a different conclusion. Plato had already so far distinguished the virtue of the ruler from that of the ruled as to say that φρόνησις exists only in the ruler (Rep. 433 C), but neither he nor Protagoras had drawn any distinction between the temperance and justice of the ruler and the same qualities in the ruled, when they said (Plato, Rep. 431 E–432 B, 433 D: Protag. 324 D–325 A) that justice and temperance should be possessed by all classes in the State. Aristotle’s principle is that ruling differs in kind from being ruled, and that therefore the virtue of the ruler differs in kind from the virtue of the ruled (1. 13. 1259 b 37 sq.). I do not remember any other passage in Aristotle’s writings in which this view is expressed with equal distinctness. He appears in what follows to connect the difference between the courage and temperance of the man and the woman with the more active and arduous nature of the functions of the man in household management.

20. καθ’ ἄ, cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 13, δύναμιν καθ’ ἣν ἐσται πρακτικός.

ῶσπερ κ.τ.λ. This has been already said in 1. 13. 1260 a 21 sqq., where we are told that these virtues in the man are ἄρχαι and in the woman ἰπτηρεῖκαι. In Poet. 15. 1454 a 22 we read ἐστι γὰρ ἀνδρείων μὲν τὸ ἥθος, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἄρμοττον γυναικὶ τὸ ἀνδρείαν ἢ δεινὴν εἶναι, but Αε has τῶς in place of the second τό with a blank space before it large enough for two letters, and Vahlen conjectures οὕτως. The article is absent before σωφροσύνη in γυναικὸς καὶ ἄνδρος ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία, just as it is often absent in similar sentences where ὅ αὖτος ὀφείλεται: see above on 1276 b 5, 7, and 1277 a 13, and cp. 24, ἐπεί καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικὸς.

22. καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμίᾳ εἴθε ὦσπερ ὅ ἀνήρ ὅ ἀγαθὸς. Looking to δειλός, 22, which is the opposite of ἀνδρεία, we might expect to find ἀκόλαστος, the opposite of σωφρονία, in place of λάλος, and Susemihl on the strength of ‘inhonesta’ in Leonardus Aretinus’ translation places ἀκόλαστος in his text, but λάλος is probably right. Λάλος is often opposed to κόσμιος, e.g. in Philem. Βδελφοί, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 5),

οὐκ, ἄν λαλὴ τις μικρῶν, ἐστὶ κόσμιος,
οὐδ’ ἄν πορεύνται τις εἰς τὴν γῆν βλέποντ’
ὁ δ’ ἥλικον μὲν ἡ φύσις φέρει λαλῶν,
μηδὲν ποιῶν δ’ ἀσχημον, οὕτως κόσμιος.

Λάλος, it is true, is found only in Π1, but Π2 (except Π1), which has
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\text{\textit{άλαλος}} have \textit{άλλος}, which is frequently found in MSS. as a misreading for \textit{άλας} (see for instance Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 858 : 3. 567). L. Schmidt has shown (Ethik der alten Griechen, i. 313) how nearly akin \textit{κοσμώτις} is to \textit{σωφροσύνη}. Compare with the passage before us Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adespora 364 (Nauck),

\textit{άλλος} \textit{γυναικός} \textit{κόσμος}, \textit{άλλος} \textit{άρσενων}.

24. \textit{έπει} καὶ \textit{κ. Τ. Λ}. For the transition here from \textit{άρετή} to \textit{οικονομία}, compare what Meno says in Plato, Meno 71 E, \textit{εἴ δὲ βούλει γυναικός \textit{άρετήν}, οὐ χαλεπὸν διελθεῖν, ὅτι \textit{δεί} αὐτὴν \textit{τὴν οἰκίαν εὖ} \textit{οἰκεῖν}, σωζοῦσαν τε \textit{τὰ ἐνδον καὶ κατήκουν} \textit{οὖσαν} \textit{τοῦ} \textit{ἄνδρός}. Aristotle evidently has this passage before him, and probably also Xen. Oecon. 7. 25, \textit{έπει \textit{δὲ} καὶ \textit{τὸ}} \textit{φυλάττειν} \textit{τὰ} \textit{εἰσενεχθέντα} \textit{τῇ} \textit{γυναικί} \textit{προσέταξε, γιγνώσκοι} \textit{ὅ} \textit{θεος} \textit{ὅτι} \textit{πρὸς} \textit{τὸ} \textit{φυλάττεν} \textit{οὐ} \textit{κάκων} \textit{ἐστὶ} \textit{φοβερῶν} \textit{εἶναι} \textit{τὴν} \textit{ψυχὴν πλεῖον} \textit{μέρος} \textit{καὶ} \textit{τοῦ} \textit{φοβοῦ} \textit{διάσατο} \textit{τῇ} \textit{γυναικῇ} \textit{ἡ} \textit{τῷ} \textit{ἄνδρῷ}. Compare also [Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 3. 1343 b 26–1344 a 8. The account given there and in the passage before us of the household management of the man as being concerned with acquiring is, however, at issue with the usual teaching of Aristotle on the subject, which is that household management has to do with using: see above on 1256 a 11. To acquire is more difficult than to keep and demands a higher type of virtue (Demosth. Ol. 2. 26, \textit{πολὺ} \textit{γὰρ} \textit{μᾶς} \textit{ἐξοντας} \textit{φυλάττειν} \textit{ἡ} \textit{κτήσασθαι} \textit{πάντα} \textit{πέρυκεν}: Dio Cass. Hist. Rom. 52. 18. 5, \textit{καὶ} \textit{μακρῷ} \textit{τὸ} \textit{φυλάζει} \textit{τὶ} \textit{τοῦ} \textit{κτήσασθαι} \textit{μᾶς} \textit{ἐστὶ} \textit{πρὸς} \textit{μὲν} \textit{γὰρ} \textit{τὸ} \textit{τάλλο-} \textit{τρα} \textit{προσποιύσασθαι} \textit{kαὶ} \textit{πόνων} \textit{kαὶ} \textit{κυδή} \textit{καὶ} \textit{κυδή} \textit{δὲι}, \textit{πρὸς} \textit{δὲ} \textit{τὸ} \textit{τὰ} \textit{ιπάρχοντα} \textit{σῶσαι} \textit{βραχεία} \textit{φρonteis} \textit{άρκει}}.

25. \textit{ἡ} \textit{δὲ} \textit{φρόνησις} \textit{φρόνοντος} \textit{ίδιος} \textit{άρετή} \textit{μόνη}, \textit{‘and moral prudence [is the only virtue which has not two kinds, for it] is the only virtue which is peculiar to the ruler.’} This sentence is a continuation in a rough way of 18–21. The fem. form \textit{ίδιος} is used here, as in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 12 and De Part. An. 2. 7. 652 b 2, in all three cases before a word commencing with a vowel (see note on 1283 a 33). Bonitz (Ind. 472 b 44) gives a number of instances in which the word \textit{μόνος} is placed at the end of a sentence, among them Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1149 a 20. As to the ruler’s need of \textit{φρόνησις} see above on 1277 a 14. It has been already said (above on 17) that Plato treats \textit{φρόνησις} as peculiar to the ruler in Rep. 433 C, a passage which Aristotle also has before him when he ascribes \textit{δόξα} \textit{άληθῆς} to the ruled. Compare Timaeus 51 D sqq. and the contrast between ruler and ruled in Laws 734 E sq. Yet in Laws 632 C Plato speaks of instituting guardians of the laws, \textit{τοὺς} \textit{μὲν} \textit{διὰ}
3. 4. 1277 b 24—5. 1277 b 34.

φρονήσεως, τούτω δὲ δι’ αὐθεντικῆς δόξης ιόντας, so that in the State of the Laws there were to be rulers without φρονήσεως, armed only with true opinion (see as to this vol. i. pp. 437, 449). For the effect of ‘true opinion respecting what is noble and just and good and the contrary’ on the character of the members of a State, see Plato, Polit. 309 C sqq. Bonitz (Ind. 203 b 52) refers to Aristot. peri μυθής καὶ ἀναμνήσεως I. 450 a 15, διὸ καὶ ἐτέρως ταῖς ὑπάρχει τῶν ζῴων, καὶ οὗ μοῦν ἀνθρώπως καὶ τοῖς ἓχουσι δόξαν ἡ φρονήσις, where the distinction reappears.

26. δοικεὶν ἀνάγκαιον εἶναι κοινὰς κ.τ.λ. For the omission of εἶναι see notes on 1260 a 14 and 1277 a 38.

28. ἀρχομένου δὲ γε κ.τ.λ., ‘but as to a person ruled, his virtue is not moral prudence but true opinion, for the ruled person is like a flute-maker, while the ruler is a flute-player, who uses what the flute-player makes.’ The reason assigned seems at first sight to be no reason at all, till we recall I. 8. 1256 a 5 sqq. and I. 10. 1258 a 21 sqq., where the art that makes is explained to be ministerial (ὑπηρετική) and subordinate to the art that uses. The ruled person is similarly ministerial to the ruler, and hence has a merely ministerial kind of virtue. Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 13. 1246 b 11, ἢ γὰρ τοῦ ἀρχοντός ἄρετὴ τῇ τοῦ ἀρχομένου χρήται. Compare also (with Sus.², Note 499) Plato, Rep. 601 D, οἷον αὐθεντής που αὐλοποιῷ ἐξαγελεῖ peri τῶν αἰλῶν, οἳ ἰν ὑπηρετῶσιν ἐν τῷ αἰλῶν, καὶ ἐπιτάξει οἶνος δὲ ποιεῖν, ὁ δ’ ὑπηρετήσει, and (with Prof. Jowett) Cratyl. 388 sqq. (esp. 390 B sqq.). Γέ in δὲ γε qualifies ἀρχομένου: see Liddell and Scott s. v. γε sub fin.

31. καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἄτερα. The virtue of a good citizen has been shown to be the same as the virtue of the good man in the case of the citizen of the best State who is possessed of φρονήσεως, or in other words who is capable of ruling. For πῶς, cp. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 41 sqq.

34. ὃς ἀληθῶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The question raised here is probably C. 5. suggested by the mention in c. 4. 1277 b 1 of the fact that in some States handicraftsmen had no share in office till the ‘ultimate democracy’ came into being. Cp. Polyb. 10. 17. 6, where οἱ πολιτικοὶ are distinguished from οἱ χειροτέχναι. But surely handicraftsmen even in those States shared in the ἀρχηγότατος ἀρχηγύ access to which, according to c. 1. 1275 a 30 sqq., suffices to make a man a citizen? Aristotle now seems to require that the citizen shall share not merely in ἀρχηγότατος ἀρχῇ, but in ἀρχᾳ strictly so called.
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(35 sqq.). He appears to hold that if a citizen does not do so, he cannot be said to possess the virtue of a citizen (36). Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of citizen-virtue results, in fact, in a change in his standard of citizenship; at any rate we are told in 1278 a 35 that ὁ μᾶλλον πόλιτης is to be found in ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν.

37. τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετὴν, 'the virtue which we have ascribed to the citizen' (cp. 1278 a 9, πόλιτον ἀρετὴν ἣν εἴπομεν), i.e. the virtue which fits men both to rule and to be ruled.

οὔτος γὰρ πολιτής. Οὔτος, i.e. ὃ μὴ μέτετην ἄρχὼν. The addition of οὔτος γὰρ πολιτής seems unnecessary, but it is quite in Aristotle's manner: cp. c. i. 1275 a 11, and the addition of οἷς μὲν γὰρ θορκᾶ ἔχουσιν, οἷς δὲ ὑποτέρας in De Gen. An. 3. 5. 755 b 20 sqq., and see notes on 1282 a 36 and b 39.

38. ἐν τίνι μέρει θετέος ἔκαστος; 'in what class are we to place the individual handicraftsman?' For ἐν τίνι μέρει see Liddell and Scott s. v. μέρος. Compare Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 23, εἰ σκέψασθε ἐν τίνι τάξει τούτην ὑπέρ οὗ τὸ πνεύμα εἰρήνη, πόσερα ξένος ἢ μέτοικος ἢ πολιτής ἐστιν.

39. διὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, 'by reason of this statement at any rate,' i.e. the statement that βάναυσαί are not citizens nor metoeci nor aliens. Cp. Metaph. A. 10. 1075 a 25, ὅσα δὲ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει ἢ ἄτοπα τοῖς ἄλλοις λέγουσι.

1278 a. 2. τῶν εἰρήμενων, i.e. citizens metoeci and aliens.

τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές κ.τ.λ. The preceding sentence has pointed to the conclusion that βάναυσαί are not citizens, and γὰρ introduces a justification of this conclusion. For the thought cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.

4. οὕτως οἱ παῖδες, 'not even the children, [though they come nearer to being citizens than handicraftsmen do].' For what follows cp. c. i. 1275 a 14 sqq. The sons of citizens are said to be citizens ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, because they are citizens not absolutely but 'on an assumption'—the assumption, namely, that they will become citizens when they grow older.

6. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἄρχαιοις χρόνοις κ.τ.λ. For the use of μὲν οὖν here see note on 1265 b 12. It is answered by δὲ, 8. The sense is—'Nay, in ancient times the handicraftsmen were in some States slaves or aliens, but the best State will not go so far as to make them slaves, it will refuse to make them citizens' (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 33 sqq.). Handicraftsmen would be especially likely to be slaves in military States (Xen. Oecon. 4. 3, and Plut. Lycurg. et
Num. inter se comp. c. 2, αὐστηρὰ δὲ ἡ Δυσκόργειος (διάταξις) καὶ ἀρσυκτορικὴ, τὰς μὲν βανανάσους ἀποκαθαρίσασα τέχνας εἰς οἰκεῖοι καὶ μετοίκων χείρας, αὐτοῖς δὲ τῶν πολίταις εἰς τὴν ἀσπίδα καὶ τὸ δόμον συνά-
γυσα). In maritime and commercial States like Corinth, where handicraftsmen were less despised, there would be less eagerness to keep them outside the citizen-body. When Solon offered citizenship at Athens to persons immigrating with their families for the practice of a handicraft (Plut. Solon c. 24), he bade farewell to the old-fashioned policy of keeping handicraftsmen slaves and aliens, and aided in the creation of that numerous body of handi-
craftsmen, the existence of which made it possible for Themistocles a century later to build and equip a fleet (Diod. ii. 43. 3). That handicraftsmen were often strangers in early days is implied in Hom. Odysse. 17. 382 sqq., and it appears that the first makers of the peplos of Athena were two aliens, Aceseus of Patara and Helicon of Carystus (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 22), but, according to Büchsenschütz (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 321), we do not read in Homer of slaves employed in handicrafts.

7. διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι καὶ νῦν. That handicraftsmen were often aliens in Plato's day is implied in Laws 848 Λ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον δημιουργοῖς τε καὶ πάντως τῶν ξένων. Cp. also Andoc. ap. Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 1007, where we read about Hyperbolus ὃς δὲ ξένοι ὄν καὶ βάρβαρος λυγμοποιεῖ, and Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 31, ἡμεῖς δὲ ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ ταυτίας πολεῖν καὶ ξήν οὐκ ὄντες τρόπον βασιλικὴν καὶ εἰ σοὶ ἐστὶ τούτο σημείον, ὥς Εὐβοιλίδης, τοῦ μὴ Ἀθηναίων εἶναι ἡμῖς κ.τ.λ. Even at Athens most handicraftsmen may have been slaves or aliens as late as the time of Aristotle, though the Athenian citizen-
body undoubtedly comprised a large number of βάλαναιοι.

9. εἰ δὲ καὶ οὕτως πολλῆς, ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. For this use of ἄλλα in the sense of 'at any rate' in an apodosis after a conditional clause introduced by εἰ or εἴπερ, see Bon. Ind. 33 Α 42 sqq., and cp. Phys. 8.
6. 258 b 32—259 a 4.

10. λεκτέων οὐ παυτός κ.τ.λ., sc. εἶναι: see above on 1277 a 38.

11. τῶν δ' ἀναγκαῖων κ.τ.λ. The expression τῶν ἀναγκαίων presents much difficulty. It is possible that the word ἀναγκαῖοι has been repeated by a scribe's mistake from the preceding sentence and has displaced some other word (perhaps ἄλλων, which Bernays would read in place of it). Another possible view is Prof. Postgate's (Notes, p. 26), who construes τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων 'and with respect to necessary services,' but the sentence certainly reads as if τῶν
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ἀναγκαίων were masculine. If we take it as masculine, we may translate ‘the necessary people,’ so termed in contradistinction to ‘those who are quit of necessary services,’ and compare 6 (4). 1291 a 15, ὑώς ἄναγκαίως βοηθήσατε. It is thus that Lambinus appears to interpret τῶν ἄναγκαίων, for his rendering is ‘corum autem qui operibus et muneri necessariis funguntur.’ Τὰ τουάτα = ἄναγκαία ἔργα. In speaking of slaves as rendering services to an individual, Aristotle forgets the case of public slaves.

12. οἱ δὲ κοινῇ κ.τ.λ. Compare their name δημοφυγοι.

13. ἐντεύθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένως, ‘starting from this point and carrying our investigation a little further.’ So we have in Meteor. i. 3. 340 b 14 δεί δὲ νοεῖν οὕτως καὶ ἐντεύθεν ἠρθόμενος. Ἐντεύθεν should probably be taken, as Susemihl takes it, with μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένως, and not with φανερῶν, as Bernays, followed by Mr. Welldon, takes it.

14. αὐτῶν, i. e. βίαναυσοι and θητες.

αὐτῷ γὰρ φανέν τὸ λεχθὲν τοιεί δήλων, ‘for that which has been said is enough by itself, when once made known, to render this manifest.’ Aristotle probably refers in τὸ λεχθὲν to what has been said in c. i. 1275 a 38 sqq. For φανέν, cp. Plato, Gorg. 508 E, ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἀνῶ ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λόγοις οὕτω φανέρα, and Soph. O. T. 848,

ἀλλ’ ὡς φανέν γε τούτοις ὅδ’ ἐπίστασθαι,


εἰτ’ αὐτῷ δηλοὶ τοξργον, ἤ τεινειν χρεών:

Androm. 261 Bothe, 265 Dindorf (for other references to Euripides see Liddell and Scott s.v. σημαίνω i. 2): Aristoph. Lysistr. 375 Didot: Cratin. Πυλαία, Fragm. 9 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 114). See also Rhein. Mus. 42. 400.

16. καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἀρχομένου πολιτοῦ. Cr. i. 13. 1260 a 3 sq.

18. οἶον εἰ τίς ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. Cr. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 25 sqq. Ἡν καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατίκην, for ἀριστοκρατία in the truest sense of the word implies something more than the
award of office according to virtue; it implies a constitution under which all the citizens, or at any rate all the citizens capable of rule, are men of full excellence (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.). Cp. 6 (4). ii. 1295 a 31, ἀλὰ καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατίας.

20. καὶ ἀξίων is here associated with καὶ ἀρετήν, but we must not identify the two expressions. Ἀξία, as Hildenbrand has already pointed out (Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie i. 294), attaches not only to virtue, but to property and to every other attribute which gives its possessor a special importance in relation to the life of the State. Τὸ καὶ ἀξίων ἰσον is commonly contrasted with τὸ καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἰσον (e.g. in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 29 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sq.), whence we infer that constitutions not based on τὸ καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἰσον, for instance oligarchy, are based in a sense on τὸ καὶ ἀξίων ἰσον: indeed, democracy itself, though commonly represented as resting its claims on τὸ καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἰσον (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sq.), is sometimes implied to rest them on τὸ καὶ ἀξίων ἰσον (Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq.: cp. Pol. 3. 17. 1288 a 20 sqq.). Wealth, virtue, high birth, education, and even εὐνοεῖα, confer ἄξια (Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq.). That the wealthy, the well-born, and the free-born have a real, and not merely a fancied, claim on the score of ἄξια, results, I think, from Pol. 3. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq. Their claim, however, cannot compare with that of men superior in virtue (3. 9. 1281 a 4 sqq.: cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sqq.), and hence καὶ ἀξίων is especially and most truly used in the Politics, as it is in the passage before us, of ἄξια conferred by virtue (see 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 15: 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 17 : 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 33).


22. μὲν, 'while,' as often elsewhere.


24. πλούσιοι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps has in his mind Homer. Odyssey. 17. 386, where δημοφιλοῦντος are referred to,

οὕτω γὰρ κλητοὶ γε βροτῶν ἐπ' ἀπείρων γοίνων, πτοχοὰ δ' οὐκ ἄν τις καλίστα τρύφωστα ἐ αὐτῶν.

25. ἐν Θήβαις δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but in Thebes;' etc. Bern. translates δέκα ἔτῶν 'seit zehn Jahren' ('since ten years previously'), Sus. 'zehn Jahre lang' ('for the space of ten years'). In support of Bernays' rendering Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 418. 8 b, may be referred to. In Aristoph. Lysistr. 280 the Latin translation contained in Didot's Aristophanes renders εἰς ἔτων ἄλοιπος 'inde a sex annis illotus.' But I should prefer Susemihl's rendering of δέκα ἔτων if parallel passages from Aristotle's writings can be adduced in support of it. It is conceivable, though perhaps hardly likely, that διὰ has dropped out before δέκα. Ἀπεσχημένον τῆς ἀγορᾶς appears to mean 'abstained from selling in the agora.' Aristotle no doubt refers to the time when Thebes was under an oligarchical constitution; he contrasts the oligarchy which existed at Thebes with other forms of oligarchy under which it was possible for a handicraftsman to find his way into office, and evidently prefers the strictness of the Theban oligarchy: cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26, τὴν δὲ μετάδοσιν γίνεσθαι τῷ πλῆθει τοῦ πολιτείατος ἦτοι . . τοῦ τὸ τίμημα κτωμένος ἦ, καθάπερ Θήβαιος, ἀποσχημένος χρόνον τινὰ τῶν βασιλείασων ἔργων κ.τ.λ. (It would seem, if we compare this passage with that before us, that abstaining from the practice of a handicraft and abstaining from selling in the agora were much the same thing; handicraftsmen would appear to have both manufactured their goods and sold them in the agora, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26–30). Xenophon may perhaps refer to Thebes as well as to the Lacedaemonian State when he says in Oecon. 4. 3, καὶ ἐν ἐνίας μὲν τῶν πόλεων, μάλιστα δὲ ἐν ταῖς εὐπολεμίως δοκούσις εἶναι, οἷς ἐξέστι τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδενὶ βασιλείακας τέχνας ἐργάζεσθαι. Many oligarchies went further and enacted laws forbidding holders of offices to engage in any lucrative occupation (7 (5). 12. 1316 b 3 sqq.). Νόμος ἦν is probably emphatic, as in 2. 9. 1270 b 3; there was no concealment in the way in which Thebes excluded βασιλεύοντες from office, as there was in the methods followed by some States (1278 a 38 sqq.).

26. ἐν πολλαίς δὲ πολιτείασις κ.τ.λ., 'but on the other hand in many constitutions,' etc. Here we pass from one extreme to another, from the extreme strictness of the Theban oligarchy to
the extreme laxity of other constitutions. Aristotle evidently holds, in full agreement with current opinion, that to make aliens citizens was worse than making handicraftsmen citizens. The constitutions to which he refers were no doubt extreme democracies (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6-19), and it is noticeable that Aristotle does not charge even them with commonly admitting absolute aliens to citizenship, whatever they might do at special crises (see note on 1275 b 34); he speaks in the passage before us of ‘some of the class of aliens’ (τῶν ξένων, not τῶν ξένων), and refers in particular to ‘persons born of a citizen-mother and an alien father,’ i.e. half-aliens. As he distinguishes these half-aliens from νόθοι, he would seem to regard them as born in wedlock. These half-aliens would differ much among themselves; the alien parent would be in some cases a Greek, in others an European or Asiatic barbarian, and a barbarian of high or low position. Cimon was the son of a Greek father and a Thracian princess, Themistocles of a Greek father and a Thracian or Carian woman of less exalted position, and this would be much the commoner case. Many half-aliens would probably be the offspring of marriages between poor citizen-women and rich metoeci (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 299. 1). Similar differences would exist in the ranks of the νόθοι. The term νόθος was used in strictness to designate those who were not born in wedlock, even if they were descended from citizen-parents (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 190). Thus a νόθος might be more purely Athenian than the half-aliens of whom we have been speaking, for he might be the offspring of an illicit connexion between Athenians of full citizen status. Far more frequently, however, he would be the offspring of an illicit connexion between an Athenian citizen and a slave-woman; occasionally he might be the offspring of an illicit connexion between an Athenian woman and a slave. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 299. 1) holds that in the passage before us Aristotle intends to identify the νόθοι with οἱ ἐκ δούλου ἡ δούλης (33), but perhaps we need not take him to assert that these constituted the whole class of νόθοι: they were no doubt the largest and least welcome portion of it. The distinction between ξένοι and νόθοι is not always maintained: see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 297. 2, who refers to Pollux 3. 21, νόθος δὲ ὁ ἐκ ξένης ἡ παλλακίδος . . . τῶν δὲ νόθων καὶ ματρόξεναί ἐνοι καλοῦσιν, and to Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 213.

29. οὐ μήν ἀλλ' ἐπεῖ κ. τ. λ. 'Επεῖ, 'as' or 'seeing that.' The
passage implies that all States which made aliens and bastards citizens did so for want of genuine citizens, a statement which seems to conflict with 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq., where we are told that the founders of extreme democracies adopted measures of this kind, not because they could not help themselves, but with the view of making the demos strong. Aristotle leaves cases of this nature out of sight, for his object in the passage before us is to prove that States only make aliens and bastards citizens when they are forced by necessity to do so, and that, in fact, even the States which do this practically confess that some types of citizen are less authentic than others (vol. i. p. 241). Ποιοΰνται, 'make for themselves': contrast ποιήσει, 1278 a 8, and ποιώσαν, 34, and compare for a similar transition c. 16. 1287 b 29–31. Τούς τοιούτους, i.e. ξένους καὶ νόδους. It would seem from Oecon. 2. 1346 b 13–29 that at Byzantium the law requiring both parents to be citizens was relaxed at a time of merely financial pressure.

31. οὗτος χρώνται τοῖς νόμοις, 'they have laws of this nature' (literally, 'they have their laws thus'): cp. Aristot. Fragm. 155. 1504 a 25, πολλοὶ δὲ οὗτος χρώνται τῶν βαρβάρων.

32. εὑροφοινίτες δ' ὀχλου κ.τ.λ. The occurrence of δέ in the apodosis here after a protasis introduced by ἓνει raises a very difficult question. There is no doubt that in the writings of Aristotle, as in those of other Greek authors, δέ not unfrequently occurs in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἓ, when the apodosis or some part of it is opposed in sense to the protasis: see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 770. 1 a. We have instances of this in 3. 16. 1287 b 11 sqq.: Metaph. B. 4. 999 a 26 sqq.: Phys. 4. 8. 215 b 13 sqq. But the question is whether δέ occurs in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἓνει in the genuine writings of Aristotle. It occurs after a protasis introduced by ἓνει in the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics (1349 b 12, ὃς δὲ πρὸς τούτων ἐτάξε, σφάξεσθαι δόσα δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας, οἱ δὲ πάλιν ἱεροθύτα ἐποίουν, referred to in Bon. Ind. 167 a 38), but Bonitz (Ind. 167 a 34 sqq.) and Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 31) hold that in the genuine writings of Aristotle δέ does not occur in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἓνει, and Sus. reads δή in the place of δέ in the passage before us. Neither Bonitz nor Eucken, however, notice this passage: see Bonitz' discussion of the question in Aristot. Studien, 3. 124 sqq., and Eucken's in De Partic. Usu, pp. 26–31. When in 3. 12. 1282 b 14 sqq. a long string of sentences connected
by δὲ and introduced by ἐπεὶ is followed, as it would seem, by an apodosis in 21 introduced by δὲ, ποιῶν ὑ' ἱσότης ἐστὶ καὶ ποιῶν ἰνοῦτης, the presence of δὲ in the apodosis may be accounted for by the anacoluthic character of the sentence.

The same reason may be given for the occurrence of δὲ in the apodosis after a string of sentences introduced by ἐπεὶ in Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 a 3–14, where the best MSS. have δὲ in 10, though the Vet. Int., supported by a few MSS. not of the best type, gives no equivalent for it. In the passage before us we make a nearer approach to the structure of the passages in which δὲ occurs in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by εἰ, for in this passage, as in those, there is an opposition in sense between the protasis and the apodosis, but here again the passage may be anacoluthic, the insertion of the parenthesis, διὰ γὰρ ἀλγανθρωπίαν οὐτὸν χρωνταί τοῖς νόμοις, serving to break the grammatical connexion and leading to the addition of δὲ in εἰσπορόωντες δ' ὀχλοῦ. But whether we regard the passage as anacoluthic or as a real instance of the occurrence of δὲ in the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἐπεὶ, there is no need to follow William of Moerbeke in omitting δὲ or to substitute δὴ for it.

κατὰ μικρὸν παραπολύναι. Aristotle appears to be speaking of a gradual change in the law of citizenship, not of such purgations of the citizen-lists as occurred at Athens after the expulsion of the Peisistratidae (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 13) and in B.C. 444 (Plut. Pericl. c. 37) and 346 (Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 2. 289 sq.).

33. τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρῶτον ἡ δούλης. As to this class see above on 1278 a 26, and cp. Diod. 1. 80. 3, νόθον δ' οὐδένα τῶν γεννησάσιε ὑμίζουσιν, οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἀργουρωνίτων μητρὸς γεννηθῇ, where Diodorus is speaking of the Egyptians. If Antiochus' account of the Partheniae of the Lacedaemonian State (ap. Strab. p. 278) is true, and they were the sons of slaves, their enforced emigration to Tarentum would be an illustration of what Aristotle says here. The children of slaves were commonly thought to be morally below the mark (Eurip. Fragm. 966: Theogn. 537–8).

ἐτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, i.e. sons of a citizen-mother by an alien, not a slave, father (Jowett). It will be noticed that sons of a citizen-father by an alien, not a slave, mother were usually the last to be excluded.

34. τοὺς εὗ ἄμφου ἄστων. See above on 1275 b 21. For ἄμφου τοῦ ἄστων see below on 1310 b 5 and critical note on 1301 b 35.
NOTES.

δτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is not answered by ἄλλα, 38; it has, in fact, nothing answering to it, unless we take it to be eventually answered by δὲ in 1278 b 6, ἕπει δὲ ταύτα διώρισται. In 1278 a 34–40 we have a summary of the results of the fifth chapter introduced by μὲν οὖν, and in 1278 a 40–b 5 a summary introduced by another μὲν οὖν of the results of the fourth chapter, this second μὲν οὖν finding an answer in 1278 b 6, ἕπει δὲ ταύτα διώρισται. No doubt the fourth and fifth chapters form to a certain extent a connected whole, for the fifth chapter is added by way of supplement to the fourth, it being necessary to explain that there are citizens in whose case the definition of the citizen’s virtue given in c. 4 does not hold good, but still there is much awkwardness in the arrangement by which a summary of the results of the fourth chapter is added at the end of the fifth, all the more so as we have already had a brief mention (hardly a summary) of the results of the fourth chapter at the end of that chapter (1277 b 30 sqq.). It is doubtful whether the summary in 1278 a 40–b 5 is not an interpolation by some editor. It is not quite exact: see vol. i. Appendix B, and note on 1285 b 27.  As to ἐδὴ πλεῖω πολίτοι, there are citizens who share in office and there are citizens who do not share in office except under certain constitutions.

36. ὥσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ. Καὶ, ‘for instance,’ as in i. 12. 1259 b 8. The quotation is from Hom. II. 9. 648 and 16. 59, where Achilles complains of Agamemnon’s treatment of him. Aristotle quotes the words as if Achilles meant ‘excluded from office’ by ἀρίστερος. The transition was easy for Greeks from the idea of exclusion from office to that of being dishonoured (cp. c. 10. 1281 a 29 sqq. and Thuc. 6. 38. 5).

37. ὥσπερ μέτοικοι γάρ κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. s. v. μέτοικος) refers to Eth. Eud. 3. 5. 1233 a 28, διὸ καὶ οὐδὲς ἄν εἶποι μικρόψυχον, εἶ τις μέτοικος δὲν ἄρχειν μὴ ἀξιοῖ έαυτῶν ἄλλ’ ὑπείκει, ἄλλ’ εἶ τις εὐγενῆς ἄν καὶ ἡγοῦμενος μέγις εἶναι τὸ ἄρχειν. Cp. also Isocr. Paneg. § 105 and Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 6.

38. ἄλλ’ ὅπου κ.τ.λ., ‘but where exclusion from office is concealed, [there is a bad motive present, for] this concealment is practised by those who resort to it with a view to deceive those who dwell in the same State.’ Aristotle uses the expression τῶν συνοικίστεον, not τῶν συμπολεμοῦσιν, because those who are excluded from office can only be said κοινωνίας τῆς οἰκίστεος, like metoeci and slaves (c. i. 1275 a 7). How hateful a thing it was
to deceive one's fellow-citizens appears from the remark of Solon to Peisistratus (Plut. Solon. c. 30), οὗ καλῶς, δὲ παί Ἰπποκράτους, ὑποκρίνεται τῶν 'Ομηρικῶν 'Οδύσσεια ταύτα γὰρ ποιεῖ τῶν πολιτῶν παρακρούοντων, οἷς ἐκείνοι τοὺς πολεμίους ἐχθρατήσαν αἰκισμένοι ἐαυτῶν. At Athens to deceive the people was a crime (Hdt. 6. 136: Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 97). To wrong σύναξις is especially dangerous (Isocr. Panath. § 178). Most oligarchies openly excluded the many from office (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 33 sqq.), but there may have been some oligarchies, and certainly there were aristocracies, in which an attempt was made to conceal their exclusion from them (6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq.). To these aristocracies, as Susemihl has already remarked (Sus.², Note 518: Sus.⁴, i. p. 379), Aristotle probably here refers.

40. πότερον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. As to this summary see above on 34. For the omission of ἀφετήρι, cp. i. 13. 1260 a 24, and see vol. ii. p. li. note 4.

2. For the added explanation διὰ κ.τ.λ. cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 6 sq. 1278 b. The sentence, if complete, would apparently run, διὰ τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ σπουδαίος πολίτης ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ τῷ ἄνδρι τῷ ἀγαθῷ κ.τ.λ.

3. κάκεινος οὐ πᾶς, 'and not every citizen of the State in which the two are the same.'

ὁ πολιτικός. With the account given of the πολιτικός here compare Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 11, where the word πολιτικός is conjoined with ἀρχαῖοι λικαίοι. Οἱ πολιτικοί are distinguished from οἱ δημοτικοί in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 24, from οἱ ἐργαστικοί in Polyb. 10. 16. 1, from οἱ χειρότεραι in Polyb. 10. 17. 6, and from οἱ δημιουργοί and οἱ ἔρημοι in Plato, Apol. 23 E (cp. Diog. Laert. 2. 39). In 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11, ἐπεὶ δὲ πολίτον καὶ ἀρχηγόν τὴν αὐτὴν ἀφετήριν ἐναι φαίνει καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἄνδρος, Aristotle substitutes ἀρχηγόν for πολιτικοῦ.

4. καθ' αὐτῶν. Sus.² (Note 521: Sus.⁴, i. p. 380) holds that Aristotle is thinking of ὁ βασιλικός, but we have been concerned in c. 4 with statesmen who understand both ruling and being ruled, and the reference probably is to magistracies held singly and not in conjunction with others: cp. Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 109, ἀλλ' ἵπποι καθ' αὐτῶν μὲν ἀρχαῖοι φαίλοι ἢν, μετὰ πλείωνων δ' ἐπιεικῆς. Cp. also c. 11. 1282 a 40, τῶν καθ' ἐνα καὶ κατ' ἀλίγοις μεγίστα ἀρχάς ἀρχηγῶν,

C. 6. Ἡπείρ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The question raised in c. 1. 1275 a 1, τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν πολιτήν καὶ τίς ὁ πολιτής εἶστι, has now been answered, and in strictness (cp. 1274 b 38 sqq.) the next question is τί ποστ ἐστίν ἡ πόλις, but this has been answered already in c. 1. 1275 b 20, and Aristotle passes on at once to the question as to the nature of each constitution which he has marked out for consideration in the first sentence of the Third Book. The citizen has been defined by access to office, and as access to office is regulated by the constitution, the question whether there are more constitutions than one, and, if so, how many there are and what differences exist between them, is ‘next’ (τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα) dealt with. Aristotle prefixes to his discussion of these questions (see c. 7. 1279 a 22 sqq.) an inquiry into two preliminary ones, what is the true end for which the πόλις exists, and what is the true nature of political rule. At the close of this inquiry he no longer troubles to ask whether there are more constitutions than one (he has, indeed, already assumed this in c. 5. 1278 a 15), but asks at once (c. 7 init.) how many there are.

7. κἂν εἰ πλείους. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 61) remarks that κἂν εἰ is often used just as καί εἰ might be. ‘Id iam apud Platonem, Demosthenem, alios inventur, sed apud nullum saepius quam apud Aristotelem . . . Inveniuntur loci, ubi nihil impedit, quomunus ἄν ex verbo κἂν ad apodosin referamus’ (he refers among other passages to De An. 2. 10. 422 a 11 sq.), ‘sed multo saepius omnino nulla apodosis est ad quam ἄν referri possit, maxime in Politicis, in quibus, ut exemplum afferam, saepe compluribus rebus enumeratis postremo loco verbis κἂν εἰ aliiquid additur quod magis generale est (cf. Pol. 1. 9. 1257 a 38) . . . Sed etiam aliiis rationibus κἂν εἰ codem modo atque καί εἰ usurpatur’ (Eucken cites the passage before us and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 16 sqq.). ‘Simili modo κἂν εἰ etiam in ceteris scriptis adhibetur, sed saepius praeter Politica in Metaphysics tantum, rarius in ceteris, maxime in Rhetoricis, ubi semel (1. 1. 1354 a 25) usurpatur.’

8. διαφορὰ τίνες αὐτῶν εἰσίν, ‘what are the differences between them’: cp. Hist. An. 1. 1. 487 a 11, αἱ δὲ διαφορὰ τῶν ζῴων εἰσὶ κατὰ τὲ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς πράξεις κ.τ.λ. This question is dealt with in c. 7, where the normal and the deviation-forms of constitution are distinguished, and also in c. 8. 1279 b 39 sqq. But it receives further consideration in the Sixth Book: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 31, ἐτι δὲ τίνες αἱ διαφορὰ (τῶν πολιτειῶν) καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν αὐξάνει.
lowed by Sus. and Mr. Welldon, are probably right in translating, 'now a constitution is an ordering of a State in respect both of its other magistracies and especially of the magistracy which is supreme over everything' (πάντων is probably neuter, cp. 6 (4). 1292 a 26). Compare Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 27, τὰ δὲ κύρια δὰ ῥηταὶ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας ὅσαι γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι, τοσαίτα καὶ τὰ κύρια ἔστων. See vol. i. p. 243, note 1, for other accounts in the Politics of the nature of a constitution. That implied in 3. 2. 1276 b 1 sqq., that it is the ἐλθος τῆς συνθέσεως of the elements of the πόλις, should not be lost sight of. See note on 1276 b 4.

10. κύριον μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Γάρ introduces a proof that the constitution is an ordering of the supreme magistracy. It is so because it is an ordering of the πολίτευμα and varies as this varies, and the πολίτευμα is the supreme authority of the State. Τὸ πολίτευμα, 'the supreme authority,' whether One Man or a Few or Many (cp. c. 7. 1279 a 25 sqq., and see vol. i. p. 243, note 2), usually not an individual, but a number of individuals, and thus we read of οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ πολίτευματος in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 15 (cp. 24, τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας). It was, however, possible to be a member of the πολίτευμα and yet not to share in the greatest magistracies, as we see from 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 12, καταλύονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἐν τῇ διληχρίᾳ ἑτέραν διληχριάν ἐμποίοσιν τοῦτο δὲ ἔστιν ὅταν τοῦ παντὸς πολιτείματος διλέγον δυτὸς τῶν μεγίστων ἄρχων μὴ μετέχωσιν οἱ διλέγοι πάντες.

11. πολίτευμα δὲ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτεία, 'and the supreme authority virtually is the constitution.' With Sepulv., Vict., Giph., Heinsius, and Stahr I take πολίτευμα to be the subject of the sentence (for the absence of the article before πολίτευμα see above on 1276 b 28).

Lamb., however, translates, 'civitatis autem administrandae forma, quam politiam diximus a Graccis appellari, est administratio seu gubernatio civitatis'; thus he makes ἡ πολιτεία the subject of the sentence, and Bernays appears to do so too, for he translates, 'die regierende Klasse bestimmt sich nach der Regierungsform' ('the governing class is determined by the form of government'). This rendering suits well with 8–10, but not so well with what follows in 11 sqq., and I prefer the other interpretation. Aristotle proves that the constitution is especially an ordering of the supreme authority by showing that the nature of the supreme authority is decisive of the character of the constitution, from which it follows that the main business of the constitution is to fix the supreme authority. The two words πολιτεία and πολίτευμα are interchanged.
in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 6, καὶ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, and in 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 14 sqq., where τῆς πολιτείας δὲ ἀλίγων σωφροσύνες answers to τοῦ παιντός πολιτεύματος ἄλγους ὁμοίως.

12. For the omission of πόλεις after ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς see above on 1266 b 1. We rather expect ταῖς ἄλγων ὁμοίως to follow.

13. ϕάμεν δὲ κ. τ. λ., 'and we say that the constitution also (as well as the πολιτεύμα) of these' (i.e. of those who live under the supremacy of the demos and those who live under the supremacy of the few) 'is different.' It is not quite clear whether in ϕάμεν Aristotle refers to himself and his school or (as Bernays thinks) to the common use of language (cp. c. 7. 1279 a 33, καλεῖν εἴθουσαν). Perhaps ἐρώτουμεν in the next line rather points to the former interpretation.

15. τῶν ἄλλων, 'the others' (in opposition to τούτων), i.e. those who live under the supremacy, not of the demos or the few, but of some other supreme authority. Or possibly 'the other constitutions.' Susemihl takes the words in the latter way, and he may be right.

ὑποθετέον δὴ κ. τ. λ. We must ascertain the end for which the State exists and the various kinds of rule exercised in relation to man as a member of society before we can say how many forms of constitution there are or discriminate the normal forms from the deviation-forms. For in the normal forms the true end is aimed at and the true kind of rule exercised, and in the deviation-forms neither is the case.

16. τῆς ἀρχῆς ἔδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ τῆν κοινωνίαν τῆς ἀντίκης. We are concerned here only with the kinds of rule exercised in relation to man (not in relation to the lower animals), and still further, only with such as have to do with human beings as associates in life, therefore with those kinds of rule only which are connected with the Household, Village, and State.

17. κατὰ τοὺς πρώτους λόγους. As to οἱ πρώτοι λόγοι see vol. ii. p. xx sqq., and cp. Isocr. De Antid. § 71, where Isocrates, speaking of his own address to Nicocles, uses the words, ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ τοῖς πρώτους λεγομένους. The reference in the passage before us is to i. 2. 1253 a 1 sqq.

19. καὶ ὅτι κ. τ. λ., 'among other things this also, that;' etc. The passage commencing here, together with c. 9. 1280 b 36 sqq. and perhaps i. 2. 1252 b 12 sqq., seems to have been known to and used by an interpolator of Strabo, p. 419, where we read, ἥ μὲν οὖν ἐπίνοια αὐτή τῆς τε τῶν πόλεων κτίσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν κοινωνίαν ἑρώτων ἑκτιμήσεως· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ πόλεις συνήσαν καὶ κατὰ ἔθνος φυσικῶς κοινωνικοί ὄντες καὶ
21. οὗ μήν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ., 'not but that the common advantage also brings them together, so far as a share in good life falls to the lot of each.' See above on 1252 b 27 sqq., and for the limiting clause, cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 38, συμμετέχηκε δὲ οὐκός ὅστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνεχεισθαί μετέχειν αὐτῆς (i.e. εὐδαιμονίας), τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἢ μεγέν, and Plato, Rep. 421 C, ἐστον ὅπως ἐκάστοι τοῖς ἐθεων ἡ φύσις ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταλαβάσαν εὐδαιμονίας.

23. As to μέν οὖν see above on 1252 b 27 sqq. Τούτο, i.e. τὸ ἔτιν καλῶς. For the thought cp. c. 9. 1280 a 31 sqq., where however it seems to be implied that men do not come together to form the State for the sake of life alone, which does not agree with 24 sqq.


25. ἵνας γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for perhaps there is an element of what is noble in life even if we take it by itself.' ἀνεττὶ is probably not to be taken with κατὰ τὸ ἔτιν αὐτὸ μόνον as if κατὰ meant 'in'; it means rather 'in respect of,' and τὸ ἔτιν should be supplied with ἀνεττὶ. In order to show that τὸ ἔτιν may be the end with which the πόλις is formed and maintained, Aristotle shows that τὸ ἔτιν has in it two characteristics of the end of human action, τὸ καλὸν and pleasurableness: cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 17, καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὀμολογομένων δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἢκειν τὸ καλὸν ἄλλα καὶ τὴν ἥδουν' τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν εἰς ἀμφότερον τούτων ἐστὶν. Compare with the account of τὸ ἔτιν in the passage before us Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 19, τὸ δὲ ἔτιν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἥδεων' ἀρισμένον γὰρ, τὸ δὲ ἀρισμένον τῇ τάγαθος φύσεως, 1170 a 25 sqq., and b 1: Eth. Nic. 9. 7. 1168 a 5 sqq.: Rhet. 1. 6. 1362 b 25 sqq. Aristotle follows here in the track of Sappho, Fragm. 79,
where Clearchus of Soli, who has preserved the fragment (ap. Athen. Deipn. 687 a: Clearch. Sol. Fragm. 4 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 304), adds, φανερῶν τουῖσα πάσιν ὅσ ἦ τοῦ ζῆν ἐπιθυμία τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑξῆν αὐτῷ, and in ἄν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κ.τ.λ. in the track of Aeschylus, Fragm. 171, 

τὶ γὰρ καλὸν ζῆν βιοῦ, ὃς λύπας φέρει; 

(where we should read with Nauck ὁ βιοῦ, or possibly ὃς βιοῦ, or, with Richards, βίστον, δύ), and Soph. Aj. 473, 

αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἀνδρὰ τοῦ μακροῦ χρῆξειν βιοῦ, 

κακοίστιν ὅστις μιθὲν ἐξαλλάσσεται. 

Cp. also Aesch. Fragm. 392, Soph. Fragm. 445, 867, and Bacchylides 1. 30 sqq. For τοῦ καλοῦ μόριον τι, cp. c. 9. 1281 a 9, μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου λέγουσι, and i. 11. 1258 b 28 sq. For τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τοῦ βιοῦ, cp. Rhet. 2. 17. 1391 a 32, τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθά. 

27. δῆλον δ’ ὃς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps designedly refers to οἱ πολλοὶ rather than to οἱ σοφοὶ, thinking that their views are a better guide to what is natural (5 (8). 5. 1340 a 2 sqq. and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 15 sqq.), but he might have said the same thing of some σοφοὶ: see as to the last days of Antisthenes and Speusippus Diog. Laert. 6. 18 sqq. and 4. 3. For οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἄνθρωπων cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 24. 

30. ἄλλα μὴν ... γε, 'but certainly' (see above on 1271 a 20). 

τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῖς λεγομένους τρόπους, 'the forms of rule commonly spoken of.' Boitiz (Ind. 424 b 40) compares Categ. 12. 14 a 26, πρῶτερον ἐτέρου ἐτέρου λέγεται τετραχώς, and 14 b 9, οἱ μὲν οὖν λεγόμεναι τρόποι τοῦ πρωτέρου σχεδὸν τοσοῦτοι εἶσον. He adds that Bernays translates the words otherwise ('die in Betracht kommenden Weisen der Herrschaft'), and refers to Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 53. Boitiz' translation seems to me to be the right one. 

31. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις κ.τ.λ. Ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι are literally 'external inquiries,' i.e. probably inquiries external to philosophy, cp. Eth. Eud. i. 8. 1217 b 22, ἐπίσκεψισσα δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόπου καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 114 sqq. (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 110 sqq.) for a full discussion of the meaning of the expression (also Grote, Aristotle, i. 63 sqq., and Sus., i. p. 561 sqq.). Zeller remarks (p. 119. 2: Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 115, note 4) that if we give an extended meaning to the 'we' of διαφώτισθα in the passage before us, it is possible to take ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι here as referring to views advanced outside the
Aristotelian school in the intercourse of ordinary life, but that the use of the term in other passages makes it probable that Aristotle here also refers to writings of his own of a popular kind (possibly to the politeia and the peri basileias).

32. ἢ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 2. There is a striking resemblance between the passage before us and Dio Chrys. Or. 14. 439 R.

37. ἢ δὲ τέκνων ἄρχῃ κ.τ.λ. Οἰκονομικὴ ἄρχῃ is here used in a sense exclusive of δεσποτικὴ ἄρχῃ, though undoubtedly the rule of the master over the slave is usually treated in the Politics as a part of οἰκονομικὴ ἄρχῃ (cp. for instance 1. 3. 1253 b 1 sqq. and 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq., and see Sus.², Note 529 : Sus.¹, i. p. 383). We must bear in mind that Aristotle's use of the word χρηματιστικὴ also varies (see note on 1256 a 1), and that the free members of the household are its members in an especial sense, so that in 1. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq. the only members of the household mentioned are husband and wife, father and child. Thus in 1. 2. 1252 b 20 (cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 31 sq.) the household is said βασιλεύσαται, though the rule of its head over his slaves is of course not a kingly rule. Cp. Hom. Odys. i. 397, where the οἶκος is distinguished from the δώμας,

αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν οἶκου ἀναξ ἐσομ’ ἡμετέρου
καὶ δώμων οὐς μοι λησσατο διὸς Ὀδυσσέας.

Younger brothers and sisters may be referred to in τῆς οἰκίας πάσης ('the household as a whole,' see above on 1253 b 33, πᾶς ὁ ὑπηρέτης, and cp. also 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 34. πάντα τὸν δήμον). In Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 8–17 (cp. 5. 15. 1138 b 7 sq.), τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον is distinguished from τὸ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον, but is explained as existing between husband and wife only, not between father and child also.

38. ἢν δὴ. Δὴ 'vim relativi urget,' and means 'just' or 'exactly' (‘eben’ or ‘gerade,’ Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 43).

39. ἢ κοινοῦ τινὸς ὁμφοίν, sc. ἀγαθοί.

40. ὁσπερ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τᾶς ἄλλας τέχνας, sc. εἰναι.

2. κἂν αὐτῶν εἶν, i. c. κἂν αὐτῶν χάριν εἶν ἦ ιατρικὴ καὶ ἡ γυμναστική. 1279 a. See Schneider's note.

οδέην γὰρ κωλύει κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 338 a 33) groups this passage with Metaph. Δ. 12. 1019 a 17, ἢ ιατρικὴ δύναμις οὔσα ύπάρχοι ἐν ἑν τῷ ἰατρευομένῳ, ἀλλ' οὖχ ἢ ἰατρευόμενον.


4. ὃ μὲν οὖν παϊδοτρίβης κ.τ.λ. takes up ὁσπερ ὁρῶμεν καὶ τᾶς ἄλλας
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tέχνας, 1278 b 40: here as elsewhere (see above on 1252 b 27 sqq.)
μεν οὖν ' usurpatur ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur.'

8. γίνεται, 'comes to be': see above on 1252 b 7 and 1264 a 14.
παθοτρίβης οὖ, ' though he is a training-master.'

dιό κ.τ.λ., ' hence' (i.e. because rule over a household and the
rule which is exercised in the arts is essentially for the good of the
ruled, and only accidentally and in certain cases for the common
good of ruler and ruled) men imply by their acts that rule in
a State also is essentially for the good of the ruled, inasmuch as
they claim that all should hold office in turn, at any rate when
the constitution rests on a basis of equality, thus treating office as
a burden which should be borne in turn by all. No doubt this is
not the case now—on the contrary, men seek to be perpetually in
office, inasmuch as office brings great gains—but we must judge
by what was the case formerly, when the state of things was
natural. It may be asked how, if ruling is a burden to the ruler,
perpetuity of rule, such as exists in a kingship, is fair to the ruler.
Aristotle would perhaps reply that the perpetual ruler receives
a quid pro quo in ' honour and reward' (see vol. i. p. 244, note 4).
In τὰς πολιτικάς ἄρχας State-offices are referred to in contradistinction
to such positions of command as those of the captain of a ship
or a physician (cp. c. 16. 1287 a 37 and 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 19).

9. διὰν Ἡ κ.τ.λ. The suppressed nom. to Ἡ is ἡ πόλις or ἡ πολιτεία,
probably the latter, for συνεστηκιώ points rather to it (6 (4). 3.
1290 a 25: 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 33, b 16, etc.), though we have in
4 (7). 4. 1325 b 36 περὶ τῆς μελλονῆς κατ' εὑχὴν συνεστάναι πόλεως.
For κατ' ἱσότητα συνεστηκιώ, cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32, βούλεται γὰρ
ἐκατέρα κατ' ἀριτήν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην.

10. πρότερον μὲν κ.τ.λ. Πρότερον, 'in former times.' As Susemihl
has already pointed out (Sus.3, Note 532 b: Sus.4, 1. p. 384),
Aristotle has before him Isocrates' picture of Athens in the days
when the Areopagus was strong (Areopag. § 24)—αἵτων δ' ἦν τοῦ
ταύτα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκει καὶ μὴ περιμαχήτως εἶναι τὰς ἄρχας, ὅτι μεμ-
θηκότες ἦσαν εργάζεσθαι καὶ φειδεσθαι, καὶ μὴ τῶν μὲν οἰκείων ἀμελεῖν τοὺς
δ' ἀλλοτρίως ἐπιθυμεῖναι, μὴ δ' ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων τὰ σφέτερ' αὐτῶν διοικεῖν,
ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐκάστους ἵππαρχοντων, ὅτι τε ἐθέλει, τοῖς κοινοῖς ἑπαρκεῖν, μὴ δ' ἀκριβέστερον εἰδέναι τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀρχείων προσόδους ἢ τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων
γεγομένως αὐτῶν' ὅτως δ' ἀπείρωτο σφήδρα τῶν τῆς πόλεως ὅστε παρα-
πότερον ἢ ἐν ἑκάστοις τοῖς χρόνοις εὑρεῖν τοὺς βουλομένους ἀρχεῖν ἢ νῦν τοὺς
μηδὲν δεομένους' οὐ γὰρ ἐπιστρεφιοί ἀλλὰ λειτουργεῖαν (cp. 11, λειτουργεῖα)
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12. τάλιν answers to πρῶτον in δισεὶρ πρῶτον κ.τ.λ., as it answers (coupled with ἔπειτα) to πρῶτον in 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 28 sq.

13. τὰς ὁπλείας τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς. This repeats Isocrates’ phrases quoted above on 10 from Areopag. § 24, ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων τὰ σφέτερ’ αὐτῶν διοικεῖν and τὰς ἐκ τῶν ἀρχείων προσώποις: cp. also De Antid. § 145, τῶν μὲν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμολογίων ἑνευθέν γνωριμίων. Profits derived from office are distinguishable from those derived from public property, for they would often come in the shape of bribes from individuals. It would seem from 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 20 sqq. that in an oligarchy, at all events, not all offices were lucrative.

14. βουλοῦντας συνεχῶς ἀρχεῖν, as at Thurii (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 6 sqq.). Compare the reference to τί συνεχεῖς ὁδὸν in Demosth. Prooem. 55, p. 1461. The repeated tenure of the same office was no doubt often forbidden or discouraged in democracies, but even where that was the case, men might be perpetually in office, if they held different offices.

17. φανερὸν τοῖνυν κ.τ.λ. For ὡσαὶ μὲν ... ἀσταὶ μὲν compare (with Sus.1 Ind. Gramm. s. v. Μέν, p. 629 foot) 28-29 and 1. 5. 1254 b 16-19: cp. also 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sq., and see Bon. Ind. 454 a 23, where De Gen. et Corr. 1. 1. 314 a 8-9 is compared. Τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον, i.e. τῶν πολιτῶν (cp. 31 sqq. and c. 13. 1283 b 40 sqq.). As to Aristotle’s distinction of ὀρθαὶ πολιτείαι and παρεκκλάσεις, see vol. i. p. 215 sq. Is it not, however, possible that in some cases the rule of the holder or holders of supreme power, though exercised exclusively in their own interest, may nevertheless be for the common advantage? Gibbon remarks (Decline and Fall, c. 5) that ‘the true interest of an absolute monarch generally coincides with that of his people. Their numbers, their wealth, their order, and their security are the best and only foundations of his real greatness; and were he totally devoid of virtue, prudence might supply its place, and would dictate the same rule of conduct.’ Is it not also possible that there are constitutions in which the rulers rule partly for their own and partly for the common advantage?
And are there not cases in which it is impossible to legislate for the advantage of all, the interest of one section of the population (for instance, producers or consumers) being entirely opposed to that of another? In 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 39 sqq., again, we find constitutions mentioned which are partly aristocratic, partly oligarchical in their organization, and others which are partly organized as polities, partly as democracies. These constitutions then will be partly normal, partly deviation-forms.

18. κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, 'according to the standard of that which is absolutely just.' Τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον (cp. Soph. Fragm. 699, τὴν ἀπλῶς δίκην) is opposed to δίκαιον τι in c. 9. 1280 a 22, and to τὸ ἱδίᾳ συμφέρον καὶ δίκαιον in c. 13. 1284 b 24 sqq. Τὸ δίκαιον, by which is no doubt meant τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, is identified with τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον in c. 12. 1282 b 17. It is because the normal constitutions conform to the end for which the State came into being, and adjust their mode of rule to that which should prevail in communities of freemen, that they are pronounced normal according to the standard of absolute justice. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11 sqq.

20. For the place of πάσαι, see note on 1281 a 26.

C. 7. 23. πρῶτον τὰς ὅρθας αὐτῶν. We find in fact that the normal constitutions are described first in 1279 a 25—b 10. On the other hand, in a later Book (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 31 sqq.) the study of the Polity, and indeed of the lower forms of Aristocracy, is designedly postponed till Democracy and Oligarchy have been studied.

26. πολίτευμα δὲ κ.τ.λ. With all the translators and commentators, so far as I have observed, I take πολίτευμα to be the subject of the sentence. For the absence of the article, see above on 1276 b 28 and 1278 b 11.

27. ἀνάγκη δ’ εἶπαι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὅλιγος ἢ τῶν πολλῶν. Aristotle leaves out of sight the possibility that the One, Few, and Many, or two of them, may share supremacy.

28. τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον, as in 33 and 37, not τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον, as in 17 and 1278 b 21. Cp. Plut. Phocion c. 21, Arat. cc. 10, 24, where τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον occurs.


31. ἢ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for [they deviate from the true standard, inasmuch as they do not admit all the citizens to a share of advantage,
33. καλεῖν δ' εἰωθαμεν κ.τ.λ. Kingship exists for the protection of the ἐπικείσι against the demos (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sq.), but still it rules for the common advantage. Ideally Kings are guardians both of the rich and of the demos against wrong (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 40 sqq.). Polybius (6. 4. 2), on the other hand, rests the distinction between Kingship and Tyranny on the willingness or unwillingness of the subjects, but this criterion comes to much the same thing as that of Aristotle (see 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 19–23).

34. τὴν δὲ τῶν ὁλίγων μὲν κ.τ.λ. We must apparently supply ἀρχὴν from μουρχίων (cp. 2. 12. 1274 b 24 sq., where νόμος must be supplied from νομοθέτης).

35. τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀρχεῖν. Cp. c. 18. 1288 a 33 sqq.: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq., 40 sq.: Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 33 sqq.

36. ἡ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνούσιν αὐτῆς, τ. ε. τῆς πόλεως, cp. 4. (7). 2. 1324 a 15, δ' διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως. In 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 19 we have τὸ γὰρ βάρανσον οὗ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως. A definition of Aristocracy by its aim is most in harmony with the method of c. 7: thus Kingship (33), Polity (37), and the πορεκβάσεις (1279 b 6 sqq.) are all classified by their aim in c. 7. Perhaps another object with which this alternative definition of ἀριστοκρατία is added is to include such aristocracies as those described in Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 33 sqq. and 1366 a 5, where the ruling class is αἱ φιλόμενοι ἀριστοὶ (cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12 sqq.). The similarity of the language used here to that used in c. 13. 1283 b 40 sq. should be noticed.

37. ἕταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος κ.τ.λ. The name πολιτεία was already used to designate democracy (Harpocr. s. ν. πολιτεία. ἰδίως εἰόθασι τῷ ὅμοιῳ χρήσανται οἱ ῥήτορες ἐπί τῆς δημοκρατίας, δισερ Ισοκράτης τε ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ καὶ Δημοσθένης ἐν Φιλιππικοῖς, where the reference probably is to Isocr. Paneg. § 125 and Demosth. Phil. 2. c. 21).

39. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως, i.e. ‘it happens reasonably’ that it bears the common name of all constitutions. It seems likely that we should supply these words, but it is by no means easy to explain why Aristotle thinks that this happens reasonably. Giph. (p. 335) explains the matter thus—‘cur autem huic reipublicae potius acciderit id quam aliis, ut suo vacans nomine dicatur communi, rationem reddit Aristoteles; quia vix accidat ut multi virtute praediti bonum
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spectent publicum: facilius unus aut pauci reperiuntur tales, multi difficillime. Quare factum est ut regnum et aristocratia essent nota vocabula, multorum respublica vix esset nota et profinde nomine vacans,' and he refers in confirmation of this to 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 39 sqq., where we are told that the polity was of rare occurrence. (Mr. Mark Pattison takes a somewhat similar view in a note written in his copy of Stahr's edition of the Politics—'συμβαινει δ' ευλόγως, viz. that this form should appropriate to itself κατ' εξοχήν the term which is common to all the forms, viz. πολιτεία, as it must be more rare than either of the other forms, in proportion as it is more difficult to find many virtuous than to find few or one.') I am myself inclined to suggest whether Aristotle's meaning is not rather this—it happens reasonably that the polity is called by the name common to all constitutions, and not by a special name indicative of exalted virtue in the rulers, such as Kingship (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 41 sq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 31 sqq.) or Aristocracy, because the Many who rule in the polity will not be possessed of exalted virtue. I can hardly think that Bernays' view of the passage is right, but it deserves mention. He refers συμβαινει δ' ευλόγως to what follows, not what precedes, translating these words 'bei diesem Verfassungsstaat tritt nun naturgemäss folgendes Verhältniss hervor.' It would be more possible to refer συμβαινει δ' ευλόγως to what follows if we could suppose that the passage is anacoluthic, and that, when Aristotle began his sentence, he intended to write συμβαινει δ' ευλόγως κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον εἶναι τὸ προπολεμὸν, but being led to interpose after συμβαινει δ' ευλόγως the parenthetic explanation ἐνα μὲν γὰρ—γίγνεται, prefixed διόπερ to the postponed completion of his sentence, thus making it anacoluthic. But this is hardly a likely supposition. The probability is that συμβαινει δ' ευλόγως refers to what precedes, not to what follows. Schmidt and Sus., on the other hand, transpose 1279 b 3, καὶ μετέχουσαν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὀπλα, to before συμβαινει δ' ευλόγως, but not, I think, rightly. These words seem to me to be better placed where they stand in the MSS.

40. πλείους δ' ἡδη κ.τ.λ., 'but when we come to a larger number of men, it is difficult that they,' etc. See as to ἡδη note on 1268 b 21.

1279 b. 1. ἥκριβωσθαί πρὸς πᾶσαν ἄρετήν, 'to be perfected in respect of every kind of virtue.' Compare such phrases as τέλεος πρὸς ἄρετήν (Plato, Laws 678 B, 647 D), and cp. Plut. De Solertia Animalium
c. 4, τῶν θηρίων αἰτιάσθαι τῷ μὴ καθαροῦ μηθ ἀπεκριβωμένον πρὸς ἀρετήν: Plato, Laws 810 B, πρὸς τάχος ἢ κάλλος ἀπεκριβωθαί. For πάσων ἀρετῶν, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 5, τὰ κατὰ πάσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα.

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὴν πολεμικὴν. Obviously we are not intended to carry on χαλεπῶν ἡρκυβωθαί πρὸς, as we might naturally do, for this would give a false sense: what we must carry on is ἐνδέχεται ἡρκυβωθαί πρὸς. Compare Metaph. I. 7. 1057 a 37, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τι ὀσα μὴ ἐναντία, οὐκ ἔχει μεταξὺ αὐτίων 8 ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἑστὶν τῇ γάρ ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἐπιστητοῦ μεταξὺ; ἀλλὰ μεγαλὸν καὶ μικρὸν (sc. ἐστὶ μεταξῷ), and Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 6, τοιχαροῦν ὁὐ συμβλητῶν κατὰ τοῦτο, οἷον πότερον κεχρωμάτισα μᾶλλον, μὴ κατὰ τί χρώμα, ἀλλ' ἣ χρώμα: ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ λευκά (sc. συμβλητῶν ἑστὶν).

2. αὐτή γὰρ ἐν πληθὺ γίγνεται, 'for this kind of virtue arises in a mass of men.' See note on 1330 b 38.

3. μετέχουσιν αὐτής οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ δῆλα. Cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1, 2. 6. 1265 b 28, and 3. 17. 1288 a 12 sq.

5. τυραννίς μὲν βασιλείας. In 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39 sq. tyranny is implied to be a παρέκβασις of the συμβασιλεία.

6. ἢ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 2 sqq. and Thuc. 1. 17. 'It is but justice to Meg Dods to state that though hers was a severe and almost despotic government, it could not be termed a tyranny, since it was exercised upon the whole for the good of the subject' (Sir Walter Scott, St. Ronan's Well, p. 13). The Scholiast on Aristophanes, speaking of the terms βασιλείας and τύραννος, remarks (Acharn. 61), χρώματι δὲ ἀδαφόρως ἐνοί τοῖς ὑνάμασιν. Ἡρωνα μὲν βασιλέα Πίνδαρος καλεῖ τῶν ἑπακούσιων τύραννον, Εὔπολις δὲ ἐν Δήμοις εἰσάγει τὸν Πεισίστρατον βασιλείαν.

7. ἢ δ' ὁλιγαρχία κ.τ.λ. We should naturally supply ἐστὶ μοναρχία, but of course ἐστὶ only must be supplied.


11. τίς ἐκάστη τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστίν, i.e. apparently the C. 8. three deviation-forms (cp. 16—19), though tyranny soon drops out of view. For the question τίς ἐκάστη cp. c. 1. 1274 b 32.


15. δηλοῦν, 'to make fully manifest': see note on 1253 a 10.
16. ἐστὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'now tyranny is, as has been said' (in c. 7. 1279 b 6 and c. 6. 1279 a 21) 'a form of monarchy ruling over the political association as a master rules over his slaves.' Τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας appears to be in the genitive after δεσποτική (see Liddell and Scott, s. v. δεσποτικός, who compare 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 19 and Xen. Oecon. 13. 5). In c. 6. 1279 a 21 the πόλις is said to be an association of freemen; hence tyranny is evidently wrong and receives no further consideration.
17. ὀλιγαρχία δὲ κ.τ.λ. This agrees with Plato, Rep. 550 C, except that Plato adds that the poor have no share in office.
δημοκρατία δὲ κ.τ.λ. In the first form of democracy the law refuses to give supremacy either to rich or to poor, still, as the poor are in a majority, supremacy necessarily falls as a matter of fact to them (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 31–38).
19. οί μὴ κεκτημένοι πλῆθος οὖσιάς ἄλλη ἄποροι. This shows that the ἄποροι in the Politics are not altogether without property, but have not much property. Cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 20, where οἱ ἄποροι are opposed to οἱ ἐξοιτητες τίμημα, and 3. 12. 1283 a 17 sqq. They must not be confused with οἱ λιαν ἄποροι and οἱ σφόδρα πένητες, of whom we read in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 32 sqq., 2. 9. 1270 b 9, and 1271 a 30, but they do not appear commonly to have had any slaves (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5 sqq.), and unless they received pay from the State (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq.), they were obliged to work hard for the support of themselves and their families (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 4 sqq.). As to οἱ πένητες see note on 1297 b 6.
20. πρώτῃ δ' ἄπορία πρὸς τῶν διορισμῶν ἐστίν. Sepulv. 'est autem prima de definitione controversia,' and so Vict. Giph. Bern. and Sus. ('the first difficulty affects the definition'): Lamb., however, 'prima autem difficultas ac dubitatio ad superiorem distinctionem pertinens est haec.' The former interpretation is probably to be preferred. For the absence of the article with πρώτῃ ἄπορία, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30, δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρώτῃ μὲν ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἄσον. For πρὸς, cp. c. 13. 1283 b 13, ἐστὶ δὲ ἄπορία τις πρὸς ἀπαντας τῶν διαμφισβητοῦντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν, and Metaph. Ζ. 6. 1032 a 6, οἱ δὲ σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγ- χοι πρὸς τὴν θέσιν ταύτην φανερῶν ὅτε τῇ αὐτῇ λύοντα λύσει. The definition of oligarchy and democracy given in the foregoing (c. 7.
1279 b 6—c. 8. 1279 b 19) has represented the former as a constitution in which a few rich rule and the latter as a constitution in which many poor rule, and has failed to make it clear whether both characteristics (the fewness and the wealth of the rulers in the case of oligarchy, and their numbers and poverty in the case of democracy) are essential features of the two constitutions, or, if not, which of them is so. This question, however, requires an answer. A similar inquiry as to the nature of oligarchy and democracy occurs in 6 (4). 1290 a 30 sqq. (where, however, no reference is made to the earlier discussion), but the inquiry contained in the chapter before us is far the more satisfactory of the two. See note on 1290 a 30. It should be noticed that though constitutions in which the rich, being a majority, rule on the ground of their wealth are here implied to be oligarchies, and constitutions in which the poor, being a minority, rule are implied to be democracies, no place is made for oligarchies and democracies of this type in the classification of forms of oligarchy and democracy contained in 6 (4). 1291 b 30 sqq. and 6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.

22. ἃςβαίνω. See above on 1260 b 31, and critical note on 1279 b 22.

32. τὴν ἐν ἧν πλείους εὐποροι, 'that in which there is a majority of rich men.' For τὴν ἐν ἧν Bonitz (Ind. 495 a 14 sq.) compares Anal. Post. 1. 24. 85 b 36, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὅσα αἰτία οὗτος ὡς ὃ ἐνεκα κ.τ.λ.

38. διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ. With τὰς ῥήθεις I supply αἰτίας (not πολέμης, as Bernays), and take these words to refer to πλῆθος and ὀλιγοτης, translating thus—'hence' (i.e. because πλῆθος and ὀλιγοτης are accidents and not differentiae) 'it also does not happen that the causes we have mentioned' (πλῆθος and ὀλιγοτης) 'come to be causes of a difference between oligarchy and democracy.' Prof. Jowett (Politics 2. 124) and Prof. J. A. Stewart (Class. Rev. 9. 456) have anticipated me in this view of the passage. One αἰτία is made to serve for two, much as one μετέχειν is made to serve for two in 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 35, ἐστι γὰρ καὶ πάσιν ἐξείλα τῶν ἀναπεπνοόντων κατὰ τὸ γένος (sc. μετέχειν), μετέχειν μέντοι δυναμένους σχολάζειν. See also note on 1326 a 34. For αἰτίας διαφοράς cp. 1280 a 5 and 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 33, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν εἰδος ἐν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταῖτας τὰς αἰτίας. A definition of a thing must not be built on a distinguishing feature which is only an accident and not present in every case (Top. 6. 6. 144 a 23, σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ῥπάρχει τῷ ὁριζομένῳ ἦ
NOTES.

1280 a. 1. μέν, answered by ἀλλά, 3, marks the antithesis between that which is necessary and τὸ συμβεβηκός: it is on the former that the real διαφορά between oligarchy and democracy rests.

διὰ πλοῦτον, cp. 5, δι’ ἀσίτιας (i. e. εὐφορίαν καὶ ἑλευθερίαν) ἀμφιβολοῦσιν ἀμφότερος τῆς πολιτείας, and Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1161 a 2, οὗ δὴ γίνονται κατ’ ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις.

C. 9. 7. Ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον κ.τ.λ., ‘we must first ascertain what distinguishing principles of oligarchy and democracy men put forward’ [before we go on to examine their soundness], ‘and what is the oligarchical and the democratic version of what is just.’ Cp. c. 6. 1278 b 15, ὑποθετῶν δὴ πρῶτον, and 7 (5). 2. 1302 a 17, οἱ Ληπτέον καθολοῦ πρῶτον τὰς ἀρχὰς κ.τ.λ. Liddell and Scott render ὅροι in passages like that before us as ‘end’ or ‘aim,’ comparing Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 2 sqq., but perhaps its meaning here is rather ‘mark’ or ‘distinguishing principle’ (‘id quo alicuius rei natura constituitur et definitur,’ Bon. Ind. 529 b 44): cp. Plato, Polit. 292 Α.

8. τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικὸν. For the absence of the article before δημοκρατικόν, cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 37, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὸ τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικὸν.

9. πάντες is explained by Sus, as here=ἀμφότεροι. See Sus. on the passage before us and on 1273 a 8. So in 40 πᾶσιν means ‘for both’: for this use of πᾶντες, ‘ubi de duobus tantum agitur,’ see Bon. Ind. 571 b 50 sqq.

ἀποτελοῦσι δικαίου τινὸς. Bonitz (Ind. 89 b 56) compares Eth. Eud. 2. 10. 1227 a 1, εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ διακριθοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀποτελοῦσι γέ τῇ τῆς ἀληθείᾳ: De Gen. et Corr. 1. 7. 324 a 15, ἀπεσταθαὶ τῆς φύσεως. Cp. also Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 21, καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ λιαν ἄκριβος, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶν ὅπῃ ψαίει τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὸ μυθόδες. Δικαίου τινός, ‘a just ground of claim,’ ‘a principle which is in a degree just.’ Δικαίου τι is here contrasted with τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον, as in 22 with τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον.

10. μέχρι τινός, ‘[only] to a certain point’: see note on 1282 a 36.

11. οίον δοκεῖ ίσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. To show that the views of democrats and oligarchs as to what is just are only partially correct, Aristotle takes first a view prevalent among democrats and then (in
12) a view prevalent among oligarchs, and points out that neither is completely true. For ὅσον δοκεῖ ἵσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, cp. c. 12.
1282 b 18, Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 12, εἰ ὅσον τὸ ἄδικον ἵσον, τὸ δίκαιον ἵσον ὑπὲρ καὶ ἀνε ὅλον δοκεῖ πάσιν, and Eurip. Phoeniss. 513
Bothe (547 Dindorf),
οὐ δὲ οὐκ ἀνέξει δωμάτων ἔχον ἵσον,
καὶ τὸ δὲ ἀπονεῖμείς; κατὰ ποῦ ἐστὶν ἡ δίκη;
12. καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι. Cp. 2. 1. 1267 a 1, where see note.
14. ἀφαίροῦσι, 'take away,' 'strike off': ἀφαίρεῖν is here, as often elsewhere, opposed to προστὶβέναι. It would seem, however, from 19, τὴν δὲ ὀς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, that the advocates of oligarchy and democracy did not ignore the fact that the determination of what is just involves a question of persons, but that they each gave a different answer to this question and, as it turns out, a wrong one.
15. σχέδον δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the thought cp. c. 16. 1287 b 2 sq.
and Xen. Hell. 5. 3. 10, λεγόντων δὲ τῶν κατελημνότων, καὶ τὸς ἀντὰ δίκη ἑυ, ὅσον αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δικάζομεν, οὐδὲν εὐσῆκονον.
16. ὅστ' ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ., 'and so, since what is just is relative to persons and is divided in the same way in respect of the things distributed and the persons who receive them' (i.e. since a just allotment of things to A and B will correspond with and follow the just claims of A and B respectively), 'as has been said before in the ethical discussions, they agree as to the equality of the thing, but differ as to the equality of the persons.' Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 14—24, and esp. 20, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐσταί ἰσότης, ὃς καὶ ἐν ὃς. For διήρηται τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων κ.τ.λ., cp. (with Jackson and Stewart) Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 b 3, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέταρτῳ ἐλαχίστῳ, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς' διήρηται γὰρ ὤμοιος, ὃς τε καὶ ἄ (i.e. if the one person stands to the other in the proportion of two to one, a just distribution will make the things stand to each other in the same proportion). Both in this passage and in that before us we have the perfect, not the present—διήρηται, not διαφεύται: as to this use of the perfect see Vahlen on Poet. 5. 1449 b 9 (p. 114), quoted below on 1282 b 24. I have translated τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα ὄμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ ὀς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, 'they agree as to the equality of the thing, but differ as to the equality of the persons,' but there is a further question what these words exactly mean. Perhaps 'they agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing,
but differ as to what constitutes equality in the persons.' For
\(\tau \nu \tau \nu \rho \alpha \gamma \mu \alpha \tau \sigma \alpha \) is \(\sigma \iota \sigma \eta \tau a\) cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19, \(\tau \iota \varsigma \) \(\iota \sigma \omega \iota \tau \gamma \sigma \) \(\tau \iota \) \(\pi \alpha \lambda \epsilon \tau \iota \alpha \iota \alpha \iota \alpha\).

20. \textit{Diôti}. '\(\Delta \iota \iota \iota\) non raro usurpatur pro verbo \(\delta \iota\), veluti . . .
Pol. 3. 9. 1280 a 20 (quamquam ibi causalem vim habere potest),' observes Bonitz, Ind. 200 b 43 (see his remarks in 45 sqq.). Bernays and Susemihl render \(\delta \iota \iota \iota\) by 'because' in the passage before us, but I incline (with Bonitz and Mr. Welldon) to the rendering 'that': \(\delta \iota \iota \iota\) may well be used in place of \(\delta \iota\) because \(\delta \iota \) precedes.

22. \(\alpha i \mu \epsilon \nu \gamma \alpha r k . t . \lambda . \) Cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 28 sqq., which agrees with what is said here. Cp. also Plato, Protag. 331 E, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τὰ ὁμοίων τι ἔχοντα ὁμοία δίκαιον καλεῖν, οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνάμοιον τι ἔχοντα ἀνάμοια, κἂν πάντων συμφέρει ἐχεῖ τὸ ὁμοίον.

24. \textit{Διευθερεία}. See vol. i. p. 248, note 1, as to the meaning of this word.

25. \(\tau \iota \kappa \rho \iota \omega \tau \alpha \tau \alpha \tau \nu\) evidently is the aim with which the \(\pi \alpha \lambda \iota \) was founded.

27. \(\delta \iota\) τῶν \(\delta \iota \gamma \alpha \rho \chi \iota \kappa \omega \nu\) \(\lambda \gamma \iota \sigma \iota\). Cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 39 sqq. Οὐ γὰρ εἶναι κ. τ. λ., sc. φασί, appears to explain ὁ λόγος.

30. \(\iota \upsilon\) τῶν \(\epsilon \iota\) ἀρχῆς \(\iota \upsilon\) τῶν \(\epsilon \iota \gamma \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \) \(\epsilon \iota \gamma \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \μοιον, \(\text{neither of the original sum nor of the accruing profits,}' for Bernays can hardly be right in rendering these words 'whether it be the first founders of the company or their successors' (‘mögen es nun die ersten Begründer der Gesellschaft oder deren Rechtsnachfolger sein’). These words seem to be epexegetic of τῶν ἐκατὼν \(\mu \nu \nu\), 29, and to be, like them, in the gen. after \(\mu \tau \epsilon \chi \epsilon \varepsilon \nu\). Sharing in the hundred minae includes sharing not only in the sum originally contributed, but also in the profits accruing from it. The word \(\epsilon \iota \gamma \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \mu \iota \μοιον, \(\text{often used in the Revenue Laws of Ptolemy Philadelphia in the sense of 'surplus.'} \) Cp. also \(\epsilon \iota \lambda \iota \lambda \iota \lambda \) in I. II. 1259 a 27 sq.

31. \(\epsilon \iota\) δὲ \(\mu \tau \epsilon \iota \iota\) του \(\xi \iota \nu\) \(\mu \nu \nu\) \(\epsilon \iota \epsilon \kappa \epsilon \kappa\) k. t. l. Yet in c. 6. 1278 b 24 we are told \(\sigma \iota \nu \iota \rho \chi \iota \omega \iota \iota\) δὲ καὶ του \(\xi \iota \nu\) \(\epsilon \iota \epsilon \kappa \epsilon \kappa\) αὐτοῦ, and in I. 2. 1252 b 29 the \(\pi \alpha \lambda \iota\) is said to come into existence for the sake of life, though it exists for the sake of good life. The proptasis which
begins here expires in 36 sqq. without being succeeded by an
apodosis. If an apodosis had followed, it would evidently have
been to the effect of διὸσερ ὅσοι κ.τ.λ., 1281 a 4 sqq.

32. καὶ γὰρ ἦν κ.τ.λ. For τῶν ἀλλων ζῴων see above on 1254 b
23, and cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 57, line 31. Slaves do not share in εὐδαι-
μονίᾳ (compare— with Mr. Congreve—Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1177 a 8,
eὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνθρωπόφορος μεταδίδωσι, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον), nor in life
in accordance with προαίρεσις: in this they might share without
sharing in εὐδαιμονίᾳ (they might live, for instance, in accordance
with a vicious προαίρεσις, which would not bring them εὐδαιμονία).
That slaves have not προαίρεσις, we see from Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a
12 (cp. Phys. 2. 6. 197 b 6, καὶ διὰ τὸ τούτο οὕτε ἄγνωμον οὐδὲν οὕτε
θηρίων οὕτε παιδῶν οὐδέν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἄρει προαίρεσιν).
The citizen of the best State is ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος
ἀρχησθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν πρὸς τὸν βίον τῶν κατ' ἀρετὰν, and no ci-
itizen can act the part of a citizen without προαίρεσις. The notion of
a 'city of slaves' is as old as Hecataeus (Fragm. 318: Müller,
Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 124), and there was a proverb ἐστὶ καὶ δοῦλων
πόλις, ἐπὶ τῶν πονηρῶν πολιτευόμενων (Leutsch and Schneidewin,
Paroem. Gr. 1. 411) and a counter-proverb οὐκ ἐστὶ δοῦλων πόλις:
διὰ τὸ σπανόν εἰρησαι (ibid. 1. 324, 433). Just as there were those
who knew where to look for the mythical land 'where mice eat
iron' (Herondas 3. 75: Crusius, Untersuchungen zu den Mim-
iamben des Herondas, p. 73), so there were those who found
a 'local habitation' for 'the city of slaves.' Hecataeus said that
it was in Libya (Fragm. 318), and was followed by Ephorus
(Paroem. Gr. 1. 433, note: cp. 2. 371); others placed it in Crete
or Egypt; in a fragment of the Σερίφιος of the elder Cratinus
(Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 133) we read
ἐίτα Σίκας ἄφικνει καὶ Σιδινόις καὶ Ἠρεμβοῦς,
ἐς τε πόλιν δοῦλων, ἀνδρῶν νεοπλουτοπονήρων,
αἰσχρῶν, Ἀνδροκλέων, Διονυσιοκυροπρών, on
which see Meineke's note, and cp. Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 506.
On the other hand, Anaxandrides, who was a senior contemporary
of Aristotle, placed in the mouth of one of the characters of his
Ἀγχίας the lines (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 162),
οὐκ ἐστὶ δοῦλων, ὃ 'γάθ', οὐδαμοῦ πόλις,
tύχη δὲ πάντα μεταφέρει τὰ σώματα,
and perhaps they are present to Aristotle's memory here. Meineke
(Fr. Com. Gr. 5. xl) refers to Lehrs, Ep. Qu. p. 85 on the subject,
which I have not seen. Aristotle again dismisses the idea of a city composed wholly of slaves in c. 12. 1283 a 18 sq.: compare also c. 6. 1279 a 21.

34. μήτε συμμαχίας ένεκεν, διός ύπο μηδενός άδικώτατι. In strictness the term for an engagement for mutual defence against attack was ἐπιμαχία, but συμμαχία was often used in this sense, as here (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsart. 2. 387, who refers to Thuc. 1. 44 and 5. 48). We have in the passage before us ὑπὸ μηδενός άδικώτατι, but in 39 σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μη άδικῶν and in 1280 b 4 ὑπὸ μηδεν άδικήσανων αἵλόνων. The two things are not the same. To say that the πόλις is formed for protection against wrongs inflicted by all and sundry is not the same thing as to say that it is formed to protect its members against wrongs inflicted on them by each other. It is evident that Aristotle has the latter view of the origin of the πόλις before him in 39 and in 1280 b 4: hence it is not quite certain that he is thinking of the former in the passage before us, though his language is such as to admit of this interpretation. The view, however, that the πόλις was formed for protection against attacks from those outside it is a very tenable one, and deserved more consideration than it here receives. The rise of the πόλις out of a collection of scattered villages was probably often due to a wish for better protection against hostile attack than the village régime could offer. Thus the Athenian general Demosthenes was encouraged to invade Aetolia because the Aetolians lived in scattered and unwalled villages (Thuc. 3. 94. 4), and Megalopolis was founded to protect South-West Arcadia against Lacedaemonian attack (Paus. 8. 27. 1). Another and probably still more common origin of the πόλις in early times was that described by Lucretius (5. 1108),

Condere coeperunt urbes arcemque locare
Praesidium reges ipsi sibi perfugiumque.

To cases of this kind Aristotle makes no reference.

35. μήτε διὰ τὰς ἄλλαγὰς κ.τ.λ. This is the origin which Plato imagines for the πόλις in Rep. 369 A sqq. (see vol. i. p. 36). Cp. also 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 14 sqq., where Aristotle says that the buying and selling of necessaries is thought to be the original cause which brings men to group themselves under one constitution.

36. As to the relations of the Etruscans and Carthaginians see Meltzer, Geschichte der Karthager i. 168 sqq. and Mommsen, History of Rome, Eng. Trans., i. 153. The Phocaecans settled
about B.C. 560 at Alalia (Aleria) in Corsica, opposite to Caere, and about twenty-five years later (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 753–755) they were expelled by a combined fleet of Etruscans and Carthaginians—an evidence of the alliance of which Aristotle here speaks. According to E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterthums 2. 708, Aristotle refers to treaties concluded between Carthage and each of the Etruscan seacoast cities separately, not between Carthage and a central Etruscan authority; this may be so, but one would hardly have guessed it from Aristotle's language. His words appear to imply that States which were not connected by σύμβολα did not commonly trade with each other.

38. εἰς γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθήκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδίκειν καὶ γραφοὶ περὶ συμμαχίας. Not all συνθήκαι between States had to do with exports and imports, but when a State had surplus products to export or needed to import products, it made a συνθήκη with States willing to take exports from it or to supply it with imports, the object of the συνθήκη being to facilitate and regulate this trade. Compare Rhet. i. 4. 1360 a 12, ἢτι δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση δαπάνη ἵκανη τῇ πόλει καὶ ποίᾳ ἡ αὐτοῦ τε γενωμένη καὶ εἰσαγώγης, καὶ τίνων τ' εξαγωγής δέονται καὶ τίνων εἰσαγωγῆς, ἵνα πρὸς τούτους (i. e. those who will receive exports and send imports) καὶ συνθήκαι καὶ συμβολαί γίγνωσται· πρὸς δόρο γὰρ διαφυλάσσων ἄνυκαίον ἄνεγκιητοὺς τοὺς πολίτας, πρὸς τε τοὺς κρείττους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ταύτα χρησίμους, and see for an example of such συνθήκαι Hicks, Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 74 (p. 129). When States were linked together by a mutually advantageous commerce of this kind, it was important that provision should be made for the peaceful settlement of disagreements arising between individual citizens belonging to them, and hence σύμβολα were concluded between them in addition to the συνθήκαι. Σύμβολα may indeed have occasionally existed between States not linked together by συνθήκαι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων. These σύμβολα established a form of legal process for the trial of offences committed by members of the one State against those of the other, in order that sufferers by those offences, or the State to which they belonged, might no longer be obliged, if they wished to obtain redress for them, to resort to forcible reprisals. The provisions of these σύμβολα were probably very various; a common one in those concluded by Athens was that offenders were to be proceeded against in the courts of the State to which they belonged, though the prosecutor
might appeal from their decision to a third State (ἐκκλητος πόλις). What the provisions of the σύμβολα between Etruria and Carthage were, we have no means of knowing. As to σύμβολα see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. i. 2. 432, ed. Thumser, and Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 432 sqq., and Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 380 sqq. Γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας, for not all alliances were in writing (Polyb. 3. 25. 3).

40. ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. Peloponnesus is regarded by Polybius (2. 37) as in his day all but one πόλις, inasmuch as it had the same laws, weights and measures, and coinage, and also the same magistrates, councillors, and dicasts, the only thing wanting being a common wall. Πᾶσιν, 'for both,' see above on 1280 a 9. Ἐπὶ τοῦτοι is rendered by Sus. and Welldon 'to secure these objects' (cp. i. 2. 1253 a 14), but Bonitz (Ind. 268 b 8) groups this passage with 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 22, τὰς ἀρχαὶ ταῖς ἐφ' ἐκάστοις τεταγμένας, and evidently interprets ἐπὶ τοῦτοι 'over these things,' charged with jurisdiction over these matters.' I incline on the whole to follow Bonitz. Cf. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 37, ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῦτοι ἀρχαὶ πλείους εἶσιν.

1280 b. 1. For the construction, if τοῦ is omitted before ποιοῦς (with Μs P1 Vat. Pal. and perhaps Γ), cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 5. 1232 b 6, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀν φροντίσεις ἀνὴρ μεγαλόφυσος τί δοκεῖ ἐν σπουδαίῳ ἢ πολλοῖς τοῖς τυγχάνοις, but the construction with the genitive is far more usual. For the thought cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 29, τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθημεν, αὐτὴ δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιοῦ τινα καὶ ἄγαθον τοὺς πόλιτας πούσαι καὶ πρακτικοῦς τῶν καλῶν. That members of the same State seek to make each other good had been pointed out in a famous passage of the discourse of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 327 A sq., where the speaker says, λυσίτελε γὰρ, οἷμαι, ἡμῖν ἢ ἄλληλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή.

5. περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοποῦσιν ὁσοὶ φροντίζουσιν εἰνομίας. Πολιτικῆς, not συμμαχίες. The word is emphatic, and there can be little doubt that Γ Μs pr. P2 are wrong in omitting it. These MSS. are prone to omit words; they also give the next word διασκοποῦσι in a corrupt form. For ἀρετῆς πολιτικῆς cp. 1281 a 6, κατὰ δὲ τήν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, where, as in the passage before us, κατ' ἀρετὴν follows in the next line, and 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 42, τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετῆν παδευομένοις πολιτικὴν (where see note). Cp. also Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 232, ἀυτοὶ δὲ ὦ κυκλίων χωρῶν κραταὶ καθεστηκότες, ἀλλὰ νόμων καὶ πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, and Plato, Protag. 322 E. We expect oi μᾶς πόλεως πολίται in place of ὁσοὶ φροντίζουσιν εἰνομίας,
but Aristotle probably remembers that not all πόλεις cared for the promotion of virtue in their citizens. Hence he prefers to appeal here, as he does in 2. 5. 1263 a 31 sq. and Rhet. i. 1. 1354 a 18 sqq., to the practice of those who care for εὐνομία, or in other words of those who are truly πολιτικοὶ, for εὐνομία is the end of the political science (see above on 1253 a 37, and Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 b 14, Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216 b 18), and of any πόλεις which deserves the name (6 sqq.). For διασκοπέων, ‘to consider carefully,’ cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 8. 1217 b 16, where it is contrasted with συντόμως εἰπέων, and Thuc. 7. 71. 6.

6. ἢ καὶ φανερῶν κ.τ.λ. For the construction περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελείς εἶναι κ.τ.λ., Bonitz (Ind. 275 a 43 sq.) compares Hist. An. 3. 3. 513 a 14, ei τιν περὶ τῶν ποιοῦντων ἐπιμελείς, and Metaph. E. 2. 1026 b 4. Not all πόλεις are regarded by Aristotle as making the promotion of virtue a matter of public concern (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.: Pol. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12, ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιομένωσι κοινῆς ἐπιμελείαις ἀρετῆς: 4 (7). II. 1330 b 32), but he evidently thinks that all πόλεις which deserve the name should do so. Still, even where the πόλεις failed to do this, much was done for virtue by other agencies at work within it, as we see from the address of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 325 C sqq. So that Aristotle’s view that a πόλεις omitting to make the promotion of virtue a matter of public concern becomes a mere ‘alliance’ does not seem to be altogether true.

8. γίνεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for otherwise,’ etc. Sus., following Conring, reads συμμαχίων in place of συμμάχων, which is the reading of ΓΠ, but τῶν ἀποθεῖν συμμαχίων is an awkward phrase needing to be justified by parallel instances, and we should probably supply τῆς συμμαχίας before τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἀποθείν συμμάχων. Cp. Plato, Rep. 375 A, οὖν ὡν τι... διαφέρειν φύσιν γενναίον σκόλακος εἰς φυλακὴν νεωτίσκου εὐγένειος; We have perhaps in συμμάχων a similar irregularity to that which often occurs in comparisons (see note on 1267 a 5, μείζων ἐπιθυμιών τῶν ἀναγκαίων, and cp. Meteor. 1. 4. 342 a 30, σημεῖον δ’ ἡ φανομένῃ αὐτῶν ταχύτης ὀμοία οὐδα τοῖς ὑφ’ ἡμῶν ῥητομοῦνης, and Xen. Cyrop. 5. 1. 4, καὶ τοῖς ὑμιαίν ταῖς δύνασθε εἰξέ τῷ ἑσθητοῖς). For τῶν ἀποθείν συμμάχων cp. Plut. Aquae et ignis comparatio, c. II, τῶν ἔξωθεν συμμάχων.

10. καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 389. As to the sophist Lycophron see above on 1255 a 32, and see Sus.², Note 552 (Sus.⁴, i. p. 393). In Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 10 he is
spoken of as a writer. 'Ὁ σοφιστής is added to distinguish this 
Lycophron from others who bore the same name. This view of 
the object of the law was inherited by Epicurus: see Zeller, Stoics 
Epicureans and Sceptics, Eng. Trans., p. 462 sq., who refers to 
Diog. Læert. 10. 150, τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιων ἔστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέ-
ροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλληλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι: Stob. Floril. 43. 
139, αἱ νόμοι χαίριν τῶν σοφῶν κεῖναι, οὐχ ἣν μὴ ἀδικῶσιν, ἄλλ' ἣν μὴ 
ἀδικώνται: Lucr. 5. 1143 sqq. To Schopenhauer 'the State is in 
essence nothing more than an institution designed for protection 
against external attacks directed against the whole and against 
internal attacks made by individuals on each other' (see the refer-
ences in Frauenstädt's Schopenhauer-Lexikon 2. 343 sq.).

12. ἀγαθοῦς καὶ δικαίους. Καὶ δικαίους is added partly to explain 
ἀγαθοῦς, partly to sharpen the contrast with τῶν δικαίων in the 
preceding line. In much the same way we have ἄρετήν καὶ δικαιο-
σύνην ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολεισὶ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολεισίαν in 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 
36, where καὶ δικαιοσύνη is added because Aristotle is about to 
prove that ἄρετή relative to the constitution exists by proving the 
existence of δικαιοσύνη relative to the constitution. Another reason 
for adding καὶ δικαίους in the passage before us may be that bravery 
is often connoted by ἀγαθός more than anything else (see note on 
καὶ δικαίων ἀνδρῶν, Plato, Protag. 327 B, ἢ ἄλληλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἄρετή, 

ὅτι δὲ τούτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, i.e. that the πόλις is not really 
πόλις, if it does not care for the promotion of virtue. Aristotle 
proves this by showing that nothing short of participation in 
good life constitutes a πόλις, or at any rate what would be 
accepted as a πόλις by close inquirers (οἱ ἄκριβοι θεωροῦντες, 
1280 b 28)—that unity of site is not enough, even if combined 
with intermarriage, nor nearness, or even unity, of site combined 
with the exchange of products and laws for the punishment of 
persons wronging each other in that exchange.

14. τοὺς τόπους, 'the sites of two cities.'

16. ἐπιγαμίας, plural, as in 36 and in Rhet. 1. 14. 1375 a 10, 
and these are the only passages in Aristotle's writings in which the 
Index Aristotelicus notes the occurrence of the word.

τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων, 'one of those acts of com-
munion which are characteristic of States.' As to the right of 
intermarriage see Hdt. 5. 92 and Thuc. 8. 21, referred to by Eaton,
passages which show that it did not always exist between members of the same πόλις. See also Plut. Thes. c. 13, from which it would seem that it did not exist between the two Attic demes Pallene and Hagnus, whether permanently or not, we are not told. Nor was it exclusively possessed by members of the same πόλις, for it was often granted by Greek States to the citizens of States on friendly terms with themselves (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 378 sq.). The word κοινώμημα occurs occasionally in Plato's writings, but the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in those of Aristotle.

19. ἀλλ' εἴησαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφάζ αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν κ.τ.λ., 'but they had laws for the sake of preventing the infliction of mutual wrongs.' For the 'genitivus causalis et finalis,' τοῦ μὴ σφάζ αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν, see Bon. Ind. 149 b 13 sqq. Cp. Οεcon. 1. 4. 1344 a 8, πρῶτον μὲν ὅπως γυναῖκα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν' οὕτως γὰρ ἄν ὀδὸν αὐτῶς ἀδικοῦτο.

20. οὗτος εἰ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has in his mind Plato's supposition in Rep. 369 A sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 10 sqq. Καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἴν μὲν οὕτως ἐκτὸς, because he is not content with the four or eight members which Plato had implied were enough to constitute a πόλις, and wishes to place the αὐτάρκεια ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις of the imagined community beyond all question.

25. οὕτω κοινωόντες, i.e. κοινωόντες ἄλλαγῇ καὶ συμμαχίᾳ. Cp. c. 1. 1275 a 32, τοὺς οὕτως μετέχοντας.

26. καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ. We expect the optative of βοηθέων in place of βοηθοῦντες, but Aristotle continues the sentence as if χρώμενοι καὶ τοῖς ἰδίαις οἰκίαις διότι πολέσων had preceded, and not ἐκαστὸς μὲντοι χρῶτο τῇ ἱδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ διὸτι πολέσει.


30. τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφάζ αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν. Τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, like τῆς μεταδόσεως, is dependent on χάριν: it is not dependent on κοινωνία.

32. οὗ μὴν οὕδε 'his tantum locis inveni, Pol. 1280 b 32, Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 a 13' (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 10).

33. ἄλλ' ἢ τοῦ εὗ ἤν κοινωνία κ.τ.λ. Supply (with Bernays and others) ἢν πόλις ἔστιν. Aristotle often insists, as he does here, that the necessary conditions of a thing are not the thing (this is implied, for instance, in c. 5. 1278 a 2 sqq. and 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq.). What is exactly meant by the phrase 'the communion of
households and families in living well? It stands in opposition to 25, ἐκαστὸς μέντοι χρύτο τῷ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὄσπερ πόλει, and means that the several households and families do not live well singly, each within itself, but that they, as it were, throw their ‘living well’ into a common stock so that all share in it, and live well as members of a larger whole, the πόλις. The dative καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι designates the sharers: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15, πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰς πόλεσιν ἥ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, and see Bon. Ind. 166 a 61 sqq. for instances of a similar dative. The πόλις is not an union of single individuals but of οἰκίαι and γένη (= κόμαι): cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 27 sqq., 2. 5. 1264 a 5 sqq., and the closing sentences of the interpolation in Strabo, p. 419, quoted above on 1278 b 19.

35. τοῦτο, i.e. ἥ τοῦ εὖ καὶ κοινωνία κ.τ.λ.

36. διὸ κ.τ.λ. ‘Hence,’ i.e. because ἥ τοῦ εὖ καὶ κοινωνία cannot be realized without dwelling in the same place and intermarrying, or in other words without τὸ συνή, various forms of τὸ συνή came into being in States. Κηδεία, φρατρία, θυσία, and διαγωγή τοῦ συνή bring together the households and γένη of which the πόλις consists, and enable them to realize ‘communion in good life.’ The omission of any mention of the tribe is significant. It was probably too large, and at Athens too scattered, to be of much value as a means of τὸ συνή. There may well have been some who regarded τὸ συνή as the end of the State (cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 1. 1234 b 22, τῆς τε γὰρ πολιτικῆς ἔργου εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα συνήσαι φιλίαν, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διὰ τούτῳ φαίνει εἶναι χρήσιμον οὐ γὰρ ἐνδεχόμεθα διὰλογὸν ἄντοις εἶναι τοὺς ἀδικομενοὺς ἀπ' ἄλληλοι): hence the pains which Aristotle takes to point out that it is only a means to that end. Compare his language in c. 6. 1278 b 20 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 19, ἐναι δὲ τῶν κοινῶν δὲ ἣδουν δοκοῦντι γίγνεσαι, βιασωτῶν καὶ ἐραστῶν αὕτα γὰρ θυσίας ἐνεκα καὶ συννοοίας. πάσαν δὲ αὕτα ἐπὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐοίκασιν εἶναι οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμβέβηκεν ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφέσται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀπαντα τὸν βλ. There was a risk that the πόλις might be regarded as existing for the sake of pleasure like θίασοι and ἔρασι, or at any rate might be bracketed with marriage and the phratry as a means primarily to τὸ συνή. Aristotle is all the more anxious to show that the end of the πόλις is not τὸ συνή but τὸ εὖ καὶ, because he is thus enabled to draw the conclusion which he draws at the end of the chapter, that virtuous men have a claim to a larger share in the πόλις than the rich or the ἔλευσεροι. Just as Plato had spoken of festivals in Laws 653 D as a means by which men correct
and complete their education (cp. 828 A, where he takes up the subject of festivals for treatment immediately after that of education), so Aristotle regards affinities and phratries and sacrifices and ways of passing time pleasantly together as aiding in the realization of a 'communion in good life.' Another use of social ties of this kind was that they served to protect the individual from wrong, as we see from Plato, Laws 729 E, ἔρημος γὰρ ὄν ὁ ξένος ἐπάραν τε καὶ ξυγγενῶν ἐλευθεροὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ θείας, but a reference to this would not be to the point here. Compare the enumeration of social ties in AESCHIN. De Fals. Leg. c. 23, ἡμεῖς δὲ, οἷς ιερὰ καὶ τάφοι προγόνων ὑπάρχουσιν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι καὶ διατριβαί καὶ συνήθεια μεθ' ᾳμῶν ἐλευθεροὶ καὶ γάμους κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ κηδεστὶ καὶ τέκνα κ.τ.λ. I take διαγωγάι τοῦ συζήν to mean 'modes of passing time belonging to social life': cp. (with Bonitz, Ind. 710 a 38) Eth. Nic. 4. 13. 1127 a 17, ἐν δὲ τῷ συζήν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμολογούεις εἴρηται. Διαγωγάι τοῦ συζήν are tacitly contrasted with διαγωγάι not τοῦ συζήν, such as, for instance, solitary contemplation. I prefer this interpretation to those of STahr (‘Vereine für den Zweck heiterer Geselligkeit’) and Bernays (‘Belustigungen zur Beförderung des Zusammenlebens’), in which τοῦ συζήν is taken to mean 'for the purpose of social life.' Common sacrifices and festivals were all the more necessary to ancient City-States, because their citizens usually dwelt scattered over the territory, and not concentrated in the city, like those of many mediaeval City-States.

38. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον. The point of this remark, which is not at first sight evident, becomes so if we translate, 'but that which has just been mentioned' (i.e. τοῦ συζήν) 'is the business of friendship, [not the end of the πόλεις].'

40. κωμῶν is added in explanation of γενῶν (cp. I. 2. 1252 b 16 sqq.).

1. τοῦτο, i. e. ζωὴ τελεία καὶ αὐτάρκης. 1281 α.

2. ὡς φαμέν, cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1219 a 38, εἴη ἀν ἡ εὐθυμονία ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετὴν τελείας.

4. διόπερ κ.τ.λ. Compare 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sqq. Τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, i.e. τὴν τῶν καλῶν πράξεων χάριν συνεστηκτικά κοινωνίαν. Πάντες here means 'both,' as in 1280 a 9, and μέρος τι τοῦ δικάιου, 'only a part of what is just.' For the suppression of 'only' see below on 1282 a 36.

11. Ἐξελ 8 ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ. So far the question discussed has C.10. been who have the best claim to a superior share in the πόλεις, but VOL. III.
now Aristotle asks what the supreme authority of the State should be, for we have been told in c. 6. 1278b 8 sqq. that the nature of the constitution depends on the award made of supreme authority in the State. In the discussion which commences here Aristotle probably has before him Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 42 sqq., where Pericles is compelled by Alcibiades to admit that a law imposed by force whether by a tyrant, the few, or the many, is not law but lawlessness. Compare also Plutarch, Ad Princ. Inerudit. c. 4, ői παλαιοί οὕτω λέγοντα καὶ γράφοντα καὶ διδάσκοντα, ὡς ἄνευ δίκης ἄρχειν μηδὲ τοῦ Δῶς καλὸς δυναμένων.

12. For ἧ γάρ τοι Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 72) compares Phys. 8. 3. 254a 18, adding that τοι appears to belong to ἧ, not to γάρ.


ἡ τύραννος. If we hold that the Good should be supreme, then we shall have to allow that the One Best should be supreme, and so again, if we hold that the rich should be supreme, we shall have to allow that the One Richest, or in other words a tyrant, should be supreme: cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318a 22, εἰ μὲν γάρ ὁ τι ἄν οἱ δικοὶ, τυραννὴς (καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν εἰς ἢ πλείω τῶν ἄλλων εὐπόρων, κατὰ τὸ διλεγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἄρχειν δίκαιος μόνος).

ἄλλα ταύτα πάντα ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. Compare the very similar sentence in 2. 8. 1268b 3, ταύτα δὴ πάντα πολλῆς ἢ χαὶ ταραχῆς, where also we have the emphatic order ταύτα πάντα (‘every one of these things’). See critical note on 1282a 40.

14. ἃν οἱ πένητες κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318a 24 sqq. and Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 43 sqq. Τοῦτ' οὖκ ἄδικον ἐστών; ‘is this not unjust?’ The answer to this question is given by a supporter of the supremacy of the Many—‘No, for by Zeus it was justly decreed by the supreme authority’—to which Aristotle replies, ‘Then what are we to say is the extreme of injustice, if not this?’ Δικαίως, not ‘with full legal validity’ (as Sus. ‘auf durchaus rechtsgültige Weise’), but ‘justly,’ for what the supreme authority decides is ipso facto just. Δικαίως is severed from ἔδοξε, the word which it qualifies, for the sake of emphasis: see notes on 1255a 21, 1265b 15, and 1323a 36, and Holden on Xen. Oecon. 2. 8. Vict. and some others take τὸ κυρίῳ δικαίως together (‘summam potestatem habenti iustæ’), but not, I think, rightly. Νῦ Δία occurs also in c. 11. 1281b 18, but the Index Aristotelicus gives no other
instance from Aristotle's writings. In both these passages the expression is used asseveratively to introduce a statement which may be strongly affirmed.

17. πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθεύτων, 'and again, taking men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty.' For πάντων ληφθεύτων see above on 1254 b 15, and cp. λαμβανομένων, c. 13. 1283 a 42. Bernays, followed by Susemihl, translates these words 'nachdem [den Reichen] Alles genommen worden,' but I cannot think that they are right. Mr. Welldon translates rightly, 'take the whole body of citizens.' Aristotle here, in fact, turns to consider the case of the Many despoiling the Few of their property, whether those Few are rich or poor.

19. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἦ γ' ἀρετὴ κ.τ.λ., 'but certainly it is not virtue that destroys the thing which possesses it,' so that the measures of spoliation just referred to cannot be the outcome of virtue. Cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 15, ῥήτειν οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὐ δὲ γ' ἀρετή, αὐτὸ τε εὖ ἔχων ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργαν αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 12 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 235), μειράκιον, οὐ οἷον κατανοεῖν δοκεῖς ὅτι ἐπὶ τῆς ἱδίας ἔκαστα κακὰς σήμετα.

20. οὔδε τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν. Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 30, τὸ ἵσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σῶξει τὰς πόλεις. The just is the political good (c. 12. 1282 b 16), and 'the good of each thing preserves it' (2. 2. 1261 b 9: cp. Plato, Rep. 608 E sqq.).

21. καὶ τῶν νόμων τούτων, i.e. the law by which supreme authority is given to the majority, no less than that by which supreme authority is given to the poor. So we read in c. 17. 1288 a 14, κατὰ νόμον τὸν καὶ ἄξιον διανέμονα τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχαί. Where a depreciatory meaning is intended to be conveyed, as perhaps here, οὖτος is often placed by Aristotle after its substantive—e. g. in 2. 3. 1262 a 13, 2. 6. 1265 b 16, 18, 1266 a 1, 2. 9. 1271 a 1, 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 28, and 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 23. But οὖτος is often placed after its substantive where this is not the case.

ἐτι καὶ τὰς πράξεις κ.τ.λ. This was the greatest of paradoxes, for a tyrant was commonly regarded as the incarnation of injustice (4 (7). 2. 1324 a 35 sqq.: Plato, Rep. 344 A).

26. διαρπάζωσι. Bernays takes διαρπάζειν to be here used absolutely ('rauben'), but Susemihl supplies τὸ πλήθος ('das Volk plündern'), and Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) τὰ κτήματα τοῦ πλῆθους. I incline to follow Bonitz (see also Liddell and Scott), for Aristotle some-
times introduces a necessary word later than we expect: see for instance 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 31 and 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 1, where δωνασθαι comes in late; also 2. 6. 1264 b 35 (μετέχοντι), 3. 6. 1279 a 20 (πᾶσαι), 3. 8. 1279 b 15 (τι), and 1. 2. 1252 a 33 (φύσει).

28. τῶν ἔπεικεισ, who will not plunder anybody. As to the danger arising from a mass of ἄτιμοι see note on 1281 b 28.

34. ἀλλὰ ἵσως φαίη τις ἄν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to Plato, Laws 713 E sqq., where States are advised to place themselves under the rule of law, since a god is no longer forthcoming, as in the days of Cronus, εἰ δ’ ἀνθρώπος εἰς ἡ ὀλυγαρχία τις ἢ καὶ δημοκρατίᾳ ψυχὴν ἐχουσα ἥδοναν καὶ ἐπιθυμίων ὀρεγομένην καὶ πληροῦσαι τοῦτον δεομένην, στέγουσαν δὲ οὐδὲν, ἀλλ’ ἀνήρτω καὶ ἀπλήστω καθ’ νοσήματι ἐκεχομένην, ἀρξεὶ δὴ πᾶλεως ἢ τινος ἵδιοτοι καταπατήσαι ὁ τοιοῦτος τοὺς κόμους ... οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρίας μηχανῇ. Cp. also c. 15. 1286 a 16 sqq. Long before Plato, however, Pittacus had declared in favour of the rule of law (Diod. 9. 27. 4: Diog. Laert. 1. 77). See below on 1286 a 7.

36. ἄν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Plato had omitted to guard himself by explaining that the rule of law which he recommended must be the rule of good law. ‘The Englishman in America will feel that this is slavery—that it is legal slavery, will be no compensation, either to his feelings or his understanding’ (Burke, Speech on American Taxation: Works, ed. Bohn, 1. 433). Burke goes still further elsewhere when he says that ‘bad laws are the worst sort of tyranny.’ Aristotle, however, finds in the Sixth Book (6 (4). cc. 4—5) and elsewhere a great difference between democracies or oligarchies in which law (i.e. democratic or oligarchical law) is supreme and those in which it is not.

C.11. 40. ὅτι δὲ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Λύσεθαί has been translated in many different ways. Vict. translates δύζειν ἂν λύσεθαί 'videtur solvi,' and Lamb. 'videatur esse expeditum ac solutum.' Bernays translates the words in what I take to be a similar way ('scheint sich befriedigend zu erledigen'). Bonitz appears to explain λύσεθαί here as 'to be refuted' (which is also the rendering of Mr. Weldon), for in Ind. 439 a 20 sqq. he groups the passage before us with passages (Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 b 6: Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 27 and 7. 13. 1153 a 29) in which the word bears this meaning, but, if we interpret λύσεθαί thus, it seems to be little in harmony with the words which follow immediately. Sus. translates 'gegen die angeregten Bedenken vertheidigen zu lassen' ('to be susceptible
of defence against the doubts raised about it' ), but it is not easy to get this meaning out of the Greek, and he does not seem himself to be satisfied with his rendering, for he holds that the text is unsound in λύεσθαι—διήθειαν. If we retain λύεσθαι, I should be disposed to follow Vict. in his rendering of the word and to translate, ' but [the apparent paradox] that the Many ought rather to be supreme than the Few Best would appear to receive a solution ' (cp. Metaph. Λ. 7. 1072 a 19, ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν τι εὐδέχεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ οὕτω, ἐκ νυκτὸς ἔσται καὶ ὁμοί πάντως καὶ εἰ μὴ ὄντος, λύειν ἐν ταῖτα, where Bonitz explains ' dirempta sunt hae questions,' and Grote, Aristotle, 2. 377, ' we may consider the problem as solved '). But there is some strangeness in ὅτι δὲ δεὶ κ.τ.λ. followed by λύεσθαι in this sense, and I strongly suspect either that some word has dropped out before or after λύεσθαι, such as δεὶ, or that λύεσθαι is corrupt. Perhaps we should read λείπουσθαι (' to remain as a possible alternative ') in place of it. The Few Best had found a panegyrist in Heraclitus (Fragm. 111 Bywater, τὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν νόδον ἡ φρίς; [δῆμον] δαὐδοὺς ἐπονοῦ καὶ διδασκάλῳ χρέωνται ἡμῖν, οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι πολλοὶ κακοὶ δλίγοι δὲ ἁγαθοὶ αἱρέωνται γὰρ ἐν ἀντὶ πάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέα πένανθεν θυσίων, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηνται ἀκωστηρ κτήμα: cp. Eurip. Fragm. 358, (ἐσθοὺς ἐγὼ)

δλίγους ἐπαινῶ μᾶλλον ἢ πολλοὶ κακοῦς,

where ἐσθοὺς ἐγὼ is added e conj., but probably rightly, by Hense, and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16, οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον ὄρεγονται τοῦ κέρδους ἢ τῆς τιμῆς. But it is especially because Plato in the Republic had placed his ideal State in the hands of the Few Best (see Rep. 503 A sqq.) that Aristotle takes pains both here and in c. 13. 1283 b 20–35 to show that if superior virtue gives a claim to political power, the Many have solid claims on that ground to such political power, at any rate, as they can exercise when gathered in an assembly and converted as it were into a single human being. We must not take him, however, to assert that a constitution in which the Few Best and a popular assembly of good type divide the powers of the State between them in this fashion is the best possible constitution; on the contrary, the best constitution is that in which all the citizens are men of complete excellence (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 32 sqq.: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.). His aim in the Eleventh Chapter, as in the Ninth, is in the main a negative and critical one—to overthrow the exclusive claims of the Few Best, just as in
the Ninth he overthrows the exclusive claims of the rich and the 
ελεύθεροι.

41. καὶ τιν’ ἔχειν ἀπορίαν. See above on 1275 b 34.

42. καί. ‘Ipsum καὶ non sequente ei ita usurpatur ut a simplicе 
καὶ vix distinguatur’ (Bon. Ind. 41 a 36, where instances of this 
are given).

τοὺς γὰρ πολλοὺς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here probably remembers Hom. 
Il. 13. 237,

ξυμφερῆ δ’ ἄρτη πέλειι ἀνδρῶν καὶ μάλα λυγρῶν.

1281 b. 1. σπουδαίος ἄνὴρ. See vol. i. p. 293.

ὁμος stands in opposition to ὃν ἐκαστός ἐστιν οὐ σπουδαῖος ἄνὴρ. 
Compare its use in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μῆ 
ποιουμέναις κουνίν ἐπιμελείαν ἄρτης εἰσὶν ὃμοι τινὲς οἱ ἐνδοκοιμοῦντες καὶ 
δοκαῦτες εἶναι ἐπιμελεῖς, and in De Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 7 sqq., in both which 
passages the opposition is of a similarly indirect character.

2. ἐκείνων, ‘the Few Best.’


οἶν τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 15. 1286 a 29, ὀσπερ 
ἐστιάσις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς: Hesiod, Op. et Dies 
722 sqq.: St. Jerome, Epist. 26, c. 4.

4. πολλῶν γὰρ δύντων κ.τ.λ., ‘for each of them, numerous as they 
are, may have a share of virtue and prudence, and the Many, when 
they have come together, just as they become one man with many 
feet and many hands and many senses, may likewise become one 
man with many excellences of character and intelligence.’ Supply 
ἔνδεχεται from 1 with ἔχειν, 4. Ἁρτῆς καὶ φρονήσεως is taken up by 
τὰ ἡθο καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, 7. For συνελθόντων, where συνελθόντας might 
have been used (it is the reading of some of the less good MSS.), 
see notes on 13 and 1335 b 19, and cp. De Gen. An. 2. 6. 744 a 
15 sqq. and De Gen. et Corr. 1. 4. 319 b 10 sqq. As to the gain 
of having many eyes, ears, hands, and feet, see c. 16. 1287 b 
26 sqq. The Lacedaemonians dedicated a statue of Apollo with 
four hands and four ears, as he had appeared to the combatants in 
a battle near Amyclae (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 
22: 2. 264); the Erinnyx is conceived by Sophocles (Electr. 488) 
as having many hands and feet; we read of beings like Geryon 
(see vol. i. p. 256, note 5, and Stallbaum’s note on Plato, Laws 
795 C); and Aristotle imagines the same multiplicity extended to 
moral and intellectual gifts. He perhaps remembers in the passage 
before us Aristoph. Ran. 675 Didot,
Moius, virum igerun episthētai kai elth' eiti térpsiν aoidas emai,
tovn polon dphomiν laos ḍholon, ou sophian
μυρια κάθηται.

Compare also Eurip. Bacch. 358 Bothe (427 Dindorf),
sophai δ' aptekein prapida frêna te perissων para phitων
το plêbos δ' ti to philôteron
ēnωμε χρηταί te, τόδε τον λέγωμ' άν,
and Xen. Cyrop. 4. 3. 21, where Chrysantas says that the mounted
horseman gets the advantage of his horse's ears and eyes as well
as his own, and thus comes to be something better than a centaur,
for a centaur has only two eyes and two ears. The thought that
the Many gathered in an assembly become, as it were, one man
493 A sqq.) compared the Many under these circumstances to
a thêmma μεγα kai ἵσχυροι, but had regarded the opinions of this
great creature, whether on questions of drawing, or music, or
politics (493 D), as the reverse of wise, and the Sausage-seller in
the Equites of Aristophanes (752 sqq. Didot) finds the Athenian
Demos far cleverer at home than in the Pnyx (cp. Demosth. Prooem.
14. p. 1427). On the other hand, bodies of men acting as a whole
have sometimes been credited by good observers with a superiority
to the individuals composing them taken singly. Thus 'Canning
used to say that the House of Commons as a body had better
taste than the man of best taste in it, and I am very much inclined
to think that Canning was right' (Letter of Lord Macaulay,
Feb. 1831: Life and Letters, ρ. 174). 'The quick and correct
feeling of the House of Commons as a body is very striking' (Lord
Stratford de Redcliffe in 1820: Life by S. Lane-Poole, ρ. 294).
The House of Commons, it is true, is a more or less picked
assembly. Compare, however, also Plin. Epist. 7. 17. 10, opinor,
quia in numero ipso est quoddam magnum conlatumque consilium,
quibusque singulis iudicii parum, omnibus plurimum.

7. τα ήθη και την διάνοιαν. For the distinction between τα ήθη
and η διάνοια, which evidently repeats ἄρετῆς και φρονήσεως, 4, Bonitz
(Ind. 185 b 61) compares 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 38 sq.

διὸ καὶ κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον κ.τ.λ., 'hence' (i.e. because they possess
as a Whole these manifold excellences of character and intelligence)
'the Many [not only are better than the Few, but] also judge better
both works of music and works of the poets.' Socrates was of
a different opinion (Diog. Laert. 2. 42: 3. 5), and Plato also (Rep.
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493 A sqq.: Laws 670 B, γελοῖος γὰρ ὃ γε πολὺς ἤχλος ἠγούμενος ἵκανῶς γεγράφεκεν τὸ τε εὐάρμοστον καὶ εὐφρυθὸν καὶ μῦ, and 700 A—701 B). Aristotle here (speaking to some extent aporetically) echoes the compliments which it was the fashion for comic poets to shower on their audiences (Cratin. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 51: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 192),

χαῖρ', ὃ μέγ' ἀρετεύγελως ὠμίλε, ταῖς ἐπίθεσις, 

τὴς ἡμετέρας σοφίας κριτὴς ἄριστε πάντων.

10. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ κ.τ.λ., 'but it is just in this that men of complete excellence differ from each individual of the Many.' I follow Vict. Giph. Bern. and Sus. in my rendering of διαφέρουσιν. Sepulv. Lamb. and Welldon render it 'are superior to,' but the former rendering suits 16 sq. and 19 sq. better. Plato had claimed (Rep. 484 sqq.: compare the picture drawn of Theaetetus in Theaet. 144 A sq.) that there was an union of many great qualities in the philosophic nature, and Aristotle says the same thing of the σπουδαίος. For of σπουδαίοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν cp. Isocr. De Antid. § 316, τῶι καλοῖς κάγαθοί τῶι ἄνδρωι.

11. ὡσπέρ κ.τ.λ., 'as indeed men say that beautiful persons differ from those who are not beautiful and pictures done by art from the original objects.' For other instances of the chiasmus which we note in ὡσπέρ, II—ἀληθινῶν, 12, see note on 1277 a 31. For τῶν ἀληθινῶν, cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 19, τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις. Sus.² (Note 566: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 399) has already referred to the remark addressed to Socrates to Parrhasius in Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 2, and Vict. and Giph., followed by many others, to the mode in which Zeuxis obtained the ideal of womanly beauty which he depicted in his Helen. See Brunn, Geschichte der griech. Künstler 2. 80, 88 (referred to by Vahlen and Sus.), and Overbeck, Antiken Schriftquellen Nos. 1667-9, where Cic. De Invent. 2. 1. 3 is quoted, tum Crotoniatae publico de consilio virgines unum in locum conduxerunt et pictori, quam vellet, eligendi potestatem dederunt. Ille autem quinque delegit ... Neque enim putavit omnia quae quaereret ad venustatem in corpore uno se reperire posse ideo quod nihil simplici in genere omnibus ex partibus perfectum natura expolivit.

13. ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε, 'since if we conceive them' (i.e. τὰ συνημμένα εἰς ὑπ') 'to be separated from each other.' Here, as often elsewhere (see above on 1254 b 34), ἐπεὶ ... γε 'justifies what precedes by pointing out what would result if the contrary were
the case." As to the genitive absolute κεχωρισμένων, see Bonitz on Metaph. A. 9. 990 b 14, νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος. 'Omissi in genitivis absolutis subjecti exempla ex Aristotele congescit Waitz ad Hermen. 10. 19 b 37, ex alis scriptoribus Krüger, Gr. Gr. § 47. 4. 3. Usur-pantur autem genitivi absoluti, cum per leges grammaticas videatur participium ad nomen quoddam ipsius enunciat primarii referen-dum suisse (νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος idem quod νοεῖν τι φθαρέν), quo maiore vi participium, seiunctum illud ab enunciatione primaria, pronun-cietur, cf. Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 561, Krüger I. I. § 47. 4. 2. Exempla Aristotelica contulit Waitz ad An. Pr. 2. 4. 57 a 33.' Thus in the passage before us κεχωρισμένων might well have taken the place of κεχωρισμένων, and this reading is actually given by Γ and in a blundered form by Μ, but κεχωρισμένων is certainly right. Waitz on De Interp. 10. 19 b 37 compares among other passages Probl. 35. 4. 965 a 1, τὰ σώματα θυγγανών τῶν ψυχειντερά ἐστι τοῦ θέρους ἢ τοῦ κρέατος: see also Bon. Ind. 149 b 37 sqq.

15. εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν here introduces a slight qualification of what has been said (see above on 1252 b 27 sqq. and 1253 a 10): it is answered by ἀλλά, 20. For peri πάντα δήμου καὶ peri πάν πλῆθος, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12, ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλῆθος, and other passages in which the two words are used in much the same sense, e.g. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24 sqq. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19 sq. The almost tautological repetition is for the sake of emphasis (see notes on 1323 b 29 and 1325 b 10). Aristotle probably remembers a remark of Socrates recorded in Diog. Laert. 2. 34, πρὸς τὸ οὐκ ἄξιολογον πλῆθος ἔβασκε (Σωκράτης) δήμων εἰ τῇ τετράδραχμῳ ἐν ἀποδοκιμαζῷ τῶν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σωρῶν ὡς δόκιμων ἀποδέχοτο, and see vol. i. p. 256, note 1.

18. For νη Δία see above on 1281 a 14.

ἐνίων, sc. δήμων, and so ἐνιοί, 20.

ο γάρ αὐτὸς κ.τ.λ., 'for [if we claimed that every kind of demos possesses this superiority over the Few Good,] the same argument would hold in the case of brutes also, [which is absurd:] and yet what difference is there, so to speak, between some kinds of demos and brutes? ' Aristotle refers in ἐνιοί especially to cases in which the demos is composed of βίανοιοι ἄγοραίοι and βῆτες, and is therefore of a servile type (cp. 1282 a 15, ἄν γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος μη λιαν ἀνδραποδώδες, and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 24 sqq.). The βίανοιος and the βῆς have been ranked with slaves in c. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq., and the slave comes very near to the brute (1. 5. 1254 b 24 sqq.). The Many had been compared to brutes by Heraclitus (Fragm. I. I. I, quoted above on
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1281 a 40), by Plato (Rep. 496 C sq.), and by Aristotle himself (Eth. Nic. i. 3. 1095 b 19 sq.).

21. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότερον εἰρήμενην ἀπορίαν λύσειν ἂν τις διὰ τούτων κ.τ.λ. The question referred to is that raised in c. 10. 1281 a 11, τί δέ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. Isocrates had already declared for a similar solution of the question (Areopag. § 26, ὡς δὲ συντόμως εἰπεῖν, εἰκεῖν διεγνωκότες ἡσαν ὅτι δέ τὸν μὲν δήμον ὅσπερ τύραννον καθιστάναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας καὶ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν ἀμφιβολούμενων, τοὺς δὲ σχολὴν ἀγεῖν δυνάμειν καὶ βιον ἱκανὸν κεκτημένους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν κωνών, ὅσπερ οἰκέτας . . . καίτοι πῶς ἂν τις εὐρός ταύτης βεβαιοτέραν ἡ δικαιοτέραν δημοκρατίαν, τῆς τούς μὲν δυνατώτατον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις καθιστάσης, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τῶν δήμων κύριον ποιοῦση;) . Half the interest of the chapter before us lies in this, that in it Aristotle supports the views of Isocrates against those of his master Plato. There are no doubt some expressions in the passage just quoted of which Aristotle would not approve; he would also, it would seem, wish the magistracies to be in the hands of the Few Best rather than of ὁ σχολὴν ἀγεῖν δυνάμειν καὶ βιον ἱκανὸν κεκτημένου, though this is not quite clear, for in 1282 a 31 sq. he connects the ἐπιεικεῖς of 1282 a 26 with the possession of high property-qualifications.

24. θόσοι μήτε πλούσιοι κ.τ.λ. For the omission of εἰσὶν see Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7, where Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 5, καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονοί καὶ ἀνθρεῖοι καὶ τάλα ἔχομεν εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς, is compared among other passages. For ἐξίομα ἔχουσιν ἄρετὴς μᾶθεν, ‘possess no ground of claim in respect of virtue,’ cp. 2. 5. 1264 b 8 sqq. and Plut. De Adulator et Amico, c. 33, καὶ δὲ ἔχων ἄρετής ὁμολογούμενον ἐξίομα καὶ δόξης.

25. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. If we supply φύσεις ἂν τις εἶναι with οὐκ ἀσφαλές from λύσειν ἂν τις, 22, we shall thus be able to explain the infinitives ἄδικεῖν ἂν (which Sus., following Rassow, would alter into ἄδικεῖν ἀνάγκη) and ἀμαρτᾶνειν. Aristotle is still expressing the views which the imaginary τις of 22 might entertain. See notes on 1259 a 39 and 1280 a 27. Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristot. Poet. i. 51, explains these infinitives as ‘dependent on the thought contained in what precedes,’ and refers to Waitz on Hermes. 19 a 23. The strong language here used as to the ἀφροσύνη and ἄδικα of the Many as individuals recalls the language of the Persian Megabyzus in Hdt. 3. 81, ὁμιλοῦ γὰρ ἀχρησίῳ οὐδὲν ἐστι ἀξιόντετερον οὐδὲ ἀμαρτῶτερον, and that of Plato in Rep. 496 C sq., where μανία and ἄδικα are ascribed
to them; Aristotle himself, if he were expressing his own views, would perhaps use milder terms.

28. τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερῶν. Supply ἄρξης with μεταδιδόναι and μετέχειν, and εἶναι with φοβερῶν. For the risks attending the presence in a Greek State of many ἄτιμοι see [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 3. 12 sq. and Plut. Ages. c. 30. Cp. also 2. 12. 1274 a 17, μηδὲ γὰρ τοῦτον (i.e. τοῦ τάς ἄρχας αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ εἴθονειν) κύριος ὁν ὁ δήμος δοῦλος ἐν εἰς καὶ πολέμοις, and 3. 15. 1286 b 18 sqq.

31. λείπεται δὴ κ.τ.λ. For τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν, cp. c. 1. 1275 b 18, ἄρχης βουλευτικῆς ἡ κριτικῆς, where κριτικῆς = δικαστικῆς, as appears from 1275 b 16, τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ δικάζειν. Hence τὸ κρίνειν in the passage before us probably means ‘judging,’ but as Aristotle is speaking of functions exercised by the whole demos gathered in one assembly, and not broken up into a number of dicasteries, he must refer to the judicial functions which fell to the popular assembly (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 3 sqq.). When the holders of magistries are said in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq. βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρίνειν καὶ ἐπιτάττειν, the word κρίνειν is used in a different sense. In saying that, if the ἐλεύθεροι are excluded from the greatest offices, the only remaining course is to give them rights of deliberating and judging, Aristotle forgets that it would be possible to admit them to minor offices, a course suggested by him under certain circumstances in 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 27 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.

32. Σόλων. Cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 15—21, Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 7, and Plut. Solon, c. 18. As Solon gave the assembly no more power than this, it is difficult to understand why he took the trouble to institute a Boulê of 400 to aid it in the performance of these light duties. Aristotle points out in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq. the risks besetting oligarchies in which ὁδὲ ἄλλοι ἄρονται τάς ἄρχας ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄρχοντες εἰσί. Was not the Solonian constitution exposed to similar risks? Contrast with Solon’s policy that of the founder or founders of the Lacedaemonian Ephorate; this great office was made accessible to all the citizens. It is possible that Solon legislated on this subject in intentional opposition to them. The passage before us reads as if Solon was the first to give the right of electing magistrates to ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν πολεῖων at Athens. If this is Aristotle’s meaning, we must suppose that in 2. 12. 1273 b 41 sqq., where he says that Solon found the magistrates already appointed by election, he means that, though they were thus appointed before Solon’s time,
they were not elected by the people. On the question whether
Aristotle's statements as to Solon here and in 1282 a 25 sqq. and
2. 12. 1274 a 15 sqq. are reconcilable with 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 8, τὰς ὅρ.
ἁρχάς ἐποίησε (sc. ὁ Σόλων) κληροτάς ἐκ προκρίτων, [ο]ὶς ἐκάσιο]τη προ-
κρίνει τῶν φιλῶν προβρίσαν δ' εἰς τοὺς ἐννέα ἐκάστη δέκα, καὶ
τοῦ[τοις] ἐ[πεκλήρων (or καὶ [ἐκ] το[ῦ]ν ἐκλήρων), Gilbert (Const.
Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 136. 1) and Busolt
(Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 275. 1) take opposite views, the former thinking
that they are and the latter that they are not. To me the latter
view seems to be the true one.

τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθέτων. Hippodamus allowed the demos in
his ideal State the right of electing the magistrates (2. 8. 1268 a
11), but (so Aristotle thinks) excluded the cultivators and artisans
from the most important offices (1268 a 20 sqq.). In some oligar-
chies the demos, though excluded from office, had the right of
electing the magistrates (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.).

τάττουσιν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀρχαιοσίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 151,
ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς πράξεις σὲ τάττουσι, νομίζοντες τοὺτων μὲν σὲ κάλλιστ' ἄν
ἐπισταθήσαι κ.τ.λ. (Liddell and Scott s. v. τάσσω i. r.). Aristotle
speaks here as if to give the Many the right of electing the magis-
trates was equivalent to giving them deliberative authority; he
distinguishes the two things, however, in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq.
As to ἐπὶ τῇ κ.τ.λ. see note on 1284 a 35.

34. κατὰ μόνας. See vol. i. p. 257, note 2, and cp. Plato, Polit.
292 B, κατὰ πρότασ. The expression probably includes magis-
tracies administered by Boards in addition to those held by single
individuals.

35. For the order of the words in ἰκανὴν αἰσθήσιν see note on
1275 a 32.

μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίωσι, cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20, βουλεύσοντα γὰρ
βελτίων κακῆ βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ὁ μὲν δὴμος μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων, οὔτε δὲ
μετὰ τοῦ πλῆθους. Dr. Arnold has already compared the passage
before us with Thuc. 6. 18. 6, where Alcibiades says, καὶ νομίζατε
νεότητα μὲν καὶ γῆρας ἄνευ ἄλληλων μὴν δύνασθαι, ὅμως δὲ τὸ τε φαίλων
καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάν ἀκριβὲς ἄν εὐγκραθῆν μάλιστ' ἄν ἱσχύειν.
See also above on 1276 b 37.

36. ἡ µῆ καθαρὰ τροφή. Food in a more or less raw state,
standing in need of some further working-up to fit it for consump-
tion, is termed 'impure food' in De Gen. An. 1. 20. 728 a 26, ἔστι
γὰρ τὰ καταμία σπέρμα ὁὐ καθαρὸν ἄλλα διόμενον ἐργασίας, ὁστερ ἐν τῇ
περὶ τοῦς καρποὺς γενέσθαι, ὅταν ἤ μίπω διητημένη (διητημένη Ζ, followed by Aubert and Winmer, 'sifted through,' from διατίθαι), ἔνεστι μὲν ἡ τροφή, δεῖται δὲ ἐργασία πρὸς τὴν κάθαρσιν· διό καὶ μεγνυμένη ἐκεῖνη μὲν τῇ γούθῃ, ἀυτὴ δὲ καθαρὰ τροφή, ἢ μὲν γεννᾶ, ἢ δὲ τρέφει. Ὅπερ. 

De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 a 14, τῆς μὲν οὖν πρώτης τροφῆς περίττωμα φλέγμα καὶ έἰ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον καὶ γὰρ τὸ φλέγμα τῆς χρησίμου τροφῆς περίττωμα ἔστιν σημείον δ' ὅτι μεγνυμένον τροφή καθαρὰ τρέφει καὶ ποιοῦσι καταναλώσεις. In Athen. Deipn. 109 c a καθαρὸς ἄρτος, or 'loaf of pure meal,' is opposed to a συγκοματός ἄρτος, or 'loaf of unbolstered' (i.e. 'unsifted') 'meal,' and in Hippocr. De Victus Ratione (vol. i. p. 673 Kühn) καθαρὰ ἀλευρα are opposed to συγκοματὰ ἀλευρα. Aristotle evidently thinks that a large quantity of pure and impure food together is more nutritious than a smaller quantity of pure food. He was much interested in questions about diet (Plut. Alex. c. 8, δοκεῖ δὲ μου καὶ τὸ φιλιατρεῖν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ προστρίφασθαι μᾶλλον ἐτέρων Ἀριστοτέλεις, οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῇ τεωρίᾳ ἡγάπησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνούσιν ἐζοηθεὶ τοῖς φιλαῖς καὶ συνέταττε θεραπείας τινᾶς καὶ διαίτας, ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν λαβεῖν ἐστιν). 


41. I have not traced elsewhere the construction ποιήσαι ὑμᾶς τὴς νόσου τῆς παρούσης, though Liddell and Scott give ὑγιασθείς τοῦ τραύματος from Anon. ap. Suid. s. v. ἱγιασθεῖς. 

42. οὖτος 8' ἐστίν ιατρός. Ms P1 and possibly Ρ add ὁ before ιατρός, but probably wrongly: see above on 1253 b 11 and cp. c. 4. 1277 b 15, αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολλοῦ, and 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32. See also Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. We must apparently supply ἐχει. For similar omissions of ἐχει see Bon. Ind. 306 a 16 sqq. 

1. τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. See note on 1297 b 20. 1282 a. The two words are conjoined also in 1. 9. 1257 a 4 and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 21. 

3. ιατρός δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and we give the name of physician to the executant, and to the man of directing skill, and thirdly to the man who is merely cultivated in the science.' For the contrast of δημιουργός and ἄρχητεκτονίκος, cp. Polyb. 8. 9. 2, 'Ιέρωνος μὲν χορηγοῦ
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gegonoton, ἀρχιτέκτων δὲ καὶ δημιουργοῦ τῶν ἐπινοημάτων Ἀρχιμήδους. In 1. 3. 1253 b 38 the ἀρχιτέκτων is contrasted with the ὑπηρέτης and in Metaph. A. 1. 981 a 30 sqq. and b 31 sq. with the κειροτέχνης. As to ὁ πεπαθευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην, Coray compares Plato, Protag. 312 B, ὅπερ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ θεατρόποι καὶ παιδοτρίβοι τούτων γὰρ σὺν ἐκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνη ἐμαθεῖς, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδεία, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει, and Bonitz (Ind. 558 a 4), De Part. An. i. 1. 639 a 1, peri πᾶσαν δεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινωτέρας τε καὶ τιμωτέρας, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἐξοσίας εἶναι, ὥς τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλὸς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' οὖν παιδείαν τινά: πεπαθευμένον γὰρ ἔστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρίνα στοχὸς τι καλῶς ἢ μη καλῶς ἀποδίδουσιν ὁ λέγων.

4. εἰσὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See critical note on 1282 a 5.

7. τὴν αἰρέσιν, 'the election' of magistrates and other masters of an art, as well as the review of their conduct.

8. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλέεθαι ὀρθῶς κ.τ.λ., 'for choosing rightly also [no less than judging rightly] is the work of those who know the particular science or art.' The force of καί is here retained in καὶ γὰρ. Compare the remarks of Cicero in Pro Plancio 3. 7 and 4. 9.

10. εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for if in the case of some kinds of work and some arts some non-scientific persons also do share in the ability to make a good choice, they do not do so in a higher degree than the scientific.' Supply τοῦ ἐλεέθαι ὀρθῶς with μετέχουσιν. Coray, followed by Bekk., would read οὗ τοι in place of οὗ τι, but οὗ τι seems to be right here: see Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 70, who remarks, 'hoc videtur praemittendum esse, οὗτοι ita distare ab οὗτι, ut illud sententiam restringi significet, cum τι ad οὗ addito nihil aliud nisi particularæ negantis vis presumitur.' See also Bon. Ind. 539 b 18 sqq. The passage before us was perhaps present to the memory of Dionysius of Halicarnassus in De Thucyd. iud. 4, οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰς Ἀπελλοῦ καὶ Ζεύξιδος καὶ Προτόγενου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γραφέων τῶν διώμησεμένων τέχνας οἱ μὴ τὰς αὕτας ἐξοντες ἑκεῖνοι ἀρετὰς κρίνεις κακῶλυται' οὐδὲ τὰ Πειδίου καὶ Πολυκλετοῦ καὶ Μύρωνος ἔργα οἱ μὴ τημικοῦτοι δημιουργοί' εὖ γὰρ λέγειν, ὅτι πολλῶν ἔργων οὐχ ἤττων τοῦ τεχνίτου κριτῆς ὁ ἱδιώτης.

15. ἀν ἣ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες. In a passage of the Laws (701 A) which Aristotle probably has before him here Plato had said that the theatrikrateia which sprang up at Athens after the Persian War would have mattered less if the demos had consisted of ἐλεύθεροι ἄνδρες.
18. peri eπίων, sc. τεχνών. Aristotle would not say this of geometry, for instance.

μόνον ο ἑοιμάς. See critical note.

20. ἀλλὰ καὶ βάττιον κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 601 D, οὐκειον ἀρετή καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὑράθης ἐκάστου σκεύεως καὶ ζύφων καὶ πρᾶξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι· τὴν χρειάν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἦν ἄν ἐκατὼν ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ πεφυκός; Οὕτω. Πολλὴ ἡρὰ ἀνάγκη τὸν χρῷμενον ἐκάστῳ ἐμπειρῶτατον τε εἶναι καὶ ἄγγελον γίγνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ οἷα ἁγαθὰ· καὶ κακὰ ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ ὁ χρήτας· οἴων αὐλητής ποιν αὐλοποιῷ ἐξαγγελεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν οἶ ἄν ὑπηρέτωσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖ, καὶ ἐπιτάξει οίων δεῖ ποιεῖν· ὁ δ’ ὑπηρετήσει, καὶ Cratyl. 390. Yet if the user is a better judge of the excellence of some articles than the maker, it does not follow that some users are not better judges than others.

22. καὶ θοίνην ὁ δαίτμων ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος. For the thought see vol. i. p. 258, note 1. Cp. also Alexis, Fragm. Λύσος (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 444), καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑποκριτῶν πολὺ κράτιστος ἐστὶν ὑφοποιὸς, ὡς δοκεῖ τῶν χρωμένων, τῶν δ’ ὑφοποιῶν ὑποκριτῆς.

25. δοκεῖ γάρ κ.τ.λ. This probably refers to Plato, Laws 945 B sqq.: see vol. i. p. 258.


28. As to τῶι δήμοις and ἡ ἐκκλησία, see above on 1275 b 7.

29. καίτοι κ.τ.λ. introduces a proof that members of the assembly, etc., are φαύλοι (26). So much mixed up is the conception of φαύλος and ἐπιείκεια with wealth and poverty. It is here implied that the Boulê is not one of αἱ μέγισται ἄρχαι, whereas in 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 30—b 17 it is grouped with the offices of stratēgus and euthynus and logistēs and counted among the most important magistracies. Notwithstanding what is said here, a high property-qualification was sometimes required for membership of the assembly, and sometimes none at all (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq.). At Athens no one could be a member of the Boulê or the Heliaea till he was thirty years of age (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 265, 392), but Aristotle would perhaps regard this as ἡ τυχήσα αὐλία. We read of Solon in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 7, τάς μ[ἐν οἷς] ἄρχαι ἀπένειμεν ἄρχειν ἐκ πεντακοσιομεδίμνων καὶ ἱππεῶν καὶ ζευγίτων, τῶι
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entrée ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ταμίας . . . τοῖς δὲ τὸ θητικῶν τελοῦσιν ἐκκλησίας καὶ δικαστηρίων μετέδοκε μόνον. Solon, in fact, required the ταμία τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς to be Pentacosiomediimni, and the law was the same in Aristotle’s day, but it was no longer observed (’Αθ. Πολ. c. 47 ἴνι. : c. 7 sub fin.: c. 8. 1. 7). It does not appear that there was any property-qualification for the office of stratēgus at Athens, for the stratēgi are said to be elected ‘from all’ (Gilbert, ibid. p. 230).

33. καὶ ταῦτα, i.e. the giving of greater powers to men possessed of a small property-qualification only and youthful in years than to men possessed of a high property-qualification, no less than the giving to unskilled persons of the right to elect magistrates and to review their conduct in office.

36. μόριον ἐστὶ τούτων, ‘is only a part of these.’ For the suppression of ‘only’ cp. c. 9. 1281 a 9, c. ii. 1282 b 4, and c. 15. 1286 b 8, and see notes on 1336 b 26, 1340 a 34, and 1292 a 32.

λέγω δὲ μόριον κ.τ.λ. This explanation seems unnecessary, but see above on 1277 b 37 and below on 1282 b 39. See also Vahlen on Poet. 13. 1453 a 4.

40. πάνων τούτων, i.e. the members of the demos, the Boule, and the dicastery.

τὸ τῶν καθ’ ἑαυτὰ καὶ κατ’ ὀλίγους κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1278 b 4, κύριος ἢ καθ’ αὐτὸν ἢ μετ’ ἀλλων τῆς τῶν κοινών ἐπιμελείας.

1282 b. 1. ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεξθεισά ἄπορια, i.e. the discussion on the ἀπορία raised in c. 10. 1281 a ii, τι δὲ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. This discussion has made it clear that the check of law is necessary to prevent the Many or the Few committing injustice, and that law must be just law if it is to do this.

4. περὶ τούτων, ‘only about those things’ (see above on 1282 a 36).

ἐξαδυνατοῦσιν, ‘are wholly unable.’

7. τὸ πάλαι διαπορθέν, i.e. τί δὲ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.

8. ἄλλα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘but it must needs be also that as the constitutions [to which laws belong] are bad or good and just or unjust, so the laws also are the same—this, however, is clear that the laws must be adjusted to the constitution, [not the constitution to the laws]—but if this is so, it is evident that laws in accordance with the normal constitutions must necessarily be just and laws in accordance with the deviation-forms not just.’ For the view that laws vary with constitutions, cp. Plato, Laws 714 B sq. Cp. also 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 13, πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας τοὺς νόμους δὲ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται πάντες, ἄλλ’ οὐ τὰς πολιτείας πρὸς τοὺς
vómous. Demosthenes insists on this also: see Hug, Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum, p. 79, where Demosth. c. Androt. c. 30 is referred to, ἀξίων τοῖνυ, ὦ ἀνδρέε 'Ἄθηναιοι, καὶ τῶν βίων τῶν νόμων ἔξετάσαι Σιδώναι, καὶ θεάσασθαι ὅσην πρόνοιαν ἐποιεῖτο ἐν ἀπαιν ὦς ἐτίθει νόμως τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ὅσφ περὶ τούτων μάλλον ἐσπούδαζεν ἢ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ oδ tιδεῖ ὑν νόμων, and also Demosth. in Lept. cc. 105–109, where the variation of the laws respecting rewards under different constitutions is traced. Sus. has already referred to Isocr. Areopag. § 14, ταύτη (i. e. τῇ πολιτείᾳ) καὶ τοὺς νόμονι καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἀναγκαῖων ἐστιν, ὑμοιὸνθα, καὶ πράττειν οὕτως ἑκάστους οὖσαντε ἐν ταύτῃ ἔχοσιν. Εἰ τούτο (11), sc. φανερὸν ἐστί.

14 sqq. Aristotle's inquiries have so far led him to the conclusion that the true supreme authority is to be found in 'laws in accordance with the normal constitutions,' and we expect him (see vol. i. p. 259) to go on and ask what laws are in accordance with the normal constitutions, but perhaps he feels that he has not yet sufficiently studied how normal or just constitutions should be organized, and that till he has done this he cannot decide what laws are in accordance with them. At all events, instead of asking this question, he makes a new start in the Twelfth Chapter and learns from a renewed inquiry into the nature of Political Justice, (1) that a just or normal constitution will recognize in its distribution of power all attributes which contribute to the being and well-being of the State, and not one of them only, and (2) that under given circumstances the conclusion at which he has arrived in favour of the supremacy of law does not hold good, and that Justice may require that the State shall be ruled not by law, but by the will of an Absolute King supreme over all law. To this extent then the conclusion reached at the end of c. 11 needs to be modified. In teaching that account ought to be taken of other things besides virtue in the award of political power, and that superiority in virtue alone, unless it is transcendent, gives no just claim to exclusive political supremacy, Aristotle differs from the language held by Plato in Laws 756 E–758 A, and especially 757 C, where we read of the nobler of the two kinds of ἰσότης (ἡ ἀληθεστάτη καὶ ἀρίστη ἰσότη), τῷ μὲν γὰρ μείζον πλέον, τῷ δὲ ἐλάττων σαμικρέται νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρός τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν έκατέρω, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμάς μείζον μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ ἐλεόμενοι, τοὺς δὲ τοιούτουν ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τῷ πρέπον ἐκατέρως ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον' ἐστὶ γὰρ δὴ που καὶ το πολιτικόν ἢμιν ἢ τοιν' αὐτό, τὸ δίκαιον. He probably has

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also before him Rep. 540 D, when one as evident philosophy, dialectics, he argues, is, in performance, towards many who argue forcibly... to the rhetor per or and many others... and especially not only, but also to a great extent, to the disciples, and to those who conclude the same and others assert it. Cf. Isoc. Archid. § 35.

'Epētē dē k. t. l. Here begins a long string of protases introduced by ἐπεί, which lack an expressed apodosis to take them up: compare i. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq. The virtual apodosis perhaps comes in 21, ποιῶν δ' ισότης κ. τ. λ., unless we supply after τὸ κοινῷ συμφέρον we shall do well to inquire what the just is. Compare Magn. Mor. i. i. 1182 b 1, ἀλλὰ μὴν γε πολιτικὴ βελτίστη δύναμις, ὥστε τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἂν εἴη ἁγαθῶν. For ἁγαθῶν (not τὸ ἁγαθὸν) see Stallbaum on Plato, Hipp. Mag. 293 E. For μᾶλλον see note on 1252 a 4. That τὸ πολιτικὸν ἁγαθὸν is τὸ δίκαιον might be guessed from Pol. 2. 1261 a 30, διόπερ τὸ ἓσον τὸ ἀντίϋπτου ἄφαινε τάς πόλεις, taken with 1261 b 9, καθοτά τὸ γε ἐκάστον ἁγαθὸν σώζει ἐκαστόν. As to ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις, 'αἱ μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις idem fere sunt ac τέχναι et ἐπιστήμαι, itaque saepe χρώματα vel coniungitur cum verbis τέχνην, ἐπιστήμην vel pro synonymo usurpatur' (Bon. Ind. 207 b 4 sqq.). The three terms are already used in conjunction by Isocrates in Panath. § 30, ἐπειδὴ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδοκιμάζῃ.

17. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῷ συμφέρον, 'and by the just I mean that which is for the common advantage.' Cp. i. 9. 1257 a 19, ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν οἰκία). Aristotle adds this remark because he has already explained in c. 6 that the common advantage is the end for which the State originally comes into being and the end of all normal constitutions: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. ii. 1160 a 11 sqq. and Rhet. i. 6. 1362 b 27 sq.

18. δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἵσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. Cp. c. 9. 1280 a 11 (where see note). By ἵσον τι is probably meant ἵσον καὶ ἀναλογίαν: cp. 7 (5). i. 1301 a 26, πάντων μὲν ἀμοιλογοῦντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καὶ ἀναλογίαν ἵσον.

19. τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, εὖ οἷς διώρισται περὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν. The reference appears to be to Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 9 sqq. Popular opinion is distinguished from 'philosophical inquiries' very much as in Eth. Eud. i. 8. 1217 b 22, ἐπέσκεψαι δὲ πολλοὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοι καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν: cp. De Part. An. i. 1. 642 a 4, τῶν μὲν γὰρ δύο τρόπων ὁμοίως ὁμοίως τῇ ὑπάρχει, τῶν διωρισμένων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν. See Bon. Ind. 821 a 18 sqq., and cp. Plato, Symp. 218 A, τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων.
20. τι γὰρ καὶ τινὶ τὸ δίκαιον, 'for that which is just is a thing and has to do with persons,' or, in other words, justice involves an assignment of a thing to persons.

22. ἔχει γὰρ τοὺς ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν, 'for this inquiry is productive of questions and of philosophical speculation on politics.' For ἔχει see above on 1268 b 24. It is a merit in inquiries to give rise to aporetic discussion: see above on 1275 b 34. Bonitz (Ind. 820 b 58 sqq.) compares Phys. i. 2. 185 a 17, οὗ μὴν ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ περὶ φύσεως μὲν ὦ, φυσικὰς δὲ ἀπορίας συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ἵσων ἔχει καλῶς ἐπὶ μικρῶν διαλεξθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν' ἔχει γὰρ φιλοσοφίαν ἡ σκέψις, and Eth. Eud. i. i. 1214 a 12, ὅσα μὲν ὦν ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μύνον θεωρητικὴν, λεκτέων κατὰ τῶν ἐπιβάλλοντα καρπῶν, ὁ τι περ ὀικείον ἦν τῇ μεθόδῳ. Cp. also 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 30.

23. ἢσος γὰρ ἂν φαίνῃ τις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps has before him the discussion in Plato, Gorg. 490 B sqq. He may possibly have thought that Plato lent some countenance to the view criticized by him when he said of true Justice in Laws 757 C, τὸ μὲν γὰρ μείζον τὸ πλέον, τῷ δ' εὐγενείᾳ συμφόρηται νεῖμε, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὸν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῳ, yet it is likely that Plato's language in Rep. 454 C (esp. ἐκείνο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως τε καὶ ὀμοιώσεως μὸνον ἐφυλάστομεν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τεῖνον τὰ ἐπιτήδευματα) suggested to Aristotle the distinction between the work attributes contributing to the done and others. See also below on 27.


25. μηδὲν διαφέροις ἄλλῳ ὀμοιοὶ τυχόνοις ὄντες. For this 'abundantia contraria copulandi,' see Vahlen on Poet. 1. 1447 a 17, who refers among other passages to Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 41, ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχειν τρόπον.

26. τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαιν. Καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαιν is added in explanation of τὸ δίκαιον (see note on 1257 b 7) and to show that the kind of τὸ δίκαιον referred to is that which rests on ἀξία, for Q 2
there is another kind of τὸ δίκαιον (§ 6). 2. 1317 b 3, καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικόν τὸ ἵσων ἦχιν ἐστὶ κατὰ ὰρθῶν ἄλλα μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν). That this kind alone is truly just we see from 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16, οἷοιον οὕτως ἀμφότεροι νεκρούσαν συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον ἦναί τὸν ἦχιν γὰρ αὕτη ἢ διαίρεσοι τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν.

27. ἄλλα μὴν κ.τ.λ. In correcting this error (cp. 1283 a 11-14) Aristotle probably before him saying of Solon (Diod. 9. 2. 5, ὁ Σόλων ἑγεῖτο τοὺς μὲν πύκνας καὶ σταδικαῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπεπτᾶς μηδὲν ἀξίωσον συμβάλλεσθαι ταῖς πόλεις πρὸς σωτηρίαν, τοῖς δὲ φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ διαφέροντας μόνοις δύνασθαι τὰς πατρίδας ἐν τοσί κινδύνοις διαφυλάττειν), a saying which Xenophanes virtually repeats in the well-known lines (Fragm. 2. Bergk),

οὔτ' εἰ πρότις ἡγαθὸς λαοὶ προτέρι
οὐτ' εἰ πενταθλεῖν, οὔτε παλαισμοῦν κ.
οὐδὲ μὲν εἰ ταχυτίτι ποδῶν, τὸ πέρ ἐστι προτίμων
ῥόμησι θαυμ' ἄνδρων ἐγγ' ἐν ἄγων πέλει
τούτων ἐν δὴ μάλλον ἐν εὐνομῇ πόλει εἰπ' ἡμαρκρον β' ἄν τι πόλει χάρμα γένοιτι' ἐπι τοῖς
εἰ τὶς ἀκδελεύοντα κωφ' Πίθαον πορ' ἤχθαί
οὐ γὰρ παῖνει τοῦτα μενοῖν πόλεως

(cp. Isocr. Paneg. § 1 sq.). Plato had lent some momentary countenance to the opposite view in Laws 744 B (see vol. i. p. 260, note 1), but he anticipates Aristotle in Laws 696 B, ὃς γὰρ ἐν ἐναὶ κατὰ πόλει γε εἶναι τὰς τιμὰς ὑπερχοῦσας, ἢ τὶς ἐστὶ πλούτῳ διαφέρουν, ἐπεὶ οὔτ' εἰ ταχέα ἢ καλῶς ἢ ἱσχυρὸς ἄνευ τιμῶν ἀρετῆς οὔτ' ἁρτῆς ἀν ἀνωφροσύνη ἀπ' (where he perhaps remembers the saying of Solon and the lines of Xenophanes), except that Aristotle thinks that the rich man has a better claim to office than the swift or handsome or strong man. The Ethiopians were said to make the biggest and strongest man among them their king (Hdt. 3. 20: Pol. 6 (4), 4. 1290 b 4 sqq.) or else the handsomest (Athen. Deipn. 566 c: Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 142 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 463), other barbarians honoured swiftness of foot in the same way (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 138: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. ibid.), and Euripides had put in the mouth of one of his characters the lines (Fragm. 1035),

ὅτης κατ' ἰλανθίσμου πρώτος ἠμοίαζο
ἡ τέχνα πάλλων ἡ μάχη διόρος σέβεται,
τοῦτον τυραννεῖν τοῖς κακῶναίν ἔχειν.

Indeed, Aristotle himself speaks in 1. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq. and 4 (7).
3. 12. 1282 b 27—1283 a 3.

14. 1332 b 16 sqq. as if a great physical superiority conferred a title to rule.

30. ἰπερδόν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημών καὶ δυνάμεων. Cr. c. 13. 1284 b 7, δήλον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημών.

31. τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle first takes the case in which the essential attribute (skill in flute-playing, in the illustrative parallel which he has chosen) is shared by several individuals in an equal degree, and he says that these individuals must be awarded flutes of equal excellence; extraneous qualifications like that of high birth must not be allowed to turn the scale in favour of any one of them (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 8, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἰσον τοῖς ἰσοῖς καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁμοῖον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καλῶν).

He next passes on (34 sqq.) to the case in which one individual possesses the essential attribute in a far higher degree than the rest, and as to this case he tells us that no inferiority of this individual in respect of higher but non-essential things must lead us to deny him the superior award of flutes which is his due.

35. ἐτὶ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγαγοῦσιν, 'if we push it still further.' Cr. Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 22, δάξεις δ' ἀν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖ καὶ διαιρᾶσαι τὰ καλῶσ ἐξοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ: Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 8, μικρον προαγαγότες τὸν λόγον.

38. εἰ καὶ μείζον κ. τ. λ. How little respect was felt for the art of flute-playing, we see from 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 18 sqq.

ἔκαστον here takes the place of ἐκάτερον, as in Poet. 6. 1449 b 25 (see Vahlen’s note on this passage: he says 'ἔκαστον hic ut alibi est pro ἐκατέρω' and refers to his Aristot. Aufsätze, 2. 50).

39. λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ. For this really needless explanation see above on 1277 b 37 and 1282 a 36.

κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν, 'if we compare the two ratios,' i.e. the ratio in which noble birth and beauty excel the art of flute-playing and the ratio in which the surpassing flute-player excels his fellows. Cr. Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 31, ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσοτὴς ἐστὶ λόγων καὶ ἐν τέταρτῳ ἐλαχίστῳ.

2. In place of τοῦ πλούτου we expect τοῦ κάλλους, but see below 1288 a. on 1323 b 35.

3. ἐτὶ κατὰ γε τοῦτον τῶν λόγων κ.τ.λ., i.e. the λόγος of the imagined opponent in 1282 b 23 sqq. Things that differ very much are not commensurable (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 b 18, τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδεχετο ἰκανός· and 1133 a 19, διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δὲ ποι
 translate, ‘if magis imperiorum et principatus civitatis esse particeps debet,’ etc., and so Sus.⁴, ‘for if a given bodily stature [confers political privileges] more [than a certain amount of wealth or good birth].’ These interpreters apparently supply δε φετέχεων τῶν ἄρχον, or something similar, with μᾶλλον (cp. 1282 b 23 sqq.). Stahr, on the other hand, translates, ‘denn wenn eine bestimmte Körpergrösse für irgend etwas höheren Werth verliehe (confers a higher value for anything whatever),’ and Bernays, ‘denn wenn z. B. einem gewissen Maass von Körpergrösse im Vergleich zu Reichthum und freier Geburt irgend etwas in höherem Grade zukommt.’ Prof. Ridgeway brackets μᾶλλον, and another critic would read ἐνάμιλλον in place of it, and Sus.⁴ mentions these suggestions, though he still retains μᾶλλον in his text. I am myself inclined to supply ἀγαθῶν with μᾶλλον from the preceding sentence (‘more a good’), and to translate, ‘for if a given amount of size is more a good than [a given amount of some other good, such as wealth or free birth].’

καὶ ὁλος ῥκ.τ.λ., ‘size would also generally’ (i.e. apart from its amount) ‘be capable of being matched against wealth and free birth.’

6. ὅστ’ εἰ κ.τ.λ., ‘and so, if this man excels in size more than this man in virtue’ (or in other words, if this man’s amount of size is superior to this man’s amount of virtue), ‘and size generally’ (i.e. apart from questions of amount) ‘is superior in a higher degree than virtue, everything would be comparable [whatever its amount], for if such an amount is better than such an amount, such an amount will evidently be equal.’ I have followed Sus. in bracketing μέγεθος, 8, which may have been repeated by mistake from the preceding line, though it is possible that instead of bracketing μέγεθος we should read ἀγαθῶν in place of it. The difficulty of retaining μέγεθος arises from this, that, if we do so, we have to translate, ‘for if such an amount of size is better than such an amount [of something else], such an amount will evidently be equal,’ and it is doubtful whether we have any right to supply ‘of something else.’ Aristotle probably means by εἰ ἐν συμβλητα πάντα, 8, that all goods would be comparable, not everything, for this is all that his argument proves. For τοιοῦτο γὰρ κ.τ.λ., cp. Phys. 7.
3. 1283 a 4—18.

4. 248 a 11, εἰ δὴ ἔστι πάσα (sc. κίνησις) συμβλητή καὶ ὁμοσχές τὸ ἐν ἦσο ἄρα χρώµα ἵπτον κυνώμενον, ἔσται περισσερῆς τις ἵπτειν, καὶ μεῖζων δὴ καὶ ἔλλειται. Κρείττων in 9 must mean 'better.'

9. ἔπει δὲ τούτ’ ἄδυνατον. See above on 3.

10. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, 'in the case of things political also,' no less than ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων (1282 b 30). For τὰ πολιτικά, cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 11.

11. εἰ γὰρ . . . 14. τὴν τιμὴν. Here the fragment of Xenophanes quoted in part above on 1282 b 27 is especially present to Aristotle's mind. οὐδέν is to be taken with δὲ, as in Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 27, οὐδὲν οὖν δὲν αὐτῶν. Τὴν τιμὴν, 'the honour which falls to them.'

13. ἥ τούτων διαφορά, 'the superiority possessed by these men.'

14. ἄλλας ἢ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Ἐν τούτοις is 'in respect of these things': cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 1, ἐπειδὰν γὰρ σφόδρα οὐκ ἐπάρχειν (sc. αὐτοῖς) ἐν τούτοις ἐν οἷς σκοπούται, οὐ φροντίζουσιν, and Poet. 2. 1448 a 16, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ πρὸς τὴν κυμφόδιαν διεστηκεν. See also Stallbaum on Plato, Gorg. 452 E, καθοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δουλουν μὲν ἔξεις τὸν λατρῶν, δουλουν δὲ τὸν παθοτρίβην. The πόλις is regarded by Aristotle as composed of wealth, free birth, nobility, culture, etc.: cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17, ἦτοι δὲ πᾶσα πόλις ἐκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποιοῦν λέγοι δὲ ποιῶν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν πλοῦτον παιδείαν εὐγένειαν, ποιοῦν δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλῆθους ὑπεροχὴν.

16. Τῆς τιμῆς, cp. τὴν τιμὴν, 14, which answers to τῶν ἄρχων, 11.

17. δεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., [for free birth and wealth are things of which the πόλις is composed,] for' etc. Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 21 (quoted above on 1276 b 37). In 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 33 Aristotle mentions τὸ ταῖς οὐδαίαις λειτουργυίας, ὅ καλαίγειν εὐπόροι, as a necessary part of a State. It is true that in Crete the State defrayed the liturgies which were elsewhere borne by rich men (see above on 1272 a 17), and that this might have been made the general rule, but even then rich men would be needed to contribute to the eisphora. Aristotle says nothing about οἱ εὐγενεῖς, though he has mentioned them in 16, probably because he includes them under οἱ ἐλευθεροὶ (cp. 33 sqq.).

τίμημα φέροντας, i.e. contributing to the State a rateable quota of property. Cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 20, τοὺς ἐξουσιον τίμημα, and for φέρειν, 2. 5. 1263 a 3, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀνάλισκειν. For the contrast implied here between οἱ ἀποροὶ καὶ οἱ τίμημα φέροντες, see note on 1279 b 19.

18. οὐ γὰρ ἄν εἰη κ.τ.λ. See above on 1276 b 37 and 1280 a 32. Is there a tacit reference here to the latter passage, in which it was
shown that there could not be a πόλις wholly composed of slaves? If so, we have something to add to the other evidence (see vol. i. Appendix C) that cc. 12 and 13 were placed where they stand by Aristotle.

19. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1291 a 24 sqq. (where military prowess and judicial virtue are again mentioned together) and 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 18 sqq. Tyrtaeus had long ago said (Fragm. 12. 15),

Ξυνόν δ' εσθήνων τούτῳ πόλης τε παντὶ τε δήμῳ,

ότις ἀνήρ διαβάς ἐν προμάχοσι μέγη

νολεμέως κ.τ.λ.,

and as to justice Protagoras had gone farther than Aristotle, for he makes it essential to the very existence of a State (Plato, Protag. 324 D sqq., and 326 E, τούτου τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δεὶ ἰδιωτείναι).

21. πλήν κ.τ.λ. For the contrast here drawn between εἶναι πόλιν and οἰκείον καλῶς, cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 6 sqq.

C. 13. 24. πρὸς μέντοι ζωήν ἀγαθήν ή παιδεία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ μάλιστα δικαῖος ἀν ἀμφισβητοῖσαν. Ζωή ἀγαθή is taken as the standard in 1. 8. 1256 b 32, and said to be the end which the lawgiver should set before him in 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 7 sqq. Παιδεία and ἀρετὴ are here conjoined as in Plato, Laws 757 C, and in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 29 and 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 26 sqq. Παιδεία, 'culture,' is connected with aristocracy in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 24 sq., where the offices in an aristocracy, which are usually said to be filled ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων (3. 7. 1279 a 35), are said to be filled ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων. In 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq. it is opposed to βανανία and treated as a note of oligarchy (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 37). Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s.v. ἀμφισβητέω, notes the rare occurrence of ἀμφισβητοῖσαν, adding however that ἀμφισβητοῖσαν occurs in Plato, Euthyd. 296 E, and ἀμφισβητοῖσαι in Menex. 242 E (see also Demosth. Prooem. 46. p. 1453 for ἀμφισβητοῖσειν). Ἀμφισβητήσεις is used in Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 24 and 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 12.

26. καθάπερ εἰρηται καὶ πρότερον, in c. 9. 1281 a 4 sqq.

ἐπεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. This has been already said in substance in c. 9. 1280 a 21 sqq., and it is repeated in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq. For πάντων ἰσον ἔχειν, 'to have an equal share with others of everything,' cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1242 b 30, ἵνα ἰσον ἄν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ τῆς λειτουργίας, and Eurip. Phoeniss. 513 Bothe, 547 Dindorf,

σὺ δ' αὐτ ἀνέξει δομάτων ἐχων ἰσον;
Τὰς τοιαύτας πολιτείας, i.e. constitutions which give an equal amount of everything to those who are equal in one thing only, or which give an unequal amount of everything to those who are unequal in one thing only. The reason why such constitutions must necessarily be παρεκβάσεις is that they contravene τὸ ἄπλως δίκαιον (cp. c. 6. 1279 a 17 sqq.).

29. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερον κ.τ.λ. This was said in c. 9. 1280 a 9 sqq. Μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. Aristotle's original intention probably was, after interposing an explanation of the grounds on which the different claimants base their claims, to continue, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἦδη σκέπτεον, εἰ πάντες εἰέν ἐν μὴ πόλει, τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ. In adding this explanation, however, he allows his attention to be diverted and the strict sequence of the passage to be broken (just as in i. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq.), and thus it happens that μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. Μὲν οὖν here, as elsewhere, introduces a more particular and detailed treatment of the subject.

30. ὃτι διαμψυχητοῦσι τρόπων τινα δικαίως πάντες, ἄπλως δ' οὗ πάντες δικαίως. For the repetition of πάντες, cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 1, φανερῶν ὃτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον.

31. οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. In the passage 31—42 Aristotle bears in mind the rule which he has laid down in c. 12. 1283 a 14 sq. that claimants for political power must rest their claims on attributes entering into the composition of a State. The different claimants are represented as doing so. This is indicated by κοινῶν (32), πρὸς τὰ συμβολαία πιστοῖ μᾶλλον (32), πολιταί μᾶλλον (34), οἴκου τίμιος (36), βελτίους (36), καὶ κοινωνικὴν ἀρετὴν (38). Κοινῶν, 32, 'a public thing,' or in other words, one of the things which are essential to the State: cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 5 sqq. Compare also Eth. Nic. 8. 16. 1163 b 5, οὖν δ' ἔξειν τοῦτο καί ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζον· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ διδοται τῷ τὸ κοινῷ εὐεργετοῦντί, ἢ τιμὴ δὲ κοινῶν. It is implied in the passage before us that the rich will be owners of land, and this may have commonly been the case in Greece; still there were other forms of wealth besides wealth in land (2. 7. 1267 b 10 sqq.), and most of Nicias' wealth was in silver (Plut. Nic. c. 4).

32. ἐτὶ κ.τ.λ. So the Syracusan Athenagoras, though he was the leader of the demos, admits that the rich are the best custodians of money (Thuc. 6. 39): that this was a common view we see from such passages as Rhet. ad Alex. 9. 1429 a 34, τοὺς γὰρ πλείονοι
NOTES.

The importance of citizenship is recognized everywhere (1. 6. 1255 a 32 sqq.), but this would not have been equally to the point. The sophist Lycophron would not admit that nobility belonged to the class of τίμα καὶ σπουδαία (Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 9 sqq.). The fem. form τίμος is used in the passage before us (possibly because it is followed by ἐτε: see note on 1277 b 25): in De Part. An. 1. 5. 644 b 24 we have περὶ μὲν ἑκείνας (sc. τὰς οὐνίας) τιμὰς οὐσᾶς καὶ βείαις. For ἐτε διότι βελτίων ἐκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτίωνων, cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 b 29, οἷον εὐγένεια καὶ παθεῖα ἐκὸς γὰρ ἐκ ἁγαθῶν ἁγαθοῖς καὶ τῶν οὐτῶ τραφέντα τοιοῦτον εἶνα. For the definition of εὐγένεια as ἀρετή γένους cp. Rhet. 2. 15. 1390 b 22, ἐτε δὲ εὐγενεῖς μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρετὴν, γενναίον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἑξίστασθαι τὰς φύσεις· ὅπερ ὡς ὑπὸ τὸ πολὺ οὖ συμβαίνει τοῖς εὐγενεῖσιν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εὐτελεῖς· φορὰ γὰρ τίς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ἄνδρών ὡστε ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς χώρας γεγομένως, καὶ εὑρίσκει ἄν ἦν ἁγαθὸν τὸ γένος, ἐγγίνεται διὰ τῶν χρόνων ἄνδρες περιττοί, κάπετα πάλιν ἀναδιδόσαν (‘deficit,’ Bon. Ind. s.v. ἀναδιδόσαν): Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b.
18 sqq.: Aristot. Fragm. 85. 1490 b 43, $\eta$ $\mu$\varepsilon $\epsilon$\varepsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$\nu$ $\dot{\alpha}$\varepsilon$\mu$ $\hat{\epsilon}$\varepsilon$\gamma$\nu$\omega$ $\delta$' $\dot{\alpha}$\varepsilon$\mu$ $\hat{\epsilon}$\varepsilon$\sigma$\pi$\omicron$\upsilon$'' $\sigma$\pi$\omicron$\upsilon$'' $\delta$' $\dot{\alpha}$\varepsilon$\iota$ $\gamma$\varepsilon$\nu$ $\epsilon$ $\dot{\omega}$ $\pi$\omicron$\lambda$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\pi$\omicron$\upsilon$' $\sigma$\pi$\omicron$\upsilon$' $\pi$\omicron$\nu$\omicron$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\nu$\theta$\alpha$\omicron$$. These passages show that $\dot{\alpha}$\varepsilon$\mu$ $\hat{\epsilon}$\varepsilon$\gamma$\nu$\omega$ means 'excellence of race' in the sense that the race to which the $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\iota$ stands at any rate a better chance of being virtuous than one who is not $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$. We must bear in mind that this definition of $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$ is here placed in the mouth of $\dot{\iota}$ $\dot{\epsilon}$\le$\iota$"$\dot{e}$\iota$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$, who would be likely to take the most favourable view of $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$. We see from Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 34 that $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$ did not, in the ordinary acceptance of the word, necessarily imply descent from ancestors remarkable for virtue; it might imply only descent from ancestors remarkable for wealth or other social advantages; nor did it necessarily imply a frequent occurrence in the family of virtuous individuals, but only of individuals distinguished in some way or other ($\epsilon$\nu$\pi$\nu$\phi$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$). Cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 88. Still the view that $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$ is $\dot{\alpha}$\varepsilon$\mu$ $\hat{\epsilon}$\varepsilon$\gamma$\nu$\omega$ is not far from that of Aristotle. In the Rhetoric (2. 15. 1390 b 22 sqq.), as we have seen, it is distinctly adopted by him, though he holds that, owing to the occurrence from time to time of degeneracy in families, most $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$ are men of little worth. Compare the view taken in the fragments of the possibly genuine $\Pi$\varepsilon$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$ (Aristot. Fragm. 82-85. 1490 a 1 sqq.). Here, however, we find (1490 a 31 sqq.) a reference to the contention that $\dot{\iota}$ $\dot{\epsilon}$\le$\iota$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$ $\pi$\omicron$\lambda$\omicron$\omicron$ $\pi$\omicron$\nu$\omicron$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\omega$ no less than $\dot{\iota}$ $\dot{\epsilon}$\le$\iota$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$ $\epsilon$ $\dot{\omega}$ $\pi$\omicron$\lambda$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\pi$\omicron$\upsilon$ (cp. Julian, Or. 2. p. 81 B, $\phi$\omicron$\sigma$ $\zeta$ $\dot{\alpha}$ $\dot{\epsilon}$ $\sigma$ $\pi$\omicron$\lambda$ $\pi$\omicron$\nu$\omicron$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$), and in the Politics Aristotle seems to adopt as his own the doctrine that $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$ implies descent from ancestors not only virtuous but rich (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 21, $\dot{\iota}$ $\dot{\epsilon}$\le$\iota$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$\epsilon$\iota$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$ $\dot{\alpha}$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$ $\epsilon$\gamma$\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$). 37. $\dot{\iota}$ $\dot{\epsilon}$\le$\iota$ $\epsilon$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\tau$ $\lambda$ $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\nu$ $\kappa$, 'we shall say then that in a similar way virtue also prefers a just claim, for we say that justice, which is necessarily accompanied by all the other virtues, is virtue operative in social relations [and therefore essential to the State: so that virtue as a whole has as good a claim to recognition as justice].' I take the antecedent to $\dot{\iota}$ to be $\tau$ $\nu$ $\delta$\iota$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\omicron$\upsilon$\nu$' $\nu$ $\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\dot{\epsilon}$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\dot{\epsilon}$\varepsilon$\sigma$\nu$ $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\delta$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\omicron$\upsilon$\nu$' $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\delta$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\omicron$\upsilon$\nu$' $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\delta$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\omicron$\upsilon$\nu$' $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\delta$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\omicron$\upsilon$\nu$' $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\delta$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\omicron$\upsilon$\nu$' $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\delta$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\omicron$\upsilon$\nu$' $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\delta$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\omicron$\upsilon$\nu$' $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\delta$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\omicron$\upsilon$\nu$' $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\delta$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\omicron$\upsilon$\nu$' $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\delta$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\omicron$\upsilon$\nu$' $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\delta$\kappa$\omicron$\omicron$ $\sigma$\omicron$\upsilon$\nu$' $\nu$ $\kappa$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\dot{\iota}$ $\nu$ $\delta$\kappa$\omicron$\omicro
NOTES.

1283 b 16, 19, 31: it is not to be taken with δικαίως. That justice is virtue operative in social relations we see from Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 25–1130 a 5, and from the definition of virtue ascribed with whatever truth to Plato in Diog. Laert. 3. 91, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη (ἀλήτα) τοῦ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις καὶ τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δικαιοπραγεῖν: cp. also Plut. De Defect. Orac. c. 24, εἰσὶν οὖν ἐκτός ἔτεροι θεοὶ καὶ κόσμοι, πρὸς οὓς χρήσαι (ὁ θεὸς) ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς ἀρέταις: οὔτε γὰρ πρὸς αὐτῶν οὐδὲ μέρος αὐτῶν χρῆσις ἐστὶ δικαιοσύνης ἡ χάριτος ἡ χρηστότητος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλους. That there is a close connexion between justice and the other virtues, we see from Aristot. Fragm. 75. 1488 b 5, ap. Plut. De Stoic. Repugn. c. 15, (ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ γὰρ περὶ δικαιοσύνης . . . ) Ἀριστοτέλει περὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀντιγράφων οὐ φησιν αὐτῶν ὀρθῶς λέγειν ὅτι, τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔσης τέλους, ἀναρεῖται μὲν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, συναρεῖται δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τὰν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἐκάστη, and from Plato, Laws 631 C, ἐκ δὲ τούτων (ἰ. e. φρονήσεως καὶ σωφροσύνης) μετ' ἀνδρείας κραθέισων τρίτων ἀν εἰ καὶ δικαιοσύνη.

40. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ. τ. λ. Here, as Eaton points out, Aristotle has before him Plato, Gorg. 488 D.

42. λαμβανομένων. Cp. c. 10. 1281 a 17, πάντων λαθέων.

ἀρ' οὖν εἰ πάντες εἶν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει κ. τ. λ. Here Aristotle perhaps has before him Plato, Gorg. 490 B, ἐὰν εἰ τῷ οὕτω δίμεν, ὅσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἄρετος ἀνθρώποι κ. τ. λ. Ἀρ' οὖν is repeated in πότερον for the sake of clearness, the parenthetic sentence λέγο ἐδ. . . πολιτικῶν having intervened: compare the way in which δῆλον ὅτι takes up δῆλον ὃς in 1283 b 17 sqq. after an intervening hypothetical sentence.

1288 b. 2. οἱ πλοῦσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς. The article is omitted before εὐγενεῖς because the rich and noble are classed together in contradistinction to the good: cp. 1283 a 33, οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς.

ἐὰν δὲ πλήθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικῶν, 'and further outside their ranks a mass composed of citizens.' Πολιτικῶν is added because there is such a thing as a non-citizen πλήθος (4 7). 4. 1326 a 18, ἀναγκαίων γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ἵπτοι ὑπάρχει καὶ δουλῶν ἀριθμοῦ πολλῶν καὶ μεταίκων καὶ έξένων).

5. τοῖς γὰρ κυρίως διαφέρουσιν ἄλληλοι, 'for it is just in respect of the supreme authority they constitute that they differ from each other' (Bernays).

6. τῷ δὲ πλούσιων. For the omission of the article, cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 24, οὖν ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁλεθριαῖς ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, and see note on 1310 a 6.

7. ἀλλ' ὅμως σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ταύτης ὑπάρχη χρόνον. These constitutions settle the matter in their own way, but still we persist in asking how it ought to be settled. Ταύτα refers to οἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ οἱ πλουσίοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἄλλο δὲ πλῆθος ἅπας τις πολιτικὸν: for the gender, see above on 1263 a 1.

8. εἰ δὴ ... 13. εἷς αὐτῶν. 'Well, if those who possess virtue are quite few in number, in what way should we determine the question? Or perhaps we should [not trouble about their number in itself, but] consider the expression "few" in relation to the work they have to do, [and ask] whether they are able to govern the State, or whether they are numerous enough to constitute a State?' Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 47) and Susemihl think that this paragraph should be transposed so as to precede εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστιν, 1284 a 3, but it seems to me to be in its right place. The discussion of the question just raised is introduced by δὴ, as often elsewhere (e.g. in c. 4. 1277 a 14-16 and c. 15. 1286 a 7 sqq.). Τίνα δὲ διελεύσῃ τρόπον, 10, takes up πῶς διοριστέον, 9. Aristotle's first impulse is to challenge the claims of the good to rule on the score of the smallness of their number, as he has already done in c. 10. 1281 a 28 sqq. But he drops this ground of attack, probably because he feels that paucity is no bar to a claim to rule. Even a single individual may have a just claim to rule, if his virtue is transcendent. Hence he passes on in 13 sqq. to deal with another objection, the discussion of which brings out this fact. The claims of the good have a weak point which they share with those of the rich and noble. Just as the claims of the rich and noble to rule may be defeated by those of one man who is richer or nobler than all the rest, so the claims of the good may be defeated by those of one man who is better than all the rest. And the claims of the Many may be defeated in a similar way. If this superiority of One Man or of a Few not numerous enough to constitute a State is overwhelming, the fact that they are not numerous enough for
this must not stand in the way of our giving him or them supreme authority.

16. οἱ κατὰ γένος, i.e. οἱ ἔλειθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς.

δήλον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'Aliquoties enunciatio per ὡς introducta per ὡς continuatur, e.g. in Phys. 6. 2. 233 a 13 sqq.: 1. 7. 190 b 17 sqq.: 8. 7. 260 a 23 sqq.' (Bon. Ind. 872 a 1). For the repetition of δήλον, see vol. ii. p. li, note 6. For the thought, cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 22 sqq. 

Εἰς πλουσιώτερος ἀπάντων seems to have been almost a proverbial expression: see Plut. Solon, c. 14, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν διὰ μέσου πολιτῶν, τὴν ὑπὸ λόγου καὶ νόμου μεταβαλλὴν ὀρῶντες ἐργάδη καὶ χαλεπὴν οὐδαν, οὐκ ἔβεβην ἐνα τὸν δικαίωταν καὶ φρονιμῶταν ἐπιστήσασον τοῖς πράγμασιν: Plut. De Cupid. Divit. c. 7, ἣ, καθάπερ λέγοντων, Εἰς δ' πονηρότατος εὖ τῇ γένει γενόμενοι καταφάγη τὰ πάντων. In Pausan. 7. 12. I we read βεβαιοὶ δὴ τὸ λέγόμενον, ὡς ἄρ' ἦν καὶ πῦρ ἐς πλῦν ἄλλυν πυρὸς καίνον, καὶ λίκων ἀγριώτερος λίκων ἄλλων, καὶ ἀκυτέρως ἵσαρξ ἵσαρκος πείνασθαι.

17. κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον. Κρ. c. 17. 1288 a 19 sqq.

18. For the juxtaposition of τὸν ἐνα καὶ ἀπάντων, see notes on 1281 a 13 and 1285 a 3.

23. οὐκοῦν κ.τ.λ., 'therefore if the Many also really ought to be supreme because they are stronger' (κρείττον, not ἀμεῖνον) 'than the Few.' Cp. 1283 a 40 sqq. Aristotle has before him Plato, Gorg. 489 E sqq. (Eaton). For εἰ... γε, cp. Plato, Rep. 433 C, εἰ δέοι γε κρίναi.

27. πάντα δὴ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. 'Οροι are here 'criteria,' such as wealth or virtue, on the strength of which men claim political supremacy. Plato had already used the expression ὥρθος ὡρος in Polit. 293 C, ταυτὴ θέσομεν, ὡς οἴμαι, καὶ ὁμοὶ ἄλλη, τοῦτον ὄρον ὥρθον εἶναι μόνον ἰατρικής καὶ ἄλλης ἡπτυσσούσιν ἀρχής. Aristotle's conclusion is not convincing. It does not follow that a claim is bad because it does not hold under all circumstances.

30. καὶ γὰρ δὴ, 'for surely.'

31. For κυρίους τοῦ πολιτεύματος, an expression which does not, I think, occur elsewhere in the Politics, cp. Diod. 15. 45. 2, τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς Δακεβαμοίων ἐπιστασιάς κυρίοις γεγονότις τοῦ πολιτεύματος.

32. ἔχουσάν όν is in the plural, though τὰ πλήθη is neuter, possibly because Aristotle is thinking of the individuals of whom τὰ πλήθη are composed (cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 2, ἐφ' αἷς τὰ πλήθη χαλεπαίνουσα). He often, however, uses a plural verb with a neut. plur. nominative, even where this explanation does not hold good: see Waitz on Anal. Pr. 2. 26. 69 b 3, and Bonitz on Metaph. A. 4. 985 a 27.
tā πλήθι, as in 7 (5). II. 1314 b 2 and Diod. 9. 24. 2, οὐ μὴν τὰ πλήθι κατεπλήγη αὐτοῦ τὴν βαρύτατα: so also in Plato, Gorg. 452 E and Soph. 268 B (Liddell and Scott).

35. ἄδροις, not ἄδρον: cp. I. 2. 1252 b 14, οἶκος...οἶς κ.τ.λ.

διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ. Καὶ appears to mean that we are not only led to the conclusion stated in 27 sqq., but are enabled to solve an ἀπορία which is raised by some persons. Τοῦτον τῶν τρόπων, 'on this basis,' i.e. on the basis of a recognition of the claims both of the Better and of the Many. Who were the persons who raised this ἀπορία? It is difficult to say, though some approach is made to the question by the disputants in Plato, Gorg. 488 B sqq.: cp. also 483 B, ἄλλ', οἷα, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀνθεκτεῖς ἀνθρωποί εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί: πρὸς αὕτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν συμφέρον τοὺς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἑπανοῦσι κ.τ.λ., and Laws 757 D. Andocides says in c. Alcib. c. 6, καίτω ταῦτα διέγνωσται ἀρματα τῶν δογμάτων, ἡ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀληθοῖς ἀρμάτοντα μᾶλστα τυχάνει καὶ πλείστους ἑπιφυμητάς οἴκει.

38. τίθεομαι. We expect rather τίθεαι (Harpocr. s.v. τίθεαι, ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων λέγεται ὡς ἐθήκη μὲν ὧ νομοθέτης, ἐθετο δὲ ὧ δῆμος). So we have ἐτίθει νόμον in 2. 8. 1268 a 6: cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 36.

39. ἐταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθὲν, i.e. when the Many taken collectively are better than the Few. The contrary case is dealt with in 1284 a 3, εἰ δὲ τίς ἔστιν εἰς κ.τ.λ. Bern. and Sus. take ἐταν συμβαίνῃ τὸ λεχθὲν with ἐνδέχεται ἑπαναίνει, thus making the sentence ἀποροῦσι, 36...πλείστων, 39, parenthetical, but the length of the parenthesis by which on this view these words are parted from the words which they qualify makes against this interpretation, and it seems preferable to take them, as Bekker and others do, with ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τιμῆς κ.τ.λ.

40. τὸ δ' ὅρθων ληπτέων ἰσως, 'but [the advantage of neither is to be studied exclusively, for] we must determine that which is correct and normal in a fair and equal fashion.' For ληπτέων, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 36, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὖν αὐτῷ ληπτέον. 'Omnino λαμβάνειν est animo concipere, ita quidem ut modo investigandi (Waitz ad Anal. Post. 1. 4. 73 a 24), modo inveniendi cognoscendi desiniendi intelligendi vim habeat' (Bon. Ind. 422 b 38). 'Ἰσως is used in the sense of 'equally' in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 22, κληρωτῶν ἰσως ἐκ τῶν μορίων.

NOTES.

1. 25. 85, omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt duo Platonis praecepta teneant: unum, ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut quaecumque agunt ad eam referant oblii commodorum suorum; alterum, ut totum corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Cicero perhaps refers to Plato, Rep. 420 B. Solon claimed that he had endeavoured to be fair both to the Few and to the Many (Fragm. 5).

42. πολίτης δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the absence of the article, see note on 1276 b 28. Compare with the form of the sentence which commences here 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 7, ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἥδον ὑπείρει τὴν αὐτήν τιθέασιν, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐκαστος καὶ τὴν ἔξω τὴν αὐτῶν, ὁ δὲ ἀρίστος τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. The statement that the citizen in general is he who shares in ruling and being ruled is based on c. 4: in c. 1, on the other hand, the citizen is defined as ὁ ἐξουσία κοινωνίας ἀρχής βουλευτικής κριτικῆς.

1284 a. 1. πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην, 'and to suit the best': cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11, διήρρησα μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τοιτον τῶν τρόπων. Aristotle takes it for granted here that the citizens of the 'best State' will both rule and be ruled, and thus anticipates the conclusion at which he arrives after a discussion in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq.

3. τῶν βίων τῶν κατ' ἀρέτην. For virtue is the main source of 'the most desirable life,' which the citizens of the best State are said to live in 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14 sqq. Cp. also 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 30 sqq.

εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστιν εἰς κ.τ.λ. This sentence is closely connected with what precedes; it deals with the contrary case to that supposed in ὅταν συμβαίνη τὸ λεξέων, 1283 b 39. The sense is, 'but if there is one man or a few of transcendent virtue, we must not treat them as citizens on a level with the rest, or expect them to be content with ruling and being ruled; their part is to rule.' To insert 1283 b 9–13 between πρὸς τῶν βίων τῶν κατ' ἀρέτην and εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστιν εἰς κ.τ.λ., as Sus. does, is to destroy the connexion. Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 540 D, ὅταν οἱ ὡς ἄληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται ἢ πλείους ἢ εἰς κ.τ.λ.

4. μὴ μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως. These words are added because Aristotle is now dealing only with the case in which the Good exist in the same community with those possessing other attributes essential to the State (cp. 1283 a 42 sqq.). If the Good are numerous enough themselves to constitute a State, as in
the case of the State sketched in the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books, then the State will consist of equals, and they may each of them be treated as part of it and subjected to law.

6. τὴν δύναμιν αὑτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν. Translate (with Bern. and Sus.) here and in 10, 'their political capacity,' and τὴ δύναμιν, 13, 'in capacity.' So Plut. Cic. c. 4, ἀνεκίνει τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν. Sepulveda explains, 'facultatem civilem vocat quicquid opis in homine est quod faciat ad civilem societatem iuvandam tuendamque, sive administrandam.' Δύναμις πολιτικῆς answers to δυνάμειος, 2, as ἀρετῆ answers to προαιρούμενος. For the distinction implied between virtue and political capacity, cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq., where virtue is distinguished from δύναμις τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς, and 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq., where it is distinguished from δύναμις ἡ πρακτική τῶν ἀριστῶν. Δύναμις is used in a different sense, that of 'political influence,' in 20, and πολιτική δύναμις often bears this sense (e.g. in Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 a 33 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 473 D), but not, I think, here.

8. οὐκέτα θετέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως, i.e. we must not treat them as mere fellow-citizens of the rest (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 20), and expect them to take their turn with the rest of ruling and being ruled. Men of this transcendent excellence stand to their inferiors as a whole stands to its part (3. 17. 1288 a 26 sqq.).

9. ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἄξιομενοι τῶν ἴσων. Τῶν ἴσων refers to 1283 b 40, τὸ δ ὅρθων ληπτέων ἴσως. 'Classic authorities always use the future middle ἀδικήσομαι as passive in place of ἀδικήσαμοι' (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective s.v.).

10. ὁσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις stands in tacit contrast to θεῶν ἐν θεοῖς. A god among men is in a position of transcendent superiority not enjoyed by a god among gods. For the meaning of θεῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, cp. Plut. Alex. c. 51, "οὐ δοκοῦμαι," εἶπεν, "ὡς οἱ Ἑλληνες ἐν τοῖς Μακεδονίσι κόσμοι ὁσπερ ἐν θηρίοις ἡμῖνει περιπατεῖν;" Θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις was a proverbial expression: cp. Theogn. 339,

χεύτως ἂν δοκοῦμαι μετ' ἀνθρώποις θεῶς εἶναι,
εἴ μ' ἀποτείματοι μοῖρα κίον θανάτου,

and (with Crusius, Untersuchungen zu den Mimiamben des Herondas, p. 3) Antiphanes, Τριταγωνιστής (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 121),

θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἦν ἔκεινς, εἰδὼς τὴν ἀληθῆς μονακῆς.

See Crusius ibid. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 360 C.

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11. ὀδεν, because treating them as part of a State involves injustice.

12. καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν, 'legislation no less than treating men as part of a State.' Aristotle still has the lawgiver in view whom he has imagined in 1283 b 36 sqq., and is still advising him as to the course he should adopt. If men of the type described exist in the State, he must abstain from meddling with them; he must not attempt to fetter them by legislation.'

τοὺς ἰσοὺς καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, 'equals both in race and in capacity.' Gods are superior to men in both these respects: as to kings, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12. Proportional equals are no doubt included under τοὺς ἰσοὺς: we may infer this from Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 26, τούτῳ δὲ (i. e. τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον) ἔστιν ἐπὶ κοινῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ ἰσούν ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἄριθμον: ἀπὸ τῶν μὲ ἐστὶ τούτῳ, οὐκ ἔστι τούτους πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καθ' ὀμοιότητα· ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς. Contrast with this view of law as existing only between equals or proportionate equals the Stoical view set forth by Cicero in De Legibus 1. 7. 23, est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius estque et in homine et in deo, prima homini cum deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem rationem, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio est communis. Quae cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum dis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio iuris est.

13. κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμοσ. This expression recurs in St. Paul, Galat. v. 22–23, ὀ δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ Πνευματὸς ἐστὶν ἀγάπη ἵπτει δὲ εἰρήνη... κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμοσ, where the meaning of κατὰ is no doubt 'against,' but of κατὰ in the passage before us among others Bonitz says (Ind. 368 a 34), 'saepissime per κατὰ τινος ca res significatur de qua aliquid dicitur vel cogitatur.' See for instance 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 2, ὀπὸ ἐφησκε ἔν τοῖς πρὸτερον καθόλου κατὰ παιδῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν. Still Aristotle may remember here the expression of Callicles in Plato, Gorg. 488 D, where he says of the Many, οἱ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθεναι ἐπί τὰ ἑνὶ, and κατὰ may be used (and not περί, as in περὶ τοὺς ἰσοὺς, 12) because unfavourable laws are especially thought of, laws, for instance, enforcing on the persons referred to an equality of rights (cp. κατ' αὐτῶν, 15). I incline to think that 'against' is nearer to the meaning of κατὰ here than 'concerning.' Bern. Sus. and Welldon translate in a more neutral fashion 'for.'
14. αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶ νόμοι. Cp. c. 17. 1288 a 2, οὕτε μὴ νόμοις ὑπὸν, ἀλλ' αὐτῶν ὡς ὑπὰ νόμον. This is as much as to say that they are Absolute Kings. The Persian King was a law to the Persians (Plut. Artox. c. 23, χαίρειν ἕσσαι πόλεις Ἑλλήνων καὶ νόμοις, Πέρσαις δὲ νόμον αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ δικαιωθῆναι αἰσχρῶν καὶ καλῶν ἀποδεικνύον). This explains the exclamation of Anaxarchus to Alexander, when the latter had murdered Cleitus and was lying speechless from remorse, οὕτως ἀλέξανδρος, εἰς ὅν ἡ οἰκουμένη νῦν ἀποβλέπει: ὦ δὲ ἔρριπται κλαίων ὡσπερ ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων νόμον καὶ φόνον δεδακός, οἷς αὐτῶν προσήκῃ νόμον εἶναι καὶ ὅρον τῶν δικαίων (Plut. Alex. c. 52). So Xenophon (Cyrop. 8. i. 22) says of his Cyrus, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἄρχοντα πλέπωντα νόμον ἀνθρώπων ἐνόμουν, οτι καὶ τάττες ἱκανὸς ἐστι καὶ ὀρῶν τῶν ἀνακτοῦντα καὶ κολίζειν. It was claimed in Justinian's time that to the power of the Roman Emperor αὐτοῦ ὁ θεός τοὺς νόμους ὑποτεθείκε, νόμον αὐτὴν ἔμψυχον καταπέμψαν ἀνθρώποις (Nov. 105. c. 4, quoted by Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 713. 2, ed. 1).

15. λέγοιεν γὰρ ἐν κ.τ.λ. Coray remarks on this passage, "οὐκ εἶ

Antisthenes may have related the fable here alluded to in his 'Cyrus, or on Kingship,' a work mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, 6. 16. Had he before him a version of the fable of the Lion and the Wild Ass (Babrius, Fab. 67) in which lions and hares joined in hunting and fell into a dispute as to the division of the spoil? Compare the fragment of the lyrical poet Cydias preserved by Plato, Charmides 155 D, ἐνόμισα σοφότατον εἶναι τὸν Κυδίαν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὃς ἐίπεν ἐπὶ καλοῦ λέγων παιδός, ἄλλω ὑποτιθέμενοι, ἐλλακτίᾳ μὴ κατέναντα λέοντα νεβρόν ἐλθόντα μοίραν αἱρεῖσθαι κρέων· αὐτὸς γὰρ μοι ἐβδόκω ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτον θρέμματος ἐαλωκέναι. See Bergk on Cydias, Fragm. 1.
17. διὸ καὶ τίθενται κ.τ.λ., 'hence' (i.e. from a sense of the immense superiority of certain men) 'States democratically constituted also institute the ostracism [in addition to adopting other democratic measures] for the reason which has been mentioned' (i.e. because they feel that these men are too superior to the rest to be treated as equals). It appears indeed later on (35) that oligarchies also got rid of over-powerful individuals, and in a less humane way than democracies, for they exiled them and put them to death. The democratically constituted States referred to include (in addition to Athens) Argos (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18), Miletus, and Megara (Schol. Aristoph. Eq. 855). At Syracuse the ostracism was for a time represented by the petalism, which, it may be noted, would seem to have been introduced when the constitution of Syracuse was not a democracy, but what Aristotle variously terms an ἀντωνοκρατία (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 8) or a πολεισία (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.). The account given in the passage before us of the object of the ostracism resembles that given in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq. and (in substance) the more detailed account given in 'Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 22, and it is probably correct. It is accepted by Schömann, Gr. Alt. i. 188 sqq. and by Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 151 sq., though Grote (Hist. of Greece, 3. 197 sq.) and Susemihl (Sus.², Note 603: Sus.⁴, i. p. 415) conceive the object of the ostracism to have been to put an end to dangerous rivalries between two leading statesmen by removing one of them beyond the limits of the State. Aristotle's account of its object receives confirmation from Thuc. 8. 73. 3, from Philochorus, Fragm. 79 b (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. 396), and from Diod. 11. 55 and 19. 1 (compare Diodorus' account of the object of petalism, 11. 86. 5–87. 2). See also Plut. Aristid. c. 1, Pericl. c. 7, and Themist. c. 22. At Athens, however, and probably elsewhere (cp. 1284 b 20, τὰς πολεῖς), the ostracism ceased after a time to be used for the object for which it was instituted and was perverted into an instrument of faction (στασιαστικῶς, 22). Aristides was not ostracized because he was disproportionately powerful, but because he was an opponent of whom Themistocles wished to be rid. Damon the musician was not ostracized because he was dangerous to the State, but because he was a friend of Pericles. Aristotle regards the original object of the ostracism as not wholly illegitimate. He would indeed prefer that the constitution and the laws should be so framed as to prevent the rise within
the State of any disproportionately powerful person (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 10-18)—with this end in view he would avoid creating great offices held for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 18 sqq., b 10 sqq.: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 20 sqq.), and would seek to equalize property (2. 7. 1266 b 14 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23 sqq.) and to increase the number of the moderately well-to-do (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 1-5)—but, if measures of this kind should fail of their object, he recommends (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 19) that any sentence of removal inflicted on disproportionately powerful men shall be a sentence of removal beyond the limits of the State, in other words he recommends something very like the ostracism. That both the petalism and the ostracism had the evil effect of discouraging the participation of the more distinguished citizens in political life, we see from Diod. 11. 87. 3 sqq. and from Plutarch’s Life of Pericles (c. 7). If there is any truth in Plutarch’s view that in choosing the side of the Many Pericles was influenced to some extent by a dread of the ostracism, the institution gave a decisive turn at that moment to the constitutional development of Athens.

19. αὐταί γὰρ δῆ κ.τ.λ., ‘for these, I suppose, are thought to pursue equality more than anything else’: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 3 sqq. Aristotle says ‘are thought,’ because democracies pursue only one kind of equality, arithmetical equality, and lose sight of equality based on desert (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 29 sqq.). ‘Even now one discovers a tendency in the United States, particularly in the West, to dislike, possibly to resent, any outward manifestation of social superiority. A man would be ill looked upon who should build a castle in a park, surround his pleasure-grounds with a high wall, and receive an exclusive society in gilded saloons’ (Bryce, American Commonwealth, 3. 315).

20. διὰ πλοῦτον ἢ πολυφιλίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἵσχυν. Cp. Soph. O. T. 540,

ϕιλον καί φίλων τυραννίδα

ηρᾶν, ὥ πλήθει χρήματι θ’ ἀλίσκεται;

Plato, Rep. 434 B, ἐπειτα ἑπαρμένοις ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ πληθεὶ οἱ ἵσχυε οἱ ἄλλῳ τῷ πολιτικῷ ἐδῶ τοῖς ἐπιτελεῖς λέναι: Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 13, οἱ μὲν ἐν ὑπεροχαῖς εἰπτυχμάτων ὅστε, ἵσχὺς καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ φίλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πολιτικῶν. That the possessor of these advantages was not unlikely to be ostracized, we see from what is said of Pericles in Plut. Pericl. c. 7, πλοῦτου δὲ καὶ γένους προσώπων αὐτῶν
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λαμπροῦ καὶ φίλων, οἱ πλείστον ἠδύνατο, ἡμῶν, μεθυμενος ἔξοστρακισθῆραι. We learn what Aristotle means by τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἴσχυν from Plut. Aristid. c. 1, τῷ δ' ὀστράκῳ πᾶς ὁ διὰ δόδων ἡ γένος ἡ λόγου δύναμιν ὑπὲρ τῶν πολλῶν νομιζόμενοι ἵππεπιτεν, though he may perhaps hint that even virtue, as in the case of Aristides, was a cause of ostracism at Athens.

21. μεθυμησος, the technical word used in cases of ostracism: cp. Philoch. Fragm. 79 b (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. 396), τούτου εἴδει...ἐν δέκα ἡμέραις μεταστήναι τῆς πόλεως ἐτή δέκα: Diod. ii. 55. i: [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 6. The same word is used of the banishment of involuntary homicides (Demosth. c. Aristoc. c. 45, τῶν ἐπ' ἀκουσίων φόνῳ λέγει μεθεσθηκότων). It is used in contrast to φυγαδεύων and is a milder term than even ἐκβιάλειν.

22. χρόνως ὁρισμένους. Cp. c. 14. 1285 a 34 and 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 27. Ten years, or, according to Philoch. Fragm. 79 b, originally ten, and afterwards five. Diodorus (ii. 55. 2) makes the term five years. In the petalism it was five (Diod. ii. 87. 1). A temporary absence from the State would not indeed make the ostracized person less wealthy or less well-born, but it would sever him from his friends and followers, and so tend to diminish his influence.

μυθολογεῖται δὲ κ.τ.λ. See Sus.², Note 604 (Sus.⁴, i. p. 416), who refers to Pherecydès of Leros, Fragm. 67 (ap. Schol. Apollon. i. 1290: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 88), Ἀντίμαχος ἐν τῇ Λύδῃ φησίν ἐκβιάλαθεν τὸν Ἡρακλέα διὰ τὸ καταβραίηθαι τὴν Ἀργώ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἤρωος. Τούτω καὶ Παυσιππος ὁ ἐπιγραμματογράφος ἤκολούθηκε καὶ Φερεκύδης, and Apollodor. Biblioth. i. 9. 19, Φερεκύδης αὐτὸν ἐν Ἀφέταις τῆς Θεσσαλίας ἀπολειφθήτην λέγει, τῆς Ἀργοῦ φυλεγμένης μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τούτου βέρος. See also Prof. Robinson Ellis’ note on Catullus 64. 23, where the expression ‘mater’ probably refers to the Argo—’the idea is not unnatural in itself and agrees with the recurring representations of the Argo as an animae being (Ἀργῷ a proper name, like Eido, Hypso, Aphro, Brimo, Ioulou), possessed of voice and reason and in part divine. Philo Iud. vol. ii. p. 468 (quoted by Nauck, Fr. Aesch. 20), οὖδ' ἡ Ἀργῳ μαναρχόουσα Ἰδανος ἐπέτρεπεν ἐπιβάινεις αἰκέταις μεμοράμενη καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ λογισμοῦ, φύσεως οὐδα μαλείδερος· ὅθεν καὶ Δάσυλος ἐπ' αὐτῆς εἰπε’ Ποὺ δ' ἐστιν Ἀργοῦ ἱερὸν ἀὐθαυσαν (rather ἀδδάσαυν) Ἐξουλ; Apollod. i. 9. 19’ (quoted above), ‘cf. i. 9. 24, places which all seem to refer to the piece of speaking timber (ἀὐθαυσαν δόρῳ) which Athenae built into the cut-water, and which
Apollonius describes as urging the start from Pagasae (ι. 525) and warning the Argonauts to expiate the murder of Absyrtus by a visit to Circe (iv. 580 sqq.).


26. διό κ.τ.λ. Καί τὸν ψέγωνας, 'among others those who blame.' In τοὺς ψέγωνας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to Sosicles the Corinthian and the speech which he is represented in Hdt. 5. 92 to have addressed to the representatives of the Lacedaemonians and their allies gathered in council, in which, while recounting the misdeeds of the tyrants of Corinth, he dwelt especially on the hint given by Thrasybulus tyrant of Miletus to Periander tyrant of Corinth to get rid of the men who overtopped the rest. Compare Eurip. Suppl. 433 Bothe, 447 Dindorf,

\[\pi\omega\nu\sigma\nu\nu\varepsilon\tau\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu \gamma\varepsilon\nu\nu\nu\nu\nu \iota\chi\nu\nu\nu \tau\omicron\lambda\iota\sigma,\]

\[\delta\tau\nu\nu \tau\iota\varsigma, \\omega\nu\lambda\epsilon\mu\mu\omega\nu\nu \eta\rho\iota\nu\nu \sigma\tau\iota\chi\nu\nu,\]

\[\tau\omicron\lambda\iota\mu\mu\alpha\varsigma \delta\phi\iota\alpha\rho\iota\gamma \kappa\iota\pi\omega\lambda\omega\iota\iota\iota\nu \nu\nu\nu;\]

Herodotus, as has been said, makes Thrasybulus give the hint to Periander, whereas Aristotle here makes Periander give the hint to Thrasybulus, but any one who compares the two narratives will see that the story as told by Aristotle is a shortened version of that of Herodotus. How then are we to account for the inversion in it of the parts played by Periander and Thrasybulus? We have already noticed other instances in which a slight divergence from a narrative of Herodotus is observable (see above on 1262 a 19 and 1276 a 28), and the same thing occurs again in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 17 sq. Aristotle's memory may have betrayed him, as it did in the mention of Hector in Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 a 33 (see below on 1285 a 12) and of Calypso in Eth. Nic. 2. 9. 1109 a 31, where Hom. Odys. 12. 219 is referred to, but, if this was so, the slip must have been something more than a mere momentary one, for it recurs in 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20. It is natural that Aristotle should credit Periander with the advice, for he believed that many of the traditional maxims of tyranny came originally from Periander (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 36). We notice that Herodotus, a Greek of Asia Minor, ascribes the famous hint to a tyrant of Miletus, while Aristotle, a Greek of Europe, ascribes it to a tyrant of Corinth. For the dative ὀρθοβουλημένων dependent on the substantive συμβουλίων, cp. De Part. An. 2. 17. 660 a 35, καὶ χρᾶνται τῇ
γλώττη καὶ πρὸς ἐρμηνείαν ἀλλήλους, and see Bon. Ind. 166 a 61 sqq. In 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20 we have τὸ Περανδροὺ πρὸς Θρασύβουλον 
συμβούλευμα.

28. τὸν πεμβέντα κύρικα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας. For the order of these words, cp. 1284 b 8, τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς 
συμμετρίας, and c. 12. 1282 b 31, τῶν ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν τῆν 
tέχνην, and see Vahlen on 
Poet. 15. 1454 b 16, τὰς ἀκόλουθιας αἰσθήσεις τῇ 
pοιητικῇ.

30. ομαλῶναι. ‘Ομαλῶνεν is a rare word, but it is used by Plato 
in Tim. 45 E.

35. καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας. In sentences 
of this kind the preposition is usually repeated in the 
Politics before the second substantive (e.g. in 1. 8. 1256 b 17 we have 
καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν 
tροφὴν), and this is so whether ‘both . . . 
and’ is expressed by καὶ . . . καὶ or by τε . . . τε, but sometimes 
the preposition is not thus repeated (e.g. in the passage before us and 
critical note on 1330 b 31). I have not noticed that the 
preposition is similarly omitted in the Politics when ἥ . . . ἥ, οὔτε . . . οὔτε 
(or μὴτε . . . μὴτε, εἶτε . . . εἶτε, οἱ πότερον . . . ἥ are used, except 
that in 3. 1. 1275 b 17 Mē P1 omit the second 
περὶ in ἥ περὶ πάντων ἥ

37. τρόπον τινά. See above on 1255 a 13.

38. οἱ κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως. Cp. Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 187, 
οἱ τῆς φήσιν νυν γεγονότες κύριοι.

39. δόν Ἀθηναίοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. It is clear from this that the 
Samians, Chians, and Lesbians were the most powerful 
States of the Athenian alliance. They had been the leaders in the 
transfer of the headship of the maritime league against Persia 
from the Lacedaemonians to Athens (Plut. Aristid. c. 23). Miletus 
was no longer their equal. We read in Ἀθ. Pol. c. 24, πεισθέντες 
de τῶτα καὶ λαξόντες τὴν ἄρχην (οἱ Ἀθηναίοι) τοῖς τε συμμάχους δεσποτι-
κωτέροις ἐχρώντο πλὴν Χιών καὶ Δεσπίων καὶ Σαμίων τούτων δὲ 
φόλακας εἶχον τῆς ἄρχης, ἔσωντες τὰς τε πολιτείας παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄρχειν δων ἐτυχον ἄρχουσιν. 
This remark is obviously not true of the period subse-
quent to the revolt and subjugation of Samos in n. c. 440, and 
it probably refers to the Athenian Confederacy in its earlier 
days before it was converted into an Empire. If we understand it thus, 
it is not inconsistent with the passage before us. But it is not 
easy to say what were the infractions of treaties to which Aristotle
alludes. He appears to refer to humiliations inflicted by Athens on Samos, Chios, and Lesbos at a comparatively early period of her ascendancy, 'as soon as she had taken a firm grip of her rule.' He can hardly refer, therefore, to humiliations which followed the suppression of revolts, for Samos did not revolt till b.c. 440, nor Mytilene till b.c. 428, nor Chios till b.c. 412. Besides, he seems to be speaking not of humiliations brought about by disloyalty on the part of these States, but of humiliations prompted by Athenian jealousy of their greatness. Athens may have prohibited wars between one of these States and other members of her alliance (see the speech of Hermocrates in Thuc. 6. 76)—it was a prohibition of this kind that led to the revolt of Samos (Thuc. i. 115) —or demanded the removal of fortifications (compare the case of Chios in b.c. 425, Thuc. 4. 51), or meddled with their territory (as in the case of Thasos, Thuc. i. 100). No doubt, the Mytilenean envoys in Thuc. 3. 9 sqq. (see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 6. 309), speaking in b.c. 428, do not charge Athens with any infractions of treaties; on the contrary, they speak of their State having been 'honoured' by Athens, and ascribe their revolt to fear of ultimate subjugation, not to actual wrongs inflicted on Lesbos in the past. Still Plutarch implies in Aristid. c. 25 (where he perhaps follows the same authority as Aristotle does in the passage before us, for he uses the words, ἐστερον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων ἄρχειν ἕγκρατέστερον, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἐξαγαπόμενον, cp. Thuc. i. 76. 1) that Athens was guilty of infractions of treaties in her relations with her dependent allies, and it is likely enough that Samos, Chios, and Lesbos did not escape. That a time did come when Athens changed her original easy-going headship into a firm imperial control, we see from Thuc. 6. 76 and Diod. ii. 70. Diodorus (who may here represent Ephorus, a witness likely to be favourable to the dependent allies, as he belonged to the Aeolic Cyme) dates the commencement of this change from the time when Athens became aware that the Lacedaemonians had abandoned all thought of attempting to regain the headship of the maritime league by war. This happened as early as b.c. 475, if Diodorus' chronology is to be trusted (Diod. ii. 50. 8).

41. ὁ δὲ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers not only to severities inflicted by the Persians on the Medes, Babylonians, and others after the suppression of revolts (see as to Babylon Hdt. i. 183 and 3. 159 and Arrian, Anab. 3. 16. 4 and
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7. 17. 2), but also and more especially to unprovoked evidences of distrust like that mentioned in Diod. ii. 6. 3, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν ἀναλαβὼν (ὁ Ζήρης) ἤκεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐν Θερμοπόλαισ "Ελληνας προτάξεις ἀπάντων τῶν ἐθνῶν Μίθιδας, ἔτει δὲ ἀνδρείαν προκρίνας αὐτοῦς ἔτει καὶ βουλόμενος ἀπαντάς ἀπολέσαι' εὗρ' γὰρ ἔτι φρόνημα τοῖς Μίθιδας, τῆς τῶν προγόνων ἡγεμονίας οὖ πάλαι καταπεπονημένης: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 7. 5. 69, μισθῶν δὲ καὶ τούτους (i.e. τοὺς φρούριοις) Βαβυλωνίους ἔταξεν (ὁ Κύρος) παρέχειν, βουλόμενος αὐτοῦς ᾠρ ἀνηχαυκτάτους εἶναι, ὅπως ὅτι ταπεινώτατοι καὶ εὐκαθεκτάτατοι εἶν. Egypt is probably referred to in τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐπ' ἀρχής: cp. Diod. 17. 49, οί γὰρ Ἀγύπτιοι, τῶν Περσῶν ἡγεμόνων εἰς τὰ λεπτα καὶ βιαῖους ἀρχόντων, ἀσμενοὺ προσεδέχετο τοὺς Μακεδόνας. Compare Plato's picture of Persian rule in Laws 697 D, which explains Alexander's triumph.

1284 b. 2. πεφρονηματισμένοις. 'A word occurring in the Politics alone of Aristotle's writings, but not very uncommon there, is φρονηματισμένοις. It occurs later in Polybius and is certainly un-Attic. It is entirely absent from the 'Aθ. Πολ., where θαρρείων takes its place' (Kaibel, Stil und Text der Politieca 'Athenaion des Aristoteles, p. 37).

ἐπέκοπτε. Ἐπικόπτω is a rare word; the passage before us is, so far as I know, the earliest prose passage in which it occurs. It is a technical term of arboriculture, to 'lop' or 'pollard' (Theophr. Caus. Plant. 5. 17. 3, περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπικοπῆς καὶ τῆς κολούσεως ἐν ἄλλους ἕ σκέψις . . . κολούσι δ' ἐπικοπῆν, ὅταν ἀφαιρεθείης τῆς κῶμης ἐπικόψῃ τις τὸ ἄκρων), and its metaphorical meaning in the passage before us agrees pretty closely with that of ἐπαινόσθαι in 1284 a 41.

3. περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ἄρθρας, 'with regard to all constitutions, even the normal ones.' Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 2. 767 a 32, καὶ ἐν πάσιν ἐστὶ τροφὴ τούτῳ (i.e. τὸ ὅδωρ), καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἥπεροις. We gather from 25 sqq. that the best constitution will expel, if necessary, men who are disproportionately superior in wealth or political influence, though not men disproportionately superior in virtue. As to the importance of συμμετρία in the members of a State, see 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 33 sqq.

4. μέν is answered by οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, as in c. 4. 1276 b 34, c. 6. 1278 b 19, and 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 39 sqq.

5. πρὸς τὸ ἰδίων ἀποσκοποῦσαι. The opposition between πρὸς τὸ ἰδιὸν ἀποσκοποῦσαι and τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθῶν ἐπισκοποῦσαι will be noticed. The Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of the use of ἀποσκοπεῖν by Aristotle. 'Ἐπισκοπέων is also rare in the sense in which it is used in 6. It is not perhaps necessary to supply
\[\text{\textit{ovte}}\] from the next line with \(\text{\textit{tov}}\) \(\text{\textit{ideov}}\): cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 30. 1437 a 36, καὶ γὰρ ὄστοι ἐνεκά τινος ἰδίου δοκεῖ παρὰ τὸ ἑδος δημογορίαν (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 339 a 22).

7. \(\text{\textit{de toütò}}\) κ.τ.λ. " Cp. c. 12. 1282 b 30. \(\text{\textit{Toütò}},\) i.e. the fact that a part of a whole which is disproportionate to the whole to which it belongs is not tolerated.

8. \(\text{\textit{ovte}}\) is here followed by \(\text{\textit{ovte}}\) and \(\text{\textit{oude δή}}\) (‘nor yet surely’). See above on 1272 b 38, and compare the somewhat similar sequence in 17. 1288 a 24 sqq. In the passage before us the change from \(\text{\textit{ovte}}\) . . . \(\text{\textit{ovte}}\) to \(\text{\textit{oude δή}}\) is enough to cause the future \(\text{\textit{eiswv}}\) to take the place of the optative \(\text{\textit{eiswv an}}\).

10. \(\text{\textit{ovte}}\) καυτηγός προμένων κ.τ.λ. We must apparently supply \(\text{\textit{eiswv an}}\) ἐν ἑπερβάλλειν τῆς συμμετρίας.

13. \(\text{\textit{ovte}}\) διὰ τούτο μὲν κ.τ.λ. ‘[The teacher of a chorus does not fall out with his chorus because he excludes from it a disproportionatey excellent singer, for his rule over the chorus is beneficial to it, as being exercised for the advantage of the ruled (c. 6. 1278 b 39 sqq.),] and thus, so far as this practice at any rate is concerned, there is no reason why monarchs should not be in harmony with the States they rule, if, when they resort to it, their rule is beneficial to their States.’ For \(\muέν\) solitarium see above on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. Τάς πόλεις I take to mean ‘the States ruled by them’: cp. 33, \(\text{\textit{ovte}}\) βασιλεάς εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους ἀδίους ἐν τάς πόλεις. For τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς, cp. 21, and 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 26, τὰς οἰκείας γυναῖκας.

15. διὸ κ.τ.λ., ‘hence in relation to acknowledged superiorities the argument in favour of the ostracism is not without a certain element of political justice.’ Διὸ introduces an inference from the fact that constitutions which aim at the common good and practitioners of the arts resort to measures akin to the ostracism. Whatever restores the symmetry of the constitution is in a certain degree just. Κατὰ τὰς ὀμολογουμένας ὑπεροχὰς (cp. 26, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, οἴνον ἴσχυον καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ πολυφλίας, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῖς γένηται διαφέρων κατ’ ἀρετῆς) is added to exclude the application of the ostracism to cases in which there is no acknowledged superiority (such, for instance, as that of Hyperbolus). For the phrase τὰς ὀμολογουμένας ὑπεροχὰς cp. Plato, Rep. 569 B and Meno 96 B, and Isocr. Hel. § 12. ‘Ὑπεροχὰς is in the plural because there are more kinds of superiority than one (Bon. Ind. 793 a 40, ὑπεροχαὶ, i.e. varia τῆς ὑπεροχῆς genera’); there is superiority in
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virtue, in wealth, in command of friends, in birth, and so forth. For ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ τῶν ὀστρακισμῶν, cp. c. 9. 1280 a 27.

17. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. 'True, it is better,' etc. The same thing is said in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq. For the means by which Aristotle would effect this, see above on 1284 a 17.

19. δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς κ.τ.λ. On the proverb δεύτερος πλοῦς, see Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 359 and 2. 24, where the lines of Menander are quoted (Ἑρμοδώρου, Fragm. 2, ap. Stob. Floril. 59. 9: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 139), ὁ δεύτερος πλοῦς ἐστὶ δήπον λεγόμενος, ἀν ἀποτύχῃ τις οὐρίου, κῶπαι πλεῖν (οὐρίου Grotius, πρῶτον, εὖ or simply εὖ MSS.: see Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 5. ccliii). *Ἀν συμβῇ, sc. τὸ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης λατρείας. Διορθόειν, sc. τὴν πολιτείαν.

20. διπερ οὖκ ἐγίνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις, 'which did not come about in connexion with the States' (see note on 1327 b 7), a softened way of saying 'which was not done by the States.' Greek States did not use the ostracism to heal a defect in the constitution.

22. τοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς, plural in the sense of 'acts of ostracizing,' ἐν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'in the deviation-forms of constitution, then, that the practice of removing persons disproportionately superior is of advantage to each form severally and just according to their several views of justice, is evident, and perhaps this also is evident that it is not absolutely just.' It is not absolutely just, because it is resorted to in the interest of the holders of power, not in the common interest of all the citizens (4 sq.). Μὲν οὖν is answered by ἄλλα, 25.

26. οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἅγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχήν. Τῶν ἄλλων ἅγαθῶν is emphasized by being placed before τὴν ὑπεροχήν: cp. c. 14. 1285 b 18, τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, and 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 25, τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ κτήνη, and 34, τῶν μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίων αἱ μεταβολαί.

27. ἵσχύος must mean 'political strength': cp. 1284 a 21, ἡ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτικῆν ἵσχύν.

28. οὐ τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ’ ἀρετήν. Τῶν ἄλλων ἅγαθῶν is emphasized by being placed before τὴν ὑπεροχήν: cp. c. 14. 1285 b 18, τῶν πολεμικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, and 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 25, τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ κτήνη, and 34, τῶν μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίων αἱ μεταβολαί.

29. οὐ γὰρ δὴ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle no doubt remembers, as Vict. points out, Heraclitus' indignant censure of the Ephesians for their expulsion of Hermodorus (see vol. i. p. 263, note 2). Compare the language ascribed to the Persian King when Themistocles was driven from Greece to his court (Plut. Themist. c. 28, μακαρίσας δὲ
This page contains a section of a philosophical discussion about the concept of envy and its causes. It explores the idea of the Athenian popular belief that envy is the result of a deficiency in social rank, as expressed in a proverb attributed to Theophrastus. The text discusses various interpretations and translations of the proverb, highlighting the importance of context and historical background in understanding ancient philosophical works. The discussion touches on the nature of envy, its societal implications, and the role of distribution and social hierarchy in its manifestation. The page also includes references to other texts and scholars, such as Schneidewin, Leutsch, and Susemihl, who have contributed to the scholarly understanding of this topic.
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πειθεσθαι τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, καὶ κύριον εἶναι μή κατὰ μέρος τοῦτον ἄλλ' ἀπλῶς. Compare with this passage 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 23-27 and 3. 16. 1287 a 16-18, and we shall find that the three passages lend support to Bernays' rendering of μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς, 'by a rotation in their tenure of the offices' ('gemäss einem reihenweisen Wechsel der Aemterbekleidung'), in which he is anticipated by Sepulveda, who however erroneously supplies οἶ θεοὶ as the nom. to ἄξιοιεν. Sepulveda, in fact, explains the passage in his commentary thus—'simile, inquit, esse ac sì Dii statuerent inter se, ut sic per omnes aut aliquos ipsorum iret imperandi vicissitudo, ut Iuppiter modo imperium teneret, modo esset sub imperio, quod esset absurdissimum.' But does μερίζειν bear this sense in any other passage? I am not aware that any such passage has been produced, and till it has, it will be safer to translate μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς in the ordinary way, 'distributing the offices,' i.e. distributing them among themselves and Zeus, and treating him as on a level with themselves in the matter of ruling, or, in other words, as partly ruling and partly ruled, instead of making him sole ruler. Cp. 1284 a 9, ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἄξιοιμενοι τῶν ἱσων. I take μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς to mean the same as ἄξιοιεν αὐτῶν τῶν ἱσων. In Aristoph. Aves 467 sq. and 1225 sqq. (Didot) the Birds go further and claim to rule over Zeus and the gods without giving them even a turn of office. Bonitz remarks (Ind. 41 a 31) on the construction παραπλησίων κάν εἰ 'insolentior videtur usus formulae κάν εἰ ubi καί pertinet ad vocabulum similitudinem significans (παραπλησίων, ὥσποτ, τὸ αὐτὸ),' as in the passage before us, with which he compares Phys. 8. 5. 257 a 7 sqq. and (a passage very similar in structure to ours) περί ἀνάπτυξις 9. 475 a 11, παραπλήνων γὰρ συμβαίνει κάν εἰ τίς τινα τῶν ἀναπτυόντων πνεύμα, τὸ στόμα κατασχέων. The difficulty of getting the better of Zeus was proverbial (Hom. II. i. 396 sqq. and 8. 209 sq.), and indeed the difficulty of ruling over the gods (Eth. Nic. 6. i. 13. 1145 a 10 sq.), already referred to by Eaton: Aesch. Prom. Vinct. 49, 356 sqq., Pers. 749: Hom. II. 8. 18 sqq.: Aristoph. Plut. 141 sqq. Didot: Diod. 17. 41. 1).

32. λείπεται τοῖνυν κ.τ.λ. When willing obedience is rendered to a man, it is a sign that he is a natural King (Xen. Cyrop. 5. i. 24 sqq.). Cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 10, ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχῆ βασιλικῆ τὸ γὰρ γεννήσαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἀρχῶν καὶ κατὰ πρεσβεῖαν ἐστὶν, ὅπερ ἐστι βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἀρχῆς. Is the passage before us present to Milton's memory in the address to Cromwell in the Defensio Secunda,
where we read, 'We all willingly yield the palm of sovereignty to your unrivalled ability and virtue, except the few among us who are either... or who do not know that nothing in the world is more pleasing to God, more agreeable to reason, more politically just, or more generally useful, than that the supreme power should be vested in the best and the wisest of men' (Prose Works, i. 288 Bohn)?

33. βασιλεύς αὐτός. 'Forma accusativi pluralis plerumque βασιλεύς, veluti 2. 9. 1271 a 26: 2. 11. 1272 b 37: 3. 14. 1285 a 26: 3. 15. 1286 b 11, sed βασιλεύς legitur 3. 13. 1284 b 33' (Bon. Ind. 135 a 21 sqq.), and also in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 24. Βασιλεύς is the form found in Attic Inscriptions, though βασιλεύς appears after B.C. 307 (Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 110). The acc. plur. of ιερεύς in the Politics is ιερεῖς and of ἵππεις ἵππεῖς. For the meaning of αὐτός see above on 1271 a 40. Not more temporary kings, like the βασιλεύς mentioned in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 29, but perpetual kings.

35 sqq. μεταβήναι, because a transition is now made from C. 14. a question affecting all constitutions to the study of a single constitution, Kingship. Aristotle had said in c. 7. 1279 a 23 sqq. that he would discuss the normal constitutions first, and Kingship is a normal constitution. The inquiries of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters have had reference to the question of Justice, but now Aristotle asks whether Kingship is expedient, not whether it is just; the two questions, however, do not lie far apart, and when he at length arrives at the end of the inquiry in c. 17. 1287 b 36 sqq., we find that an answer is given to both of them (1287 b 39, δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον: 1288 a 1, οὕτε συμφέρον οὕτε δίκαιον: 1288 a 18, δίκαιον: 1288 a 30, πότερον οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ συμφέρει). The question of the expediency of Kingship cannot be discussed until the various kinds of Kingship have been distinguished, for it may well be that one and the same answer will not hold good of all. Besides, Aristotle is not sorry to seize the opportunity which his classification of Kingships affords him of describing the various forms of Kingship and of correcting the error of those who regarded the Lacedaemonian Kingship as Kingship in a truer sense than any other Kingship according to law (1285 a 3 sqq.); for he holds that the Lacedaemonian Kingship is, in fact, the least of those according to law. It is the expediency of the Absolute Kingship, however, that he really wishes to discuss. In his account of this form Aristotle
probably has the Persian Kingship before him (see notes on 1284 a 14 and 1287 a 1). Socrates had described Kingship as always according to law (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12, βασιλείαν δὲ καὶ τυραννίδα ἄρχας μὲν ἀμφοτέρας ἥγετο εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐνόμιζε· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πόλεων ἄρχην βασιλείαν ἡγεῖτο κ.τ.λ.). Aristotle takes a different view. Just as in the classification of democracies and oligarchies in the Sixth (Fourth) Book forms in which law is supreme are marked off from those in which it is not, so here in the classification of Kingships the same is the case; but while the democracies and oligarchies in which law is not supreme are the worst, the form of Kingship in which law is not supreme is the best and highest. Aristotle's classification of Kingships would have been simplified, if he had first divided them into Kingships according to law and not according to law, and had then subdivided the class of Kingships according to law. His study of Kingship would probably have been fuller and more complete if he had not studied Kingship according to law on the way, as it were, to an examination of the question as to Absolute Kingship. We are grateful to him for studying barbarian Kingship as well as Greek, for in the case of other constitutions he is silent as to the non-Greek world, if we except his notice of the Carthaginian ἀριστοκρατία, and not entirely for want of material, for non-monarchical constitutions appear to have existed, for instance, in Lycia (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 185); but his treatment of barbarian Kingship is cursory in the extreme. It makes no pretence of being exhaustive, for the kind of barbarian Kingship which Aristotle selects for notice is said by him to exist only among 'some of the barbarians' (c. 14. 1285 a 17). It should also be noted that in the inquiry respecting the downfall and the preservation of Kingship and Tyranny contained in the Seventh (Fifth) Book no notice is taken of the distinction drawn in the Third between different kinds of Kingship, or of that drawn in the Sixth (Fourth) between different kinds of Tyranny. So again in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10 Aristotle evidently implies the existence of Kingships not κατὰ γένος, but it is not easy to say to what Kingships he there refers (see note on 1313 a 10). One remark may be added. Aristotle classes under the head of βασιλεία dignities to which we should not allow the name of Kingship. The Aesymneteship, for instance, might be held for only a few months or years, yet it is treated by Aristotle as a form of βασιλεία. It is so because it is
exercised over willing subjects and is invested with large powers, for these are the two characteristics of βασιλεία (7 (5). 10. 1313 a 5). 

Βασιλεία may or may not be according to law, may or may not be κυρία πάνων (c. 14. 1285 a 4, b 29), may or may not be elective, may or may not be hereditary, may even be for a less term than life, but these two characteristics are always found in connexion with it.

37. σκέπτεσθαι δὲ πότερον κ.τ.λ. Compare the question raised in 2. i. 1261 a 2, ἀλλὰ πότερον δῶσιν ἐνδέχεται κοινωνίσαι, πάνων βέλτιον κοινοὶ τίνι μέλλουσιν οἰκήσεσθαι πόλιν καλῶς, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ νομίζειν; Τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς οἰκήσεσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ ἵππῳ stands in opposition to τισὶ μὲν συμφέρει τισὶ δ' οὐ συμφέρει, therefore it must mean 'broadly to any city and country which is to be well-constituted politically.' We have been told in the preceding chapter that in some cases the best constitution must assume the form of a perpetual Kingship, but that does not preclude the raising of the question whether Kingship is advantageous to any political community which desires to be well-constituted or only to some. Aristotle's readiness to consider the question whether Kingship is expedient or not would be little in harmony with popular opinion in Greece, which was no doubt unfavourable to the institution: cp. Demosth. Philip. 2. 25, βασιλεὺς γάρ καὶ τύραννος ἀπας ἔχεις ἀλεξιθερία καὶ νόμος ἑνατίος. Even Isocrates, though he praises Kingship in his Nicocles and Ad Nicoclem—he could hardly do otherwise in works written for a King—speaks of it in his Oration to Philip (§ 107) as little suited to Greeks, though indispensable to barbarians, and allows in his Nicocles (§ 24) that the Lacedaemonians and Carthaginians reserve it for use in war and are oligarchically governed at home. Xenophon's praises of Kingship in his Cyropaedeia refer, at any rate nominally, to a Persian King. Plato, however, had been bolder in his Republic and Politicus, for he certainly has Greeks in view when he advocates in those dialogues Kingship of the most thoroughgoing kind. See on this subject vol. i. p. 277.

38. καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρα. Χώρα probably here means not 'a territory occupied by villages,' as in Strabo, p. 336, σχεδόν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τόπους τῶν κατὰ Πελοπόννησον πλῆθος ὁλίγων, ὦν κατέλεξεν ὁ σαμνικής, οὗ πόλεις ἄλλα χώρας νομίζετε δεῖ, συστήματα δήμων ἔχουσαν ἐκάστην πλείω, εἶ δ' ὀν ὕπτερον αἱ γεωργίαι πόλεις συνοφράγοντα, but 'a territory occupied by an έθνος or έθνη,' as in Xen. Anab. 4. 8. 22.

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ἐν τῇ Κόλχοις χώρᾳ, for in c. 14. 1285 b 30 we have ὅσπερ ἐκαστὸν ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκάστη, and in 1285 b 33 πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἐνὸς ἦ πλείωνων. Nothing, however, is said of the χώρα or ἔθνος in the recapitulatory summaries in c. 17. 1288 a 30 sqq. and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 6 sqq.

41. ἦ πλείους ἔχει διαφοράς, ‘or has several different forms’: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 33, οὐ γὰρ οἶδα τὸ ταύτων ξύρων ἔχειν πλείους στόματος διαφοράς.

1285 a. 2. τῆς ἄρχης ὁ τρόπος. In some forms of Kingship (the barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship) the τρόπος τῆς ἄρχης is despotic (1285 a 22, b 2 sq.), in others not; in some the King is supreme over more things than in others (c. 15. 1285 b 35 sqq.).

3. πασῶν, sc. τῶν βασιλείων. For the juxtaposition of εἰς and πασῶν see note on 1281 a 13.

ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῆ πολιτείᾳ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle places first and second in his enumeration of forms of Kingship two existing forms, the Laconian and the barbarian, and then passes on to two obsolete forms, the Aesymneteship, which existed in the ancient days of Greece, and the Kingship of the heroic times.

δοκεῖ, ‘is thought,’ by whom we are not told: possibly Plato’s language in Laws 691 D–692 B respecting the Lacedaemonian Kingship is present to Aristotle’s mind. He does not agree with this view; he sees that there are Kingships according to law (the barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship) which are supreme over more things than the Laconian, and therefore are Kingships in a fuller sense, for the true King is κύριος πάνων (c. 17. 1288 a 18 sq.: cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37). In Diog. Laert. 3. 82 a classification of Kingships into Kingships κατὰ γένος and Kingships κατὰ νόμον is ascribed with very doubtful correctness to Plato, and the Lacedaemonian Kingship is brought under the former head, so that it is implied not to be κατὰ νόμον.

5. ὅταν ἔξελθῃ τῇ χώρᾳ, sc. ὁ βασιλεύς. Ἐξέρχομαι rarely takes the accusative (see Liddell and Scott).

ἡγεμῶν ἐστὶ τῶν πρῶ τῶν πόλεμον, ‘he is the leader in all matters relating to war’: cp. 1285 b 18, τῶν πολεμικῶν τῆς ἡγεμονίας, and Hdt. 9. 33, Λακεδαίμονις δὲ ... μισθῳ ἐπιέρασθαι πείσαστε Τιμαμοῦν ποιέσθαι ἁμα Ἡρακλείδεσθαι τούτι βασιλεύσοι ἡγεμόνα τῶν πολέμων. For τῶν πρῶ τῶν πόλεμον, cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 12. 5, ἦ πόλις οὐκ ἄσκει δημοσίᾳ τὰ πρῶτα τῶν πόλεμον: Anab. 4. 3. 10: Cygor. 1. 2. 10. ‘Ἡγεμῶν τῶν πρῶ τῶν πόλεμον stands in tacit contrast to ἡγεμονία πολιτικῆ, of which
we read in c. 17. 1288 a 9. In Philip. § 33, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τοὺς ἀν’ ἐκεῖνον γεγονόσι καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν εἰς ἀπαστὰ τῶν χρόνων δεδώκασι. Isocrates appears to distinguish between the Kingship and the ἡγεμονία. According to Hdt. 6. 56 the Lacedaemonian Kings had the right to determine against whom war should be made (πόλεμον ἐκφίερεν ἐπ’ ἦν ἀν’ βούλωνται χώρην), and Gilbert holds (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 46) that there are some indications that this right remained to them even in Xenophon’s time (Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 34: 2. 2. 7: 4. 7. 1), but Xenophon implies in Rep. Lac. 15. 2, καὶ στρατιῶν ὅσοι ἠκτὸς ἡ πόλις ἐκπέμπῃ, ἥγεισθαι, that the State and not the Kings possessed it.

6. ἔτε δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεούς (cp. 1285 b 23) answers to τὰ πρὸς τῶν πόλεων. Something more is meant by this phrase than the offering of sacrifices to the gods, sacrifices such as the Kings of the heroic times offered (1285 b 10: cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.), and it probably includes the right of the Lacedaemonian Kings to name the officers called Pythii, through whom the Delphic oracle was consulted (Hdt. 6. 57. 2), and to have the custody of oracles (6. 57. 4). We learn from Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 1, ἔθηκε γὰρ θέους μὲν βασιλεία πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τὰ δημόσια ἀπαστὰ, ὡς ἀπὸ θεοῦ ὁμός, why it fell to the Lacedaemonian King to sacrifice. It was natural that the same authorities should be charged with matters relating to the gods and to war, for success in war was held to be given by the gods. In his account of the prerogatives of the Lacedaemonian Kings Aristotle omits to notice their share in deliberative authority as members of the senate, and also the judicial authority which, as we know from Hdt. 6. 57, they possessed in a particular class of cases (this had perhaps been narrowed: see above on 1270 a 21).

7. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία κ.τ.λ. Μέν οὖν is taken up by ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἔδω βασιλείας, 14, and then at length finds a δὲ to answer to it in παρὰ τούτην δὲ, 16. Αὕτη ἡ βασιλεία (cp. 14) means ‘this kind of Kingship,’ as αὕτη ἡ δικαιοσύνη in Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 25 means ‘this kind of justice,’ for the Lacedaemonian Kingship is not the only Kingship included in the class, as we see from 15, τούτων δ’ αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ’ αἱρεταί. It appears, in fact, from 10 sqq. that the Kingship held by Agamemnon as leader of the Greek forces before Troy is included in it, a Kingship which we must not confuse with his Kingship of Mycenae, for his Kingship of Mycenae belongs to the fourth class of Kingships, αἱ κατὰ τοὺς
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Aristotle may well have also referred to this class the Kingship, or Leadership, of Greece, which was held for a time by Agesilaus and for life by Philip and Alexander of Macedon. Compare Plut. Ages. c. 40, where Agesilaus is said to have been regarded until the defeat at Leuctra as σχεδόν δῆς 'Ελλάδος ἰγμῶν καὶ βασιλείων, with Ages. c. 6, where we read that in a dream which Agesilaus had at Aulis before embarking for Asia, he heard a voice addressing him thus, ὁ βασιλεὺς Δακεδαμινών, ὅτι μὲν οὐδεὶς τῆς 'Ελλάδος ὁμοῦ συμπάσης ἀπεδείχθη στρατηγὸς ἡ πρώτερον 'Ἀγαμέμνον καὶ σὺ νῦν μετ' ἐκείνων, ἐννοεῖς ὁποῦ; and with Isocr. Panath. § 76. At a later time Philip of Macedon was elected by the Congress at Corinth ἰγμῶν (or στρατηγῶν) αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς 'Ελλάδος (Diod. 16. 1. 89, 91: Arrian, Anab. 7. 9. 5: cp. Demosth. De Cor. c. 201 and Justin, 9. 4, and see Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 51. 3), and on his death his son Alexander was elected by the Congress to the same dignity (Diod. 17. 4. 9: Arrian, Anab. 1. 1. 2: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 90. 1). Thus the office of ἰγμῶν, or στρατηγῶν, αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς 'Ελλάδος in the hands of Philip and Alexander was an elective office and tenable apparently for life. Long before the time of Agesilaus and Philip, Gelon had asked to be appointed στρατηγὸς τε καὶ ἰγμῶν τῶν 'Ελλήνων πρὸς τῶν βάρβαρων (Hdt. 7. 158). Aristotle can hardly intend to include the Carthaginian Kingship under this form of Kingship, for in 2. 11. 1273 a 30 he distinguishes between the offices of King and General at Carthage. He would seem to omit the Carthaginian Kingship from his enumeration, for it cannot fall under the head of the barbarian Kingship, though the Carthaginians were non-Greeks, inasmuch as its authority was by no means of a 'despotic' type. Would such an office as that of the ταγός of the Thessalians be classed by Aristotle under this form of Kingship?

στρατηγία τις αὐτοκράτορον καὶ αἰδίος. 'Αἰδίος is explained by διὰ βίου in 15. Α στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ αἰδίος evidently had not the power of life and death. Vict. would read αὐτοκράτωρ in place of αὐτοκράτορον, partly because the rendering of Vet. Int. is 'imperialis,' and Schneider and Sus., adopting his suggestion, place αὐτοκράτωρ in their text (see critical note on 1285 a 8). But, though στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ is a recognized title, I do not remember to have met with στρατηγία αὐτοκράτωρ. With στρατηγία τις αὐτοκράτορον may be compared 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18, δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν. A στρατηγία αὐτοκράτωρ differed from
an ordinary στρατηγός in having authority to deal with many questions for himself as to which an ordinary στρατηγός would have to consult the popular assembly or other supreme authority: cp. Polyb. 3. 87. 7, ὁ δὲ δικαστὸρ ταὐτὴν ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑπάτων τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπάτων ἑκάτερῳ δώδεκα πελεκεῖς ἀκόλουθοι, τοῦτο δὲ εἶκοσι καὶ τέτταρες, κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ἐν πολλοῖς προσδίδοται τῆς συγκλήτου πρὸς τὸ συντελεῖν τὰς ἐπιβολὰς, οὔτος δὲ ἐστὶν αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός. So in Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 37 A. § 4, συναγωγὴς δὲ τῶν λογιστῶν ἤ βασιλεία αὐτοκράτωρ ἔστω, the word αὐτοκράτωρ is explained by Mr. Hicks to mean 'not bound to consult the popular assembly.' Cp. also Thuc. 6. 26 and 5. 27. It was the practice of Greek States to create στρατηγοὺς αὐτοκράτορες to deal with crises, just as the Romans created a dictator, but the στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ had not, like the dictator, the power of life and death, and more στρατηγοί than one could be declared αὐτοκράτορες, whereas the dictatorship was always confined to a single individual, though on one or two occasions we find two dictators in existence at the same time (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 131, ed. 1). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in fact, identifies the Roman dictator, not with the στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ, but with the αἰσιμνήτης (Ant. Rom. 5. 73). Still the position of sole στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ was often the first step to a tyranny in the hands of men like Phalaris (Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 10 sqq.: cp. Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 28), Aristodemus of Cumae (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 8), and Dionysius the Elder (Diod. 13. 94. 6).

8. εἰ μὴ ἐν τοῖς βασιλείασ κ.τ.λ., 'except in a particular Kingship, as for instance [in the Kingship existing] in the time of the ancients, on warlike expeditions by right of force.' ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ is probably to be rendered 'manuum iure' (Lamb. 'lege ca quae est in manibus et armis posita'). It is opposed to ἐν δίκης νόμῳ (Liddell and Scott s. v. νόμος). Where a person is slain by an exercise of the right which superior force confers, he is said to be slain ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ, whether he is slain by his adversary on the battlefield or, as in the passage before us, by his King for cowardice in presence of the enemy. Eaton compares Thuc. 3. 66, οὐς μὲν ἐν χειρὶ ἀπεκτείνατε, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλγοῦμεν (κατὰ νόμον γὰρ δὴ τινὰ ἐπαρχοῦ): compare also the word χειροδικαία in Hes. Op. et Dies, 189 ('men who use the right of might'). Bernays translates ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ 'als standrechtliches Verfahren' ('by process of martial law'), and Mr. Welldon follows him, but the use of the word χειροδικαία does not support this translation. In the kind of Kingship of
which Aristotle is speaking the King had, I conceive, the right to put to death with his own hand any of his warriors who showed cowardice on a warlike expedition; he had not the right to put any of them to death by judicial process. Sus. renders \( \text{εν χειρός νόμῳ 'im Handgemenge'} \) (\text{‘in the mêlée’}), but I much prefer the interpretation given above. How would the King be able to slay one of his own men while himself engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the foe? For \( \text{εν τιν \ βασιλείας, cp. c. 5. 1278 a 17, \epsilonν τιν \ πολιτείας, and 1278 a 28, \epsilonν τιν \ δημοκρατίας. Sus.}^3: \text{‘εν τιν \ βασιλείας seclusit Gifanius, βασιλεία εοδωm tempore secluserunt Bernaysius et Susemihlius.’} \) The suggestion of Bern. and Sus. is not without plausibility, but I do not think that any change is called for. Aristotle’s meaning is that the class of Kingship of which the Lacedaemonian Kingship is the type does not possess, as a class, the power of life and death, but that particular Kingships falling under the class do possess it, and he gives an instance of this. It is doubtful whether, as the emendation of Bern. and Sus. would imply, the Lacedaemonian King possessed the right to put a Spartan citizen to death ‘in a certain case’; we expect also to be told what case is referred to, but the only case mentioned is that of \( \text{o} \ \text{i} \ \text{αρχαῖοι.} \) The Lacedaemonian King does not appear to have possessed the power which Kings of this type possessed \( \text{επί} \ \text{τῶν} \ \text{αρχαῖων;} \) the punishment provided by the Lacedaemonian law for \( \text{o} \ \text{i} \ \text{πράσσειτε} \) seems, on the contrary, to have been a severe form of \( \text{ἀγμα} \) (Plut. Ages. c. 30).

11. \text{kακῶς μὲν ἄκουσαν κ.τ.λ.} \text{‘For instance, in II. 1. 225 sqq.’} (Sus.\(^2\), Note 618: Sus.\(^4\), p. 422). See also II. 2. 224 sqq.

12. \text{ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτείναi κύριος ἥν. For} \text{ἐξελθόντων see above on I281 b 4, 13. Καὶ κτείναι, not merely not to tolerate, but even to put to death.}

\text{λέγει γοῦν κ.τ.λ. The quotation is from II. 2. 391, where Agamemnon says,}

“\( \text{διν δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε} \ \text{μάχης} \ \text{έθελοντα} \ \text{νοήσω} \)
\text{μμακάζειν παρὰ} \ \text{ηναί} \ \text{κορωνίςων, οὐ} \ \text{ο} \ \text{i} \ \text{έπειτα} \ \text{ἄρκιον} \ \text{έσσειται} \ \text{φυγέειν} \ \text{κύνας} \ \text{ἡ} \ \text{o} \ \text{i} \ \text{ωνούσ.}”
\text{δὲ} \ \text{ἐφάτ’} \ \text{‘Αργείων} \ \text{δὲ κ.τ.λ.}"

In Eth. Nic. 3. II. 1116 a 32 these threats are ascribed to Hector, for there we read, \( \text{ἀναγκάζουσι γάρ} \ \text{o} \ \text{i} \ \text{κύριοι, ὀπερ} \ \text{δ’} \ \text{Εκτωρ} \)
\text{διν δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε} \ \text{μάχης} \ \text{πτώσοντα} \ \text{νοήσω,}
\text{οὐ} \ \text{o} \ \text{i} \ \text{ἄρκιον} \ \text{έσσειται} \ \text{φυγέειν} \ \text{κύνας.}"
Aristotle probably remembered the similar threats placed by Homer in the mouth of Hector in II. 15. 348 (cp. II. 12. 248 sqq.),

\[\text{δι' \ ο} \ \text{ἐγόν \ ἀπάνευθε \ νεών \ ἐτέρωθε \ νοήῳ,}
\]
\[\text{ἀυτοῦ \ οἱ \ βάνατον \ μητίσομαι, \ οὐδὲ \ ν\simeq \ τάγη}
\]
\[\text{γνωτι \ τε \ γνωσί \ τε \ πυρὸς \ λελάχισω \ μανώντα, άλλα \ κὺνες \ ἐρύοσοι \ πρὸ \ ἀστεος \ ἡμετέρων,}\]

and was thus led into the error of ascribing the lines quoted by him to Hector, and not to Agamemnon. It will be seen that Aristotle abbreviates this passage of Homer in quoting it both here and in Eth. Nic. 3. 11, that in the latter passage he substitutes \(πτώσοντα\) for \(εἰ
\�\ha\d\l\o\v\i\v\o\i\v\d\e\v\d\o\i\v\p\r\a\v\n\a\v\a\v\d\o\v\\) \(\nu \eta\nu\i\o\i \ κορώνιαν,\) and that in the passage before us he adds \(πάρ \ γὰρ \ ἐμοὶ \ βάνατος \) after \(οἶνον\), words which do not appear in our text. There is nothing surprising in the abbreviation or the substitution to which reference has been made, but the addition of \(πάρ \ γὰρ \ ἐμοὶ \ βάνατος\) is remarkable. The passages in which the text of Homer as quoted by Aristotle differs from the text handed down in the extant MSS. and other authorities are very numerous. A list of them will be found in Bon. Ind. 507 a 29 sqq. In some of them Aristotle’s memory may well be at fault (compare his inaccurate quotation from Isocrates in Rhet. 3. 9. 1410 a 1, and see Prof. Butcher in Class. Rev. 5. 310 sq.), and if the addition before us stood alone, we might be tempted to account for it by supposing a confusion with \(αὐτοῦ \ οἱ \ βάνατον \ μητίσομαι\) in the similar passage, II. 15. 348 sqq. But it does not stand alone. In 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 25 Aristotle attributes to Homer the line (which is not to be found in our Homer),

\[\text{άλλα \ οἶνον \ μὲν \ ἐστὶ \ καλῶς \ \ἐπὶ \ βαῖτα \ βαλέσιν,}\]

and in Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 a 33 sqq. he adds after II. 11. 542,

\[\text{Άιαντος \ δὲ \ ἀλέεω \ μάχην \ Τελαμωνιάδαο,}\]

the following line, which does not occur in the MSS., but which Plutarch also found there (see De Audiend. Poet. c. 6. 24 C and c. 14. 36 A),

\[\text{Ζεῦς \ γὰρ \ οἱ \ \νεμέοσα\'x, \ δὲ \ ἀμέλειν \ φωτὶ \ μάχωνο.}\]

So again, as we learn from Soph. El. 4. 166 b 6 sqq. (cp. Poet. 25. 1461 a 22) Aristotle found the words \(διόμεν \ δὲ \ οἱ \ εὐχὸς \ ἀρέσθαι\) in the address of the Dream to Agamemnon (II. 2. 23 sqq.), but they are not to be found there now, though the words \(διόμεν \ δὲ \ τοι\)
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euxos apartheu occur in Il. 21. 297. For other instances of the same thing see Bon. Ind. 507 b 52 sqq. Variations of this nature must probably be ascribed to a difference between the text of Homer which Aristotle had before him and that which has come down to us. Even as early as the time of Alcibiades it seems to have been usual for grammarians to 'correct' the text of Homer (Plut. Alcib. c. 7, epirou de (yrammatodidaskalev) fhsantos eixeiv "Omprou up' aitou diorwmmenon, "eis," ephi, "yrammata didaskaleis "Omprou epavorboiv ikanos dnon; oxi tovs neous paideveis"); and, as Camerarius long ago pointed out (Interp. p. 134), Alexander possessed a copy of the Iliad corrected by Aristotle himself (Plut. Alex. c. 8: Strabo, p. 594). It is likely enough, therefore, that in the time of Alexander, and even earlier, more texts than one of Homer were current, with not a few varieties of reading. Recent discoveries of Homeric papyri add to the likeliness of this. See as to them Mr. F. G. Kenyon 'On the Geneva Fragments of Homer' in Class. Rev. 8. 134 sqq., and also in Class. Rev. 11. 406. The text of the quotations from the Homeric Hymn to Apollo given in Thuc. 3. 104 differs widely from that of our MSS. (see Mr. T. W. Allen in Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 15. p. 309).

13. ouoi arkeion esseitei phugein, 'it shall not be a sure thing for him to escape'—perhaps a Litotes for 'he shall have no hope of escaping.'

15. tou'ton de e. k.t.l. Katara genos does not perhaps necessarily imply that the Kingship passed from father to son, but only that it was confined to members of a given family. In place of aipetal we have in c. 15. 1285 b 39 katara meros, a wider term, for an office held katara meros may be filled by election or otherwise. See below on 1285 b 39. To what elective Kingships of the Lacedaemonian type does Aristotle refer? Hardly to the Carthaginian (see above on 1285 a 7); perhaps, among others, to the office of hgemon autokratow tis' Ellados held for life, as we have seen (above on 1285 a 7), by Philip of Macedon and Alexander: whether he refers to the office of tayos of the Thessalians, is doubtful, though this office was elective.

16. parad tauten de e. k.t.l. Monarchias eidos, as in 29 sq., not basiaileias, as in 15, while in 1285 b 4 we have eidos monarchias basisileias. Yet in the recapitulation, 1285 b 20 sqq. (cp. c. 15. 1285 b 34, 1286 a 5), all the forms which Aristotle enumerates are classed as basisileias eidos. Perhaps he is in doubt whether the
barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship are really forms of Kingship or of Tyranny; in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 7 sqq. they are treated as forms of Tyranny shading off into Kingship, and we are there told that the barbarian Kingship was elective, which we do not learn here, unless it is implied in 1285 b 2 sq. (see note). He speaks of the ‘barbarian’ form of Kingship as existing only among ‘some’ of the barbarians of Europe and Asia. Other barbarian races perhaps had hereditary Kings whose power was more limited. Others again were not ruled by Kings at all; we hear, for instance. of Ἐρράκες ἀβασιλεύσι in Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 17. The Kingship of the Thracians, Illyrians, Phoenicians, and Ethiopians may have been of the type here described by Aristotle. Hardly the Molossian Kingship (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 23 sq.), or the Macedonian, for the Macedonians were very outspoken to their King (Polyb. 5. 27. 6, εἴχον γὰρ ἕνι ταύτῃ ἰσηγορίαι ἑκείοικοι ἅλτεσ πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς), and the Macedonian people seem to have been the judges in capital cases in time of peace (Abel, Makedonien vor König Philipp, p. 136, note).

18. ἐξουσία δ᾽ αὐταὶ κ.τ.λ. It is natural to expect that when the power of a Kingship is great, it will not be governed by law and hereditary. Tyranny is regarded by Aristotle as not hereditary, for though tyrannies often passed from father to son, the inheritor of a tyranny was apt to lose it (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 21 sqq.). Πατρικός is apparently not used by Aristotle elsewhere in the sense of ‘hereditary,’ and in 24, 33, and 1285 b 5, 9 we have πατρίδος used in this sense, but πατρικός often bears this meaning (e.g. in Thuc. 1. 13). As to the extent of the authority of barbarian Kings, cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, κατ᾽ ἀρχοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄσασα πόλεις Ἑλλάδας ἀβασιλεύσει, πλὴν οὖν ἠσπερ τὰ βαρβαρα ἐθνὶς δεσποτικός, ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμους των καὶ ἐθνομοὺς πατρίδος (this is perhaps based on Theophrastus, but Aristotle would say that the barbarian King also governed according to law): Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Antig. 8. 182 C : Eurip. Hel. 246 Bothe, 276 Dind.,

τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δουλα πάντα πλὴν ἐνὸς.

19. διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is added to explain how it happens that the law in these countries authorizes a despotic rule and that these Kingships are hereditary. As to the slavishness of barbarians, cp. Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adespota 291 Nauck,

ἰὼ τυράννη βαρβάρων ἀνδρῶν φίλη,
and Isocr. Philip. § 107. Aristotle advised Alexander in ruling his empire τοὺς μὲν Ἐλλήσιον ἡγεμονικῶς, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους δεσποτικῶς ἀχοθᾶτι (Aristot. Fragm. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.: see note on 1324 b 36). That Asians were especially slavish, we see from 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 27 sqq. and Plut. De Vitos. Pud. c. 10, πάντες οἱ τῶν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντες ἐνι δουλεύονσιν ἀνθρώπῳ διὰ τὸ μη δύνασθαι μιᾶν εἰσεῖν τὴν οὐ συλλαβῆν.

22. τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, not, as in c. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq., in the sense of ‘rule exercised for the advantage of the master’ (for then this form of Kingship would not be a normal constitution, as it is), but ‘despotic rule,’ as in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 21 (cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 3).

23. τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., ‘thus while they are of a tyrannical type for the above-mentioned reason, they are safe’ (and therefore unlike tyrannies), ‘because they are hereditary and in accordance with law.’ Does ‘for the above-mentioned reason’ mean because the subjects are slavish, or because the power of the King is as great as that of a tyrant? Bernays and Welldon take the former view, but, looking to 1285 b 2 sq. and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 15 sqq., I lean rather to the latter. It is easy to understand why conformity to law confers safety, but why are Kingships the safer for being hereditary? Probably because men more willingly submit to rule when it has come down to the ruler from his ancestors and has become traditional. Thus ἐκῶντων takes the place of πάτρωι in 27.

24. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The bodyguard of a barbarian King is composed of natives of the State for the same reason for which his tenure of power is safe, i.e. because it is hereditary and in accordance with law, and therefore willingly submitted to. We see that Kings no less than Tyrants and Aesymnetes (c. 15. 1286 b 37 sqq.) had a bodyguard—usually at any rate, though perhaps not invariably (c. 15. 1286 b 6 sqq.)—but the King’s bodyguard was not intended, like the Tyrant’s, to secure his throne, but merely to enforce obedience on any of his subjects who might be for the moment recalcitrant (c. 15. 1286 b 27 sqq.).

25. οἱ γὰρ πολίται κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 7 and Isocr. Hel. § 37. The Lacedaemonian Kings were guarded by citizens (Isocr. Epist. 2. 6).

26. τόις δὲ τυράννους ἥξεινκόν. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 7. 8), Aristodemus of Cumae had
three bodyguards, one of the lowest of the citizens, another of manumitted slaves, and a third of hired barbarians.

30. ἕτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and another which existed among the ancient Greeks, [the monarchy of those] who are called Aesymnetes.' The εἶδος μοναρχίας is loosely explained by the name given to those who held it: compare 2. i. 1273 a 30, τὰς μεγάστας (ἀρχαίς), τοὺς τε βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, and 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 10. Pittacus and, it would seem, Peisistratus (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.) are counted by Aristotle among the ancient Greeks, but not of course Dionysius the Elder (3. 15. 1286 b 37 sqq.). 'We find the word αἰσιμυνητήρ correctly explained in Etym. Magn. αἰσιμυνάν δέ ἐστι τὸ αὐτῶν μήμην ποιεῖσθαι' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 280. i). The title αἰσιμυνητής was not confined to the extraordinary magistrates to whom Aristotle here refers. At Cyme (we are not told which Cyme) the magistrates generally were called by this name (Aristot. Fragm. 481. 1556 b 44 sqq.); in Hom. Odys. 8. 258 the αἰσιμυνήται are umpires in contests for prizes; and in Megara and her colony Chalcedon and also in Chersonesus, a colony of the Pontic Heracleia, which was itself a Megarian colony, the functions of the αἰσιμυνήται or αἰσιμυνώτες seem to have been those of the πρωτόμος at Athens (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 72. 3, 188. i, 194. 5, 280. i). We are here concerned, however, only with the extraordinary Aesymnete. The nature of his office may be gathered from Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 54 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 389), which refers to Miletus, 'Ἐπισκέφθη μετὰ τῶν ἀίσιμυνήτων ὅπο τοῦ δήμου χειροτονεῖται λαβῶν ἐξουσίαν κτείνειν οὔς βούλεται· καὶ δὲ τῶν μὲν παῖδων 'Αμφισθήσας οὐδενός οὖς τ' ἦν ἐγκράτης γενέσθαι· ὑπεξῆλθον γὰρ παραχρῆμα δείσαντες' τὰ δὲ δύνα αὐτῶν ἐθέμεσον, καὶ ἀγρώνων ἐκήρυξεν, εἰ τις αὐτῶν κτείνειν τῶν δὲ κοινών τοῦ φύλου τρεῖς ἀπέκτεινεν, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις φυγὴν προσεῖτεν οἱ δὲ ὄχοντο. Οἱ μὲν δὴ Νῆλείδαι κατελύθησαν ὄδε. This is the earliest extraordinary Aesymnete we hear of, unless the Aesymneteship of Tynnondas in Euboea (Plut. Solon, c. 14) was still earlier. The μοναρχὸς ἐξουσία which the Athenian Aristarchus held at Ephesus at the time of the overthrow of the Medes by Cyrus (b.c. 559) may possibly, as Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 141, points out, have been that of an Aesymnete, but this is not certain. The Aesymnete had larger powers than any Greek King—larger than even the Greek King of heroic times, for the administration of the State lay wholly in his hands. He is, in fact, commonly described as a tyrant (31: cp. c. 15. 1286 b 38: Plut. Solon, c. 14: Theophrast. ap. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 73),
though Pittacus is not unnaturally spoken of as a king in the popular ditty (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr., Carm. Popul. 43),

Thus tyrants in early days were called Aesymnetes (Aristot. Fragm. 481. 1557 a 5 sqq.). The Aesymnete ruled κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην (6 (4). Ἰο. 1295 a 16), though his office is implied in 1285 a 32 to be κατὰ νόμον: the law, in fact, empowered him to rule κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην. Like the tyrant, he had a bodyguard, though his bodyguard would be smaller than the tyrant's (c. 15. 1286 b 35 sqq.) and composed of citizens, like the bodyguard of the king, not of mercenaries, like that of the tyrant. Aristotle evidently conceives a resemblance to exist between the Aesymneteship and the barbarian Kingship (32), and it is possible that the Greeks borrowed this great office from the barbarians, for we are told in 6 (4). Ἰο. 1295 a 11 that elective αὐτοκράτορες μόναρχοι existed among some of the barbarians. Dionysius of Halicarnassus finds its equivalent in the Roman Dictatorship (Ant. Rom. 5. 73, ἢστι γὰρ αἱρετὴ τυραννὶς ἡ δικτατορία δικοῦσι δὲ μοι καὶ τοῦτο παρ᾽ Ἑλληνῶν οἱ Ῥωμαίοι τὸ πολιτεύμα λαβεῖν οἱ γὰρ Ἀσινμυὴτα καλοῦμενοι παρ᾽ Ἑλλησ τὸ ἀρχαῖον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ βασιλείας ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος, αἱρετὸι τινες ἦσαν τύραννοι ἥρωντο δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ πόλεις ὀνὴ εἰς ἀρισταν χρόνων ὄντες συνέχως, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς, ὅποτε δόξεις συμφέρει καὶ εἰς ὀπόσον χρόνων ὁπερ καὶ Μιτυληναίοι ποθὲ εἴλοντο Πίτακων πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας τοὺς περὶ Ἀλκαίων τοῦ ποιητῆρ, where Theophrastus evidently has this passage of the Politics before him, though he says nothing of the Aesymnetes mentioned by Aristotle who held office for life). The Aesymneteship resembled the Roman Dictatorship in being called into play 'in asperioribus bellis aut in civili motu difficiliore' (Speech of the Emperor Claudius in the Lyons Tables, ι. 28: Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. ι. 140), but there were some important differences between the two offices. The Aesymnete, for instance, was elected by the people, whereas the dictator was named by one of the consuls. The dictator held office for not more than six months; Pittacus, on the contrary, remained Aesymnète for ten years (Diog. Laert. ι. 75), and Aristotle knew of Aesymnetes who held office for life. The dictator was always created to deal with some specified business; this was frequently, but not always, it would seem, the case with the Aesymnète. The Aesymnète was master of
the State in civil no less than in military affairs; the civil authority of the dictator was less extensive (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. i. 141 sqq.). It is not surprising that the Aesymneteship soon fell into disuse. It might not have done so if its power had been less, or if its tenure had been limited, like that of the Roman dictatorship, to six months. Pittacus surrendered it after holding it for ten years and retired into private life, but there were not many Greeks of his stamp, and there must always have been a risk of Aesymnetes declining to retire. Hence the Greek States allowed the office to disappear, and made shift with ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοκράτωρ in its place. Indeed, the creation even of a sole ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοκράτωρ was sometimes attended with peril to the State, for the risk of the establishment of a tyranny was always greater in Greece than at Rome. Still Greece probably lost something by allowing the Aesymneteship to fall into disuse. It was an office which in the hands of good men was a means of suppressing tyranny.

32. τῆς βαρβαρικῆς, sc. μοναρχίας.

34. μέχρι τινῶν ὧρισμένων χρόνων ἥ πράξεων, 'till the expiration of some definite time or the performance of some definite actions.'

35. τοὺς φυγάδας ἰἰν προειστήκασαν κ.τ.λ. Compare the very similar expression in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 19, οἱ φυγάδες, ἰὼν οἱ Ἀλκμεωνίδαι προειστήκασαν.

'Αντιμενίδης καί Ἀλκαίος ὁ ποιητής. In a passage of Diogenes Laertius based on Aristotle (2. 46: Aristot. Fragm. 65. 1486 b 34) we find the form 'Αντιμενίδας, which is the correct Lesbian form. He was a brother of Alcaeus, and another brother was named Κίκες (Alcaeus, Fragm. 137), κίκες meaning 'strength,' so that the names of all the three brothers were indicative of strength and prowess. See note on 1311 b 29.

37. δηλοὶ δ' Ἀλκαίος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle evidently anticipates that his statement that Pittacus was elected tyrant by the Mytileneans will hardly be credited by his own contemporaries—an elective tyranny would seem to them to be a contradiction in terms—and he supports it with the strongest testimony he can find, that of the foe whom Pittacus was elected to put down. The fact would hardly have been forgotten if the songs of Alcaeus had not, like those of Simonides (Aristoph. Nub. 1353 sqq.), passed somewhat out of fashion. Alcaeus, however, can only have known of Pittacus' election by hearsay, for he was an exile when it took place. His scoliun, or convivial song, was probably composed in the camp of
the exiles leagued against Mytilene, but it would not be long in finding its way into the city. It would be sung with most zest by others than the Mytileneans, for it satirized them as ἐβελθόντας, a grave reproach to Greeks (cp. Hdt. 3. 143 and i. 62 sq., and Theogn. 847–850).

39. τὸν κακοπάτριδα Πιττακὸν κ.τ.λ. Alcaeus, Fragm. 37 A. Bergk. There is a reference to this fragment in Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 a 30 sqq. 'Respicit Plutarchus, Erot. c. 18, κοινὴ τὸν Ἑρωτα συνεγγράφουσιν εἰς θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἱ κράτιστοι καὶ νομοθέτω καὶ φιλοσό-φοιν ἀδρόναι φωναί μέγα ἐπαινέοντες, ὡσπερ ἔφη τὸν Πιττακὸν ὁ Ἀλκαῖος αἱρείσθαι τοὺς Μεγαληναιοὺς τύραννοιν, ubi cum Reiske ἀδρόα φωνά coniecisset, illud ipsum Schneidewin Alcaeo tribuit' (Bergk). The epithet κακοπάτρις, 'born of a mean father,' is no doubt applied to Pittacus because his father was a Thracian and perhaps a slave. As to his Thracian extraction cp. Duris, ap. Diog. Laert. i. 74 : we see from Thuc. 4. 107 that Pittacus was a Thracian name. Τὸν κακοπάτριδα closes a line, and then follow two complete lines. In the second of these, 'Εστάσατο κ.τ.λ., the second syllable is long, but this syllable may be either long or short in this metre, and thus we are not obliged to regard the a of Πιττακός as long. Ahrens (De Graec. Ling. Dial. i. 246) accentuates Πιττακόν : he remarks (1. 10), 'Grammatici uno ore testantur, Aeoles accentum in ultima acutum fugientes retraxisse in priores syllabas, exceptis tantum-modo, ut accurariores moment, praepositionibus et conjunctionibus.'

In place of πόλεως and ἐπαινέοντες Alcaeus probably wrote πόλος (Ahrens, i. 116) and ἐπαίνεντες (Ahrens, i. 142), but it is doubtful whether Aristotle did so in quoting his lines. Not much dependence can be placed on our MSS. in this matter, but it deserves notice that even when in citations from non-Attic writers they in the main preserve the dialect, as they do here—and this is often not the case (see for instance the quotation from Heraclitus in 7 (5). ii. 1315 a 30 sq.)—they allow Attic forms to slip in: thus we have ἔσθλον (not ἔσθλον) in the quotation from Sappho in Rhet. i. 9. 1367 a 8 sqq., and Simonides may have written ἄματα and καλέσων in the passage (Fragm. 12) quoted from him in Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 b 7 sqq. See also critical note on 1340 b 26. Ἐπαινέντες is not only the correct Lesbian form, but it is required by the metre, unless the third and fourth syllables of ἐπαινέοντες can be regarded as coalescing. It may possibly be a technical word for the expression of assent to the election of a magistrate (cp. Alcaeus,

Fragm. 128, Hesych. 'Επαίνους τις κρίσεις καὶ τὰς συμβουλίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχαιερείας Σαφοκλῆς Θεότητ Σκικωνίω καὶ Ἀλκαίως (MSS. ἀλκεωί ταῖς ἐπανήτησιν), but see Bergk on this fragment.

ἀχόλω, 'meek,' 'lacking gall.' Compare [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 1. 27, καὶ οὐδὲς ἐμῶν χολῆν οὐδὲ ὄργην ἔχουν φανήσεται ἐφ' οἷς ὁ βαθειῶς καὶ ἀναδίκης ἄνθρωπος οὗτοι βιάζεται τούς νόμους; and a passage quoted from Plutarch by Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 3. i. 3 (referred to by Liddell and Scott), ὅς δεόν ἀθύμον καὶ ἄχολον καὶ καθαρέωυς ὅργης καὶ πικρίας ἀπάτης τῆς γυναικός καὶ ἀνδρός εἶναι συμβίωσιν. Compare also Aristoph. Lysistr. 463, 

πότερον ἐπὶ δούλας τινὰς ἢκεν ἐνόμισας, ἢ γυναικίν οὐκ οἶει χολὴν ἐκεῖναι;

where the proverb ἔστεκτι καὶ μύρμηκι χολή (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 111) is alluded to. Hamlet's 'I lack gall To make oppression bitter' is familiar.

2. αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Ἀὐταί, 'these monarchies' (cp. αὐταί, 1285 b. 1285 a 18 and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 14). Εἰσί perhaps refers to the barbarian Kingship (cp. 17, εἰσί), and ἤσαν to the Aesymneteship (cp. 30, ἤν.). If so, the barbarian Kingship is here implied to have been elective, which we have not been told before, though we learn the fact in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 11 sq.

4. τέταρτον δ' εἶδος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not tell us whether he includes only Greek Kingships in this class, but probably this is his meaning, for he makes ἡ βαρβαρική βασιλεία a separate kind. Κατὰ νόμον should be taken with γιγνόμενα ('which arose in accordance with law in the heroic times, voluntary and hereditary in character'); these Kingships are said to arise in accordance with law, because they do not, like tyranny, owe their origin to the arbitrary action of an individual (compare the contrast of κατὰ τήν αὐτοῦ βασιλείαν καὶ κατὰ νόμον in c. 16. 1287 a 1 sqq. and c. 15. 1286 b 31 sqq.); they owe it, in fact, as is explained in the next sentence, to their subjects' gratitude for benefits conferred. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 7, ἐπάρχει δ' ἡ γένεσις εἰδις ἐς ἐναντίων ἑκάτερα τῶν μοναρχιῶν κ.τ.λ. Τοὺς ἡρώων κρόνους, 'the times of the heroes,' the times of Heracles (Probl. 30. 1. 953 a 13 sqq.) and Priam (Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1100 a 7 sq.). Thus Isocrates (Evag. § 65) calls the Trojan War 'the war of the heroes.' The 'heroic times' seem to come to an end before, or perhaps with, the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnese (Paus. 7. 17. 1, "Ἀργος μὲν ἐς πλείστον
NOTES.

ἀφικομένην δυνάμεως πόλιν ἐπὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἥρωων ὀμοῦ τῇ μεταβολῇ τῇ ἔσ Δωρείας ἐπέλειπε τὸ ἐκ τῆς τύχης εὐμενέτι. As to 'the heroes,' cp. Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 17, ἔκεινοι μὲν γὰρ ἥρωων μιμηται' οἱ δὲ ἠγειρόντες τῶν ἀρχαίων μόνοι ἦσαν ἥρωες, οἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἀνθρώποι.

6. Διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Γάρ justifies ἐκούσαί τε καὶ πάτραι γεγομέναι κατὰ νόμον by introducing an explanation in detail of the way in which this came about.

τοὺς πρώτους, 'the first kings of each dynasty,' 'the founders of dynasties.'

τοῦ πλήθους εὐφρέγετας. The founders of the heroic Kingships won their thrones, according to Aristotle, by services to the people, just as it was the revolt of the people that overthrew Kingships (15). Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 84) has already pointed out that this account is hardly consistent with 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sq., where Kingship is said to have come into being for the protection of the ἐπιείκειας from the demos. However, the origin of Kingship generally (including the Persian Kingship, for Cyrus is referred to) is traced in a very similar way in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 31 sqq. Aristotle refers the origin of Kingship to the will of the people, but the Kings themselves would probably claim that they owed their thrones to Zeus, from whom they sprang (see Schömann, Gr. Alt. i. 23).

7. κατὰ τέχνας, 'in connexion with arts.' Bernays translates 'by the invention of arts,' and no doubt services of this nature are especially present to Aristotle's mind, but the phrase is wide enough to include cases like that of Melampus, who was made joint-king of Argos with his brother and the previous King Anaxagoras for healing the Argive women of their madness (Paus. 2. 18. 4). As to Kings who won their thrones by discoveries in connexion with the arts, we may compare the words of Atreus in Eurip. Fragm. 853,

δείξας γὰρ ἀστρων τὴν ἑαυτῶν ὅθεν
δήμους τ' ἐσώσα καὶ τύραννος ἥψηρν,

where Nauck refers to Strabo, p. 23 (Polyb. 34. i. 4 sqq.), καὶ Πολύβιος δ' ὀρθῶς ὑπονοεῖ τὰ περὶ τῆς πλάνης τὸν γὰρ Διόλου τῶν προσημαίνοντα τοὺς ἐκπλους εν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν πορθμὸν τότοις ἀμφιδρόμους οὕσε καὶ δυστεκπλου τὰ τῆς παλιρροίας ταμιάν τε εἰρήθαι τῶν ἀνέμων καὶ βασιλεά νενομίσθαι ψηφι, καθ'àπερ Δαναῶν μὲν τὰ ύδρεα τὰ ἐν Ἄργοι παραδείξαται, Ἀτρέα δὲ τοῦ ἕλιου τῶν ὑπεσαντίων τῷ ὑφράκτῳ ὄρμων, μάντεις τε καὶ ἱερουκοπομένους ἀποδείκνυσθαι βασιλέας, τοὺς δ' ἱερας τῶν Αἰγυπτίων.
καὶ Χαλκίδαιος καὶ Μάγους σοφία τυφλομερώς τῶν ἄλλων ἡγεμονίας καὶ
τιμής τυγχάνειν παρὰ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν. Καμερινιος (Interp. p. 137)
compares Dion. i. 43. 6.

ἡ πόλεμον. Aristotle no doubt remembers the way in which
Bellerophon came to be King of the Lycians (Hom. ii. 6. 189 sqq.).

ἡ διὰ τοῦ συναγαγεῖν, sc. τὸ πλῆθος. Συνάγειν is used here in the
sense of 'forming into a πόλις' (ep. c. 6. 1278 b 21 sq., Dion. 3.
56. 3, μυθολογοῦσι δὲ πρῶτον παρ' αὐτοῖς Ὑφαίνων βασιλεύεις καὶ τοῦς
ἀνθρώπους σπαράδον οἰκούντας συναγαγεῖν εἰς πόλεως περίβολον, Paus. 2.
30. 9, and Isocr. Hel. § 35), so that it answers to κτίσαντες in 7 (5).
10. 1310 b 38. In Plato, Laws 681 C we have τοὺς ἱγμοὺς καὶ
Biblioth. Cod. 186. p. 131 a 23 Bekk., παραλαβόν τὴν βασιλείαν
(Λυγιδοῦ), ἐπεὶ ο ὑπέρτη ἐπελεύθησεν, ἠθροισα τὸν λαὸν σπαράδον
οἰκούντα καὶ πόλιν ἐκτίσεν ἐπὶ τῷ ποσαμῷ μεγάλῳ καὶ εὐδαιμονε, Καῦνος
ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπονομάσας.

ἡ πορίσαι χώραν. So the Heracleidae, being heirs to Argos,
Lacedaemon, and Messene, made over their territories to their
comrades in the invasion of Peloponnesus and received Kingships
in return for them (Isocr. Archid. § 17 sqq. and especially § 20).
Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 38, ἡ κτίσαντες ἡ κτησάμενοι χώραν, ὡσπερ οἱ
Ἀκαδαμιόνων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ Μολωνῶν, and Polyb. 6. 7. 4,
χώραν κατακτάμενοι (sc. οἱ βασιλεῖς).

8. καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνοι πάτριοι, 'and hereditary for those
who succeeded to them.' So Bern., 'und für die folgenden Ge-
schlechter ward diess dann ein angestammtes Verhältniss.'

9. κύριοι δ' ἡσαν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle says nothing of the share of the Kings in
deliberative authority as conveners of the γερουσία
(Hom. ii. 9. 68 sqq.). For τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας cp. 2. 10.
1272 a 9.

10. τῶν θυσίων, ὅσα μὴ ἱερατικά. The sacrificial functions of the
Kings passed to the βασιλεῖς or ἄρχοντες or πρωτάρχεις, as to
whom see 8 (6). 8. 1332 b 26 sqq., and note on that passage.
The Egyptian King was a priest according to Plato, Polit. 290 D
sqq.; not so the Greek King of heroic times. The sacrificial and
judicial prerogatives of early Greek Kings were no doubt sources of
profit to them, and their military position would bring them plunder.

καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰς δίκες ἐκρινον. Did the King try all the
actions that were brought? If so, there cannot have been many
of them, especially as the King would be from time to time absent

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on campaigns. Gilbert (Beiträge zur Entwickelungsgeschichte des griech. Gerichtsverfahrens und des griech. Rechtes, p. 445) thinks that in the earliest days of Greece the whole people sat in judgment on offences affecting the collective interests. He infers this from the practice in historical times of the Macedonians (see note on 1285 a 16), the Epirots (Polyb. 32. 21 Hultsch), and the Acarnanians (Liv. 33. 16). But he holds that the right of trying these offences passed to the King in those States of Eastern Greece in which, as at Mycenae, a powerful Kingship came into existence, though the King may probably have exercised it with the advice of his γέροντες (p. 446).

11. τοιοῦτο δ' ἐποίοιον οἱ μὲν οὐκ ὄμνυόντες, οἱ δ' ὄμνυόντες. In times later than the heroic Greek judges and dicasts probably always adjudicated on oath (cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 47, ἅπασι δὲ προστάττετο παρωοι καθάτερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ μεθ' ὅρκου τὴν ψῆφον ἐπιφέρειν): the oath of the Athenian dicast is well known (see vol. i. p. 273, note 1, and below on 1287 a 25). Hence Aristotle's mention of the fact that some Greek Kings in the heroic times adjudicated unsworn. Those Kings who adjudicated on oath would no doubt swear to judge justly, and possibly to judge according to the laws. We must not assume that the Kings who adjudicated unsworn did not take an oath from time to time to rule according to the laws. The Lacedaemonian Kings swore to the Ephors every month that they would so rule (Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 7), but we do not hear of their adjudicating on oath, though they may have done so. Plutarch in Quaest. Rom. 44 speculates why the priest of Jupiter at Rome was not allowed to swear—πῶτερον ὅτι βασιλεύς τις ἐλευθέρων ὁ ὅρκος ἄστι, δεῖ δὲ ἀμαρτιάστων εἶναι καὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἱερέως; ἢ ὅτι περὶ μικρῶν ἀπιστεύσας τὸν τὰ θεία καὶ μέγιστα πεπιστευμένον οὐκ εἶκός ἐστιν; ἢ ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ὅρκος εἰς κατάραν τελευτᾷ τῆς ἐπιρρίας, κατάρα δὲ δύσφημον καὶ σκυθρωτόν; ... ἢ κοινὸς ὁ τῆς ἐπιρρίας κίνδυνος, ἀν ἀνήρ ἀσεβὴς καὶ ἐπιρρόχος εὐχῶν κατάρχησαι καὶ ἱερῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως; That the oath was a check on the King we see from Soph. Fragm. 428,

ὥρκον δὲ προστεθέντος ἐπιμελεστέρα
ψυχὴ κατέστη δισσά γὰρ φιλάσσεται,
φίλοις τε μέγιστον κέις θεοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν.

The Athenians out of respect for Xenocrates would not allow him to give his testimony on oath (Cic. ad Att. i. 16. 4). We have ὄμνυόντες here, as we have ὄμνυόνται in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 9 and in
12. ὁ δ᾽ ὄρκος ἤν τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐπανάτασις. The article is absent before ἐπανάτασις, as is often the case when the genitive comes first: cp. Thuc. 4. 12. 2, τῶν τε χωρίων χαλεπότητι, and 3. 58. 4, ἐς πατέρων τῶν ἐμπερέων θῆκας (Richards). Cp. also 3. 4. 1277 a 11 sq., b 19, 4 (7). II. 1330 b 29, τῶν ἀμπέλων συντάδας, and see critical note on 1331 b 5. Ἐπανάτασις, not simply ἀνάτασις, because the sceptre is lifted up in a particular direction. For the fact see Hom. II. 7. 412: το. 321. Compare the oath of Abraham (Gen. xiv. 22, And Abram said to the king of Sodom, I have lift up mine hand unto the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth, that I will not take from (thee?) a thread even to a shoelatchet, and that I will not take anything that is thine). The lifting-up of the sceptre perhaps signified that the King staked his sceptre on the honesty of the judgement. No words needed to be uttered, no gods to be named; in both these respects the oath referred to differed from ordinary oaths, in which it was common to name three gods (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 21. 9). Cp. Alexis, Fragm. Θητεώντες (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 420), ὄρκος βεβαιὸς ἐστιν ἃν νεόσω μένον, and Cratin. Χείρονες, Fragm. ΙΙ (Meineke, 2. 155), οἷος ἢν μέγιστος ὄρκος ἀπαντὶ λόγῳ κύων, ἑπετεὰ χήν’ θεοῖς δ᾽ ἐσῖγων, where see Meineke’s note.

13. οἱ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Οἱ ἄρχαιοι χρώματος include οἱ ἡρωϊκοί χρώματος, in which these Kingships came into being, but also far later times (see above on 1285 a 30). For ἄρχειν with the accusative of the matters over which rule is exercised, cp. c. 16. 1287 a 9, where Π have ἄρχει πάντα. If we read with all the MSS. (except M*, which omits the first τά, and P1, which adds κατὰ before ἔνδημα) καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερύμα (St. Hilaire and Sus. would omit the first καὶ), we shall probably be right in translating, with Bernays, ‘both matters in the city and matters in the territory and matters beyond the frontier,’ though τὰ ἔνδημα usually means ‘home-affairs,’ and it would be possible to take it in this sense here, translating ‘both matters in the city and home-affairs generally and matters beyond the frontier.’ Those who strike out καὶ before τὰ κατὰ πόλιν translate ‘the affairs of the State, both home-affairs and affairs beyond
the frontier.’ ῥὰ κατά πόλιν might probably mean ‘the affairs of the State’ (cp. Plato, Polit. 287 B, D, 295 E, 305 E, and see Holden on Xen. Oecon. 11. 14), but ῥὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν (Isocr. De Pace, § 49) or ῥὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1145a 11) is more commonly used in this sense, ῥὰ κατὰ πόλιν meaning rather ‘matters in the city’ in contradistinction to ‘matters in the country’: compare for the contrast of κατὰ πόλιν and κατ’ ἄγρον Xen. Oecon. 11. 14 and Cyneg. 13. 15, Plato, Theaet. 142 A and Rep. 475 D, and Menand. ‘ῤηδίλια Fragm. i (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 207). If we are right then in taking ῥὰ κατὰ πόλιν in the sense of ‘matters in the city,’ the three-fold division in the passage before us will answer to that in Plato, Phaedrus 230 C, οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄστιος οὕτ’ εἰς τὴν ὑπεροίκιαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὕτ’ ἔξω τείχους ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ τὸ παράπαν ἐξίναι.

14. συνεχῶς ἡρχον, unlike the later βασιλείας (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.), who were annual officers.

ὑπεροίκια δὲ κ.τ.λ. As to the circumstances attending the fall of Kingship compare 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 38 sqq. and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, where Theophrastus is probably followed, as in the passage immediately preceding. Both Dionysius and Polybius (6. 7. 6–9) speak as if the Kingship of heroic Greece always passed into a tyranny before it fell (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 10 sqq.), but we gather from the passage before us and from 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 40 sq. that this was not always the case.

15. τὰ μὲν ἅπτων παραίτητων τῶν βασιλέων. Aristotle probably refers in the first place to Theseus (Plut. Thes. cc. 24, 25), but also to Theopompus the Lacedaemonian King (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 26 sqq.) and to the Kings of the Molossians (1313 a 23 sqq.).

τὰ δὲ τῶν ὄχλων παραπρομένων. The diminution of the powers of the Kingship is commonly attributed by the authorities to οἱ πολλοὶ or οἱ δῆμοι. Cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, ἀρξεμένων δὲ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις πλημμελεῖν, καὶ νόμοις μὲν διὰ νὰ χρωμένων, ταῖς δ’ ἐκατον γνώμαις τὰ πολλὰ διοικητάντων, δυσχεραίνεται δόλω τὸ πράγμα οἱ πολλοὶ κατέλυσαν μὲν τὰ βασιλικὰ πολιτεύματα, νόμους δὲ καταστημάτως καὶ ἀρχὰς ἀποδέξαντες, ταύτας ἐξρήνον τῶν πόλεων φυλακαίς. Pausanias speaks of οἱ δῆμοι in 4. 5. 10 and 2. 19. 2. Polybius also assigns the chief part in the overthrow of monarchy to the πλῆθος (6. 8. 1), and so does Lucretius (5. 1136 sqq.). Their view is confirmed by the fact that in the Achaean cities Kingship was succeeded by democracy (Polyb. 2. 41. 4 sqq.). Aristotle speaks of Kingship as designed to protect the ἑπιεικεῖς from the δῆμος (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9), and it is
natural that he should regard the Many as the agents in its overthrow. If we ask how it happened that, though Kingship was overthrown by the Many, it was nevertheless usually succeeded by the supremacy of the Few, Polybius has an answer ready; the Many effected the overthrow of Monarchy by means of προστάται, and they allowed these προστάται to rule over them (Polyb. 6. 8. 1 sq.).

16. αἱ πατρίους θυσίαι are so termed in contradistinction to αἱ ἐπίθεται ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 3: Isocr. Areopag. § 29). The Kingship was reduced to priestly functions at Cyrene (Hdt. 4. 161) and Ephesus, where we read of the descendants of Androclus in Strabo, p. 633, καὶ ἕνων αἱ ἐκ τοῦ γένους ὄνομαζονται βασιλεῖς ἔχοντές τινας τιμίας, προεδριάν τε ἐν ἁγώσι καὶ πορφύραν ἐπίσημον τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γένους, σκίτσακα ἀντὶ σκήπτρου, καὶ τὰ ιερὰ τῆς Ἑλευσινίας Δήμπτρος.

20. μὲν οὖν is taken up by μὲν οὖν, 28, and then answered by πέμπτον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 29.

22. ἐπὶ τισὶ δ᾽ ὀρισμένοις, 'but held on certain fixed conditions.' Though the submission rendered to the heroic Kingship by its subjects was a willing submission, it was not unconditional. Aristotle conceives the heroic Kingship to have been granted to the Kings by the people on the condition that they should be generals and judges and supreme over matters relating to the gods. This form of νομικὴ βασιλεία resembles νομικὴ φιλία (Eth. Nic. 8. 15. 1162 b 25, ἐστι δὴ νομικὴ μὲν (φιλία) ἢ ἐπὶ ῥήτορις κ.τ.λ.).

24. ἐκ γένους, literally 'resulting from family,' 'by right of family.' Ἐκ here signifies the 'origo et causa' of the ἄρχη (Bon. Ind. 225 b 15). Cp. [Plato,] Menex. 238 D, οὗτοι δὲ (i. e. βασιλεῖς) τοτὲ μὲν ἐκ γένους τοτὲ δὲ ἀρετοί. Elsewhere we have κατὰ γένος.

26. Φοι τετάρτη τούτων, 'fourth of these which I am enumerating,' cp. 2. 11. 1272 b 28, and see Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 19.

27. αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle forgets that he has included under the Lacedaemonian type of Kingship not only hereditary but also elective Kingships (1285 a 15: cp. also c. 15. 1285 b 39). His recapitulations are not always exact: see vol. i. Appendix B, and above on 1258 a 17 and 1278 a 34.

29. πέμπτον δ᾽ εἴδος κ.τ.λ. Πάντων is here neuter (though in c. 16. 1287 a 11 we have τὸ κύριον ἐνα πάντων ἐστιν τῶν πολιτῶν): cp. Magn. Mor. i. 35. 1198 b 13, οὗτος γὰρ πάντων κύριος καὶ πάντα διωκεῖ, and Demosth. Ol. 1. 4, τὸ γὰρ ἐστι πάντων ἐκέινον ἐνα ὡντα κύριον καὶ ῥήτων καὶ ἀπορρήτων. It is characteristic of Monarchy to be supreme over
NOTES.

everything (Rhet. i. 8. 1365 b 37 sq.), though all Kings were not so (1285 a 4). Compare with Aristotle’s language here the address of the Chorus to the King of the Argives in Aesch. Suppl. 370 sqq. Sus. appears to take πίντων with τῶν κοινῶν, reading ὄσπερ in place of ὄσπερ with Buecheler, but Bernays seems right in following Bekker, who places a comma after ὄσπερ and takes ὄσπερ ἐκαστὸν ἔθνος καὶ πόλεις ἐκάστη τῶν κοινῶν together.

30. τῶν κοινῶν, ‘public matters,’ as in c. 5. 1278 b 4 (not ‘public property,’ as Bern.).

31. τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν, sc. ἄρχήν, ‘answering to household rule.’ Supply βασιλεία from εἶδος βασιλείας (cp. 34). Bonitz (Ind. 748 b 18 sqq.) explains τάτειν here as used ‘de notionum ordine logico,’ and refers among other passages to 7 (5).

10. 1310 b 32, ἡ βασιλεία τέταται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν, Eth. Nic. 5. 1130 b 18, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὴν ἄρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη, and Top. 5. 1271 a 30 sqq., where τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι λεγόμενον is used synonymously with τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τεταγμένον.

όσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Supply ἄρχην with ἡ οἰκονομική. In saying that the rule over a household is a kind of Kingship (see above on 1278 b 37), Aristotle is thinking of the relation of the father to his children, not of that of the husband to his wife or of the master to his slaves.

32. οὕτως ἡ βασιλεία κ.τ.λ. Sus. would read παρὰ βασιλεία in place of βασιλεία, but Aristotle speaks of the fifth kind of Kingship simply as Kingship (cp. τὴν βασιλείαν, c. 16. 1287 b 35), because it is Kingship κατ’ ἐξοχήν. Πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἐνὸς ἡ πλείων is of course dependent on οἰκονομία, not on βασιλεία.

C. 15. 33 sqq. Aristotle seems to take it for granted that if he discovers whether the two extreme forms are expedient or not, he will have solved the question of the expediency of the intermediate forms. In just the same way Hippocrates in his treatise De Aere, Aquis, Locis sketches the extreme variations of the human race under the influence of climate and region, closing the treatise with the words, αἱ μὲν ἐναντίωταται φύσεις τε καὶ ἰδεῖα ἔχουσιν οὕτως· ἀπὸ δὲ τοινὲων τεκμαρόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, καὶ υἱὸ υἱῷ αὐτῆς. Aristotle may also have felt that a discussion of the expediency of the heroic Kingship and the Aesymmeteship would have only an historical, and a discussion of the expediency of the barbarian Kingship only a scientific, interest for Greeks.

35. τῶν ἄλλων αἱ πολλαί. Aristotle probably refers to the heroic
Kingship and possibly also to the barbarian Kingship, for the power of the Aesymnetae seems to have been quite unbounded.

36. ἐλαττώνων μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the late appearance of εἰσὶν in this sentence cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 35 sqq. and see note on 1332 b 42.

τῆς παμβασιλείας, literally 'Kingship over everything' (cp. παμ-
μήταρ = πάντων μήτηρ), as we see from c. 16. 1287 a 8 sqq. It
would seem from the expression τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης, 1287 a 8,
and from the absence of any remark in the passage before us, that
the word was not coined by Aristotle, as Schneider thinks, but was
a recognized Greek word. Παμβασιλείασ does not occur in Aristotle's
writings, though it occurs in Σωφία Σειράξ 50. 15 and in C. I. G.
4725. 6 (Liddell and Scott).

39. ἡ κατὰ γένος ἡ κατὰ μέρος. See above on 1285 a 15, where
we have τούτων δ’ αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ’ αἱρεταί. Tenure 'by
family' is opposed to tenure 'by turns,' because tenure 'by turns'
makes the office accessible to all, not indeed simultaneously but
successively. Tenure 'by turns' is a wider term than tenure 'by
election,' because, when tenure 'by turns' is the rule, the dignity
may pass by election or it may not.

2. τὸ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'now to inquire as to the kind of Generalship 1286 a.
we have mentioned is to enter on an inquiry belonging in species
rather to inquiries respecting laws than to inquiries respecting
constitutions.' The inquiry started by Aristotle in c. 14. 1284 b
35 sqq. is an inquiry respecting Kingship as a constitution (cp.
1284 b 39, ἡ οὖ, ἄλλ’ ἄλλη τις πολιτεία μᾶλλον). So too in 3. 1.
1274 b 32 it is taken for granted that the subject for considera-
tion is the constitution: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 29, ἡμῶν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον
eίμαι περὶ πολιτείας. For ἔχει εἰδος Bonitz (Ind. 218 b 17) compares
Rhet. 2. 22. 1395 b 20, περὶ δ’ ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου τε ἐπεσημεν, τίνα
τρόπον δεὶ ξηθεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς τόπους ἄλλο γὰρ εἰδος ἐκατέρω
τοῦτων ἔστιν. Notwithstanding what he says here, Aristotle
describes in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 17 sqq. an attempt to abolish the
Lacedaemonian Kingship as an attempt to alter 'a part of a
constitution.'

4. ἐν ἀπάσαις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 16. 1287 a 4 sqq. and see note
on that passage.

For τούτω referring to τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας, see notes on 1263 a 1
and 1291 a 16, and cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 25, where ταύτα refers to
φθοραί and σωτηρίαι.
5. ὁσὶ’ ἀφεὶσθω τὴν πρώτην. Aristotle evidently intended to treat of laws some time or other: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 11 sqq.

7. ἄρχῃ δ’ εστὶ κ.τ.λ. This is the initial inquiry; it is followed by the further inquiries, τίσι συμφέρει καὶ πῶς (c. 17. 1288 a 30 sqq.). The question whether the rule of men or of law is best was as old as the time of Pittacus, if we may trust Diod. 9. 27. 4 and Diog. Laert. 1. 77 (see above on 1281 a 34), and of Solon, to judge by Plut. Solon, c. 14, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν διὰ μέσον πολιτῶν τὴν ὑπὸ λόγον καὶ νῦν μεταβολῆν ὁρῶσε ἐργῶδη καὶ χαλεπὴν ὀνόμα, οὐκ ἔφευγον ἐνα τῶν δικαίωσεων καὶ φρονιμώσεων ἐπιστήσαι τοῖς πράγμασιν. Athenian public opinion had long decided the question in favour of law; it identified Democracy with the rule of law and Monarchy and Oligarchy with the rule of persons (vol. i. p. 494, note), and it is in this spirit that Theseus speaks as the representative of Democracy in Eurip. Suppl. 415 sqq. Bothe (429 sqq. Dind.): cp. also Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 9. 23, ὃ[ν] γὰρ ἄνδρος ἀπειλήν, ἀλλὰ νῦν φωνὴν κυριεύειν δὲὶ τῶν εἰθαμόνων. The teaching of Socrates, however, gave new life to the discussion. No one rendered a more willing obedience to the laws than he, yet his view that he who knows is the true ruler, and that a parallel exists between the ruler of a State and the master of an art, furnished Monarchy, or at any rate Monarchy in the hands of a scientific ruler, with a fresh ground of claim. For what master of an art would be prepared to fetter his practice of his art by written rule? It does not appear that Socrates himself ever raised this question, but his views undoubtedly suggested those to which Plato gives expression in Polit. 294 A sqq. and Laws 874 E sqq. See as to Plato’s views vol. i. p. 270 sqq. Aristotle in his first inquiry on the subject, contained in c. 15, is led, after a brief discussion (1286 a 9–21) of the question whether the best man or the best laws should rule, to suggest a compromise—let the best man promulgate laws and let laws rule except where they deviate from what is right, or in other words let the best man rule in subjection to law, except where right requires that he shall overrule law. But at the beginning of c. 16 Aristotle discovers that a ruler in this position would not be an Absolute King, whereas it is the claims of Absolute Kingship that he has promised to examine. Hence the compromise has to be abandoned and a fresh inquiry into the subject undertaken in c. 16 with the result that law should rule in some cases and the One Best Man in others.

agrees that the law from its inevitable generality is unable to regulate some things and fails to regulate others well (1286a 24), even when the utmost possible degree of ἀρέτης is imparted to it. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 14. 1137b 13-32: Pol. 2. 8. 1269a 9 sqq.: 3. 11. 1282b 1-6: 3. 15. 1286a 36 sqq.: Rhet. i. 13. 1374a 18 sqq. Law is said in c. 16. 1287b 22 to be unable to regulate things about which men deliberate. For πρὸς τὰ προσεπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 5. 16, πρὸς τὸ συμπάττον δέι διατάττων ἑπορεύετο.

12. For ἀρχεῖν, used of the master of an art, cp. c. 6. 1279a 4 sqq.

καὶ ἐν Αἰγυπτίῳ κ.τ.λ., ‘and in Egypt it is permissible for the physicians to change’ (i.e. to depart from) ‘the rules of treatment prescribed by law after four days’ treatment, while if a physician does this before, he does it at his peril.’ Bonitz (Ind. 391 a 7) is probably right in supplying τοὺς γεγραμμένους νόμους with κεινόν, unless indeed we should rather supply τὰ γράμματα from 12. With μετὰ τὴν τετράμερον Prof. Postgate (Notes, p. 7) supplies μελέτην: perhaps, however, θεραπείαν is the word which is suppressed (cp. c. 16. 1287a 40, τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν). For ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ (not αὐτῶν) κεινόν, cp. c. 16. 1287b 30, τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἁρχῇ καὶ αὐτὸν φίλους ποιοῦσα (οἱ μόναρχοι) συνάρχους, and Eth. Nic. 3. i. 110 a 9, ὁπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδείς ἀποβαλλέτωμεν ἕκων, ἐπὶ σωτηρία δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀπαντεῖ οἱ νοῦν ἔχουσε. As to the fact Camerarius (Interp. p. 136) refers to Diod. i. 82. 3, κατὰ δὲ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς τῆς χάρας ἐκδημίας θεραπεύονται πάντες οὐδείς μασθοῦν ἴδια διδώτες: οἱ γὰρ ἱστροὶ τὰς μὲν τροφάς ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ λαμβάνουσιν, τὰς δὲ θεραπείας προσάγοντι κατὰ νόμον ἐγγραφον, ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δεδοξασμένων ἱστρῶν ἁρχαίων συγγραμμένον καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς Ιερᾶς Βίβλου νόμους ἀναγνωσκομένους ἀκολουθήσατε ἀδινατήσωσι σῶσαι τὸν κόσμον, ἀθόφοι παντὸς ἐγκλήματος ἀπολύσαι, ἣν δὲ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα ποιῆσωσι, θανάτῳ κρίνων ὑπομένωσιν, ἡγουμένων τοῦ νομοθέτου τῆς ἐκ πολλῶν χρῶν παρατετημένης θεραπείας καὶ συντεταγμένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων τεχνιτῶν διλέγοντος ἔν γενέσθαι συνετῶτέρους. The authority followed by Diodorus does not seem to have been aware that the physicians in Egypt were free after four days to depart from the treatment prescribed by law, if desirable. The reason why they were allowed to do so may have been that a crisis in the disease was thought to occur on the fourth day: cp. Hist. An. 5. 20. 553 a 9, αἱ δὲ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται τοῖς πλέιστοι κατὰ τριήμερον ἦ τετράμερον, ὄσπερ καὶ αἱ τῶν νόσων συμβαίνουσι κρίσεις. See also Hippocr. De Morb. 4. vol. ii. p. 347 sqq. Kühn, where the
writer explains that the crisis in fevers occurs on days uneven in number, the third, fifth, seventh, or ninth, and adds, μεθεί εἴ τὸ πῦρ ἐν τῇ σια περισσηγεῖα διὰ τόδε, ὅτι ἐν τῇ σια ἀρτίας τῶν ἑμερῶν ἐλκεῖ τὸ σῶμα ἀπὸ τῆς κολῆς, ἐν δὲ τῇ σια περισσηγεῖαν ἀφίει, but this teaching hardly agrees with that of the passage just quoted from the History of Animals. Or the view may have been that the full effect of the drugs administered would not be experienced by the patient till the third day: see Hippocr. De Morb. 4. vol. ii. p. 341 Kühn.

16. διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, for the same reason for which ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους θεραπεία is not the best—the reason being that the γράμματα καὶ νόμοι may be unsuitable in the given case.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. This is the rejoinder of an advocate of law.

'But yet [if it is made an objection to law that it embodies an universal principle,] that universal principle too [no less than other things] must be possessed by the rulers, [so that their sway is open to the same objection,] and that from which the affective element is wholly absent is better than that in which it is innate. Now the affective element finds no place in the law, whereas every human soul must have it. [Hence the law is a better ruling authority than a man.]' Ἰδαίεν τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου takes up 10, τὸ καθόλου μόνον λέγειν.

That without ὁ καθόλου λόγος a ruler cannot rule aright, we see from 1. 13. 1260 a 17, διό τὸ μὲν ἂρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεὶ τὴν ἁθωκὴν ἄρτην (τὸ γὰρ ἐργον ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), and Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 20–28: cp. Plut. Ad Princ. Inerud. c. 3, τίς οὖν ἄριθμος τὸ ἄρχοντος; ο νόμος, ο πάντων βασιλείως θυτῶν τε καὶ ἄθανάτων, ὡς φησὶν Πινδαρος, οὐκ ἐν βιβλίοις ἐξ ἀναγραμμένοις, οὐδὲ ταῖς ἐξωλογίς, ἀλλ' ἐξωφυγοὶ ἕως ἑαυτῶς λόγος, ἰδιὰ συνυφύμως καὶ παραφυλάσσως καὶ μηδέποτε τὴν ψυχὴν ἔως ἑρμον ἀγαμάσας.

17. κρεῖττον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 26 sqq. and Plato, Laws 713 E sqq. As to τὸ παθητικόν see above on 1254 b 8, and compare c. 16. 1287 a 28 sqq., where τὸ παθητικὸν is represented by ἐπιθυμία.

For ὃ συμφέροντος cp. Plato, Timaeus 7α E, καὶ κατέδησαν ἐγὼ τὸ παιόστον (i.e. τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) ἐντάσσετα ὡς βρέμα ἐγγυον, τρέψειν δὲ εὐνημεύουν ἀναγκαίων, εἴπερ τι μελλον τὸν ὑπηρτὸν ἐσεῖται γένος.

19. ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην. Cp. c. 10. 1281 a 34 sqq., and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 3. 18, καὶ ὁ σῶν πατήρ πρῶτος τὰ τεταγμένα μὲν ποιεῖ τῇ πόλει, τὰ τεταγμένα δὲ λαμβάνει, μέτρον δὲ αὐτὸ οὖν ἣ ψυχὴ ἀλλὰ ο νόμος ἐστίν. Ἀνθρωπίνην is probably added because the proposal was to put a man in the place of the law.

20. ἄντι τοῦτο, perhaps rather 'in return for this' than 'in
compensation for this’ (‘pro eo quod affectibus non caret,’ Bon. Ind. 63 a 57). The presence of an affective element in the individual human being is the price he pays for his deliberating better about particulars. Cp. Hdt. 3. 59, παρὰ δὲ Ἐρμονέων νῦσον ἀντὶ χρημάτων παρελαβοῦν.

21. δὲ μὲν τοῖνυν κ.τ.λ. Λέερων, i.e. τῶν ἀριστῶν ἄνδρα. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Polit. 295 D–E, 300 C. He draws the provisional conclusion that it will be best to have a Lawgiver-King content in general to leave supremacy to the law which he has made, but ready to overrule it when it is well that he should do so. (Compare c. ΙΙ. 1282 b 1 sqq., where a similar arrangement is suggested.) Plutarch describes in Ages. c. 30, how Agesilaus after Leuctra, seeing how numerous those were who had lost courage in the battle (οἱ τρέσαντες), advised that the laws which imposed a severe form of ἀτυχία in such cases should ‘sleep for a while.’ Aristotle, however, goes much further than this, and asks that his Lawgiver-King shall overrule the law not only in critical times, but whenever it deviates from the right. We may compare the powers of overruling law possessed by the Roman Senate, and afterwards by the Emperor, even before the Principate became an Absolute Monarchy (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 823 sqq., ed. 1), and also the dispensing power of the Popes and the English Kings (Macaulay, Hist. of England, c. 6). Cowell in the earlier editions of his ‘Interpreter, or Law Dictionary,’ writing in the reign of James I, who found it necessary to suppress the work by proclamation, said under the title ‘King,’ ‘And though at his coronation he take an oath not to alter the laws of the land, yet, this oath notwithstanding, he may alter or suspend any particular law that seemeth hurtful to the public estate’ (Hallam, Const. Hist. of England, c. 6). It must be borne in mind that the King whom Aristotle would invest with powers of this nature is ex hypothesi an ἀνήρ ἄριστος.

24. δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ. The antecedent to ὅσα is τούτων or ταῦτα (after ἄρχειν). Κρίνειν, ‘to decide,’ as in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 29.

25. καὶ γάρ τινων κ.τ.λ. Συνινότες takes up πάντας (cp. c. ΙΙ. 1281 b 34, πάντες . . . συνελθόντες). Κρίνωνοι, ‘come to decisions.’ Both judicial and deliberative decisions are probably referred to, whereas in c. ΙΙ. 1281 b 31, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 5, and 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 4 κρίνειν refers only to the former. The point of the addition, αὕτω δ’ αἱ κρίσεις εἰσὶ πάντων περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστῶν, will become clear if we supply
after τῶν καθ' ἐκαστον the words 'which are just the things that the law cannot deal with.'

28. μὲν οὖν, 'true.' This passage seems to be based on c. II. 1281 a 42 sqq.

29. ἀλλ' ἐστιν ἢ πόλεις ἐκ πολλῶν, 'but the State is made up of many individuals, [and therefore is better than any single individual].'
Cp. c. II. 1282 a 38 sqq.

30. μιᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς. An ἐστίασις συμφορητός is really a number of ἐστίασεις, and it is compound, not ἀπλής.

diὰ τοῦτο. For the asyndeton cp. 6 (4). II. 1295 b 33, διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἥντι τοῦ Φωκυλίδης: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b II, αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφοῖν κ.τ.λ.: 7 (5). II. 1314 a 12, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τωμάτα τυραννικά μῖν καὶ σωτηρία τῆς ἀρχῆς: Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 a 36, διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄι παρασκομένοις μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται: Magn. Mor. 2. II. 1209 a 24, ταῦτ' ὅπερ ὁρόιος λέγονται.

καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον, 'also decides better' [besides being better].

31. ἔτι μᾶλλον . . . 33. ἀδιαφθορῶτερον. A numerous body not only arrives at better decisions than a single individual or a few, but is also less likely to be led astray from the just conclusions at which it arrives. For the structure of the sentence see above on 1253 b 35–37. μᾶλλον ἀδιαφθορόν, 'less easily seduced': cp. Plato, Laws 768 B, δικαστὰς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα ἀδιαφθόρους ταῖς δήσεσι δικαίως, where the word is explained in Bekk. Anecd. I. p. 343 by τὸ μὴ παρακεκυμένον τῆς ὀρθῆς γνώμης (see Stallbaum on the passage). For the thought, cp. 'Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 41, καὶ τοῦτο δοκοῦντι ποιεῖν ὀρθῶς: εὐδιαφθορώτεροι γὰρ (οἱ) ὀλγοῦ τῶν πολλῶν εἰσὶν κ[αί] κέρδει κ[αί] χάρισιν, and Bryce, American Commonwealth, 2. 78, 'The legislator can be "got at," the people cannot . . . The legislator may be subjected by the advocates of women's suffrage or liquor-prohibition to a pressure irresistible by ordinary mortals, but the citizens are too numerous to be all wheedled or threatened.' Yet the Constitution of the United States looks, and not in vain, to the President to act as a check on the tendency of Congress 'to yield to pressure from a section of its constituents or to temptations of a private nature' (Bryce, 1. 75 sqq.).

33. τοῦ δ' ἐνός κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just been pleading that the decisions of a multitude are less easily seduced by the wrongful influence of others than those of one man, and now he goes on to plead that they are less easily warped by internal passion. Sus. reads γὰρ ε εκοι. in place of δ', which is the reading of ΠΠ, but not,
I think, rightly. When a whole people did come to be mastered by anger, to appease it was impossible; the only thing possible was to let its anger have full course in the hope that it would exhaust itself after a time (Eurip. Orest. 678 sqq. Bothe, 696 sqq. Dindorf).

36. ἐστι δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλευθεροὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 701 A, εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ δημοκρατία ἐν αὐτῇ τίς μόνον ἐγένετο ἐλευθερῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐδὲν ἦν πάντως ἢν τὸ γεγονός, c. II. 1281 b 15 sqq., 23 sq., and c. 15. 1286 b 31 sq. Aristotle evidently connects the overriding of law with the rule of a πλῆθος of the kind which bears sway in extreme democracies (6 4). 4. 1292 a 15, 23 sqq.: 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq.), a πλῆθος including other elements than οἱ ἐλευθεροὶ (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 38 sqq.).

38. εἰ δὲ δῆ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο, 'this abstinence from overriding of the law.' A high degree of virtue is not attainable by the Many (c. 7. 1279 a 39 sqq.: 4 (7). II. 1330 b 39). 'Ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους κ.τ.λ., 'still if there were a plurality of persons good both as men and as citizens.' This is the characteristic of true ἀριστοκρατία (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 5 sq.). For ἀλλὰ cp. c. 5. 1278 a 9.

1. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. As Giph. points out (p. 395), this view is 1286 b. implied in the argument of Darius in favour of Monarchy (Hdt. 3. 82): compare also the answer of Alexander to the proposal of Darius to share the Persian Kingship with him (Diod. 17. 54. 5). In the quaint story preserved in Stob. Floril. 10. 50 Aristotle hints that even in an individual the right side may fall out with the left. And if the One Man does escape internal discord, his rule may nevertheless be productive of στάσις, for others will be apt to fall out with him (Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 29).

2. ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Good men do not fall out among themselves (Eth. Nic. 8. 4. 1156 b 11 sq.). Σπουδαίων τίνι ψυχῆν, cp. Thuc. 2. 40. 5.

3. εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. This is suggested by Plato, Rep. 445 D, ἐγγενομένου μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἐνός ἐν τοῖς ἄρχοντι διαφέροντος βασιλεία ἐν κληθείς, πλείων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία. (Contrast the account given of ἀριστοκρατία in Plato, Polit. 301 A.) Aristotle is speaking aporetically in the passage before us. It is not his deliberate view that Kingship differs from Aristocracy in being the rule of one good man, while Aristocracy is the rule of several. The true King is one who surpasses in virtue and political capacity all the rest of the citizens put together. No such superiority is possessed by the individual rulers of an Aristocracy.
NOTES.

6. καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως κ.τ.λ., ‘both when the Kingly office is accompanied with a bodyguard and when it is not.’ It was a drawback to Kingship that it usually involved a bodyguard, and Aristotle says that Aristocracy would be better than Kingship, even if the King had no bodyguard. That Kingship is an ἄρχη, we see from 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 8.

7. καὶ διὰ τούτο κ.τ.λ., ‘and it was perhaps only owing to this that,’ etc. ‘Only’ is often left unexpressed by Aristotle: see above on 1282 a 36 and b 4. The account of the succession of constitutions given in the passage which commences here is aporetic only, and is not in agreement with Aristotle’s deliberate opinion on the subject. A quite different account is given in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq., where constitutional changes are connected with changes in the art of war; indeed, in the criticism of Plato which is ‘tacked on’ (see vol. i. p. 519, note) at the close of the Book on Revolutions (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1 sqq.) Aristotle seems to deny that there is any regular succession of constitutions (1316 a 20 sqq.). The object of the review here given of the succession of constitutions appears to be to show that the days of Kingship were long past, and that it was in place only when States were small and a few much surpassed the rest in virtue. When States became larger, its place was naturally taken, first by an equal constitution, and then by degenerate forms of this ending in democracy, and when they became larger still, democracy came to be the only constitution which could easily be introduced.

8. For στάνον with the infinitive see Liddell and Scott.

9. ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκούντας πόλεις. Πόλεις here seems to mean ‘States,’ not ‘cities’: see notes on 20 and 1310 b 17. It is implied in the latter passage that States were small when Kingship prevailed.

10. ἕτε δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘besides, men instituted their Kings in consequence of benefit conferred, and benefits are the work of good men, [and good men were then rare].’ ‘Απὸ in ἄπε εὐεργεσία marks the ‘origo et causa’ (Bon. Ind. 77 b 51 sqq.). For the fact, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 10 sqq. That benefits are the work of good men is implied in Xen. Cyrop. 3. 3. 4, ὁ δὲ Ἀρμένιος συμπροέπεμπε (τὸν Κύρον) καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἀνθρωποι, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν εὕεργήτην, τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν. In an inscription found at Lycosura and published by Cavvadis in his ‘Lycosura’ we read ὅπως ἔπω σιδῆς ἀνθρώπους γνωστὰ ἄ τε τῶν ἄγαθων ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσία ἄ τε τὰς πόλις εἰς τοὺς ἄξιους εὐχαριστία.
Complimentary decrees declaring individuals εὐφράται often speak of them as ἀνδρεῖς εὐγαθοί (see e.g. Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 92 and No. 138, line 40).

12. οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον κ.τ.λ., 'they no longer endured [to be ruled by Kings], but sought for something shared in common by all, and established a constitution.' Cp. Plato, Polit. 301 C (quoted on 1287 a 22), Isocr. Hel. § 35, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα (Θησείου) κοινὴν τὴν πατρίδα καταστήσας καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν συμπολιτευομένων ἐλευθερώσας ἦς ἵσον τὴν ἀμιλλαν αυτοῖς περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐποίησε κ.τ.λ., and Paus. 9. 5. 16, τὸ δὲ ἐντειθὲν δὲ πλείονον πολιτεύεσθαι μηδὲ ἀνθρώπος εὐς ἦργησαν τὰ πάντα ἰμαίνον ἐφαβέτο τοῖς Θησείοις. We should infer from the passage before us that the constitution established after the fall of Kingship was one which gave supreme power to 'many' (cp. 12, πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετῆν), but we are told in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq. that it was an oligarchy of knights. For κοινὸν τι, cp. c. 3. 1276 b 1, εἴπερ γὰρ ἐστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἐστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας: Plut. Aristid. c. 22, γράφει ψήφισμα ('Ἀριστείδης') κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας εἰς Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἱρεῖσθαι: and (with Bon. Ind. 399 a 60) Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 29 sqq. In the passage before us, as often elsewhere when the object is easily supplied, 'accusativus eius rei, quam quis ύπομενέι, omissitur' (see Bon. Ind. 800 b 61, where Hist. An. 9. 12. 615 b 18 is referred to among other passages). It is indeed quite in Aristotle's way to suppress the accusative governed by a verb: see below on 18, and see note on 1273 b 18. Here, as in the Seventh (Fifth) Book, Monarchies, or at any rate Kingships, are marked off from Constitutions (see vol. i. p. 521 and vol. ii. p. xxvii).

14. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D sqq., which is corrected in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 39 sqq. The meaning of ἐντιμον γὰρ ἐποίησαν τῶν πλούτων will be clearer if we translate 'for they made wealth [and not virtue] the honoured thing.' In an aristocracy virtue should be honoured above wealth, if it is to be durable (2. 11. 1273 a 37–b 1). That τὸ ἐντιμον ποιεῖν τῶν πλούτων is a sign of oligarchy, we see from Eurip. Fragm. 628,

δήμῳ δὲ μίτε πᾶν ἀναρτήσῃς κράτος

μήτ' αὖ κακός, πλούτου ἐντιμον τιθεῖς.

Cp. also Plato, Rep. 564 D.

16. ἐκ δὲ τούτων κ.τ.λ. Plato in the Republic (555 B sqq.) had made oligarchy pass into democracy and democracy into tyranny, but Aristotle here makes oligarchy pass into tyranny and tyranny
into democracy, ingeniously suggesting that tyranny is an intensification of oligarchy, both these constitutions resting on a sordid love of gain (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 8 sqq.), but differing in this that tyranny claims for one man what oligarchy claims for a few (cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 22 sqq.). Oligarchy did often pass into tyranny (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 sqq.), and tyranny into democracy (1316 a 32), but in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 20–39 Aristotle appears to reject anything like a fixed succession of constitutions. We are also there told that constitutions less often change into cognate forms than into opposite forms (1316 a 18 sqq.), so that we do not expect oligarchy often to pass into the cognate form, tyranny.


18. αἰεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the omission of the object of ἀγοντες see above on 12: τὴν πολιτείαν is probably to be supplied, cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 36, ἐπὶ δ᾿ ἄταν ένίοι εἰς ἐλάττους ἀκωσὶ τὴν ἀλήχηξα, and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 25, οἱ τὸ μέσον ἐκβαινοντες καθ᾿ αὐτοὺς ἄγουσι τὴν πολιτείαν. For the risks attaching to the exclusion of a large number of citizens from office see above on 1281 b 28. For ἱσχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 7, τὸν δήμον ποιεῖν ἱσχυρόν.

20. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘but now that States have come to be even larger [than they were when it first happened that many were alike in virtue], perhaps it is no longer even easily possible, [much less suitable to the circumstances,] for any other constitution than democracy to come into existence.’ Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μεὶχος εἶναι συμβεβήκε τὰς πόλεις answers to 11, ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβην γίγνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετὴν. I translate τὰς πόλεις ‘States’ (with Sus. and Welldon), not ‘cities’ (as Bernays), because the words must apparently bear the same meaning as in 10, where I render πόλεις ‘States.’ Cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq., 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22, and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 17 sq. Compare also Isocr. Areopag. § 62, where the word πόλεων seems to mean ‘States,’ not ‘cities.’ In [Demosth.] c. Neer. c. 75 it is not clear whether ἕπολεις means ‘the State’ or ‘the city.’ In 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq. τὰς πόλεις evidently means ‘the cities.’ For ὁδὲ ῥάδιον, cp. c. 16. 1287 a 10, ὁδὲ κατὰ φύσιν, 1287 b 8, ὁδὲ ῥάδιον, and c. 2. 1275 b 32, ὁδὲ δυνατῶν.
23. πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν: Bonitz (Ind. 150 b 4) explains τὸ γένος here by τὰ τέκνα, but perhaps it means the descendants generally (cp. Thuc. 1. 126. 12, 13).

25. κύριοις ὧν, 'although he has the power to do so.'

26. αὐτῷ οὐκέτι κ.τ.λ., 'but here we reach a statement which it is no longer easy to believe,' 'here we pass the point at which belief is easy.' For οὐκέτι cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sqq. Aristotle's friend Antipater, however, refrained on his deathbed from passing on his regency to his son Cassander and appointed Polysperchon, who was not related to him, regent instead (Diod. 18. 48. 4: Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 7. 238). Marcus Aurelius, on the other hand, shrank from excluding his son Commodus from the succession, 'and his weakness must reflect strongly on his memory. He may have judged, indeed, that the danger to the State from a bad prince was less than the danger from a disputed succession, especially in the face of the disasters accumulating around it' (Merivale, Hist. of the Romans under the Empire, 8. 348). Giphanius (p. 397) thinks that Aristotle is led by the difficulties which he raises in the passage before us to reject hereditary Monarchy altogether, but this is not the case, for he believes in the existence of families in which surpassing virtue is hereditary, and in their case he approves of hereditary Monarchy (c. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq.).

27. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ., 'there is matter for debate, again, in the question with respect to the bodyguard also [as well as in that with respect to the children], whether,' etc. "ἔχει is here used impersonally: see Bon. Ind. 305 b 31 sqq., where Phys. 1. 2. 185 b 11, ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ ὁλου... πότερον ἐν ἡ πλείω τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὁλον, is referred to. The Lacedaemonian Kings had a bodyguard (Isocr. Epist. 2. § 6), and in Hom. II. 1. 324 Agamemnon says of Achilles,

> εἴ δέ κε μὴ δώσην, ἐγώ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἐλωμαί
eλθὼν ἔξω πλεύνεσσι' τό οἶ καὶ μήμον ἔσται.


34. μὲν ὄν is answered by δέ, c. 16. 1287 a 1.

35. δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχύν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν really belongs to ἰσχύν, but 'interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis VOL. III. U
 cernitur’ (Bon. Ind. 454 a 20, where 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12 sqq. is referred to: cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32 sqq.).

36. ὀστε k.t.l. For the suppression of εἰναί, see Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7, where reference is made to Poet. 15. 1454 a 34, ἐπείν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἰκός, ὀστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκός (sc. εἰναί). See also notes on 1277 a 38 and 1327 a 34.

ἐκάστου καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ συμπλείονων. Cp. Plato, Laws 932 C, εἰς δικαστήριον εἰσαγόντων αὐτοῖς εἰς ἑνα καὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν πολιτῶν, οἱ τινὲς ἂν διὰ πρεσβύτατοι ἀπάσων, where ἑναι καὶ ἐκαστὸν seems to mean much the same thing as ἑνα ἐκαστον. No other instance of the occurrence of the word συμπλείονες in Aristotle’s writings is given in the Index Aristotelicus, and it is an extremely rare word. Σύμπολλοι occurs in Plato, Polit. 261 E and elsewhere.


καθάπερ k.t.l., ‘after the fashion in which the ancients granted bodyguards, whenever they set up one whom they called Aesymnete or tyrant of the State.’ Bonitz (Ind. 779 b 52) is probably right in making τύραννων as well as αἰσχυνήτην in the accusative after ἐκάστου and not taking τύραννον with καθίσταειν. As to οἱ ἁρχαῖοι see above on 1285 a 30. For ὅτε καθίσταειν, ‘whenever they set up,’ cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7, 21. The contrast with ὅτε ητει illustrates Eucken’s remark (De Partic. Usu, p. 67) ‘ὁτε utrum cum indicativo an cum optativo ponatur, ab Aristotele accurate distinguitur.’


C. 16. 1. τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν πάντα πράττοντος. 1287 a. Aristotle is thinking of a King like the King of the Persians (Hdt. 3. 31, ἄλλον μέντοι ἐξευρήκεια νόμον, τῷ βασιλεύοντι Περσείων ἔξεινα ποιεῖν τὸ αὐ βούληται).

4. καθάπερ εἴπομεν, in c. 15. 1286 a 2 sqq.

ἐν πάσαις γὰρ k.t.l. The example of the Lacedaemonian ἀριστοκρατία shows that a perpetual, and indeed an hereditary, generalship might exist in an ἀριστοκρατία. Perpetual magistracies were also not unknown in democracies, though the tendency there was to clip their wings (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 41 sqq.). As to Thessaly, cp. Diod. 15. 60. 2, διότερ οἱ Θεσπόλοι προστασίμενοι τῶν ἀρχῶν ἦγεσαν ἱσόνα πολέμῳ τὰ κατὰ τῶν πόλεμον ἐπέτρεψαν. We are reminded of the Stadholders of Holland, as to whom see Lord Macaulay, Hist. of England, c. 2. ‘The Stadholder,’ he says, ‘commanded the forces of the common-
wealth, disposed of all military commands, had a large share of the civil patronage, and was surrounded by pomp almost regal.'

6. καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἑνα κύριον τῆς διοίκησεως, 'and many make one man supreme over the internal administration of the State'—the opposite province to that of a perpetual general—and thus virtually constitute a Kingship according to law of a different kind. Διοίκησις is here opposed to στρατηγία, as Sus. ³ (Index s.v.) has already pointed out: cp. Isocr. Panath. § 128, καὶ κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ περὶ διοίκησιν τῆς πόλεως, and Αθ. Πολ. c. 43 ἵνα, where αἱ περὶ τὴν ἐγκύκλιον διοίκησιν ἄρχαί are distinguished from αἱ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. Cp. also Deinarch. c. Demosth. c. 97, τὸν μὲν ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς πράξεις ἀπαστόν γεγενημένοι, ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ὁικονομίαις ἄχρηστον. As to Epidamnus, cp. 7 (5). i. 1301 b 25. Epidamnus and Opus were both of them oligarchical States (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 39 sqq., 236). Some oligarchies went further and placed the greatest offices—both military and civil, it would seem—in the hands of one man (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22). Pharsalus was probably an oligarchy when it placed the administration in the hands of Polydamas (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 2, οὗτος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ θεταλίᾳ μᾶλα εὐδοκίμει, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ πόλει οὕτως ἔδοκεν καλὸς τῇ γάγαθσι ἐάναι ὧστε καὶ στασιάσατες οἱ Φαρσάλιοι παρακατέθεντο αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἐπέτρεψαν λαμβάνοντι, ὡς ἐγέραστο ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, εἰς τὰ τὰ ἑρά ἀπαλάσκει καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην διοίκησιν). But the same tendency is traceable even in democracies. For instance, we find a great authority wielded at Athens by ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοίκησις (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 248). This important office, however, to judge by the silence of the 'Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία, did not exist at the time when this treatise was written (Gilbert, ibid.), and very possibly did not come into existence till after Aristotle's death. A multiplicity of magistrates (ἡ πολυρρία), with the attendant 'circumlocution' and rivalries, often did harm to Greek States, as we can judge from Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 18 and Plut. Camill. c. 18, and they often gained by placing power in the hands of one man, thus anticipating on a small scale the experience of the Romans in relation to the Empire.

7. καὶ περὶ Ἐπιδάμμων, 'at Epidamnus for instance' (see above on 1266 b 22, καὶ περὶ λειμάδια).

καὶ περὶ ὄποιαντα δὲ κατὰ τι μέρος ἐλαττῶν, 'and indeed at Opus to a certain smaller extent': cp. Plato, Laws 757 D, ἐὰν μέλλει στάσεως εαυτῇ μὴ προσκαινωνῆσειν κατὰ τι μέρος, and Tim. 86 D, τὸ δὲ
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...
τροφήν ἦ ἐσθήτα. As to τροφήν, Mr. Broughton has already referred to Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106a 36 sqq. (cp. also Plato, Laws 691 C). As to ἐσθήτα, a big man in a small garment would suffer physically from cold, and a small man in a large garment from heat.

16. διότερ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 2. 1261a 32 sqq. The subject of ἄρχειν is τοὺς ἰσοὺς supplied from the preceding sentence.


τὸν ἄρα νόμον κ.τ.λ. 'Inter articulum et nomen ἄρα collocatum legitur in De Caelo 4. 4. 311 b 27, τὸ ἄρα πῦρ οὐδὲν ἔχει βάρος' (Bon. Ind. s.v.). Μᾶλλον is occasionally used by Aristotle not only in the same clause with a comparative (as in Plato, Polit. 259 C sub fin.), but also, it would seem, in close connexion with it (e.g. in Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 b 5, μᾶλλον φανερότερα: see other instances given in Bon. Ind. 402 b 53 sqq.), and it may be so used here (cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 b 23, καὶ ἄλος τὸ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος αἱρετῶτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, ὅπον τὸ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντεινον ἢ τὸ πρὸς φρόνησιν). But as Bonitz says of the passages in which μᾶλλον is used with a comparative, 'saepe dubites utrum μᾶλλον "magis" an "potius" significet,' and μᾶλλον ἢ may mean 'potius quam' in the passage before us.

20. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and in accordance with this same contention, even if it should be better that certain individuals should rule [and not the law alone], it will be right to make these individuals guardians of the laws and ministers to the laws, [for otherwise the law will not rule].' Magistrates who are only guardians of the laws are contrasted with Kings by Plato in Polit. 305 C, καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαστῶν ἄρα ὑφιστάμεθα τῶν καθίσκασθαι οὐ βασιλείην ὁδον, ἀλλὰ νόμων φύλακα καὶ ὑπηρετών ἐκείνης: compare what Plutarch says of Theseus in Thes. c. 24, τοῖς δὲ δυνατοῖς ἀθανασίαν πολιτείαν προτείνων καὶ δημοκρατίαν αὐτῷ μίνων ἄρχοντες πολέμου καὶ νόμων φύλακα χρησιμοεῖν. Cp. also Plato, Laws 715 C–D. The archons at Athens swore ὑματικάζειν τοὺς νόμους (Pollux, 8. 86).

22. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Magistrates are necessary, because there are things which the law cannot regulate (1287 b 19–25). With ἕνα τῶν (cp. c. 17; 1288 a 19) supply ἄρχειν, and cp. Plato, Polit. 301 C, οὕτω δὴ τίμαρρον τε γέγονε, φασμέν, καὶ βασιλεύς καὶ ἀρχοντεῖα καὶ ἀριστοκρατία καὶ δημοκρατία, δυσχεραίνων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν ἕνα ἐκείνων μοναρχῶν.
NOTES.

23. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. See on this passage vol. i. p. 273, note 2, where the view which Bernays takes of it has been explained. His rendering is, 'hier wendet vielleicht Jemand ein: gegen die Lückenhaftigkeit des Gesetzes helfen Beamte nicht, denn] wo das Gesetz ausser STande scheint, etwas Bestimmtes zu verordnen, wird auch wohl kein Mensch im STande sein, sich ein festes Urtheil zu bilden.' I still prefer the explanation which has been given in vol. i. p. 273. I take ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε to introduce not an objection proceeding from an advocate of the claims of the One Best Man—objections are commonly introduced by ἀλλὰ, as in c. 15. 1286 b 24, 26—but a still more cogent argument in favour of the claims of Law than those which have hitherto been urged. (Ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε introduces a similar transition from a statement advanced with less emphasis to a statement advanced with more in 2. 9. 1271 a 18–22, 3. 13. 1284 b 30, and 3. 16. 1287 a 41.) Aristotle has been reminded by what he has just said, ἀναγκαίων γὰρ εἶναί τινας ἀρχὰς (22), that there are things which the law cannot regulate, so that as to them the law cannot rule, as he has said in 18 sqq. that it ought to do, and now he adds that with respect to these things the law is no worse off than a human being would be. They are as much beyond the cognizance of a human being as they are beyond definition by the law. But the law does all that can be done in relation to them, for it educates the magistrates to supply its own defect of particularity, and it also allows of its own amendment.

25. ἀλλ’ ἐπίτηδες κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1287 b 25, κρίνει γὰρ ἐκαστὸς ἄρχων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς. It has already been pointed out (vol. i. p. 273, note 1), that Aristotle here has before him the oath taken by the Athenian juror. See Demosth. in Lept. c. 118. A similar oath is prescribed to be taken by jurors in an inscription from Eresus in Lesbos (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 125, p. 211). The expression κατὰ γρώμαν τὰν δικαιοστάτων occurs also in an inscription from Calymna and in the oath of the Delphian Amphiictyons (Dareste, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques, i. 170). Its meaning may be gathered from Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 63, ἐκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ὄρκου ἐξήισαν τὸ προκείμενον γρώμη τῇ δικαιοστάτῃ καὶ ὡστε χάπτοι ἐνεκ’ οὕτω ἐξήθρᾳ. The term τοὺς ἄρχοντας, however, includes not only jurors (cp. 1287 b 15 sq.) but office-holders generally, as may be inferred from the words κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν. For ἐφιστησθαι κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας Schneider compares Isocr. Areopag.

§ 37. άστε τήν ἔξε 'Αρείων πάγου βουλήν ἐπέστησαν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τής εὔκοσμίας. Τὰ λοιπά, 'whatever it cannot regulate in detail.'


28. ὁ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. I take οὖν here to contain an inference, as in i. i. 1252 a 7 (see note), and translate 'therefore.' Attention has been drawn in what precedes to the reasonableness of law. The contrast of θεός and θηρίον and of both with ἀνθρώποι is familiar to us from i. 2. 1253 a 27 sqq. The rule of law had been represented by Plato (Laws 713 C—714 A) as an approach to the rule of the δαίμονες of Cronus, νόμος being explained as νοῦ διανοή (cp. Laws 674 B). Reason is, in fact, often identified with God, e.g. in Eurip. Fragm. 1007,

ο νοῦς γὰρ ἠμῶν ἐστώ ἐν ἑκάστῳ θεῷ:

cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 281, νῦ πείθου: ὡμοίᾳ τῇ, πείθου θεῷ. Aristotle conceives a human being as an union of a god in the shape of reason (cp. Eth. Nic. io. 7. 1177 b 26 sqq.) with a brute, much as Plato in Rep. 588 C sqq. conceives the human soul as three shapes under the external aspect of a man, the shape of a many-headed animal, the shape of a lion, and the shape of a man, representing respectively desire, θυμός, and reason. That a brute is present in every human being was suggested by such phrases as those used by the Chorus of Women in the Lysistrata of Aristophanes (683 sq. Didot),

εἰ νὴ τῶ θεῶ με ζωτυρήσεις,
λύσω τήν ἐμαντῆς ἐν ἐγὼ δή,

where a proverb is alluded to (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 318).

31. καὶ ὁ θυμός κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably remembers Hom. II. 9. 553,

ἀλλ’ οὔτε δὴ Μελέαγρον ἔδω χόλος, οὔτε καὶ ἄλλων
οἴδάνει ἐν στῆθεσι νόν πύκα περ φρονεῖντων,

and Pindar, Olymp. 7. 27–31. The remark would gain in interest if it was suggested by the complicity of Dion in the murder of Heracleides at Syracuse (Plut. Dion, cc. 47, 53) or by Alexander's murder of Cleitus in b.c. 328, but it would be rash to assume this.
For διαστρέφει cp. Polyb. 8. 24. 3, Καύρας ὁ Γαλάτης, ὅν τάλλα ἀνήρ ἀγαθός, ὑπὸ Σωστράτου τοῦ κόλακος διεστρέφετο.

32. διόπερ ἀνεύ δρέξεως νοῖς ὁ νόμος ἐστιν, 'hence' (i.e. because Law is God and Reason unmixed with anything else) 'Law is Reason without appetite,' and Reason without appetite is better than Reason with appetite (c. 15. 1286 a 17 sq.). Cp. De An. 3. 10. 433 a 26, νοῖς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁρθὸς· ὁρεῖς δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθή καὶ ὁκ ὀρθή. Anaxagoras had said that it is by virtue of being ἀμηγής and pure that νοῖς subdues everything (Fragm. 6 in Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. i. 249: Aristot. Phys. 8. 5. 256 b 24 sqq.: De An. 3. 4. 429 a 18 sqq.).

33. τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν κ.τ.λ. This corrects the argument used in c. 15. 1286 a 11 sqq. Ὅτι κ.τ.λ. gives, in explanation of τὸ τῶν τεχνῶν παράδειγμα, the point which the parallel of the arts is adduced to prove.

34. For καὶ αἱρετῶτερον cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 6, οἷς ἄρα ἰδιωταὶ τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἦτον δοκοῦν τὰ ἐπικεφ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον, Pol. 2. 4. 1262 a 30, and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 37. See critical note.

35. οἷς μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for [it is better to be treated by physicians rather than by written rule only because] physicians do not do anything contrary to right reason for the sake of friendship.' I follow Bernays in thus completing the reasoning. For παρὰ τὸν λόγον cp. Eth. Nic. 7. i. 1151 b 34, δὲ γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἶος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἥδωρας ποιεῖ καὶ ὁ σώφρων κ.τ.λ., and 4. i. 1125 b 33 sqq.

37. οἷς δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plut. Aristid. c. 4, where Plutarch says of Aristides, οὐ μόνον δὲ πρὸς ἐννοιαν καὶ χάριν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ὀργήν καὶ πρὸς ἐχθρὰν ἐχθρότατος ἦν ύπὲρ τῶν δικαίων ἀντιστίχων. As to ἐπιρεία see note on 1311 a 37.

38. ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. This passage may be rendered in two different ways. 1. With Liddell and Scott (who compare Strabo, p. 259, πρῶτοι δὲ νόμοις ἐγχράσατοι χρήσασθαι πεπιστευμένοι εστὶ) and others, we may take διαφθείρειν as in the infinitive after πιστευέται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, and translate 'since when [the case is otherwise and] patients suspect physicians of being commissioned by their enemies to destroy them for the sake of gain.' 2. We may (with Bernays) take διαφθείρειν as in the infinitive after ὑποπτεύωσι τοῖς ἰατροῖς. I incline to prefer the latter rendering, especially as διὰ κέρδος comes in a little awkwardly, if we adopt the former. Aristotle has
before him here Plato, Polit. 298 A, καὶ δὴ καὶ τελευτῶτες ἦ παρὰ ἐνγεγένων ἡ παρὰ τινον ἐχθρῶν τοῦ κάμνοντος χρήματα μισθον λαμβάνοντες (οἱ λαστροὶ) ἀποκτινώσας: indeed, he only repeats what Plato himself in effect says in Polit. 300 A. If it was not clear that he has this passage of Plato before him, we might be tempted to imagine that he alludes to a well-known incident in Alexander’s career, the relation of which in Plutarch’s Life of Alexander (c. 19) begins thus, εν τούτῳ δὲ Παρμενίων ἐπέμενεν ἐπιστολήν ἀπὸ στρατοπέδου, διακελεύομενος αὐτῷ (i.e.  Ἀλέξανδρῳ) φυλάξασαι τὸν Φίλιππον (his physician Philip the Acranianian) ὡς ὑπὸ Δαρείου πεπεισμένον (cp. πιστευόντας τὸν ἐχθροῖς) ἐπὶ δορεάς μεγάλας (cp. διὰ κέρδος) καὶ γάμφω θυγατρῶς ἀνελεῖν Ἀλέξανδρον: compare Arrian, Anab. 2. 4. 9, εν τούτῳ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρῳ δοθήνα πεπεισμήν παρὰ Παρμενίωνος φυλάξασαι Φίλιππον αὐκοὶ γὰρ διεφθάραν ὑπὸ Δαρείου χρήμασιν ὥστε φαρμάκῳ ἀποκτέναι Ἀλέξανδρον. This happened in b.c. 333.

40. τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν, ‘the treatment prescribed by the writings,’ like τὸν ἐκ τῶν νόμων χρόνων in Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 28.

41. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ... γε, ‘but certainly,’ as elsewhere. Ἰατρὸν εἰσάγεις τινί, ἵνα καλύπτῃ κατά μέρος τό τιτανικόν τις πάντα χρυσάμονα, ‘If you could get hold of one of the doctors, it would be more convenient for it to be a goldsmith’s instead of a surgeon,’ (Liddell and Scott, who refer to the passage before us). Ἐφ’ ἐπικτόν, ‘to take charge of themselves’ (see note on 1273 b 19, ἐπὶ τῶν πόλεων). Not only do patients prefer a written scheme of treatment to treatment by physicians whom they regard as corrupted by their foes, but physicians themselves show distrust even of medical advice which is simply wanting in dispassionateness, for, when they are sick, they do not treat themselves, but call in other physicians. They do so because they feel that they are themselves at such a time under the influence of emotion, and that they need the guidance of a neutral dispassionate authority.

3. διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὡστε. Cp. Thuc. i. 1287 b. 63, παρὰ δὲ παρὰ τὴν χῆλὴν διὰ τὴν βαθάσσθης βαλλόμενος καὶ χαλεπῶς, and see Mr. W. H. Forbes, Thucydides Book i. p. 151. For ἐν πάθει ὡστε cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 8. 1150 a 27 sqq. and 7. 5. 1147 b 9 sqq. Aristotle seems to think that not only sick physicians, but also gymnastic trainers, when engaged in gymnastic exercises, would be ἐν πάθει.

ὡστε δὴ λοιν κ.τ.λ. Supply οἱ τῶν νόμων ὡστώντες as the nom. to
In 1287 b 23 we have to supply in a similar way 'the advocates of the supremacy of law.' 'And so it is clear that [those who seek for written law] in seeking for that which is just seek for that which is neutral, for the law is that which is neutral.' This is made clear by the practice of physicians to which reference has just been made. So that the parallel of the arts, far from telling against the use of written law in the State, as some claimed that it does, in reality furnishes an argument in favour of its use. That the way to the just lies through the neutral, we see from Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 19 (already compared by Eaton), διό καὶ ὅταν ἀμφιβασθῆται, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἱέναι ἱέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βαίλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἐμψυχον' καὶ ἠφούσα δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσα ἐνιοῦ μετεῖποις, ὡς ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τούχωσι, τοῦ δίκαιου τευχόμενοι. Sus., following Thurot, reads ὁ δὲ νόμος in place of ὁ γὰρ νόμος without MS. authority and not, I think, rightly.

5. ἔτι κυριώτεροι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just been asserting the value of written law (cp. 1287 a 34, κατὰ γράμματα, and 40, τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν), and now he says that the case is even stronger in favour of unwritten law. For the distinction between οἱ κατὰ γράμματα νόμοι, 'laws resting on writings,' and οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη, 'laws resting on (unwritten) customs,' cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 86 (a passage professing to record Plato's views), νόμον διαιρέσεις δύο· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γεγραμμένος, ὁ δὲ ἄγραφος· ὃ μὲν εἰν ταῖς πόλεις πολιτευόμεθα, γεγραμμένος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ ἔθη γενόμενος, οὕτως ἄγραφος καλεῖται, and Plato, Polit. 299 A, κατηγορεῖν δὲ τῶν βουλόμενοι, ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὰ γράμματα τῶν ἐναντίων ἐκβάλλειν τὰς ναῦς, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν προγόνων ἔθη. For οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη νόμοι, which are here implied to be unwritten (as ἔθη are in Plato, Polit. 295 A, 299 A, and Laws 841 B), cp. 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 40 sq. On ἄγραφοι νόμοι see Cope, Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 239-244, where he concludes (p. 244) that customs are 'what we are to understand principally by the νόμοι ἄγραφοι in the Politics,' so that the term is used in the Politics in a wider sense than it is when it refers, as it sometimes does (see Cope), to 'the great fundamental conceptions and duties of morality,' such as 'the worship of God, duty to parents, gratitude, the requital of benefits,' and the like. For the fact that more important matters are dealt with by unwritten than by written laws, cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. Zeuxidam. 1, 221 B, Zeuxidamo, πυθομένου τους διὰ τὶ τούς περὶ ἄνδρειας νόμον ἄγραφος τηροῦσι, καὶ τοῖς νέως ἀπογραψίμενοι οὐ διδάσασι ἀναγινώσκειν, "Οτι, ἔθη, συνεβιβάζονται [ὅτι] ταῖς
The eyes of Tov Tov compare by rather the speaking of Xen. 11, 299. and adds, and rather the speaking by Kings and of their word be kept in many things. Eurip. Phoeniss. 692 Bothe (745 Dindorf), εἰς ἀνήρ οὐ πάνθ' ὀρᾶ, had passed into a proverb (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 378). Cp. also Xen. Oecon. 4. 6, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀμφὶ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ὁικεῖων (sc. τῶν μεσθόφορων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἷς ἀπλίσθαι προστέταται) αὐτὸς (i.e. ὁ βασιλεὺς) ἐφορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πρόσω ἀποκούντας πιστῶς πέμπει ἐπισκοπέων, and Cyrop. 8. 2. 11, εἰ δὲ τις οἴεται ἔνα αἱρετῶν εἶναι ὀφθαλμός βασιλεύ, οὐκ ὀφθάλμος οἴεται: ἄλγε γὰρ εἰς γ' ἀν ἵδοι καὶ εἰς ἀκούσεν. Were the Lacedaemonian ephors at their origin designed to be the 'eyes' of the Kings? The word ἐφόροι is used in the sense of 'spies' by Megasthenes ap. Strab. p. 707 (see note on 1313 b 12).

10. τοῦτο, i. e. τὸ πλείονας εἶναι ἄρχοντας.
11. πρότερον, in c. 15. 1286 b 3 sqq.
12. εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. In τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς κ.τ.λ. the apodosis is introduced by δέ. For the use of δέ in the apodosis after a conditional sentence introduced by εἰ or εἶν, see above on 1278 a 32.
13. τὸ ἴσχυ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρχιλόχου, ὡς τρεῖς ἀφέντ' προστάτης θ' ἀπλών πόλεως σφαλεροῖς, ύπον δὲ κάλλους οὐ κακῶν πέλει, and Archil. Fragm. I. 44 (ap. Aristid. 2. 137), καὶ ὁ μὲν γε κατ’ ἠχύν προφέρων, εἰ καὶ ἐνός εἰς κρίτων, ὑπὸ δυοῦν γ' ἀν αὐτῶν κατείργεσθαι φησι καὶ Ἀρχιλόχου καὶ η παροιμία, where the Scholiast (quoted by Bergk) adds, ἢ μὲν παροιμία φησιν' οὐδὲ Ἡρακλῆς πρὸς δύον το ἡ Ἀρχιλόχου ὄψιν οὑν μὲν ἐστιν, οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἵσιν δὲ ἀν εἰς τοῦτον.
14. καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ κ.τ.λ. Hom. II. 2. 372, where Agamemnon is speaking of Nestor (Sus², Note 651).
15. εἰς δὲ καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ. This takes up 1287 b 8, δεήσει ἄρα... 11, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, in which words the suggestion is made that the powers which it is proposed to entrust to the One Man should rather be given to a plurality of magistrates. "Ωσπερ ὁ δικαστής, for
it was well known from the terms of the dicast's oath (see above on 1287 a 25) that he had to regulate matters as to which the law was silent. Aristotle has already implied in 1287 a 25 sqq. that the magistrates have to do so too in relation to some matters. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32 sqq.

18. ἀρεῖοι καὶ κρίνειν. Cp. 1287 a 26, κρίνειν καὶ διοκεῖν.

20. διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν. Διαπορεῖν here = ἀπορεῖν according to Bon. Ind. 187 b 1 sqq., where Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216 a 11, διαποροῦντα τοιαῦτ' ἀττα καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνος ἑνεκα κ.τ.λ., is placed next to the passage before us.

28. οὗ τοῖνυν κ.τ.λ., 'nay, [the advocates of the supremacy of law] do not make this counter-assertion that' etc. οὗ τοῖνυν is used in self-correction: see above on 1267 a 5 and compare in addition to the passages there referred to Plato, Rep. 603 B, and Strato, Fragm. Φανοκύδης, 31 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 546),

"οὐτὼ λαλεῖν εἰσίνε. μὴ τοῖνυν λάλει
οὔτως πορ' ἐμοὶ γ' ὁν.

24. ἀλλ' οὖτί οὐχ ἔναι μόνον, sc. εἶναι δεῖ τῶν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιαῦτων.

26. ἀτοπῶν τ' ἵσως κ.τ.λ. For the thought compare Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 10–12, a passage which seems to be present to Aristotle's memory here. "Ἱδοι evidently suits ῥμασι not only, not ἀκοαῖς or what follows, but Aristotle 'often expects us to supply a word from a previous clause which is not altogether suitable': see above on 1257 a 21. For ἀκοαῖς in the sense of 'organs of hearing' see Bon. Ind. s. v.

27. δυοῖν is apparently the reading of all extant MSS. (one cannot tell from 'duobus' what reading Vet. Int. found in his text), but the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in Aristotle's writings as the dative of δῶ— it is common enough in them as the genitive, but δυαὶ or δῶ are the forms of the dative mostly used by Aristotle—and here it strikes us as all the more strange because it is followed by δυοῖν and δυσί. According to Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschriften, p. 124 (ed. 2), δυοῖν is used as the genitive and dative in Attic Inscriptions down to b.c. 329, δυεῖν from b.c. 329 to b.c. 229, and δῶ as the genitive, δυσί as the dative, in Roman times. Thus, if the MSS. are to be trusted, Aristotle often departs in this matter from the usage of the Attic Inscriptions of his time.
29. ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ. Πολλοὺς is emphatic (see note on 1275 a 32): cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 11, ἐκ τούτων δὴ καὶ πολλοὶ ένομίζοντας Βασιλέως ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ πολλὰ δότα· εἰ δὲ τις οἴεται ἕνα αἱρετῶν εἶναι ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλεία, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴεται· οἷγα γὰρ εἰς ἵνα ίδοι καὶ εἰς ἰκούσεις κ.τ.λ., where Xenophon probably intends to correct Hdt. i. 114, ὃ δὲ αὐτῶν διέταξε τοὺς μὲν οἰκίας οἰκοδομεῖν, τοὺς δὲ δορυφόρους εἶναι, τῶν δὲ καὶ τινα αὐτέων ὀφθαλμῶν βασιλείας εἶναι· τὸ δὲ τινά τὰς ἀγγελίας ἑιρέειν ἑδίδου γέρας, ὡς ἐκαίστῳ ἤργῳ προστάσεωσι. The messengers mentioned by Herodotus would be included among the ‘King’s eyes’ referred to by Aristotle here. The ‘many ears and eyes’ of a King became proverbial: cp. Lucian, Adv. Indoct. c. 23, οὐκ οἴεθα ὡς ὡστα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ πολλοὶ βασιλείως; The important fact that Cyrus had fallen in the battle of Cunaxa was discovered and reported to Artaxerxes by an ‘eye of the King,’ Artasuras (Plut. Artox. c. 12). Institutions as unlike as the ὠτακονταί of Hiero I of Syracuse (7 (5). ι. 1313 b 13 sqq.: cp. Plut. De Curiositate, c. 16) and the ‘younger members’ of the Nocturnal Council of Plato’s Laws (964 E: see vol. i. p. 448 sq.) were probably suggested by this Persian institution. According to Megasthenes (ap. Strab. p. 707) a similar institution existed in India: see his account of the ἐφοροι.

30. τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἄρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. Aristotle probably remembers the words of Achilles to his friend Phoenix in Π. 9. 616,

ἰσον ἐμοὶ βασιλεία καὶ ἡμιον μείρεω τιμῆς.

Cp. also Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 18 σὺδ βίν, καὶ τὸ Δαρείου γένος ἐβασιλεύσει, ἀνδρός οἱ μόνοι ἀδελφοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ φίλοις ἐπισταμένου κοινωνίας πραγμάτων καὶ δυνάμεως, and Thuc. 2. 97. 3, where we read of οἱ παραδυναμενοὶ τε καὶ γεναῖοι ὁδρυνόμενοι (i.e. associates of the King of the Odrysae in his rule). Monarchs expect of those whom they make partners in rule not only friendliness to their rule but also friendliness to themselves. The two things are not the same. Alexander, we remember, called Craterus φίλος-βασιλεύς and Hephaestion φιλαλέξανδρος (Plut. Alex. c. 47: Diod. 17. 114): cp. Plut. Brut. c. 8, λέγεται δὲ Βρούτος μὲν τὴν ἄρχην βαρύνεσθαι, Κάσσιος δὲ τῶν ἄρχοντα μισεῖν, where Julius Caesar is of course referred to. Τῆς ἄρχης φίλου should probably be read (with Casaubon and Richards: see critical note) in place of τῆς ἄρχης φίλου, though this expression is used in an unfavourable sense in Lucian, Catapl. c. 11, ἄνοιεὶς ὅτι πάντες οἱ καὶ προσκυνοῦστε καὶ τῶν λεγομένων.
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καὶ πραττομένων ἐκαστα ἐπανωτεῖς ἡ φύσις ἡ ἐκπίστιν ἔδρων τῆς ἄρχης ὄντες φίλοι καὶ πρὸς τὸν καύρον ἀποθέποντες; In place of αὐτοῦ (MSS. wrongly αὐτοῖς) Sus. would read αὐτοῖς, which is found in the version of the passage given by the Aldine edition of the Scholia on Aristophanes (Acharn. 92: Duebner excludes this quotation from the Politics from his text of the Scholia—see Dindorf’s Preface, pp. iv–v Duebner, as to the Aldine edition), but not, I think, rightly: see above on 1286 a 12. The title ‘friend of the King’ probably came originally from Egypt, where we trace it as early as the Twelfth Dynasty (see Maspero, Histoire Ancienne des Peuples de l’Orient, p. 104, ed. 1), and even the Sixth (Erman, Life in Ancient Egypt, Eng. Trans., p. 72). The Macedonian Kings made those whom they raised to the dignity of ‘friends’ so far partners in rule that they consulted them on the most important matters and employed them on the most important commissions (see Spitta, De Amicorum, qui vocantur, in Macedonum Regno Condicione, p. 38, who refers among other passages to Diod. 17. 54, and Arrian, Anab. 1. 25. 4). Ποιοῦται here takes the place of ποιοῦν, 29, just as in c. 5. 1278 a 34 ποιοῦσιν takes the place of ποιοῦται, 1278 a 30.

31. ὡς φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες κ.τ.λ., ‘[friends indeed they must of necessity be, for] if they are not friends,’ etc.


34. οἴοται δεῖν ἄρχεις, sc. ὁ βασιλεὺς.

35. οἱ διαμφισβητοῦτες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν. Cp. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 24, where see note.


37. ἐστι γὰρ τι φύσει δεσποστὸν κ.τ.λ., ‘for there is that which is marked out by nature to be ruled by a master, and another to be ruled by a King, and another marked out for free government, and it is expedient and just that each should be thus ruled.’ For καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ συμφέρον, cp. 41, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε φανερὸν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖσ ὄμοιοισ καὶ ἴσοισ οὖτε συμβιέτει ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον ἕνα κύριον ἐκαὶ πάντως, 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq., and 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16 sq. I prefer the rendering which I have given of καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον to that of Sepulveda, ‘et horum imperiorum cuiusque aliud est ius et alia commoditas,’ though Bernays translates the passage in a somewhat
similar way. Richards would add τοῦτο after δίκαιον, 39. For ἕστι γὰρ τι φύσει δεσποστῶς, cp. 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq. and 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 36 sqq. Πολιτικῶν in 38, καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικῶν, appears to be used in reference to the kind of free government which obtains in a Polity, for Aristotle is evidently speaking of normal constitutions only, and he can hardly refer in πολιτικῶν to Aristocracy. Of course, if we regard 1288 a 6—15 as authentic and as placed where it stands by Aristotle, we have an additional reason for taking πολιτικῶν to refer to the Polity, for it clearly refers to the Polity in 1288 a 7, 12.

40. οὖντε τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείων, 'nor any of the other constitutions.' For the genitive, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 30, and Diod. 5. 21. 2, οὐτε γὰρ Διώνυσον οὐθ 'Ερακλέα παρειλήφαμεν οὐτε τῶν ἄλλων ἥρων ἢ δυναστῶν ἐστρατευμένοι εὖν αὐτὴν.

41. ἄλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε κ.τ.λ. See as to this passage vol. i. p. 274—5. In 1288 a 1 we have a μὲν solitarium (see above on 1262 a 6).

2. πάντων is here masculine (cp. c. 16. 1287 a 11, τὸ κύριον ἐνα 1288 a. πάντων ἐνα τὸν πολιτῶν). This is clear from 3, οὐτέ ἀγαθὸν ἄγαθῶν κ.τ.λ.

3. ἄλλ' αὐτόν ὡς ἄντα νόμον. Supply κύριον ἄντα after αὐτῶν. As to the chiasmus in οὐτέ ἀγαθὸν ἄγαθῶν οὐτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθῶν, see note on 1277 a 31.

4. οὐδὲ ἂν καὶ ἄρετὴν ἀμείνων ἢ may be added to correct a dictum of Plato to Dionysius the Elder recorded in Diog. Laert. 3. 18, ὅ δὲ διαλεγόμενος περὶ τυραννίδος καὶ φάσκων ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο κρίττων ὃ συμβέβη αὐτῷ μόνῳ, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἄρετὴν διαφέρειν, προσέκρουσεν αὐτῷ. Cp. also Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 37.

6. πρότερον, in c. 13. 1284 a 3 sqq. . πρῶτον δὲ . . . 15. ἄρχας. SusseMhl brackets this paragraph as an interpolation, and it looks at any rate like a subsequently added passage. It may well be from the pen of Aristotle—its contents do not seem to be seriously at variance with his teaching elsewhere (see vol. i. Appendix D)—but it is doubtful whether it was placed where it stands by his hand or by that of another. A similar doubt arises as to other passages in the Politics (see for instance vol. i. p. 569 and p. 519, note). The position of this paragraph in relation to its context is certainly remarkable. Aristotle is discussing Kingship, and in particular is about to describe what degree of superiority over those he rules an Absolute King should possess: why should he pause at this point to explain
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who are fit subjects for Kingship, Aristocracy, and Polity, when he is concerned for the moment only with Kingship? And why is it necessary to enter into this question as to Aristocracy and Polity first (πρώτον, 1288 a 6), before stating what degree of superiority over those he rules an Absolute King should possess? Then again, though the recapitulation in 1288 a 30 sqq. makes it clear that in what has preceded it has been explained for whom Kingship is an expeditious institution, this may refer only to what has been said in 1288 a 15-19. On the other hand, it may be urged in defence of the paragraph that it is after a long argument in favour of Aristocracy (in the sense of the rule of a plurality of good men) that Aristotle interposes his closing remark in 1287 b 36 sq., 'but perhaps these things are so in the case of certain persons and not in the case of others,' and that therefore he may naturally wish to explain before he goes further who are the persons in whose case the arguments in favour of Aristocracy hold good, no less than who are the persons in whose case the arguments in favour of Kingship hold good. Nor is it altogether surprising that he should add a similar explanation as to Polity, for he has implied in 1287 b 37 sqq. that there are those who are marked out by nature for each of the normal constitutions. Still it must be admitted that the paragraph has an intrusive look where it stands.

8. τὸ τοιοῦτον here refers not to anything preceding, but to what follows. See for other instances of the same thing note on 1337 b 6. As to φέρειν, see vol. i. p. 290, note 1. The case is omitted in which Kingship falls to a single individual, not a γένος.

9. πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικήν. Πολιτικήν is added to show that a mere fitness for ἡγεμονία πολεμική is not enough. Cp. πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν in 12 and πλῆθος πολεμικῶν in 13. The King is to be capable of πολιτικὴ ἡγεμονία, the rulers in an aristocracy of πολιτικὴ ἀρχὴ. The word ἡγεμονία belongs especially to Kingship: cp. Rhet. ad Alex. i. 1420 a 21, where οἱ υπὸ τὴν τῆς βασιλείας ἡγεμονίαν τεταγμένοι are contrasted with οἱ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολεμούμενοι, and Plut. adv. Colot. c. 31, οὐχ οἱ τῶν τῆς ἀπαράξειν στέφανον ἀνάμβλητον εἰσὶ ταῖς μεγάλαις ἡγεμονίαις λέγοντες; οὐχ οἱ τοῦ βασιλείου ἀμαρτίαν καὶ διάπτωσιν ἀποφαίωσεν; Cp. also Plato, Laws 711 C, τῇ τῶν δυναστεύοντων ἡγεμονίᾳ.

ἀριστοκρατικῶν δὲ . . . 15. τὰς ἀρχὰς. See vol. i. Appendix D.
3. 17. 1288 a 8—18. 1288 a 32. 305

11. κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἣγεμονικῶν, and not κατὰ πλούτον καὶ δύναμιν, as in oligarchies (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1161 a 2 sq.).

12. πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, the rule which is exercised over persons ὀρμοι τῷ γένει καὶ ἐλευθεροὶ (c. 4. 1277 b 7 sqq.).

πολιτικῶν δὲ πλῆθος κ.τ.λ. The law in a polity gives office to the well-to-do, just as in an aristocracy office falls to the γνώριμοι (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2). Does κατ’ ἀξίαν imply that office will be elective in a polity? If so, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq. and contrast 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8—11 and 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 34 sqq., passages which, however defective the text of the latter may be, seem to show that magistrates might be appointed by lot in a polity (see vol. i. pp. 509, 573).

15. As to τῶν ἄλλων see critical note.

16. καὶ κύριοι πάντων is added because not all Kings are κύριοι πάντων (c. 14. 1285 a 4).


20. τὸ δίκαιον, i.e. τὸ καθ’ ύπεροχὴν δίκαιον, cp. c. 13. 1283 b 17; κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον.

22. πάντη γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for they entirely claim on the basis of superiority, though not the same superiority.’ Aristotle’s account in Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq. of the ‘superiority’ on which the partisans of democracy base their claims does not agree with the account given in Pol. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sqq., for in the former passage (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 28 sqq.) they are said to base their claims on ἀξία—the ἀξία, in fact, which ἐλευθερία confers—and in the latter not on ἀξία but on number. Still, whichever of the two passages we follow, they base their claims on a ‘superiority.’

24. ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λέχθεν, i.e. because no other course is becoming or in accordance with nature: cp. c. 13. 1284 b 28 sqq.

28. τοῦτο, i.e. to constitute the whole of which the rest are parts.

31. πῶς, ‘under what conditions’ (so Bern.). Cp. c. 3. 1276 a 17, ὅπως δ’ ὅλοι τὸ λόγον εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταῦτης, πῶς ποτὲ χρῆ λέγειν τὴν πολύν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἄλλ’ ἐτέραν.

32. ἐπεί δὲ κ.τ.λ. At this point a transition is made from the C. 18. question what are the different forms of Kingship and for whom Kingship is advantageous to the question how a Kingship or an Aristocracy (for the two forms turn out in 34 sqq. to be nearly related, cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 31 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 2 sqq. 31 sq.) is to be brought into being. For a similar transition cp. 6 (4).

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8. 1294 a 25 sqq. The reasoning of the paragraph which commences at ἐπὶ δὲ is—the best State is an aristocratical or Kingly State, but the virtue of a citizen of the best State is the same as the virtue of a good man; hence the virtue of a citizen of an aristocratical State or of a man of Kingly mould is identical with the virtue of a good man; hence to institute an aristocratical or Kingly State it is necessary to have recourse to the education and customs which produce good men. This preface prepares us to find in the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books what we do find there—inquiries directed to the discovery of the education and customs which produce good men. As to the transition from the Third to the Fourth Book see vol. i. p. 292 sqq.

34. The use of the word οἰκονομομυσίν indicates the completeness of the control exercised: cp. c. 14. 1285 b 31 sqq.

37. ἐν δὲ κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. Appendix B.


41. ὁστ’ ἐσται κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle corrects the view expressed by Plato in his Politicus that the essence of the βασιλικός and the πολιτικός is to possess a certain science. Just as he had said in 1. 7. 1255 b 20 that ὁ δεσπότης οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, ἄλλα τῷ τούτῳ δε εἶναι, so he now implies the same thing as to the βασιλικός and the πολιτικός. The education which is to produce them is not the communication of a science; it is the communication of an ἔξως. Contrast Plato, Polit. 292 B, τὴν βασιλικὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἶναι τῶν ἔφαμεν, οἶμαι, and 292 E; also 259 B. Aristotle, however, allows in 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq. (cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 5 sqq. and 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.) that the ruler should possess not only virtue but also political aptitude. In 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 8 certain πολεμικὰ καὶ πολιτικὰ ἀσκήσεις are referred to which find a place apparently in Aristotle’s scheme of education, though their exact nature is left obscure, and these πολιτικὰ ἀσκήσεις may perhaps be one means by which he would seek to develop this political aptitude, but he probably thought that the art of ruling was mainly acquired in the course of being ruled (3. 4. 1277 b 8 sqq.).

1288 b. 1. καὶ παίδεια καὶ ἔθη. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, εἰσαγόμενοι καὶ παιδευμένοι, and Menex. 241 C, μαθόντας καὶ ἓξωσθέντας μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τῶν βαρβάρων. In 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10, on the other hand, it is implied that παίδεια comprises an element of habituation.
2. In place of πολιτικῶν we expect ἀριστοκρατικῶν, but the rulers in the best State have already been spoken of as πολιτικοὶ in c. 5. 1278 b 3.

4. τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς. The same two questions are raised as to the Polity in 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 30 sqq.

BOOK IV (VII).

14. Compare the very similar sentence in De An. 2. 4. 415 a 14, C. I. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι λαβέιν ἐκαστὸν 1323 a. αὐτῶν τι ἔστιν. For μέλλω with the aor. infin. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 b 11, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἀν οὐδὲ μελλῆσις γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. Phrynichus condemns as un-Attic the use of μέλλειν with the aor. infin., but that it is so used by Attic writers is undoubted: see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 74. Schanz remarks in his Prolegomena to Plato's Symposium, § 5, 'aorist infinitivi cum μέλλειν a Platone copulati exempla apud Platonem exstant, quae haud facile quisplam in dubitationem vocare possit.' He refers among other passages to Protag. 312 B, μέλλεις παρασχέων, and Gorg. 512 E, ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιώναι, and 525 A. It is natural that Aristotle should find the clue to the best constitution in the inquiry what is the most desirable life, for we read in 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40 that 'the constitution is the mode of life chosen by the State.' See vol. i. p. 209 sqq. An instructive commentary on the first chapter will be found in the second of Vahlen's Aristotelische Aufsätze, Über ein Capitel aus Aristoteles' Politik, from which I shall frequently have occasion to make quotations.

16. For πρῶτον in the sense of πρότερον Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 5, note) compares 3. 4. 1276 b 19.

17. ἀριστα γὰρ πράττειν κ.τ.λ., 'for [the best constitution and the most desirable life go together, inasmuch as] it is fitting that those who live under the best constitution their circumstances enable them to attain should fare best, unless something contrary to expectation happens.' It has already been pointed out (vol. i. p. 294, note 2) that the reasoning latent in the Greek cannot be fully expressed in English. For the thought cp. Plato, Laws 828 D, ὡς ἐσθ ἡμῖν ἡ πόλις οἷς ὡς ἐν τοῖς ἐτέραν εὑροί τῶν νῦν περὶ χρόνου σχολῆς καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἑξοντάς, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὴν, καθάπερ ἦν ἀνθρωπον, ζῆν εὖ. We hardly expect Aristotle to add the
qualification 'their circumstances enable them to attain' (ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς), for those who fare best must be those who live under the absolutely best constitution, which is contrasted in 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 25 sq., 32 with the best attainable under given circumstances (ἡ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστη, ἢ ἐνδεχομενὴ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων).

20. πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν, 'all individuals, so to say,' for πᾶσιν corresponds to ἐκάστῳ, cp. 1323 b 21. Aristotle first discusses the question what is the most desirable life for the individual (1323 a 21–b 29), and then the same question as to the State.

21. χωρίς, i.e. ἐκάστῳ, 'for the individual': cp. 1323 b 40, καὶ χωρίς ἐκάστῳ καί κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, 3. 6. 1278 b 24, and Soph. Fragm. 521, νῦν δ' οὐδὲν εἰμὶ χωρίς' ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐβλέψα ταύτη τὴν γυνακείαν φύσιν, ὡς οὖν εὐθέων εἶμεν, where, as Gomperz remarks (Die Bruchstücke der griech. Tragiker, p. 33), χωρίς (= ἰδία, 'privatim,' 'seorsum') serves to distinguish the individual lot of the speaker from the general lot of women.

νομίζωνται οὖν . . . 23. αὐτοῖς, 'holding then that many of the things said in the non-scientific inquiries also respecting the best life are adequately said, we must now too make use of them.' On the question what 'non-scientific inquiries' are here referred to, something has been said in vol. i. p. 299, note 1. The expression ἕωτερικοὶ λόγοι, when used by Aristotle, does not necessarily refer to non-scientific inquiries of his own, still less to writings of his own, but it probably refers to writings of his own in the passage before us, for, besides that, as Zeller remarks (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 119. 2: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 115, note 4), the contents of the passage are quite Aristotelian in spirit, it seems to be implied in the words καὶ νῦν, 'now too,' that Aristotle has himself said these things before (cp. Meteor. 1. 3. 339 b 36, εἰρηταὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ πρῶτοι εἰς τοίς περὶ τὸν ἄνω τόπον θεωρῆμαι, λέγωμεν δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων καὶ νῦν, and 341 a 12 sqq.). Whether, as Bernays held (Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 69 sqq.), a Dialogue of Aristotle is here 'used,' is uncertain, for the non-scientific writings of Aristotle were not all of them Dialogues (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 123: Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 119 sq.). What is the exact meaning of χρηστέων? The word recurs in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 26, λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς (i.e. τῆς ψυχῆς) καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἕωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκοῦντος ἐνα, καὶ χρηστεών αὑτοῖς, where χρηστέων seems to introduce merely a statement of results, but it does not follow that it always means no more than
this. Bernays thought that we have in 1323 a 24 sqq. a verbatim extract from the non-scientific composition made use of. Against this Vahlen argues in the second of his Aristotelische Aufsätze. Zeller holds (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 119. 2: Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 115, note 4) that the contents of the non-scientific composition are reproduced, not indeed verbatim, but pretty closely (‘ziemlich eng anzuschliessen scheint’), and we are certainly conscious (with Bernays) of a freer flow of periods in the first chapter than we often meet with in Aristotle’s writings, though Vahlen has shown that many of the expressions used occur elsewhere in them. Bernays takes the use of the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι to extend to the end of the first chapter, and it would seem from the words peri τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς in 23 that all that is said on this subject is based on them, so that they will have been used at any rate down to σώφρων, 1323 b 36. If we ask why Aristotle has recourse on this subject to the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι, and not, as in c. 13. 1332 a 7 sqq. and 21 sqq., to the Nicomachean Ethics—Zeller finds teaching to the same effect in Eth. Nic. i. 6 sqq., 10. 6 sqq.—the answer probably is that he prefers, when he can, to refer to the more popularly written and more Generally accessible class of compositions. Zeller (Hermes, 15. 553 sqq.: see vol. ii. p. x, note 1) thinks that the passage 1323 a 21 sqq., in addition to Eth. Nic. i. 8. 1098 b 9 sqq., was before the writer of Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1218 b 32, πάντα δὴ τἀγαθὰ ἡ ἕκτη ἡ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τούτων αἱρετῶτερα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διαιρούμεθα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις: φρόνησε γὰρ καὶ ἁρετή καὶ ἱδονή ἐν ψυχῇ, διὸ ἐνα ἡ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν, but perhaps the passage in the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι was itself before him. For the aorist νομίσαντας, cp. c. 7. 1328 a 3 and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 27, and see above on 1271 b 4. As to the case of νομίσαντας see note on 1275 a 16.

24. ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for in truth against one division [of goods] at any rate no one would contend,’ etc. Γάρ introduces a justification of the use of the ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι on the ground of the absence of dissent. For ἀμφισβητεῖν πρὸς, cp. 3. 15. 1287 b 35: Isæus ii. 9, ἀμφισβητήσας πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνου διαθήκας: Demosth. in Phorm. c. 33, ἀμφισβητεῖς πρὸς ἐν ὑμα τῶν ἐν τῇ συγγραφῇ: Polyb. 2. 2. 10, ἀμφισβητοῦντων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα. But how would an assertion that the happy need not possess all three kinds of goods run counter to the division of goods into these three kinds? Apparently in this way. The division implies that all the three kinds of goods are goods, and it is taken for granted that those who are
be happy should possess all goods (4 (7). 15. 1334a 28 sqq.). There were other divisions of goods—among them a division into εὖαντα, τίμα, and δυνάμεις (Eth. Nic. 1. 12). As to the division into external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, see vol. i. p. 299, note i. That wealth should be accompanied by virtue had often been said by the poets (Sappho, Fragm. 81: Pindar, Olymp. 2. 53 sqq. and Pyth. 5. i sqq.: Eurip. Fragm. 163: compare Lysander’s remark to the younger Cyrus in Cic. De Senect. 17. 59, recte vero te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtutie tuae fortuna coniuncta est), and Simonides (Fragm. 70) had said that health should accompany wisdom. Cp. also Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 14 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 17 sqq. When Aristotle sought to show in the inquiry which commences here that the chief ingredient in εὐδαιμονία is virtue, his work was half done for him by the ordinary use of the Greek language. To the Greeks ὁ εὐδαιμων was ὁ ἐδ πράττων (1323 b 29 sqq.), and ὁ ἐδ πράττων was ὁ τὰ καλὰ πράττων, and ὁ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν implied virtue. Our word ‘happiness’ has no such link with virtue.

27. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The word μακάριος is used throughout the first chapter as interchangeable with εὐδαιμὼν, but it is a slightly stronger word, as we see from Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 6–8. Aristotle offers no proof that the happy should possess external goods and the goods of the body, no doubt because he considers it unnecessary to do so; the only question likely to be raised is whether they need possess the goods of the soul. Compare Plato, Phileb. 21, which is evidently present to his memory. For φαίη μακάριον without εἶναι cp. 2. 3. 1261 b 22.

29. δεδοτὰ μὲν τὰς παραποτομένας μυῖας. We read in a fragment of Plutarch (Libr. Perdit. Fragm. 7. 10), φαρμακοποίην δὲ τινα εἰδέναι ὅτε μὲν δρακόντων καὶ ἀσπίδων μιθέων πάσχειν, κάνωσα δὲ φεύγετε μέχρι βοῆς καὶ ἐκπόλεσως, but Aristotle is thinking not of gadflies, but of harmless flies. As to cowardice of this kind see Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1149 a 4 sqq.

30. ἀπεχώρειν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τῶν ἐσχάτων is in the gen. after μηδενός. To act thus is to be like a wild beast: cp. Plato, Laws 831 D, μηδὲν δυσχεράνωντα, ἐὰν μὲν ἕκκ Δύναμις καθάπερ θηρίῳ τοῦ φαγεῖν παντοδαπὰ καὶ πιεῖν, ὡσοιτο καὶ ἀφροδισίων πᾶσαν πάντας παρασχεῖν πλησιμοῖν, which is imitated in Epist. 7. 335 A sq. For ἐπίθυμησιν τοῦ φαγείν ἡ πιεῖν Vahlen compares Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 16, τοῦ εὐδοξείν ἐπιθυμῶν, and 1. 7. 3, and Xen. Oecon. 14. 9.
32. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1174 a 1, οὐδεῖς ὑπὲρ ἐλατοτέρον καταφέροντας ἢ χαίροντες, εἰδὼς εἴποις τὰ παθῶν ὢς ὀλίγοι τε μᾶλλον. Φορὰ τῆς περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ διεφνευμένον Vahlen compares Phylarch. ap. Athen. Deipn. 536 e, οὕτως ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν . . . ὡστε τὸν πάντα χρόνον ὑπολαβεῖν βιώσεσθαι καὶ λέγειν ὅτι μόνον εὑροί τὴν αἰτιάσει. For τι παθῶν, cp. 1323 b 8, ὀργανόν τι, and see Bon. Ind. 763 a 16 sqq., where Meteor. 3. 3. 372 b 13, καὶ διώτι περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἢ τὴν σελήνην, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν, is referred to.

34. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'but these things almost all men would admit when said; they differ, however, in respect of the quantity they desire of each good and in respect of their relative superiority.' As to λεγόμενα Vahlen remarks that it is to be taken in close connexion with συγχωρήσειαν, and compares among other passages Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 32, διὸ δεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξεις μὴ μόνον ἀληθείς εἶναι τούτ' εἰρημένον: Plato, Rep. 436 E, οὐδέν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τῶν τοιούτων λεγόμενον ἐκπλήξει: Hdt. 2. 146, τούτων δὲ ἀμφότερον πάρεστι χράσθαι τοίς τις σημεύει λεγομένοις μᾶλλον, and 4. 11, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος λόγος ἢ δεδομένος δὲ, τῷ μᾶλλον λεγομένῳ αὐτός πρόσκειμαι. For ὀσπερ πάντες, where ὀσπερ = 'feret,' Vahlen compares Rhet. 1. 6. 1363 a 11, ὀσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἢδη ὁμολογοῦσιν, εἶ καὶ οἱ κακῶς πεποιθότες, perhaps not a quite conclusive parallel. Closer ones may be found in Plato: see Ast, Lex. Platon. s.v., who refers in illustration of the use of ὀσπερ in the sense of 'feret' to Protag. 346 A, ὀσπερ ἀσμένους, among other passages. For ταῦτα ὑπεροχάις cp. 1323 b 14, κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν. A different interpretation of ταῦτα ὑπεροχάις from that given above is, however, possible; it might mean 'in respect of the excess they desire of this or that good' (cp. τὴν ὑπερβολήν, 38, and 1323 b 8), but 'superiority,' not 'excess,' is probably the meaning. ὑπεροχάις appears to be in the plural because three different sorts of goods are measured against each other, so that whichever sort is preferred will conceivably possess one degree of superiority over the second and another over the third.

36. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς κ.τ.λ. Ὁποσονοῦν ἢ ὑπεροχήν is severed from τῆς ἀρετῆς by the whole length of the sentence for the sake of emphasis: see above on 1281 a 14. Aristotle here remembers Plato, Apol. Socr. 29 D, ὃ ἀριστέων ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναίων ὁν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκεμονάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἀχίλλην, ὁμοιῶν μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελοῦμενος, ὡς σοι ἐστι ὡς πλείον, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς Βελτίστη ἔσται, οὐκ
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epimelēi oúde φροντίζεις; and 29 E, οὖν διό ὅτι τὰ πλείστον ἄξια περὶ ἑλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαινότερα περὶ πλεῖονοι.

37. For πλοῦτον καὶ χρημάτων Vahlen compares 1. 9. 1257 b 7, ποιητικὴ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ πλοῦτον καὶ χρημάτων. Πλοῦτος is explained in 1. 13. 1259 b 20 as ἡ τῆς κτήσεως ἀρετῆ. Cp. also c. 5. 1326 b 33, περὶ κτήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας.


39. οὔτε βραδίου μὲν κ.τ.λ. Μέν is taken up by οὐ μὴν ἄλλα, 1323 b 6 (see note on 1284 b 4). Περὶ τούτων, ἢ. ὅ. whether it is right to be content with a small amount of virtue and to seek an unlimited amount of external goods. In place of διαλαμβάνειν Lamminus followed by Bekk.3 reads λαμβάνειν (Sus. and Bonitz, Ind. s.v., also bracket the δια’), and it is true that in 2. 3. 1262 a 17 we have ἀναγκαίων λαμβάνειν περὶ ἄλληλων τὰς πίστεις, and that no parallel has hitherto been adduced for the expression διαλαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, but it is not perhaps absolutely certain that διαλαμβάνειν is wrong. Many verbs compounded with δια’ are occasionally used in a sense but little removed from that of the simple verb, e.g. διαναγκάζειν, διασπορεῖν, διαλαμβάνειν, διαφυλάττειν, etc.

40. ὀρῶντας οἳ κ.τ.λ. So that those who possess the virtues have the means of acquiring external goods in addition, whereas those who possess external goods have not necessarily the means of acquiring the virtues, whence it follows that the virtues are to be sought in preference to external goods. A little later, however, Aristotle says that external goods are the gift of fortune (1323 b 27 sq.). He continues here to make use of the Apology of Plato, 30 Α, οὔδ’ οὖν γάρ ἄλλο πράττον ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθομ ύμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μὴτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελείσθαι μὴτε χρημάτων πράττειν μηδ’ οὗτο σφόδρα, ὡς τής ψυχῆς, ὡς ἦν ἀρίστῃ ἐστίν, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετῆ γίνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τάλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπατώ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. Compare the definition of εὐδαιμονία in Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 16 as εὐθύνη κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων: Isocr. De Pace, § 32, τοῖς γὰρ ἀγάθοις οἰς ἔχομεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τούτοις κτόμεθα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὑφελέας ἡν δεόμενοι τυγχάνομεν ὡσποδ’ οἱ τῆς αὐτῶν διανοίας ἀμελεύτες λελάβασι σφάς αὐτοῖς ἄρα τοῦ τε φρονεῖν ἄμεινον καὶ τοῦ
πράττειν βολτιῶν τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀλγοφρούντες: Xenocr. Fragm. 63 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 3. 127), Ἑνοικράτης δὲ ὁ Χαλκηδώνος τὴν εὐδαι-

1. τῷ χαίρειν = ἕδοιγ, as in De Gen. An. 1. 18. 724 a 1 (referred 1823 b.

in Bon. Ind. s.v. χαίρειν). Protarchus in Plato, Philod. 21 A sqq.

finds the Good to be τὸ χαίρειν or pleasure. The word μακάριον was supposed to be derived from χαίρειν (Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b

6 sq., quoted by Vahlen). Tyrants were thought to be εὐδαιμονεῖσι καὶ μακάριοι if they were seen to be in the daily enjoyment of bodily pleasures (7 (5). 11. 1314 b 28 sqq.).


Εὐδαιμονία is said to be a combination of τὸ καλὸν and pleasure in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 19: see vol. i. p. 296, note 1.

ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει κ.τ.λ. Compare the remark of Solon quoted in Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 9, καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαιμονεῖς ἵσος ἀπεφανεῖν καλὸν, ἐπὶ ποιός μετρίος τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπαγώσας δὲ τὰ κάλλιοτά, ὡς φηκτο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνους· ἐνδόχειται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν ἄ δει, and Plato, Euthyd. 281 B, ἐρά γε ὀνείρας ἀν ἀνθρωπος πολλά κεκτημένας καὶ πολλά πράττων νοῦν μη ἡχον; ἡ μᾶλλον ἀλγα νοῦν ἡχον; (cp. Laws 660 E). Compare also the remark of Bias to Croesus, made in support of Solon (Diod. 9. 27. 3), τὰ γὰρ ἐν σοι βούλεται (ὁ Σόλων) θεωρήσας ἄγαθα διαγρώναι, νυνὶ δὲ τὰ παρὰ σοι μάλιν ἑόρακεν· εἶναι δὲ δι' ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον ἡ τάδε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὐδαιμονεῖσι.

and two lines variously ascribed to Antiphanes (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 63: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 154), Alexis (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 41: Meineke, 3. 521), and Menander (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 175: Meineke, 4. 273),

ψυχὴν ἡχει δεῖ πλαύσιν τὰ δὲ χρήματα
tαυτ' ἑστιν ὀψις, παραπέτασμα τοῦ βίου.

4. τὴν ἐξω κτήσιν τῶν ἄγαθων· 'the external acquisition of goods.' Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 16, note 1) compares Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1098 b 26, τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν. Compare also Plato, Rep. 443 C, τὸ δὲ γε ἀληθὲς, τοιοῦτο μὲν τι ἡ, ὥς ἐσοικέ, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' οὗ περὶ τὴν
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εξω πραξεων των αυτοι, αλλα περι την έντος ως αληθος, περι έαυτων και τα έαυτοι, μη διασωτα ταλλωτρα πραξεων παρατουν εν αυτοι μηθε πολυπραγμονειν προς αλληλα τα εν τη ψυχη γενη, and Aristot. De Gen. An. 3. 3. 754 a 33, το των βατραχων ουν μονον στηρεον εστι και στεφρον προς την εξω σωτηριαν.

5. πλειω των χρηματων, cp. Pol. 1. 9. 1257 a 16, τα τα μεν πλειω τα δ' ελαττω των ικανων εχειν τους άνθρωπους (Vahlen), and Isocr. De Pace, § 90, πλειω των ικανων.

tουτως, i. e. τοις περι τη θεος και την διανοιαν αγαθας, or (as in 10) τοις περι ψυχην αγαθοις.

6. ου μην αλλα κ.π.λ. Aristotle proves that it is not well to be content with a small amount of virtue and to seek an unlimited amount of external goods by showing (1) that the goods of the soul are not, like external goods and ὑγιανα generally, harmful or useless when in excess, but on the contrary increase in utility with every increase in their amount; (2) that the best state of the soul is as much more precious (τιμωτερον) than the best state of property and of the body as the soul is more precious than property and the body; (3) that external and bodily goods are desirable for the sake of the soul, not the soul for the sake of external and bodily goods. On all these three grounds it is clear that the goods of the soul are to be sought to a far greater extent than the goods of the body and external goods.

7. ωσπερ ὑγιαναι τι, cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 16, ωσπερ ὁ δικαστης. That instruments have a limit, we see from 1. 8. 1256 b 35 sqq. and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 35 sqq.

8. παν δε το χρησιμον κ.π.λ., 'and everything that is useful' (not merely external goods but bodily goods also, vol. i. p. 299, note 2, and επωδία as a whole, Eth. Nic. 7. 4. 1153 b 21 sqq.) 'belongs to the class of things whose,' etc. Supply τούτων with ἑστιν (with Giph.). Τα χρησιμα (οι δουλαιμα) are goods that are desirable for the sake of other goods (Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1096 b 13 sqq.: 1. 3. 1096 a 7, χρησιμον γαρ και διαλου χαρων: 8. 2. 1155 b 19). Cp. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 3 sqq. and De Part. An. 2. 5. 651 a 36 sqq.

9. άναγκαιον. 'In the first chapter of the Fourth Book of the Politics, which Bernays is probably right in believing to be taken over (herübergenommen) from an ethical dialogue, άναγκη and άναγκαιον are interchanged in such a way that the latter stands where the use of άναγκη owing to its being followed by a vowel would have produced an hiatus' (Kaibel, Stil und Text der Politieia
\'Aδημαίον des Aristoteles, p. 10). Kaibel has apparently overlooked the fact that the same rule is followed throughout the Politics: see for instance 3. 11. 1282 b 8–13 and 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39–b 1. I have noticed only one passage in the Politics in which ἀνάγκη stands before a vowel, 2. 4. 1262 b 14, ἐπισθήθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθίβατο ἢ τὸν ἔνα, and the reason why it is used there probably is that ἀναγκαῖον occurs in the next line, unless indeed τοὺς should be added before ἀμφοτέρους. On the other hand there are several passages in which ἀναγκαῖον stands before a consonant.

For αὐτῶν used pleonastically in addition to the relative, cp. Plato, Rep. 395 D, and Stallbaum’s notes on this passage and on Gorg. 452 D. The same usage occurs in English, e.g. in ‘Who is the poet but lately arrived in Elysium whom I saw Spenser lead in and present him to Virgil?’ (Lyttelton’s Dialogues of the Dead).

10. τῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. With εἶπαι supply ἀναγκαῖον from 9. Δὲ answers to μὲν in 7, τά μὲν γὰρ ἔκτις, and we expect in 11 not χρῆσιμον εἶπαι, but χρῆσιμον ἐστιν. See however Vahlen, Aristot. Aufs. 2. 24 sqq., who adduces other passages (Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 2 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sqq.: De An. 2. 5. 417 a 22 sqq.) in which the second limb of an antithesis suffers a similar change, and is caught into the structure of an intervening sentence.

11. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Menand. Monost. 579 is in the same spirit:

νοὺς ἐστι πάντων ἡγεμόν τῶν χρῆσιμῶν.

13. ἔλως τε κ.τ.λ., ‘and broadly it is manifest that we shall say that the best state of every individual thing, if we match one against another, corresponds in respect of superiority to the distance between the things of which we say that these very states are states,’ i.e. if we match two things one against the other, the superiority of the best state of the one thing over the best state of the other corresponds to the distance between the one thing and the other. ἕλως marks a transition from statements as to this or that class of goods to a broad universal proposition as to ἕκαστον πράγμα: see above on 1262 b 3. For ἕκαστον πράγματος πρὸς ἄλλα Vahlen compares among other passages Poet. 23. 1459 a 24, ὡν ἕκαστον ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλα. Ἡπερ εἶληφε διάστασιν = τῇ διαστάσει ἡπερ εἶληφε, and τῇ διαστάσει is dependent on ἄκολουθων. In Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 15 sq. and Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 23 we find ἄκολουθων followed by κατά, and many have connected it here with κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, but Vahlen (whose interpretation I have
followed) is probably right in connecting ἀκολουθεῖν with τῇ διαστάσει (understood), and not with κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχῆν. That εἰληφε διαστάσει is a perfectly possible phrase (no less than εἰληφε διάστασιν, the reading of Πι) is shown by Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 30), who compares among many other passages Plato, Tim. 65 A, δὲ κατὰ σμικρὸν τὰς ἀποχωρήσεις ἑαυτῶν καὶ κενώσεις εἰλήφε, τὰς δὲ πληρώσεις ἀθρόας καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα.


ψυχή γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐστι τιμῶτερον,

she means by ψυχή 'life.'


καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου. Πλούτος is said to be the ἀρετῆς of κτίσεως in 1. 13. 1259 b 20.

22. ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, 'moral and intellectual virtue': cp. 1323 a 27–34 and 1323 b 2, τὸ ἡδον καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν.

καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας. An important addition. Hitherto we have been told only this, that those who are to be happy must possess as much virtue as possible, but now we are told that action in accordance with the virtues is also essential to happiness, and this is not lost sight of in the sequel (cp. 31–36, 41 sqq.).

23. μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρυσένοις, 'appealing to the happiness of the Deity in proof of this.' Vict. 'quod inquit posse nos hoc videre utentes Deo teste, non intellectus debere nos adhibere ipsum testem et quasi invocare ut hoc confirmet, sed uti illo tanquam signo quodam certo et exemplo huius rei claro atque illustri.' Μάρτυρι χρυσάθαι τινι is commonly used in the sense of 'producing some one as a witness,' as in Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 30, 'Ἀθηναίων Ὀμήρῳ μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμίνος, but here, as Vahlen points out, μάρτυς has the same meaning as in Plato, Phileb. 67 B, τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἰονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρες μᾶλλον ἢ κ.τ.λ. or as 'testes' in Cic. De Fin. 2. 33. 109. Cp. also Metaph. A. 1. 1069 a 25.

24. ὡς εὐδαιμῶν μὲν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος κ.τ.λ. As to the source and nature of the happiness of God, cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 12. 1245 b 18, αὐτιον δ' ὅτι ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ εὖ καθ' ἑτέρον, ἐκείνῳ δὲ (i. e. τῷ θεῷ) αὐτῶς αὐτοῦ τὸ εὖ ἑστίν, and Plut. De Is. et Osir. c. 1, οὗ γὰρ ἀργύρῳ καὶ χρυσῷ μακάριον τὸ θεῖον, οὐδὲ βρωταίς καὶ κεραυνοῖς ἅχυρον, ὡς' ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρονήσει. As to the phrase εὐδαιμῶν καὶ μακάριος see note on 1314 b.
28. "In the earlier days of Greece εὐδαιμων would hardly be used of a deity, as we can easily understand if we look to the original meaning of the word; later also it appears to have gone out of use again to some extent as an epithet of the gods. On the other hand we often find it thus used by Plato and other writers of his time (see Ast, Lexicon Platonicum). I have found it elsewhere in Aristoph. Aves 1741, τῆς τ' εὐδαιμονος Ἡρας, in Aristot. Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 b 8, τῶν θεῶν γὰρ μᾶλλα ἐπειλήφθηνεν μακάριος καὶ εὐδαιμονας εἶναι, and 'in the passage of the Politics before us (Heinze, Der Eudämonismus in der griech. Philosophie, 1. 663).

28. ἐπει καὶ κ.τ.λ., 'since it is just on account of this' (i.e. because happiness does not spring from external goods) 'that prosperity also differs from happiness [no less than external goods differ from goods of the soul], for the spontaneous and fortune are the cause of goods external to the soul [the abundance of which constitutes prosperity], whereas no one is just or temperate [or consequently happy] from fortune or owing to fortune.' ἐπεί introduces a justification of the statement that the happiness of the individual is proportionate to his virtue and moral prudence and to the degree in which he acts in accordance with them: if this were not so and his happiness sprang from external goods, it would not differ from prosperity. That prosperity consists in an abundance of external goods, we see from Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 b 39, εὐτυχία δ' ἐστίν, δὲν ἡ τύχη ἀγαθῶν αἰτία, ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἡ πάντα ἡ τὰ πλείοτα ἡ τὰ μέγιστα. That it was identified by many with happiness we see from Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 b 7 sq. and 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq.

28. As to ταὐτότατον καὶ ἡ τύχη see vol. i. p. 21 sqq.


29. ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην. This expression is used for the sake of emphasis: cp. Plut. De Fortuna, c. 1, πότερον οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη τὰ θυτῶν πράγματα, οὐδὲ ἱσότης, οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη, οὐδὲ κοσμώτης, ἀλλ' ἐκ τύχης μὲν καὶ διὰ τύχην 'Αριστείδης ἐνεκαρτήσει τῇ πενή... ἐκ τύχης δὲ καὶ διὰ τύχην Φιλοκράτης λαβὼν χρυσὸν παρὰ Φιλίππου πόρων καὶ ίχθως ἤγοραζε;

ἐξόμενον δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ., 'and next in order, and calling for the same arguments to establish it, comes the truth that the best State also is happy and does well.' But it cannot do well—Aristotle in effect proceeds—unless it does noble things, and it cannot do noble things without moral and intellectual virtue, and the courage,
justice, and wisdom of a State are identical in nature with the same virtues in an individual, so that the happiness of a State, like that of an individual, cannot exist apart from the moral and intellectual virtues and action in accordance with them; its happiness is inseparable from the very same virtues with which happiness is associated in the individual. Bernays and Susemihl, who substitute γὰρ in 31 for the δὲ of the MSS., regard the passage ἀδύνατον, 31—σῶφρον, 36, as containing the proof of the preceding sentence ἐχόμενον, 29—καλῶς, 31, but Vahlen has already pointed out (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 45 sq.) that the former passage is rather a deduction from latter. The arguments used in the passage 31—36 are not the same as those used in 1323 a 38—b 29, nor do they prove that the best State is happy; what is proved in 31—36 is that the happy State will possess the same courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom which are possessed by the virtuous individual. One can conceive that the State might be happy without possessing the virtues of the virtuous individual; the object of 31—36 is to show that this is not the case, and that any happy State must possess these virtues, and thus to supplement and complete 29—31. It follows that the best State will possess them. In saying that the courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom of a State are identical with the courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom of an individual Aristotle follows in the track of Plato, Rep. 435 B sq. and 441 C sq. With ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν κ.τ.λ. compare the reasoning in Plato, Gorg. 507 C.

34. ἔχει, not ἔχουσι, cp. 8 (6). i. 1316 b 34 sq. and Plato, Phileb. 64 E, μετρώτητος γὰρ καὶ ἐξωμετρεία κάλλος δήπον καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ἔμβαινε γίγνεσθαι.

35. μορφή. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) remarks of this passage, 'μορφή idem fere quod δύναμις significat.'

The suppressed antecedent of ὅν must be τῇ ἀνθρώπῃ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ φρονήσει: we expect therefore ἀνθρώπος καὶ δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος in place of δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σῶφρον, but Aristotle is not careful of exact correspondence in enumerations of this kind, as Vahlen shows by comparing Eth. Nic. i. i. 1103 a 4—8, Pol. i. 13. 1259 b 39—1260 a 2, Pol. 6 (4). i. 1295 b 6—9, and Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 36—1283 a 3, where we expect τοῦ κάλλους in place of τοῦ πλοίουν in 1283 a 2. The same thing is observable in Plato: see Stallbaum on Plato, Rep. 490 C.

37. μὲν is probably answered not by δὲ in νῦν δὲ ὑποκείσθω, 40,
but by δὲ in πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 1324 a 5 (see Vahlen, Aristot. Aufs. 2. 25).

περιφρομασμένα. Not only what has been said on this subject, but the whole contents of the first three chapters are introductory, because they merely prepare the way for the inquiry with which Aristotle is mainly concerned, the inquiry as to the best constitution (cp. c. 2. 1324 a 19 sqq., c. 4. 1325 b 33 sqq.).

38. διγγάνειν 'is rare in the best Prose (ἀποτομή being the common verb), but is used by Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 3, 5, 5. 1, 16, 6. 4, 9, and by Aristotle' (Liddell and Scott s. v.). See also Rutherford, New Phrynichus, pp. 169, 391. 'Επεξερήθαιν (aor. infin.) is used though διγγάνειν (pres. infin.) has preceded, probably because επεξήρθαιν is not used in this sense.

39. étéras σχολῆς, i. e. étéras mebódon (Sus.3 Ind. s. v. σχολή), cp. 1324 a 2, επὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου, and 21, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην πραγμάτευμα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν. Compare also Plut. Pericl. c. 39, ἀλλὰ ταύτα μὲν ἵνως étéras δόξης πραγμάτειας εἶναι. Νῦν δὲ, 40, is in opposition to étéras σχολῆς.

40. μὲν should rather follow ὑποκείσθω, but 'μὲν interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur' (Bon. Ind. s. v.).

41. κεχορηγημένης κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. i. 9. 1099 a 32 sqq. and 10. 9. 1179 a 4 sqq. Xenocrates, on the other hand, had identified the good and the happy life, and his view is consequently corrected here (Top. 7. i. 152 a 7, καθάπερ ξενοκράτης τῶν εὐθαίρων βίων καὶ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀποδείκνυσ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἐπείδη πάντως τῶν βίων ἄρετῶτατος ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁ εὐθαῖρων ἐν γάρ το ἄρετῶτατον καὶ μέγιστον), and also that of the Cynics, for they held that virtue needed only the addition of the strength which Socrates possessed to be sufficient for happiness (Diog. Laert. 6. 11, αὐτάρκη γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐθαίρων, ὁμοιοί προσδεδομένων ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἴσχυος).

1. The suppressed subject of μετέχειν probably is, not τῶν βίων, but 1324 a. ἐκαστον καὶ τὰς πόλεις.

2. επὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου, 'for the time of the present inquiry': cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 a 34, ἀφείσθω επὶ τοῦ παρώντος, and Isocr. Paneg. § 167, επὶ τῆς νῦν ἡλικίας, and see Bon. Ind. 268 a 5-13.

5. Póteron δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotcle has just said that the courage, C. 2. justice, etc., of a State are the same as the corresponding virtues in an individual, and now he asks whether this is also true of happiness. The question marked out for inquiry in 1323 a 20 sq., póteron ὁ ἄρετώτατος βίοι κοινῆ καὶ χορίς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἔτερος, has been so
far answered that we have been told that the most desirable life both for the State and for the individual is μετ' ἀρετῆς, but we have not yet learnt whether the happiness of the State resembles the happiness of the individual (1323 b 21 sqq.) in springing from virtue and being proportionate to it, and, till we know this, we cannot affirm that the happiness of the State and that of the individual are the same. We are now told that this is the case (1324 a 13, καὶ πόλεις εὐδαιμονίστεραι φήσει τὴν σπουδαιότεραν). Plutarch claims that Lycurgus was already aware of this (Lycurg. c. 31, ὥσπερ ἐνὸς ἀνδρῶς βίω καὶ πόλεως ὀλίγο νομίζων εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἐγγίνεσθαι καὶ ὅμοιος τῆς πρὸς αὐτήν, and Ages. c. 33). He often seems tacitly to defend Lycurgus against Aristotle's criticisms (see notes on 1270 a 4, 19, and 1324 b 7).

12. ἀποδέχεται, 'accipit cum assensu, probat' (Bon. Ind. s.v.). Cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 25.

14. ἐν μὲν κ.τ.λ. For συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως see note on 1293 a 4, κοινωνούσι καὶ πολιτεύονται. As to the question here raised and the parties to the discussion, see vol. i. p. 305 sqq. In using the words ὁ ξενικός καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολελυμένος Aristotle probably has before him not only the language of Aristippus in Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 13, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοι...οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν καταλιθῶ, ἀλλὰ ξένοις πανταχοῦ εἰμι, but also the example of Anaxagoras, who lived many years at Athens, though a Clazomenian, and when he was forced to leave it, did not return to his native city, but preferred to live a stranger's life at Lampsacus and died there (Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 b 15).


18. κοινωνεῖν πόλεως = συμπολιτεύεσθαι, to take an active share in a State (cp. i. 15).

19. εἶτε καὶ τοις μὲν μῆ τοῖς δὲ πλείοντοις. For καὶ, cp. c. 9. 1329 a 7, τρόπον μὲν τινα τοὺς αὐτοῖς, τρόπον δὲ τινα καὶ ἑτέρους.

ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The best MSS. have ἐκείνοι μὲν γὰρ in 22, though P4 6 L8 omit γὰρ and Vet. Int. has no equivalent for it (Vet. Int. occasionally fails to render γὰρ: see vol. ii. p. lxiii). Γὰρ should probably be retained in the text, and if we retain it, we must place the apodosis at ὅτι μὲν ὁδὸν κ.τ.λ., 23. After a string of protases introduced by ἐπεὶ, the apodosis is often introduced by ὁ δὲ in Aristotle's writings (see Bonitz, Aristot. Studien, 2. 59 sqq.). In c. 13. 1331 b 26 sqq. and in De An. 1. 4. 408 a 5 sqq. the
apodosis is introduced by μὲν οὖν after a protasis introduced by ἐπειδή or εἰ.

τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας. Cp. c. 3. 1325 b 20, θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεως. Bonitz (Ind. 186 a 28) explains διάνοια here as 'cogitandi actio' (i.e. 'thought'), referring to Metaph. E. i. 1025 b 6, πάντα ἐπιστήμη διανοητική ἡ μετέχουσι τι διανοιάς, Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 11 sq., and De Interp. 14. 23 a 32 sq.


24. κἂν ὀστισοῦν, whether πρακτικὸς or θεωρητικός.


27. οἱ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένος, οὖν θεωρητικὸς τις, δι’ μόνον τινὸς φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. Aristotle was on the point of saying ὁ φιλόσοφος, as in 32, but he substitutes this long phrase, because he declines to identify this kind of life exclusively with the philosophic life. He selects three strong assertions for review, each containing the word μόνον, and this is the first of them. The other two are μόνον γὰρ ἀνθρώπος τῶν πρακτικῶν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικόν, 39, and οἱ δὲ τῶν δεσποτικῶν καὶ τυραννικῶν τρόπων τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εὐθαιμονά φασιν, 1324 b 2. As to the passage before us cp. c. 3. 1325 a 18, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμάζουσι τᾶς πολιτικῆς ἀρχῆς, νομίζομεν τὸν τοῦ εὐθείαν βίον ἑτέρων τινών εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἱρετῶταν, οἱ δὲ τούτῳ ἀριστον. Πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένων, however, means something more than a mere rejection of political office; Aristotle probably has Anaxagoras in his mind, his refusal to be cumbered even with property, his passion for θεωρία and ἐλευθερία: compare the account of Anaxagoras in Plut. Pericl. c. 16, where ἄφραγνων καὶ ἀπροσδεί τῆς ἐκτὸς ὦλης ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ τῆς διάνοιας may be compared with πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένων, in Himer. ap. Phot. Bibliothe. 1088 R (quoted by Menage on Diog. Laert. 2. 6), where πάσης ἑαυτοῦ τῆς ἰχθυοῦ ἀρχολια ἐλευθερότατες may be compared with the same phrase, and in Diog. Laert. 2. 6, οὗτος (i.e. Ἀναξαγόρας) εὐγενεία καὶ πλούτος διαφέρων ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνη, ὅσ γε τὰ πατρίδα παρεχώρησε τοῖς οἰκείοις, αἰτιαθείς γὰρ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὡς ὁμιλῶν, "Τί οὖν," ἔφη,

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"οἷς ἰμείς ἐπιμελεῖσθε;" καὶ τέλος ἀπέστη καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν θεωρίαν ἢ, οὐ φροντίζων τῶν πολιτικῶν. See also Clemens, Strom. 2. 416 D (quoted by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 912. 5). Ἀναβαγώραν... τὴν θεωρίαν φάναι τοῦ βιόν τέλος εἶναι καὶ τὴν απὸ ταύτης ἐλευθερίαν: Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 13 sqq.: Eth. Eud. 1. 4. 1215 b 6 sqq. and 1. 5. 1216 a 10 sqq. Aristotle, however, may also be thinking of Empedocles (cp. Diog. Laert. 8. 63, quoted below on 1325 a 19). Ὄν μόνον τινὶς φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον perhaps contains a reminiscence of Plato, Theaeet. 175 D, οὗτος δὴ ἑκατέρου τρόπος, δὴ θεόδωρος, δὲ μὲν τῷ ὄντι εν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολὴ τεθραμμένον, δὲ δὴ φιλόσοφον καλείς, and Rep. 476 A, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτές δὲν ὁ λόγος, οὗ μόνους ἂν τις ὀρθῶς προσεῖτοι φιλοσόφους: cp. Plut. De Facie in Orbe Lunae, c. 30, οἱ σώφρονες (ψυχαί) μετά σχολῆς ἀπράγμανα καὶ φιλόσοφον στέρζασι βιον. Aristotle hints in these words that it is possible to lead a philosophic life without withdrawing altogether from politics; he probably remembers that Socrates, Archytas, and Epaminondas had done so. Cp. Plut. An Seni sit gerendae Respublica, c. 26, much of which chapter is thought by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 892. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 441, note 1), to be based, in substance at any rate, on Dicaearchus, Σωκράτες γὰρ οὗτος βάθρα θεῖς οὗτʼ εἰς θρόνον καθίσας οὗτε ὄραν διατριβής ἢ περιπάτου τοῖς γνωρίμως τεταγμένην φιλάττων, ἄλλα καὶ παιζόν, ὅτε τύχοι, καὶ συμπίνων καὶ συνεταξιέσθαις αὐτός, καὶ συγγεράζων, τέλος δὲ καὶ συνδεδεμένως καὶ πίνων τὸ φάρμακον εὐφιλοσόφει, πρῶτος ἀποδείξας τὸν βιόν ἀπάντῃ χρώμα καὶ μέρες καὶ πάθει καὶ πράγμασιν ἀπλῶς ἀπαίδευσεν διεξάγων, and Cic. de Orat. 3. 34. 137, septem quisque dictun tur uno tempore, qui sapientes et haberentur et vocarentur. Hi omnes praeter Milesium Thalen civitatibus suis praefuerunt. Plato, again, though he speaks of the true philosopher as scoring political office (Rep. 521 A sq.), will not hear of his philosophic class refusing political office, at any rate in his ideal State. Cp. also Gorg. 550 D. Chrysippus was so far from thinking the σχολαστικὸς βίος the only one fit for a philosopher that he classed it as an ἱδιονός βίος (Plut. De Stoicor. Repugnantis, c. 2).


31. καὶ τῶν προτέρων (e.g. Anaxagoras and, as we shall see, Gorgias) καὶ τῶν νῦν (e.g. Isocrates and Epaminondas). οἱ
πρότεροι does not, I think, occur elsewhere in the Politics (οἱ πρότεροι is the usual phrase), but it occurs in Plato, Phaedr. 274 B and Menex. 241 D.

λέγω δὲ δύο κ.τ.λ. See critical note.

32. διαφέρει δὲ οὖ μικρὸν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably has before him the words of Socrates in Plato, Gorg. 500 C, ὥρας γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦτον εἶναι ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὐ τί ἰν μᾶλλον σπονδάσει τις καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἐχον ἀνθρωπος, ἤ τούτο, δυνα ἡρή τράπον ζήν, πάτερον ἐπὶ ὁν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ (the political life) ... ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν τῶν βιον τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφία.


35. νομίζουσι δὲ οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. It is possible that Anaxagoras had expressed himself to this effect: he seems at any rate to have implied in his account of the happy man that he was not a δυνάστης (Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 13 sqq.). Isocrates had said in his Letter to the Sons of Jason (§ 11), ἤμιοι γὰρ αἱρετάτεροι τὸ βίος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ βελτίων ὃ τῶν ἱδωτεύων ἢ ὧν τῶν τυραννοῦντων, καὶ τὰς τιμὰς ἰδίους ἡγούμαι τάς ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις ἢ τάς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις: compare the spurious Fourth Philippic ascribed to Demosthenes, c. 70. As Eaton points out, Plato had already made Thrasymachus in Rep. 344 A sqq. speak of τυραννίας ως τηλεωτάτη ἀδίκια: cp. also Gorg. 478 E, Polymb. 2. 59. 6, αὐτῷ γὰρ τούνομα (of tyrant) περιέχει τὴν ἁμα- βεστάτην ἐμφάσιν, καὶ πάσας περειλήψει τάς ἐν ἄνθρωποις ἀδίκιας καὶ παρανομίας, and Paus. 8. 27. 11, τούτῳ τῷ Ἀριστοδήμῳ καὶ τυραννοῦτι ἑξεγέντο δῶμον ἐπικελθὴναι Χρηστῷ, and 8. 36. 5. In μετ’ ἀδίκιας τυχόν εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης (‘accompanied with injustice of the very greatest kind’) τών lends emphasis: cp. Xen. Mem. 1. 3. 12, ὁ Ἡράκλεις, ὃς δεινὴν τινα λέγεις δύναμιν τοῦ φαλάκρου εἶναι (‘how very terrible’), and Soph. O. C. 560, and see Liddell and Scott, s.v. τις Λ. ii. 8.

37. πολιτικῶς δὲ, i.e. if rule is exercised as it should be exercised over men free and equal (cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 7 sqq.: i. 7. 1255 b 20).

38. ἐμπόδιον ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐμερεία, and so not to be productive of τὸ ἀριστα πράττειν καὶ τὸ κατὰ μακρίας (24). As to ἐμπόδιον ἔχειν see above on 1266 a 27. Τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐμερεία, in contrast to ἡ ἐκτὸς εὐμερεία (health, etc.), Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1178 b 33 sqq.
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toúton δὲ k.t.l. As Bonitz points out (Ind. 247 b 23), εὖ énvνiας takes a dative in Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 31.

39. μόνον γὰρ k.t.l. This was the view of Gorgias as expressed by Meno in Plato, Meno 71 E, αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆ, ἱκανῶν εἰναι τὰ τὰς πόλεως πράττειν (and perhaps also of Prodicus and Protagoras, Rep. 600 C sq.): compare what Socrates says to Callicles, the friend of Gorgias, in Gorg. 500 C, ὡς τοιαὶ τρόποι ζῆν, πάτερον ἐπὶ ὑμῖν παρακαλεῖ ἐμε, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντα τε εἰν τῷ ἀνδρῷ καὶ βητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτεύομενον τούτον τὸν τρόπον, ὁν ὑμεῖς ὑπὸν πολιτεύεσθε, ἣ ἐπὶ τῶν τῶν βίων τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφία, and what Callicles himself says in Gorg. 485 D of one who continues to study philosophy after he has ceased to be young, ἵππαρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνδρῷ καὶ τῶν πάνω εὐφυῆς ἐμε, ἀκόντου γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἁγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἐπὶ οἱ ποιητὶς τοῦ ἀνδρᾶς ἀρετησίες γίγνεσθαι κ.τ.λ., and Hipp. Maj. 281 B sq. Gorgias formed himself (Hipp. Maj. 282 B) and his disciples (Xen. Anab. 2. 6. 16) on this model; his ideal of human life stood in the strongest possible contrast to that of Anaxagoras. Nowhere can it have found more sympathy than at Athens (cp. Thuc. 2. 40). The added remark (c. 3. 1325 a 21 sqq.), ἀδύνατον γὰρ τῶν μηδὲν πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δ' εὐπραγιαν και τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι τοιάν, may also be due to Gorgias. In 2. 2. 1261 b 1 (cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.) Aristotle leaves the question open whether ruling is a good thing or not.

40. ἐφ' ἐκάστης γὰρ k.t.l. This was not the general view: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 6, τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς οἷς γὰρ ἰδιώται τῶν δυναστῶν ὃς ὢς ἤτοι δοκοῦντες τᾶς ἐπικρατείς, ἄλλα καὶ μᾶλλον. Aristotle, however, seems to have said, if the προτερπτικός ascribed to him was really his, that Kings were favourably circumstanced for philosophizing (Fragm. 47. 1483 a 41 sqq.): compare the view of Marcus Aurelius (Comm. 11. 7), and contrast Plut. Ad Princ. Inerud. c. 5, where Plutarch suspects that Alexander was half inclined to regard his own splendid and power ὡς κάλυσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ ἀσχολίαν. For ἐπί with the gen. in the sense of 'in respect of,' cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 17, and Plato, Rep. 460 Λ, ὡστε τῶν φαύλων ἐκείνων αὐτίσσαθαν ἐφ' ἐκάστης συνέργεως τέχνην.

1324 b. 2. οἱ δὲ k.t.l. By 'the despotic and tyrannical form of the constitution' Aristotle means a form of constitution devised πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ διαπίστους τῶν πέλας. No notice is taken of those who praised the life of the tyrant, probably because no one would claim
that the tyrant was alone happy. For τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 11, ὁ τρόπος τῆς δῆλης πολιτείας, and 2. 7. 1267 a 17, ὁ τρόπος τῆς ψαλίδου πολιτείας. Thibron and other writers on the Lacedaemonian constitution are probably referred to (see c. 14. 1333 b 18 sqq.), for they seem to have called the Lacedaemonian State happy because it ruled over many, and to have ascribed its happiness to theramer of its constitution (1333 b 22 sq., 29 sqq.). Aristotle may have thought that Alexander needed warning on the subject (cp. Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 13: Aristot. Fragm. 614. 1581 b 18 sqq.).

3. παρ’ ἐνίοις δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and in some States this is the distinctive aim both of the constitution and of the laws, that the members of the State may exercise a despotic rule over others.’ In the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States, for instance, both constitution and laws were framed with this end in view (c. 14. 1333 b 5 sqq.). For ὅρος τῆς πολιτείας cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 10 sq. Compare also the use of ἱπδοθείς in 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 27 sqq.

5. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύθην ὡς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις. Καὶ ‘though’: cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 2, Ἀθηναίου δὲ και ὧν μεταλαβόντες τοῦτον τοῦ χρυσοῦ ὅμως πρόθυμοι ἦσαν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον, and see Liddell and Scott s.v. καὶ B. ii. 4.

νομίμων = νόμων: cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 42 and 1269 a 1, and see Bon. Ind. s. v. νόμων.


7. ὅσπερ κ.τ.λ. The same thing is said in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5 sqq. and of Lacedaemon in 2. 9. 1271 b 2 sqq.: cp. also 1325 a 3, and Plato, Laws 626 A, καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνευρήσεις οὕτω σκοπῶν τὸν Κρητῶν νομοθέτην, ὡς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀπαντά δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τὰ νόμιμα ἡμῖν ὑποθέτων συνετάξατο. We should hardly have guessed that this was so from the part of the Code of Gortyna which has come down to us, but the account of Cretan institutions given in Strab. p. 480 on the authority of Ephorus so far bears out the testimony of Plato and Aristotle, that it represents the development of courage in the young citizens to have been one main aim of the constitution. Plutarch probably has similar charges before him when in Lycurg. c. 31 and Ages. c. 33 he tries to make out that the aim of Lycurgus was very much that which Plato and Aristotle said that it ought to have been (see above on 1324 a 5). For ἦ τε παύεια καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλήθος, cp. c. 14. 1333 b 9, τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν. For τὸ
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τῶν νόμων πλήθος, 'most of the laws,' Bonitz (Ind. 603 b 17 sqq.) compares 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 31, 32 and 2. 5. 1264 a 13.

9. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further in all the non-Greek nations that are capable of winning at the expense of others warlike prowess is honoured.' Aristotle has before him Hdt. 2. 167, ὅρεων καὶ Θρήκες καὶ Σκύθας καὶ Πέρσας καὶ Λυδοὺς (he substitutes the Celts for the Lydians) καὶ σχεδὸν πάντας τούς βαρβάρους ἀποτιμοτέρους τῶν ἄλλων ἡγημόνων πολιτῶν τοὺς τὰς τέχνας μαθάνοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐγχώνους τούτων' τοὺς δὲ ἀπαλλαγμένους τῶν χειρωναξίων γενναίους νομιζομένους εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἀνεμένους' μεμαθήκασι δὲ ὑπὸ τούτο πάντες οἱ Ελληνες, καὶ μάλιστα Δακεδαμίονια, where there is a transition from the barbarians to the Lacedaemonians, just as in the passage before us there is a transition from the Lacedaemonians to the barbarians. He probably also has before him Plato, Laws 637 D, πότερον, ὅστερ Σκύθαι χρώντα καὶ Πέρσας, χρηστέον, καὶ ἔτι Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ Κέλται καὶ Ἴβηρες καὶ Θρήκες, πολεμικὰ ξύμπαντα ὅντα τοῦτα γένη, ἢ καθαρότερ ψύεις (i.e. the Lacedaemonians and Cretans), and perhaps Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 10. Cp. also Isocr. Paneg. § 67, ἐστὶ γὰρ ἄρχικώτατα μὲν τῶν γενῶν καὶ μεγάλας δυναστείας ἐξοντα Σκύθαι καὶ Θρήκες καὶ Πέρσαι. The phrase τοῖς δυναμείοις πλεονεκτέων recurs in 8 (6). 3. 1318 b 4, where οἱ κρατοῦντες takes its place in the next line: cp. Demosth. De Chers. c. 42, ἔστε γὰρ ψύεις οὐκ αὐτοῖς πλεονεκτήσαί καὶ κατασχέων ἄρχην εἰς τεφυκότες. No doubt among the barbarians of Europe in Aristotle’s day, as among those of Africa in our own, there were raiding and raided races. 'Ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις, i. e. ἡ πολεμικὴ δύναμις, referring to πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους, 8 (cp. τὴν ἄρετὴν ταύτην, 13). Thus πολέμον is emphatic in 16 and 18, and τῶν πολεμίων in 20. For the perfect τετίμηται see above on 1280 a 16, διήρηται, and see Holden’s note on Xen. Oecon. 9. 4, ἀνασπάσται.

12. καὶ νόμοι τινὲς εἰσὶ, 'laws also' providing for the giving of honours, as well as honours. The honours might be given apart from any provisions of law.

13. καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι κ.τ.λ., 'as for instance at Carthage men receive, we are told, their decoration composed of armlets with as many armlets as they have served campaigns.' Coray would read ἐκ τοσοῦτων κρικῶν, but Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 34) rightly disapproves of this attempt to secure a more exact correspondence between antecedent and relative. I translate κρίκων ‘armlets,’ not ‘rings,’ for the κρίκος which Demosthenes wore was not a ring but an armlet (Plut. Demosth. c. 30, Ἐρατοσθένης δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν κρίκῳ
Compare the armillae given to Roman soldiers for brilliant feats of arms (Liv. 10. 44: Guhl and Koner, Life of the Greeks and Romans, Eng. Trans. p. 586). We hear very little of similar rewards for gallant service in Greece. It was with land that Pittacus was rewarded for slaying his antagonist Phrynon (Plut. De Herod. Malign. c. 15). It was not by rewards given to the brave but by the education of youth that the Lacedaemonians and Cretans developed military prowess in their citizens. The Carthaginian custom may have been derived from the Libyans around them (cp. Hdt. 4. 176), or possibly from Egypt (Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. 3. 201, p. 168. 25 sqq. Bekker). It seems likely from the passage before us that the decoration of kríkos was confined to citizens of Carthage and was intended to induce them to serve in war and not to leave military service to mercenaries.

15. ἕν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and there was at one time a law in Macedon also that he who had slain no foeman should be girded with his halter (instead of a belt).’ A man girded with a halter would cut a sorry figure beside one girded with a handsome belt adorned with metal, and possibly golden, buckles (Guhl and Koner, Eng. Trans. p. 235). Among the Cappadocians to wear a belt meant to be an officer (Anth. Pal. 11. 238: Liddell and Scott s.v. χώνη). Compare the Macedonian custom mentioned by Hegesander, quoted in Athen. Deipn. 18 a, 'Ἡγεσανδρος δὲ φησίν οὐδὲ ἔθος εἶναι ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ καταλλάσσεθαι τυποῦ ἐν δείπνῳ, εἰ μὴ τις ἔξω λίνον ἐν κεντήσειν ἄνω δὲ τότε καθήμενον ἐδείπνον, where we read that Cassander, though a brave man and a skilful hunter, had not been able to fulfil this requirement at the age of thirty-five and still sat at dinner. A closer parallel may be found in the iron ring worn by many of the Chatti till they had slain an enemy in war (Tac. Germ. c. 31, et aliis Germanorum populis usurpatum raro et privata cuiusque audentia apud Chattos in consensum vertit, ut primum adoleverint, crinem barbamque submittere, nec, nisi hoste caeso, exuere votivum obligatumque virtuti oris habitum . . . Fortissimus quisque ferreum insuper anulum (ignominiosum id genti) velut vinculum gestat, donec se caede hostis absolvat. Plurimis Chattorum hic placet habitus). Similar customs are traceable among the Sauromatae (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 122: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 460). 'It is a rule
among all the tribes’ [of the head-hunting Malays of Borneo] ‘that no youth can regularly wear a mandau (sword) or be married or associate with the opposite sex, till he has been on one or more head-hunting expeditions. A mandau is presented to him probably at his birth or when he receives a name, but not till he has washed it in the blood of an enemy can he presume to carry it as part of his every-day equipment’ (Bock, Head-hunters of Borneo, p. 216). Under Cetewayo, a Zulu who had not ‘washed his spear,’ that is, who had not killed an enemy, could not marry. We light on a more genial form of the same custom in the island of Skye. ‘In Dunvegan Castle is kept an ox’s horn, hollowed so as to hold perhaps two quarts’ (of what liquid?) ‘which the heir of Macleod was expected to swallow at one draught as a test of his manhood, before he was permitted to bear arms or could claim a seat among the men’ (Dr. Johnson’s Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, Works, 8. 289).

17. ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις κ.τ.λ. Now we pass from laws to customs (cp. 22). The result is attained by law at Carthage and in Macedon, by custom among the Scythians and Iberians. Eaton compares Hdt. 4. 66, where however there is no mention of the σκύφος περιφερόμενος, so that it is doubtful whether Aristotle derives his statement from this source. See however above on 1262 a 19, 1276 a 28, and 1284 a 26. The σκύφος was used by herdsmen and country people (Athen. Deipn. 498 f) and is quite in place among the Scythians: some, in fact, imagined an etymological connexion between σκύφος and Σκύθης (Athen. Deipn. 499 f). For πίνειν σκύφον Eaton compares Hom. Il. 8. 232,

πίνοντες κρητηρίας ἐπιστεφάδος οἴου.  

18. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἱβραίοις κ.τ.λ. Why have we ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις in 17, and ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἱβραίοις here? Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 21, where see note. A similar custom existed among the Sindi, a Scythian race dwelling at the foot of the Caucasus on the East coast of the Euxine (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 121 : Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 460, Σινδοὶ τοσοῦτος ἱχθὺς ἐπὶ τοῦς τάφους ἐπιμάθεον, ὅσους ἐκ τοὺς πολεμίους ὕπατομενος ἄπεκτων ἦ). For καταπηγνύοιν περὶ τῶν τάφων, cp. Thuc. 5. 11. 1, περιέρχοντες αὐτῶν τὸ μνημεῖον (with Arnold’s note). The word ὄβελισκος is usually explained here as meaning ‘an obelisk,’ but this use of it is rare, and if we explain it thus, we must suppose that a long pointed stone is referred to, for soldiers after a battle would not find it easy to set up real obelisks at the grave
of a comrade. It is possible that the word should be translated here 'a small spit.' This is its usual meaning, and every soldier had a small spit ready to hand (Plut. Reg. et Imperat. Apophth., Scipio Minor 16, 201 B). Spits might be thought likely to be useful to the dead man, like the fish thrown on the grave by the Sindi. I am glad to see since the foregoing words were written, that Dr. Jackson also translates ὀβελίσκος 'spits' (see his note in Sus.\(^\text{4}\)). Professor Ridgeway (Academy, Aug. 29, 1885), rendering the word 'obelisk,' makes the interesting suggestion that the passage before us throws light on the original purpose of stone circles. I read in the Athenaeum for Dec. 14, 1895, that 'at Monte Pitti in the province of Pisa, near some remains of ancient walls, an Etruscan necropolis has been discovered, the tombs of which are enclosed in circles of rude stones.' See also Dr. Thurnam, Ancient British Barrows in Archaeologia 42, p. 211, quoted by Prof. Boyd Dawkins, Early Man in Britain, p. 285, and the remarks of Mr. Arthur Evans quoted by Prof. Windle, Life in Early Britain, p. 54 sq. We expect διεφθαρκός, not διαφθείρη, for the destruction of the foe must necessarily precede the fixing of the ὀβελίσκος, but compare the use of the present participle in 2. 8. 1268 a 8, καὶ τῶι παιι τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τελευτών ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν. The present is probably used in these passages because a thing occurring frequently is referred to. That the Iberians were a warlike race, had been remarked by Plato, Laws 637 D, and by Thucydides (6. 90, Ἰβηρας καὶ ἄλλως τῶν ἐκεὶ ὄμολογομένους νῦν βαρβάρων μαχητῶν): compare the story told in Diod. 14. 75. 8 of their gallant behaviour when deserted by the Carthaginians. Aristotle mentions the fact, partly in confirmation of the statement in 10 that it is among warlike races that these customs prevail, partly because the Iberians were little known to the Greeks, though they had been mentioned by Hecataeus, Herodotus, and Thucydides. They must have become better known in Greece after their employment as mercenaries by Dionysius the Elder, and still more after the arrival in Greece of a contingent of Celtic and Iberian mercenaries sent by him in B.C. 369 to aid the Lacedaemonians against the Thebans (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 20). It is possible indeed that an Iberian belonging to this contingent may have been buried in Greece in the manner here described by Aristotle.

20. καταπηγνύομαι. The forms πηγνύο, καταπηγνύο are 'rare in classical authors' (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective,
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s.v. πήγυμι). We find ἀπολλύονωσι in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 12 (in 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 23 some MSS. have ἀπολλίασι and others ἀπολλύονος). As to δεικνύοντω see Bon. Ind. 167 b 50 sqq., and cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 36. As to ὁμόνοιοι see note on 1285 b 11.


24. The suppressed nominative to ἀρχή is probably not ὁ πολιτικός, but τις: see as to this use of the third person singular Bon. Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.

26. πώς γὰρ ἰν κ.π.λ. Ἡ νομοθετικῶν is added to strengthen the argument, for it is still more difficult to suppose that what is not νόμμον is νομοθετικῶν than that it is πολιτικῶν. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 1129 b 12, τά τε γὰρ ὄρασιν ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμων ἐστι, καὶ ἐκαστὸς τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φαμέν, and Eurip. Ion 404 Bothe (442 Dind.),

πώς οὖν δίκαιον τοὺς νόμους ἕμας βροτοῖς γράψαντας αὐτοὺς ἀνομίαν ὀφλισκάνειν;

27. οὐ νόμμον δὲ κ.π.λ., 'and it is not lawful to rule not only justly but unjustly, and it is possible to conquer [and so to acquire rule] unjustly as well as justly,' so that it is possible to rule over unwilling subjects unjustly. This is added because some held that Might is Right (1. 6. 1255 a 18). Conquering (τὸ κρατεῖν) is the first step to ruling over others (c. 14. 1333 b 30). Οὐ νόμμον δὲ, as always, like οὐ καλὸν δὲ (c. 7. 1328 a 8), οὐ ῥάδιον δὲ (c. 10. 1330 a 6), οὐκ ἐστί δὲ (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 9), οὐκ ἐμπίπτει δὲ (6 (4) 16. 1300 b 34), etc.

29. τοῦτο, i. e. that it is the function of the master of the art to rule over unwilling, no less than willing, subjects.

30. τὸ ή πείσαι ή βιάσασθαι, which are the characteristics of rule over the unwilling, for they are the characteristics of despotic rule: cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 22, τὰς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πλεονεξίας ὑπάσας (αἱ μοναρχίαι) περιελθφάσων καὶ γὰρ παρασκευάσασθαι δυνάμει καὶ χρήσασθαι τάταις, ὡστε καὶ λαθείν καὶ ὀφθήναι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πείσαι, τοὺς δὲ βιάσασθαι . . . μᾶλλον αἱ τυραννίδες τῶν ἄλλων πολειτῶν οίαί τε εἰσίν. Plato contemplates the use of persuasion and force by the physician in Laws 720 D and Polit. 296 B (cp. Gorg. 456 B), but perhaps
he would not dispute what Aristotle here says, that the function of the physician, quasi physician, is not to persuade or coerce, but to heal (cp. Rep. 488, esp. D–E). Cp. also Athen. Deipn. 427 f sq.


33. καὶ ὅπερ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο, the antecedent to ὅπερ, = τὸ ἄρχειν μὴ θαυμάζοντες, cp. τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἄρχειν. Cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 41 sqq.

36. ἄτοπον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 37, ἔστι γὰρ τι φύσει δεσπο- στῶν, and 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq. Thus Aristotle urged Alexander to rule over the Greeks ἡγεμονικῶς and the barbarians only δεσποτικῶς (Aristot. Fragm. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.), perhaps remembering the advice of Isocrates to Philip (Philip. § 154, φημῇ γὰρ χρημαί σε τούτο μὲν "Ελληνας εὐργετεῖς, Μακεδόνων δὲ βασιλεύεις, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων ὡς πλείοντων ἄρχειν).

40. ἐστὶ δὲ θηρευτόν, sc. πρὸς τοῦτο, i.e. εἰτὶ βοήνυν ἡ θυσίαν, for as a rule only animals fit to be eaten were offered in sacrifice, though it is true that dogs were sacrificed to Hecate and that some other exceptions to the rule occur (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 26).

41. ἄλλα μὴν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle no doubt has before him the State sketched in the Laws of Plato (704 C, ΛΘ, γείτων δὲ αὐτῆς πόλει ἄρ' ἐσταῖ τις πλησίον; ΚΛ. οὐ πάντων διὸ καὶ κατοικίζοντων παλαιὰ γάρ τις ἐξοίκησεν ἐν τῷ τόπῳ γενομένῳ τὴν χώραν ταυτὴν ἔρημον ἀπείρασται χρόνου ἀμέχανον ὅσον). The Islands of the Blest (to which Aristotle playfully compares his best State in c. 15. 1334 a 28 sqq.) lay far away from men: cp. Hegesiod, Op. et Dies, 167,

τοῖς δὲ δίχ' ἀνδρῶν βίοτον καὶ ἠθέ' ὑπάσσας
Ζεὺς Κρονίδος κατένασε πατήρ ἐς πείρατα γαίης.

It was a situation of this kind that the Phaeacians were taught by experience to seek out: cp. Hom. Odyssey. 6. 2,

ἀυτὰρ Ἀθήνη
βῆ ρ' ἐς Φανίκοις ἄνδροι δήμον τε πόλιν τε,
οὶ πρὶν μὲν ποτ' ἔναισσαν ἐν εἰρήνῳ ὑπερεῆ,
ἄγχου Κυκλώπων, ἄνδρῶν ὑπερηφανεῦστων,
οἱ σφαεασ σωσάκοιον βραβεῖ δὲ φέρτεροι ἤσαν.
ἐνδεν ἀναστήσας ὅγε Ναυσίδων θεοευθῆς,
εἰσεν δ' ἐν Σχερή, ἐκάς ἄνδρων ἀδόστατων.

4. ἔστατο. For the future cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 18, 2. 8. 1267 b 1325 a. 34 sqq., etc.

5. τοιοῦτον, i.e. πολέμων.
δῆλον ἀρα ὅτι κ.τ.λ., ἵνα it is evident, then, that while all cares and studies with a view to war are to be considered noble, they are not to be so considered as being the highest end of all, but as existing for the sake of that end. That they are not the highest end of all, or in other words that they do not constitute happiness, is evident because happiness is attainable by States in which they are not practised, and also because they are not the ἔργαν τοῦ πολιτικοῦ (1324 b 22 sqq.), whose end is to produce happiness. There were probably those who regarded 'cares and studies with a view to war' as the highest end of all; thus an admirer of the Lacedaemonians claims in Isocr. Panath. § 202 that gratitude is due to them, ὅτι τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐπισθενμάτων εὐράντες αὐτοί τε χρώνται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατέδειξαν, and explains in § 217 that he refers to τὰ γυμνάσια τάκει καθεστώτα καὶ τὴν ἀσκησιν τῆς ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὴν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ συνόλως τὴν περὶ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμέλειαν. As to δῆλον ἀρα ὅτι see critical note.

7. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου κ.τ.λ., 'and the good lawgiver's business is to see with respect to a State and a race of men and every other association how they are to share [not in conquest, but] in good life and the measure of happiness attainable by them.' Cp. Plato, Laws 631 B, where happiness is implied to be the end of laws, and Rep. 521 A, οἱ τῷ ἄντοι πλούσιοι, οὐ χρυσίον, ἀλλ' οὖ δὲ τῶν εὐδαιμονά πλούτεων, ζωὴς ἀγαθῆς τε καὶ ἔμφρονος. Γένος ἢ ἠθος, as in 2. 9. 1269 b 25 sq. (cp. Plato, Gorg. 483 D, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ἀλλας ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν). Aristotle keeps both πόλεσι and ἱθῃν in view here, because he has had both in view in his criticisms (1324 b 3 sqq.). It should be noticed that he regards the ἱθαν as a kind of κοινωνία. Ζωῆς ἀγαθῆς is emphasized by its position in the sentence: cp. Plato, Rep. 413 C, τούτο ὡς ποιητέον.

10. διοίκει μέντοι κ.τ.λ., i.e. though this will always be the end at which he aims, the laws by which he seeks to attain it will differ according as his State has neighbours or not. If it has no neighbours, his laws will be less directed to the encouragement of military prowess than in the contrary case. For τῶν παττομένων ἐνα νομίμων cp. Plato, Laws 743 E, τῶν προστατομένων αὐτόθι νόμων.

11. καὶ τούτο κ.τ.λ., 'and it is the province of the legislative art, if the State has neighbours, to consider this, [not how to subjugate them all indiscriminately, but] what sort of studies should be practised in relation to each sort of neighbour, or how the State is to adopt the measures which are appropriate in relation to each of
its neighbours.\textsuperscript{1} Τῆς νομοθετικῆς takes up τοῦ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου. Πρὸς ποίους and πρὸς ἕκαστους are emphatic. The lawgiver should not lay down one indiscriminating rule, as the Lacedaemonian lawgiver had done, but rather a rule varying according to the character of the neighbours with whom the State has to deal. Ποία means πολεμικά ἢ ἐιρηνικά. We may infer from c. 14. 1333 b 38 sqq. that the lawgiver will teach his State to practise military studies in relation to aggressive neighbours or neighbours who deserve to be enslaved, but not in relation to others. Πώς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἕκαστους χριστέων is a wider inquiry than ποία πρὸς ποίους ἔσκιστέον, and includes the whole subject of the action of the State in relation to its neighbours both in peace and in war, which of them should be ruled ἡγεμονικῶς and which διεσποτικῶς, how war should be waged with them, if they are Greeks (cp. Plato, Rep. 471 A sqq.), and other questions of the same kind. Aristotle evidently does not agree with Isocrates when he says that laws affect only the internal organization of States, and not their mutual relations (De Antid. § 79: see vol. i. p. 552).


19. τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς, so termed, as we see from 3. 6. 1279 a 8 C. 3. (where see note), in contrast to the ἀρχαί of the head of a household, a ship-captain, or a training-master, and the like, and also to priesthoods (6 (4). 15. 1299 a 18).

tε should follow not τῶν, but ἐτερον: for other instances of its displacement see Bon. Ind. 749 b 44 sqq. and above on 1259 a 13.

tοῦ ἐλευθέρου, cp. Diog. Laert. 8. 63, φησι δ' αὐτῶν (i.e. Empedocles) καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐλευθέροιν γεγονέναι καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς ἀλλότριων, εἰ γε τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτῶν διδομένην παρατήσατο, καθάπερ Σάνδος ἐν τοῖς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγει, τὴν λειτουργίαν δηλούσι πλέον ὑγιήσας: Clemens, Strom. 2. 416 D (quoted above on 1324 a 27), Ἀναβαγόραν . . . τὴν βεβηρίαν φάναι τοῦ βίου τέλος εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἄπο ταυτῆς ἐλευθερίαν: Plut. De Exil. c. 12, οὗτος τῆς φρονήσεως πρὸς ἐν μέρος τὸ ἀδοξόν ἑνενόμονον παρορόμεν τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην καὶ τὴν συλλογὴ καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

20. With τοῦ πολιτικοῦ supply βίου, as with τοῦ διεσποτικοῦ in 24.

21. οἱ δὲ τούτων ἄριστων, sc. εἶναι νομίζονται.

ἀδύνατον γάρ κ.τ.λ. Gorgias may probably have used this argument. Aristotle is of the same opinion: cp. 1325 b 14 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1095 b 32 sqq.

22. τὴν δ' εὐπραγίαν κ.τ.λ., so that one who does nothing cannot be happy. Cp. Phys. 2. 6. 197 b 5, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία πραξῆς τις
NOTES.

εὐπραξία γὰρ, and Rhet. i. 5. 1360 b 14, where εὐδαμονία is said to be often defined as εὐπραξία μετ’ ἀρετῆς.

24. οἷς μὲν ὅτι κ.τ.λ. ὁ τῶν ἑλευθέρων = the man who avoids political offices. Cp. Isocr. Epist. 6. § 11, ἕμοι γὰρ αἱρετάτερος ὁ βιος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ βελτίων ὁ τῶν ἰδιωτευόντων ἢ ὁ τῶν τυραννευόντων, a proposition in favour of which Xenophon often makes Hiero argue (e.g. in Hiero i. 2, 7 sqq.).

25. οὐδέν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Ἡ ἐπίταξις ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων is implied to be the function of ὁ δικαστικὸς (cp. i. 7. 1255 b 33 sqq.: 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq.).

27. τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν κ.τ.λ. It is apparently implied that those who rejected political office regarded all rule as despotic, yet in c. 2. 1324 a 35 sqq. they are said to have distinguished between despotic and constitutional rule.


30. ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις, in i. 7. 1255 b 16 sqq. This reference to the πρῶτοι λόγοι might well be taken to show that the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books do not fall within them, were it not that a similar reference occurs in 3. 6. 1278 b 17 sqq., a chapter which certainly seems to form part of the πρῶτοι λόγοι (see vol. ii. p. xxi).

32. ἐτὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and further the actions of the just and temperate in them the perfect realization of many things that are noble’: cp. Plato, Tim. 90 D, ὁμοφώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἐχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώπων ἢτοθεών ἀρίστων βιών, and Epinomis 985 A, θεῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐς τὸν τέλος ἐχοντα τὴς θείας μόρας ἐξω τοῦτων εἶναι, λίπης τε καὶ ἡδονής. Πολλὰν καὶ καλῶν τέλος ἐχουσιν stands in contrast to οὐδένος μετέχει τῶν καλῶν (26).

34. καίτοι τάχ’. ἅν κ.τ.λ. The tyrant Jason is here alluded to (see vol. i. p. 237, note 1). A saying of his is mentioned in Rhet. i. 12. 1373 a 25 (cp. Plut. Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 24 and De Sanitate Tuenda, c. 22), δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἐνα, ὅπως δύνηται καὶ δικαία πολλὰ ποιεῖν, which no doubt referred to the acquisition of a tyranny. Jason was a great admirer of Gorgias (Paus. 6. 17. 9), and it is possible that Gorgias’ praises of the practical and political life may have influenced him. Be that as it may, Aristotle evidently fears that his own identification of εὐδαμονία with τὸ εὖ πράττειν (for this is what he means by τοῦτων ὁτα διωρασμένων, cp. 1325 b 14 sq.) may lead some one to the same conclusion as Jason, but he hastens to explain that absolute power does not bring with it τὸ εὖ πράττειν, except in the hands of one who is as superior to those he rules as
a master is to his slaves (1325 b 3 sqq.). Aristotle does not dispute that political power makes it easier to do noble things (cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 a 32 sqq.), but then political power must not be out of proportion to the worth of its possessor.

36. πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων... πράξεων. This takes up πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν, 32.

ὡστε οὖ δει κ.τ.λ. Susemihl reads e conj. δειν for δει, but cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 5, where the indirecta oralio is similarly abandoned, though Aristotle is describing the views of others. In the Phoenissae of Euripides Eteocles, who has deprived his brother Polyneices of his share of the Kingship, or Tyranny, of Thebes, refuses to give up the Tyranny to him, and Aristotle no doubt has his famous speech in his memory. He says (470 sqq. Bothe, 504 sqq. Dindorf),

ἀστρων ἄν ἐλθοιμ' ἠλίου πρὸς ἀντολής
cαι γῆς ἐνερθε, δυνατὸς ἄν δρᾶσαι τάδε,
tὴν θεῶν μεγίστην ὡστ' ἔχειν τυραννίδα.
tουτ' οὖν τὸ χρηστόν, μήτερ, οὐχὶ βούλομαι ἄλλον παρέναι μᾶλλον ἣ σῶζειν ἐμοί.

38. καὶ μήτε πατέρα παίδων κ.τ.λ. This reads as if Aristotle were quoting from some solemn covenant for the establishment of a tyranny: compare the oath taken in support of Drusus in Diod. 37. II, τὸν αὐτὸν φίλον καὶ πολέμιον ἡγησασθαι Δρούσῳ, καὶ μήτε βιόν μήτε τέκνων καὶ γονέων μηδεμίας φείσεσθαι ψυχῆς, εὰν (μή) συμφέρῃ Δρούσῳ τε καὶ τοῖς τῶν αὐτῶν ὄρκων ὀμόσαιν. Polybius (7. 8. 9) dwells with emphasis, and perhaps with a little surprise, on the loyalty of Gelon to his father Hiero II, tyrant of Syracuse.

39. ἄλως, "broadly," not only fathers and children (who are one kind of friends), but friends of all sorts.
As to ὑπολογίζειν see critical note.

πρὸς τοῦτο, "in comparison with this": cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 8. 1108 b 16, ai μέσα εἴειν πρὸς μέν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλειπούσιν.

1. τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἱρετῶτατον, i.e. τὸ εὖ πράττειν. Isocrates had 1325 b. called τυραννῖς in Evag. § 40 to καλλιστον τῶν ὄντων and τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μέγιστον καὶ σεμνότατον καὶ περιμαχτότατον.

2. ὑποτίθενται τοῦτο ψεῦδος, "in assuming this as the foundation of their argument they assume what is false."

3. οὐ γάρ ἐτι κ.τ.λ. The reply of the Chorus to the speech of
Eteocles referred to above on 1325 a 36 (Eurip. Phoeniss. 492 sq. Bothe: 526 sq. Dind.) is perhaps present to Aristotle's memory:

οὐκ ὡς λέγειν χρῆ μη 'π' τοῖς ἔργοις καλοῖς:
oú ýár kalón tou't', álλά ἡ̉ δὴ̂ díkê pikróv.

Compare also the remark of Plato to Dionysius the Elder quoted above on 1288 a 4, Hdt. 3. 142, and Eurip. Fragm. 172.


10. διὸ κἀν ἄλλος τις κ.τ.λ. This takes up and corrects 1325 a 36 sqq. Aristotle perhaps remembers the saying of Aristides when he surrendered his day of command at Marathon to Miltiades (Plut. Aristid. c. 5, καὶ παρ' ἡμέραν ἐκάστου στρατηγοῦ τὸ κράτος ἔχοντο, ὥσ περιθάνειν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ ἀρχήν, παρέδωκε Μιλτιάδη διδάσκοντας ὅτι τὸ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκαλουθεῖν τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν οὐκ αἰσχρῶν ἄλλα σεμώνων ἐστὶ καὶ σαφῆνων). Aristides behaved in just the same way to Themistocles also, serving under him willingly and accepting the second place in the State (Plut. Aristid. c. 8: Aristid. et Cat. inter se comp. c. 5).

κατ' ἄρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀριστῶν, 'in virtue and in the power which is capable of effecting the best things': cp. Eth. Nic. i. 10. 1099 b 31, πρακτικὸν τῶν καλῶν. Some take τῶν ἀριστῶν after κρέστων and as masc., 'superior to the best men,' but not, I think, rightly. For ἄρετὴ καὶ δύναμις see above on 1284 a 6. The repetition of κατὰ may be for the sake of emphasis (κατὰ is not repeated in 3. 13. 1284 a 9, ἀνίσοις τοσοῦτον κατ' ἄρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν). That Aristotle attaches importance to the presence of both qualifications is evident from 12 sqq. Compare the effect of the repetition of prepositions in 3. 11. 1281 b 15, περὶ πάντα δήμον καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος, and in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 4, οἶνον ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλέει καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεις συμβεβηκέναι.

11. For the repetition of τούτῳ see notes on 1317 b 5 and 1284 b 28.

12. δεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but [if a man is to be followed and obeyed as a sovereign,] he should possess,' etc. So in 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq. Aristotle requires of those who are to hold the more important magistracies that they shall possess not only virtue, but δύναμις μεγίστη τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς and attachment to the
existing constitution. Compare Callicles' description of \( \sigma i \) \( \kappa r i t t o u s \)
in Plato, Gorg. 491 A sq.

15. \( \epsilon \upnu \rho \pi a \gamma a i \). Aristotle uses both \( \epsilon \upnu \rho \pi a \gamma a i \) and \( \epsilon \upnu \rho a \zeta i a i : \) 'in
Attic prose \( \epsilon \upnu \rho \pi a \gamma a i \) was preferred' (Liddell and Scott).

16. \( \alpha l l a \ k . t . l . \) Two separate assertions are here made—
(1) that activity is not necessarily in relation to others, and (2)
that it is not necessarily a means to something else, but that
thoughts which are an end in themselves may be of an active
type. The first of these two assertions does not seem to be quite
in harmony with the spirit at any rate of Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 a 30
sqq., but still we gather from Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 31 sqq. that
there is an use of virtue not \( \pi r o s \) \( \epsilon \tau e r o n \) but \( k a b \) \( a u t o n \) (\( \tau e l e i a \ 8\) \( \varepsilon \varepsilon \tau i n \)
(sc. \( \eta \ \delta \lambda \ \delta i k a i o s i o n \)), \( \delta \) \( \xi \chi o n \) \( a u t h \) \( k a \) \( \pi r o s \) \( \epsilon \tau e r o n \) \( d i w n a i \) \( \tau \eta \) \( \acute{\alpha} \rho \tau e t h \)
\( \chi r \rho i s o i \), \( \alpha l l a \) \( \alpha o \mu \mu o n \) \( k a b \) \( a u t o n \). The second of them clearly
conflicts with De An. 1. 3. 407 a 23, \( \tau o n \) \( \mu \nu \) \( \gamma \alpha r \) \( \pi r a t k i t k o w \) \( \nu o i s e i o w \)
\( \xi t i \) \( \pi r e r a t a \) (\( \pi a s a i \) \( \gamma \alpha r \) \( \epsilon \tau e r o n \) \( \chi a r o n \)), \( a i \) \( \delta e \) \( \theta e w o r h e k a i \) \( t o i s \) \( \lambda o \gamma o i s \) \( \omega m o i o s \)
\( \omega r i \zeta o n t a i . \) But Zeller has already remarked (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 368. 1: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 400,
note 1) that Aristotle sometimes uses the word \( \pi r a \zeta i s \) in the
Nicomachean Ethics in a wider sense than usual, and includes
even pure thought under it—e.g. in Eth. Nic. 7. 15. 1154 b 24,
\( \epsilon p e i \) \( e i \) \( t o n \) \( \eta \) \( \phi \omega i s \) \( \alpha p l h \) \( e i \), \( a i \) \( \eta \) \( a u t h \) \( \pi r a \zeta i s \) \( \eta \delta i a t t h \) \( \varepsilon o t a i \), where he
must refer in \( \eta \) \( a u t h \) \( \pi r a \zeta i s \) to contemplative activity.

17. \( k a h a t \eta p e r \) \( o \delta o n t a i \) \( t i n e s . \) Aristotle probably refers to the
persons whose opinion is stated in 1325 a 21 sqq., for they
appear to have held that a man who lives a contemplative life
does nothing and is not \( \pi r a t k i t k o s \). Epaminondas was regarded
at the outset of his career as \( \acute{\alpha} \rho r a \gamma i w o n \) because he was a philo-
sopher, and was consequently despised (Plut. Pelop. c. 5).

18. For the severance of \( \epsilon k \) \( t o u \) \( \pi r a t t e i w \) \( f r o n \) \( t o w \) \( \acute{\alpha} \rho o \beta a v i n \omega t o w \)
\( \chi a r o n \), on which it depends, compare c. 4. 1326 b 8, \( \delta \) \( \pi r o t w n \) \( \pi l \acute{\alpha} \beta o s \)
\( a u t a r k e s \) \( \pi r o s \) \( t o \) \( \varepsilon \) \( \xi \) \( \varepsilon \) \( \varepsilon t i \) \( k a t a \) \( t h n \) \( p o l i t i k h a \) \( k o u n o n i a \), \( w h e r e \) \( k a t a \) \( t h n \)
\( p o l i t i k h a \) \( k o u n o n i a \) is similarly severed from \( \pi r o s \) \( t o \) \( \varepsilon \) \( \xi \) \( \varepsilon \). As here
\( \pi r o s \) \( t o \) \( \varepsilon \) \( \xi \) \( \varepsilon \), so in the passage before us \( t o w \) \( \acute{\alpha} \rho o \beta a v i n \omega t o w \) \( \chi a r o n \) is
emphasized by its position in the sentence. Cp. also Hicks, Greek
Historical Inscriptions, No. 179, \( t a \) \( \acute{\xi} \) \( \varepsilon \varepsilon v e g \chi e \varepsilon o t a \) \( \epsilon k \) \( t h s \) \( \chi a r o s \) \( l e r a \)
\( \acute{\alpha} \gamma \lambda \iota m a t h a \) \( \upsilon \) \( p o t o w \) \( P e l o i \).

20. \( \theta e w r i a s \) \( k a i \) \( d i a p o n h \varepsilon i s , \) cp. c. 2. 1324 a 19, \( t h s \) \( p o l i t i k h s \)
diavnodi kai \( \theta e w r i a s . \)

21. \( \eta \) \( \gamma \alpha r \) \( \epsilon \upnu \rho a \zeta i a k . t . l . , \) 'for doing well is the end, and there-
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fore there is a kind of action which is the end, [so that there is nothing strange in thoughts which are an end in themselves being active,] and we predicate action also [as well as thought] in the truest and fullest sense, even in the case of actions done in relation to others, of those who as master-agents direct action by their thoughts, [and whose thoughts are therefore more an end in themselves than those of the journeymen they direct].’

Tōn ἐξωτερικῶν πρᾶξεων is in the gen. after ἀρχιτέκτων. For καὶ πράττειν (i.e. πράττειν as well as διανοεῖσθαι), see above on 1255 a 14, καὶ βιάζεσθαι.

That the thoughts of a master-agent are more an end in themselves than those of a subordinate, we see from Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 14, εἰν ἀπαθαί δὲ (ταύς τέχναις) τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτέκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἱρετῶτερα τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτά’ τούτων γὰρ χάρων κακείνα διόκεται. In 21–23 Aristotle corrects Plato, who in Polit. 259 C, E had identified πράκτικοι with χειροτεχνικοί, and had said that the ἀρχιτέκτων is γνωστικός, not πράκτικος (Ἐ. τῆς δὴ γνωστικῆς μᾶλλον ἡ τῆς χειροτεχνικῆς καὶ δῶς πράκτικῆς βούλει τῶν βασιλέα φῶμεν οἰκεύστερον εἶναι; and Ἐ. καὶ γὰρ ἀρχιτέκτων γε πᾶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐργατικός, ἀλλὰ ἐργατῶν ἄρχων. NE. ΣΘ. ναί. Ἐ. παρεχόμενος γέ που γνώςων, ἀλλ’ οὐ χειρουργίαν. NE. ΣΘ. οὕτω. Ἐ. δικαίως δὴ μετέχειν ἀν λέγοιτο τῆς γνωστικῆς ἐπιστήμης). In Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 24 sqq., however, the word πράκτικος is used in the narrower sense in which Plato had used it in the Politicus, for here ἡ ἀρχιτέκτονική φύσις is marked off from another kind which is said to be πρακτική (cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 6. 1217 a 6, τῶν μὴ’ ἔχωσκον μὴτε δυναμένων διάνοιαν ἀρχιτεκτονικήν ἡ πράκτικήν). For ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὡστε καὶ πράξις τις, cp. Phys. 2. 6. 197 b 5, ἡ δ’ εὐδαιμονία πράξις τις’ εὐπραξία γὰρ, and De An. 3. 2. 426 a 27, εἰ δ’ ἦν συμφανία φωνὴ τῆς ἑστίν.

23. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle, after proving the second of the two assertions contained in 16 sqq. (οἴδε τάς διανοίας κ.τ.λ.), takes up and proves the first of them (τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐκ ἄναγκαίους εἶναι πρὸς ἐτέρους). States situated by themselves have already been said not to be necessarily unhappy (c. 2. 1324 b 41 sqq.), and now they are shown not to be necessarily inactive.

25. οὖτω, i.e. καθ’ αὐτάς and not πρὸς ἐτέρους.

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for this also [as well as other things] can take place by sections [and not alone between whole States].’

Τοῦτο = τὸ πράττειν. For καὶ τοῦτο cp. 4. 1326 a 13, καὶ πολεμοῖς. For κατὰ μέρη cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 27 sqq. Among the ‘other things’ referred to rule would be included, for it was a familiar fact
that rule might be exercised by successive sections of the citizen-body (1325 b 7 sq.).

26. πολλαί γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It is implied that, if there are κοινωνίαι ('relations') between the parts of the State, activity will exist. We may suppose that when the parts of the State have relations with each other, inter-action results or co-operative action or both. What is meant here by the expression 'the parts of the State'? Among the parts referred to are probably rulers and ruled: cp. c. 4. 1326 b 12, εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἄρχοντων τῶν δ' ἄρχομενων, and c. 14. 1332 b 12, ἢπεὶ δὲ πάσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνεστηκέν ἐξ ἄρχοντων καὶ ἄρχομενων.

27. ὄροις δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τὸύτο = τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἀπρακτεῖν τὸν ζῆν καθ' αὐτῶν προηρημένων. For ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τινος, cp. De Interp. 3. 16 b 13 and Anal. Pr. 2. 22. 67 b 28.

28. σχολὴ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for otherwise God and the whole universe [could hardly be active, and so] could hardly be well circumstanced [which all agree that they are], seeing that they have no actions external to them over and above their internal actions.' That God is well circumstanced we see from De Caelo, 2. 12. 292 a 22, ἐστι γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἄριστα ἐχοντε ὑπάρχειν τὸ εὖ ἀνευ πράξεως. The universe consists according to Aristotle of concentric spheres with the earth in the centre (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 447 sqq.: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 487 sqq.), and God, who is an incorporeal being distinct from the universe, is outside its outermost sphere, so far as an incorporeal being can be said to be in any particular place. He is the First Mover of the universe, but he moves it passively, as the object of love (Metaph. Α. 7. 1072 b 3, κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρωμένων); he does not act upon it otherwise. Action is not to be predicated of him (Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 b 8 sqq.: De Caelo, 2. 12. 292 a 22 sq., quoted above); at least not action in the ordinary sense of the word, for it would be beneath him; his only activity is thought, and as his thought must be exercised on what is best, it must be exercised on himself (Metaph. Α. 9. 1074 b 33, αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἰσπέρ ἑστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἢ ἕστω νοήσεως νόησεως νόησεως). Acts of thought exercised by God on himself, therefore, are the οἰκείαι πράξεις ascribed to God in the passage before us. But if God has no οἰκετερικαί πράξεις, neither has the universe, for in Aristotle's view there is but one universe in existence (De Caelo, 1. 8. 276 a 18 sqq.: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 446 sq.—Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 485 sq); there is nothing corporeal outside the universe,
and therefore nothing on which it can act. Plutarch maintains the opposite view, arguing for a plurality of worlds, in De Defect. Orac. c. 24, 

32. tois ἀνθρώποις, = τοῖς πολίταις, cp. c. 4. 1326 a 6, where τῶν ἀνθρώπων corresponds to πολίτων, c. 4. 1325 b 40, and also Isocr. Archid. § 81, οὗ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς πόλεως οὐδὲ τῷ πλῆθει τῶν ἄνθρωπων, and Thuc. 6. 18. 7.

33. περὶ αὐτῶν, cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 2, πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις.

34. καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. This would seem to refer to the contents of the Second Book: cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 29, δεὶ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἑπισκέψασθαι πολιτείας.

35. οὗ γὰρ οἷον τε κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 39, καὶ δ’ οἱ μὲν τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ δεσμένην πολλής χρησάμεν εὑροῦσι μόνον.

36. διὸ δεὶ κ.τ.λ. See above on 1265 a 17, where the same remark occurs. We read in Plato, Rep. 456 C, οὐκ ἄρα ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ εἰχαίς ὅμοια ἐνομαθετοῦμεν, and in Demosth. c. 68, εἰ γὰρ αὐτοὶ καλῶς μὲν ἔχουσιν, μὴ δυνατὸν δὲ τι φράζοι, εἰσῆρχε, οὖ νῦμοι, διαπράττομεν ἀν ἔργον, and these passages agree with that before us in implying that men often pray for impossibilities: yet εἴχον δυνατά is one of the Precepts ascribed to the Seven Wise Men in the Collection of Sosiades (Stob. Floril. 3. 80: Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 217). Προφθείσθαναι is middle; the perfects τέθειμαι, εὐτέθειμαι are used more commonly in a middle than in a passive sense (see Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, pp. 635, 636). The reason of this is, as Richards points out, that κέισθαι is used in their place to express the passive.

37. λέγω δὲ οἷον περὶ τε πλῆθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας, sc. δεὶ πολλὰ προφθείσθαι, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον. Plato, who begins the construction of his State in the Laws (737 C sqq.) with arrangements respecting these matters, had in Aristotle’s opinion (2. 6. 1265 a 10 sqq.) fixed the number of the citizens at an impossibly high figure.
40. ὧσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 709 C sq. (which Aristotle probably has before him), and Xen. Hiparch. 6. 1, ἄλλα γὰρ οἷς ὄντι ἐν τει πᾶν πλάσατο ὑπὸν βούλευσα, εἰ μὴ ἐξ δὲ γε πλάτατο παρεσκευα-
μένα εἰπ` ὡς πείθεσθαι τῇ τοῦ χειροτέχνου γνώμῃ οὔδὲ γ` ἄν ἐξ ἀνδρῶν, εἰ μὴ σὺν θεῷ οὖσα παρεσκευασμένοι ἔσονται ὡς φιλικῶς τε ἔχειν πρὸς τῶν ἀρχαιν κ.τ.λ.

4. τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτη. See note on 1274 b 36.

5. ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and under the head of political equipment falls first [for consideration] the body of men composing the State, how many and what sort of men they should be by nature,' etc. Compare the similar sentences in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 4, ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας πολλὰς διαφοράς, πόσαι τε ἄρχαι, καὶ κύριαι τίνων κ.τ.λ., and 4 (7). 16. 1334 b 30–32. Πολιτικὴ χορηγία, 'the equipment necessary to a State' (answering to τὴν οἰκείαν ὑπην, 4), is different from the equipment necessary to an individual, but both are the gift of Nature and Fortune (c. 13. 1331 b 40 sqq.: 1332 a 29 sqq., 39 sqq.: 6 (4). I. 1295 a 27 sq.). Nature supplies men possessing the needful qualities of body and soul (1332 a 40 sqq.), and Fortune supplies external and bodily goods (c. 1. 1323 b 27 sq.). Τῶν ἀνθρώπων = πολιτῶν, 1325 b 40, and τῶν πολιτευόμενων, c. 7. 1328 a 17. Aristotle is not here concerned with the number or quality of the slaves of the State or of its metoeci. As he says that the question of the characteristics of the men and the territory is the first which needs consideration under the head of 'political equipment,' we infer that there are others which need consideration, and what are they? Probably the questions which arise as to the subsidiary classes of cultivators and artisans; these are dealt with in cc. 8–10. Τινὰς in 6 seems to belong both to πόσους and to ποῖος, and τινά in 8 both to σῇν and to ποίαν, cp. c. 7. 1328 a 17, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευόμενων, πόσους τε υπάρχειν δὲ καὶ ποῖος τινάς τὴν φύσιν, ἐτι δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσην τέ τινα καὶ ποίαν τινά, διώρισται χειρός, καὶ c. 10. 1329 b 38, καὶ πόσην τινά χρῆ καὶ ποίαν εἶναι τὴν χώραν (so apparently Bonitz, Ind. 533 a 59 sqq.). For κατὰ τὴν χώραν, 7 ('in connexion with the territory'), cp. Oecon. i. 3. 1343 b 7, τῶν δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ κατὰ γυναῖκα πρώτη ἐπιμελεία. "Οὐσί, 7, is probably right: see Stallbaum’s note on Plato, Crito 48 A, and cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 18, τῷ δὲ ἐρώτημα τι προσβάλει πεφρονισμένης δεόμεναν ἀποκρίσεως, οὖν ὡστε ἀριστος ἐν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἢ ποία τε ἢ τοῦτο πράξεις, and Herondas 2. 28, ὡστε ἐστι κακὸ ποίον Πηλοῦ πεφύρηται. Μα P1 have ὡσπίσιν, not πόσην, in 1328 a 18.
8. ὁτεναι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 7.42 D, ἡταὶ δὴ τοῦ νοῦν ἔχοντος πολιτικοῦ βούλησις, φαμέν, οὐχ ἂντερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ φαίνειν, δεῖν βουλέσθαι τὸν ἄγαθων νομοθέτην ὡς μεγίστην τε εἶναι τὴν πόλιν, ἃ νοῶν εὐ νομοθετοῖ, καὶ ὁ τε μάλιστα πλούσιαν: cp. also Rep. 460 A, where there may be an allusion to the name of Megalopolis founded in B. C. 369 shortly before the time when many think that the Republic saw the light. See also Rep. 423 A sq. (referred to by Eaton) and Laws 737 D.

11. τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων, 'of the inhabitants,' not merely of the citizens, so that according to these authorities a city would be μεγάλη which included a large number of slaves, metoeci, and aliens.

12. δεί δὲ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. Cp. De Caelo, 1. 5. 271 b 11, τούτου δ’ αἰτίαν οὐτὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνάμει μείζων ἡ μεγέθει, and Xen. Anab. 7. 7. 36, οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ἐστιν ὁ ὁρίζων τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ ὀλίγων, ἀλλ’ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ τε ἀποδιδόντος καὶ τοῦ λαμβάνοντος. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 32) remarks that δεί in εἰς δὲ δύναμιν is used in the same sense as ἄλλα, and compares Metaph. K. 3. 1061 a 23, μὴ τοῦ ὀλον λόγου, τοῦ τέλευταίου δὲ εἶδος, and De An. 1. 5. 409 b 28.

13. καὶ πόλεως, 'of a State also [as well as of other things]': cp. c. 3. 1325 b 25, καὶ τοῦτο.

18. οὖ κατὰ κ.τ.λ., 'it is not in respect of any and every multitude that we must do so.' For κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλῆθος cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 26 and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11 sqq. It is evident from what follows that Aristotle counts βάσανου here among δοῦλοι, just as he does in 3. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq. Camerarius (Interp. p. 279) has already referred to the story told of Agesilaus by Plutarch in Ages. c. 26. The allies of the Lacedaemonians had contrasted the large number of troops which they contributed to the army of Agesilaus with the small number of the Spartans, and Agesilaus by way of reply ordered all the potters, smiths, carpenters, masons, and other βάσανου τεχνίται in his army to stand up successively. Nearly every man in the contingent of the allies stood up, but not a single Spartan, and Agesilaus remarked, with a smile, ὁρᾶτε, δὲ ἀνδρεί, δοῦν πλείονας ὑμῶν στρατιώτας ἐκπέμπομεν ἡμεῖς. Aristotle may remember this story.

ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This would be especially the case in a State like that which Aristotle is constructing—a State in which the citizens are not allowed to practise handicrafts or to till the soil. It would also be the case in a State like that of Plato's Laws (848 A). But even in actual Greek States ἔσονταν were numerous.
Many handicraftsmen were ξίνοι (3. 5. 1278 a 7). ξίνοι were especially numerous in seaports (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 11 sqq.), but even at Sparta there were ξίνοι (Plut. Agis, cc. 8, 10), not merely slaves. The rapid development of the arts and of commerce in ancient Greece was largely due to the ease with which its chief cities drew metoeci and other aliens from the Greek colonies in Asia and elsewhere and from Asia generally (see as to Sidonian residents in Athens Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, p. 157). Many of these metoeci were skilled craftsmen. Asia and probably Egypt were to some of the arts of ancient Greece what Italy was to those of mediaeval Europe. Italy, indeed, did not supply metoeci to the ruder nations to the same extent. Even at the present day 'in Roumania commerce and industry are in the hands of foreigners, principally Jews, the upper classes being landed proprietors' (Times, March 18, 1897).

19. δούλων ἄριθμὸν πολλῶν. Here, as in 2. 7. 1266 b 10 sqq., ἄριθμὸς takes the place of πλήθος. So in Phys. 6. 7. 237 b 33 τῷ πλήθει τῶν μορίων = τῷ ἄριθμῷ τῶν μορίων (Bon. Ind. 603 a 41).

20. ἀλλ' ὅσοι κ.τ.λ. Καὶ εὖ δῶν συνίσταται πόλις οἰκεῖων μορίων is added to explain in what sense ὅσοι πόλεως ἐστὶ μέρος is used. It is implied in what follows that hoplites are οἰκείων μόρια τῆς πόλεως (cp. c. 9. 1329 a 37, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὸ τέ όπλιτικον καὶ βουλευτικόν, and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.), but not βάναυσοι, who are here contrasted with hoplites, though it is clear (see above on 18) that they often served as hoplites.

23. εἰςφροται. Aristotle probably remembers the description of the Egyptian Thebes in Hom. ΙΙ. 9. 383,

αἳ θ' ἐκατόμπηλοι εἴσι, διηκόσια δ' ἀν' ἐκάστος ἀνέρες εξοικρεύσι σὺν ἐπισοις καὶ ὁχεσφιν,

and perhaps also ἐκπέμπωμεν in the story of Agesilaus related above on 18.

24. οὔ γὰρ ταῦτα μεγάλη τε πόλις καὶ πολυάνήρωπος. For the use of τε, compare c. 10. 1329 b 1, καὶ τὸ τε μάχημον ἐπερον εἶναι καὶ το γεωργούν.

25. ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε, 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. Καὶ τοῦτο, 'this also,' i. e. that not only is a populous State not necessarily a large one, but that a very populous State cannot easily be a well-ordered one. And a State which is not well-ordered is only a State in name (3. 9. 1280 b 5–8).
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27. τῶν γού δοκουσών κ.τ.λ. 'Ανειμένη πρὸς τὸ πλήθος, 'set free in the direction of number’ : cp. Plat. Lycurg. c. 10, ἀδιαφθείρωτα ἀμα τοῖς ἴθεσι τῷ σόματα πρὸς πάσαν ἐπίθυμαν ἀνειμένα καὶ πλησιμοῖν. Carthage must have been an exception, unless we suppose its citizen-body to have been smaller in Aristotle’s day than it afterwards became (see vol. ii. Appendix B). As to the Lacedaemonian State, cp. Isocr. Archid. § 81, where Archidamus is made to say, τῶν Ἑλλήνων διενηρήκαμεν οὐ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς πόλεως οὐδὲ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἄνθρωπων, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ., and as to Athens, which was in the contrary plight, De Antid. § 172, διὰ γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ πλήθος τῶν ἔνοικοιν-τῶν οὐκ εὐσύνοπτος ἔστιν οὐδ’ ἀκριβῆς κ.τ.λ.

29. ὁ τε γὰρ νόμος τάξεις τῆς ἐστὶ. 'Id etiam conversum posuit libro tertio’ (3. 16. 1287 a 18), ’Η γὰρ τάξεις νόμος’ (Camerarius, Interp. p. 280).

32. θείας γὰρ δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'for surely this’ (i.e. the ordering of a great number of things) ‘is [beyond the power of man and] is the function of divine power, which is such as to hold together even the vast universe in which we live: the beautiful, in fact, [which is closely allied with order,] is commonly found in connexion with a given number and magnitude.’ For θεία δύναμι Bonitz (Ind. 324 a 1) compares the spurious De Mundo, 6. 397 b 19. Aristotle clearly has before him Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 22, ἀλλὰ θεὸς γε τοὺς ἀεὶ ὄντας καὶ πάντ’ ἐφορώντας καὶ πάντα δυνάμενος, οἰ καὶ τήρης τὴν τῶν ὅλων τάξιν συνέχουσιν ἀτριβῆ καὶ ἀγάματον καὶ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ ὑπὸ κάλλους καὶ μεγέθους ἀδιάδημαν, τοὺς δὲ δυοδόμονες μισεῖς αὐτῆς μηδὲ πάντων μήτε ποιῆσητε μήτε βουλεύσητε: cp. also Plut. Dion, c. 10, πρὸς τὸ θειότατον ἀφομοιωθένη παράδειγμα τῶν ὄντων καὶ κάλλωτων, ὅ τὸ πάν ἐγούμενος πειθόμενον ἐξ ἀκοσμίας κάσμος ἐστί, and for τὸ πάν, Plato, Polit. 269 C, τὸ γὰρ πάν τὸ τετὸν μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ἐξωποδηγεῖ πορευόμενον καὶ συγκυκλεῖ, τοτε δὲ ἀνήκει, and Gorg. 508 A, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κάσμων καλούσι. Συνέχεια is used as equivalent to ἐνοπίων in De An. 1. 5. 410 b 10, ἀπορήσει δ ’ ἂν τις καὶ τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνοπίων αὐτὰ (i.e. τὰ στοιχεῖα): ἢ δὴ γὰρ οὐκέ τα γε στοιχεῖα κυριώτατον γὰρ ἐκεῖν οὐ συνέχον δ’ τι ποτ’ ἐστίν, and to μίν ποιεῖν in De An. 1. 5. 411 b 6 sqq.: cp. Polyb. 11. 19. 3. Aristotle probably regards God as holding the universe together passively by being the common object towards which everything strives: see above on 1325 b 28. That the beautiful is closely allied with order we see from Metaph. M. 3. 1078 a 36, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη τάξει καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὀρισμένον: cp. Plato, Phileb. 64 E, μετρώσης γὰρ καὶ
34. diō kai πόλεις κ.τ.λ., 'hence a State also,' as well as other things. For the 'nominativus pendens,' πόλεις, see Bon. Ind. s. v. Anacoluthia, where 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 9 sqq. is referred to among other passages, and see Stallbaum on Plato, Cratylus 403 A, ó δὲ 'Αιδης, οἱ πολλοὶ μὲν μοι δοκοῦσιν ὑπολομβάνειν τὸ αἰδῆς προσείρησθαι τῷ ὑπόματι τούτῳ, and Riddell, Apology of Plato (Digest of Idioms, § 271 b), who quotes among other instances Theaet. 173 D and Rep. 565 D–E. Cp. also De Gen. An. 4. 1. 765 b 31 sqq. and De Part. An. 3. 8. 671 a 12 sqq., and see Vahlen on Poet. 4. 1449 a 19. Bekker and Sus. have πόλις in place of πόλεις, but all MSS. except Γ Μ* have πόλεις, and there can be little doubt that πόλεις is right, for this 'nominativus pendens' is a not uncommon form of anacoluthon.

35. ἂλλ' ἐστὶ τι κ.τ.λ., 'but in fact [apart from questions of beauty and good order] there is a due measure of size for a State also, as well as for everything else.' Not only will too large a State fail of being well-ordered and beautiful, but it will fail also to be able to discharge the function of a State and to realize self-completeness in respect of good life, and the same thing may be said of too small a State likewise. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 29, τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους κατ' ἁριθμόν, ἢ ἐστὶ τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλῆθους, ὅσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα αὐθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις οὐτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἐτί πόλεις ἐστίν: De Gen. An. 2. 6. 745 a 5, ἐστι γὰρ τι πάι διὸς φώς πέρας τοῦ μεγέθους, διὸ καὶ τῆς τῶν ὀστῶν αὐξήσεως: De An. 2. 4. 416 a 16, τῶν δὲ φύσει συνισταμένων πάντων ἐστὶ πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξήσεως: De An. Motione, 3. 699 a 34, ἐστι γὰρ τι πλῆθος ἰσχύος καὶ δυνάμεως καθ' ἢν μένει τὸ μένου,
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οσπερ καὶ καθ’ ἥν κινεῖ τὸ κινοῦν: Plut. Sympos. 5. 5. 1, καὶ γὰρ συμποσίου μέγεθος ἰκανὸν ἔστιν, ἄχρι οὗ συμπόσιον ἐθέλει μένειν εἰάν δὲ ἀπεράντη διὰ πλῆθος, ὡς μηκέτι προσήγορον ἐαυτῷ μηδὲ συμπαθεῖ εἶναι ταῖς ἐλεφθεροῦσιν μηδὲ γνώριμον, ο듭ὲ συμπόσιον ἔστι. Compare also Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 21–35. As to ὄργανα, see 1. 8. 1256 b 35 sq. We note that a State is distinguished by Aristotle from an ὄργανον. It is not a mere ὄργανον πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν for the individual, but a moral being like the individual, only nobler and greater than he (Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 7 sqq.).

39. ἐστερημένον ἐσται τῆς φύσεως. Compare such expressions as ἐξιστασθαι τῆς φύσεως (Meteor. 4. 1 1. 389 b 10, φθειρόμενα καὶ ἐξατάμενα τῆς φύσεως) or χωρίζοσθαι τῆς φύσεως (Meteor. 4. 1. 379 a 14), which stand in contrast to ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν (Poet. 4. 1449 a 15, ἔσχεν ἢ τραγῳδίᾳ τὴν αὐτὴς φύσιν).

41. δυοῖν σταδίουν, cp. Poet. 7. 1451 a 2, οἷον εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἰς ζῷον.

εἰς δὲ τι μέγεθος ἄδθον, ‘but when it has assumed a measured size.’ Cp. Meteor. 1. 14. 352 a 6, ἐξανανομηθον γὰρ οἱ τόποι ἐρχονται εἰς τὸ καλὸς ἔχειν.

1326 b. 2. ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὀλέγων λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11 sqq., where the view expressed by the Platonic Socrates in Rep. 369 D, εἰ γὰρ ἂν ἡ γε ἀναγκασιοτάτη πόλις ἐκ τεττάρων ἡ πέντε ἀνθρών, is corrected.

3. ἡ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἁγάν κ.τ.λ. Α Πόλις consisting of too large a number of citizens is not a πόλις because a πόλις is a κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτεία (3. 3. 1276 b 1), and a constitution cannot easily exist in a very large πόλις, for magistrates cannot easily exist in it, and a constitution implies the existence of magistracies (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15, πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμχηται). It seems to be implied that the constitution is the source of ‘completeness in respect of good life.’ Aristotle’s argument here throws some light on his reference to Babylon in 3. 3. 1276 a 27 sqq., where it is implied that Babylon covered too large a space to be one city. He would probably also say that its inhabitants were too numerous to possess a constitution or to be marshalled by a general. When he says that an ἔθνος possesses only ‘completeness in respect of necessaries,’ is he speaking of ἔθνος composed of πόλεις (see note on 1261 a 27), as well as of ἔθνος composed of villages? As to Aristotle’s account of the ἔθνος something has already been said in vol. i. p. 39. We should have been glad if he had told us more on the subject (see note on 1274 b 34 sqq.).
The ἐθνος appears to be a κοινωνία (cp. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 8, πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν): it has τύμμα or νόμα (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 9 sqq.); it is bound together not only by internal trade and by united action against external foes, but also by intermarriage and common sacrifices; it is often ruled by a King, and may even have an Absolute King at its head (3. 14. 1285 b 31 sq.), but it is too large to have a constitution—we must suppose that the word 'constitution' is here used in a sense exclusive of Kingship—apparently because it is too large to be controlled by common magistrates (cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 40). We may conjecture that in Aristotle's view the members of an ἐθνος have not that desire to promote the virtue of their fellows which is to him one distinguishing mark of a citizen (3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.). An ἐθνος is, in fact, rather a συμμαχία and something more than a πολιτική κοινωνία.

7. διὰ κ.τ.λ. Here again, as in 2, the Platonic Socrates is corrected (see above on 2). Cp. c. 8. 1328 b 16 sq. and 2. 2. 1261 b 12. Take πρὸς τὸ εὐ δην κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν together (see note on 1325 b 18). Κατά seems to mean 'in connexion with': cp. c. 2. 1324 a 15, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως (βίος) ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ἐνικός καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπολλυμένος. For τουτοῦτο followed by δέ, see above on 1267 a 24.

9. ἐνδιέχεται δὲ κ.τ.λ. Μεῖζω is bracketed by Schneider, Bekker, and Susemihl, but it appears to be correct: cp. De Gen. An. 4. 4. 771 b 33, ἀλλ', ὁσπερ καὶ τελευμένων τῶν ζωῶν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τι μέγεθος καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν, ὃν οὔτ' ἂν μεῖζον γένοιν οὔτ' ἐλαττον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ μεταξύ διαστήματι τοῦ μεγέθους λαμβάνομεν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν ὑπεραχήν καὶ τὴν ἐλλεἴψει, καὶ γίνεται μεῖζον ὁ δ' ἐλαττῶν ἀνθρώπου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζωῶν ὁπώς, οὔτω καὶ κ.τ.λ. A man must be of a certain minimum size, if he is to be a man at all; if he exceeds that minimum and does not exceed the maximum, he is a larger man; if he exceeds the maximum, he ceases to be a man. The same thing, we are told in the passage before us, holds of the πόλις.

11. ὁσπερ εἶπομεν, in 1326 a 34 sqq.

14. ἀρχοντος δ' ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις ἔργων. Κρίσις here refers especially to judicial decisions (cp. τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων in the next sentence). In the similar passage, 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq., on the other hand (μᾶλλον δ' ὡς ἀπλῶς ἐπίταξιν ἀρχάς λεκτείν τάτας, ἦσιν ἀποδεδοτα βουλευσαοντι τε περὶ τυών καὶ κρίναυ καὶ ἐπιτάξιας, καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦτο· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάξεων ἀρχικωτέρον ἐστιν), κρίναι does not refer to judicial decisions, for here Aristotle is speaking of ἀρχαῖ in
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a sense exclusive of τὸ δικαστικόν, of which he treats in another chapter of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (c. 16).

πρὸς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων seems to be given as an instance of αἰ τῶν ἄρχατων πράξεις, and τὸ τῶν ἄρχατων διανέμειν καὶ
ἀξίαν as an instance of αἰ τῶν ἄρχομένων. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Laws 738 D, ὅπως ἀν ... φιλοφρονόνται τε ἄλληλους μετὰ βουσίων καὶ οἰκείων καὶ γνωρίζωσιν, οὐ μείζων οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ
γνωρίμως αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι· ὅπου γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἄλληλοι ἕστιν ἄλληλοι ἐν
τοῖς τρόποις, ἀλλὰ σκότος, οὔτ' ἐν τιμῇ τῆς ἀξίας οὔτ' ἀρχῶν οὔτε δίκης ποτέ
tίς ἐν τῇς προσημοίωσις ὀρθῶς τυγχάνει: cp. also Laws 751 D and
766 E. Dr. Johnson says of the lairds' courts in the Highlands of Scotland (Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, Works, 8.
320)—'When the chiefs were men of knowledge and virtue, the
convenience of a domestic judicature was great. No long jour-
neys were necessary, no artificial delays could be practised; the
character, the alliances, and interests of the litigants were
known to the court, and all pretences were easily detected.' See also
Aristotle probably refers to Athens, for though in addressing an
Athenian audience Hyperides says (Pro Lycophr. col. xii. 5, ed.
Blass), λαθεὶν γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ἵματον οὐκ ἐν τί ἐντε ποιηθῶν οὐτα ὀδένα
§ 172 as too large to be ἐγευσοῦται (cp. Thuc. 8. 66. 3, already referred
to by Eaton). Still even at Athens owing to the publicity of men's
life in ancient Greece fellow-citizens knew each other far better
than they do in a modern city of the same size: see Haussoulier,
Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 179 sq., who however goes too far
when he says, 'tou te savait, tous se connaissaient à Athènes.' It
is, indeed, difficult to understand how even in a citizen-body of (say)
5,000, with all the help derivable from frequent festivals, every
citizen could be known, either personally or by repute, to his fellows.
Yet Aristotle seems to imply that the citizens of a State ought to
be acquainted with the character of every member of their body, if
not with his person. The experience of the United States fully
confirms the view of Plato and Aristotle that where fellow-citizens
are not well acquainted with each other's characters, offices will not
be well filled. 'In moderately-sized communities men's characters
are known, and the presence of a bad man in office brings on his
fellow-citizens evils which they are not too numerous to feel indi-
vidually... In large cities the results are different because the
circumstances are different' (Bryce, American Commonwealth, Part 3, c. 62). ‘City governments begin to be bad when the population begins to exceed 100,000 and includes a large proportion of recent immigrants. They are generally pure in smaller places, that is to say, they are as pure as those of an average English, French, or German city’ (ibid. Part 3, c. 67: vol. ii. p. 521, ed. i. See also c. 61, vol. ii. p. 435). Aristotle would, of course, think a citizen-body even of 100,000 ten times more numerous than it ought to be. As to London, compare a remark made by a member of the County Council of London at its first meeting. ‘Provincial corporations could easily proceed to elect aldermen, because in the provincial towns persons knew all about each other, but it was quite different in the metropolis’ (Times, Feb. 1, 1889).

20. ἔτι δὲ ἔξενοι καὶ μετοίκοι κ.τ.λ. This frequently happened at Athens. The register of citizens was kept by the deme: ‘l’assemblée du dème est peu fréquentée; c’est un petit nombre de voix qu’il faut acheter, et quelques drachmes suffisent: ici cinq drachmes par tête, ailleurs peut-être moins encore.’ See Haus- soulier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 32 sqq., who refers to Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 59, οὔτω γάρ, δὲ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, βουλομένους των ἄνδρων ἔξενοι πολίταις γενέσθαι, Ἀναξιμένη καὶ Νικόστρατον, κοινῇ διανεμώμενοι πέντε δραχμάς ἕκαστος προσεδέξαντο. Those whose names got upon the register in this or in other unlawful ways were called παρέγχραστοι. The larger the State was, the less check there would be on the registering authority. The Attic demes of Halimus, Suniurn, and Potami, all of them on the coast, were especially credited with a readiness to admit aliens to the register (Hug, Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum, p. 32). It will be noticed that Aristotle speaks only of aliens and metoeci, not of slaves.

22. δήλον τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 314.

24. εὐσύνοπτος must apparently mean ‘easily within the view of the magistrates and the citizens’ (cp. i. 14 sqq.).

26. Παραπληγίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. ‘Similarly,’ because Aristotle has just C. 5. said that the larger the State is, the better, if only it is εὐσύνοπτος, and now he goes on to say that the most self-complete territory is the best, and one which is large enough to support its citizens in a life, not temperate only, but temperate and liberal, though it must be εὐσύνοπτος (1327 a 1). Αὐταρκεστάτην, 27, takes up
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αὐτάρκειαν, 24. For τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας, cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 23, τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων. We more often have the acc. after περὶ in phrases of this kind in the Politics.

περὶ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For περὶ in the sense of ‘quod attinet ad,’ see Vahlen on Poet. 23. 1459 a 16, who quotes Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 25, καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθω· περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρες εἰτὶ διητοί, and Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 29. With ποιὰν τινὰ supply δεὶ εἰναὶ τῆν χώραν. In his preference for a territory as self-complete as possible Aristotle follows Plato, Laws 704 C, ΑΘ. τί δὲ περὶ αὐτὴν ἡ χώρα; πότερα πάμφορος καὶ τιμῶν ἐπιδείξῃ; ΚΔ. σχεδὸν οὐδενὸς ἐπιδείξῃ, and Critias 110 E, and also Solon (Hdt. 1. 32, ὥσπερ χώρη οὐδεμία καταρκεῖ τίνα ἐντὸς παρέχουσα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχει, ἐτέρου δὲ ἐπιδείκτειν ἢ δὲ ἄν τὰ πλεῖστα ἔχει, ἀρίστη αὐτὴ). Hesiod, indeed, had already said of the just (Op. et Dies, 236),

θάλλουσαν δ’ ἐγαθίσω διαμπερές’ οὐδ’ ἐπὶ νηῶν
νίπτονται, καρπὸν δὲ φέρει ξείδορος ἄρωρα, with which Virgil’s lines (Ecl. 4. 38 sq.) may be compared,

Cedet et ipse mari vector, nec nautica pinus
Mutabit merces: omnis feret omnia tellus.

Thessaly was famed for the variety of its produce; it was rich in corn and wine and timber, and in pasture for horses cattle and sheep (Bursian, Geographie von Griechenland, 1. 47); Cyprus was rich in corn, wine, oil, timber, and copper (Strabo, p. 684). We read of the χώρα πάμφορος of the Tyrrenians in Diod. 5. 40. 3, and of the νῆσος εὐδαίμων καὶ πάμφορος of Sardinia in [Aristot.] De Mir. Auscult. 100. 838 b 22. Isocrates speaks of Egypt in Busir. § 12 as πλεῖστα καὶ παντοδαπὰ φέρειν δυναμένη. Messenia (Eurip. Fragm. 1068) and Laconia (E. Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 218) were remarkable for the variety of their produce. All these were fertile regions, but there were countries which were at once πάμφοροι and rugged, and it is a territory of this kind that Plato prefers (Laws 704 D). Aristotle would hardly follow him in this. He would hardly be satisfied with a territory like the Attic, which comprised much poor land (Plut. Solon, c. 22), though it is called παμφορωτάτη by Xenophon (De Vect. 1. 3: cp. Plato, Critias 110 E, and Antiphanes, Fragm. 'Ομώνυμοι: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 98). The main reason which leads both Plato and Aristotle to prefer a πάμφορος territory is that in a State possessing such a territory importation and exportation are reduced to a minimum, and consequently also the commercial class. States with a barren territory
have often in the history of the world been forced to become commercial in order to exist—e.g. Aegina (above on 1258 a 34), Phocaea (Justin, 43. 3. 5), Elea (Strabo, p. 252). As to Chios see note on 1291 b 20. Much of the territory of Corinth was infertile, and this helped to make her a commercial State (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 516). 'It was on a bare rock surrounded by deep sea that the streets of Tyre were piled up to a dizzy height' (Macaulay, Hist. of England, c. 24). As to Venice see H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 251. 'Nuremberga, cuius agro nihil magis sterile fieri potest, omnium tamen Germaniae urbiun populossimma et opificem multitudine florentissima putatur' (Bodinus, De Republica, p. 518). The word πανοφόρος appears to be extremely rare: πάμφορος is common enough.

30. πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει κ.τ.λ. With τοσαύτην we should probably supply, not πάς τις ἄν ἐπαινέσθη, but δὲ εἶναι as with peri μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποίουν τιμᾶ, 26 (cp. c. i. 1330 a 41 sqq.). See 2. 6. 1265 a 28–38, where the same standard is adopted, in correction of Plato, Laws 737 D, γῆς μὲν ὑπὸντο πάσοντο σώφρονα δύναται ἰκανή τρέφειν. Yet Plato's language in Critias 112 C, τὸ μέσον ὑπερφανίας καὶ ἀνελεφθείσας μεταδιώκοντες κοσμίας ἑκδομόμενοι οἰκήτεις, is quite in the spirit of that of Aristotle here. Aristotle does not wish the citizens of his 'best State' to live either like the people of Myconus, who were charged with stinginess (Cratin. Inc. Fab. Fragn. 6: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 175), or like the Boeotians, of whom the comic poet Eubulus said (Meineke, 3. 222),

κτίζε Βοιωτῶν πόλιν
ἀνδρῶν ἀρίστων ἐσθίειν δὲ ἡμέρας.

See also vol. i. p. 316, note i. For the use here of πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει, cp. c. 6. 1327 b 3, peri δὲ πλήθουσα ἡδῆ καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. We have μείζων καὶ πλεῖων used in a somewhat similar way in Meteor. 2. 5. 363 a 15, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τῶν τότων εἶναι πολὺ πλεῖω ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἀναπεταμένον μείζων καὶ πλεῖων καὶ μᾶλλον ἀλεενόν αὐνέμος ὁ νότος ἔστι τοῦ βορίου, and in Aen. Poliorc. c. 8, προσδεχόμενον πλεῖον καὶ μεῖζον δύναμιν πολεμίων. Σχολάζοντας, 31, 'though at leisure.'

33. ὅστερον. This is one of the promises of future investigations which are not fulfilled in the Politics as we have it (see vol. ii. p. xxi sqq.).

peri κτήσεως καὶ τῆς peri τὴν οὐσίαν εὑστορίας. Καὶ is explanatory, καὶ τῆς peri τὴν οὕσιαν εὑστορίας being added to make it clear in what sense κτήσεις will be dealt with. Κτήσεις has been dealt with from
another point of view in 1. 8. 1256 a 1 sqq. Compare what Plato says on the subject in Rep. 591 D sq. For τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3, προοδῶν εὐπορίας, and Isocr. Panath. § 7, τῆς περὶ τῶν βίων εὐπορίας. See also below on 1327 a 8, τῆς περὶ ἔιλα ὑλῆς.

35. πῶς δὲ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν αὐτῆν, ι' how and in what way it should stand to the use made of it': cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 99, εὐπορία δὲ ἐστὶν ὅταν τις πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ χρήσεις οὕτως ἔχῃ ὡστε καὶ φίλους εὑρεῖν καὶ φιλοτίμοις καὶ εὐπόροις ἀπολειτουργῆσαι, and Xen. Hiero, 4. 8, οὐ γὰρ τῷ ἀριθμῷ οὕτε τὰ πολλὰ κρίνεται οὕτε τὰ ἱκανὰ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις· ὡστε τὰ μὲν ὑπερβάλλοντα τὰ ἱκανὰ πολλὰ ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἱκανῶν ἀλλείποντα ὁλίγα. For πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον, cp. Phys. 8. 5. 257 a 31, ὡστε τούτο κασκετέον λαβοῦν ἄλλην ἀρχήν, εἴ τι κινεῖ αὐτὸ αὐτό, πῶς κινεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον: Hippocr. De Capitis Vulneribvs, vol. iii. p. 356 Kühn, χρή δὲ καὶ ἐφαστὰν τὸν τετρωμένον ὁποιον ἔσαθε καὶ τίνα τρόπον: Plato, Laws 964 D, πῶς οὖν δὴ καὶ τίνα τρόπον, δὲ ἔφει, ἀπεκαίδευται αὐτῷ τουτότι τινὶ λέγομεν; and Polyb. i. 32. 2, πῶς καὶ τίνη τρόπο γέγονεν, and 2. 31. 7, οὕτω καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ: see also Stalbaum's note on Plato, Laws 681 D, οὕτω τε καὶ ταύτη. Λατήνι is added to τὴν χρήσιν to contrast 'the use itself' with τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν: cp. c. i. 3. 1331 b 24, περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, where 'the constitution itself' is tacitly contrasted with matters preliminary to the constitution and not falling within it. Vet. Int. wrongly refers αὐτῆν to τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας, translating 'qualiter oportet habere et quo modo ipsam ad usum.'

36. πολλαί γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for there are many disputes on the subject of this inquiry, arising because of those who, etc. For ἐλκειν εἴφ' ἐκατέραν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 22, ἐλκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, and Plato, Laws 890 Λ, ἐλκοῦσιν πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὀρθὸν βίον. Should τὴν χρῆσιν be supplied with ἐλκουσι;? On the side of γλυκορύπος were the Pythagoreans (see a fragment of Aristophon in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 362, and fragments of Alexis, ibid. 3. 474, 483), the Cynics (Diog. Laert. 6. 8 sub fin.: 6. 25: Diog.Cynicus, Fragm. 273 Mullach), and writers like Ephorus (see above on 1265 a 30), to say nothing of the lawgivers of Sparta (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 5 sq.: Plut. Lycurg. c. 17) and Crete (2. 10. 1272 a 22); while on the side of τρυφή were Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2. 68, 69, 84) and others (vol. i. p. 301, and p. 302, note 1: also p. 199, note 1).
probably right in placing δεὶ δ' ἐνσε- ἐμπείροις in a parenthesis and making δότι κ.τ.λ. dependent on εἰσεῖν. Τὸ ἐδώς τῆς χώρας, 'the character of the territory,' i.e. its geographical character, as distinguished from the character of the soil, which has been dealt with in 1326 b 26-30. Cp. Plato, Laws 625 C, τὴν γὰρ τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν ὀρᾶτε, ὅσ οὐκ ἑστι, καθάπερ ἢ τῶν Ῥήττανων, πεδιάς, and 834 C.

δεὶ δ' ἐνσε κ.τ.λ., 'and we must be guided in respect of some matters by the opinion also of those who are experienced in questions of generalship [as well as that of those who look especially to the supply of commodities, the subject which has just been before us].' Aristotle may probably have before him the work of Aeneas Tacticus entitled Στρατηγικὰ βιβλία οἱ περὶ τῶν στρατηγικῶν ὑπομνήματα, of which we possess a part in the Commentarius Poliorceticus of Aeneas (see below on 1331 a 16): cp. c. 8, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς τὴν χώραν προσδεχόμενοι πλείον καὶ μεῖζον δύναμιν πολεμίων πρῶτον μὲν τὴν χώραν δυσείσβολον τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ δυσστρατοπέδευτον καὶ δυσπόρευτον κατασκευάζειν καὶ τοὺς ποταμοὺς δυσδιαβάζουσι καὶ δυσπλούσι, and c. 16. 16 sqq. Aristotle learns something from generals in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 16 sqq. as well as here.

40. δότι χρῆ μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον, αὐτοῖς δ' εὐεξόδον. Compare what is said of the city in c. 11. 1330 b 2 sqq. and 1331 a 3 sqq. Egypt (see vol. i. p. 316, note 2, and Strabo, p. 819) and Persis (Plut. Alex. c. 37) were difficult of access to foes, and Socrates claimed (vol. i. p. 316, note 2) that Attica was so, but Laconia is probably especially present to Aristotle's mind, for it was δυσεμβολοτάτη (Xen. Hell. 5. 5. 24: Eurip. Fragm. 1058: see Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 217, 311). Boeotia, on the contrary, lay comparatively open to the foe (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Epaminond. 18. 193 E, καὶ τὴν χώραν ὑπίπτιον οὖσαν καὶ ἀναπεπταμένη πολέων ὁρχῶσαν προσηγόρευς, ὡς μὴ δυναμένοις κρατεῖν αὐτής, διὰ μὴ τὴν χεῖρα διὰ πόρπακος ἐξωσί), and of Elis we read in Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 6, 'No region of the Peloponnesian is less protected against attacks from without. A broad river-valley leads, like an open entrance-road, from the interior into the midst of Elis; the mountains at the back of the territory afford little protection, because they are only the lower ranges of higher mountains. The level coast-line offers the easiest of approaches from the North and the South; the plains and the villages are exposed on all sides to landings from a hostile fleet.' That a country might be at once

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hard of entrance to foes and easy of exit for friends we see from Plato, Laws 761 A, ἄδυσβατα δὲ δὴ πάντα πολεῖν τοὺς ἐχθροῖς, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις δὲ τι μάλιστα εὔβατα, ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ ὑποζυγίους καὶ βοσκήματιν, ὁδὸν τε ἐπιμελομένους κ.τ.λ. Another characteristic which the territory should possess, but which is not noticed here, is that it should be such as to favour the unity of the State (7 (5). 3. 1303 b 7 sqq.). Ἱρὴ τοῖς μὲν, not ἱρὴ μὲν τοῖς, is the logical order, but 'μὲν interdum non ei additur vocabulo, in quo vis oppositionis cernitur' (Bon. Ind. 454 a 20): see above on 1268 b 12.

1327 a. 2. οὖτω καὶ τὴν χώραν, sc. εὐσύνοπτων εἴναι δεί.

3. τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν κ.τ.λ. The recommendation that the territory should be well within reach for purposes of protection leads on naturally to the question as to the site of the city. This question is here dealt with only so far as the position of the city with reference to the territory and the sea is concerned; other matters come up for consideration in c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq. The city should be placed where it will be readily able to protect the territory and to receive supplies of commodities. For both purposes it must be near the sea, yet it must also be well situated with respect to the territory. Whether Aristotle's opinion was known to Alexander when he founded Alexandria in b.c. 332, it is impossible to say, but at any rate the site of this city in many respects fulfilled Aristotle's requirements. Cf. Strabo, p. 798, τῆς δ' εὐκαρίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τὸ μέγαστόν ἐστιν ὅτι τῆς Λιγυρύτου πάσης μόνος ἐστὶν οὖτος ὁ τόπος πρὸς ἀμφότερος ἐυθείας περιφέρεις, τά τε ἐκ διάλεξης διὰ τὸ εὐλόγιον, καὶ τά ἐκ τῆς χώρας ὅτι πάντα εἰμαροῦ τὸ ποταμός πορθεῖνυ ςυνάγει τε εἰς τοῖς πολεῖν χωρίον ὑπὲρ μέγιστον ἐμπόριον τῆς οἰκουμείας ἐστι. (No doubt Aristotle would not rejoice in the greatness of Alexandria as an emporium or in its close contiguity to the sea.) Some cities had the fault of being at a great distance from their territory (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 32 sqq.). In not a few cases part of the territory was cut off from the city by mountains (this was the case with the Thyrean territory of Argos and the Lepreate territory of Elis), or by an arm of the sea (as when island cities held territory on the adjacent mainland). On the other hand, there were cities like Sparta, which were too far from the sea. Sparta is probably especially present to Aristotle's mind in 1327 a 3-27. It was evidently in his opinion not situated so well either for the protection of its territory or for the transmission of produce from its territory, as it would have been if it had been nearer to the sea.
Nor was it (18 sqq.) easily within reach of rescue by sea or capable of striking a blow by sea, nor could it well receive by sea commodities lacking to it or send away by sea its surplus produce. The cities of Elis and Messene were also too far from the sea. Cp. Polyb. 2. 5, ταύτας γὰρ ἂν τὰς χώρας (i.e. τὴν Ἡλείαν καὶ τὴν Μεσσηνίαν) Ἰλυροῖς περιστόθεν διετέλουν: διὰ γὰρ τὸ μήκος τῆς παραλίας καὶ διὰ τὸ μεσογαῖον εἶναι τὰς δυνατήτατας ἐν αὐτάσι πόλεις μακρὰ καὶ βραχεῖα λίαν ἐγίνετο τοῖς προερημένοις αἱ παραβοήθειαι πρὸς τὰς ἀποβάσεις τῶν Ἰλυριῶν, ὅπερ ἅδεως ἐπέτρεχον καὶ κατέσυρον ἂν τάς τὰς χώρας. In Aristotle's view the ideal site for a city was one which placed it in easy communication with both land and sea. Rome, according to Cicero (De Rep. 2. 5. 10), was marked out for empire by a position of this kind, and much the same thing may be said of London. We learn, indeed, from c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq. that a city should be in easy communication, not only with its own territory and with the sea, but also with the mainland on the verge of which it lies. Such was the situation of Athens: cp. Xen. De Vect. 1. 7, καὶ μέν ὦν περὶπρυτοῦ γε οὕσα (ἡ Ἀττική) ὡμοι ὡσπερ νῆσος πάσης ἀνέμοις προσάγεται τε ὅν ἐκαίνει καὶ ἀποπέμπεται ἐπὶ βουλήται· ἀμφιβάλλοντο γὰρ ἄστι. καὶ κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολλὰ δέχεται ἐμπόρια· ἥπειρος γὰρ ἄστιν. Aristotle evidently prefers the site of Athens to that of Sparta, and indeed to those of most other Greek cities. It is easy to see from 1327 a 3–27 that Greek cities at a distance from the sea, and especially those whose communications with the coast were difficult—such cities, for instance, as Tegea and Mantinea—were neither very secure from foes nor very well supplied with commodities, and that cities immediately on the coast—and most Greek colonies were thus situated—tended to become denationalized and disorderly owing to the multitude of aliens which flocked to them, and also to suffer an increase in the number of their citizens not conducive to efficient government. In this matter as in others Aristotle favours a mean; the city should be neither on the sea nor too far from it.

4. πρὸς τε τὴν βάλλασσαν κ.τ.λ. For the order of the words cp. c. 11. 1331 a 12 sqq. and c. 16. 1335 b 5 sqq. Τε...τε, ut apud omnes prosarios, apud Aristotelem quoque raro in usum venit’ (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 16, who gives as another instance in the Politics c. 10. 1329 b 2 sqq.).

5. εἰς μὲν ὁ λεγθεὶς ὅρος. We expect μὲν ὄν in place of μὲν, but cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 19, εἰς μὲν τρόπος διδασκαλίας ἦν αὐτῷ ὁδός τοῦ Λαγοῦ...
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παρέιναι ἀλλος δὲ κ.τ.λ., and Thuc. 2. 97. 2, τὰ μὲν πρὸς θάλασσαν τοσαῦτη ἦν.

7. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς κ.τ.λ., i.e. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς ὅρος ἑστὶ τῆν πόλιν εἶναι εὑπαρακόμιστον κ.τ.λ. I follow the punctuation of Jackson, Welldon, and Sus. The fact that Athens lay near the coast must have greatly facilitated and cheapened the transport to it of the produce of its territory, and especially the transport of heavy commodities like timber, stone, marble, and metals.

8. ἐτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and further, of material for timber and for any other industry of the kind that the territory may possess.’ Aristotle passes from τῶν γυμομένων καρπῶν, 7, to commodities like wood, stone, and metals which are ἀκαρπα μὲν χρήσιμα δὲ (1. 11. 1258 b 27 sqq.: cp. Xen. De Vect. 1. 5, ἐστι δὲ καὶ γῆ ἡ σπειρομένη μὲν οὐ φέρει καρπῶν, ὄρυκτομένη δὲ πολλαπλασίους τρέφει ἂ εἰ σῖτον ἐφερε). Attica was rich in marble and silver (ibid. 1. 4 sq.). For ἐργασίαν, cp. Thuc. 4. 105, κτῆσιν τε ἑκείν τῶν χρυσείων μετάλλων ἐργασίας εὐ τῇ περὶ ταῦτα Θράκη. For τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης, cp. 1326 b 34, τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας, and Top. 2. 7. 113 a 31, διὰ γὰρ τῆς περὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ αἰσθήσεως τὴν ἑν ἐκάστῳ μορφῇ γνωρίζομεν, and see Bon. Ind. 579 b 43 sqq.

C. 6. 11. Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλασσαν κοινωνίας κ.τ.λ. The persons referred to here held that nearness to the sea was prejudicial to orderly government in two ways—(1) it involved the residence in the city of aliens bred up under other laws and likely to exercise an unfavourable moral influence on the citizens; (2) it involved the existence of a very numerous citizen-body, inasmuch as the numbers of the citizen-body would be swollen by a body of merchants, who, it is taken for granted, would be citizens. (That the word πολυναυθροπία refers to the number of the citizens appears from 1327 b 7–9, where it is explained that in Aristotle’s ‘best State’ there will be no πολυναυθροπία in connexion with the oarsmen of the fleet, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δεὶ τῆς πόλεως.) Aristotle contends, on the contrary, that nearness to the sea does not necessarily involve either of these results. The city might be placed at a little distance from the sea and might possess a port on the coast, whose inhabitants might be restrained from free communication with the inhabitants of the city; and this port should be a small port, intended for the supply of the needs of the members of the State, not of those of the world in general.

Who were the critics whose views are here controverted? Possibly Plato is referred to, but this is not certain, for though he objects
to nearness to the sea in Laws 704 D sqq. (see Stallbaum on this passage, who refers to Cic. De Rep. 2.3.5 sqq., and cp. Laws 949 E sqq., 952 D sqq.) on account of the risk of evil influences from aliens, he does not object to it on the ground of its involving πολυαμορσία. In all probability the views here controverted were those of persons oligarchically inclined. That πολυαμορσία is unfavourable to good government we have already seen (c. 4. 1326 a 25 sqq.). Many Greek cities were much exposed to the influence of aliens. Byzantium was overrun with them (Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 14: cp. Athen. Deipn. 526 e), and at Agrigentum in its palmy days, if we may trust Diodorus (13. 84. 4), there were 180,000 aliens, while the citizens numbered somewhat more than 20,000. Haussoullier (Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 189) shows how foreign worships were instituted at the Peiraeus by aliens for their own behoof, and some of these probably spread to the citizens. We know that the seaports of Dundee and Leith were the channels through which the Reformation found its way into Scotland. "The knowledge of God," says Knox, "did considerably increase within the realm, and this was chiefly effected by merchants and mariners belonging to Dundee and Leith," who imported the reformed doctrines from abroad' (Academy, Feb. 11, 1893). That contact with aliens might have ill results, we see from Cic. De Leg. Agrar. 2. 35. 95, Carthaginenses fraudulenti et mendaces non genere, sed natura loci, quod propter portus suos multis et variis mercatorum et advenarum sermonibus ad studium fallendi studio quaeustus vocabantur. Contact with aliens even of a satisfactory type might well affect the fidelity of the citizens of a Greek State to its traditions, and many of the aliens who crowded to Greek seaports were Asiatics of a type the reverse of satisfactory. The people of Epidamnus found that those of their citizens who had much communication with their Illyrian neighbours became demoralized (Plut. Quaes. Graec. 29, γιγνομένους πονηρούς). We read of the Spartan Callieratidas in Diod. 13. 76. 2, οὗτος δὲ νέος μὲν ἦν παντελῶς, ἀκάκος δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπλούς, οὗτος τῶν ἐξεικών ἤδην πεπειραμένος, δικαίωτας δὲ Σπαρτιάτων. Machiavelli in his Discourses on the First Decade of Livy (1. 55) ascribes the integrity and piety of the Germans of his day in part to the fact that 'they have never had much commerce with their neighbours, being seldom visited by them and seldom going abroad themselves, but live contented with the food and clothing that are the product of their own country, thereby preventing
all opportunities of evil conversation that might corrupt their manners.' It should be noticed that the argument here reproduced by Aristotle assumes that aliens did not take up their abode in inland cities; this does not, however, seem to have been invariably the case, for we hear of metoeci at Thebes (Diod. 17. 11: Lys. Or. 23. 15) and under the name of πάροικοι at Thespiae (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 294. 1). Indeed, Aristotle himself speaks in c. 4. 1326 a 18 sqq. as if a body of aliens and metoeci was a necessary appendage to every Greek State.

15. γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., sc. τὴν πολιονθρωπίαν. With διαπέπωντας καὶ δεχομένους ἐμπόρων πλῆθος Bonitz (Ind. s. v. διαπέπων) compares De Part. An. 4. 5. 681 a 28, ἔχει δὲ τούτῳ τὸ ζόφον δύο πόρους καὶ μίαν διαίρεσιν, ἢ τε δέχεται τὴν ὑγρότητα τὴν εἰς τροφὴν, καὶ ἢ πάλιν διαπέπωει τὴν ὑπολειπομένην ἑκάστα. 18. μὲν οὖν appears to be answered by δὲ, 32. ταῦτα, i. e. τὸ ἐπιζευγόθανα τίμιας καὶ ἡ πολιονθρωπία. 19. πρὸς εὔποροιν τῶν ἀναγκαίων. States in command of the sea were for one thing less exposed to famine than States which were not ([Xen.] De Rep. Ath. 2. 6). See also Plato, Laws 705 A (quoted in the next note). We can imagine with what anxiety cities at a distance from the sea, for instance those of Arcadia, watched the prospects of the corn-harvest. The worship of Demeter and of Zeus, the giver of rain, would be especially congenial to such localities. They no doubt kept a vigilant eye on their rivers and the catabothra through which they in some cases flowed off to see that no flooding occurred and that they were not interfered with by rival neighbouring States. Greek colonies, on the other hand, were mostly at no great distance from the sea, and their command of necessaries must consequently have been much superior to that of many districts of Greece proper.

μετέχειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν τῆς θαλάττης, cp. 25, ἀμφοτέρων (i.e. γῆς καὶ θαλάττης) μετέχοντα. Susemihl, following Bojesen, reads μετέχειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ τῆς θαλάττης, referring to c. 5. 1327 a 3 sqq. and to c. 11. 1331 a 34 sqq., but compare on the other hand 32, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρῶμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχουσιν καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἑπίνεια καὶ λιμένας κ.τ.λ., and Plato, Laws 705 A (a passage perhaps present to Aristotle’s mind here), πρόσοικοι γὰρ ὑβλαττα χώρα τὸ μὲν παρ’ ἐκλύσθην ἡμέραν ἡδὺ, μάλα γε μὴν ὄντως ἀλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν γειτόνημα. The territory no less than the city may be said μετέχειν τῆς θαλάττης, for it draws part of its supplies from the sea and sends part of its
surplus produce away by sea, besides being more easily protected
against foes. Aristotle had advised in c. 5. 1327 a 3 sqq. that the
city should be well placed in relation both to its territory and to
the sea. No one had disputed that it should be well placed in
relation to its territory, but a doubt had been raised whether it
ought to stand in any relation whatever to the sea. Hence what is
uppermost in Aristotle's mind is to show that it should not be far
from the sea. That it will be well placed in relation to its territory,
it takes for granted.

21. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For evidence of this fact, see vol. i. p. 317.
Compare also Thuc. 5. 82. 5 sq. The successful resistance of the
seaport Stralsund to the besieging army of Wallenstein illustrates
Aristotle's remark. 'The problem of overcoming the resistance of
a fortress open to unlimited succours by sea is one of the most
difficult in the whole art of war' (S. R. Gardiner, Thirty Years' War,
p. 107). The Duke of Wellington preferred Calcutta to Agra
as the seat of British Government in India (Lord Stanhope's Con-
versations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 306). For πρὸς τὸ ρόον
φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους (for so we should probably read with Sylburg
in place of τοὺς πολέμους, which is the reading of ΓΠ), cp. 2. 7.
1267 a 27, πολέμου ὑπενεγκείν, and 2. 9. 1270 a 33, μὲν γὰρ πληγὴν
οἷς ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις.

23. καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι κ.τ.λ., 'and with a view to injuring
assailants, if it should not be possible [to be easily succourable]
both by land and by sea, the State will be more in a position to be
so by one or the other, if it shares in both.' I do not think with
Susemihl (Bericht über Aristoteles, etc., in the Jahresbericht für
Altertumswissenschaft, lxxix. 1894, p. 273) that Argyriades is
right in bracketing πρὸς before τὸ βλάψαι. The suppressed nom.
to ἀναστῶν (ἐστιν) is not τὸ βλάψαι, but τὸ εὐθυρήτους εἶναι. Greece
defended itself in both ways against Xerxes, and Syracuse against
Athens. Agrigentum, on the other hand, had no fleet when it was
besieged by the Carthaginians (Diod. i. 13. 85 sqq.: Holm, Griech.
Gesch. 2. 592). Athens would have had little prospect of success
in the Peloponnesian War if she had only been able to strike at her
assailants by land. The Lacedaemonian State suffered from not
being able to attack its Theban invaders by sea. Compare a saying
of Epaminondas (Aristid. Leucr. i. p. 421, 18, quoted by Schäfer,
Demosth. i. 104. 4), λέγειν γὰρ ἢ ἢ ἢ πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ὡς ὀδὴν
ὀθρολος τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ πλεονεκτημάτων, εἴ μὴ καὶ τῷ βιλατταν δι' αὐτῶν ἔξοσιν.
25. ὅσα τ' ἄν κ.τ.λ. It seems to be implied that the import and export of commodities was only possible by sea: Athens, however, imported many commodities by land (Xen. De Vect. 1. 7, καὶ κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολλὰ (ὁ 'Αττικής) δείχνει ἐμπόρια), and that there was traffic by land in Greece we see from Plato, Polit. 289 E, ὅτι δὲ πόλιν ἐκ πόλεως ἀλλάττοντες κατὰ θάλασσαν καὶ πεζοῖ. But the land-trade of Greece was not comparable in extent to its trade by sea (see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 444 sqq.).

26. αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορικήν κ.τ.λ. takes up and justifies ὅσα τ' ἄν μὴ τειχανῇ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἄντα κ.τ.λ. A State may do things for itself which it would demean itself by doing for others (cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 19 sqq. and 3. 4. 1277 b 5 sqq.).

27. οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες κ.τ.λ. This remark is directed against Athens. Isocrates had claimed that in instituting a great mart at the Peiraeus, Athens had done Greece a service (Paneg. § 42); Aristotle, however, asserts that Athens had had the increase of her revenue in view. No doubt she derived a large revenue from the Peiraeus (see Xen. De Vect. 3. 12 sqq., 4. 40, and [Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1346 a 5 sqq.), but the existence of a great emporium there also added largely to her influence; we see how bitterly the Megarians felt their exclusion from it (Thuc. 1. 67, 139). Among the chief sources of revenue at Athens were the fiftieth on exports and imports, the duty on sales, and the impost paid by metoeci (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 350 sqq.); the existence of a great emporium at the Peiraeus would largely increase the receipts from these and other sources. The revenue of States which did not possess an emporium must have been much smaller than the revenue of those which did. The revenue of inland States especially must have been limited, and few inland democracies can have been able to provide pay for attendance at meetings of the assembly and dicasteries.

30. τοιαύτης μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, 'to share in greed of this kind,' i.e. greed for revenue, for πλεονεξία probably does not mean 'gain' here, though it often bears this meaning. Cp. Plato, Tim. 27 C, πάντες δοσοὶ καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν.

32. πολλαῖς . . . καὶ χώρας καὶ πόλεων, e.g. the territories and cities of Athens, Corinth, Megara, etc.

33. ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας. 'Ἐπίνεια are port-towns: cp. Suidas s.v., πόλισμα παραβαλλόσαυν, ἐνθα τὰ νεώρα τῶν πόλεων εἰσαῦ, ὅσπερ Πειραιῶν τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Νίσαια τῆς Μεγαρίδος' δύνασαι δὲ ἐπὶ παντὸς
34. ὤστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστυ μήτε πόρρω λίαν, sc. εἶναί, 'so as neither to occupy the same city [as the buildings of the city] nor to be very far away.' The subject of νέμειν appears to be ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας understood, unless we supply τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας.

*Ἀστῦ* is used of the central city of the State lying round its central acropolis, in contradistinction to other cities comprised within the territory. For the omission of εἶναι, see above on 1277 a 38 and 1286 b 36. Cylene, the port of Elis, and Gytheium, the port of Sparta, would be thought by Aristotle to be too far from Elis and Sparta.

35. ἄλλα κρατεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ., 'but to be held in subjection by walls and other similar defences' (such as trenches, cp. Xen. Anab. 2. 4. 22).

36. διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, 'through participation in them,' i.e. in ports and harbours.

37. εἰ δὲ τι βλαβερόν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 952 D sqq. Compare the plan adopted by the people of Epidamnus of appointing a πολιτής, through whom alone all purchases from, and sales to, their Illyrian neighbours were to be made (Plut. Quaest. Gr. 29).

41. βέλτιστον, thus used, is less common in the Politics than βέλτιον, but we have it in Plato, Gorg. 500 C.

οὐ γὰρ μόνον κ.τ.λ. We read of Dionysius the Elder in Diod. 14. 107. 4 that he required Rhegium to surrender to him its fleet of seventy triremes, διελάμβανε γὰρ τῆς κατὰ βάλαταν βοηθείας ἀποκλεισθένης ῥάδιοι ἐκπολιορκίσεις τὴν πόλιν. For αὐτοίς φοβεροῖς εἶναί, cp. c. 8. 1328 b 7—10 and 3. 15. 1286 b 27—31. Sections of the citizen-body were often the originators of στάσεις (7 (5). 3—4) and might need to be controlled.

3. περὶ δὲ πλῆθους ἡδή καὶ μεγέθους κ.τ.λ., 'but when we come 1327 b. to the amount and magnitude of this force, with respect to that,' etc. For πλῆθους καὶ μεγέθους, see above on 1326 b 30.

4. εἰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. That a Greek State could not live a life of hegemony without possessing a fleet, is virtually implied by the view, which dates back as far as the days of the Persian Wars, that a hegemony confined to the land is a 'lame hegemony' (Diod. 11.
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50. Epaminondas held this view (see above on 1327 a 23, and also Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10.416–419, and Schäfer, Demosthenes, 1. 104 sq.).

5. πολιτικῶν, 'spent in relations with other States,' not a solitary life, like that of the States referred to in c. 3. 1325 b 23 sqq. Cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 22. Πολιτικῶν is a broader term than ἰγιμονικῶν, for a State may have political relations with others without standing to them in a relation of hegemony.

7. τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γεγομένην περὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν ὀχλῶν, 'the excessive number of citizens which arises in connexion with the mass of trireme-oarsmen.' So Sus. 'jene Pöbelmenge die aus dem Schiffsvolk entspringt.' For γεγομένην περὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν ὀχλῶν, cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 20, ὃπερ οὐκ ἐγίγνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις. Τίγρεσθαι περὶ with the acc. means 'to happen to' in Plato, Protag. 309 B, and in Polyb. i. 16. 7, i. 22. i, and 5. 110. 7, but I do not think that this is what it means here. As to πολυανθρωπία, see above on 1327 a 11. The Athenian demos was largely composed of trireme-oarsmen (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23).

11. πλήθους δὲ κ.τ.λ. The connexion of this sentence with that which precedes it would have been clearer if it had run, 'but the oarsmen need not be citizens, for, as a mass of perioeci and cultivators of the territory will be forthcoming, there will necessarily be no lack of sailors also.' Would Aristotle's serfs, who are not to be θεροειδεῖς, make good sailors? His plan of employing serfs as oarsmen had been anticipated not only at Heracleia on the Euxine, but also by Jason of Pherae (Xen. Hell. 6. i. 11, ἀνδρῶν γε μὴν ταύτας (sc. τὰς ναύς) πληρῶν πότερον Ἀθηναίους ἠ ἡμᾶς εἰκός μᾶλλον δύνασθαι, τοιούτους καὶ τοιούτους ἔχοντας περίττας). 'Quod idem nostris quoque aetate Veneti factitant, qui ad instruendas classes in agris delectum habere et valentiores agricolas triremis adscribere consuerunt' (Giph. p. 945). Even at Athens, where a large section of the demos was composed of trireme-oarsmen (see above on 7), metoeci and aliens, and occasionally slaves, were also thus employed (Thuc. 1. 143, 3. 16, 8. 73 : Isocr. De Pace, §§ 48, 79). The oarsmen of the Lacedaemonian fleet were Helots or hired men (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 12).

13. ὅρωμεν δὲ κ.τ.λ. takes up 1327 a 32 sqq. Καὶ τούτῳ, 'this also,' i.e. τὸ ἀνθρώπινα εἶναι ναυτῶν, as well as favourably situated ports and harbours. As to the fleet of the Pontic Heracleia, see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 12. 623. 3. Heracleia waged a vigorous
naval war with Leucon, prince of the Cimmerian Bosporus, who reigned from about B.C. 392 to 352. In later days (B.C. 280) her ships of war with five and six banks of oars and her one great 

14. Ἠρακλέωτῶν. P 4. S b Vb have Ἠρακλεωτῶν, but the forms Ἠρακλέωτης, Ἠρακλεωτικός appear elsewhere in Aristotle’s writings without any recorded variant. Ἠρακλεωτής is the earlier form (see Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschr., p. 34, ed. 2) and appears in an Attic inscription prior to B.C. 403, but Aristotle probably used the form Ἠρακλεωτής, which is found in an Attic inscription of B.C. 298.

15. τῷ μεγεθεί, i.e. in respect of the number of its citizens.

16. λιμένων is placed next to χώρας, because the harbours were to be outside the city, not, as was often the case, within it.

πόλεων, i.e. the ἄστυ and its ἐπίνειον or port.

17. ἕστω διωραμένα. Cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 39, ἐπεὶ δ’ ἕστιν ἐνίοις γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων.

19. πρότερον, in c. 4. 1326 b 22 sqq.


22. ὁς διειλήπται τοῖς ἐθνεῖσιν, literally ‘how it is divided into sections by nations’: cp. c. 12. 1331 a 20, and Plato, Laws 886 A, τὰ τῶν ὄρων διακεκοσμημένα κἀκε ὄντως, εἰσαυτοὺς τε καὶ μησὶ διειλημμένα, and Phaedo 110 B, ἢ γὰρ αὕτη . . . ποικιλῆ, χρώμασι διειλημμένη.

Gr. i. 375). Aristotle probably held that a connexion exists between coldness of climate and abundance of ὑμός. He may have traced the connexion thus. Cold hardens the animal frame and makes it dry and earthy, not watery (De Gen. An. 5. 3. 783 a 15 sqq.), and animals in whose blood the earthy element predominates are spirited in character (De Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 33 sqq.), whereas those whose blood is of a more watery nature have a more subtle intelligence, and, if this wateriness is extreme, are cowardly (650 b 18 sqq.). See vol. i. p. 319, note 1, and De Part. An. 2. 2. 648 a 2–11. A different explanation may be deduced from passages in the Problems ascribed to Aristotle, which are not, however, one of his authentic works (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 100: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 96). ὑμός is connected with internal warmth (De Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 35, θερμότητος γὰρ ποιητικῶν ὁ ὑμός: cp. Probl. 10. 60. 898 a 5, ἢ ὁ ὑμός μετὰ θερμότητος; ὁ γὰρ φόβος κατὰψυχεῖ κτων ὁν (sc. ζῴων) τὸ αἷμα ἐνθερμόν ἔστι, καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ θυμοειδή), and a cold climate, according to Probl. 14. 16. 910 a 38 sqq., makes the flesh close and solid, and so prevents the escape of the internal heat. As to the 'spirit' of the barbarians to whom Aristotle refers, cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 b 28, διὰ ὑμόν, οἱ Χαλκινοί πρὸς τὰ κύματα ἐπικαλέσεται ἀπαντῶσα λαβόντες, καὶ ὁ λαός ἡ βαρβαρικὴ ἀνδρεία μετὰ θυμοῦ ἔστιν: Polyb. 2. 35. 3, διὰ τὸ μὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἀλλὰ συλλήβδην ἀπαν τὸ γενόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν Γαλατῶν θυμὸν μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμῷ βραβείῳ: Seneca, De Ira, 1. 11, quid Cumbrorum Teutonorumque tot millia superfusa Alpibus ita sustulit ut tantae cladiis notitiam ad suos non nuntius sed fama pertulerit, nisi quod erat illis ira pro virtute, and 2. 15 (referred to by Giph. p. 948), 'ut scias,' inquit, 'iram habere in se generosi aliquid, liberas videbis gentes quae iracundissimae sunt, ut Germanos et Scythalas'... Deinde omnes istae feritate liberar gentes, leonum luperquomque ritu, ut servire non possunt, ita nec imperare. Non enim humani vim ingenii, sed feri et intracariabilis habent: nemo autem regere potest, nisi qui et regi. Fere itaque imperia penes eos fuere populos qui mitiore caelo utuntur. As to the meaning of ἔθνος here, see vol. i. p. 318, note 3. In Hom. Hymn. in Apoll. 250 sq., 290 sq. ἔθνος is distinguished from the Peloponnesse and the islands, but not from Hellas.

25. διότερ κ.τ.λ., 'hence they continue comparatively free, but devoid of constitutional organization and unable to rule their neighbours.' They are free in comparison with Asiatics (3. 14.
1285 a 21). Aristotle can hardly include the Macedonians among the 'nations of Europe,' for they were not unable to rule over others, but does he regard them as Greeks? He is probably thinking of the Scythians, Thracians, and Illyrians among other European races: cp. Xen. Cyrop. i. i. 4, and γὰρ τοιοῦτον διῆρεγκε (Κῦρος) τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων . . . ὡσθ' ὦ μὲν Σκύθης, καίστε παραπόλλων ὄστων Σκύθων, ἄλλων μὲν οὐδὲνος δίναι' ἄν ἐδοὺς ἐπάρθθαι, ἀγαπῇ δ' ἄν εἰ τοῦ ἕαυτον ἔδους ἄρχων διαγίνοιτο, καὶ ὁ Θράξ Θρακῶν καὶ ὁ Ἴλλυριός Ἴλλυριῶν, καὶ τᾶλα δὲ ὁσαίτως ἐθνὶ ἀκούομεν τὰ γοῦν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ἔτι καὶ νῦν αὐτόνωμα εἶναι καὶ λελυσθαί ἀπ' ἄλληλων. Contrast Isocr. Paneg. § 67, where the Scythians and Thracians, as well as the Persians, are described as ἀρχικόστατα τῶν γενῶν καὶ μεγίστας δυνατείας ἔχουν.

27. τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς Ἀσίας κ.τ.λ. Αγαμή, cp. Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 553 Kühn, περὶ δὲ τῆς ἄθυμις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς ἀναθρείης, ὅτι ἀπολειμένιοι εἰσιν τῶν Εὐρωπαίων οἱ 'Ασινοὶ καὶ ἡμεροῖνοι τὰ ἤθη κ.τ.λ. Hippocrates, however, in the same treatise (p. 554 Kühn) says justly enough, εἰρήσεις δὲ καὶ τοὺς 'Ασινοὺς διαφέροντες αὐτῶν ἐωτείων, τοὺς μὲν βελτίωνας τοὺς δὲ φαυλότερους ἔωτας. Would Aristotle say of the Persians (cp. c. 2. 1324 b 11) what he says of the Asiatics here? Modern observers take much the same view of Asiatic character. 'The Asiatic is as clever as the European with his hands and wits, though he lacks initiative and the power of government' (Speech of Sir H. H. Johnston, Times, Nov. 7, 1894). Aristotle's account of the Asiatics was hardly flattering to Alexander as the conqueror of Asia, nor did it lend support to his scheme of fusing Greeks and Asiatics. See on the subject vol. i. p. 319, note 3. Aristotle traces similar contrasts between animals to those which he here traces between the nations of Europe and Asia (Hist. An. i. i. 488 b 12, διαφέρουσι δὲ (τὰ ἄνζα) καὶ ταῖς τοιαύταις διαφοραῖς κατὰ τὸ ἱδέα' τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ πράα καὶ δύσθεμα καὶ νῦν ἐνστατικά, οὖν βοῦς, τὰ δὲ ἡμών ἐκντατικά καὶ ἀμαθή, οὖν ἐς ἄγρος, τὰ δὲ φρόνεια καὶ δελτία, οὖν ἐλαφος, δασύτους κ.τ.λ.).

28. διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ, i.e. enslaved to their rulers. Kingship prevailed over most of Asia (Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 553 Kühn), and in many places of a despotic type (3. 14. 1285 a 16 sqq.).

29. τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος κ.τ.λ. Contrast Isocrates' account of the difference between Greeks and barbarians in De Antid. § 293, καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ προεξέπη καὶ διαφέρετε τῶν ἄλλων ὥς τὰς περὶ τῶν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείαις, οὕτω ὦτι κάλλιστα πολιτείαισθε καὶ μάλιστα φυλάττει
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τοῖς νόμοις οὖσιν ὡς ὡμι λείκανοι κατελίστον, ἀλλὰ τούτους διήσερ ἡ φύσις ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἄλλων Δίηνεγκε καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν βαρβάρων, τῷ καὶ πρὸς τὴν φρονήσαν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἀμενων πεπαιδευθεῖ τῶν ἄλλων.

ὁσεῖν μεσεῖε κατά τοὺς τόπους. Τὸν ὀμφαλὸν τῶν αἰφνίδιων Πελοπ. ἡμείς τοῦν ὑποκρίνησαμεν τὰς τούτοις τῶν ἑαυτῶν μὲν ἐπιστήμην, νέοτέραν δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀιώνιας, ἐκαλέσαν τῆς γῆς ὀμφαλῶν κ.τ.λ.). Χενοφόντης αναφέρει τὸν ίδρυτην τῶν Ἑλλήνων τούτων ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον ἑχομένων τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς ἀρετὴν εἰς τοῦ σχεδὸν ἀριστον, τὸ δ' ἐπανευρήματος αὐτοῦ χρῆ λέγεται, ὡς μέσον τοῦ εἰς χειμώνων τε καὶ τῆς θερμῆς φύσεως.

32. καὶ δυνάμενον ἀρχεῖν πάντων, μᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. See vol. i. p. 321, note 1, and compare also the exclamation of Agesilaus in Plut. Ages. c. 16, and Isocr. Paneg. § 131. For miás τυγχάνειν πολιτείας, cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 16 sqq.: Plut. Pelop. c. 24, πᾶσαν Ἀρκадίαν εἰς μιᾶν δύσμαν συνενήσαν, and Diod. 15. 59, ἐπειτα τοὺς Ἀρκάδας εἰς μιᾶν συντέλειαν ταχῦνην: Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 263, οὕτω Χαλκιδῶν πάντων εἰς ἑν συνφιλίσμενοι. What kind of ‘unity of constitution’ Aristotle has in his mind is not clear; he may be thinking of the establishment of a common council of Greece by Philip of Macedon after the battle of Chaeroneia (vol. i. p. 321, note 1), or of an union of the free States of Greece, not under the headship of Macedon, but under some Federal bond. The latter kind of union would be more truly an union of Greeks than an union under the headship of Macedon, and it is of an union of Greeks that Aristotle speaks.

34. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μονοκόλων. Among Hellenic races possessed only of ὀικῶν Ἀριστοτέλης probably counted the Arcadian (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 168) and Aetolian, and possibly also the Boeotian (see above on 1274 a 32), and among those possessed only of διάων some of the Ionians of Asia Minor.

36. φανερῶν τοῖνοι κ.τ.λ. Compare for the phrase εὐαγγέλου τοῦ νομοθέτη Plato, Laws 671 B. Plato had claimed (Rep. 376 A sqq.) that the mildness of the dog to those whom he knows is due to the philosophic element in his nature, and had concluded (376 B), οὐκοῦν διαφοράτης τιθάμεν καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, εἶ μελέτη πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρῶτος τις ἔσεσθαι, φύσει φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλολογίᾳ αὐτῶν δείν

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Aristotle claims, on the contrary, that what Plato ascribes to the philosophic element is really due to θυμός (38 sqq.), inasmuch as it is θυμός that makes men loving. Few ruling races have possessed in perfection the combination of qualities which Aristotle demands in the citizens of his best State. In most perhaps there has been more θυμός than διάνοια.

38. διπερ γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for as to what,' etc. The reference is to Plato, Rep. 375 D sqq. Plato is referred to as τινες also in c. 10. 1329 b 41 sqq. and in other passages collected by Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 62, note 41. Plato's remark that dogs are fierce to those whom they do not know was no doubt suggested by Heraclitus, Fragm. 115 Bywater, κύνες καὶ βαλέοντο ὅν ἀν μὴ γνώσασθαι. The connexion of θυμός with affectionateness appears also in Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b 21, τά δὲ (τῶν ἐφ' αυτοῖς) θυμικὰ καὶ φιλητικὰ καὶ βουλευτικὰ, οἷον κύων. Compare also Top. 2. 7. 113 a 35 (referred to by Schneider), οἷον ἐὰν τὸ μίσος ἐπεστᾶ όργὴ ἐφήσειν, εἰτ ἄν τὸ μίσος ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεί; ἐκεί γὰρ ἡ ὀργή σκεπτέον οὖν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἐναισθένια ἐν τῷ θυμοειδεί; ἡ φιλία; εἰ γὰρ μὴ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ ἐστὶν ἡ φιλία, οὐκ ἀν ἐποτο μίσος ὀργὴ.

Camerarius (Interp. p. 289) remarks that Theognis had already connected love and hatred with θυμός (Theogn. 1091, ἀργαλέως μοι θυμός ἔχει περὶ σῆς φιλότητος' οὔτε γὰρ ἐχθαίρειν οὔτε φιλεῖν δύναμαι).

41. For ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις, cp. De An. 2. 3. 414 a 29 sqq.: Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γάρρος 1. 467 b 16 sqq.: and other passages collected by Bonitz, Ind. 207 a 46 sqq.

1. σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 42, σημεῖον γάρ οὐ μικρὸν 1328 a. διεύρυνται τούτο παρασκευαζόντων ἐν γάρ τοῖς ὀλυμπιονικοῖς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle finds an indication that θυμός is the faculty of love in the fact that when it is stirred it is more stirred in relation to those we love than in relation to those who are unknown to us. Is the following fragment of the Medea of Euripides (Fragm. 2), a tragic poet of the time of Euripides or possibly somewhat earlier, based on the passage of Archilochus of which Aristotle quotes a part?

ἐὰν τί δράσεις, θυμέ; βούλευσαι καλῶς
πρὸς ἡ ἐξαμαρτεῖν καὶ τὰ προσφιλεῖστα
ἔχθαστα διέταξα, τοί ποτ' ἐξῆς (cp. αἱρεταί), τάλας;
κάτισχε λήμα καὶ σθένος θεοστυγές.
καὶ πρὸς τί ταῦτα δύρομαι ψυχῆν ἐμῖν
ὁρίσο' ἐρήμοι καὶ παρμηλημένην (cp. ὀλυμφομέναί)
πρὸς ὑν ἐχρόν ηκίστα;
Cp. also Plato, Laws 717 D, ὑμοιομένως τε ὧν (τοῖς γονεύσι) ὑπείκειν δεῖ καὶ ἀποσιμάλλοι τὸν θυμὸν ... ἣν γυγερφυσάκουτα ὡς ἐκίτως μάλιστα πατήρ νείτε δοξάζων ὁδικείσθαι θυμοὶν ἀν διαφερόντως, and (with Eaton), Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 2, καὶ τοὺς φίλους (ὁργίζοντα) μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις· οἴονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον πάσχειν εὖ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ. Ὁ γάρ θυμὸς αἰρεται, cp. Probl. 27. 3. 947 b 32, διὸ καὶ τὸ ἀναζέων καὶ τὸ ὀρίσεικα τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ταράττεισθαι, καὶ ὡς τοιαῦτα λέγουσιν οὐ κακῶς ἀλλ’ οἰκεῖος, and 2. 26. 869 a 5, καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ζέει τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐστὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, and also Fragm. Trag. Gr. Adespota, 321 Nauck, ἀπράξιος πάντων φρενῶν ἀνωτέρω.

3. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος κ.τ.λ., 'hence Archilochus for instance' (see above on 1255 a 36), 'when he complains of his friends, fittingly enough discourses to his spirit [which is closely connected with friends, saying,] "For thy tortures surely were from friends.' See Archil. Fragm. 66, 67. For ἀπάχχον, cp. Aristoph. Vesp. 686 Didot, ὁ μάλιστα μ’ ἀπάχχοι ('excruciat').

6. καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ κ.τ.λ., i.e. the principle of rule and freedom as well as the capability of affection. Here Aristotle does not dissent from Plato, but agrees with him. He remembers Plato, Rep. 375 B, ἢ οὐκ ἐννενόκας ὡς ἄμαχον τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμός, οὗ πάροντος ψυχή πάσα πρὸς πάντα ἄφοβος τὲ ἔστι καὶ ἀήτητος; where there is evidently a tacit reminiscence of the saying of Heraclitus quoted in 7 (5). 11. 1315 a 30 sq. Compare also Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 a 27, ὡμοὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυσικὴ ἡ τοῦ θυμοῦ (ἀνδρεία) ἀήτητον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς, διὸ καὶ οἱ πάθεις ἀράτα μάχονται, and Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 a 36, ἐνιότε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλείπουσας ἐπανομένους καὶ πρῶτος φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώθεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν.

8. οὕτως καί ἐκεῖ κ.τ.λ. With χαλεποῦς εἶναι supply δεῖν, as in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 3. See note on 1335 b 5. This takes up 1327 b 40, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγρότας ἀγρόν, and corrects Plato, Rep. 375 D sqq. Magnanimous men are fierce only to those who act unjustly, and so far from being fiercer to such persons when unknown to them, they will be fiercer to them when they are familiar friends. Plato, however, had himself said in Laws 731 B, θυμοειδῆ μὲν δὴ χρῆ πάντα ἄνθρο πεῖν, πρῶν δὲ ὦς ὅ ὁ τι μάλιστα.

10. πλῆ. Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares De An. 2. 1. 412 b 20, ἢς ἀπολεποῦσης οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμός, πλῆ ὀμωνύμως.

13. παρ’ οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for in quarters in which they conceive there should be a feeling that the benefit conferred in the past is owed back [and ought to be required], they think that in addition
to the injury done them they are defrauded also of the benefit.' Aristotle mentions in Rhet. 2. 8. 1386 a 11, among things that arouse compassion, τὸ ὅθεν προσήκεν ἀγαθὸν τι πράξαι, ὡς τι νομισμένα.

15. ὅθεν εἰρήται "χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γάρ ἀδελφῶν." We learn from Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 5, χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γάρ ἀδελφῶν, ὡς Εὐριπίδης εἰρήκεν, δυτερόν, χαλεπώτατοι τοῖς γονέοις αὐτοῖς εἰσιν, that this is a fragment of Euripides (Fragm. 965): cp. Democrit. Fragm. Mor. 228 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. i. 355), ὡς τῶν χιλιαδών χιλεπώτεροι μίλησα.


17. τῶν πολιτευομένων, 'those who exercise the rights of citizens in the State': cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 40 and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, and also 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 4 sq.

18. For πόσημον, see above on 1326 a 5.

19. οὗ γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for we must not aim at the same exactness of detail by means of theoretical inquiries as is realized by means of what is presented to us through sense-perception.' For χρησίμως διὰ τῶν λόγων κ.τ.λ., cp. c. 17. 1336 a 5 sqq., and Plut. Pericl. c. 9, θεωρείσθω διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ἢ αἰτία τῆς μεταβολῆς. For τῶν γεγονότων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, cp. De Caelo, 3. 4. 303 a 22, καὶ πιθανὰ τῶν ενδόξων καὶ τῶν φανομένων κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσειν αναφερούν, and for the contrast of οὗ λόγοι καὶ τὰ γεγονότα διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, see Bon. Ind. 20 b 30—39, and above on 1261 b 29. The double διὰ is awkward, but of this kind of awkwardness there are many instances in the Politics: see 2. 6. 1266 a 21 sq., 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 1 sqq., and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 9 sqq. The same thing happens with other prepositions—with πρῶς in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 18 sqq., and 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 38, with περὶ in 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 35 sq. and 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 34, and with ἐν in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 29 sq. and 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 2.

21 sqq. Aristotle here passes on to the question who are to be C. 8 ‘parts of the State.’ It is from cc. 8–10 that we learn most of the little that he tells us as to the constitutional and social organization of his ‘best State.’ He begins by laying down a principle which holds of all things existing by nature, and therefore of the πόλις, and indeed of all κοινωνία which issue in ‘something one in kind.’ In all things that exist by nature the necessary conditions of the existence of the thing are to be distinguished from its parts. Not
all the necessary conditions are parts of the thing, but only those which have something in common. In a πόλις the 'something in common' is 'the best attainable life' (1328a 36), or in other words εὐδαιμονία, and as this is inseparable from virtue (c. 9. 1329a 22), no class of persons is rightly a part of the State whose occupation precludes its attainment of virtue. Hence cultivators, artisans, day-labourers (c. 9. 1329a 35 sq.), and traders (c. 9. 1328b 39) are not to be parts of the State, or in other words are not to be citizens. The classes which will be parts of the State and which will constitute its citizen-body will be τὸ πολεμικὸν (c. 9. 1329a 2), or rather τὸ ὑπλιτικὸν (c. 9. 1329a 31, 37), τὸ βουλευτικὸν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων, and τὸ κρίνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων. Aristotle takes no notice here of a class which he recognizes in 6 (4). 4. 1291a 34 sqq., the official class (τὸ δημοτικὸν), but this also he would no doubt reckon as a part of the State. He is not, however, satisfied with excluding from citizenship the classes which are not δημοτικοὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς (c. 9. 1329a 20); he requires that those who exercise deliberative and judicial functions in his 'best State' shall be over a certain age and yet not too old. In other words he gives supreme authority in his State to men of mature but not too advanced age, who will be presumably possessed of φρόνησις. Plato in his Republic had reserved the rule of the State for a special class of men highly gifted in intellect and character and prepared for rule by a long-continued philosophical training, but Aristotle does not think that the soldiers of the State would submit to be ruled by a class into which they would not ultimately rise; he also insists rather on the possession of φρόνησις by his rulers than on a philosophical training, and φρόνησις is according to him the fruit in fit minds of a ripe age. He follows in fact rather in the track of Plato's Laws than in that of his Republic, for Plato had required in the Laws that the holders of the chief offices should be men of mature years. But Plato had not, like Aristotle, arranged that deliberative and judicial functions should be withdrawn from men over a certain age, though he contemplates in Rep. 498 C the retirement of infirm old men from political and military duties. This was, it would seem, a more or less novel suggestion. Its importance was no doubt brought home to Aristotle's mind by his observation of the ill effects of advanced age on the holders of life-offices in the Lacedaemonian State (2. 9. 1270b 38 sqq.), and probably also in many oligarchies. It will be
noticed that in Aristotle's 'best State' the right of deciding questions of peace, war, and alliance would rest, not with the soldiers who would have to fight for the State in case of war, but with the older citizens (contrast the view of the young Archidamus in Isocr. Archid. § 3 sqq.), and that judicial authority, including no doubt the momentous right of inflicting the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, would also rest with the older citizens. Aristotle evidently thinks that the prospect of succeeding to these great powers after the attainment of a certain age would reconcile the younger citizens to their non-possession of them. He appears to allow the younger citizens to be owners of land (c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.), and perhaps to hold all but the chief military offices. But they are to have nothing to do with deliberative or judicial functions. In this Aristotle would seem to go too far. The attainment of a certain age has often been made a condition of the tenure of the highest political offices. This was the case at Rome (Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 242). Even restrictions of this kind would now and then exclude a William the Silent or a William Pitt. But it is one thing to impose a limit of age on the tenure of the highest offices and another to exclude the younger men from the exercise of all deliberative and judicial functions. How is the future statesman to learn his business, if his earlier career is to be exclusively devoted to the profession of arms, and he is not allowed to hold even minor civil offices? Aristotle is evidently too uncompromising, but we must bear in mind two things, if we wish to do him justice—(1) that he desires supreme authority in the State to be in the hands of those who are morally as well as politically ripe for its exercise; he desires Reason to rule in the State as it rules in the well-constituted individual; (2) that one of his aims is the limitation of war and of indiscriminate conquest, and that his exclusion of the more martially-disposed part of the citizen-body from supreme power in his 'best State' is closely connected with this aim. Nothing had done more to break up and weaken Greece in the fourth century B.C. than the incessant wars which had been waged between the various States—between the Lacedaemonians and the Thebans, the Thebans and the Phocians, the Thessalians of Pherae and the Thessalians of Larissa—and Aristotle may well have thought that the best way to check these wars was to place supreme power in the hands of the older citizens.
21. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὁσπερ κ.τ.λ., 'but since, as in the other things which are constituted according to nature, not all those things are parts of the whole organization without which the whole would not exist, it is evident that neither must all those things be taken to be parts of the State which must necessarily be possessed by States, nor must we take as parts of any other union issuing in something one in kind all the things which are essential to such an union.' As this sentence stands, the words τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτων would seem to be in the gen. after τῆς ὀλίγης συντάσεως, but it is probable that Aristotle began the sentence with the intention of making these words in the gen. after μόρια and inserted τῆς ὀλίγης συντάσεως only by an afterthought. For the thought, cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 2, τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλης, ὅσο οὖν πάντας θετέοι πολίτας ὃν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις, and for the distinction between ὃν οὐκ ἄνευ and μέρη, cp. (with Eaton) Eth. Eud. 1. 2. 1214 b 26, ὃν ἄνευ γὰρ οὐκ ὅδω τε εὐθαμοῦειν, ἕνω μέρη τῆς εὐθαμονίας εἶναι νομίζοναι. Plato had already drawn a similar distinction: cp. Polit. 287 D, ὅσαι γὰρ συμκρόν ἡ μέγα τι δημιουργοῦσι κατὰ πόλιν ὄργανον, θετέοι ἄπασα τῶν ὃς ὀύσας συναιτίους—ἀνέυ γὰρ τούτων οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοετο πόλις οὐδὲ πολιτικῆ τούτων ὃς ἀν δυσεικής ἔργον τέχνης οὐδέν ποι ὂνθομεν, and (with Eaton) Phaedo 99 B, and see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 331. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 360, note 1). Τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτα are so termed in contradistinction to τὰ ἀπὸ τέχνης and to τὰ ἀπὸ τέχνης and ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου (De Part. An. i. 1. 640 a 27—b 4). They are things which have in them a principle of motion and rest, whether that motion takes the form of locomotion, or increase and decay, or alteration: cp. Phys. 2. 1. 192 b 8, τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φύσει, τὰ δὲ δὴ ἄλλας αἰτίας, φύσει μὲν τὰ τὸ ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλὰ τῶν σωμάτων, οὖν γὰρ καὶ τῶρ καὶ ἄρη καὶ ὄδωρ ταύτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φαμέν. πάντα δὲ τὰ ῥήματα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρός τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ φύσει ὄντα πάντα φαίνεται ἔξωντα ἐν ἐαυτοῖς ἄρχῃν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ καὶ αὕτης καὶ φύσις, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀλλοίωσιν (whereas the products of art have no such principle of motion and rest in them, except accidentally, so far as they are formed of earth or stone or other natural entities). Some of these natural entities are eternal, others are subject to generation and decay (De Part. An. i. 5. 644 b 22 sqq.); some of them are bodies and magnitudes (for instance, the human body), others possess body and magnitude (for instance, a human being), others are principles within beings possessing
body and magnitude (for instance, the soul): cp. De Caelo, 1. 1. 268 a 4 sqq., and see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 384. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 417, note 2). The πῶλες, we learn from the passage before us, belongs to the class of natural entities; it must belong to the subdivision of this class which consists of 'things possessing body and magnitude.' As to the words οὖν ἀλλὰ κοινωνίας οὐδεμίας, εἷς ἐν τί τὸ γένος, see vol. i. p. 43, note 1.

27. οὖν εἶτε τροφῆ κ.τ.λ. Food is the 'common thing' in the case of a συνσίτοιν, a certain amount of land in the case of the owners of an undivided estate (2. 5. 1263 b 23 sq.).

28. ὅταν δ' ἢ κ.τ.λ. That there is nothing in common between the craftsman who uses an instrument and the instrument used, we learn in Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32, ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινὸν ἔστι τῷ ἀρχοντι καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλίαν οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον ἀλλ' οὖν τεχνίτη πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχή πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς δοῦλον ὡφελείται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὡς τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὖν ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα οὐδὲ δίκαιον· ἀλλ' οὖν πρὸς ἔπον ἡ βούλι, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ἡ δούλι. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινὸν ἔστιν· ὃ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμυσικον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἀϕεξος δοῦλος: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 9. 1241 b 17–24 and 7. 10. 1242 a 11 sqq. A slightly different lesson is taught in the passage before us. Here we learn that there is nothing in common between the instrument and the craftsman on the one hand and the product they bring into being on the other, except this, that the instrument and the craftsman act and the product is acted upon. That where one thing acts and another is acted upon there must be something common to the two things, we see from De An. 3. 4. 429 b 22, ἀπορήσεις δ' ἄν τις, Ε' οὖν ἀπολύου ἔστι καὶ ἀπαθεῖ καὶ μηδὲν μηδὲν ἕκει κοινῆς, ὡσπερ φησίν 'Ἀναξαγόρας, πῶς νοῆσει, ἐκ τὸ νοεῖν πᾶσχειν τί ἔστων· ἣ γὰρ τὶ κοινὸν ἁμοίου ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ δοκεί τὸ δὲ πᾶσχειν. But two things thus related to each other need not have much in common: see vol. i. p. 323, note 1. The usual antithesis to ποιεῖν is πᾶσχειν, not λαμβάνειν, but we find λαμβάνειν τὴν μορφήν contrasted with ποιεῖν in De Gen. An. 1. 21. 729 b 6 sqq.: cp. also Hist. An. 6. 23. 577 a 29 sqq., where λαμβάνειν = δέχεσθαι. In the passage before us the instrument and the craftsman who uses it are said ποιήσαι and the work produced by them λαβεῖν.

34. οὖν γὰρ δ' ἔστιν ἡ κτήσις μέρος ἡς πώλεως, because property stands to the πώλεις as a means stands to the end to which it is a means, and thus there is nothing in common between property and the πώλεις except that the former acts on the πώλεις and the πώλεις
is acted upon. It follows that slaves, who are animate articles of property—and χερνήτες, including βάναυσα τεχνίτα, are brought under the head of slaves in 3. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq.—are not parts of the State. ‘It was a maxim of ancient jurisprudence,’ says Gibbon (Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, c. 2), ‘that a slave had not any country of his own; he acquired with his liberty an admission into the political society of which his patron was a member.’ Contrast with οὗτος δ’ ἐστιν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως, Oecon. i. 1. 1343 a 10, πόλις μὲν οὖν οἰκίων πλῆθος ἐστι καὶ χώρας καὶ χρημάτων αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ἐν ζην.

35. ἢ δὲ πόλις κ.τ.λ. Τῶν ὁμοίων is emphatic. Κοινωνία τις, because there are other κοινωνία τῶν ὁμοίων besides the πόλις, e.g. trading or religious associations. For the thought, cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25, βούλεται δὲ γε ἡ πόλις εἷς ἰσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὁτι μᾶλλον. When Aristotle says in 2. 2. 1261 a 22, οὐ μόνον δ’ ἐκ πλείσθων ἄνθρωπων ἐστιν ἡ πόλις, ἄλλα καὶ εἶς εἴδει διαφερόντων ὀυ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις εἷς ὁμοίων, he is thinking of the distinction between rulers and ruled, so far as he is not using the word πόλις in a wider sense (see vol. i. p. 40).


38. τέλειος is here the fem., as in Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 16, Metaph. Δ. 6. 1016 b 17, and Phys. 8. 8. 264 b 28. In c. 13. 1332 a 9 we have χρησίν ἀρετής τελείας, and the form τελεία seems to be the commoner form of the fem. in Aristotle's writings, to judge by the Index Aristotelicus.

συμβέβηκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. Slaves have no share in happiness (3. 9. 1280 a 33). Βάναυσα, ὁγοραίοι, and γεωργοὶ live lives unfavourable to virtue (c. 9. 1328 b 40 sqq.), and so do not share in happiness. There are persons excluded from happiness on account of some defect of nature or fortune (c. 13. 1331 b 40 sq.). For συμβαίνων ὡστε, cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 34 sq. and 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12.

40. δῆλον ὡς κ.τ.λ. For the various accounts given in the Politics of the causes of constitutional diversity, see vol. i. p. 220 sqq. For εἶδη καὶ διαφοράς, cp. Phys. 3. 5. 205 b 31, τόπον δὲ εἶδη καὶ διαφοράς τῶν καὶ κάτω καὶ ἐμπροσθεν καὶ ὀπισθεν καὶ δεξιῶν καὶ ἀριστερῶν.

41. ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον κ.τ.λ. Ἀλλον τρόπον is a wider expression than δ’ ἄλλων, which is added in explanation and to give increased precision to its meaning. Cp. c. 15. 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐστιτι, and 3. 18. 1288 a 39. For τούτῳ τε βίους καὶ τὰς πολιτείας, cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40, ἢ γὰρ πολιτεία βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως. For the
middle ποιοῦνται, 'make for themselves' (not ποιοῦσιν), cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 31, συμβεβήκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖται τὰς παιδιὰς τέλος, and Meteoor. 1. 5. 342 b 22, τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων φαινόμενον ὡσα ταχείας ποιεῖται τὰς φαινομενά.

2. καὶ πόσα κ.τ.λ., i.e. not only what the parts of the State are, 1328 b. but also how many are the things without which the State cannot exist. For the omission of the article before πόλις, cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 2, τοῦτο γὰρ άλλης, ὅσο ὦν πάντας βετέον πολίτες δὲν ἦν οὐκ ἀν εὖ πόλις, and 2. 2. 1261 a 24, οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις εὖ ὁμοίων: also 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 34 sq.

4. ἐν τούτοις ἄν εὖ (ά) ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν. See critical note.

5. τῶν ἔργων, 'the services which a State needs' (cp. 1328 b 19, ἐργασίας).

6. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 369 C, ἄλλα μὴν πρώτῃ γε καὶ μεγίστῃ τῶν χρειῶν ἢ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκευῇ τῷ εἶναι τε καὶ ζῷν ἑνεκα. Παντίπαται γε. Δευτέρα δὴ οἰκήσεως, τρίτη δὲ ἐσθήτος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. 'Εστι ταῦτα: also Critias 110 C, ἢ λείπει δὴ τὸν ἐν τῇ χάρᾳ τά μὲν ἄλλα ἐθνικά τῶν πολιτῶν περί τάς δημοσιώργας ὅσα καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφῆν, τό δὲ μάχην ὡς ἀνδρῶν θείων κατὰ ἀρχὰς ἀφορισθέν ςυνδετι κ.τ.λ.


8. καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς, 'within their own body also,' as well as in the hands of any mercenaries they may employ or any allies they may possess. Cp. Plato, Laws 697 E, where the misery of a State dependent for its defence on mercenaries is depicted, and Philoch. Fragm. 132 (Müller, Gr. Hist. Gr. 1. 406), μὴ ἔξωκιν ἄλλο αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων. Cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq., and Thuc. 1. 121, δάνειασα γὰρ ποιηθέντοις ὑπολαβεῖν οἷοι τ' ἐστὶν μισθῷ μείζων τοῦ ἐξουσίας αὐτῶν ναιβάτας· ἀναλήγη γάρ Ἀθηναίων ἡ δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία.

πρὸς τε τὴν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθοῦντων χάριν. Cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 27-31.

10. χρημάτων τῶν εύπορίαν, 'a certain abundance of money,' in contradistinction to εὐπορία τροφῆς, ὑπάρχου, etc.

11. καὶ πρὸς πολεμικάς. Schneider, Bekker², and Susemihl add τὰς before πολεμικάς, but cp. c. 11. 1330 a 41, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρὸς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καθὼς ἐχειν. 'In the non-repetition of the article, and also of prepositions, Aristotle appears, if I do not mistake, to go further than other prose-writers' (Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, 3. 330).
12. καὶ πρῶτον, 'and first in excellence,' cp. Isocr. Areop. § 29, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ περὶ τοῦς θεοὺς, ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἀρχεσθαι δίκαιον. Τὰ διαμόναν are placed first in the list of subjects of official competence given in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 29 sqq. Cp. also 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 40, τῆς πρώτης καὶ δευτέρας (πολιτείας), and Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 a 23, τῶν δὲ κτημάτων πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἀναγκαιότατον τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ ἡγεμονικότατον τούτο δ᾽ ἦν ἀνθρωπος.


15. μὲν οὖν is answered by δὲ, 24. Susemihl places in a parenthesis everything between ἡ γάρ, 16, and συμφιλώσων, 23, but the parenthesis should stop at ταύτην, 19, for ἀνάγκη τοιῶν, 19, introduces an inference from 15, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐργα ταύτ᾽ ἐστίν δὲν δεῖ ταῦτα πάσα πόλις ὡς εἰσίν.


ἐὰν δὲ τι τυγχάνῃ τοιῶν ἐκλείπου Κ.Τ.Λ. Τοῦτων, sc. τῶν ἐργῶν. This would be the case in the ἀναγκαιότατη πόλις of Plato, Rep. 369 C–E, where there are no soldiers or priests or men of judicial or deliberative skill. For τὴν κοινωνίαν ταύτην, 'the society in which this occurs,' see above on 1276 a 14.

19. κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν, 'should be composed in accordance with these industries': cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32, βούλεται γὰρ ἑκατέρα (ι.ε. ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία) κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην.

20. Aristotle forgets that herdsmen, fishermen, and hunters are also providers of food.

22. κριτᾶς τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων. Lamb., followed by Bekk. and Sus., reads δικαίων in place of ἀναγκαίων (cp. 14 sq.), but compare the passages collected in vol. i. p. 323, note 2, and also Polyaen. Strateg. 6. 1. 5, ὡς συμβούλῳ Χρησάμενοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς, and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 40, τοῦτος οὖν προσέχετε τῶν νοῦν, καὶ ὕμων δόξη δικαία τε καὶ συμφέροντα τῷ κοινῷ, προσθῆκε ὁ ὅτι καὶ ἀναγκαία, συγγραφόνετε ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τυχεῖν ἐκόστε. Judges are probably included under κριτᾶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, the broad term τὰ ἀναγκαία comprising τὰ δικαία τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλους.

C. 9. 25. πάντων τοιῶν, sc. τῶν ἐργῶν.

ἐνδέξεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for it is possible that the same men should be all of them both cultivators and artisans and the deliberators and judges.' Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2 sqq.
27. ἢ καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἐργὸν τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους ὑποθετέων, 'or whether for each of the above-mentioned services we are to assume the existence of a separate class.' For καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἐργὸν τῶν εἰρημένων, not καθ' ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐργῶν, see note on 1283 b 4, καθ' ἐκάστην πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων.

29. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταύτῳ πολιτείᾳ, 'but the same arrangement does not prevail in every constitution.'

καθάπερ εἰσπομεν, in 24—28.

31. ταύτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these differing arrangements as to participation [besides being different themselves] also make constitutions different.' This proves their possibility. Cp. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 3 sqq.

34. αὐτὴ δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 2. 1324 a 23 sqq.

36. εἰρήται πράτερον, in c. 1. 1323 b 29 sqq.

38. τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἄνδρας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, 'that which possesses men absolutely just and not merely just relatively to the principle which may happen to be taken as the groundwork of the State': cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 3 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36 sqq.: 2. 9. 1269 a 32 sqq. See also Bon. Ind. 797 a 52 sqq.

39. οὐτε βάναυσον βίον οὔτ' ἀγοραῖον δεὶ ζήν τοὺς πολίτας. Plato had already forbidden the citizens of the State of the Laws, or even their slaves, to practise a handicraft (846 D), and had forbidden the practice of retail trade with a view to money-making to any one except strangers (847 D; 849 C sqq.; 920 A). Thus he goes farther in this matter than Aristotle.

40. ἀγεννὴς γάρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26 sqq., and (with Eaton) i. 11. 1258 b 38, ἀγεννηστάτα δὲ (τῶν ἐργασίων) ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἄρετής.

πρὸς ἄρετην ὑπεναιτίος. Plato (Laws 920 B) had reckoned retail trade among the ἐπιπεδώματα ἀ προτροπὴν ἐχει τινά ἀγεννηστάτα πρὸς τὸ προσρέπειν κακοὺς γίγνεσθαι. He has in his mind not only the adulteration practised by retailers (Laws 917 E, 920 C), but also their habit of exacting an excessive profit (Laws 918 D, 920 C).


τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐσεσθαι, sc. πολίτας. Omissions of this kind are not rare in the Politics: see vol. ii. p. li, note 4, and note on 1266 b 1.
NOTES.

1329 a. 1. deι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the connexion of leisure with virtue and capacity for rule, cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 28, σχολαστικῶτερον γὰρ γεγ
νόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὔπορίας καὶ μεγαλοψυχοτέρου πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν: 2. 11. 1273 a 24, ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν: 2. 9. 1269 a 34 sqq. Compare also Eurip. Suppl. 406 Bothe (420 Dind.),
yαπὸνος δ’ ἀνηρ πένης,
eἰ καὶ γένουτο μὴ ἀμαθῆς, ἔργων ὑπὸ
οὐκ ἄν δύνατο πρῶς τὰ κοιν’ ἀποβλέπειν.

4. καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα δόντα, ‘and evidently are in an especial sense parts of the State, [so that there is no question to be raised as to their citizenship, such as has been raised as to the citizenship of the βάναυσοι and γεωργοί].’

5. ἑπερὰ καὶ ταῦτα θετέον. Susemihl, following Coray and Bekk.², inserts ἑτέρους after ἑπερὰ, but cp. c. 10. 1329 a 41, ὅτι δει διηρήσαται
χόρις κατὰ γένη τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ τέμαχιον ἑτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν.

6. ἄμφως, sc. τὰ ἔργα, i.e. τὸ πολεμεῖν καὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν: cp. 8, ἐκτέρου τῶν ἔργων.

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τούτο. It has already (1328 b 37) been said to be φανερὸν that the citizens must not be βάναυσοι or ἀγαρίδοι or
γεωργοί.

διότι τρόπον μὲν τίνα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 14. 1332 b 41, ἐστι μὲν ἄρα ὡς
tους αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἐστι δὲ ὡς ἑτέρους. For καὶ
before ἑτέρους, see above on 1324 a 19.

8. ἑτέρος ἀκμῆς, ‘a different prime.’ Warlike activity suits the prime of the body, which, according to Rhet. 2. 14. 1390 b 9 sqq.,
falls between thirty and thirty-five years of age, whereas deliberative and judicial activity suits the prime of the soul and the intelligence,
which Aristotle places at forty-nine (ibid.) or fifty (Pol. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 32 sqq.). Plato places the prime both of body and of
wisdom for men between thirty and fifty-five years of age; he does not seem to have discriminated the two primes, like Aristotle:


δὲ τῶν ἄδυνάτων κ.τ.λ. Eaton compares Xen. Cyrop. 7. 5. 79
and Thuc. 3. 27. Cp. also Plut. Aristid. c. 22.

12. For the construction of μένειν ἣ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν,
cp. Plato, Rep. 429 b, οὐ γὰρ, οἷμαι, εἶτον, οὐ γε ἄλλοι ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ δειλὴι
ἡ ἀνδρείας ὄντες κύριοι ἃν εἴη ἡ τοῖοι αὐτὴν εἶναι ἡ τοῖαν.

13. λείτυσαι τοῖοις κ.τ.λ., ‘the only course left, then, is to assign
these constitutional rights’ (i.e. those of fighting, judging, and
deliberating) 'to the same men and to both classes' (i.e. both to those who have strength and to those who have wisdom), 'not however simultaneously; but in the natural order of things strength is found in younger men and wisdom in older men; therefore it is advantageous that distribution should be made to both classes in this way' (i.e. so that fighting should fall to the younger men, and deliberating and judging to the older men), 'and it is just that this should be so, for this division of functions has in it conformity to desert.' Ἀποδιδόναι takes up τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἀμφω, 6. For τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην, see note on 1264 a 38. There is, however, just a possibility that πολιτείαν has been repeated from the preceding line by an error on the part of the copyist of the archetype and has taken the place of λειτουργίαν or τάξιν or some such word: cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 20, where πολιτείας, repeated from πολιτικῶν in the preceding line, has taken the place of βοηθείας in R Ms and Vat. Pal. Vict. interprets τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην 'hanc curam in republica' and Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 47 sq.) 'hanc partem republicae administrandae.' Sus. would substitute ἀμφότερα for ἀμφότεροι and ταύτα for ταύτην (Mr. Welldon follows him in the former change but not in the latter), and would make τὴν πολιτείαν (in the sense of 'the best constitution') the subject of ἀποδιδόναι. But perhaps no change in ἀμφότεροι is necessary. The reading ἀμφότεροι is supported by ἀμφότερος, 16. For δὶσπερ πέφυκεν, cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 11, ἔπεφυκεν, and Meteor. 2. 4. 360 b 2, ὡς πέφυκεν. For the addition of καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι (sc. ὑπὸ ὅ), compare the addition of καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον in 3. 17. 1287 b 37 sqq. and that of καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν in 1. 9. 1256 b 40. Welldon, however, may possibly be right in reading δίκαιων ἑτέρων in place of δίκαιων ἑτερων (see critical note). In assigning strength to younger men and wisdom to older, Aristotle perhaps has before him Hom. II. 13. 727-734, 19. 216-219, and 3. 108 sqq.: cp. also Eurip. Fragm. 293 and 511, and Aeschin. c. Timarch. cc. 24, 139. Wisdom was often ascribed not to πρεσβύτεροι, but to old men (e.g. by Pindar, Fragm. 182, cp. Plut. An Seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 10, and Plato, Laws 653 A: by Sophocles, Fragm. 240, contrast Eurip. Fragm. 25: and by Euripides, Fragm. 622), but Aristotle ascribes it to πρεσβύτεροι. What exact age Aristotle designates by this word, it is difficult to say. In c. 16. 1335 b 29 (see note) those over fifty or even fifty-five years of age are referred to: on the other hand, in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 23 οἱ πρεσβύτεροι are contrasted not with οἱ νέωτεροι, but with
NOTES.

ol νειο. As the prime of the intelligence is placed by him at forty-nine or fifty (see above on 8), perhaps this is the age intended. Alcibiades was probably about thirty-five when he became the advocate of the Syracusan expedition. The saying of Eupeolus in his Demi, μη παδι τα κυνοι (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 467 : cp. Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 128), was famous. Aristophanes makes the Athenian Demos say of the young men (Eq. 1382 Didot: cp. Isocr. Areop. § 45),

μα Δι', ἄλλ' ἀναγκάσω κυνηγετείν ἐγὼ
tóstous ἄπαντας, παυσαμένους ψηφισμάτων.

In the Polity or moderate Democracy which existed at Syracuse before the Athenian attack, the younger men were excluded from office by law (Thuc. 6. 38. 5). We read in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebus publ. 31, νόμος δὲ ἦν Χαλκιδεύσι μὴ ἀρβαί μηδὲ πρεσβεύαι νεότερον ἐτῶν πεντήκοντα. A somewhat similar principle underlay the ordo magistratuum at Rome. Alcibiades, on the other hand, contends in Thuc. 6. 18. 6 that deliberation is most likely to be successful when it is carried on by old and young men together: compare the arguments put in the mouth of the young Archidamus by Isocrates (Archid. § 3 sqq.).

17. ἄλλα μήν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes on from the γεωργοι, τεχνίται, τὸ μάχιμον, and the κρηταὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων (c. 8. 1328 b 20 sqq.) to τὸ εὐπορον (1328 b 22), and in 1329 a 27 sqq. to οἱ ἑρείκε. Περὶ τούτων corresponds to τοῦτων, 25 (Bon. Ind. 579 b 43 sqq.). By τούτων Aristotle means soldiers, judges, and delibera tors (cp. c. 10. 1329 b 36 sqq.). I add εἴναι with Bekk., Sus., and others, though its omission may possibly be defensible, cp. c. 10. 1330 a 25, where however there is an εἴναι close at hand, and Rhet. 3. 12. 1414 a 18, τὸ δὲ προσδιαρείσθαι τὴν λέξην, ὅτι ἥδειαι δὲ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ, περίεργον, and see Vahlen on Poet. c. 24. 1459 b 7. Εὐπορία must be possessed by the citizens, for otherwise they will not be at leisure to attend to politics.

21. τὴς ἀρετῆς δημιουργῶν. This phrase comes from Plato, Rep. 500 D, ἀρα κακῶν δημιουργῶν αὐτῶν οἶει γενόσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαίωσίνης καὶ ξυμπάθεις τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; It is, however, implied in the saying of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 326 E, τοῦτο τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μὲνει πόλει εἶναι, οὐδὲνει δὲι διωστεῖαν. Contrast the description of the χρηματιστῆς in Plato, Gorg. 452 C as πλούσιον δημιουργόν.

tοῦτο δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but this' (i.e. the fact that βάναυσαι and generally
those who are not producers of virtue ought not to be citizens)
'is manifest from the principle which forms the basis of our State,
for happiness must be forthcoming in it in close alliance with virtue,
and we should pronounce a State happy, looking not to a part of it,
but to all its citizens, [so that all the citizens must be virtuous,
whence it follows that βάναυσοι and their likes must not be citizens].'
In requiring that all the citizens shall be happy, Aristotle here goes
beyond 2. 5. 1264 b 17 sqq., and in requiring that they shall all be
virtuous beyond 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sqq. For τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, cp. c. 9. 1328 b 35, τὴν δ᾽ εὐδαιμονίαν
ὅτι χωρίς ἀρετῆς οἶδονντον ὑπάρχειν εἰρήται πρότερον, and Plato, Laws
742 E, σχέδον μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἦμα καὶ ἄγαθοὺς ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι.

25. φανέρων δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and this also is evident that the landed
properties should belong to these' (i.e. to the soldiers, judges, and
deliberators), 'if, as is the case,' etc. The landed properties might
have been given to the cultivators (to whom Plato had given them
in the Republic, 2. 5. 1264 a 32 sqq.), if it were not necessary that
they should be slaves or barbarian serfs.

28. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν κ.τ.λ. Compare the regulation as to the
purchase of a priesthood in Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 369,
ἀνέσθω δὲ ὅσ [κα ἡ ὅλ]άκληρος καὶ ὁ δαμοσιοργίας [μέτεστι], and see
Haussoullier's note quoted by Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 323,
ote 5, and also No. 358, μὴ ἐξείναι κα[τάρ]χεσθαι εἰς τὸ Ἰπαί[ον]
ἐίναι μηδενὶ, and [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 73.

30. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The reasoning is—the gods should be
worshipped by citizens, but we have ranged all the active citizens
either in the hoplite or in the deliberative class (Aristotle here
appears to merge the judicial in the deliberative class: cp. 1328 b 26,
τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ δικαίωτας, and 1329 a 3 sq.), so that we must
assign the priesthoods to those of the citizens who are past the age
for work. Citizens who are past work are still ἰωσ πολίται (3. 1.
1275 a 14 sqq.). Aristotle thinks it fitting that the easy and
recreational work of paying honour to the gods should fall, not, as
was often the case in Greece, to those whose strength was unim-
paired, but to those who had become infirm through age (cp. 5 (8).
7. 1342 b 20 sqq., where easy harmonies are recommended to οἱ
ἀπειρηκότες διὰ χρόνου). Plato, on the contrary, had advised (Rep.
498 C sqq.) that in old age, when strength declines and military and
political work is over, men who are to be happy should reserve
themselves exclusively for philosophy. See also on this subject
vol. i. p. 329 sq. At Sparta men of advanced years were allowed to discharge important public functions (2. 9. 1270 b 38 sqq.), and this Aristotle does not approve. He does not intend to withdraw from the βασιλεῖς, ἄρχοντες, or προτάνεις the public sacrifices connected with the common hearth of the State which it was their function to offer (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.). These were not priestly sacrifices, and it is of priests alone that Aristotle is speaking in the passage before us. Ἀνάπαυσις is rather 'relaxation' than 'repose': cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 15 sqq. For the connexion of relaxation with the worship of the gods, cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 24, τιμᾶς ἀπονέμουσαι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις παρίζωσε μεθ' ἥδων, and Plato, Rep. 364 E (where Stallbaum compares Hdt. 8. 99, ἐν θυσίαί τε καὶ εὐπαρχίαι, and 9. 11, Ὑπαρχά τε ἄγεται καὶ παῖσετε), and Laws 803 D sq.

34. ὧν μὲν τοῖνυ...1329 b 35, ζητεῖν. I incline to regard this passage as an interpolation and as not being from the pen of Aristotle. As to 40, ἐοικε δὲ...1329 b 35, ζητεῖν, I have already spoken in vol. i. Appendix E, and if we reject this passage, as we should probably do, it is difficult to retain the recapitulation, 34, ὧν μὲν τοῖνυ...39, κατὰ μέρος. For this recapitulation cannot have been immediately followed by the second recapitulation 1329 b 36, ὧτι μὲν οὗν...39, χώραν, and to expunge (with Sus.) this second recapitulation is not advisable, for then the mention of τῆς διανομῆς in 39 becomes extremely abrupt, inasmuch as the reference to the territory which prepares the way for it in the text as it stands will have disappeared. The passage 40, ἐοικε δὲ...1329 b 35, ζητεῖν appears still more clearly to have been interpolated. It may have been originally an annotation written by some member of the Peripatetic School on the margin of his copy of the Politics, and may have crept from the margin into the text. It is apparently intended to excuse and account for the absence of a special investigation of the question whether the fighting class should be distinct from the cultivating class. Thus we are told at its close (1329 b 33 sqq.) that it is useless to waste time in investigating what is well settled, and that one should investigate only what has been overlooked. It should be noticed that it says nothing of the existence in India both of castes and of a distinction between the fighting and cultivating classes, though Megasthenes, not very long after the time when the Politics was written, testified to this (ap. Strab. p. 703, φησὶ δὴ (ὁ Μεγασθένης) τὸ τῶν Ἰνδῶν πλῆθος εἰς ἑπτὰ μέρη
 διηρήσθαι κ.τ.λ.), but it would be rash to conclude that, if the passage is an interpolation, its author wrote before the publication of Megasthenes’ work. That it stood where it stands in the Politics in the days of the authority followed by Stobaeus in his account (Ecl. 2. 6. 17) of the Political Theory of the Peripatetics is likely, for he says of the distribution of functions between the young, the elders, and the old, ταύτην δ’ ἄρχαίαν εἶναι πάνω τὴν διάταξιν, Λιγυπτίων πρῶτων καταστησαμένων, πολιτικοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὥσ την, which evidently refers, however inaccurately, to the views expressed in this part of c. 10. The late Prof. Chandler and Bojesen, indeed, contented themselves with rejecting only a part of the passage 1329 a 40... b 35; the former rejected 1329 b 3, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην... 25, Σεσώστριος, and the latter 1329 b 5, ἄρχαία... 25, Σεσώστριος. The part they reject is certainly the most evidently spurious part, but much suspicion also attaches to the part which they retain, 1329 b 25–35 (see vol. i. Appendix E), and on the whole I incline to reject the entire passage 1329 a 40–b 35, together with the recapitulation which precedes it, 1329 a 34–39.

35. γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for cultivators and artisans and the whole class of labourers are a necessary appurtenance of the State’ (literally, ‘a thing necessary to belong to States’): compare for the construction c. 10. 1330 a 3, περὶ συσστίων τε συνδοκεῖ πᾶοι χρήσιμον εἶναι (sc. τὰ συσστία) ταῖς εὗ κατεσκευασμέναι πόλεσιν ὑπάρ- χειν, and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 7, δ’ τοῦτον ὑδεῖν ἥττον ἕστων ἰαναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, and see Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 643 C, ὡς ἰαναγκαῖα προμεμαθηκέναι.

37. τὸ τε ὀπλιτικόν καὶ βουλευτικόν. For the absence of the article before βουλευτικόν, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 8, τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀπλιγραχικόν καὶ δημοκρατικάν.

38. καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ κ.τ.λ. For καὶ... δὴ see above on 1253 a 18. Κατὰ μέρος, Vict. ‘per vices,’ i.e. in such a way that the one succeeds the other.

40. Ἐσοκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. As has been pointed out in vol. i. C. 10. Appendix E, Greek writers are always glad to claim the authority of antiquity in support of their suggestions. Reference has already there been made to Demosth. in Lept. c. 89: compare also Lucian, De Saltat. c. 7, καὶ πρῶτον γε ἑκεῖνο πάνω ἢγγικέναι μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς οἱ νεώτεροι τὸ τῆς ἄρχησεως ἐπιτήδευμα τούτῳ ἐστιν, ὡθεὶς χθὲς καὶ πρῶην ἀξιόμενον, οἷον κατὰ τούς προπατόρας ἠμῶν ἡ τῶν ἑκεῖνον, ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. Isocrates says (De Antid. § 82) that the most ancient laws were
thought the best. For τῶν περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφῶν cp. 3. i. 1274 b 32, τὸ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι. Διηρήσθαι χωρίς, 41, appears to take up κεκόρωσται, 38. For διηρήσθαι χωρίς κατὰ γένη cp. 1329 b 23, ὁ χωρίσμως ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλῆθους. States were also divided κατὰ συσσίτια and κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ φυλᾶς (2. 5. 1264 a 6 sqq.).

1329 b. 2. ἐν Ἀιγύπτῳ τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. In Egypt there was a general distribution of the population into γένη (Hdt. 2. 164, where, however, the γεωργοὶ are not mentioned as one of the γένη: contrast Diod. i. 73 sq., where the classes enumerated are priests, kings, warriors, herdsmen, cultivators, and artisans). Herodotus dwells rather on the prohibition of βάναυσοι τέχναι to the warrior class in Egypt than on the prohibition of agriculture (2. 165, καὶ τούτων βάναυσις οὐδεὶς δεδάκται οὐδὲν, ἀλλ’ ἀνέστοι εἰς τὸ μάχημα), and so do Isocrates (Busir. § 18) and Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 4 sub fin.), but Plato in Tim. 24 B refers to the separation of the warrior class in Egypt from the herdsmen, hunters, and cultivators. The names of Sesostris and Minos are mentioned in the passage before us to show the antiquity of this institution in Egypt and Crete. The separation of the warriors from those who practise other arts is ascribed by Isocrates (Busir. § 15 sqq.) not to Sesostris, but to Busiris; ‘legislation respecting the warrior class,’ however, is ascribed by Diodorus (i. 94. 4) to Sesoosis (Sesostris), whom he calls the third lawgiver of Egypt, and Dicaearchus (Fragm. 7: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 235) credits him with a law making all arts hereditary. The passage before us evidently implies that the distinction between warriors and cultivators survived in Egypt even in the writer’s day, i.e. that the cultivators did not serve as soldiers, nor the soldiers as cultivators.

5. ἀρχαία δὲ κ.τ.λ. With the object of proving that political institutions and laws are of early date (cp. 31 sqq.), the writer instances another institution, that of the syssitia. Compare the similar transition from the subject of the distinction of warriors and cultivators to that of syssitia in 2. 10. 1271 b 41 sqq.

6. τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην, sc. συσσίτια, in apposition to τῶν συσσιτίων ἦ τάξις.

7. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τούτων. This results from the fact that in Italy syssitia were as old as the introduction of the names ‘Italy’ and ‘Italians’ and the conversion of the Italians from nomads into cultivators.
8. φασὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Antiocbus of Syracuse is probably referred to, for the facts here related are derived from him: cp. Antiocbus. Fragm. 3 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 181), "Αντίοχος Σινωφάνεος τάδε συνέγραψε περὶ Ιταλίας... τὴν γῆν ταύτην, ἵνα τῶν Ἰταλία καλεῖται, τὸ παλαιὸν εἶχον Οἰνωπτοὶ." "Επείτα διεξέλθων δὴ τρόπους ἐποιεῖτον και ὄσα βασιλεύειν ἐν αὐτοῖς Ἰταλὸς ἀνὰ χρόνους ἐγένετο, ὥσπερ μετανοήσθησαν Ἰταλοὶ, κ.τ.λ.: Fragm. 4, Ιταλία δὲ ἀνὰ χρόνους ἀνομάσθη ἐπ᾽ ἄνδρας δυνατοῖ, ὄνομα Ἰταλοῦ. Τώτου δὲ φησιν Ἀντίοχος ὁ Συρακούσιος... ἀπασάν ὡς ἑαυτῷ ποιήσασθαι τὴν γῆν, ὅσ τὸ ἐντὸς ἦν τῶν κόλπων τοῦ τε Ναππίτινου καὶ τοῦ Σκυλλητίνου ἦν δὴ πρῶτην κληθῆναι Ἰταλιαν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἰταλοῦ: and Fragm. 6, ἢτι δ᾽ ἀνώτερον ('apud vetustiores') Οἰνωπτοὺς τε καὶ Ἰταλοὺς μόνους ἵφθαναν οὶ τοῦ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἱσθμοῦ πρὸς τὸν Σικελικὸν κεκλειμένους πορθμόν. "Et in d' autō τὸ ἱσθμὸς ἐκάτων καὶ ἐξήκοντα αὐτάδας, μεταξὺ δυνών κόλπων, τοῦ τε Ἰππωνάστου, ἵνα Ἀντίοχος Ναππίτινον εὕρηκε, καὶ τοῦ Σκυλλητίκου. Compare also Virgil, Aen. i. 532 sq. The origin of syssitia is here traced to the territory in which the Epizephyrian Locri was situated, and not to Crete, in much the same way in which the Locrian Onomacritus was made out by some authorities (2. i2. 1274 a 25 sqq.) to have been the spiritual progenitor of a number of great lawgivers.

11. ἀκτήν, 'peninsula': cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 6. 198 R, περεύσεσθαι τε ὅλουν πᾶσαν αὐτὴν (i.e. τὴν 'Ἀττικήν') ὑπὸ τῆς βαλάντης' ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τοῦρομα λαβεῖν, οἷον ἀκτήν τινα οὐσαν.

'Ιταλιαν τοῦρομα λαβεῖν. The name taken is put in the acc.: cp. Aristoph. Fragm. 304 Didot,'Αμφιδῶρον ἐχρῆν αὐτῷ τεθεῖσθαι τοῦρομα.

12. ἐντὸς κ.τ.λ. The peninsula is apparently reckoned from its point, so that the territory lying between the point and the two gulfs is said to be within them, and the territory lying beyond the two gulfs, looking from the point, is implied to be outside them.

τοῦ Λαμητικοῦ. Antiocbus called this gulf, the modern gulf of S. Eufemia, by the name Ναππίτινος or Ναππίτινος, a name the origin of which is uncertain; how it comes to be called Λαμητικός in the passage before us, which is based on Antiocbus, is not clear. The name Λαμητικός is derived from that of a city called Lametini, probably situated on the shore of the gulf of S. Eufemia and near the stream which still bears the name of Lamato (the ancient Lamētus). See Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. Lametini and art. Napetinus Sinus.

13. ἀπέχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these two gulfs are distant from each other [only] half a day's journey.' For the omission of 'only' see VOL. III.
note on 1282 a 36. The near approach of the two gulfs to each other is mentioned in justification of the description of Italy as lying 'within' them. They were 160 stadia, or about eighteen miles, apart (see above on 8), hence a day's journey is calculated here at thirty-six miles.

14. τούτων δὴ κ.τ.λ. Italus is probably regarded as the first lawgiver of the Oenotrians, and if this is so, the introduction of legislation among them is connected with the change from a pastoral to an agricultural life: see Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Eng. Trans., 1. 21, and cp. Plut. De Iside et Osiride, c. 13, βασιλεύοντα δ' ὁσιρων Ἀγασπτίους μὲν εὐθὺς ἀπόρου βίου καὶ θηριῶδους ἀπαλλάξας, καρποὺς τε δείξαντα καὶ νόμους θέμενον αὐτοῖς, καὶ θεοὺς δείξαντα τιμῶν, and Ovid, Metam. 5. 341.

Prima Ceres unco glebas dimovit aratro,
Prima dedit fruges alimentaque mitia terris,
Prima dedit leges.

Janus takes the place of Italus in Plut. Quaest. Rom. c. 22, ἡ μάλλον ὅτι τοὺς περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν αὐτὸς ἀγρίως καὶ ἀνόμως χρωμένους ἠθέον εἰς ἔτερον βίου σχήμα, πείσας καὶ γεωργεῖν καὶ πολιτεύσανθαι, μετέβαλε καὶ μετεκόψατο; Compare the language of Strabo as to Masinissa (p. 833), καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ οὕτως ἐστιν ὁ τοὺς νομάδας πολιτικούς κατασκευάσας καὶ γεωργοὺς, ἐτὶ δ' ἀντὶ τοῦ λῃστεύειν διδάξας στρατεύειν. Syssitia (ἑότος, 'corn') are probably conceived as connected with agriculture. For τούτων δὴ τῶν Ἰταλῶν Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 39) compares 1. 6. 1255 a 7, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ δίκαων. Δὴ introduces in both passages a statement about the person or thing which has been described in what precedes. We expect δείων rather than θέσθαι, but cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 38.

16. δὲ κ.τ.λ. On the resemblance of this passage to 2. 10. 1271 b 30 sqq., see vol. i. p. 575, note 2. The continued existence of the institution and of certain of the laws of Italus among some of his descendants is apparently mentioned in confirmation of the statement that he introduced the syssitia and was the author of other laws also.

18. Ἐκοῦν δὲ κ.τ.λ. It would seem that the whole region from the Lametic Gulf to Tyrhenia (i.e. Latium Campania and Lucania) is here conceived as inhabited by Opici surnamed Ausones. That Aristotle included Latium in Opica we see from Fragm. 567. 1571 a 24 sq. Campania, according to Antiochus of Syracuse, was inhabited by 'Opici, who were also called Ausones' (Fragm. 8:
Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 183). But we do not find that Lucania is elsewhere said to be inhabited by Opici surnamed Ausones, or indeed by Opici of any kind. Herodotus regards Elea, which was in the region ultimately known as Lucania, as in Oenotria, not in Opica (i. 167).


τὸν ἰόλιον, sc. κόλπον, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 11, and see Liddell and Scott.

23. ὁ δὲ χωρισμὸς κ.τ.λ. The Egyptians, according to Plut. Lycurg. c. 4, claimed that Lycurgus visited Egypt and borrowed there the separation of the warriors from the other classes which he introduced at Sparta, and Isocrates in his Busiris (§ 17 sq.) traces this and other Lacedaemonian institutions to Egypt: cp. Pherecer. *Αγιον, Fragm. 5 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 257), where Lycurgus is connected with Egypt. Aristotle, however, in 2. 10. 1271 b 22 sqq., like the Lacedaemonians themselves (see above on 1271 b 22), traces the laws of Lycurgus to Crete.

24. πολὺ γὰρ ὑπερτείνει κ.τ.λ. According to Dicaearchus, Fragm. 7 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 235), Sesostris was king of Egypt immediately after Orus, the son of Osiris and Isis, and lived 2936 years before the first Olympiad. Herodotus, however, would seem to place Sesostris much later. Camerarius remarks (Interp. p. 298), 'quod quidem nunc ait autor, regnum Sesostris longe superare annis regnum Minois, cum narratione Herodoti non videtur congruere. Hic enim' (2. 112 sqq.) 'Proteum regem Aegypti facit tertium a Sesostris, cuius regnum inciderit in tempus belli Troiani. Et in exercitu Graecorum illius belli fuit secundum Homerum' (Odys. 19. 178 sqq.) 'Idomeneus et ipse tertius a Minoe, ut paene aequales ita reperiantur Sesostris et Minos; hoc modo, Sesostris, Pherson, Proteus, et Minos, Deucalion, Idomeneus.'

25. σχέδον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The sense is—'So then, just as we have seen that syssitia were invented first in Italy and afterwards in Crete, and the division of the population into different classes first in Egypt and afterwards in Crete, we may take it that all other discoveries have been made over and over again an indefinite number of times—for discovery comes easily to men, need reveal-
ing discoveries of a necessary kind, and others following in due course—and this holds of political institutions as fully as of anything else; but that all political institutions are ancient, [which is what concerns us now,] is proved by the example of Egypt.' The view that everything has been invented over and over again is quite Aristotelian: cp. Metaph. A. 8. 1074 b 10, ἀναγκαίαν· ἀρχαίαν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἑπεξεργασμένα εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων: De Caelo, i. 3. 270 b 19, οὗ γὰρ ἀπαξ σοῦ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεν ἄφηναι καὶ τὰ ἑπεξεργασμένα εἰς ἡμᾶς: Meteor. i. 3. 339 b 27 sqq. This view may have been suggested by the fact that the inventions which were ascribed in Greece to Palamedes, Orpheus, and others were ascribed in Egypt to far earlier inventors, so that it was natural to suppose that in the interval between the Egyptian inventors and Palamedes and the rest the arts were invented by the former had been lost. It is likely enough that arts have been lost and rediscovered. A writer in the Times of Sept. 27, 1886, remarks of some ‘glazed bricks’ of the time of Rameses II from Tel-el-Jahdî, now in the British Museum, 'Historians of Italian art speak of the “discovery” of Luca della Robbia; here is the faience decoration in the highest state of excellence more than 2,700 years before he was born.' For εὶ τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 1 sqq. Aristotle believed that the human race had existed from everlasting (see note on 1269 a 5). For the contrast of τὰ ἀναγκαία and τὰ εἰς ἑυσχημοσύνην καὶ περιονσίάν, Camerarius (Interp. p. 298) compares Top. 3. 2. 118 a 6, καὶ τὰ ἐκ περιονσίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων βελτίων, ἐνεσε δὲ καὶ αἴρετῶτερα· βελτίων γὰρ τοῦ ζην τοῦ εἴ ζην, το δὲ εἴ ζην ἐστίν ἐκ περιονσίας, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων . . . τὸ δὲ ἐκ περιονσίας ἐστίν, ἄναν υπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄλλα τῶν προσκατασκεύασθαι τις τῶν καλῶν: cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 2 sqq. For τίνος χρείας διδάσκειν αὐτὴν, cp. Eurip. Fragm. 709 (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 729),

οὐ τὰ τῶ ὁδυσσείς ἐστίν αἰμόλοις μόνοις.
χρεία διδάσκει, κἂν βραδὺς τις ἡ, σοφῶν,

and Leutsch and Schneidewin, 2. 203,

πολλῶν ὁ λιμός γίνεται διδάσκαλος.

That necessary things are discovered first had already been implied by Democritus (see vol. i. p. 356, note 1).

31. ἀτι δὲ πάντα ἄρχαια κ.τ.λ. The argument is—'we might expect the Egyptians, who are thought to be the most ancient race in the world, to have come into existence before laws and
constitutions were invented, in which case we should find them lacking these still, but the fact is quite otherwise; hence laws and institutions must be of very ancient origin.' Thus the statement with which the passage commences as to the antiquity of the distinction between the fighting and cultivating classes is fully borne out. In the reference to the Egyptians it is evidently assumed with much naïveté that as a race is when it first comes into being, so it will remain. Bernays (Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 169) and Susemihl would insert deí after τετυχά-κασι, but in my opinion without necessity. We are familiar with the belief that the Egyptian race was the most ancient in the world from the well-known story in Hdt. 2. 2. There was a general agreement as to the fact, though some claimed priority for the Phrygians (ibid.) or the Scythians (Justin, 2. 1. 5 sqq.) and Aristotle himself for the Magi (Diog. Laert. 1. 8), but there was much disagreement as to the cause. For one theory, see Hippys of Rhegium, Fragm. 1 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 13), Diod. i. 10. 1, and Justin, 2. 1. 5 sqq. Aristotle's own theory may be gathered from Meteor. i. 14. 352 b 20 sqq. The priests of Sais in the Timaeus of Plato (22 C sqq.) assign a different cause.

33. διό δὲ εἰ κ.τ.λ., 'hence we should make use of what has been adequately said [without spending time on its further investigation], and attempt to investigate [only] what has been left untouched': cp. c. 1. 1323 a 21 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 b 12 sqq.: Isocr. Ad Niccol. § 8, οὐ μὴν ἄλλα τὸ γε ἐπιχείρημα καλῶς ἔχει, τὸ ἐγείρων τὰ παραλειμμένα καὶ νομοθετεῖν ταῖς μοναρχίαις. I follow Sepulveda, Vict., and Lamb. in taking ἰκανῶς with τῶς εἰρημένοις, and not (as do Sus. and Welldon) with χρήσθαι: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1096 a 3, ἰκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἰρηται περὶ αὐτῶν, and Pol. 6 (4). 1291 a 10, διὸ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κομψῶς τοῦτο, οὐχ ἰκανῶς δὲ εἰρηται. Looking to these passages and to the very similar passage c. 1. 1323 a 21 sqq., I incline on the whole to retain the reading of Γ Π εἰρημένους, and not (with Lamb., Bekk.2, and Sus.) to substitute εἰρημένοις for it, though c. 11. 1331 a 16 might be quoted in favour of this reading. It is true also that the antithesis to παραλειμμένα is often εἰρημένα (e.g. in Soph. El. 33. 184 b 6 sqq. and Demosth. De Symmori. c. 23: cp. Pol. 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 15 sqq.), but this is not always the case, as we see from Isocr. Hel. § 67, πολὺ δὲ πλεῖον τὰ παραλειμμένα τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστίν. For the suppression of ' only,' see above on 1329 b 13 and 1282 a 36.
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36. τῶν ὁπλα κεκτημένων. For the absence of τά before ὁπλα, cp. 6 (4), 13. 1297 a 29, περί τοῦ ὁπλα κεκτήσασθαι, and see critical note on 1267 b 33. As to the distinction here implied between the hoplites and those who share in the constitution, see vol. i. p. 324 and note 1 on that page.

37. εἰρηται πρότεροι, in c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.

38. αὐτῶν ἐτέρους, 'distinct from them': cp. c. 12. 1331 b 1 and Eth. Nic. io. 2. 1173 b 28, ἔτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν (ἡδοναί) τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αὐξηρῶν.

40. τίνας καὶ ποιοὺς. The answer to τίνας (given in 1330 a 25 sqq.) is 'slaves or non-Greek serfs,' and to ποιοὺς (ibid.) is 'not of one race nor spirited in character.'

41. πρώτων. Aristotle afterwards deals with the site of the city.

1. For the reference here to Plato as τινές, see above on 1327 b 38. Lycurgus (In Leocr. cc. 92 and 132) carries this use of τινές so far as to say that τινές wrote this or that passage of verse which he quotes (Richards).

ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικῶς γινομένην κοινήν, sc. εἰναι δειν. Φιλικῶς qualifies κοινήν, 'common in friendly fashion,' 'common as the goods of friends are common': cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 29, δὲ ἄρετήν δ’ ἐσται πρὸς τὸ χρήσασθαι κατὰ τὴν παρομοίαν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. Γινομένην = ποιομένην: cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 37, φαερόν τοῖς ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ὀίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινά. For εἰναι γινομένην, cp. Hdt. 1. 146, ταῦτα δὲ ἵν γινόμενα ἐν ἔλεγχο, and Plato, Polit. 301 D, and see above on 1259 b 11. Sus. and Welldon adopt Congreve's conjecture of γινομένη for γινομένη (Sus. adding γίνεσθαι after γινομένη), but, as it seems to me, not rightly.

2. οὕτ' ἀπορεῖν κ.τ.λ. As to the importance of this, see Isocr. Areop. §§ 53, 83, and Plato, Laws 735 E.

3. περὶ συσυστάσεως τε κ.τ.λ., 'and with regard to common meals, all agree that they are an useful thing to belong to well-constituted States.' For the construction, compare c. 9. 1329 a 35 sqq. Aristotle passes on to the subject of common meals, because, like the friendly community of property which he has just recommended, they are a means of securing the citizens against a want of food. It was also necessary to settle the question of their existence before proceeding to the division of the territory, inasmuch as a portion of the territory is to be set apart for their support. Aristotle
nowhere fulfils, in what we possess of the Politics, the promise which he makes in 4, so that we can only guess why he approved of the institution. He probably valued it as a means of regulating habits of life and of enforcing the 'temperate and liberal' standard which he recommends (c. 5. 1326 b 30 sq.), as a means of making an approach to community of property (2. 5. 1263 b 40 sq.), and also as a means of developing a high spirit and mutual confidence in his citizens and securing their acquaintance with each other (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 41 sqq.). See vol. i. p. 333 sqq. For an account of the purpose for which, according to Plato, the institution was originally introduced, see Laws 780 B sq.

5. δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. All the citizens ought to share in the common meals, and not, as at Sparta, that portion only of them which could afford to pay a contribution. See 2. 9. 1271 a 26 sq. and 2. 10. 1272 a 12 sqq. Aristotle appears here to contemplate the existence of ἀποροι in his 'best State.' τὸ συντεταγμένον, 'the assessed sum' (Liddell and Scott).

7. καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἀλλην οἰκίαν, 'and to manage the rest of the housekeeping.' For τὴν ἀλλην οἰκίαν, cp. c. 17. 1336 a 40 sq. and Plato, Rep. 458 D, καὶ ἐν γυμνασίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀλλῃ τρόφῃ.

8. τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα, 'expenses in relation to the gods;' cp. 12, τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς λειτουργίας, and 2. 8. 1267 b 34 sq.

9. ἀναγκαῖον τοῖνυ κ.τ.λ. As Aristotle's principle seems to be that expenses which fall on all the citizens should be provided for by public land set apart for the purpose, we might have expected him to have gone farther in this direction, and (e.g.) to have set apart public land to defray the expenses of the public education which the citizens are to receive (5 (8). 1. 1337 a 21 sqq.). As to the public land in Greek States, see Büchenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 63 sq. Aristotle does not, like Hippodamus (2. 8. 1267 b 33 sqq.), divide the territory of his State into three parts—sacred, public, and private—but only into two, public and private. He devotes a part of the public land to expenses connected with the gods, i.e. to the provision of sacrifices, repairs of temples, and perhaps also liturgies connected with festivals.

14. τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle follows in the track of Plato, Laws 745 C, κλήρους δὲ διελέιν τετταράκοιτα καὶ πεντακισχίλιος, τούτῳ τέ αὐτί δῖχα τιμεῖν ἔκαστον καὶ ἐνεχληρώσαν δύο τρήματα, τοῦ τε ἐγγὺς καὶ τοῦ πόρρω μετέχοντα ἐκάτερον τὸ πρὸς τῇ πύλῃ μέρος τῷ πρὸς τοὺς ἐσχάτους εἰς κλήρους καὶ τῷ δεύτερον ἀπὸ πῦλως τῷ ἀπ᾽ ἐσχάτων δευτέρῳ
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καὶ τὰλλα οὖν πῶντα. (Compare the process by which lots of land are assigned to the peasants of a Russian commune, as described by M. Leroy-Beaulieu in Revue des Deux Mondes, Nov. 15, 1876, 'Chaque paysan reçoit une parcelle d'autant de sortes de terrain qu'il y a de qualités de terre dans la commune.' 'Quand les terres seraient tous de même qualité ... l'inégalé distance du village leur donne encore pour le paysan une inégale valeur.') Aristotle, however, does not approve (2. 6. 1265 b 24 sqq.) Plato's further suggestion (Laws 7 45 E) of two houses: see above on 1265 b 25. But would not the cultivation of two lots of land at a distance from each other be almost as troublesome as living in two houses? The reason for the arrangement which Aristotle follows Plato in adopting is obvious enough. Land near the city was probably as a rule far more valuable in ancient Greece than land at a distance from it. It was land in this situation that rich men were most likely to buy up (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 8 sqq.). Cp. Xen. De Vect. 4. 50, καὶ οὲ γε χώροι οὖδεν ἂν εἶν μεῖνοι δὲξους τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἐνταῦθα (at Laurium in Attica) ἡ τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἄστυ, and Hdt. 6. 20, τῆς δὲ Μιλησίας χώρης αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ Πέρσαι ἔχον τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ πεδίον, τὰ δὲ ὑπέραιρα ἔδοσαν Καρπί Πηδασεύαι ἐκτῆσαν. So on the foundation of the colony of Thurii οἱ προύπάρχοντες Συβαρίται ... τὴν μὲν σύνεγγυς τῇ πόλει χώραν κατεκτημένην ἡαυτοῖς, τὴν δὲ πόρρω κεκτημένην τοῖς ἐπῆλθοι (Diod. 12. 11. 1). The owners of land near the city would not only be better able than others to take an active part in politics and be nearer to the conveniences and the handicraftsmen of the city, but would also command a better market for their produce, and would be less exposed to attack in case of invasion. Frontier-landowners, on the contrary, were the first to suffer in that event. Thus the Lacedaemonian owners of frontier-land suffered so much from the Messenians in Eira during the Second Messenian War that civil trouble resulted (Paus. 4. 18. 1: see note on 1306 b 37). Compare the case of the citizens of Corinth who owned the fertile and extensive frontier-plain between Corinth and Sicyon. This plain 'was rendered uncultivable during 393 and 392 B.C.' by the Corinthian War, and though its owners withdrew their servants and cattle to Peiraeum, their loss 'was still so great that two successive seasons of it were quite enough to inspire them with a strong aversion to the war' (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 9. 455). As to the Acharnians, see Thuc. 2. 21, and the notes of Mr. Congreve and Prof. Jowett on the passage before us. The frontier-landowners
of ancient Greece, unlike those of the English and Scotch Border and of the Welsh Marches of England in the middle ages, seem to have feared more from the loss of their own goods than they hoped from raids on those of the foe.

16. For τὸ ἵσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 b 1 sqq.

21. συμμετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν πρός αὐτούς πολέμων. The story about the sufferings of the Lacedaemonian frontier-owners in the Second Messenian War comes from the Ἐννομία of Ῥυτταεύς (7 (5). 7. 1306 b 37 sqq.), and it is just possible that συμμετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν ὁμόρων πολέμων was a line in that poem. The Lacedaemonian State may well have been one of those in which the law referred to existed. For the absence of περὶ before τῶν πρὸς αὐτούς πολέμων, cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 37, τὸ βουλευόμενον τῶν κοινῶν.

22. διὰ τὸ ὦδιον, ‘on account of their private interest’: cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 4, αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβεβηκῶν πρὸς τὸ ὦδιον ἀποσκοποῦσα τοῦτο ὑράων. For the thought, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 14 sqq. and 3. 16. 1287 b 2 sq.

25. τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσωτας κ.τ.λ. Plato also makes agriculture over to slaves in the State described in the Laws (806 D sq.). Περίοικοι differ from slaves in being only half-enslaved (see above on 1269 a 34). Thus the Mariandynian periōkoi of the Pontic Heracleia could not be sold for export beyond the limits of the State (Strabo, p. 542), nor could the Helots (Strabo, p. 365).

εἰ δεὶ κατ’ εὐχὴν. For the omission of εὖα, see above on 1329 a 17 and 1277 a 38. Its omission is facilitated by the nearness of δούλους εὖα.

26. μήτε ὁμοφύλων πάντων μήτε θυμοειδῶν, ‘and should consist neither of men all of one kin nor of men spirited in character.’ The gen. appears to be partitive, as in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 28. Polybius distinguishes ὁμόφυλοι from ὁμοειδεῖς in 11. 19, ἀστασίαστα διετήσει τοσαῦτα πλῆθη καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς Ἀλληλα, καύστερ αὐχ ὁμοειδεῖν ἀλλ’ ὁμόφυλοι χρησάμενοι στρατοπέδουσ’ εἰς γὰρ Λίβνας ἸΒῆρας Δευνιστῖνους Κελτοὺς Φοίνικας Ἰταλοὺς Ἐλλήνας, so that, if we take Aristotle to mean the same thing by ὁμόφυλοι as Polybius does in this passage, he would be opposed to the employment of slaves belonging to one and the same great stock (Libyan, Celtic, Italian, or the like), even though they belonged to different ἐθνον, but this is not the sense in which the word is used in 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 25 sqq., and Aristotle probably means ὁμοειδεῖς by ὁμόφυλοι. In the corresponding passage in Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 b 18 in fact—καὶ μὴ κτάσθαι
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όμοεθνεῖς (boulos) πολλοῖς, ὀστερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι−the word ὀμοεθνής is used, not ὀμόφυλος. Plato had already said in Laws 777 C, δῶ όδε λείπεσθαι μόνῳ μηχανῷ, μήτε πατριώτας ἄλληλον εἶναι τοὺς μὲλλοντας μᾶς δουλεύσειν, ἀνυμφώνως τε ('different in language') εἰς δύναμιν ὃ τι μᾶλιστα, and Aristotle follows in his track. His especial object is to avoid the errors committed by the Lacedaemonian State in its organization of slavery. The Helots were serfs (περίσκοι), not slaves, and Hellenic serfs into the bargain, both ὀμόφυλοι and θυμοεθνεῖς (cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 34 sqq.). But other Greek States also probably had slaves whom he would regard as too nearly akin to each other and too spirited to be submissive. The fugitive slaves who under the name of Bruttians (βρέττιοι) did much to ruin some of the Greek colonies in South Italy (Diod. 16. 15) were apparently an instance in point. Attic slaves, on the contrary, came from a variety of sources, Lydia, Phrygia, Paphlagonia, Syria, and the Euxine (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 170). Dionysius the Elder wished his mercenaries to be collected ἐκ πολλῶν ἐθνῶν (Diod. 14. 44. 3). Aristotle would no doubt disapprove of a body of slaves wholly composed of negroes, and the experience of the island of St. Domingo in modern times bears out his view. 'It is always a wise arrangement to have different tribes in a caravan, for in the event of a strike, and there are always strikes, there is less chance of concerted action' (Prof. Drummond, Tropical Africa, p. 90). Some went so far as to advise the actual promotion of discord among slaves (Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 30, in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 242 and 5. cclxxii, and Plut. Cato Maior, c. 21, quoted by Meineke), but Aristotle says nothing about this. We notice that he imposes no limit on the number of the slaves in his 'best State,' though we might have expected him to do so.

28. δεύτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Non-Greek serfs, unlike the Helots. Aristotle probably has in his mind the Mariandynian serfs of the Pontic Heracleia (see above on 1269 a 34). Serfs of this type would have the drawback of being almost inevitably ὀμόφυλοι.

30. τοῦτον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here again Aristotle departs from the Lacedaemonian practice. The Helots employed on private estates did not belong to the owners of those estates (Strabo, p. 365, τρώγον γὰρ τῶν δημοσίων δοῦλων εἶχον οἱ Λακεδαιμώναι τούτους, i.e. τῶν ἐξατοσ): the owners could not free the Helots employed on their estates or sell them beyond the limits of the State (Strabo, ibid.).
31. **tina de k.t.l.** Plato had gone on to deal with this subject in the passage of the Laws (777 C sqq.) which Aristotle has before him here. The difficulty of the question is recognized in 2. 9. 1269 b 7 sqq. The promised solution is nowhere given in the Politics as we have it, but we have many suggestions on the subject in Oecon. 1. 5.

32. **kai dioti k.t.l.** *Diutis* is here 'why.' This promise also remains unfulfilled in the Politics as we have it, but cp. Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 b 4, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἦταν μὴ γίγνεται τοῖς βελτίωτοι βελτίων μηδὲ ἄθλα ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακίας, γίνονται χείρους, ύστερ καὶ περὶ αἰκέτας, and 14. ἥρη δὲ καὶ τέλος ὀρίσθαι πᾶσιν· δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κείσθαι ἄθλον· βούλονται γὰρ πονεῖν, ἦταν ἡ ἄθλον καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὀρισμένος. Xenophon had already said in Oecon. 5. 16, καὶ εὐπίσταν δὲ ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν ἤττον οἱ δούλοι τῶν ἐλευθέρων δεόνται ἅλλα καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅπως μένειν ἑθελοστ. Aristotle perhaps merely means by πᾶσι τοῖς δούλοις both public and private slaves. But it is possible that, as the slave often purchased his freedom from his master, emancipation was most within the reach of the slaves who stood highest in their master's service, or who had learnt some lucrative handicraft.

34. **Tην δὲ πόλιν κ.τ.λ.** Τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν, c. 10. 1330 a 23, has C. II. already been answered by τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας, 1330 a 25, but here it is further answered by τὴν δὲ πόλιν. Ἔφηται πρὸτερον, in c. 5. 1327 a 3—c. 6. 1327 a 40.

36. **autilis de pros autilin k.t.l.** Various attempts have been made to interpret this passage as it stands. Götting, Stahr, Busse (De praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 17 sqq.), and Broughton, in his edition of Pol. 1, 3, and 4 (7), take *eina* to be used in autilis pros autilin einai tηn thesiin as it is used in such phrases as εκόν einai, κατά τοῦτο einai (Plato, Protag. 317 A), εἰς δύναμιν einai (Polit. 300 C), and the like, and translate these words 'so far as concerns the position of the city in relation to itself;' but the objection to this view is that no instance is produced of the use of *einai* in this sense in combination with a similar collection of words. *Einai*, when thus used, commonly goes with one word, or two or three, of a simple and closely connected kind. Prof. Jowett, on the other hand (Politics 2. 273), thinks that 'the order of the words is as follows, *dei e'xhe'saiv kata'v'g'maiv (tou) tηn thesiν einae,' but Sus. 4 (1. p. 519) objects that, if we take the passage thus, we require tou tηn thesiν, οἶνον de, eina, or something similar, not simply tou tην theσιν
e\textit{vai}. The difficulty of interpreting the passage as it stands being so great, it is not surprising that emendations of the text have been suggested. Coray and Bekk.\textsuperscript{a} bracket \textit{e\textit{vai}}, while Bonitz (Ind. 375 b 8) places a query after \textit{katatuph\textit{vai}e\. For Susemihl’s view see his note in Sus.\textsuperscript{b} Richards suggests that \textit{kat} \textit{e\textit{vai}} should be read in place of \textit{katatuph\textit{vai}e}, translating ‘but we should pray that the position of the city in relation to itself may be the best possible,’ etc. If, however, \textit{kat} \textit{e\textit{vai}} was the original reading, we should expect it to be corrupted into \textit{katatuph\textit{vai}} rather than \textit{katatuph\textit{vai}e}, and perhaps also to stand nearer in the sentence to \textit{e\textit{vai}} than it does. In defence of \textit{katatuph\textit{vai}e} it may be pointed out that \textit{katatuph\textit{vai}} is used in the same sense (‘\textit{votis potiri}’) in Demosth. De Cor. c. 178, \textit{e\textit{vai} δ’} ἀπα μὴ συμβι \textit{katatuph\textit{vai}e}: cp. also Plut. Apophth. Lac. Ages. 59. 213 A and De Gen. Socr. c. 9. 580 B. I am myself inclined to suggest that some words may be wanting in the text. The rendering of Vet. Int. is ‘ipsius autem ad se ipsam si ad votum oportet adipisci positionem, quattuor utique respicientes.’ Sus. thinks that he here renders a gloss, Busse (De praesidiiis, etc., p. 18) that he fills up a lacuna in his Greek text by borrowing words from c. 5. 1327 a 3 sq. It is, however, possible that the text of \textit{\Gamma} differed here from that of the MSS. known to us, and that some words have really dropped out in our MSS. of which the rendering of Vet. Int. preserves a trace. The text, in fact, may have originally run, α\textit{vτις} δὲ \textit{πρὸς} α\textit{υτὴν} (εἰ δὲ \textit{κατ} \textit{e\textit{vai}}) \textit{e\textit{vai} τὴν} \textit{θε\sigma\nu}, ε\textit{χεισθαι δὲ \textit{katatuph\textit{vai}} πρὸς τέ\textit{τταρα δὴ βάλενται}. The four things seem to be health, adaptation to the needs of political life, adaptation to those of war, and beauty (κόσμος, 1330 b 31), though Aristotle in his haste omits to mention the last. Less attention seems generally to have been paid by the founders of cities in ancient Greece to the first two points than to the rest: cp. Strabo, p. 235, τῶν γαρ Ἑλλήνων περὶ τὰς κί\textit{σεις εὐ\textit{στοχήσαι} μάλιστα δοξ\textit{ινων ὅτι κάλλους ἐστοχάζοντο καὶ ἐρ\textit{μυνότητας καὶ λιμένων καὶ χώρας εὐ\textit{φυοὺς κ.τ.λ.}} Mycecellus, however, the founder of Crotona, had looked to health rather than to wealth (Strabo, p. 269), and in later days Hippocrates in his treatise De Aere, Aquis, Locis had paid great attention to the question what site and aspect are most favourable to the health of a city. Plato also had taken health into consideration (Laws 778 E). For \textit{πρὸς τέ\textit{τταρα δὴ}, cp. Pindar, Pyth. 9. 90,}

\textit{Ἀλγίνα} τε γὰρ

\textit{φαμὶ Νίςον τ’} ἐν λόφῳ τρὶς δὴ πῖλιν τάνδ’ εὐκλείξαι.
Δὴ thus used strengthens.—(Holden, Index to the Oeconomicus of Xenophon s. v.).

38. πρώτον μὲν, ὡς ἀναγκαίον, πρὸς υγίειαν. Sepulveda translates, 'primum ad valetudinem, ut rem necessarium' (and so Lamb.); Vict. 'primum quidem, ut necesse est, ad corporis sanitatem.' But perhaps it is better (with Richards) to supply ὅν with ἀναγκαίον and to take ὡς ἀναγκαίον as=ὡς ἀναγκαίον ὃν βιλέπεω πρὸς τοῦτο. A thing may deserve to be looked to first either on account of its excellence (cp. c. 8. 1328 b 11 sq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 b 5 sq.) or on account of its indispensability (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 29 sq.), and Aristotle is careful to explain that health is to be looked to first for the latter reason. Cp. 1. 16. 1258 a 29, καίτω δεὶ ὑγιαίνειν τούς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, δοστερ ἦν ἡ ἀλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, and Plato, Laws 743 E, ει δε τι τῶν προστιτυπέτων αὐτὸθ νόμων σωφροσύνης ἐμπροσθεν ὑγίειαν ἐν τῇ πόλει φανεῖται ποιῶν τιμῶν, ἡ πλοῦτον υγείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονείου, οὐκ ὁρθὸς ἀναφαίνεται τιθέμενος. Some had regarded health as the most excellent thing in the world (Plato, Gorg. 451 E sq.): Anaxandrides, Θησαυρός, Fragm. 1, in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 169, a line of which,

τὸ μὲν ὑγιαινειν πρώτον ὧς ἀριστον ὅν,

may be in Aristotle's memory here: Rhet. 2. 21. 1394 b 13 sq.: Lucian, Pro Lapsu inter Salutandum, c. 5 sqq.: Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 1 sqq.).

αἱ τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Te should follow ἢν, not αί: for other cases in which it is found out of its proper place, see above on 1325 a 19 and 1259 a 13. Πόλεις is omitted as a word which will be readily supplied: for other cases of its omission, see above on 1266 b 1. Hippocrates, as Stahr and others have pointed out, had already pronounced in favour of an Eastern aspect for cities in De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 530 Kühn, ὁκόσαι μὲν (τῶν πόλεων) πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολὰς τοῦ ἡλίου κέονται, ταῦτα εἰκός εἶναι ὑγιεινότερα τῶν πρὸς τὰς ἀρκτικὰς ἐστραμμένων καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ θερμά, ἦν καὶ στάδιον τὸ μεταξὺ ἦ. Compare Columella, De Re Rustica, 1. 5. 5, optime autem salubribus locis ad orientem vel meridiem...villa convertitur. The climate of Patras, the ancient Patrae, is thought unhealthy for strangers, because the mountains which rise above it close at hand screen it from the East winds (Curtius, Peloponnesos, i. 440). Cities whose site slopes towards the East are exposed to the wind ἀπηλώτης (Probl. 26. 12. 941 b 17, καθάπερ ὅν καὶ τὰ ἀπ' ἀντιθέτης κινών ἀπηλώτας ἄνεμους ἤγειρεν (ὁ ἥλιος), οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας κινών
NOTES.

νότους ἐγείρει), a wind which is in a mean between hot and cold winds (Probl. 26. 55. 946 b 24 sq.), and health results when things hot and cold are in due proportion to each other (Anal. Post. i. 13. 78 b 18 sqq.). The East wind is described as ‘warm’ in Probl. 26. 31. 943 b 24, and as ‘comparatively warm’ in Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 19 sqq. See also vol. i. p. 337, note 4.

40. δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν, ‘and in the second place those which are sheltered from the North wind.’ Here Aristotle differs from Hippocrates, who appears to regard cities facing North and sheltered from the South as more favourably situated for health than cities facing South and sheltered from the North (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. pp. 525–9 Kühn). For κατὰ βορέαν, cp. κατὰ-βορρῶς, Oecon. i. 6. 1345 a 33. We expect αἱ κατὰ βορέαν, but cp. 1330 b 10, δεύτερον δὲ ὑδαίν ἤγεινοις χρῆσθαι, where ἐν τῷ ὑδαίν ἤγεινοις χρῆσθαι would have been more regular. See vol. i. p. 337, note 5. Some places suffered much from the North wind, e.g. Ismarus in Thrace: cp. Eustath. on Dionys. Perieg. 27, p. 90 Bernhardy (quoted by Ellis, Commentary on Catullus, p. 384), καθίστερ καὶ ἵσμαρικός ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ὡ βορρᾶς, ἀπὸ ἴσμαρον πολέως ἥρακης, ἐνθα μᾶλλον βορρᾶς καταρρήγωντα. Plataea was exposed to the North wind, though, as it happened, the North wind was gentle there (Theophrast. Fragm. 5. c. 32 Wimmer). Plato had given the plain around the city in the island of Atlantis a Southern aspect sheltered from the North wind (Critias 118 A).

41. τῶν δὲ λατιπῶν κ.τ.λ. Δεῖ should probably be supplied, as in c. 5. 1326 b 30 sqq. The sentence would have been more regularly constructed if καλῶς ἔχειν had not been added, for then πρὸς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς would have depended on βλέποντας, 38, but as a long parenthesis has intervened (αἱ τε, 38–μᾶλλον, 41), Aristotle adds καλῶς ἔχειν to make his meaning clear, and might have added δεῖ also. For πρὸς τὲ τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς, cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17, ἐκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ, and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 7, πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολεμικὰς ἀσκήσεις. Aristotle does not explain what sort of site would be well adapted for political activity, but he would perhaps regard as such a site which, while fairly level and favourable to easy communication, had within it a spot suitable for the common life of the elder citizens who are to rule the State, and somewhat withdrawn from the turmoil of buying and selling, such a spot as he sketches in c. 12. 1331 a 24 sqq.
Pindarus, 'pluvias,' many see rain-water, 'aquas native.' A city would be 'hard of approach' (δυσπρόσδος), if it lay, like Sparta, behind mountains penetrable at only a few easily-guarded points (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24). Compare the description of Thalameae in Elis in Polyb. 4. 75. 2, πλείστη δ' ἀποσκευή καὶ πλείστος ὅχλος ἥθροισθη σωμάτων καὶ θρεμμάτων εῖς τὸ χωρίον δ' ἐκέχον, διὰ τὸ τήν τε χώραν τὴν πείρας αὐτοῦ στενήν εἶναι καὶ δυσέμβυλον τὸ τε χωρίον ἀπραγμάτευτον καὶ δυσπρόσδος. So we read of Rome in Plut. Romul. c. 17, ἦ δὲ δυσπρόσδος ἡ πόλις ἡχούσα πράξημα τὸ νῦν Κατιόλων, ἐν φ' φρουρά καθεστήκει. A lake or a river or cliffs would answer the same purpose as a mountain: see as to the site of Oeniadae Thuc. 2. 102. 3, as to the acropolis of Sicyon (the site to which the city was removed by Demetrius Poliorcetes) Diod. 20. 102. 4, and as to the site of Psophis Polyb. 4. 70. 7 sqq. A city would be (2) 'hard to beleaguer' (δυσπερίληπτος), if the ground about it was made difficult by chasms or unfordable rivers or marshes. Pella was surrounded by marshes (Liv. 44. 46, sita est in tumulo vergente in occidentem hibernum: cingunt paludes inexcuperabilis altitudinis aestate et hiemae, quas restantantes faciunt lacus). Looking to the advances that the art of siege-warfare had made (1331 a 1 sq.), a city's best chance of safety in Aristotle's days probably lay in the difficulty of approaching or beleaguering it.

4. ὄδατων τε καὶ ναμάτων κτ.λ., 'and of waters and streams there should, if possible, be forthcoming a native supply.' Οἰκείων, in opposition to ὄμβριοις, 6: rain-water is not 'native,' but comes from the clouds. Compare the contrast of ὄμβριον and γιγαντεία ὦδωρ in Plut. De Facie in Orbe Lunae, c. 25. 939 C, and also the contrast of οἰκεία and ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις in c. 3. 1325 b 29 sq. Ναμάτων is added to explain and limit ὄδατων, which, if it stood by itself, would include ὄμβρια ὦδατα. The term νάματα comprises both spring and river water: cp. Plut. Quaest. Nat. 2. 912 A, τὰ πηγαῖα καὶ ποτάμια νάματα. Aristotle may possibly have in his memory here some lines of Pindar of which Quintilian has preserved a trace: see Pindar, Fragm. 258 Bergk (Quintil. 10. i. 109), non enim 'pluvias,' ut ait Pindarus, 'aquas colligit,' sed vivo gurgite exundat (Cicero), where Bergk remarks, 'Pindarus συνάγει ωδάτα ὄμβρια dixisse videtur,' but is not 'vivo gurgite exundat' also probably a translation from Pindar? Many Greek cities were famous for
their springs. Corinth was so, and especially for its spring Peirene (cp. Paus. 2. 3. 5, κρήναι δὲ πολλαὶ μὲν ἀνὰ τὴν πόλιν πεποίηται πᾶσιν, ἀτε ἄφθονον ρέωτος σφαιρῆν ὑδάτων, and see as to Peirene, Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 529, 592); Pherae was famous for its spring Hypermia (Pindar, Pyth. 4. 125: Strabo, p. 439); Cyrene was built round the inexhaustible 'spring of Apollo,' and Hermione also had an inexhaustible spring (Paus. 2. 35. 3). Compare with Aristotle’s recommendations as to water-supply those of Columella, De Re Rustica, i. 5. 1 sqq. We see from the passage before us that a city was all the stronger from a military point of view if its water-supply was good and safe from interference in the event of a siege. Athens was ill-supplied with water (see next note), and her weakness in this respect must have been keenly felt when the country-population was cooped up in the city during the Peloponnesian War.

5. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘but if a supply of this nature is not forthcoming, a way has been discovered to obtain water by constructing,’ etc. For εὑρήται, cp. 1331 a 15 sqq., and for τοῦτο γε c. 7. 1327 b 21. Τοῦτο γε εὑρήται means that we need not begin an investigation as to that, inasmuch as the problem has been already solved. Ὄμβριος is placed before ὕδατων because it is meant to be emphatic. Hippocrates has a good opinion of rain-water (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 537 Kühn, τὰ μὲν οὖν ὄμβρια (ὕδατα) κουφότατα καὶ γλυκύτατά ἐστιν καὶ λεπτότατα καὶ λαμπρότατα). So too Columella (De Re Rustica, i. 5. 2). Aristotle perhaps intends this hint for Athens. ‘There were three or four springs at Athens, but one only, that of Callirrhoe, was drinkable’ (Merivale, Hist. of the Romans under the Empire, c. 66, vol. viii. p. 217, note). See also below on 1330 b 25. Cisterns for storing rain-water existed in many Greek cities—at Alexandria (Stuart Poole, Cities of Egypt, p. 181), Cnidus (Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. Cnidus), and Termessus (Davis, Anatolica, p. 231). They existed also in the insular part of Tyre (Maspero, Hist. Ancienne des Peuples de l'Orient, p. 192) and at Jerusalem (Tac. Hist. 5. 12).

‘The sky is the only source from which fresh water is obtained in the smaller towns of Dalmatia, and especially on the islands, where there are neither springs nor streams’ (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, i. 241). Aristotle does not refer to the possibility of bringing water into the city from a distance, but aqueducts existed in his day both at Samos (Hdt. 3. 60) and at Athens (Athenaeum,
No. 3355, p. 223). He would probably, however, feel that aque-
ducts lay at the mercy of an invading foe.

7. μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας. For the construc-
tion, cp. Rhet. 3. 17. 1418 a 34, καὶ ὁ ἐλεγε Γαργίας, ὅτι νῦν ὑπολείπει
αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος, τοῦτο ἐστιν.

8. τοῦτο δ' ἐστιν ἐν τῷ κείσθαι τὸν τόπον κ.τ.λ. For εἶναι ἐν, see
Bon. Ind. 245 b 25 sqq., where among other passages c. 1. 1323 b 1,
καὶ τὸ ἵνα εὐδαιμόνως, εἰτ' ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστιν εἰτ' ἐν ἀρετῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
eιτ' ἐν ἀμφῶν, is referred to. Τοῦτο is ἤγεια. For the use of the
neuter in reference to a fem. substantive, cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 1,
and see Bon. Ind. 484 a 59 sqq., where Metaph. Z. 10. 1035 b
14, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζῴων ψευχή (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) κ.τ.λ. is
quoted.

9. ἐν τε τοιούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τοιούτον, 'both in a healthy spot and
facing a healthy quarter' (cp. Plato, Rep. 401 C).

10. δεύτερον δὲ θάσιν ὑγιεινοὶς χρήσθαι. We expect ἐν τῷ
θάσιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρήσθαι, but Schneider rightly compares c. 13. 1331 b
27, τούτων δ' ἐστίν ἐν μὲν ἐν τῷ τόν σκοπὸν κείσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος
tῶν πράξεων ὄρθως, ἐν μὲν τὸς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φεροῦσας πράξεις εἰρή-
sκεις: cp. also 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 7-10, and 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 33
sqq. As to the fact, cp. De Gen. An. 4. 2. 767 a 28, διαφέρει δὲ καὶ χώρα χώρας εἰς ταύτα (i.e. εἰς γένεσιν καὶ ἀγονίαν καὶ ἀρρενογονίαν καὶ θηλυκογονίαν) καὶ ὕδωρ ὑδάτος διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αὐτίκας ποιά γὰρ τις ἡ
tροφή γίνεται μάλιστα καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἡ διάθεσις διὰ τε τὴν κράσιν
tοῦ περισσότερος ἀέρος καὶ τῶν εἰσίνων, μάλιστα δὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ
ὕδατος τροφὴν τούτο γὰρ πλείστων εἰσφέρονται, καὶ ἐν παῖσιν ἐστὶ
tροφὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔχοις διό καὶ τὰ ἄτεραμα ὑδατα καὶ ψυχρὰ
tὰ μὲν ἀτεκνίαν ποιεῖ τά δὲ θηλυκοταῖα (see also Hist. An. 6. 19.
573 b 32 sqq.).

καὶ τοῦτον κ.τ.λ. With ἤξειω supply δεὶ from 8.

11. οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For οἷς πλείστωι χρώμεθα, see Vahlen on Poet.
16. 1454 b 20. For the thought cp. Hippocr. De Natura Hominis
vol. i. p. 361 Kühn, αἱ δὲ νοῦς γίνοντα αἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν διαιτημάτων,
αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος, δ' ἐσαγόμενοι ζωμέν. τὴν δὲ διάγνωσιν χρή
kατέρων ὡς ποιεσθῆσαι ἀκόταν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσήματος ἕνος πολλοῦ ἀνθρώπων
ἀλίσκονται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, τὴν αὐτὴν χρή ἀνατιθέναι τοιτέω ὡς τοι
κοινώστατον ἐστὶ καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν πάντες χρώμεθά' ἐστι δὲ τούτο ὁ
ἀναπλέομεν. As to water, cp. Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis,
voll. i. p. 532 Kühn (a passage which Aristotle seems to have
before him), πλείστων γὰρ μέρος ξυμβαλλεῖται (ὕδωρ) ἐστὶ τὴν ὑγείην.

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Aristotle does not say anything about the importance to health of other kinds of food than water. The Egyptians believed that all maladies arose from food (Hdt. 2. 77; Diod. 1. 82). See on this subject De Part. An. 3. 12. 673 b 25–28.

13. ἦ δὲ κ. τ. λ., 'and water and air possess this kind of nature,' i.e. are of such a nature as to be largely and frequently used by us (so Vict. 'talem naturam habere ut crebro cogamur ad illa confugere'). Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 15. 'Ἡ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος δύναμις is little more than a periphrasis for τὰ ὑδάτα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα: see Bon. Ind. 206 b 38, 'sed etiam ea res cui aliqua facultas inest δύναμις nominatur, ut interdum δύναμις prope ad paraphrasin videri possit delitescere, cf. φύσις' in such phrases as ἦ τοῦ γαλακτος φύσις, Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 14: Bonitz refers among many other passages to Meteor. 1. 2. 339 a 22, ὅστε πάσαν αὐτοῦ (i.e. τοῦ κόσμου) τὴν δύναμιν κυστερᾶσθαι ἐκείνην. The same usage is traceable in Plato: see Ast, Lex. Platon. s.v. δύναμις sub fin.

14. διόπερ κ. τ. λ. 'Εὰν μὴ πάνθ' ὦμωια μὴ' ἄφθονια τοιοῦτὼν ζηματῶν, 'if all the springs are not equally good, and there is not an unlimited supply of wholesome springs.' Πάντα, sc. τὰ νάματα. Τοιοῦτων, i.e. ἵππεινον. For μὴ followed by μίτη, see critical note on 1257 b 12. The arrangement recommended by Aristotle had probably already been adopted by some Greek cities when he wrote: thus we read of Pellene in Paus. 7. 27. 4, ἱκεδομηται δὲ καὶ ἑλευρων κρήςει ἐν τῇ ἁγορᾷ, καὶ λαυτρα ἄστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ ὑδρὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπεὶ τοις πίνειν σφισαι ὑπὸ τῶν πόλεων εἰς ὑν οὐ πολλαί. It has been adopted in more than one city of modern Europe; for instance, at Nicæ (Times, Nov. 1, 1883).

17. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐρυμῶν. Aristotle has been speaking of the τόπως τῆς πόλεως from the point of view of salubrity (9), and now he turns to consider the question of ἐρυμοί τῶν. Τῶν ἐρυμῶν follows, instead of preceding, τῶν for the sake of emphasis. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 2, πρῶτ δημον γενέσθαι τῶν ἐσχατῶν, and Diod. 13. 111. 3. τινὲς δὲ γονεῖς καὶ τέκνα τὰ νήσια λαξωτεῖς, where stress is laid on 'infant children' as being the most helpless.

19. οἷον ἀκρόπολις ὀλιγαρχικῶν καὶ μοναρχικῶν κ. τ. λ. Plato had
provided the city which he founds in the Laws with an acropolis (Laws 745 B, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα μέρη δώδεκα διελέσθαι, θέμενον Ἑστίας πρώτον καὶ Διός καὶ Ἀθηναίς ἱερῶν, ἀκρόπολιν ὁνομάζοντα), but we seem to gather from 20, ἀριστοκρατικόν δὲ οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἱσχυροί τόσοι πλείους, that Aristotle's ideal city is to have more strong places than one, and that its chief strong place (c. 12. 1331 a 24 sqq.) is not an acropolis. For μοναρχικῶν, cp. Pollux, 9. 40, τάχα δὲ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ βασιλείων ἄν τίς εἴσοι καὶ τυραννεῖον. The word, however, hints that an acropolis savours rather of Tyranny than of Kingship: cp. Diod. 16. 70, Τιμολέων δὲ ... τάς μὲν κατὰ τὴν νήσου ἀκρόπολεις καὶ τὰ τυραννεία κατάσκαψε, Plut. Timol. c. 24, and Juv. 10. 306 sq. That a level site was congenial to democracies may be inferred from the fact that the cities of Mantinea (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 230: Bursian, Geogr. von Griechenland, 2. 209) and Megalopolis (Curtius, 1. 281 sq.: Bursian, 2. 244), both of them designed to be democratically ruled, were built on comparatively level sites. Aristotle does not explain why there should be more strong places than one in the central city of an ἀριστοκρατία (see above on 1273 a 19)—perhaps he regards an ἀριστοκρατία as giving a share of power to a plurality of social elements (virtue, wealth, and the demos), each of which would have a strong place of its own—but it is a fact that at Sparta, Carthage, and the Epizephyrian Locri, the seats of three famous ἀριστοκρατιῶν, there were more strong places than one within the city. As to Sparta, cp. Polyb. 5. 22. 1, τῆς γὰρ Σπάρτης τῷ μὲν καθολον σχῆματι περιφέρουν ὑπαρχοῦσα καὶ κειμένη εἰς τόπους ἐπιπέδους, κατὰ μέρος δὲ περιεχοῦσα εἰς αὐτὴ διαφόρους ἄνωμάλους καὶ βουνώδεις τόπους κ.τ.λ., and Paus. 3. 17. 1, Δακέδαμον οἰκεῖος δὲ ἀκρόπολις μὲν ἐς ύψος περιβάλλει εξίσχυσα οὐκ ἑστι, κατὰ δὲ θηβαίους τε ἡ Καδμεία καὶ ἡ Δάρισα 'Ἀργείοις' ὀστῶν δὲ εν τῇ πόλει λόφων καὶ ἄλλων, το μάλτια ἐς μετέωρον ἄνήκον ὑψομάζοναν ἀκρόπολιν (see Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. Sparta, vol. ii. p. 1026 b). The site of Carthage was 'a peninsula with water on three sides. On the three hills within this peninsula stood Carthage and its surroundings, its suburbs, and its necropolis' (E. A. Freeman, Contemporary Review, Sept. 1890, p. 368). See also Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 165 sqq. As to Locri, see Liv. 29. 6. 14 sqq. The seven hills of Rome, which was in its best days an ἀριστοκρατία, are famous.

23. τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, i.e. other than those of war, e.g. ἀναγκαίας (c. 12. 1331 b 13) and πολιτικὰς πράξεις.
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κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν ἱπποδάμειον τρόπον. Καὶ is explanatory, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 9, τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν κατηλκυήν. Holm (Griech. Gesch. 2. 324) denies that Hippodamus was the first to lay out cities with straight streets. The Campanian Neapolis, he says, was laid out altogether in this way, and Selinus was laid out with two main streets crossing each other at right angles. ‘New cities, therefore, were built in this fashion before the fifth century B.C.,’ and all that Hippodamus did was to introduce the method in places of the highest importance. But is this view reconcilable with 2. 8. 1267 b 22 sq.?

25. ὃς ἔλθων κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον χρόνον. Like Athens, of which we read in Pseudo-Dicaearch. De Graeciae Urbibus (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 254), ἢ δὲ πόλεις ξυρᾶ πᾶσα, οὐκ εὕδρος, κακῶς ἐρματομημένη διὰ τὴν ἀρχαιότητα, and like Rome till its rebuilding by Nero (Tac. Ann. 15. 43, ceterum urbis quae domui supererant non, ut post Gallica incendia, nulla distinctione nec passim erecta, sed dimensis vicorum ordinibus et latis via rum spatiii cohibitaque aedificiorum altitudine ac patefactis areis). Compare also the contrast between the laying out of Rome and Capua in Cic. De Leg. Agrar. 2. 35. 96.

26. διεσέξοδος γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for that arrangement of private dwellings is hard of exit for foreign troops and hard of exploration for assailants [whether foreign or not].’ The fate of the Thebans who were admitted into Plataea in b.c. 431 is probably present to Aristotle’s mind. They found much difficulty in escaping from the city when their attempt on it had failed (Thuc. 2. 4. 2, 5). Compare the difficult position in which Xenophon’s troops found themselves in assaulting the city of the Drilae not far from Trapezus on the Euxine (Xen. Anab. 5. 2. 7, ὅ δ’ ἐλθὼν λέγει διὰ ἐστι χωρίον χρημάτων πολλών μεστὸν τὸ τοῦτο οὕτε λαβεῖν δυνάμεθα· ἵσχυρῶν γὰρ ἔστιν· οὕτε ἀπελθεῖν ῥάδιον· μάχονται γὰρ ἐπεξεξιλνθότες καὶ ἂν ἄφοδους χαλεπῆ). An attacking force did not relish assaulting a city which it was at once difficult to explore, and consequently to reduce, and difficult to get out of in case of failure.

27. διὰ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν, i.e. διὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσιν μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἡδίου καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὸν πολιτικὸν ἀσφαλείας χρῆσιν (cp. 31, οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμων ἔξει καλῶς). It is not quite clear whether Aristotle adds (in 29) καὶ τὴν μὲν δὴν μὴ ποιεῖν πόλειν εὕτομον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους in explanation of his suggestion that the houses should be arranged in clumps or
quincunes, or as an alternative plan. Perhaps the former is the case. His plan will then be to drive straight wide streets between the clumps or quincunes of houses, but to leave the interior of each quincunx a tangle of narrow lanes. Compare J. R. Green's description of Roman London (Making of England, p. 106); it was 'little more than a mass of brick houses and red-tiled roofs, pierced with a network of the narrow alleys which passed for streets in the Roman world, and cleft throughout its area by two wider roads from the bridge.' Silchester and St. Alban's, however, were laid out with great regularity (Fox and St. John Hope, On the Desirability of the complete Excavation of the Site of Silchester, p. 4).

28. κατασκευάζη, sc. τὴν τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσιν.
καθάπερ k.t.l., sc. κατασκευάζονται, 'as among farmers what some call clumps of vines are arranged.' For τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας, cp. Pollux, 7. 146, καὶ ξυστάς μὲν καὶ συστάσεις = ἡ ἀμπελόφυτος γῆ, ἡ μὴ κατὰ στίχου πεφυτευμένη, στοιχᾶς δὲ ἡ κατὰ στίχου. Vines were planted in clumps or quincunes, partly because they looked better when thus arranged, and partly because they were more productive (Varro, De Re Rustica, 1. 7. 2 sqq.: Columella, 3. 13. 4: Quintil. 8. 3. 9). The younger Cyrus seems to have planted trees in this way (Xen. Oecon. 4. 20 sqq.: cp. Cic. De Senect. 17. 59). Sus., following Scaliger, reads ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις ('in the fields,' or 'farms') in place of ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις, which is the reading of all the MSS., but the word γεωργίον is nowhere else used by Aristotle (is it used by any writer earlier than Philo, Mechan. Synt. p. 96, l. 49 Schoene ?), and ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις ('among farmers'), which is retained by Bekk.², appears to be defensible: cp. Pherecr. Κορινθώ, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 281), ἐν τοῖς Μαραθυνοῖς ἐκείνοις βαρβάρους χύτρας καλοῦσι τὰς μελαίνας ἱπχάδας, and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 3. 2, ἀ δὴ νόμιμα ἢν ἐν Μίδοις. Ἐν ταῖς γεωργίαις, 'in the farms,' would probably be preferable to ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις (cp. Plato, Laws 762 A). But Aristotle often refers to practices prevailing among farmers (e.g. in De Gen. et Corr. 2. 8. 335 a 13: Hist. An. 5. 32. 557 b 29 sqq.).

31. καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κόσμον. See critical note.

32. περὶ δὲ τειχῶν k.t.l. This takes up 1330 b 17, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐρυμῶν. Aristotle has just pronounced in favour of an old-fashioned arrangement of private houses, and now he passes
on naturally enough to the question whether it is not the best plan to be old-fashioned in the matter of walls, and to dispense with them altogether. He has before him Plato, Laws 778 D, περὶ δὲ τείχων, ὃ Μέγαλλε, ἕγγου ἀν τῇ Σπάρτῃ ἐξυμφεροῦμην τὸ καθεύδειν ἕν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τείχη καὶ μὴ ἐπαναστάναι κ.τ.λ. The State of the Laws was pre-eminently one which laid claim to virtue (696 Α: 731 Α sqq.). Agesilaus ([Plut.] Apophth. Lac. Ages. 30) had been asked why Sparta had no walls, and had replied, οὐ λίθοι δὲ καὶ ξύλους τετείχισθαί τάς πόλεις, ταῖς δὲ τῶν ἐνοικοῦντων ἄρεται, and a similar dictum was ascribed to Lycurgus (Plut. Lycurg. c. 19). Isocrates had spoken of the Lacedaemonians as ἀρετῆς ἀμφισβητοῦντες in Archid. § 91, and had used the expression τοὺς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιούμενους in Panath. § 228 (cp. § 120). For ἡν ἄρχων ἔργων ὑποδαμβάνουσιν, cp. Leutsch. and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 57, ἀρχαῖα φρονεῖς: ἦτοι εὐθῆ, where Aristoph. Nub. 821 (Didot) and Plato, Euthydem. 295 C are referred to.

34. καὶ ταῦθ' ὀργώτες κ.τ.λ. This refers to the humiliation (cp. 40, μὴ πάσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβρίζονται) which Epaminondas' invasions of Laconia inflicted on Sparta. For the sing. ἕργῳ, cp. Meteor. 1. 13. 349 b 35, διδόν 8' αὐτό τὸ ἑργον, and Plato, Symp. 182 C, ἑργῷ δὲ τοῦτο ἐμαθὼν. In 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 15 we have τοὺς ἔργους ἐξελήχυκται and in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 1 ἐξελήχυκται ὑπὸ τῶν ἔργων.

35. ἐστὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. So far as this Aristotle agrees with Plato's censure of those who seek safety in walls (Laws 779 Α, τείχοις δὲ καὶ πύλαις διανοεῖονται φραγμένα ταὶ καὶ καθεύδοντας σωτηρίας δυντος ἐξειν μηχανας κ.τ.λ.). Compare Thuc. i. 32. 5, where the Corcyreans say, τὴν μὲν οὖν γεγομένην ναυμαχίαν αὐτοὶ κατὰ μόνας ἀπεωσάμεθα Κορυσιόν' ἐπειδή δὲ μείζον παρασκευήν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς Ἀλλῆς Ἑλλάδος ἑρ' ἡμᾶς ὀρμήσατι, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοί ὀρμών ὄντες τῇ οἰκείᾳ μονὸν δυνάμει περιγενέσθαι κ.τ.λ.

37. ἐπει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Take the case of Plataea or Phlius besieged by the Lacedaemonians and their allies, or of Haerlem besieged by the forces of Spain (Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic, Part 3, c. 8). For καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται, see above on 1264 b 18.

38. καὶ τής ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀλλόγοις ἄρετῆς. Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 26, μήτε πρὸς ἄρετην συγκρίνουσι τὴν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἀδικάτους, Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 a 18, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἰθροῦσα μᾶλιντ' ἄν ἄρμοται λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἄρετην, ἱπποκάτ' καὶ καθ' ἔναν, Magn. Mor. 2. 5. 1200 b 11 sqq., and Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 32, οἱ δ' αὐ 'Ηλείοι . . . ἀπήλθον εἰς τὸ ἄστυ, τινοῦτον γενόμενοι οἴους τὴν ἄρετὴν θεὸς μὲν ἐν ἐμπνεύσεις δύναται καὶ
40. τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρμυνότητα κ.τ.λ. So far from strong walls being a sign of effeminacy, as many thought (Plato, Laws 778 E: [Plut.] Apophth. Lac. Agis 6, Ages. 55, and Panthoid. 1), they are really a sign of warlike forethought.

1. ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εὐρημένων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle refers among other 1331 a. things to the invention of the catapult made under Dionysius the Elder at Syracuse (Diod. 14. 42. 1, καὶ γὰρ τὸ καταπελτικὸν ἐφίβη κατὰ τοῦτον τῶν καυρῶν ἐν Συρακούσαισι, ὥς ἄν τῶν κρατίστων τεχνιτῶν πανταχόθεν εἰς ἐνα τόπον συνηγμένων . . . διότερ ἀνυπέρβλητον φιλοτιμίαν εἰσφέροντες οἱ τεχνίται πολλὰ προσεπενοῦντο βῆθι καὶ μηχανῆμα ἔτια καὶ θύμαμα παρέχεσθαι μεγάλας χρείας, and 14. 50. 4). The term μηχανή, however, probably includes not only catapults, but also battering-rams with shelter-sheds for those who worked them, movable wooden towers with drawbridges which could be lowered so as to give the besiegers access to the top of the city-wall, scaling-ladders, etc. (Droysen, Gr. Kriegsalterth. p. 209. 1). Of these contrivances, catapults and (apparently) movable wooden towers were introduced into Greek warfare under Dionysius the Elder (Droysen, p. 211). He had to contend against the Carthaginians, who were the first to use battering-rams and towers for sieges in the West, and whose use of them against the Greeks gave them a great superiority in their Sicilian campaigns (Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 134). His catapults and wooden towers revolutionized the art of besieging cities. They cleared the walls of their defenders and thus facilitated the use of the battering-ram. Nor did the development of the art stop here. As time went on, the towers became higher and better armed, and the battering-rams longer and better sheltered. The new methods of siege-warfare were inherited by Philip of Macedon, whose engines of war were famous (Demosth. Phil. 3. c. 50). See on the whole subject Droysen, op. cit. p. 211 sqq. For εἰς ἄκριβειν, cp. Plato, Gorg. 487 C, εἰς τὴν ἄκριβειαν.

3. ὄμοιον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Ταῖς πόλεσιν finds its correlative in τὴν χώραν and ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ἱδίαις. If we are to deprive cities of their defence for fear of making the citizens unmanly, why should we stop there? Why should we not deprive the territory and private dwellings of their defences also?

4. τὸ τὴν χώραν εὐέμβολον ζητεῖν, 'to seek that the territory shall be easy of invasion,' for εἶναι should be supplied with εὐέμβολον.
Compare for the construction 1. 9. 1257 b 17 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 443 B and 375 E.

περιαρείν τοὺς ὑπερνοῦσ τόπους, 'strip off (from the territory) its mountainous spots,' as one might strip off an outer coating. Περιαρείν answers to μὴ περιβάλλειν, 3.

7. For ἄλλα μὴν ο噔ὲ... γε see note on 1339 a 29.
10. ταῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημέναις. See critical note.

11. οὐκ ὃτι τεῖχη μόνον περιβλητέον. Coray brackets μόνον, but, as Sus. 3 has already pointed out, quite wrongly: see Stallbaum on Plato, Symp. 179 B, καὶ μὴν ὑπεραποθήσειν γε μόνοι ἔθλονσιν οἱ ἐρώτες, οὐ μόνον ὃτι ἄνδρες, ἄλλα καὶ οἱ γυναῖκες, where he refers to Xen. Mem. 2. 9. 8, ὅ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος τῷ Κρίτωνι ἱδέωσ ἔχαριζετο, καὶ οὐχ ὃτι μόνον ὁ Κρίτων ἐν ἰσχυρὰ ἤν, ἄλλα καὶ οἱ φίλοι αὐτοῦ.

ἄλλα καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον κ.τ.λ., 'but attention must also be paid to them to secure that they shall be in a state befitting the city not only with a view to ornament, but also with a view to military procedures, both those already in use and those further ones which have recently been discovered.' The 'military procedures' here referred to are probably those of besiegers, not those of the besieged, but this is not quite certain. For τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας, cp. c. 8. 1328 b 11, 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 34, and Plato, Phaedr. 239 D. How were walls to be made proof against recent improvements in siege-methods? By being made higher, for one thing, to resist scaling, and thicker, to resist battering-rams and heavy artillery (see Droysen, op. cit. p. 253). Aristotle's remark is perhaps based on the experience of Athens. The dangerous position in which she found herself after the defeat of Chaeroneia prompted a hasty effort to repair the walls (Aeschin. c. Ctes. cc. 27, 31), which was continued in the years b.c. 334–326 (Corp. Inscr. Att. 2. 167, referred to by Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 239, note 1, and Droysen, op. cit. p. 237. 1).

12. ὑπὸς κ.τ.λ. For the order of the words see note on 1327 a 4.
15. δὲ ὁν τρόπον. See note on 1314 a 30 and cp. Diod. 13. 95. 3, δὲ οὖ τρόπον.

16. τὰ μὲν εὐρήτατα. Many of these devices are mentioned in the Commentarius Poliorceticus of Aeneas Tacticus (τακτικῶν ὑπόμνημα περὶ τὸν πῶς χρῆ πολιορκουμένου ἀντίχεων), which was written (according to Christ, Gesch. der gr. Litteratur, p. 308) soon after b. c. 360. It is the only part which has come down to us of a larger work.
referred to by Polybius (10. 44) under the title of ὅπερ τῶν στρατηγικῶν ὑπομνήματα. See above on 1326 b 39.

ιτητίν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν. Cp. Isocr. Epist. 7. § 3, ἐρή ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν, and De Pace, § 116, φιλοσοφίσσατε καὶ σκέψετε.

17. ἀρχήν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Thuc. 1. 93. 8, ἐβούλετο γὰρ (ὃ Θεμισ-

tοκῆς) τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει (τῶν τείχων) ἀμφιστάναι τάς τῶν τολμημένων ἐπιβουλάς. The Index Aristotelicus refers to no other passage in which ἀρχήν is similarly used. The use of ἐξ ἀρχῆς in Poet. 24. 1460 a 33 sq., however, approaches that of ἀρχήν here.

19. 'Επει δὲ κ.τ.λ. As the citizen-body must be divided into C.12. syssitia, and the walls must be dotted with guard-rooms and towers, it is a natural arrangement to locate some of the syssitia in the guard-rooms. Aristotle appears to intend the guard-rooms to be in the towers, but a common plan was to build city-walls solid only up to a certain height, and to place guard-rooms in them above that height (Droysen, op. cit. p. 251). As to κατὰ τόπους ἐπικαίρους (with which Liddell and Scott compare Demosth. De Cor. c. 27, προλαβῶν τοὺς ἐπικαίρους τῶν τόπων), towers were often placed along the wall close to a gate which needed guarding, or at an angle where two curtains of wall met which could be commanded by weapons discharged from the tower, or at intervals along the curtain. In times of pressing danger, and especially during a siege, it must have been a common practice for the defenders of the walls to take their meals either on them or close to them (cp. Damon, ap. Athen. Deipn. 442 c, διὸ καὶ πολεμομένων ποτὲ αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν Βυζαντίων) καὶ οὐ προσκαρπεροῦντο τοῖς τείχεσι, Λεονίδης δὲ στρατηγὸς ἐκέλευσε τὰ καπέλια ἐπὶ τῶν τείχων σκηνοπηγεῖν, καὶ μίλις ποτὲ ἐπαύσαντο λιποτακτοῦντες, and Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 14), but Aristotle’s recommendation refers to times of peace as well as times of war, and it probably went far beyond the practice of most cities. We find, indeed, that the polemarchs of Cynaetha spent the day at the gates of their city (Polyb. 4. 18. 2, πολέμαρχοι τῶν καταλημμυρῶν τινές ἐγενόμεναι: ταύτην δὲ συμβαίνει τὴν ἀρχήν κλείουσα τάς πύλας καὶ τῶν μεταξὺ χρόνων κυρίων τῶν κλειδῶν, ποιεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸ καθ’ ἡμέραν τὴν διαιταν ἐπὶ τῶν πυλῶν), but Aristotle does not appear to be speaking here of high magistrates like polemarchs; he seems rather to have in view some part of the military force of the State. For τὰ τείχη διειλήφθαι φυλακτηρίως καὶ πύργοις, cp. Diod. 2. 7. 3, τείχοις διειλημμένων πύργων πυκνοῖς καὶ μεγάλοις.

21. αὐτά, Lamb. ‘eae res’: cp. c. 4. 1325 b 33, ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφρο-
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μίαται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν. Bonitz (Ind. 125 a 34) compares Top. i. 5. 102 a 10, ὅτι δὲ πάντα τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα τομαίτ' ἐστι, δήλου εἴ αὐτῶν, and 102 b 20, but would read αὐτό in place of αὐτά.

23. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ. Ταῦτα, 'these things,' probably refers not to συνστίτα, but to the matters which form the subject of the preceding sentence. Just as some of the syssitia and the guard-rooms are to be conjoined, so we must conjoin the temples of the gods and the syssitia of highest authority. As to μὲν δὴ, Eucken remarks (De Partic.Usu, p. 46), 'diverso modo usurpatur, saepissime quidem ita ut inquisitione quadam finita omnia quae antecedunt comprehendat': he compares Phys. i. 8. 191 b 27, εἷς μὲν δὴ τρόπος ὁδῶς, ἄλλος δὲ κ.τ.λ., and adds 'simili modo μὲν οὖν adhibetur.' See also Bon. Ind. 173 a 38 sqq.

24. τὰς δὲ κ.τ.λ. The suggestion just made as to some minor syssitia leads on to the question where 'the highest syssitia of the magistracies' are to be placed (τὰ κυρίωτα τῶν ἁρχείων συνστίτα, not τὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων ἁρχείων συνστίτα, because Aristotle has the contrast of ἕνα τῶν συνστίτων still in his mind), and to the general question how the various syssitia are to be distributed over the city, for it is not proposed that all citizens—priests, magistrates lower and higher, and soldiers—should meet for meals at one and the same spot. On the contrary, the soldiers will have their syssitia on the walls, the highest magistrates and the priests on the hill on which the temples stand, and the less dignified magistrates near the commercial agora. For τὰς τοῖς θείοις ἀποδεδομέναι οἰκήσεις (contrast αἱ Ἰδεία οἰκήσεις, c. 11. 1330 b 21), cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 21, τὰ πάσσοντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς. Τοῖς θείοις = τοῖς τῶν θεῶν, 'the things of the gods,' and especially 'religious observances' (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 8. 2, and Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 31, τὰ δαμόνα): so Lamb. 'rebus divinis,' while Vict. translates 'divinis naturis.' Aristotle takes pains to sever the temples and the highest magistrates from all else, keeping them apart even from the free agora, much more from the commercial agora: contrast Plato, Laws 778 C, τὰ μὲν τοῖνοι λεπτὸ πᾶσαν πέριξ τὴν τε ἀγορὰν χρῆ κατασκευάζειν ... πρὸς δὲ αὐτῶς οἰκήσεις τε ἁρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων, ἐν οἷς τὰς δίκας ὡς ἱερωτάτους οὐσία λήφθωσι τε καὶ διόςοιν, τὰ μὲν ός ὁσίων πέρι, τὰ δὲ καὶ τοιούτων θεῶν ἰδρύματα, καὶ ἐν τούτοις (i. e. 'deorum aedibus,' Stallbaum) δικαστήρια, ἐν οἷς αἱ τῶν φόνων πρέπει οἰκεῖ γίγνοντ' ἄν καὶ ὅσα διανάτων ἡξία ἰδικήματα. The agora at Leontini seems to have been arranged on a plan
somewhat resembling that of Plato. Cp. Polyb. 7. 6, ἡ γὰρ τῶν λευτέρων πόλεων τῷ μὲν διὸ κλῆται τέτραπτα πρὸς τὰς ἄρκτους, ἀπὸ δὲ διὰ μέσης αὐτῆς αὐλῶν ἐπίπεδος, ἐν δὲ συμβαίνει τὰς τῶν ἄρχειν καὶ δικαστηρίων κατασκευὰς καὶ καθόλου τὴν ἁγορὰν ὑπάρχειν. Aristotle does not tell us where he would place the more important law-courts; he would probably place the less important ones at any rate near the commercial agora. His scheme differs from that of Plato in another point. Plato reserves his acropolis in the Laws (745 B) for Hestia, Zeus, and Athena, whereas Aristotle brings all the gods together on the central hill except those whose temples must necessarily be placed elsewhere. He follows Plato, however, in placing the more important magistracies of the State—its stratēgi, treasurers, and auditors (8 (6). 8. 1322 a 30 sqq.: 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 9 sqq.)—in the immediate neighbourhood of the temples. Their moral influence would thus be strengthened and their sense of responsibility increased. Whether his plan of placing the 'Downing Street' of his State on the top of a hill was a wise one, may well be doubted. At Athens the magistrates lived not on the acropolis, but at its foot. It is true that at Athens the Boulê sometimes met in the acropolis (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 20), and that at Megara the offices of the chief magistracy seem to have been in the acropolis (Plut. Ages. c. 27). The wisdom of separating the offices of the major from those of the minor magistracies seems also questionable. But Aristotle's wish is to gather together in one easily defensible spot the animating forces of his State: cp. De Part. An. 3. 7. 670 a 23, καρδίᾳ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἠπαρ πάσιν ἀναγκαίᾳ τοῖς ζῴοις, ἡ μὲν διὰ τὴν τῆς θερμοπηγος ἄρχῃν (δεῖ γὰρ εἰναι τινα ὅπως ἐστιν, ἐν ᾧ κείσται τῆς φύσεως τὸ ζωτικόν, καὶ τούτο εὐφύλακτον, ὄσπερ ἀκρόπολις ὀδὸς τοῦ σῶματος), τὸ δ' ἠπαρ τῆς πέψεως χάριν.

26. ὅσα μὴ τῶν ἱερῶν κ.τ.λ. Compare the way in which Plato severs the worship of the gods of the nether world from that of the heavenly gods (Laws 828 C, ἡτι δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν χθονίων καὶ ὄσους ἁθεοὺς οἰονικοὺς ἐπονομαστέον καὶ τὸ τῶν τούτοις ἐπομεύων ὦ ἔνθιμότερον, ἄλλα χωριστέον ἐν τῷ τοῦ Πλοῦτωνος μηνί τῷ διωδεκάτῳ κατὰ τῶν νόμων ἀποδιδότας). Among the temples to which Aristotle refers are probably those of Aesculapius, which were often situated outside the city (Plut. Quaest. Rom. c. 94, "διὰ τι τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ τὸ ἱερὸν ἔξω πόλεως ἐστὶν;" πέτρων ὅτι τὰς ἔξω διατριβάς ἐγκυρώσας ἐνόμιζον εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῷ ἄρτε; καὶ γὰρ Ἑλληνες ἐν τόποις καθαροῖς καὶ ύπηλοίς ἐπιεικῶς ἱδρυμένα τὰ Ἀσκληπεία ἔχουσιν; ἡ δὲ τῶν θεῶν ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου μετάπεμπτον
NOTES.

ήκειν νομίζονσιν, Ἐπιδαυρίοις δ’ οὐ κατὰ πάλιν ἄλλα πόρρω τὸ Ἀσκληπιεῖον ἔστιν). As to other temples, cp. Plutarch peri ἴσων απ. Stob. Floril. 58. 14, δὰ τούτῳ τοι καὶ τῶν βεόω τὰ ιερὰ, ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ πάλαι ἄρχαιον νενόμισται, τοὺς ἐρημοτάτους χωρίους οἱ πρώτοι (ἐνδρυσαν), μάλιστα δὲ Μονασιν τε καὶ Πανός καὶ Νυμφῶν καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ ὁσοὶ μουσικῆς ἤγεμόνες θεοί. The temples of Eileithyia in the Peloponnesus were often outside the gate of the city (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 536); there was, for instance, a temple of Eileithyia outside the gate in the walls of Corinth which led to Tenea (Paus. 2. 5. 4). The same was occasionally the case with the temples of the Chthonian Demeter; thus at Agrigentum 'the place chosen for' the Thesmophoria of Demeter 'was far beyond the walls of the elder city; it is barely within the walls of the enlarged city' (Freeman, Sicily, 2. 8b), and at Syracuse the temple of Demeter and Persephone 'was placed by Gelon outside the bounds of his enlarged city' (ibid. 2. 213: see Diod. 14. 63. 1). For ὅ νόμος, cp. c. 17. 1336 b 16, εἶ μὴ παρὰ τισι βεοῖς τουτόύς οὐ καὶ τῶν τωθαυμῶν ἀποθεόσων ὁ νόμος. For an instance of the founding of a temple in a given spot in obedience to the commands of Delphi, cp. Paus. 1. 13. 8, καὶ σφαίρων ἔστι τοῦ βεοῦ χρύσαντος, ἔνθα ὁ Πύρρος ἐτελεύτησεν, ιερῶν Δήμητρος, ἐν δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ Πύρρος τέθανεν. Obedience was proverbially due to a command from Delphi (Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 5, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνεῖλε (i.e. Apollo at Delphi) τῷ παντὶ ὅμιλοι εἶναι (πειθοῦσα τοῖς Δυνατοῦν νόμοις), τότε ἀπεδωκεν (ὁ Δυνατος), οὐ μόνον ἄνωμον ἄλλα καὶ ἀνάσιον θεῖο τὸ πυθοχρήστος νόμωσι μὴ πειθοῦσα: Sext. Empir. adv. Math. 8. 443, αὐτῆς γὰρ ταῖς Ἑρωτιποῦσι φωναὶ ὡς πυθοχρήστοι παραγγέλομαι ἄναγκη πειθοῦσα κ.τ.λ.). Aristotle speaks only of the Delphic oracle, whereas Plato in Laws 738 B sqq. makes a similar reservation in favour of the commands of those of Dodona and Ammon also, and even of τινὲς παλαιοὶ λόγοι.

28. εἴη δ’ ἐν κ.τ.λ., 'and the place would be suitable which is such as to (ὅστε) possess adequate conspicuousness for the enthronement of virtue and a superiority of strength in relation to the adjacent parts of the city.' For ὁ τόπος δόστε (not δότε), cp. Xen. Oecon. c. 21. 10, τοῦ δὲ δεσπότου ἐπιφάνειτο ... ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον, όστε δύναται καὶ μέγιστα βλάψαι τῶν κακῶν τῶν ἔργων καὶ μέγιστα τιμῆσαι τῶν πρόδρομον. For the use of the word ἐπιφάνεια in a not very dissimilar sense, see the passages collected in Stallbaum's note on Plato, Alcib. 1. 124 C. Aristotle continues the sentence in καὶ πρὸς τὰ γεννωντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρμηνεύεσθαι as if he had written
not ἐπιφάνειαν ἔχει ἰκανόν, but ἐπιφανεστέρως ἔχει. For the use of ἔχειν in this double sense (transitive and intransitive), cp. Plato, Rep. 37ο E, and Stallbaum’s note. The ‘virtue’ referred to is apparently that of the gods and the supreme magistrates. That virtue should not be hidden, we see from Paroem. Gr. 2. 76ο, μὴ κρύπτε τὸ κάλλος ὡσπερ τὸ ποιητάχον: ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ δειλῶν κρυπτότων καὶ ἡν ἠχοῦσιν ἀρετήν: ὡ δὲ ποιητάρχος ἔστε ἐν ἴδιοις (cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 621): Pindar, Nem. 9. 6,

ἐστὶ δὲ τις λόγος ἀνθρώπων, τετελεσμένων ἐστῶν

μὴ χαμαὶ σιγὰ καλύψαι:

Hor. Carm. 4. 9. 29,

Paulum sepultae distat inertiae
Celata virtus:

and Plut. Pericl. c. 7, τῆς ἀληθείας θ' ἀρετῆς κάλλιστα φαίνεται τὰ μᾶλλον γαϊδύλενα, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνθρώπων υδέν οὕτω βαθύκλεον τοῖς ἔκτοις ὡς ὁ καθ' ἡμέραν βίος τοῖς συνούσιν. Cp. also Simonides, Fragm. 58,

ἐστι τις λόγος

τῶν ἀρετῶν ναίειν δυσαρεστόν ἐπὶ πέτρας.

Temples especially were wont to be placed on conspicuous sites: see vol. i. p. 338, note 1, and compare also Xen. Mem. 3. 8. 10, ναόις γε μὲν καὶ βωμοῖς χώραν ἐφ′ ἐναὶ πρεπώνεστάτην ἥττης ἐμφανεστάτη οὐσα ἀστιβεστάτη ἐγρ. ὡδὲ μὲν γὰρ ἴδοντα προσεύξασθαι, ὡδὲ δὲ ἀγνός ἠχοῦσα προσόνα, Corp. Inscr. Gr. 2140. 35 (referred to by Bursian, Geogr. von Griechenland, 2. 83. 2), where the temple of Apollo in Aegina is described as situate in the ἐπιφάνειστάτος τόπος τῆς πόλεως, and Polycaen. Strateg. 5. 1. See also Hom. Hymn. in Aphrod. 100 sq. That the place assigned to the gods should be strong we see from Hdt. 5. 67; there are obvious reasons why the abode of the chief magistrates should be so.

30. πρέπει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Μέν is answered by δὲ in τὴν δὲ τῶν ἄνων ἀγοράν, 1331 b 1. Ἐκαστοκεφαλή, ‘provision’ or ‘establishment,’ cp. 1331 b 10, κατασκευάσθαι. The agora here referred to is to be below the hill on which the gods and the magistrates dwell, but still on high ground (cp. 1331 b 12, τὴν ἄνω, sc. ἀγοράν). It would be in this agora that the citizens would come together to elect magistrates, for magistracies were to be elective in Aristotle’s ‘best State’ (c. 4. 1326 b 15), and here too the ecclesia would meet, if indeed, which is uncertain, Aristotle intends an ecclesia to exist. But the main function of this agora seems to be to serve as
a place for the enjoyment of leisure (1331 b 12), the highest and best thing in human life (c. 14. 1333 a 30–b 3). The buildings round it would not be the buildings which usually surrounded an agora. They would include no temples, for the temples were to be on the top of the hill above it, and no public offices either, if the public offices were also to be on the top of the hill, with the exception of those which adjoined the commercial agora. The only buildings which we are distinctly told would adjoin the ‘free agora’ are those of the gymnasium of the elders. These buildings are placed close to it, partly in order that the shady walks and the streams of the gymnasium may add a fresh charm to the agora, partly in order that the elder citizens may obtain recreation without straying from the region which is especially theirs, partly also perhaps in order that they may be encouraged to carry on in their years of maturity the physical training of their earlier years, and may not be tempted to drop it as they probably often did in ancient Greece. There were already cities in which the agora and the gymnasium were close together—e.g. Elis (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2, 29) and Sparta (ibid. 2, 234)—but it should be noticed that Aristotle brings into the neighbourhood of his ‘free agora’ only the gymnasium of the elder men; if he had placed the gymnasium of the younger men near it, he would have seriously altered the character of the spot.

31. οἶνον κτλ., ‘(such an agora) as they call by the name of agora in Thessaly, for example—I mean the agora which they term “free.”’ With ὄνομαζομένου we should supply ἀγοράν: cp. Isocr. Panath. §183, τοῖς ἄρετῖς ἀντιποιουμένοις, μὴ τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν ὄνομαζομένης καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων, where ὄνομαζομένης means ‘called by that name.’ The word ἀγορά was connected in the minds of Greeks with ἀγοράζω, and to use the word as the Thessalians did of a place in which nothing was bought or sold would seem strange to them. Lambinus, followed by Bekk.?, Bonitz (Ind. 487 b 51), and Sus., would read νομίζομεν in place of ὄνομαζομένω, but it seems to me that this change involves the loss of the point of the passage. For καὶ in the sense of ‘for example,’ see above on 1255 a 36. Ἔλευθεραν is evidently interpreted by καθαρὰν τῶν ἄνωτά πάντων in the next line. The word ἔλευθερος is occasionally used by Aristotle in opposition to ἀναγκαῖος (e.g. in 1. 11. 1258 b 11), and we read of τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀγορὰν in 1331 b 11. Camerarius (Interp. p. 305) refers to Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 3 (a passage which Aristotle evidently
remembers), or ðε Ïερείκων νομοί προλαβώντες ἐπιμέλεσθαι ὅπως τὴν ἀρχήν μὴ τοιοῦτο ἑστοναι οἱ πολεῖς οἱ ποιησοῦν τινος ἡ αἰσχροῦ ἔργου ἐφύσειαν. ἐπιμέλεσθαι δὲ ὅδε. ἕστιν αὐτοῖσ τῇ ἔλευσιν ἀγορά καλομενήν, ἐναὶ τα τῇ βασιλείᾳ καὶ τάλα ἀρχεῖα πεποίηται. ἐνεπείθεν τὰ μὲν ἄνω καὶ οἱ ἀγοραῖοι καὶ οἱ τοῦτων φωσι καὶ ἀπεροκαλλία ἀπελήλανται εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, ὡς μὴ μεγνυται ἡ τούτων τύρημα τῆς τῶν πεπαιδευμένων εἰκοσμᾶν. δημητριᾶ δὲ αὐτῆ ἡ ἀγορᾶ ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀρχεῖα τέταρτα μέρη τούτων δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν μὲν παισίν, ἐν δὲ ἐφύσεις, ἄλλο τελείως ἀνδράσιν, ἄλλο τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὰ στρατεύσιμα ἐτὸ γεγονότα. At the opposite pole to an agora of this kind stands the γυνακεία ἀγορά of Menander (Pollux, 10. 18, καὶ μὴ εἰ γυνακεῖαν ἀγορὰν τῶν τόπων οὐ τα σκέψι τὰ τουώτα πεπράσκοισιν ἐθέλους καλεῖς, εὔροις ἐν ἐν τάς Συμβολάσσαις Μενάκδρου τὸ ὅμαι: Meinecke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 204). According to Holm, Gr. Gesch. 2. 309 (see also Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 361), the agora at Athens was divided into two parts, a Southern part used for political purposes, and a Northern part used for trade and social intercourse. That Aristotle would not be satisfied with a mere division of one and the same agora into two parts, we see from 1331 b 1, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίου ἀγοράν ἔτεραν τε δεὶ τάντα εἴναι καὶ χωρίς. As to Sparta and Rome in relation to this matter, see vol. i. p. 339, note 1. The two kinds of agora are traceable in some Southern cities still. At Zara there is a Piazza dei Signori, and also a Piazza dell’ Erbe (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, i. 239, 243). At San Marino the Borgo, which is ‘the business centre of the State,’ where the market is held, is some little way below the town of San Marino; ‘it lies on a small plateau beneath the steep long ridge with its three crags crowned with castles’ on which the town is built (E. Armstrong, ‘A Political Survival,’ in Macmillan’s Magazine, No. 375, Jan. 1891, p. 197).

33. καὶ μῆτε βάναυσον κ.τ.λ. Supply εἰς ἰὼ δεὶ. For παραβάλλειν, ‘enter,’ see Böhm. Ind. s.v., where De Mir. Auscult. 81. 836 a 28, ὅτε . . . εἰς τοῦτος τοὺς τόπους παραβάλε, is quoted among other passages.

35. εἰς δὲ ἐν κ.τ.λ. At Athens in Aristotle’s day the gymnasia were outside the walls, but Plato had already proposed a change in this respect (see vol. i. p. 338, note 2). One gymnasion at any rate at Thebes was outside the city (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 25). At Sparta and Elis, on the other hand, the gymnasion was within the city (see above on 30), and this was the case also at Megalopolis (Paus. 8. 31. 8), and apparently at Pellene (Paus. 7. 27. 5: Curtius, Pelopon-
nesos, i. 483). The gymnasium built by the grave of Timoleon at Syracuse and called Timoleonteum was in the agora (Plut. Timol. c. 39). The plan of separating the gymnasium of the elder from that of the younger men may be borrowed by Aristotle from Sparta; we read at any rate in Plut. Cimon, c. 16, of the ephebi and the young men (τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ τῶν νεανίσκων) exercising together in a stoa at Sparta as far back as the time of the great earthquake, when Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, was King. In the imaginary Persia of Xenophon's Cyropaedia the boys, the ephebi, the full-grown men, and those past the military age have each of them a separate part of the agora for their use (Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 4, quoted above on 31).

38. καὶ τούτων τῶν κόσμων = καὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν, 'this arrangement' (or 'institution') 'also,' i.e. the gymnasium as well as the syssitia: cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ταύτα ὄρισμα ταῖς ἡμεραῖς, and for κόσμων, 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 5, ἦν ἀν πάντα κακίστως τῶν κόσμων, and 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 5, τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις.

40. ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀθοδόμοις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here implies that there are two kinds of αἰώνως, one genuine and the other not (cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 21. 273 M, τῆς ἀληθινῆς αἰώνως). Phaedra in the Hippolytus of Euripides (363 Bothe: 385 Dindorf) had already said,

αἰώνως τε δισσαὶ δ' εἰσίν, ἡ μὲν οὐ κακή,
ἡ δ' ἄχθος οὐκὼν,

but she is distinguishing between the αἰώνως which holds back where there should be no holding back and the αἰώνως which is not inopportune. Aristotle's distinction, on the contrary, is drawn between the αἰώνως which befits freemen and the αἰώνως which does not. The δῖος οἰκτίων πρὸς δεσπότας of which we read in Aristot. Fragm. 178. 1507 b 22, 37 was probably miscalled αἰώνως by some. True αἰώνως was rather to be sought in the respectful awe with which the Spartans regarded the members of the γερουσία (Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 180, παρελθὼν τις τῶν γερώντων, ὅσ' ἐκεῖνοι καὶ αἰσχύνονται καὶ δεδιαστε: cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. Polydor. 4. 231 F, ἔρωτησες δὲ διὰ τι Σπαρτιάτα κατὰ πόλεμον κυνικόνεοναν ἀνθρείως, ἢ οτι, ἐφι, αἰδείεσθαι τοῦ ἡγεμόνα ἐμαθὼν, οὐ φοβεῖσθαι). The nature of the αἰώνως which befits freemen may best be learnt from Plato, Laws 671 C sq. (where it is called θείος φόδος), 647 A, 698 B, and 699 C: we gather that it makes men obedient to law and order and content with their share of speech and silence, and also courageous and
Soph. Aj. 1073,

οὐ γὰρ ποτ’ οὖτ’ ἂν ἐν πόλει νόμοι καλῶς
φέροντ’ ἂν, ἔστι μὴ καθεστήκη δέος,

οὔτ’ ἂν στρατός γε σωφρόνως ἄρχοιτ’ ἐτὶ
μηδὲν φόβου πρῶτομον μηδ’ αἴδους ἔχον,

and the language of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 322 D. At
Sparta the presence of elders was held to be enough, in the absence
of magistrates, to produce aídos (cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 10, ὅπως
δὲ μηδ’ εἰ γὰρ παιδοφόρος ἀπέλθαι, ἐρωτεύσας ποτε οἱ παιδεῖ εἰεν ἄρχοντος,
ἐποίησε τὸν ἰδίου πατέρα τῶν πολιτῶν κύριον εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτάσσει τοῖς
παισίν, ὅ τι [ἂν] ἀγαθῶν δοκούσι εἶναι, καὶ καλότερον, εἰ τι ἅρματάναιεν.
τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας διεξάγαγε καὶ αἰθημοευθέρειν εἰναι τοῖς παιδίσι οὐδὲν γὰρ
οὕτως αἰδοίναι αὕτη παιδεῖς οὕτοι ἄνδρες ὅσ τοὺς ἄρχοντας, and 5. 5: also
Plut. Lycurg. c. 17)—indeed, some held that the presence, or even
the existence, of ἐρωτεύται produced aídos (Xen. Symp. 8. 33 sq.: Plato,
Symp. 178 D sq.)—but Aristotle thinks that nothing produces
so well as the visible presence of magistrates: cp. Xen.
Cyrop. 8. 1. 16 and Hell. 7. 3. 6, and on the whole subject Plut.
Cleom. c. 9, a passage which shows that Aristotle’s views were
much influenced by those which prevailed at Sparta. A current
proverb, however, is also probably present to his memory, aídos ἐν
ὀφθαλμοῖς (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 381): cp.
Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 a 34, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ μᾶλλον
(αισχύνοντα)’ ὅσον καὶ ἡ παρομία, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδός. διὰ
τοῦτο τοὺς ἰδίους πατέρας μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας
αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφότερα. See Cope’s note on this
passage.

1. τὴν δὲ τῶν ἁνίων ἀγορᾶν κ.τ.λ. This answers to 1331 a 30, 1331 b.
πρέπει δ’ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν τόπον κ.τ.λ. “Ἐχοὺσαν τόπον εὐθυνάγουν
κ.τ.λ., ‘ον οικεῖα μεῖτε λαλάραν, for a site easily made a meeting-point for all commodities,
both those coming from the sea and those coming from the territory.’
Compare the use of εἰςπαρακάμπτων in c. 5. 1327 a 7 sqq.

4. τπλῆθος. See critical note.

εἰς ἰερεῖς, εἰς ἄρχοντας. See critical note. Here, as in 6 (4). 15.
1299 a 16 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 17 sqq.), priests are distinguished
from magistrates.

5. καὶ τῶν ἰερέων συσσίτια, i.e. as well as the syssitia of the chief
magistracies. For the absence of τα before τῶν ἰερεῶν, see note on
1285 b 12, τοῦ σκηντρούν ἐπανίτασι. Vict. ‘cum enim frequentes ipsos
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oporteat esse in fanis illis, ut serviant officio suo, quod sine scelere deseri non potest, facilius id praestabunt, si explebunt desideria corporis propinquuo in loco.' Aristotle's aim probably is to secure more attention to their duties on the part of the priests than was often forthcoming from them. 'By the ἱερὸς νόμος of Oropus ('Εφ. Ἀρχ. 1885, 94) the priest of Amphiaraus was only required μένειν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ μὴ ἐλαττον ἢ δέκα ἡμέρας τοῦ μηνὸς ἐκδοστον. He probably spent the remainder of his time in the city, where he had a civil occupation in addition to his sacred office. Compare von Wilamowitz, Hermes, 21. 93' (Toepffer, Attische Genealogie, p. 160. 2).

τερὶ τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων. Schn. is probably right in supplying τάξιν. Compare the suppression of διανομήν in Plato, Laws 745 D.

6. τῶν δ' ἄρχειῶν κ.τ.λ., 'but all the magistracies which have in their charge contracts and indictments in lawsuits and callings into courts and other administrative work of the kind just mentioned.' Aristotle does not rate these functions highly (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 10 sqq.), nor does Plato (Rep. 425 C sqq.). The magistracies which have the supervision of contracts are here marked off from the agoranomi, though in 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 12, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδὴν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἢ τερὶ τὴν ἀγοράν, ἐφ' ὧν δεὶ τινὰ ἄρχην εἶναι τὴν ἐφορώσαν τερὶ τε τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν εἰκοσίαν, the functions of the agoranomi are implied to include the supervision of contracts. Aristotle is perhaps here thinking of magistrates with whom contracts were registered: see as to these 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 34 sqq. and note.

9. τὴν καλωμέμην ἀστυνομίαν. Probably the word ἀστυνομία was not familiar everywhere (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 23, καλοῦσι δ' ἀστυνομίαν οἱ πλείστοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἄρχην). The title, indeed, seems to be too grand for the functions of the office. See note on 1317 a 18. Yet Aristotle adds οἱ καλοῦμενοι to such simple and everyday words as γεωργοὶ and βάναυσοι in 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 40 sq., so that the addition of τὴν καλωμέμην here may need no special explanation.

10. πρὸς ἁγόρας μὲν δεί κ.τ.λ., 'must be established near indeed to some agora and place of public concourse, but the place adapted for the business done by them is [not the place near the free agora, but] the place near the necessary agora, for,' etc. For σύνοδος, see note on 1319 a 31. For τοιοῦτος, cp. 1331 a 28. For the contrast of ἀναγκαία ἁγόρα and ἀλευθέρα ἁγόρα, cp. i. i. 1258 b 10.

12. ἐνσυχλάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀνω τίθεμεν. For ἐνσυχλάζειν, where the infinitive expresses the purpose, see Goodwin, Moods and
Tenses, § 770, who refers among other passages to Plato, Phaedr. 228 E, παρώντος δὲ καὶ Λυσίων ἐμαυτὸν σοι ἐμελετάν παρέχειν οὐ πάνω δὲδοκεῖ, and Thuc. 2. 44. 2. For τὴν ἀνώ, cp. Thuc. i. 93. 9, τὸν τε Πειραιᾶ ὄψειμέντερον ἐνήμερε τῆς ἀνώ πόλεως. For τίδεμεν, cp. c. 13. 1332 a 30 sq.

ταύτην δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις, 'and this for necessary activities, [with the supervision of which these magistracies are concerned].'

18. νενεμήσθαι δὲ χρῆ κ.τ.λ., 'and matters in the territory should be distributed on the plan which has been described,' i.e. so that sites shall be allotted for guard-houses and syssitia of magistrates in them and for temples. Aristotle here has before him Plato, Laws 848 C sqq., and especially δῶδε κώμας εἶναι χρῆ, κατὰ μέσον τὸ δωδεκατμήμων ἐκαστοῦ μίαν, ἐν τῇ κώμῃ δὲ ἐκάστῃ πρῶτον μὲν ἱερὰ καὶ ἀγορὰν ἑξηρῆσθαι θεῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἑπομένων θεοὶς δαιμόνων . . . πρῶτον δὲ οἰκοδομίας εἶναι περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τάυτα, ὅπην οὖν ὁ τόπος ὕψηλτατος ἦ, τῶν φρουρῶν ὑποδοχῆν ὅ τε μάλιστα εὐερκή. He also follows the example of Plato (Laws 760 B sqq.) in creating the magistracy of the agronomi to keep watch and ward over the rural districts. We nowhere find a mention of ἀγρονόμουs except in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, nor of ἀλφαί except in the Politics (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 333), though Suidas has an article under the head of ἀλφαί. See as to these magistrates below on 1321 b 27. Plato had already established syssitia for the agronomi (Laws 762 B, διακάτωθαν δὲ οἱ τε ἐρχόντες οἱ τε ἀγρονόμοι τὰ δύο ἐτη τούδε τωδ' ἐργοῦ ἀρχαῖον. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ καθ' ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους εἶναι ἄντικα, εν οἷς κοινὴ τὴν διαίτην ποιήσαντο ἀπαντεῖν. As to the φιλακτή τῆς χώρας, see Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 10 sqq. (where one of its objects is implied to be the protection of property against robbers), and Rhet. i. 4. 1360 a 6 sqq. Φιλακτήρια were scattered over Attica (see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 312, note 1, and Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, p. 193); we read in Xen. De Vict. 4. 43 of a τέχος at Anaphylustos and of another at Thoricus. A description of the castle at Oeneus will be found in Droysen, Gr. Kriegsalterthümer, p. 259. We may perhaps infer from Laws 848 C sqq. (quoted above) that Greek villages often had a fortress on high ground towering over them quite in the style which we associate with the middle ages. These φιλακτήρια furnished quarters for the young citizens of Athens during the year in which they served as περίπολοι ('Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 42, § 4, with Sandys'
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note: cp. Eupolis, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 56, καὶ τοὺς περιπόλους ἀπίεν ἐις τὰ φρούρια). How important a part they sometimes played in the defence of the State appears from Diod. 14. 57. 6, where we read that after the city of Messana in Sicily had been captured by the Carthaginians, τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν φρούρια, in which most of the citizens had taken refuge, offered a successful resistance.

17. ετὶ δὲ ἵερα κ.τ.λ., 'and further temples must be marked out all over the territory, some for gods and others for heroes.' Cp. Plato, Laws 848 D, where it is arranged that in each village there shall be temples of the gods καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων θεῶν δαιμόνων: elsewhere also in the Laws he recommends worship to be paid not only to gods and heroes but also to δαίμονες (Laws 717 B, μετὰ θεῶν δὲ τούς καὶ τῶς δαίμονας ἐ γε ἐμφρόν ὄργανοι', ἤρωι δὲ μετὰ τούτους: cp. 738 B and D). As to the position given by Plato to δαίμονες, see the passages from his writings referred to by Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 501, note 38. Plutarch says (De Defect. Orac. c. 10: see also c. 17, and De Iside et Osiride, c. 25), Ἦσιοδος δὲ καθαρῶς καὶ διωριμένοις πρῶτος ἔξθηκε τῶν λογικῶν τέσσαρα γένε, θεοὺς, εἰτὰ δαίμονας πολλοὺς κἀγαθούς, εἰτὰ ἤρωις, εἰτὰ ἀνθρώπους, τῶν ἡμιθεῶν εἰς ἤρωις ἀποκρηθέντων. Aristotle is acquainted with the distinction between gods and δαίμονες (cp. Περὶ τῆς καθ’ ὑπον μαντικῆς, c. 2. 463 b 13 sqq.), and his silence in this passage about δαίμονες is significant. That heroes were believed sometimes to fight for the State which worshipped them, appears from Diod. 15. 53. 4. Attica was full of village-shrines, which appears from Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 8. 290. We see from the passage before us that the word ἵερων was used of the building dedicated to a hero, though the sacred enclosure round it was properly called not a τέμενος, but a σηκός (Pollux, 1. 6).

18. ἀλλὰ τὸ διατριβεῖν νῦν ἀκριβολογομένους κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 34, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικῶν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατριβεῖν, and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 29 sqq. Καὶ λέγονται is added in contradistinction to ποιοῦνται, cp. 20 sqq. Τῶν τοιούτων is repeated in 19 and 22, and in 20 we have τὰ τοιαῦτα. See note on 1284 b 28.

20. οὗ γὰρ χαλεπῶν κ.τ.λ. There is a designed antithesis between the similarly sounding words νοῆσαι and ποιῆσαι, εἰκή and τέχη. For the contrast of νοῆσαι and ποιῆσαι, cp. Metaph. z. 7. 1032 b 15 sqq. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 745 B, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τούτῳ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν πόλιν ἰδρύσθαι δὲ τῆς χώρας δὲ τᾶ μάλιστα εὐ μέσῳ,
καὶ τιλλα ὅσα πρόσθερα πολεί τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἔχοντα τόπον ἐκλεξύμενον, ἢ νοῇσαι τε καὶ εἰπέων οὐδέν χαλεπῶν: cp. also Phileb. 16 C, and Philem. 'Εφεδρίται, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 10).

χαλέπων τὸ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ κελεύσαν ῥάδων.


24. Περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ. The contents of the c. 13. thirteenth and following chapters have been sketched in vol. i. p. 340 sqq. The answer given in them to the question here raised is—a State that is to be happy must consist of citizens who are endowed by nature, fortune, and education with the means of making an absolutely and not merely conditionally, perfect use of virtue, or in other words of citizens who are not only good men (σπουδάων), but are also supplied with an adequate amount of bodily and external goods, i.e. of citizens possessed of ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένη (1332 a 28 sqq.: 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 sqq.). Aristotle insists on this because he holds that Plato had starved the life of his guardians in the Republic and robbed it of happiness (2. 5. 1264 b 15 sqq.), and had sought to construct a happy State without making any class of his citizens happy (see vol. i. p. 427 sqq.); he probably thought that Plato would not have made this mistake if he had studied the nature of happiness more closely. Aristotle’s own ideal of a happy State, which is a sound and noble one, is conceived in direct and designed contrast to that of Plato’s Republic and also to the model of the Lacedaemonian State. His ideal State consists of a body of citizens fully supplied with absolute goods and living a life in which work is crowned with leisure, yet unspoilt by their good fortune and enabled by a wisely ordered education to use their leisure aright. For τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ‘the constitution itself, as distinguished from matters outside it,’ see above on 1326 b 35, and cp. Plut. De Cohib. Pr. c. 12, where αὐτῆς ἡ ὁργή is contrasted with τὰ ἐν ὁργῇ ἀμαρτήματα, and Demosth. in
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Lept. c. 144, καὶ νυνὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου πάς ἐστίν ὁ λόγος, τούτω δ’ (i.e. to the proposer of the law) οὖν δεὶς ἐστὶν κῆδον τού. For ἐκ τῶν καὶ ἐκ πολῶν, cp. c. 10. 1329 b 40, and see above on 1274 b 32. As to the repetition of ἐκ, see critical note.

26. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ. τ. λ. The apodosis is introduced by μὲν οὖν, 39, as in c. 2. 1324 a 19 sqq., where see note. Plato (Laws 962 A) and Isocrates (De Pace, § 28 and Epist. 6. 8) had already dwelt on the importance in any inquiry of ascertaining both the end and the means of attaining it. For τὸ εὖ, see Bon. Ind. 291 b 25 sqq. Bonitz (Ind. 685 a 40) contrasts τῶν σκοτῶν καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων with 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 14, πανηγύρος γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὑπὸ ποιοῦσαι τὸ τέλος. See note on the latter passage.

28. ἐν δὲ τὰς κ. τ. λ., not ἐν τῷ τάς: see above on 1330 b 10.

30. ταῦτα, i.e. τὸ τέλος and τὰς πρῶς τὸ τέλος φεροῦσα πράξεις.

31. ἐκκεῖται καλός, ‘is proposed well.’ Compare (with Liddell and Scott) Megasthenes, ap. Strab. p. 707, τὸς δ’ ὀπλοποιῶς καὶ ναυπηγοὺς μισοῦν καὶ τροφαί παρὰ βασιλέως ἐκκεῖται. In 28 we have κεῖσαι ὅρθως, and in 36 τῶν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὄρον.

ἐν τῷ πράττειν, as distinguished from τὸ νοεῖν, which is a prior stage: cp. Metaph. Z. 7. 1032 b 6 sqq.

33. ὅτε δὲ κ. τ. λ. The Platonic Socrates in the Republic is charged with this twofold error in 2. 2. 1261 a 11–16.

34. οὗτον περὶ ἰατρικήν, sc. διαμαρτάνουσαν: cp. Plato, Laws 962 A, ἰατρὸς δὴ τὸ περὶ σῶμα ἰαρών, ὁ προσείπομεν ἴγνωσεν νῦν, ἡ νίκην στρατηγός ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερ ἡ δὴ διήλθομεν, ἐσθ’ ὡς ὧν καὶ τὸ πρὸς τῷ τούτῳ ἐν ἄντων φαίνοντο;

36. ὄρον here = τέλος.

38. κρατείσθαι, ‘obtineri’ (Bon. Ind. s. v.): see Vahlen on Poet. 18. 1456 a 10, πολλοὶ δὲ πλεῖστας εὖ λύνοντα κακός’ δεὶ δὲ ἄμφω ἄει κρατεῖσθαι, and cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 21, ἢςτε δεὶ ἄμφω ἑκεῖν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. See vol. i. p. 341, note 1.

τάς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις. We expect πρῶς in place of εἰς, but cp. c. 11. 1330 b 16, χωρίς τὰ τε εἰς τροφῆν ἐξατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρήσας, and c. 15. 1334 a 14, τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετάς. Cp. also Ἄθ. Πολ. c. 23, τὰ εἰς τῶν πόλεων.

39. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὖ ξην καὶ τῆς εὐθαμοινιας ἐφίενται πάντες, φανερῶν. Here the apodosis begins. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Meno 78 A, ἐστὶν οὖν ὃτις βούλεται ἀθλος καὶ κακοδαιμόνια εἶναι; and the argument which follows. Cp. also Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 4, σχέδου δὲ καὶ ἰδιὰ ἐκάστῳ καὶ κούρη πάντες σκοπᾶς τυς ἐστίν, οὐ στοχα-

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ζόμενοι καὶ αὑρώνται καὶ φεύγουσιν καὶ τούτῳ ἔστιν ἐν κεφαλαίᾳ εἰπείν ἢ τῇ ἑυδαιμονίᾳ καὶ τὰ μέρα τῆς.

40. ἄλλα τούτων κ.τ.λ. Αs to those who have not the power to attain happiness, cp. c. 8. 1328 a 38 sqq. In some of these there is a defect of φύσις (c. 13. 1332 a 40 sqq.: 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 8 sqq.); this is the case with natural slaves (3. 9. 1280 a 33 sqq.). In others there is a defect of τύχη (41 sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27, μὴτε πρὸς παιδείαν ἢ φύσεως δεῖγαι καὶ χορηγίας τυχηράς). Compare Plato, Laws 747 C (quoted in vol. i. p. 341, note 2) and 934 D.

41. δεῖται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is added in explanation of διὰ τῶν τύχης, for a defect of χορηγία is due to a defect of fortune. Καὶ χορηγίας τῶν, as well as of φύσις.


2. οἶ δὲ εὖ ὀνομάζει κ.τ.λ. Εὖθυς, 'from the outset,' because, unlike the others, who start aright but fail later on, they are wrong at starting. So we read in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 31 sqq. that there are persons who seek happiness in the pleasures of recreation, mistaking them for the pleasures of the true end of life. Cp. Eurip. Hippol. 360 Bothe (382 Dindorf), where some are said to miss what is good, ἡδονήν προβέντες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἄλλην τιν’

and Arrian, Epictet. 3. 23. 34.

7. φαμέν δὲ κ.τ.λ. As to the question whether we have here a reference to the Nicomachean Ethics, see vol. i. Appendix F. Aristotle has already given part of this definition in c. 8. 1328 a 37, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστὶν ἑυδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἁρετής ἐνέγρεαι καὶ χρῆσις τις τέλειος. We find a similar definition of ἑυδαιμονία ascribed to the Peripatetics in Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12, ἑυδαιμονίαν δὲ ἐναι χρῆσιν ἁρετῆς τελείας ἐν θεῷ τελείᾳ προηγομένην ... προηγομένην δὲ τὴν τῆς ἁρετῆς ἐνέγρεαν (sc. ἐναι δὲιν) διὰ τὸ πάντως ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθοῖς ὑπάρχειν: compare another Peripatetic definition of ἑυδαιμονία there given, χρῆσιν ἁρετῆς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀνεμπόθεντον. Speusippus
had defined εὐδαιμονία as ἔτις τελεία εν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν έξουσιν or ἔτις ἄγαθῶν (Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 579. 62), but Aristotle substitutes χρησις for ἔτις. For καὶ εν τοῖς ἕθυκοι, compare the frequent use of καὶ, when the ἔξωτερκοι λόγου are adduced (e.g. in c. 1. 1323 a 22, καὶ τῶν εν τοῖς ἔξωτερκοίς λόγοις, Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 26 and 6. 4. 1140 a 2 sq., and Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 28), and also Eth. Nic. 6. 3. 1139 b 26, ὄσπερ καὶ εν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν. Π’ add διεωρίσμεθα after καὶ, but probably wrongly; this may be a gloss on φαμέν which has crept into the text.

9. καὶ ταυτήν κ.τ.λ., i.e. ‘and this perfect use of virtue not an use of virtue conditionally, but absolutely,’ or, in other words, not a merely necessary use of virtue, but a noble use of virtue. A conditionial use of virtue is an use of virtue which is called for under certain circumstances: for instance, if an offence has been committed, it is under the circumstances an use of virtue to punish the offender, but this is not an absolute use of virtue, because it is an use of virtue dictated by circumstances not desirable in themselves; it is the adoption and acceptance of an evil for the sake of the good which under the circumstances it will ultimately produce, whereas an absolute use of virtue is concerned with absolute goods, not with evils which are under given circumstances goods; it is concerned with the calling into existence of honours and wealth. In depicting the life of the citizens of his ‘best State,’ Aristotle often has in his mind the model furnished by the life of the gods (e.g. in c. 1. 1323 b 23 sqq. and c. 3. 1325 b 28 sqq.), and here too he probably remembers the θεοί δωτῆς εἰῶν of Homer (Odys. 8. 325): cp. Isocr. Philip. § 117, ἄλλα καὶ τῶν θεῶν τοὺς μεν τῶν ἄγαθων αἰτίους ἤμαι όστα Ὀλυμπίους προσαγορεύομεν, τούς δ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς συμφοραῖς καὶ ταῖς τιμωρίαις τεταγμένους δυσχερεστέρας τὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἔχονσας, καὶ τῶν μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ νεὼς καὶ βομβικάς ἰδρυμένους, τοὺς δ’ οὔτ’ ἐν ταῖς εἰχαίς οὔτ’, ἐν ταῖς δυναίς τιμωμένους, ἀλλ’ ἀποστοματίζεται αὐτῶν ἤμας ποιομένους: Menander, Κόλαξ Fragm. 3, with Meineke’s note, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 153; and the remarks of Plutarch on the epithet ‘Olympian’ conferred on Pericles in Pericl. c. 39, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὴν μειρακιῶδη καὶ σοβαρᾶν ἐκείνην προσωνυμίαν ἐν τούτῳ ποιεῖν ἀνεπίφθονον καὶ πρέποντα, αὐτῶς εὐμενεῖς ἢδος καὶ βίον ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ καθαρόν καὶ ἀμαντόν Ὀλυμπίων προσαγορεύοντεν, καθάπερ τό τῶν θεῶν γένος αξιόμενον αἰτίου μὲν ἄγαθων ἀνάπτιον δὲ κακῶν περικού ἄρχειν καὶ βασιλεύειν τῶν ὄστων. For the association of τέλειος and ἀπλός, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 32, τό μὲν γάρ ἄδικεν μετά κακίας καὶ ψεκτῶν,
καὶ κακίας ἡ τῆς τελείως καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἂπαν τὸ ἔκοψιον μετὰ ἰδικίας).

10. λέγω δ’ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ‘and by the term “conditionally”’ I mean things which are necessary: i.e. things which are necessary if good is to come about, but which are not in themselves desirable. Bonitz (Ind. 797 a 43) explains τῶν ἀναγκαίων here by ὅν οὐκ ἀνέει τὸ εὖ, comparing Metaph. Δ. 5. 1015 b 3, καὶ εἰπὶ τῶν συναντῶν τῶν ζην καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἄσαυτος (sc. ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται) ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἐνδικὴν μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐνθα καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι οὐν τινῶν, ταῦτα ἀναγκαία καὶ ἡ αἰτία ἀνάγκη τῆς ἀστικῆς αὐτῆς. Cp. also Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1238 b 5, καὶ βούλησται τὰ ἀγαθὰ (sc. ὅ ἐπεικής τῷ φαύλῳ) ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἁπλὰ, τὰ δ’ ἑκείνῳ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ἦν πεινὰ συμφέρει νόσοις.

11. οἷον τὰ περὶ τάς δικαίας πράξεις κ.τ.λ., ‘as for instance, if we take just actions’ (i.e. uses of the virtue justice), ‘just vengeance and punishments proceed indeed from virtue’ (i.e. are uses of virtue), ‘but they are necessary,’ i.e. not desirable in themselves, ‘and are noble only in a necessary way.’ Aristotle here has before him, and slightly corrects, Plato, Laws 728 C, τούτο οὖν ἡ τὸ πάθος δίκη μὲν οὐκ ἔστι—καλὸν γὰρ τὸ γε δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δίκη—τιμωρία δὲ, ἰδικίας ἀκόλουθος πάθη, ὡς ὁ τε τυχὼν καὶ μὴ τυχανὸν ἄθλος, μὲν οὖν ιατρευόμενον, οὐ δὲ, ἵνα ἑτεροὶ πολλοὶ σώζωμεν, ἀπολλάμενοι. In Laws 859 D—860 B the difficulty of classing just punishments either as καλά or as ἀσχρά is dwelt on, and Aristotle himself says in Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 b 30, καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δικαιῶν (sc. πεπραγμένα) ἔργα (sc. ἀνάγκη καλά εἶναι), πάθη δὲ οὐ: it would seem, however, from the passage before us, that just vengeance and punishments to καλῶς ἀναγκαῖος ἐχουσίων. For the difference between τιμωρία and κόλασις, cp. Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 b 12, διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις: ἢ μὲν γὰρ κόλασιν τοῦ παύοντος ἐνεκά ἐστιν, ἢ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἵνα ἀποπληρωθῇ, Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 a 26 sqq., and Gall. 6. 14, puniendi peccatis tres esse debere causas existimatum est. Una est quae nοὐθεσία vel κόλασις vel παρανόησις dicitur; cum poena adhibetur castigandi atque emendandi gratia, ut is qui fortuito deliquit attentior fiat correctiorque. Altera est quam ii qui vocabula ista curiosius divisentur τιμωρίαν appellant. Ea causa animadverteri est, cum dignitas auctoritasque eius in quem est peccatum tuenda est, ne praetermissa animadversio contemptum eius pariet et honos removed; idcircoque id eis vocabulum a conservatione honoris factum putant. For ἀπ᾿ ἀρετῆς, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 11, πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, and Plut. Pericl. c. 1, εν τοῖς ἀπ᾿ ἀρετῆς ἐργάσις.
14. aipetoteron meν γαρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Gorg. 507 D and 478 C; also Laws 628 C sqq. For μεν solitarius, see above on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. Here the suppressed clause is 'though it is desirable that, if punishments are needed, they should be inflicted.'

15. αι δ' επι τας τιμας κ.τ.λ., 'but actions with a view to [the production of] honours and wealth are the noblest actions in an absolute sense': cp. 18, κατασκευαι γαρ ἀγαθων ειναι κα γεννησεις. For the thought, cp. De Gen. An. 2. 1. 731 b 25, το δε καλον κα το θειον αιτων δει κατα την αυτου φυσιν του βελτιωνος εν τοις ἐνδεχομενοις, and Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 a 36, ἀρετη δ' έστι μεν δυναμις, δις δοκει, ποριστηκη ἁγαθων και φυλακηκη, και δυναμις ευθεγητη πολλων και μεγαλων, and 1. 6. 1362 b 2, και τας ἀρετας δε αναγηκ γαναθων ειναι' κατα γαρ τατας εο τε διακυνται οι έξοντες, και ποιηται των ἁγαθων ειναι και πρακτικαι. Prodicus, indeed, according to Plato, Charm. 163 D, would give the name of πράξεις only to τας των ἁγαθων ποιησεις.

16. το μεν γαρ έτερον κ.τ.λ. Το έτερον = αι δικαιαι τιμοριαι και κολασεις. As Schneider points out in his Addenda (2. 506), Sepulveda (p. 229: see his note, p. 230 b, which Schneider quotes) translates, 'illud enim est malum tollere,' but, as αἱρεσις can hardly bear this meaning, Schn. would read αναίρεσις in place of it, and this reading is adopted by Bekk. and Sus. The change certainly makes the antithesis neater, for κακοι των αναίρεσις answers well to κατασκευαι ἁγαθων και γεννησεις, and it receives support (which has not hitherto been observed, so far as I have seen) from Plato, Gorg. 478 C sqq. and esp. 478 D, ΣΩ. ουκοιν το δικην διδωναι μεγιστον κακου áπαλαγη ἤν, πονηριας; ΠΩΔ. ἤν γαρ. ΣΩ. σωφρονιζει γαρ που και δικαιοτερους ποιει και ιατρικη γηγενει ποιησεις η δικη. Thus Plato at any rate regarded punishment as the 'removal of an evil,' the 'evil' being the wickedness of the offender, but the question is whether Aristotle took this view of punishment. This is very doubtful. He says indeed in Rhet. 1. 14. 1374 b 31, κα [αδικημα μειζων εστων] ου μη εστιν ἰασις' χαλεπον γαρ και αδυνατον. και ου μη εστι δικην λαβειν των παλαιτα' ανιατων γαρ' η γαρ δικη και κλασεις ἰασε (cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 16 sqq. and Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1220 a 35 sqq.). But it is one thing to say that punishment heals the injustice committed, and another to say that it heals and removes the wickedness of the wrong-doer. I incline on the whole to think that the reading of the MSS., κακου των αἱρεσις, is right, and to regard the ζημια as the κακων τι referred to: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 15, το δε κερδος και η ζημια το μεν πλεον το δ' έλαττον έναντιος,
tō mēn tōv ἁγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ’ ἐπαττὸν κέρδος, τὸ δ’ ἐναντίον ζημία, and Rhet. 3. 10. 1411 b 19, ὅτι καὶ αἱ πάλαις τῷ ψόγῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγᾶς εἴθυναι διδόσασθ’ ἦ γὰρ εἴθυναι βλάβη τις δικαια ἕστιν (where εἴθυνα means the penalty inflicted as a result of the εἴθυνα properly so called, see Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 16). The meaning of the sentence will then be that just punishments are ‘a choice of what is in a degree an evil’ (i.e. of βλάβη or ζημία). This interpretation harmonizes well with what follows in 19 sqq. (see the next note); it also has the merit of giving the proper force to κακοῦ τινός, where τινός softens κακοῦ and marks the contrast with τὸ ἀπλὸς κακὸν (cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 22, ἀντεχόμενοι τινες, ὡς ὄσιντ, δικαῖον τινός, ὥ γὰρ νόμοι δικαιόν τι), and with the φαιλαί τόξαι mentioned in 20. Evil is not a fit object of choice; men should choose the good (Plato, Protag. 358 C sq.: Gorg. 499 E: Isocr. De Pace § 106: cp. also Plut. Galba, c. 14, κατ’ οὐδένα λογομον οὐδ’ αἱρεσιν ἀμεινὼν). 19. χρήσιμο ὁ δ’ αὖ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle continues, ‘Yes, and a good man would make an in some sense noble use of virtue in relation not only to evils which are in the particular case goods (such as just punishments), but also to absolute evils like poverty, disease, and other evil contingencies; still beatitude is not to be found in them but in their opposites. For the use which the good man makes of things which are not goods to him—and no things are goods to him which are not absolute goods—is not an absolutely noble use, and therefore happiness is not to be found in it, for we have defined happiness to be an absolutely noble use of virtue.’ Aristotle perhaps has before him a saying which Plutarch places in the mouth of Epaminondas in De Gen. Socr. c. 14, ἀλλ’ ἀπάγγελε τοῖς ἐκεί γνωρίμοις, ὅτι κάλλιστα μὲν αὐτοὶ πλοῦτο χρῆται, καλῶς δὲ πενίᾳ χρωμένους αὐτὸθε φίλοις ἔχουσι: cp. Isocr. Hel. § 8, τοσοῦτον δ’ ἐπιδεικνέει πεποίηκας τὸ ψευδολογεῖν, ὅστ’ ἦδη τινὲς, ὀρῶντες τούτους ἐκ τῶν ταιούτων ὀφελουμένους, τολμᾶσθε γράφειν, ὅσ ἓστιν ὁ τῶν πτωχεύοντων καὶ φευγόντων βίοι ζηλωτότερος ὡς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, and Hor. Carm. 4. 9. 46, rectius occupat Nomen beati, qui deorum Muneribus sapienter uti Duramque callet pauperiem pati. Φαύλη τύχη is a milder term than δυστυχία: cp. Phys. 2. 5. 197 a 25, τύχη δὲ ἁγαθὴ μὲν λέγεται ὅταν ἁγαθὸν τι ἁπαθῇ, φαύλη δὲ, ὅταν φαῦλον τι, εὐτυχία δὲ καὶ δυστυχία, ὅταν μέγεθος ἔχουσα ταύτα, and Metaph. K. 8.
NOTES.

1065 a 35 sq. What Aristotle includes under φαύλοι τύχαι may be gathered from Eth. Nic. 3. 9. i115 a 10, φοβοωμέθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἄδοξίαν πενίαιαν νόσσουν ἄρισταν πάνταν. A reminiscence of the passage before us may be traced in Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν κακοῖς ἀρετῇ χρῆσατ' ἄν καλὸς ὁ σπουδαῖος, οὐ μὴν γε μακάριος ἔσται. For the conjunction of πενία and νόσσος, cp. Bacchylides 1. 32 sq. and Plato, Protag. 353 D.

21. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reference to ἡθικόν λόγον may be a reference to Eth. Nic. 3. 6. i113 a 25, τῷ μὲν οὖν σποῦδαι στὸ κατ阻挡 ἀλληθεια (sc. πουλητῶν πατέον πουλητῶν) εἶναι (see Sus. 4, p. 530), and Eth. Nic. 9. 9. i115 a 21, τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσιν ἄγαθον καὶ τῷ ἑπικεῖσθαι: in some respects, however, we trace a nearer approach to the definition before us in Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1248 b 26, ἄγαθον μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ τῷ φύσει ἄγαθά ἐστιν ἄγαθά, and in Magn. Mor. 2. 9. 1207 b 31, ἐστιν οὖν οὐ καλὸς καὶ ἄγαθός ὁ τῷ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθά ἐστιν ἄγαθά καὶ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλὰ καλὰ ἐστὶν (both passages referred to by Eaton), but there is nothing in either passage about διὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν. For τὰ ἀπλῶς ἄγαθά cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 b 8 sqq. For the thought compare Plato, Laws 661 C sqq.

23. δῆλον δ' ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'and it is evident that [just as absolute goods are absolutely good and noble, so] these uses also' (i.e. the good man's uses of absolute goods) 'are necessarily absolutely good and noble.'

25. διὸ κ.τ.λ., 'hence,' i.e. because men see that the uses made by the σποῦδαιος of absolute goods are absolutely good and noble and confer happiness on him, men think that external goods are the causes of happiness, forgetting that the σποῦδαιος owes his happiness not to them but to his own virtue, and that even in his case they are only conditions, not causes, of happiness, while in the case of those who are not σποῦδαιοι they may be the causes not of happiness, but of unhappiness, inasmuch as they may not be goods at all to them. For ἀνθρώποι, cp. Plato, Symp. 189 C, ἕμων γὰρ δοκοῦσιν ἀνθρώποι παντίπασι τὴν τοῦ ἔρωτος δύναμιν οὐκ ἡθήσαντο, and 205 E, ὡς οὖν γε ἄλλο ἑστιν οὐ ἐρώσιν ἄνθρωποι ἦ τοῦ ἄγαθον, where see Stallbaum's critical note. We have οἱ ἀνθρώποι in 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sqq. and in Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 a 15, just as we sometimes have ἀνθρώποι and sometimes ὁ ἀνθρώπος (see critical note on 1253 a 2). For the fact that men take external goods to be the causes of happiness, cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 b 6 sqq. and 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq., and Plut. De Virt. et Vit. c. 1.

27. αἰτῶτο. For the absence of τις, cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1113 a 2, εἰ δὲ ἂν βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἡζει, and other passages collected by Bonitz, Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.

28. ἀναγκαῖον τοῖνυν κ.τ.λ., 'it is necessary, therefore, as a result of what has been said,' etc.: see above on 1267 b 14. Τὰ μὲν, i.e. the external goods which are the gifts of Fortune. For ὑπάρ-χεν and παρασκευάζαι see note on 1331 b 21.

29. διὸ κ.τ.λ. These words are susceptible of two interpretations: either we may take καὶ εὐχὴν as adverbal to εὐχόμεθα and translate with Sepulv. 'precibus optamus' (so Vict. and Lamb.), or we may supply εἶναι and translate 'hence in respect of those things over which fortune is supreme we pray that the composition of the State may be all that can be wished.' Perhaps the second interpretation is the better. Compare with the passage before us Soph. Fragm. 731,

τὰ μὲν διδακτὰ μανθάνω, τὰ δὲ εὑρετὰ
ζητῶ, τὰ δὲ εὐκτὰ (al. ἐτερα) παρὰ θεῶν ἦτησάμην.

31. τὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cr. 2. 5. 1263 a 39, ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιούτων, τοῦ νομοθέτου τούτ', ἐργον ἰδιῶν ἐστίν. 'Επιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως, because science is not enough by itself: cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 1, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἁρίστην (sc. πολιτείαν πολιτῆς ἐστίν) ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἀρχεισθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν πρὸς τὸν βίου τὸν καὶ ἀρετήν. It should be noticed that if, as we are told in 39 sq., φύσις is one of the sources of virtue, it does not entirely depend on the lawgiver whether the citizens are virtuous or not. It is impossible, for instance, to turn barbarians into Greeks: still much may be done by attention to marriage and rearing to secure that the 'nature' of the citizens is what it should be.

32. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. It is implied here that a man might be a citizen without sharing in the constitution: see vol. i. p. 229.

34. ἦμιν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but in our State all the citizens share in the constitution, [so that all our citizens must be good].' See as to this vol. i. p. 324 and note 1, and Appendix B sub fin. Here Aristotle seems to use the word πολιτεία in a sense exclusive of the νεώτεροι, or in other words οἱ ὅπλα κεκτημένοι, for in c. 10. 1329 b 36 it is implied that οἱ ὅπλα κεκτημένοι do not share in the constitution.

35. τοῦτ' ἄρα σκεπτόν, πῶς ἄνηρ γίνεται σπουδαῖος. In some lines of Eupolis (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 457) Nicias asks Aristides,

πὼς γὰρ ἐγένον δίκαιος;
and Aristides answers,

\[ \eta \mu \epsilon \nu \phi \acute{u} \iota \varsigma \tau \circ \mu \acute{e} \gamma \iota \sigma \tau \circ \nu \ \eta \nu, \; \acute{e} \pi \epsilon \tau \alpha \sigma \; \delta \varepsilon \; \kappa \acute{a} \gamma \omega \; \pi \rho \omicron \beta \omicron \acute{u} \iota \omicron \sigma \varsigma \; \tau \varsigma \; \phi \omicron \sigma \epsilon i \varsigma \sigma \nu \omicron \lambda \acute{a} \mu \acute{e} \beta \omicron \alpha \omicron \nu \circ \circ \nu. \]

36. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It is more desirable that each individual citizen should be good than that all the citizens collectively should be good but not each individual citizen, because in the former case not only will each citizen be good but all will be good, and a good which includes another is more desirable than the good which it includes (Top. 3. 2. 117 a 16 sqq.). It appears from 2. 5. 1264 b 17, ἀδύνατον δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἄλλων (sc. τὴν πόλιν), μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἢ τινῶν ἔχοντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, that a State may be happy if only some of its members are happy.

38. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. For ἄγαθοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι, cp. Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 b 7. Cp. also Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 12, ἄγαθοι καὶ δικαίως. Eaton and Congreve compare Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 20, γίνονται δὲ ἄγαθοι οὐκαί οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δὲ ἑθεί, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ (= λόγῳ): cp. also Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 9 sqq. The passage before us is perhaps present to the mind of the writer of [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis, c. 4. 2 Λ, ός εἰς τὴν παντελὴ δικαιοπραγίαν τρία δὲι συνδραμεῖν, φύσιν καὶ λόγον καὶ ἑθος καὶ λόγον καὶ ἑθος· καλῶ δὲ λόγον μὲν τὴν μάθησιν, ἑθος δὲ τὴν ἀκραίαν (already quoted by Eaton). Theognis (429-438) and Pindar (Olymp. 9. 100 sqq.: Nem. 3. 40 sqq.: see L. Schmidt, Ethik d. alten Griechen, i. 158 sqq.) are already familiar with the contrast of nature and teaching as sources of virtue, and both insist on the importance of nature, but the maxim in the form in which it appears in the passage before us is perhaps found earliest in Protag. Fragm. 8 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 134), φύσις καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δέσει, words which refer to the teaching not only of virtue, but of other things, and which are all the more remarkable as coming from Protagoras, because there were sophists who promised to teach virtue without dwelling on the necessity of natural aptitude and of practice (Plato, Meno 95 B). Compare (with Camerarius, Interp. p. 309) Hippocr. Lex, vol. i. p. 3 Kühn, if this work is by Hippocrates, κρὴ γὰρ δοσις μὲλλει ἤτηρικής ἐφευσιν ἄτρεκέως ἀρμόζεισθαι, τὸνδὲ μὲν ἐπίβαλον γενέσθαι, φύσιος, διδακτολογίς, τρόπου εὐφυείας, παιδομαθῆς, φιλοπονῆς, χρώνου. The saying reappears in Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 2, Plato, Phaedr. 269 D, and Isocr. De Antid. § 187. See also Wyttenbach’s note on the passage of [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis quoted above. "Εθος is mentioned before λόγος, because
education through habit precedes education through the reason (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 4 sq.: Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 23 sqq.).


41. οὕτω καὶ ποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, 'so also of a certain quality in body and soul.' For οὕτω see critical note. Aristotle continues with οὕτω as if ὁσπέρ, and not πρῶτον, had preceded, for I do not think that οὕτω here means 'then,' as it seems to do in Rhet. 3. 19. 1419 b 15. That a man may be born too faulty to be made good by education, we see from 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 8 sqq.

42. ἑνά τε κ.τ.λ., 'and in respect of some qualities it is no good to be born this or that, for habits cause them to change; some qualities, in fact, are made by nature to be susceptible of change under the influence of habits in two directions, towards that which is worse and that which is better.' I follow Stahr and Welldon in my rendering of ἑνά τε οὕδεν ὄφελος φύνα: Sepulv. Vict. and Sus. less well make ένα the subject of φύναι. In ἑνά Aristotle refers to those elements in man which may be made better or worse by good or bad habituation, for instance the emotions: see note on 1253 a 34, and cp. Plut. Themist. c. 2, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πρώταις τῆς νεότητος ὀρμαῖς ἀνώμαλοι ἢν (ὁ Θεομοτκλής) καὶ ἀστάθμητος, ὅτι τῇ φύσει καθ’ αὐτὴν χρώμενος ἄνευ λάγου καὶ παιδείας ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα μεγάλας ποιουμένη μεταβολάς τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πολλάκις ἐξεισαμένη πρὸς τὸ χείρον, ὡς ὑστερον αὐτὸς ὀμολογεῖ, καὶ τοὺς τραχυστὰς πόλους ἀρίστον ἐπίστευτα γίνεσθαι φάσκων, ὅταν ἦν προσήκει τοὺς παιδίας καὶ καταργύσας, Nic. c. 9. οὕτω ἡ 'Αλκιμιαίδου φύσις ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα πολλῆ ῥύσια καὶ λαμπρὰ μεγάλων ἐνέδοκεν ἄρχας νεωτερισμῶν, and Coriolan. c. 1. For ἐπαφυφοτερίζοντα ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον, cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1197 a 30, ἦ ὡς ὑποληψία ἐστιν, ἦ ὡς ἀπάντων ἐπαφυφοτερίζομεν πρὸς τὸ καὶ εἶναι ταῦτα οὕτω καὶ μὴ ἔδωκα. For διὰ τῆς φύσεως, cp. διὰ
τριῶν (i.e. φύσις, ἔθος, λόγος), 39. Elsewhere we find ἵπτω τῆς φύσεως, as in Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 19 sq. and De Part. An. 2. 13. 657 a 31 sq. (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 73).

1332 b. 3. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. For τῇ φύσει ζη (‘live guided by nature’), cp. Metaph. A. 1. 980 b 25, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα (ζῆνα) ταῖς φαντασίαις ζη καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἑμπρεπίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνη καὶ λογισμαί. Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 27, τῇ ὀρέξει ζη, and Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 35, τῷ γὰρ ζηει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ (cp. 2. 13. 1390 a 16, καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἔθος). For the implied contrast between φύσις and λόγος, cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 28 sqq., where a contrast between φύσις and προαίρεσις is implied.

4. μικρὰ δὲ ένια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ‘and some to a small extent guided by habits also.’ For μικρὰ, cp. Plato, Rep. 404 A, εἶναιμικρῶν ἐκθεσιν τῆς τεσσαράγεσες διαίης, and 527 A, ὅσοι καὶ μικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἐμπειροῦ. As to the habituation of animals, cp. [Plut.] De Virtute Morali, c. 4, κύνις καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ἕφακές οὐκορίας ὀρῶντες, ἐθεὶ καὶ τροφὴ καὶ διδασκαλία φανώς τε συνετάς καὶ πρῶς λόγον ὑπηκοόν εἰσεις καὶ σχέσεις ἀποδιδόντας, καὶ πράξεις τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν ἑχούσας.

5. μόνον, sc. τῶν ζωῶν: cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 9, λόγον δὲ μόνον ἀνθρώπους ἔχει τῶν ζωῶν.

ώστε δεῖ κ.τ.λ., ‘and so [in his case] these three things must harmonize with each other, [for it will not do to leave reason out,] since men are led by reason to do many things contrary to habituation and to nature, if they are persuaded that these things are better done otherwise [than as habit and nature dictate].’ We learn from c. 15. 1334 b 9 sqq. that the three things must not only harmonize, but harmonize in the best way, i.e. by all being adapted to the best end. Plato speaks of education in Laws 653 B as being the bringing of the child’s feelings of pain and pleasure into harmony with reason (cp. Rep. 401 C, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παιδῶν λανθανὲς εἰς διομοίητα τε καὶ φυλίαν καὶ ἑξιμφανίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα). I cannot follow Sus. and Welldon in placing ὄστε δεί ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις after βελτίων, 3, for, if we place these words there, what Aristotle says will be that nature and habit should harmonize, whereas the lesson which he wishes to enforce is surely this, that nature, habit, and reason should harmonize. As to πολλὰ γὰρ — βελτίων, Laius in the Chrysippus of Euripides (Fragm. 837) had been made to plead, λέγεις οὖν τοῖς παιδί τε μὲν ὅσι νοοῦτεσί, γνώμην δ’ ἔχοιτα μ’ ἢ φύσει βιάζεται,
but the Chorus in Aristoph. Vesp. 1457 sqq. (Didot) says,

tó γὰρ ἀποστήματα χαλεπῶν
φύσεις ἢν ἔχοι τις ἀεὶ.
καίτοι πόλλοι ταῦτ' ἐπαθον' ἐξωντες γνώμαις ἐτέρων
μετεβαλλόντο τοὺς τρόπους.

Cp. also Rhet. i. ii. 1370 a 25, μετὰ λόγου δὲ (ἐπιθυμοῦσιν), ὡσα ἐκ τοῦ πειθοῦσιν πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεώσασθαι καὶ κτῆσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκόουσαντες καὶ πειθόμεντες, and Plato, Rep. 452 D, ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ, οἷμα, χρωμένοι ἁμένοι τὸ ἀποδέχεσθαι τοῦ συγκαλουτεῖν πάντα τὰ τουατά ἐφαν,' καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρύῃ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μυριπλοῦντος ἀρίστου. A reference is given in the Index Aristotelicus for the plural of ἔδισμος to Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119 a 26, καὶ οἱ ἔδισμοι ἀκιβωνου. The word ἔδισμος does not appear to occur in the writings of Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, or Isocrates; it occurs, however, in [Demosth.] Or. 17. c. 27, and it is frequently used by Polybius not only in the singular, but also in the plural (e. g. in i. 17. ii and 3. 76. 12).

9. For διωρίσμεθα in a middle sense, cp. Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 192 (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s. v. ὀρίζω). Διωρίσματι does not appear to be often thus used by Aristotle: Bonitz, however (Ind. 200 a 27), takes διωρίσματι to be middle in De Caeo, 4. 2. 308 b 1.

πρότερον, in c. 7. 1327 b 19 sqq. Ἡχειρώσως τὸ νομοθέτη in the passage before us takes the place of εὐαγγέλων τοῦ νομοθέτη πρὸς τὴν ἀρτην in 1327 b 38.

10. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἑξιζόμενοι μανθάνουσι, τὰ δὲ ἀκοῦόντες. Ἀκούόντες answers to τῶν λόγων, 7. Here μανθάνει includes both ἑξιζόθησαι and ἀκοῦει. Contrast 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 16, μανθάνει καὶ συνεβίβασθαι. Sus. refers to Eth. Nic. 2. i. 1103 a 14, διτής δὲ τῆς ἀρτης οὕσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἡθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διαδακτυλίων ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν ... ἡ δ' ἡθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται. Cp. also Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν. 1. 437 a 11, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ πρὸς φράσουν ἡ ἀκοὴ πλείουσα συμβάλλεται μέρος· ὁ γὰρ λόγος αὐτός ἐστι τῆς μαθήσεως ἀκούατός ὡς, οὐ καθ' αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, Hist. An. 9. i. 608 a 17 sqq., and Metaph. θ. 5. 1047 b 31, ἀπασόν δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὖσον τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν οὖν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τῶν δὲ ἐθεὶ ἀιν τῆς τοῦ αἰλεόν, τῶν δὲ μαθῆσει αἰν τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προενεργήσαις ἐχειν ὡςα ἐθεὶ καὶ λόγω, τὰς δὲ μὴ τουατά καὶ τὰς ἑπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν VOL. III. F f
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οὐκ ἀνίγκη. Add Philem. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 6 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 34: cp. 5. ccxxxii),

ηκουσα τοῦτο καίτος, οὐδὲ φύεται
αὐτόματος ἄνθρωπουσιν, ὡς βέλτιστε, νοῦς,
ὡσπερ εὖ ἀγριφ βύμος· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν τε καὶ
ἐτέρων ἁκούειν καὶ θεωρήσαι * *
κατὰ μικρὸν ἄει, φασί, φύουται φρένες.


ἐτέρους εἶναι, sc. διὰ βίον.

15. δὴλον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 16, καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εἰσὶν ἐτέραν εἶναι λέγουσι τινες ἀρχαίοις. For ἀκολουθεῖν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 11103 b 23, κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τοιένοις διαφοράς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αξίζεσι.

16. εἰ μὲν τοῖνοι κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle has before him Plato, Polit. 301 D, καί δὲ γε ὡς ὁδρέ ὄν ἐστὶ γεγραμένος, ὡς δὴ φαμέν, εἰ τοῖς πόλει βασιλεύων όδο τε σμήνειν ἐμφύεται, τό τε σύμα εἰσὶ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διαφέρον εἰς, δεὶ δὴ συνελθόντας ἐγγράγματα γράφειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. also i. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq. and Isocr. Hel. § 56, τοῖς δὲ καλοῖς εἰσὶν θυάτερον εὐφυτεῖ διαφόρος εὐσκόρομεθα, καὶ μόνοις αὐτοῖς ὡσπερ τοῖς θεοῖς ὄν ἀπαγορεύομεν θεραπεύομε, ἀλλ' ἰδιον δουλεύομεν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχομεν.

The passage before us shows that not only gods (i. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq.) but also heroes were credited with surpassing personal beauty, so that we are not surprised to find that Philip of Crotona, who excelled in this respect, was worshipped as a hero at Egesta after his death (Hdt. 5. 47). For ἄλφερ τῶν ἄλλων (not τῶν ἐτέρων), see Bon. Ind. 34 b 34 sqq., where Eth. Nic. 8. 7. 1158 a 28, ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰς χρόνιοι καὶ ἐτέροι ήδοι, Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 b 7, and Meteor. 2. 6. 365 a 3 sq. are referred to.

20. ὥστε κ.τ.λ. Lamb. 'ita ut incontroverta et in promptu posita esset eorum qui imperant praes idis qui sub imperio sunt excellendia': Sus. 'dass diese Ueberlegenheit der Herrschenden für die Beherrschten (selber) unzweifelhaft und einleuchtend wäre.' Thus Lamb. takes τοῖς ἀρχομένως as in the dat. after ἵπποσχῆν (so too Mr. Welldon), Sus. as in the dat. after ἀναμφισβήτησθαι καὶ φανερῶν. I have not noticed any passage in which the construction assumed by Lamb. occurs, and I incline to follow Sus., at any rate till a parallel passage is produced.

23. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but since it is not easy to light on this highly superior element, and we have not among ourselves anything to
answer to the vast superiority of the kings to their subjects, which Scylax says exists in India.’ For λαβεῖν in this sense, cp. 3. 15. 1286b 7, Rhet. i. 1. 1354a 34, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐνα λαβεῖν καὶ ὅλιγοις μᾶλλον ἢ πολλοῖς εὐφροσύνας καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικαίωσιν, and Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174a 17. As to τοῦτο, Aristotle often uses the neuter in referring to persons, e.g. in 2. 5. 1263a 1 and 3. 13. 1283b 9. He would seem to have had before him the genuine narrative of Scylax of Caryanda in Caria, as to whom see Hdt. 4. 44. The Periplus which we possess bearing his name is not the genuine work by him, and does not contain the statement here repeated by Aristotle. The testimony of Scylax as to the superiority—both physical and mental, apparently—of the kings in India to their subjects may well have been perfectly true. ‘Throughout Polynesia the chiefs and upper classes are taller than the lower orders, and with a finer physical they combine a greater mental development. They are in every respect superior to the people whom they rule. They are as genuine an aristocracy as ever existed in any country. They know every plant, animal, rock, river, and mountain, are familiar with their history, legends, and traditions, and strict in observing every point of their own complicated etiquette. They swim, row, sail, shoot, and fight better than the common people, and excel in house and canoe building’ (Seemann, Viti, p. 79). For the form βασιλέας see note on 1284b 33.

25. φανερῶν ὅτι κ.τ.λ., ‘it is clear that it is for many reasons necessary that all should share alike in ruling and being ruled in turn [and that rulers and ruled should be the same persons], for when the sharers are alike, equality demands that each shall have the same share’ (i.e. an identity of political privilege), ‘and [the constitution must be just, for] it is difficult for a constitution to last which is framed in contravention of what is just.’ For τὸ τε γὰρ ἵσον ταῦτα τοῖς ὁμοίοις, cp. 3. 16. 1287a 12 sqq. and 4 (7). 3. 1325b 7 sq., and also Thuc. 6. 38. 5, καὶ πῶς δίκαιον τοὺς αὐτοὺς μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι;

29. μετὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for together with the ruled [citizens] are forthcoming desirous of revolution all those who are scattered over the territory,’ i.e. the cultivators and other residents in the country (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319a 30, οἱ δὲ γεωργοῦσιν διὰ τὸ διασπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν, and 38, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλῆθουσι). Aristotle has arranged in c. 10. 1330a 25 sqq. that the cultivators shall not be θυμοειδεῖς or
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όμοφυλο, still he takes it for granted here that they will be desirous of revolution, though unable to make a revolution without the help of the ἀρχόμενοι πολίται. Reiz followed by Sus. would read βουλομένων, but βουλόμενοι is probably right, for Aristotle is apt to suspect slave or serf cultivators of a tendency to νεωτερασμός (2. 4. 1262 a 40 sqq.: 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 28).


34. πῶς οὖν κ. τ. λ., 'how then this difference is to exist, and how they are to share [in ruling and being ruled by turns], the lawgiver must consider.' Μεθέσουσι takes up κοινωνίαν, 26.

35. πρότερον, in c. 9. 1329 a 2 sqq.

36. ἢ γὰρ φύσις δεδωκε τὴν διαίρεσιν κ. τ. λ., 'for nature has furnished us with the distinction, having made that which is the same in kind itself of two parts, the one younger and the other older.' For διαίρεσιν, see critical note. For a similar acceptance of the guidance of nature, cp. c. 17. 1337 a 1 and i. 8. 1256 b 7 sqq.: also De Caelo, i. i. 268 a 13, διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰδηφότες ὡσπερ νόμους ἑκεῖνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀγωνίας χρόμεθα τῶν θεῶν τῷ ἁρμῷ τούτῳ (the number three), and Poet. 24. i. 460 a 3, ἄλλα, ὡσπερ εἴπομεν, αὐτῇ ἡ φύσις διδάσκει τὸ ἀρμόστον αὐτῇ διαίρεσιν. By 'that which is the same in kind,' is meant man.


38. ἀγανακτεῖ δὲ κ. τ. λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 10. 1388 a 6, τοῦ γὰρ ἐγγὺς καὶ χρώμα καὶ τόσο καὶ ἡ λίμια καὶ δαβίς φθονοῦσιν. Aristotle perhaps remembers the words of the aged Nestor to Agamemnon and Achilles (Hom. II. i. 259),

ἄλλα πίθευσθ' ἀρμῷ δὲ νεώτερῳ ἐστὸν ἐμείο, and what Agamemnon says of Achilles in II. 9. 160, καὶ μοι ὑποστήτω, ὅσον βασιλευτέρως εἰμί

ἡδ' ὅσον γενεύ̣ ἐπιγενέστερος εὐχόμαι εἰμι.

Plutarch may have the passage before us in his memory in Αn Seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 7, καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ὑπεροχαίς προσμαχωτοὺς καὶ διαμφαστούσιν ἀρέτης καὶ γέους καὶ φιλοτιμίας, ἃς ἄφαιροῦντες αὐτῶν ὅσον ἄλλοις ἴσθενται, τὸ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ χρῶνον πρωτείου, δ καλεῖται κυρίος πρεσβείων, ἀξιοτυπητῶν ἐστὶ καὶ παραχωρούμενον... ἔτι

τὴν  μὲν  ἀπὸ  τοῦ  πλοῦτον  δύναμιν  ἢ  λόγου  δεινότητος  ἢ  σοφίας  οὐ  πάντες  
αὐτοῖς  γενήσεσθαι  προσδοκώσαι, ἐφ' ὡς  δὲ  προάγει  τὸ  γήγαρ  αἴδα  καὶ  δόξαν,  
οὖνδε  ἀπελπίζει  τῶν  πολεμεωμένων.  I  have  questioned  this  in  vol.  ii.  
p.  xix,  but  I  had  not  then  remarked  the  resemblance  which  exists  
between  An  Seni,  etc.,  c.  18.  793  A,  ὁσπερ  γὰρ  . . .  ἑδός,  and  5  (8).  
7.  1342 b  20  sqq.  A  similar  calculation  to  that  of  Aristotle  
probably  underlay  the  distinction  drawn  by  Diocletian  between  the  
Augusti  and  the  Caesares,  the  former  being  ‘elder  princes’  and  
the  latter  ‘rising  in  their  turn  to  the  first  rank’  (Gibbon,  Decline  

39.  οὖν  νομίζει  εἶναι  κρεῖττων,  sc.  τῶν  ἀρχῶντων—a  step  in  the  
direction  of  discontent  (8  (6).  4.  1318 b  36,  ἀρξονταί  γὰρ  οὐχ  ἐν'  
άλλων  χειρόνων).

ἄλλος  τε  κ.τ.λ.,  ‘especially  as  he  may  expect  to  be  repaid  this  
contribution  [of  obedience],  when  he  has  reached  the  right  age.’  
An  ἔρανος  is  a  contribution  of  service  or  money  for  which  in  fairness  
a  return  should  be  forthcoming:  cp.  Eurip.  Suppl.  349  Bothe  (363  
Dindorf),

κἀλλιστον  ἔρανον  δόσιν  γὰρ  ἀντιλάβεται  
paiδων  παρ'  αὐτῷ  τοιαθ  ἤν  τοκεῖαι  δή,  
Isocr.  Hel.  §  20,  νομίζων  ὄφειλεν  τοῦτον  τὸν  ἔρανον,  μηδενὸς  ἀποστήραι  
tων  ὑπὸ  Πειρίδου  προσταχεῖντων,  ἀνὴ  δὲν  ἐκεῖνος  αὐτῷ  σωκενουσεύς,  
and  Isocr.  Plat.  §  57,  where  τοῦτον  τὸν  ἔρανον  is  explained  by  τὴν  
αὐτὴν  εὔρεγεσιάν.  It  is  not  quite  clear  what  is  meant  by  τοῦτον  τὸν  
ἔρανον  (40).  Sus.,  followed  by  Welldon,  takes  the  words  to  mean  ‘den  
Ehrenvorzug  zu  befehlen’  (‘the  honourable  privilege  of  ruling’).
To  me  it  seems  that  the  ἔρανος  referred  to  is  rather  the  contribution  
of  submission  to  the  rule  of  others  which  the  young  citizen  makes  
in  his  youth  and  receives  from  those  younger  than  himself  in  years  
of  maturity.

42.  ὡστε  καὶ  τὴν  παιδείαν  κ.τ.λ.  Rulers  and  ruled  will  be  the  
same  persons  at  different  ages,  so  that  they  will  be  in  a  sense  the  
same  and  in  a  sense  different,  and  similarly  the  education  given  to  
rulers  and  ruled  will  be  the  same  but  will  be  different  at  
different  ages,  the  young  learning  to  be  ruled  and  later  on  learning  through  
being  ruled  to  rule,  so  that  the  education  also  of  rulers  and  ruled  
will  be  in  a  sense  the  same  and  in  a  sense  different.  For  the  late  
appearance  of  εἰναι  in  this  sentence,  cp.  6  (4).  15.  1299 b  29,  ἔνθα  
μὲν  γὰρ  ἄρματτε  μεγάλας  ἔνθα  δ'  εἰναι  μικρὰς  τὰς  αὐτὰς,  and  see  note  on  
1285 b  36.
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1333 a. 2. τε γάρ here is not taken up by καί or any equivalent to καί, a thing which rarely happens (see Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 19 sq.), so rarely that Eucken pronounces the passage before us corrupt. Sus. 2, however, rightly remarks that we have here ‘one of the few cases in which τε γάρ = “etenim.”’ ‘English readers may consult Shilleto’s critical note to Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 176’ (Sus. 4). Eucken points out that in 3 (6). 4. 1318 b 33, α’ τε γάρ ἄρχαι αἰεὶ διὰ τῶν βελτίστων ἐσονται τοῦ δήμου βουλομένου καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεῖσιν οὐ φθονώστοσ, the use of τε γάρ is only apparently similar, inasmuch as the last eight words are virtually equivalent to καί ὁ δήμος βουλήσται καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικεῖσιν οὐ φθονίσει. So again in De Part. An. 3. 10. 673 a 3, γαργαλιζόμενοι τε γάρ ταχὺ γελώσι διὰ τὸ τὴν κίνησιν ἄφικεται ταχὺ πρὸς τῶν τόπων τούτων, we find τε γάρ virtually taken up in συμβαίνειν δὲ φαιν. κ.τ.λ., 673 a 10.

3. ἔστι δὲ ἄρχη κ.τ.λ., ‘but [we do not mean that he should have been ruled otherwise than a freeman should be ruled, for] rule is, as was shown in the first discussions’ (i.e. in 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq. and 3. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq.), in one of its forms for the sake of the ruler and in another for the sake of the ruled, and we say that the former of these is rule such as is exercised by a master over slaves and the latter rule such as is exercised over freemen, [so that the latter is the kind of rule to which it is fitting that the young freeman should submit before ruling].’

5. φαμεν, in 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq. and 3. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq.

6. διαφέρει δ’ ἐνα κ.τ.λ. This was probably written later than 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq., for we hear nothing there to the same effect. Aristotle had identified δεισποτικὴ ἄρχη in that passage with ἡ περὶ τάναγκα, and had added, θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδος, λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἐπηρετεῖν τὰς διακονικὰς πράξεις. Now we are told that even service of this kind may become noble if it is rendered for a noble end. What Aristotle would consider a noble end may be gathered from 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17 sqq. and 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10 sqq. (cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 5 sqq.). He probably has in his mind among other things the ἀνευ βεραπόντων αὐτῶν ἑαυτῶν (αὐτῶν ἑαυτῶν;?) διακονήσεις of the young Spartans employed in the Crypteia (Plato, Laws 633 B sqq.). Plato had already recommended his agronomi and their youthful assistants to do the like (Laws 762 E sqq., cp. especially καὶ καλλοπληεσθαι χρῆ τῷ καλῶς δουλεύσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ καλῶς ἀρβαί, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις . . . ἔπειτα τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις τε καὶ ἑντίμως βεβαιοκόστος τοὺς νέους, and 763 A, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα αὐτοὶ δὲ αὐτῶν διανοηθητώσαν ὡς

Διωσόμενοι διακοινοῦντες τε καὶ διακοινούμενοι ἕαυτοῖς). Perhaps the young Athenians who served as περίπολοι had more done for them by slaves than Plato and Aristotle approved. Vict. refers to the story of Favonius and Pompey told in Plut. Pomp. c. 73, ἐπεὶ δὲ καυρὸς ἦν δείπνου καὶ παρεσκευάσατο ὁ παύκηρος ἐκ τῶν παρώντων, ἵδιον ὁ Φαύσιος οἰκετῶν ἡπορία τὸν, Πομπήιον ἀρχόμενον αὐτὸν ὑπολείπει προσέθημε καὶ ὑπέλυσε καὶ συνήλευσε καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ τούτου περίπνον καὶ θεραπεύον ὅσα δεσπότα δουλῶν, μέχρι νύσσων πιθών καὶ δείπνου παρασκευῆς διετέλεσεν, ὥστε τὴν ἑλευθερότητα τῆς ὑπουργίας ἐκείνης δεισάμενον ἄν τινα καὶ τὸ ἄφελες καὶ ἀπλαστὸν εἰπεὶν·

Τῇ τοῖς γενναίοις ὃς ἅπαν καλὸν (Eurip. Fragm. 953).

Vict. adds, referring to the siege of Florence in 1529, 'Recordor ego, cum premeretur obsidione nostra civitas, hostisque ad portas castra posuisset, universam nostram iuventutem in operibus faciendis muniendaque urbe occupatam fuisse, neque tamen eo tempore quicquam quod nobilitati suae non conveniret gessisse, non enim ob mercedem inde capiendam, sed ob libertatem defendendam id faciebat.'

11. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. If we take Aristotle to refer in πολίτου here, as also in 3. 18. 1288 a 37 sqq., to the full citizen of the 'best State,' who is ex hypothesi capable of ruling, we shall not need to read πολιτικόν with Rassow and Susemihl. See vol. i. Appendix B. The argument is—since the virtue of a ruling citizen and the virtue of the best man are the same, and in our State the ruled citizen becomes sooner or later a ruler, so that he will need sooner or later to possess the virtue of a good man, the lawgiver must make this the aim of his labours, that the citizens may become good men, and [must seek to ascertain] by means of what pursuits [they may best be made so] and what is the end of the best life. For πραγματευτέων ὅπως... γίνονται Bonitz (Ind. 630 a 14) compares Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 b 19, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πραγματεύεσθαι πλῆν ἀπό τῶν κριθῶν ποιῶν τινα ποίησον. The end of the best life is leisure (c. 15. 1334 a 11 sqq.).

16. διήρηται δὲ κ.τ.λ. In c. 15. 1334 b 17 sqq., as in 1. 13. 1260 a 5 sqq., the two parts of the soul are τὸ λόγον ἔχειν and τὸ ἄλογον: here they are τὸ λόγον ἔχειν καθ' αὑτό, and τὸ λόγον οἷκ ἔχων καθ' αὑτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον. Thus here Aristotle adopts the division of the soul which is mentioned as feasible in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 1, εἰ δὲ χρή καὶ τούτο φάναι λόγου ἔχειν, διττόν ἔσται καὶ τὸ
λόγον ἔχων, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ ὡσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικῶν τι. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρέτη κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἡθικάς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς, ἑπεθερότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἡθικάς, a passage which throws much light on that before us, though καθ’ αὐτά, 17 ('per se,' in contradistinction to καθ’ ἔτερον: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 12. 1245 b 18, quoted above on 1323 b 24, and Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 a 22 sq., and see Bon. Ind. 290 b 34), means more than ἐν αὐτῷ, 1103 a 2. The part of the soul referred to as λόγοι οὐκ ἔχων καθ’ αὐτά, λόγον δὲ ὑπακοέων δυνάμενον is τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν (Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 30), or, as it is occasionally called in the Politics (see above on 1254 b 8), τὸ παθητικὸν. Τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς is omitted, as in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 12, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρέτης ἀομορὸν πέφυκεν. Aristotle recalls this division of the soul because he wishes to throw light on the relative worth of the virtues connected with each part of the soul, and to show, in opposition to the eulogists of the Lacedaemonian constitution, that the virtues of the rational part have more of the character of ends than those of the other part. For the perfect διήρηται, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 17 and 2. 9. 1269 b 16. For the participle δυνάμενον, see note on 1254 b 23.

19. πως, 'in any way,' as in Xen. Oecon. 9. 1, ἡ γυνὴ ἐδόκει σοι, ἐφεύ ἐγώ, δ’ ἵσχύμαχε, πῶς τι ὑπακοέων δώ σὺ ἐπούθασες διδάσκον; τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν = ὡς ἡμεῖς διαρρώμεν, for it is hardly likely that διαρρέων εἶναι should be supplied. Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 32 sq. For the μὲν solilairum in τοῖς μὲν οὕτω διαρρώσων, see above on 1332 a 14, 1262 a 6, and 1270 a 34.

21. αἰεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We learn in what sense the appetitive part of the soul exists for the sake of the rational part from Magn. Mor. 2. 10. 1208 a 12, ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἔχωμεν τὸ δὲ βελτιών, αἰεὶ δὲ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίωνος ἐνεκέν ἐστιν, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ σῶματος καὶ ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεκέν, καὶ τὸν ἔργου ἔχωμεν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸν οὕτως ἔχειν δέ ἡ κοιλία καὶ συμβάλλει τοῖς καὶ συμπαραμέτρῳ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιτελεῖν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον τὸ γὰρ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίωσος ἐνεκέν πρὸς τὸ συνεργεῖν τοῦ βελτίων. Cp. also M. Antonin. Comm. 5. 16, ἡ οὖκ ἢν ἐναργείς, διὰ τὰ χεῖρα τῶν κρειττῶν ἐνεκέν, τὰ δὲ κρειττῶ ἄλληλοι τοῖς κρειττῶ τῶν μὲν ἄφυχων τὰ ἐμψυχα, τῶν δὲ ἐμψυχῶν τὰ λογικά. On the far-reaching principle, αἰεὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτιωτός ἐστιν ἐνεκέν, see vol. i. p. 58 sq.

22. καὶ τούτῳ φανερὸν κ.τ.λ. When a principle holds good in reference both to art and to nature, Aristotle is often careful
to point out the fact: e.g. in Meteor. 4. 3. 381 a 10 sq., De Part. An. 1. 1. 639 b 15 sq., and De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 20 sqq.

24. διήρηται τε διὰ της. Sepulv., Lamb., Schn., Sus., Welldon, and others supply ὁ λόγος, but Vict. and Sus. supply τὸ λόγον ἔχειν, and perhaps this is better.

καθ᾽ ἄνπερ εἰσώθαμεν τρόπον διαμείν. E.g. in De An. 3. 10. 433 a 14, νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικὸς διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ ἰθωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει: cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 2. 1139 a 3 sqq.

26. ὁσαύτως, in the same way as ὁ λόγος, i.e. into τὸ λόγον ἔχειν πρακτικὸν and τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἰθωρητικόν.

τούτω τὸ μέρος, i.e. τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος καθ᾽ αὐτό.

ὅπλοντί is adverbial, as in c. 2. 1325 a 1: see on this use Bon. Ind. 173 b 30 sqq.

27. καὶ τῶς πράξεις δὲ κτλ., 'and indeed we shall say that the activities of the soul stand in a corresponding relation to each other.' Three classes of activities are apparently referred to—

1) πράξεις τοῦ λόγου οίκ ἔχοντος καθ᾽ αὐτό, λόγος ὁ ἐπακούειν δυναμένον (e.g. νευθέρου, ὑψφρονει πράξεις: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 6 and 3. 3. 1111 b 1 sq.): 2) πράξεις τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος πρακτικῶν (φρονίμου πράξεις): 3) πράξεις τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος θεωρητικῶν (σοφοί πράξεις).

28. τοῖς δυναμένοις πυγχάνειν ἡ πασόν ἢ τοῖν δυνώ, 'for those who can attain either to all the three activities of the soul or to the two lower ones of the three.' I take the meaning to be, that even if a man can attain only to the activities of the irrational part of the soul and to those of the lower, or practical, section of its rational part, the latter class of activities, being activities of the better part of the two, are more desirable for him than the former. If a man can attain to all three, then of course the activities of the theoretic section of the rational part are the most desirable for him.

29. αει γὰρ κτλ., 'for that is always most-desirable for each man which is the highest to which it is possible for him to attain,' whether it is absolutely the highest or not. See vol. i. p. 60.

30. πᾶς ὁ βίος, 'life as a whole': see above on 1253 b 33. In 40 we have τοῖς βίοις. By πᾶς ὁ βίος Aristotle means πᾶς ὁ πολιτικὸς βίος: cp. i. 5. 1254 b 30, χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικῶν βίων (ὁποῖος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρμένος εἰς τῷ πολεμικῷ χρειαν καὶ τῷ εἰρήκην). In i. 8. 1256 a 30 sqq. we have a classification of human life, so far as it is concerned with getting food. For the association of ἀσχολία and πόλεμος and of εἰρήνη and σχολή, cp. 41 sqq., c. 15. 1334 a 38 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 4 sqq.
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32. καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν κ.τ.λ. 'Bonitz brackets εἰς τά in 32 and 33 (Ind. 42 b 26 sqq. and 632 a 29 sq.), but see Vahlen in the Zeitschrift für d. östr. Gymn. 1872, p. 540' (Sus., p. 453). I have not seen Vahlen's article. The construction, if we supply διάρθται, as we must apparently do, is certainly remarkable. For τῶν πρακτῶν we have τῶν πραγμάτων in 40.

34. For αἴρεσιν, cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 106, εἰρήσετε γὰρ τούς πλείστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων περὶ τὰς αἴρεσις τῶν πραγμάτων ἀμαρτάνοντας.

35. πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν. Aristotle continues his sentence as if ἡ ἁνάγκη ὅμως αἰρετὰ εἶναι had preceded in 33, and not περὶ δὲν ἁνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν αἴρεσιν εἶναι. He here has before him Plato, Laws 628 D sq. (referred to by Eaton) and 803 D. Cp. (with Eaton) Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 4, δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία εἰν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἣνα σχολάζομεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ὑπ᾽ εἰρήνην ἀγωμεν.

ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχολής. See last note. There was much to suggest the view that σχολή is a nobler thing than ἀσχολία in the Greek conception of the gods as ῥεία ξώντες, and in Aristotle's own conception of the life of the Deity (see above on 1325 b 28), to say nothing of the close connexion which the Greeks held to exist between σχολή and ἐλευθερία (Plato, Theaet. 175 D) and between σχολή and culture (Isocr. Busir. § 21 sq.: Metaph. A. 1. 981 b 20 sqq.). As has often been pointed out by others, Aristotle does not mean idleness or recreation by σχολή. Σχολή is marked off by him both from ἀσχολία and from παιδία or ἀνάπαυσις: it is not, like παιδία and ἀνάπαυσις, recreation after toil (§ (8). 3. 1337 b 37 sqq.: 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 36 sqq.), nor is it, like ἀσχολία, the doing of work which is done not for its own sake, but as a means to something else; it is employment in work desirable for its own sake—the hearing of noble music and no doubt also of noble poetry, intercourse with friends chosen for their worth (Eth. Nic. 9. 11. 1171 b 12 sqq.), and above all the exercise, in company or otherwise, of the speculative faculty. Ἀσχολία and the παιδία or ἀνάπαυσις which makes ἀσχολία possible must necessarily find a place in human life, for men cannot exist without them, but the noblest element in human life is σχολή, and it is the end for which work and recreation exist. We hardly know whether Aristotle would class the sight of noble pictures or statues with the hearing of noble music and poetry as a right use of σχολή: he would probably not regard in this light the exercise of an art even for its own sake. Many will differ from him here, and some may ask whether work
done as a means to something else is not often as desirable for its own sake as anything which could be brought under the head of σχολή. May we not say this of work done in a noble cause, like that of the victors of Marathon and Salamis, or that of Pitt and Stein, when they ‘weathered the storm’? It should be noticed that while Aristotle is following in the track of Plato when he exalts peace above war, he is not a borrower from Plato in his exaltation of σχολή at the expense of ἄσχολία. His view of human life as comprising in its best form ἄσχολία, παιδιά, and σχολή is a remarkable one, and I am not aware that he owes it to any one.

2. καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δέ, ‘and indeed, things useful’: cp. Plato, 1333 b.

Theaet. 171 E, ἐνθέλησε ἀν ἐπεζηλοῦσαν καὶ παιδιόν καὶ θηρίον δε ικανόν εἶναι ἰσότης αὐτοῦ γεννώσκων ἐιστὸ το ἴγνευον.

3. καὶ παίδας ἐτί ὅπτας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἠλικίαις, ὅσαι δέονται παιδείας. According to the common view (a different view is ascribed to Pythagoras in Diog. Laert. 8. 10), boyhood ceased at puberty (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 6, ἐγὼ γὰρ παῖς τε δών τὰ ἐν παισι νομίζωμεν καλὰ δοκῶ κεκαρπώσθαι, ἐπεὶ τε ἡβησα, τὰ ἐν νεανίσκοις, τελείως τε ἄνηρ γενόμενος τὰ ἐν ἀνδράσι). Ποῖς, however, is otherwise used in 3. 1. 1275 a 14. The words τὰς ἄλλας ἠλικίαις ὅσαι δέονται παιδείας seem to imply that education in the ‘best State’ will extend over more ἠλικίαι than the two represented by boyhood and the years from puberty to twenty-one (see note on 1336 b 37).

5. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἄριστα κ.τ.λ. The Lacedaemonians and Cretans are especially referred to (cp. 12 sqq. and c. 2. 1324 b 7 sqq.: see also note on 1337 a 31). Plato had said much the same in Laws 628 C sqq. Are we to infer from the use of καὶ in 11, καὶ τῶν ἄστερῶν τιμῶν γραψάντων, that Aristotle regarded the Lacedaemonian and Cretan lawgivers as the authors of written constitutions and laws? Aristotle turns aside to censure the Lacedaemonian training in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 9 sqq. also. The Fourth and Fifth Books of the Politics are written in a strongly anti-Laconian spirit. The Lacedaemonian lawgiver is more severely criticized in them than he is in the Second. It is true that the Spartans are said in the Second Book (c. 9. 1271 b 9) to prefer external goods to virtue—a strong thing to say of men who prided themselves on their virtue (4 (7). 11. 1330 b 32)—but this fault is not explicitly traced back to the lawgiver. In the Fourth Book, on the other hand (c. 2. 1324 b 27 sq.), the lawgiver is charged with pursuing an
unlawful end; it is also implied in 1325 a 7 sqq. (cp. c. 14. 1333 b 23) that he was not a good lawgiver (contrast 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 18–21). Aristotle’s criticisms of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver throughout the Fourth and Fifth Books are, in fact, more in the spirit of those of Isocrates (see e.g. Panath. § 210 sqq.) than of those of Plato.


7. οὐτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαντες κ.τ.λ., ‘evidently have neither framed their constitutional arrangements with a view to the better end,’ etc. Πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος answers to πρὸς τὰ βέλτια καὶ τὰ τέλη, 1333 a 39, and πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἁρετάς, 8, to πρὸς πάντα, 1333 a 36. The ‘better end’ is leisure and peace and things noble.


ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν κ.τ.λ. We have been told in 1333 a 36 that things noble are to be preferred to things necessary and useful. Compare the very similar sentence in De Part. An. i. 1. 642 a 28, ἕπε Σωκράτους δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμισθήθη, τὸ δὲ ζητεῖ τὰ περὶ φόσεως ἐληφε, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρήσιμον ἁρετὴν καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀπέκλιναν οἱ φιλοσοφοῦστε: also Pol. 2. 9. 1271 b 3, Probl. 27. 5. 948 a 31, διὰ τὴ μάλιστα τὴν ἀνδρείαν τιμᾶσθαι αἰ πόλεις, οὐ βελτίστην οὔσαν τῶν ἁρετῶν; ἢ δὴ διατελοῦσίν ἢ πολεμουῦσίν ἢ πολεμαίνουσίν αὐτή δὲ ἐν ἁμφοῖς χρησιμοτάτη ἔστιν’ τιμῶσι δὲ οὐ τὰ βελτίστα, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτῶς βελτίστα, and Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 b 3, ἀνάγχη δὲ μέγιστα εἶναι ἁρετὰς τὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἢ ἁρετὴ δύναμις ἐνεργετική. Φορτικῶς, φορ τὸ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡκιστα ἁρμότε οἱ μεγαλοφύχου καὶ τοῖς εἰλευθέροις (5 (8). 1338 b 2). The Spartans valued themselves on their ἔλευθερωτήτι—compare the proverb ἔλευθερωτέρος Ἐπάρτης (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 246: 2. 393)—and when Aristotle hints here that their lawgiver was φορτικός, and in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 32 sqq. that his famous training made them βάναυσαν, he says as severe a thing as it was possible for him to say. In πλεονεκτικωτέρας Aristotle echoes Plato, Laches 182 E, οἷς (i.e. Δακεδαμιονίσι) οὔδεν ἄλλο μέλει ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖ καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὃ τι ἄν μαθῶντες καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τῶν πολέμων: cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 188 and Plut. Lycurg. c. 28, ἐν μεν οὖν τούτοις οὔδεν ἐστιν ἀδίκως ἄρσιν οὐδὲ πλεονεχιας, ἢν ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἐμοί τοῖς Λυκούργου νόμως, ὡς ἰκανῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, ἐνθέως δὲ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην.
11. **parapλησιῶς τούτως.** I do not think that Aristotle means by these words φορτικῶς. Cp. Meteor. 1. 6. 342 b 35, **parapλησιῶς** δὲ τούτως καὶ οἱ περὶ 'Ιπποκράτην τὸν Χίον καὶ τὸν μαθητήν αὐτοῦ Λισχύλον ἀπεφήμασι.

14. ἂ, 'which praises.'

15. ὅπερ γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for just in the same spirit in which,' etc. Thibron's grounds of praise are those of οἱ πολλοὶ, and are therefore sordid and easily overthrown by reasoning. οἱ πολλοὶ are athirst for εὐπλησία: cp. 2. 7. 1267 b 3, ἄπειρος γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἄγερ ἄναπλησίως οἱ πολλοὶ ζωσιν. Ζηλοῦσα, as in Isocr. De Pace, § 23, καὶ ταῦτα δρᾶντες αὐτοὶ τε τὴν πόλιν εὐθυμοῦσι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν νοῦν ὅκ ἐχόντων ἐμακάριον αὐτήν, τῶν μὲν συμβήσεσθαι διὰ ταῦτα μελ- λόντων οὐδέμια ποιούμενοι πρόνοιαν, τὸν δὲ πλούτον βασιλέωτες καὶ ζηλοῦσαν.

18. τῶν εὐπλησίατων. The term εὐπλησία is applied to τὰ ἐν ἑπεροχῇ ἄγαθα, such as high birth, wealth, and political power: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 20 sqq.

ἀγάμενος φαίνεται, 'evidently admires.' There is perhaps a reference to Thibron in Isocr. Panath. § 41, τὴν Ἐπαρχίαν (πόλιν), ἣν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ μετρίως ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἐνοικιᾳ δὲ τινες ὅπερ τῶν ἡμιβέων ἐκεί πεπολυτευμένων μέμονται περὶ αὐτῶν. As to the other writers on the Lacedaemonian Constitution, see above on 1269 a 29.

20. ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'because it was owing to their having been trained to meet dangers that they ruled over many,' and thus they owed their empire to their lawgiver. Γυμναῖσθαι is not used exclusively of gymnastic training (cp. for instance 2. 12. 1274 a 26), but the gymnastic training enforced by the Lacedaemonian lawgiver (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 27 sqq.) is probably here referred to, for it was supposed at Sparta to produce courage (1338 b 12 sqq.). The notion that γυμνάσια lead to ἄλλων ἄρχαι occurs also in Plato, Protag. 354 A–B (cp. 342 B–C).

23. ἢτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. The sense is—besides it is not merely that they have lost noble living, but that they have lost it, notwithstanding that (as they claim) they have faithfully observed the laws given them by their lawgiver and there has been nothing to hinder them from doing so; this is indeed strange. Aristotle hints that either the fault must rest with the lawgiver or the Spartans had not really observed his laws. Γελοῖον has much the same meaning here as ἄτοπον (cp. Phys. 7. 3. 246 a 25, ἢτι καὶ ἄλλως ἄτοπον. τὸ γάρ λέγειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἰλλοιόσθαι ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν λαβοῦσαν
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tēlos γελοίων κ.τ.λ.). An oracle given to Lycurgus, according to Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 57 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 390: cp. Diod. 7. 14. 7), ἀσ εὐδαίμων ἡ πόλις ἔστω εἰ τοῖς ἐκείνου νόμοις ἔμμενοι, is probably present to Aristotle's memory. In Isocr. Archid. § 61 the Lacedaemonian King Archidamus claims that the Spartans had abided by the laws which had been given them; there were, however, two views on this subject (see Isocr. De-Pace, § 102 and above on 1270 a 19). There may be an allusion in μηδενός ἐμποδίζωντος πρὸς τὸ χρήσαν τοῖς νόμοις to the fact that the observance of Solon's laws at Athens had been interrupted by the Tyranny (‘Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 22). Μηδενός is neuter, as in 6 (4). I. 1288 b 23, μηδενός ἐμποδίζωντος τῶν ἕκτων. For ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὸ χρήσαν τοῖς νόμοις, cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 6, ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς ύπερνοὺς πράξεις. For μένουσι ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, cp. 2. 8. 1269 a 7, ὡστε ἄτοπον τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς τούτων δύγμασιν.

26. οὐκ ὀρθῶς δεὶ κ.τ.λ. Even if these eulogists of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver were right in praising him for making rule over other States his end, the kind of rule—despotic rule—which they praise him for honouring is not the kind of rule which a lawgiver should be seen to honour. Cp. c. 2. 1324 b 26 sqq., and for τιμώντα φαίνεσθαι, Plato, Laws 962 A, εἰ τις τὸν σκοτῶν, οἱ βλέπειν δεὶ τὸν πολιτικὸν, φαίνοντο ἀγνοοῦν κ.τ.λ.

27. τοῦ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 3. 1325 a 24 sqq.

29. ἐτί δεὶ κ.τ.λ. Further, they praise the lawgiver not only for what brings no permanent happiness, but also for what is positively harmful.

30. κρατεῖν ἡσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν, 'trained the citizens to conquer with a view to ruling over others.' I have not met with an instance of ἁσκεῖν used with an acc. of the person and an infinitive, unless we except the passage of Photius quoted below on 1337 a 1, but Plutarch has in De Defect. Orac. c. 21 γλώσσας δε πολλαῖς ἡσκητο χρήσαν, and in Pyrrh. c. 24, ἄνδρας ἡσκημένους μάχεσθαι. Conquering is the first step to ruling over others: cp. c. 2. 1324 b 27 sqq., and 1324 b 7 sqq., and also Plut. Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 2, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν εἰδώτας οὔδὲ μελετῶντας ἡ πείδεσθαι τοῖς ἄρχοντι καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν πολεμίων.

32. δῆλον γὰρ δτὶ κ.τ.λ. A shrewd remark and one which, so far as I know, Aristotle was the first to make. There is much in the history of ancient Rome and modern France to illustrate and confirm it. Τῷ δυνάμενῳ, like τῶν δυνάμενον ἄρχειν in c. 3. 1325 a 37.

34. ὅπερ ἐγκαλοῦσι κ.τ.λ., 'yet this is just what the Laconians
charge Pausanias their king with doing, notwithstanding that he was already the holder of so great an office.' The Lacedaemonians praise their lawgiver for teaching the State to do to other States the very thing which they censure Pausanias for trying to do to his fellow-citizens. Aristotle has usually been taken to refer here and in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 20, καὶ Παυσανίαν τὸν βασιλέα (sc. φασὶ τινες ἐπιχειρήσαν καταλύσαν) τὴν ἑφορείαν, to the victor of Plataea, whom he, however, describes in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 2 sqq. as ὁ στρατηγὸς κατὰ τῶν Μηδικῶν πόλεμον. This Pausanias was not really king, but only guardian of King Pleistarchus, who was a minor (cp. Hdt. 9. 10 and Thuc. 1. 132, referred to by Eaton), but he is 'often loosely called king in the later writers, e.g. in [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 97: Duris, Fragm. 31 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 477), ap. Athen. Deipn. 535 e: Justin 9. 1' (Busolt, Gr. Gesch. 2. 380. 4, ed. 1), and Aristotle may be guilty of a similar looseness here. In the second edition, however, of his Griechische Geschichte (i. 513 and note 3, and 3. 1. 98. 1) Busolt, following E. Meyer, takes the reference here and in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 20 to be to the king Pausanias who was an opponent of Lysander. This Pausanias was really king, and might well be contrasted as such with ὁ στρατηγὸς κατὰ τῶν Μηδικῶν πόλεμον, but see on the other side of the question Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 22. 2. Was the opponent of Lysander quite the man to entertain the hardy design of abolishing the ephorate and making himself master of the State?

35. πολιτικὸς. Cp. c. 2. 1324 b 26 sq.

36. λόγων, i.e. praises of the lawgiver for his training his citizens to conquer with a view to empire.

37. ταυτὰ γὰρ ἀριστὰ καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινή. Cp. c. 15. 1334 a 11 sq. and c. 3. 1325 b 30 sqq. The 'best things' to which Aristotle refers appear to be temperance, justice, and wisdom in contradistinction to a capacity to conquer one's neighbours.

38. τὴν τε τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀσκησιν κ.τ.λ. See as to this account of the true aim of war, vol. i. p. 327 sq. Aristotle evidently has before him Isocr. Panath. § 219, οἷμι γὰρ ἀπανταὶ ἄν ὀμολογήσωμεν κακίστους ἀνδρας εἶναι καὶ μεγάστης ζημίας ἄξιους, ὅσοι τοὺς πρῶταν οἱ εὐρήμενοι ἐπ᾽ ὀφελείᾳ, τούτως ἐπὶ ἑλάβῃ χρώμενοι τυγχάνουσι, μὴ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους μυθὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας μυθὲ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν χώραν εἰσβάλλοντας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ὁκειούτατους καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς συγγενείας μετέχοντας· ἀπερ ἐποίουν Σπαρτιάται.
NOTES.

40. ἡνα is here followed by δπως. See Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 18 sqq., who gives a long list of passages in Aristotle’s writings in which the same thing occurs, among them Pol. 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sqq., 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 6–17, and 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq. Kaisaling (Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia, p. 32) compares ’Αθ. Πολ. c. 16. l. 7 sqq.

1384 a. 1. πάντων δεσποτείας, ‘despotic rule over all.’ Πάντων is an objective genitive: cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 a 21, προωδοποίηται γάρ ἐκαστὸς πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστος ὀργήν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος πάθους, where ἐκάστον = πρὸς ἐκαστὸν (Bon. Ind. 149 b 10).

2. τρίτον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Supply ὅπως ἥπτωσι. Compare Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 a 21, προωδοποίηται γάρ ἐκαστὸς πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστος ὀργήν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος πάθους, where ἐκάστον = πρὸς ἐκαστὸν (Bon. Ind. 149 b 10).

3. τάξη. See above on 1260 a 36.

4. αἱ γὰρ πλείοντες κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 3 sqq.

5. τῶν τοιοῦτων πόλεων, i.e. τῶν πολεμικῶν πόλεων, States that make war their end.

8. τὴν γὰρ βαφήν ἀφάσων κ.τ.λ. Compare for the metaphor Plato, Rep. 430 A. Βαφή here means the temper which is produced by dipping, rather than the dipping itself. In Plut. De Vitiioso Pudore, c. 4. 530 E, we have ὥσπερ βαφήν τὴν φυλάττοσαν ἀπειθῶν μαλαχθείσαν αισχύνη προέμενος. Aristotle evidently thought (cp. 25 sqq.), with Isocrates (De Pace, § 95 sqq.), that when the Peloponnesian War came to an end and the Lacedaemonians found themselves at the head of an empire, they lost much of the justice and temperance which war had enforced on them and became υβρισταί (28) and ἀνδραποδώδεις (39). Compare Isocr. De Pace, § 96, ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν καθεστῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς (i.e. τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις) ἐπιτηδευμάτων τοὺς μὲν ἱδίωτας ἐνέπλησεν (ἡ ἄρχη τῆς βαλάντης) ἄδικας, μαθηματικάς, ἀνομιας, φιλαρ- γυρίας, τὸ δὲ κοινὸ τῆς πόλεως ὑπεροφίας μὲν τῶν συμμάχων, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἠλιγφωρίας δὲ τῶν ὅρκων καὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν. Isocrates dwells on their insolent treatment of the Chians (§ 98) and of the islands generally (§ 99). He ascribes this change in them to their possession of maritime empire, which had already demoralized Athens, whereas Aristotle ascribes it to defective education and to the effect of leisure. The Lacedaemonian training was a training only for war; it did not impart justice and temperance, still less did it impart intellectual virtue. If this had been otherwise, the Lacedaemonians would have spent their leisure in pursuits which would have prevented the loss of ‘temper’ to which Aristotle refers. So Plato (Rep. 549 B) says of them that they lacked the


11. ἔπει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 3. 1325 b 30 sqq. and c. 14. 1333 b 37. C. 15. The end is σχολή, as is explained in 14 sqq.

12. ὁρον, 'distinctive aim' (= τέλος, 11): cp. c. 2. 1324 b 3 sqq.


ὑπάρχειν, sc. τῇ πάλαι: cp. 34 sqq. and contrast c. 14. 1334 a 9 sq.

That the best man will possess the capacity of using leisure aright, we have seen in c. 14. 1333 a 41 sqq.

15. πολλάκις, e. g. in c. 14. 1333 a 35.

16. τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγήν. Cp. 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 10, τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν, and 21, τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν. Διαγωγή is the use of leisure in occupations desirable for their own sake—such occupations as have been described above on 1333 a 35. See as to its nature, Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 735. 5 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., 2. 266. 5), and Sus2, Note 921 (Sus4, i. p. 542). It is closely related to the end of human life (5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29—31), and therefore to happiness (1339 b 17—19), and hence, like happiness, it combines in itself both the pleasurable and the noble.

19. διὸ σύφρονα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. i. 1323 a 40, κτῶνται καὶ φυλάττοντων οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα τάτας. Σύφροσύνη is a security for the possession of an abundance of necessaries, because it excludes the spendthrift habits of life which are a common concomitant of its opposite: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 7, διὸ καὶ ἀκλαστοὶ αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν ἀσώτων) εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί εἰχέροι γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκλασίας διαπηροῖ εἰσιν, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἐν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν. It is implied that courage and other military virtues are productive of wealth in c. 14. 1333 b 10, i6 sqq.: cp. also Xen. Symp. 4. 13, τῶν μὲν ἰσχυρῶν πανοῦντα δεὶ κτάσθαι τὰ γαθὰ καὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων κυνοφέντα, τῶν δὲ γε σοφῶν λέγοντα. That they are preservative of wealth is obvious.

20. κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, ὀδ σχολὴ δουλοσ. See Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 765, where a remark of Erasmus is quoted, 'dicitur in eos quibus propter obnoxiam ministeriis sordidioribus conditionem non vacat honestis disciplinis operam dare.'

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The proverb seems to be remembered by Euripides in a fragment of the Antiope (Fr. 215),

οὐ χρή σοι ἄνδρα δοῦλον ὅτι ἐλευθέρας γνώμας δίωκεν ὦδ' ἐς ἁργῶν βλέπειν,

and probably by Plutarch in Solon, c. 22, εἰδωτικοὶ πλήθους, ὁ βέλτιον ἄν η μὴ σχολάζειν, ἄλλα τριβόμενον ἂν καὶ πονοῦν ταπεινοῦσθαι (see note on 1313 b 18). So we read in Plut. Cato Censor, c. 21, of Cato's slaves, ἐδει δὲ ἢ πράττειν τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων οἴκων τῶν δοῦλων ἢ καθεύδειν. Compare also the saying ascribed to Socrates, Ἡ Ἀργία ἀδελφή τῆς Ἐλευθερίας ἐστί (Aelian, Var. Hist. 10. 14).


23. φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν, 'and of intellectual virtue for leisure.' Bonitz (Ind. 821 a 6) rightly explains φιλοσοφία here as = 'virtus intellectualis.' See above on 1263 b 40. In 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 26 we find φρόνημα used in the sense of 'intellectual virtue' (see Sus. 2, Note 1023: Sus. 4, i. p. 585). We do not learn in the Fifth Book how Aristotle proposes to develope intellectual virtue by his education; yet he keeps its development in view even in his arrangements respecting musical training; thus one reason why he rejects the study of pipe-playing is because it is οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν (5 (8). 6. 1341 b 6).

24. σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 b 5, διὰ τούτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μᾶλιστα τιμῶσιν ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ χρήσιμος ἄλοις. Aristotle hopes to develope temperance by means of the musical element in his education (5 (8). 5. 1340 a 18 sqq.) and possibly justice also (cp. τῶν ἄλλων ἡδικών, 1340 a 21). Something, however, would have been done for the promotion of temperance even in childhood by careful attention to children's pastimes and to the tales told them, and by the prohibition of objectionable language in their presence, etc.

25. δὲ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος κ.τ.λ., 'for war obliges men to be just and temperate,' so that in time of war men act justly and temperately, whether they have these virtues or not. Ἀναγκάζει is emphatic. Compare for the expression Eurip. Fragm. 528, τό φῶς δ' ἀνάγκην προστίθησι σωφρονεῖν; and for the thought Xen. Cytor. 8. 4. 14, δοκεῖ δὲ μοι, διὸ Κῦρο, χαλεπότερον εἶναι εἰρέτην ἄνδρα τιγαθὰ καλὸς φέροντα ἢ τὰ κακὰ τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄβρυν τοὺς πολλοὺς, τὰ δὲ σωφροσύνην τοῖς πάσιν ἐμπολεῖ.

26. ἦ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις κ.τ.λ. For the phrase, compare
Diod. 14. 80. 2, εἰς τρφήν καὶ τὴν ἐν εἰρήνῃ τῶν ἁγάθων ἀπόλαυσιν, and for the thought, Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 29, ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταί καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαύτα ἔχοντες ἁγάθα (i.e. τὰ εὐτυχήματα) γίγνονται: Thuc. 8. 24. 4, Χίου γάρ μονοί μετὰ Δακεδαμονίους δὲν ἐγὼ ἄσθομμν εἰδαμονήσατε ἀμα καὶ ἐσωφρόντων; and the proverb Κολοφωνία ὑβρίς, ἐπὶ τῶν πλούσιων καὶ ὑβριστῶν, τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οἱ Κολοφώνει (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 266). See also Justin 8. 1. 4. It would be easy to multiply instances of this familiar saying. For τὸ σχολάζειν μετ' εἰρήνης, cp. Plato, Theaet. 172 D, τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολὴς ποιοῦνται. For μάλλον, see note on 1270 b 33.


30. πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας. Cp. c. 1. 1323 a 25 sqq. and Plato, Laws 631 B. The possession of all possible goods was held to make men insolent and overbearing (Rhet. 2. 16. 1390 b 32 sqq.). Ἐν πᾶσιν ἁγαθοίς was a familiar Greek expression: cp. Bergk, Fragm. Adesp. Lyr. 18, ἀνθέσαν ἁγαθοῖς πᾶσιν οἷς θάλλει πόλεις,
and see Leutsch and Schneidewin’s note on Gregor. Cypr. Gr. 2. 36 (Paroem. Gr. 2. 58). It is parodied in Aristoph. Acharn. 1025 Didot,
καὶ ταύτα μέντοι νη Δι' ὅπερ μ' ἐτρεφετήν
ἐν πᾶσι βολίτοις,
and Vesp. 709 Didot,
διὸ μνημάδες τῶν δημοσιών ήζων ἐν πᾶσι λαγφώς.

οἶον εἰ τινὲς κ.τ.λ. Homer (Odys. 4. 561 sqq.), as Camerarius points out (Interp. p. 319), speaks of the Elysian plain; it is from Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 170 sqq., that we first hear of the Islands of the Blest. See Liddell and Scott s.v. μάκεαρ. Hesiod describes how some favoured heroes of the fourth race did not die like their fellows, but were removed by Zeus far from the haunts of men to the Islands of the Blest in the deep-eddying Ocean. Even in the later Iron Age there were those whose lot was thought to be the same—e.g. Harmodius (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. Scol. 10) and those
who were initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries (Diog. Laert. 6. 39).
Some found the μακάρων νήσοι in Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Cos, and
Rhodes, the realm of Macareus (Diod. 5. 82), but they were more
commonly believed to lie in the Atlantic Ocean at some distance
from the West Coast of Libya (Plut. Sertor. c. 8: cp. Hor. Epod. 16.
41 sqq.).

32. φιλοσοφίας is introduced at some cost of trimness, but this is
Aristotle’s way: see note on 1323 b 35.

34. μὲν οὖν has no δὲ to answer to it, as the text stands. Perhaps
it was taken up by another μὲν οὖν in the lacuna which, as we shall
see, probably exists in 1334 b 4, both being then answered by πῶς
dὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐσται, 5.

35. τούτων τῶν ἄρετῶν, i.e. φιλοσοφία σοφορούση and δικαιοσύνη.

36. αἰσχροῦ γὰρ δυντος κ.τ.λ., ‘for [if they have them not, they
will not be able to use good things in leisure-time, and] while it is
disgraceful,’ etc. Leisure is the crown of life, and ἣ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ
diaγωγῆ is the diaγωγῆ τῶν ἐλευθέρων (5 (8). 3. 1338 a 21 sqq.), hence
it is especially desirable to be able to make a right use of good
things in leisure-time. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1105 a 9, περὶ δὲ τὸ
χαλεπότερον δὲ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἄρετής καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἑδ.
βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ.

38. Observe the chiasmus in ἁσχολοῦτας καὶ πολεμοῦτας and
eἰρήνην ἄγοντας καὶ σχολαζόντας.

40. διὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 2, πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἄρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα
σονταφί τῶν νόμων ἐστί, τὴν πολεμικὴν αὐτὴ γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν.
tοιγαροῦν ἐσώφυντο μὲν πολεμοῦτες, ἀπάλλυτο δὲ ἀφάντους διὰ τὸ μὴ
ἐπισταθαι σχολαζέως μὴ δὲ ἡσκήκαται μηδὲ ἀκαπην ἐτέρων κυριωτέρων
10. 4, τάδε γε μὴν τοῦ Δυκαύργου πῶς οὐ μεγάλος ἀξίων ἀγαθήμα]
δὲ . . . ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ ἡγάγασε δημοσίᾳ πάντας πάσας ἀσκεῖν τὰς ἄρετας . . .
ἐπέδηκε δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀνυπόστατον ἀνάγκην ἄσκειν ἀπείρον πολιτικὴν ἄρετην.

41. ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The meaning is—for they do not differ from other men in their views with regard to the question
what are the greatest goods: the common herd think that external
goods are the greatest of goods (Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 17, τούτων
γὰρ—i.e. χρημάτων καὶ τιμῶν καὶ ἴδιων τῶν σοματικῶν—οἱ πολλοὶ
ἀφίγονται, καὶ ἐπισυνάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὅσα ἀρεταὶ ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμένουτα ἐστὶν), and so do the Lacedaemonians (Pol. 2. 9. 1271 b 6 sqq.); it
is only in this that they differ from the mass of men, that they hold
these goods to be won by means of one of the virtues (courage or
military virtue). So far we see our way clearly, but there is little
4 (7). 1334 a 32—1334 b 7. 453

doubt that the sentence which follows, commencing with ἐπεὶ δὲ, has reached us in an imperfect state, and that several words have dropped out after τῶν ἀρετῶν, 1334 b 4—how many, it is impossible to say. The lost words may well have ended with the word ἀρετήν, and the omission of them may well have been due to the resemblance of ἀρετήν to ἀρετῶν, 1334 b 4. Many attempts have been made to fill the lacuna (see Sus. on the passage), but with indifferent success. If I were to hazard a suggestion, it would be to insert after ἀρετῶν the words νομίζοντι, τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα χρησίμως εἶναι δοκοῦσαν ἀρετήν ἀσκοῦσι μόνον. ὡς τί μὲν ὅπως ἀσκητῶν τὴν ἀρετήν. It seems likely at any rate that this filling-up more or less represents the sense of the words which have fallen out. Compare with the passage before us 2. 9. 1271 a 41—b 10. Camerarius (Interp. p. 320) was the first to suggest 'locum mendis non carere.' For ou ταῦτη διαφέροσι τῶν ἄλλων, cp. Poet. 5. 1449 b 10 sqq. (already compared by Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 327), and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 20, ἀλλ' εἰμι ἀπληστός κάψο διόπερ οἱ ἄλλοι χρημάτων τῇ δὲ γε μέντοι διαφέρειν μοι δοκῶ τῶν πλείστων ὅτι κ.τ.λ. For ταῦτη referring to what follows Bonitz (Ind. 546 b 11) compares Poet. 23. 1459 a 30 sqq. Ἀλλὰ τῇ γενέσθαι ταῦτα (1334 b 2) = ἀλλὰ τῷ νομίζειν γενέσθαι ταῦτα, as Vict. points out. Possibly γίνεσθαι should be read (with Schn. Bekk. and Sus.) in place of γενέσθαι: cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 7, where we have γίνεσθαι. Ταῦτα, 1334 b 2, 3 = τὰ γάθα τὰ περιμάχτη. For the thought, cp. Xen. Cyrop. 3. 3. 8.

4. καὶ δὲν δι' αὐτὴν. Aristotle does not mean that virtue is not ἀρετήν, to be practised for the sake of the happiness resulting from it; what he objects to is the practice of virtue for the sake of ἀρετήν, γάθα.


6. τυχάνομεν δὲ διηρημένοι πρότερον κ.τ.λ. Δὴ here, as often elsewhere (see note on 1252 a 24), introduces an investigation. Διηρημένοι is middle and used in the sense of διαρίζων (cp. 3. 14. 1284 b 41, διελέσθαι). Πρότερον, in c. 13. 1332 a 38 sqq.

7. ταῦτα, 'of these things,' a partitive genitive: cp. c. 11. 1330 a 41, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν.
8. πρότερον, in c. 7.

9. ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. explains why this question must be considered: we must ask whether training through habit should precede training through reason, because these two kinds of training must be so harmonized with each other as to be adjusted to the best end, and we shall be better able to adjust them to the best end when this question has been answered. Aristotle has already said (c. 13, 1332 b 5) that nature, habit, and reason must harmonize with each other; he now adds that they must be so harmonized as to be adjusted to the best end. He follows in the track of Plato, Laws 653 B and 659 D. At Sparta this best kind of harmony had been missed, for in the Lacedaemonian training nature and habit had not been brought into harmony with reason, nor had reason been adjusted to the best end.

11. καί, 'both.'

12. καὶ διὰ τῶν ἑθῶν ὁμοίων ἡχθαί, sc. τοὺς παιδευομένους. In Eth. Nic. 1. 2. 1095 b 4 we have τοὺς ἑθεῖν ἡχθαί καλῶς. For ὁμοίων (i.e. ὁμοίων τῷ λόγῳ), cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 26, πρὸς τὸν θεατὴν τῶν τουκότων τοιούτω τινὶ χρῆσαί τῷ γένει τῆς μοισικῆς, and Plato, Tim. 18 B, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ περὶ γυναικῶν ἐπεμνήσθημεν, ὡς τὰς φύσεις τοῖς ἀνδραί παραπλησίας εὐθυναρμοστέους, and Rep. 472 C, διὸ ἂν ἐκείνοις ὃ τι ὁμοιότατος ἦ, τὴν ἐκείνους μοίραν ὁμοιοστάτην ἔζειν.

φανερὸν δὴ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle is about to decide that training through habit must precede training through reason, but that training through habit must be adjusted to and pursued for the sake of reason, which is the end, and he proves the second proposition first (in 12-17) and then the first (in 17-25). Translate—'this then at any rate is evident, first that as in all other things, [so in the case of the human being,] generation starts from a beginning, and that the end of some beginnings is related to another end, and that reason and thought are the end of man's natural development, so that [reason and thought are the end of generation, and] it is with a view to these ends that we should order generation and our training in custom.' I follow Sepulveda, Vict., Lamb., Stahr, and Welldon in my rendering of ὃς ἡ γένεσις ἀν' ἄρχῃς ἐστί. Sus.² (cp. Sus.⁴, i. p. 545) translates 'dass die Erzeugung und Geburt den Anfang macht (für den man zu sorgen hat)'

—i.e. 'that generation and birth are the beginning (for which we have to care)'

—comparing c. 16. 1334 b 29, but the next sentence, καὶ τὸ τέλος ὑπὸ τινός ἀρχής ἄλλου τέλους,
suggests that ἄπ’ ἀρχῆς ἔστι means 'start from a beginning.' It has not, I think, been noticed that Aristotle has before him Plato, Phaedr. 245 D, ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ γεγονόμενον γέγονεσθαι, αὐτήν δὲ μὴ εἶ ἐνοῦ εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχῆς γέγονεσθαι, οὐκ ἄν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γέγονεσθαι, which supports the interpretation adopted by me. With Sepulveda (p. 237 b) I take the 'beginning' from which generation 'starts' to be the union of the parents: cp. Plato, Laws 720 E, ΑΘ... ἀρ’ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν τὴν περὶ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν πρῶτην πόλεων πέρι κατακοσμήσει ταῖς τάξεσι; ΚΛ. τί μὴν; ΑΘ. ἀρχὴ δ’ εὐτί τῶν γενέσεων πᾶσαις πόλεσιν ἀρ’ οὐχ ἦ τῶν γάμων σύμμειξι καὶ κοινωνία; and c. 16. 1334 b 29—31, where it is implied that ἡ σύζευξις is the ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως. Compare with the passage before us those quoted in vol. i. p. 348, note 2, and Metaph. θ. 8. 1050 a 7 sqq. Aristotle’s aim is that in all arrangements connected with the generation of his future citizens and with the training of habit given them the ultimate development of reason and thought shall be kept in view, and we find that he bears this in mind later on (see above on 1334 a 23, and cp. c. 16. 1335 b 16 sqq., 29 sqq., and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 24 sq., b 6 sqq.). We expect τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχῆς in place of τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχῆς, but cp. c. 16. 1334 b 41, ἢ χώρας παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 35, τὰς κρίσεις ἐκ τῶν διακατηρησιῶν. See also below on 1336 a 41 and cp. Plato, Laws 715 A, τὰ τε πράγματα κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οὕτως ἐσφετέρισαν σφάδρι ν. κ. τ. λ. For ἄλλου τέλους, cp. Eth. Nic. ιο. 3. 1174 a 19, ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησι καὶ τέλους τινός.

19. καὶ τὰς ἐξεις τὰς τούτων κ. τ. λ. Cρ. 3. 4. 1277 a 6, where the soul is said to consist ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως, and De An. 3. 10. 433 a 9, φαίνεται δὲ γε δύο ταῦτα κωνύτα, ἡ ὀρέξεις ἡ νοῦς, εἰ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθεῖν ὡς νόημα τινα. That ὀρέξεις belongs to the irrational part of the soul and νοῦς to the rational, is implied in 1. 5. 1254 b 5—9, but we are not told elsewhere, so far as I am aware, that ὀρέξεις is the ἐξεις of the one part of the soul and νοος of the other. For the meaning of ἐξεις, cp. Metaph. Δ. 20. 1022 b 10, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐξεις λέγεται διάθεσις καθ ἢ ἢ ἢ κακῶς διάκειται τὸ διακείμενον, καὶ ἡ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια ἐξεις τῇ διάθεσις γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, and see note on 1254 a 39, where an ἐξεις has been said to be a more permanent state than a διάθεσις. Thus ὀρέξεις is a διάθεσις τοῦ ἄλογου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς καθ’ ἢ τὸ ἄλογον μέρος ἢ εἰ ἢ κακῶς διάκειται, and νοῦς stands in a similar relation to τὸ λόγων ἔχων. Ὁ ὀρέξεις is explained in 22 by δυσιά, βούλησις, and ἐπιθυμία, for ὀρέξεις is made up of these three things (De
An. 2. 3. 414 b 2, ὑπεξὶς μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, and Eth. Eud. 2. 7. 1223 a 26, ἄλλα μὲν ὡς ὑπεξὶς εἰς τρία διαιρέται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν). As Eaton points out, however, 'Aristotle's language is not uniform,' for he connects βούλησις, not with the irrational, but with the rational part of the soul in De An. 3. 9. 432 b 5, ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ὡς βούλησις γίνεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλήγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμός. As to the nature of βούλησις, see Eth. Nic. 3. 4. ΙΙΙΙ b 19 sqq. Aristotle evidently regards infants as having wishes which are not ἐπιθυμίαι, and yet which belong wholly to the irrational part of the soul. One difference between ἐπιθυμίαι and βούλησις is that the former is always felt in relation to that which is possible, and that this is not always the case with the latter (ΙΙΙΙΙ b 22).


23. καὶ γενομένοις εἰδοὺς, 'even immediately after they are born': cp. De Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 a 27, καὶ τὰ μὲν εἰδοὺς ἀκολούθει γενομένοις, τὰ δὲ προϊόντις τὴς ἡλικίας γίνεται δῆλα καὶ γνωσικώτων: Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 9, ὑπερκατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εἰδοὺς, οὕτω καὶ τελειωθέντι: and Meteor. 3. 1. 371 a 6, εἰδὸς γεγομένην.

24. ὃ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ. The expression comes to Aristotle from Plato, Rep. 586 C, πληρωμὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ βυμοῦ διάκών ἀνεν λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ (cp. 431 C and 524 B, and Laws 897 C). These are the faculties that control ὑπεξὶς (Eth. Nic. 7. 8. 1150 b 22 sqq.) and bring it within bounds. They are absent in other animals than man (De An. 3. 10. 433 a 11 sqq.), and the child has them in an imperfect form (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 13). At what age they develope we are not told. According to Probl. 30. 5. 955 b 22 sqq. νοῦ increases in men as they grow older, and reaches its highest development in old age (ἐπὶ γῆς). Some further light is thrown on the subject by Plato, Symp. 181 D, οὐ γὰρ ἐρώτα, παῖδα, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἤδη ἄρχωνται νούν ἵσχειν' τοῦτο δὲ πληρωμῆς τοῦ γενεαλόγου. Compare with what Aristotle says here
Polyb. 3. 20. 4, εἰ μὴ νῦν Δία πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἢ τύχη καὶ τοῦτο προσένεμε Ἦρωμαιος, τὸ φρονεῖν αὐτοῦς εὑθεῖος ἐκ γενετῆς.

προϊόσκει. Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares De Part. An. 4. 10. 686 b 11, προϊόσκει δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἄνθρωποις αὔξεται τὰ κάτωθεν.

25. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ. Πρῶτον μὲν is answered by ἐπειτα. With ἐπειτα τὴν τής ὁρεξεως we must apparently supply εἰναι or some such word. See note on 1279 b 7.

27. ἐνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν τής ὁρεξεως. The ὁρεξεως should be so trained as to obey νοῖς (1. 5. 1254 b 5: see note on 1333 a 21, and cp. Plato, Laws 653 B, 659 D).

τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς. Cp. Plato, Rep. 591 C, ἐπειτα δ', εἰσκα, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἔξω καὶ τροφήν οὐχ ὡς τῇ θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἑκατέργασι ἑπταμοῦντος ἤχος, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἐγκείσεως βλέπουν οὐδὲ τοῦτο προεβεβέλων, ὡς τοῖς, διὰ τῆς ἀλήθειας ἢ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ καλῶς ἔσται, εἰν μὴ καὶ σωφρονίσεως μελήσῃ ἢ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐνεκα ἑμφανώς ἀρμοστόμενοι [φανεῖται]. As to the omission of ἐνεκα with τῆς ψυχῆς Eucken remarks (Praepositionen, p. 20), 'if ἐνεκα belongs to two notions, it is usually expressed only with the first, and must be supplied with the second.'

29 sqq. Cp. Plato, Laws 721 A. But Aristotle is less guided C. 16. by Plato in this chapter than he is in the seventeenth. He raises questions here which Plato had not raised and solves those which Plato had already raised in a different way. Plato had not inquired ποιος τινὰς ὡς τοῖς χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλόλους τὴν γαμηκὴν ἐμμαθήν, nor had he discussed the proper season of the year for marriage or the other questions raised in 1335 a 39 sqq. Ἀπ' ἀρχῆς is evidently equivalent to ἀπὸ τῆς συγειέως.

30. τῶν τρεθόμενοι, 'of the children in process of rearing,' for not all that are born are to be reared. So Sepulv., whom Vict. follows.

πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'attention must first be given to the coupling of man and wife in marriage, [and the question must be considered] when'—i.e. at what age—'and in what condition [of body and mind] they should enter upon matrimonial intercourse with each other.' Critias, following no doubt Lacedaemonian traditions, had already said the same thing (see vol. i. p. 350, note 1). On the other hand, 'Chrysippus is reproached by Posidonius (Galen, Hipp. et Plat. 5. 1) for neglecting the first germs of education in his treatise on the subject, particularly those previous to birth' (Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, Eng. Trans., p. 303, note 2). In
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relation to animals other than man nature herself had fixed the age and season of the year at which intercourse was to take place (Hist. An. 5. S. 542 a 19, ὑραί δὲ καὶ ἧλικία τῆς ὅχειας ἐκάστου εἰδῶν ὕμισμέναι τῶν ᾄδων), and Aristotle follows in her track. Indeed, Greek custom seems to have prescribed a certain season of the year for marriage (c. 16. 1335 a 36 sqq.), and particular Greek States seem often to have had an age of their own for its celebration (c. 16. 1335 a 15 sqq.). Another point is recognized in 1335 b 26 sqq. as needing consideration, πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἁρμότει πρὸς τεκνοποίαν. It is not likely that regulations on this subject existed in any Greek State. Πρῶτον μὲν has nothing strictly answering to it, but it is often taken up by c. 17. 1336 a 3, γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων κ.τ.λ. Ἐπιμελήσεων περὶ τῶν σύζευξιν, as in Plato, Laws 932 B, τῶν περὶ γάμους γυναικῶν ἐπιμελουμένων. The question πότε κ.τ.λ. is considered in 1334 b 32–1335 a 35, and the question ποῖον τώος ὄντας κ.τ.λ. is considered, so far as relates to the body, in 1335 b 2–12.

32. διε 5’ ἀποβλέποντα κ.τ.λ., ‘and the lawgiver in instituting this union should look both to the persons united [as distinguished from the children to be born] and to the [whole] time for which they will live [not merely to the time at which the union takes place], in order that they may arrive simultaneously in respect of age at the same epoch’ (i.e. the epoch at which each of the two loses the power to have children: cp. 1335 a 7, τέλος τῆς γεννήσεως, and for συγκαταβαίνων 1335 a 10 sq., 31). If the lawgiver looked merely to the time at which the union takes place, and did not look forward to the time at which the power to have children is lost by husband and wife respectively, he might very well be led to arrange that husband and wife should both be of the same age and young, but to do this would be an error, and the right course for him is to keep in view the whole course of the lives of the wedded pair and to arrange that the husband shall be twenty years or so older than his wife. For τῶν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνων, cp. Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 17. 1098 E, οὐκ ἔστων αὐτῶν μέτρων ὄ τοῦ βιου χρόνος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ παντὸς αὐτῶν ἑπιθραττόμενον τὸ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον ἑξαμελλάται κ.τ.λ.: Euphron, αἴδυμοι Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 490).

ἀν Ζεῦ, τί ποθ’ ἡμῖν δοξε χρόνον τοῦ ζῆν βραχέων πλέκειν ἀλύπως τούτον ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἐσ;
Philemon, "Ephesos Fragm. 1 (Meineke 4. 10),

ουκ εἰς ἠμέραν
χειμάζομαι μιᾶν γὰρ, εἰς τὸ ζῆν δ' ὅλον:

and Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 444, Πιτύλος Ποσειδίππου τῶν ἦδιων βρεπτῶν οἰκολέοντα ἀφῆκεν ἔλευθερον παραμείναντα αὐτῷ τῶν ταῖς ζωῖς χρόνων. Camerarius (Interp. p. 323) rightly translates τῶν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνων 'vitae ipsius spacio.' Susemihl's rendering of the sentence, which Mr. Welldon follows, translating 'he should have in view not only the persons themselves who are to marry but their time of life,' needs the support of parallel instances of this use of τῶν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνων. Aristotle follows in the track of Euripides (Fragm. 24: cp. Fragm. 906, and contrast Fragm. 319, quoted below on 1335 a 1),

κακὼν γυναίκα πρὸς νέαν ζεύξαι νέον,
μακρὰ γὰρ ισχὺς μᾶλλον ἀρσένας μένει,
θῆλεια θ' ἡδή βάσσον ἐκλείπει δέμας.

For νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν, cp. 2. 8. 1267 b 39, ἐνομοθετεῖ δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν τὸ κύριον. That ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν refers to τὴν σύζευξιν, we see from 1335 a 35 sqq. The union of man and wife is called a σύζευξις in i. 3. 1253 b 9 sq. and a κοινωνία in i. 2. 1252 b 9 sq.

37. καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ διαφορᾶς. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 41, εἶτα λανθάνουσαν ἔνδον ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις στάσεις καὶ διαφορᾶς αὐτῶς ἑγκαταλείποντες, and Plut. Amat. c. 2, ἐκ τῆς γενομένης τοῖς γονεῖσιν αὐτῶν διαφορᾶς καὶ στάσεως. A 'difference' is less serious and less long-continued than a 'state of discord,' though it may often end in the production of discord: cp. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 37, καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηθείας γενομένης διαφορᾶς ἄρχῃ πασῶν ἐγένετο τῶν στάσεων τῶν υπότερον.

39. τῶν τέκνων includes female as well as male children.

40. τῶν πατέρων might well mean here, as often elsewhere, 'the parents,' but it would seem to mean 'the fathers,' if we compare 1335 a 32-35, for there the father alone must be referred to, inasmuch as he alone would be seventy years of age at the time when the children are approaching their acme.

ἀνόητος γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for elderly fathers get no good from children's return of service, nor do the children from the assistance given by fathers.' If a man marries (say) at fifty-five, he will probably be in his grave before he gets much assistance from his
children or is able to start them in life. See also vol. i. p. 184, note 2. For ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, not ἡ χάρις ἢ παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, see above on 1334 b 12.

1385 a. 1. οὔτε λαῖν πάρεγγυς ἐκναί. Euripides puts very different advice into the mouth of one of his characters (Fragm. 319),

καὶ νῦν παραιτῶ πᾶσι τοῖς νεωτέροις
μὴ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας τοὺς γάμους ποιομένους
σχολὴ τεκνούσθαι παῖδας· οὐ γὰρ ἤδονη,
γνωστὶ τῷ ἐχθρῶν χρήμα προσβύτησιν ἀνήρ
ἀλλ' ὡς τάχιστα. καὶ γὰρ ἕκτροφαί καλαί
καὶ συννεύζων ἴδιο παῖς νέον πατρί.

On the un-Attic word πάρεγγυς see Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 120.

2. ἥ τε γὰρ αἰδώς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 5. 5, καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἱ θάλασσαι ἄλληλοι σύνεις, μεθ' ἄντερ καὶ ἐλαχίστη αἰδώς παραγίγνεται. Τούτῳ τούτῳ, sc. τέκνοις, 'children of the kind we have just described,' i.e. near in age to their parents. "Ωσπέρ ἡλικιώτατας, 'as it does also to those of the same age': cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 16, ὀσπέρ ὁ δικαστής, and 2. 10. 1272 a 41, ὀσπέρ τοῖς ἐφόροις.


4. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. We are apparently intended to supply δεὶ νομοθετῶν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν before ὡς κ.τ.λ. "Οθεν ἀρχέμενοι δεύρῳ μετίθημεν, cp. 1334 b 29 sqq. Τῶν γεννώμενων, 'of the offspring in process of generation,' whether born or unborn, for τὸ γεννώμενον in De Gen. An. 1. 2. 716 a 22 refers to the latter and τοῖς γεννώμενοι in Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 13 to the former. After birth, however, τὰ γεννώμενα is the usual designation, as in 1335 b 20, 22, and c. 17. 1336 a 16, and τὰ τέκνα is used of a still later stage (1334 b 39). ὡς ἐπάρχῃ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησα, 'be such as to answer to the wish of the lawgiver.' For πρὸς with the acc. in this sense, cp. Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 16, ἐὰν δὲ δ' ἐγγραμμένοι (νόμοις) ἢ πρὸς τὸ πράγμα, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 642 a 40–54: also Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 139, ἡκεὶ γὰρ οὐτοὺς ὁμοίως ὁμοίως δειν τοὺς πάλαι κειμένους χρῆθαι νόμοις καὶ τὰ πάτρια περιστέλλειν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὰς βουλῆσεις μηδὲ πρὸς τὰς διαδύσεις τῶν ἀδικημάτων νομοθετεῖσθαι.
6. σχεδὸν δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'now all these things come about in connexion with one arrangement,' or 'one mode of dealing with the subject'—the arrangement being to place the commencement of wedlock at such ages in the case of husband and wife respectively as will enable it to close, so far as the production of children is concerned, at the age of seventy in the case of the husband and fifty in that of the wife, so that at no period of the cohabitation will the power of procreation be wanting to either party. It deserves notice that Aristotle himself was about forty years of age when he married the niece and adopted daughter of Hermias (see vol. i. p. 466). That this union was a happy one may be inferred from the direction in Aristotle’s will that his wife’s bones should be, in accordance with her request, disinterred and buried with his own (Diog. Laert. 5. 16). Πάντα ταύτα, i.e. τὸ μῆ διασφονεῖ τὰς δυνάμεις, τὸ μήτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι ταῖς ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων μήτε λίαν πάρηγγυς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν. For συμβάλεις κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν, cp. Meteor. i. 1. 338 b 20, ὅσα συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν, and Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 8, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀνδρὲ καὶ κατὰ τύχην καὶ κατ’ ἐπιμέλειαν ἐγενέσθην φύλακε κατὰ τὰς πύλας ταύτας. The phrase perhaps contains an allusion to the proverb μία μάστιξ ἐλαίνει (or μία μάστιξ πάντας ἐλαίνει, Suidas): ἐπὶ τοῦ μαθίου (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 280): cp. Herodes, Περὶ Πολιτείας, p. 175 (Bekker, Orat. Att., vol. v. p. 659), ἀπὸ μίας οὖν τέχνης ὁρμώμενος ἡμῶν τῆς κρατήσεως οἴεται καὶ τούτων δὲν δὲν ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἄρξει. Sus. transposes σχεδὸν, 6—τοῦτος, 11, to after 27, πληθύνον ἐτί (ἡ μικρόν), reading σχεδὸν δὲ in place of σχεδὸν δὴ, but the result of this transposition is to sever πάντα ταύτα from the things to which these words refer.

8. ὁ τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς ἐχατός, 'the extreme sum of seventy years' (cp. 35). For the fact, cp. Hist. An. 7. 6. 585 b 5 sqq. Camerarius remarks (Interp. p. 323), 'haec ita se habere putatur esse certum. Etsi paucat quaedam dissentanea memorantur, ut olim de Masinissa, quem Plutarchus in libello quo quaeque ad senibus capessenda sit respublica' (c. 15) 'ex Polybio' (37. 10. 5. 11 sq.) 'narrat, mortuum annos habentem nonaginta, reliquisse superstitem puern annorum quatuor. Et de Constantia, quae nupsit Friderico Secundo, traditur peperisse eam filium grandiorem annis quinquaginta.' See also Plin. Nat. Hist. 7. 61 sqq. Bonitz (Ind. 289 b 16) couples with the passage before us Hist. An. 8. 15. 599 b 10, καὶ ἢρχονται ἑπεῴσθαι (οἱ θόνοι) ἀπὸ Πλατάνδρου ἀνατολῆς μέχρι
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'Αρκτούρον δύσεως τὸ ἔσχατον. For the order of the words, which is quite regular, cp. i. 2. 1252 b 27, ἢ ἐκ πλείωνοι κομμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος: see Sandys' note on 'Αθ. Pol. c. 51. i. 10, ὃ ἐν ἀγορᾷ σῖτος ἄργος.

9. For πεντήκοντα, cp. 29, ἐπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα.

10. δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν κ.τ.λ., 'the commencement of the union, so far as age is concerned, should reach down at its close to these epochs' (i.e. the close of the union should arrive for the wife at the age of fifty and for the husband at the age of seventy, so that the husband should be twenty years older than the wife at the time of marriage). For κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν, 'in respect of age' as contrasted with time of year (τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνους, 36), cp. De Gen. An. 5. 3. 784 a 17, τοῖς δ' ἀνδρώποις κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν γίνεται χειμὼν καὶ θέρος καὶ ἐαρ καὶ μετάσφωρον. For the use of καταβάλλων, cp. Plut. Demetr. c. 53, κατήθη δὲ ταῖς διαδοχαῖς τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ βασιλείων εἰς Περσαί τελευταίοι, ἐφ' οὐ 'Ῥωμαίοι Μακεδονίαν ἤπηγάγοντο.

11. ἔστι δ' ὧ τῶν νέων συνθυσμὸς κ.τ.λ. Partly in support of the conclusion at which he has just arrived, which implies that the bridegroom will be twenty years older than the bride at the time of marriage, and therefore will not be young, and partly in order to settle the age of the bride, which has not yet been settled, Aristotle recalls the fact that the union of young persons is a bad thing. The substantive συνθυσμὸς is not used elsewhere in the Politics in the sense of 'coitus,' though it is often thus used in the zoological writings of Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s.v.), but we have συνθυσδέντων in this sense in 1335 b 24 (cp. also συνθυσίζεσθαι in i. 2. 1252 a 26, so far as it refers to the union of male and female). With the passage 1335 a 11–28 should be compared Plato, Rep. 459 B: Aristot. Hist. An. 5. 14. 544 b 14, τὸ γὰρ τῶν νέων (σκ. σπέρμα) ἐν πάσι τοῖς ὕψοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀγονοῦ, γονίμων δ' ὄστων ἀσθενεύτερα καὶ ἐλάττω τὰ ἐκγονα· τούτῳ δὲ μάλιστα δηλοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ζωτικῶν τετραπόδων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρνίθων, τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἐκγονα ἐλάττω, τῶν δὲ τὰ φά, and 7. 1. 582 a 16, μέχρι μὲν οὖν τῶν τριῶν ἐπὶ τῶν µὲν πρῶτον ἀγονα τὰ σπέρματα ἐστιν' ἐπειτα γόνιμα μὲν μικρὰ δὲ καὶ ἀτελῆ γεννώσι καὶ οἱ νέοι καὶ αἱ νέαι, ὄσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ᾑαὶ τῶν πλείστων. συλλαμβάνοντες μὲν οὖν αἱ νέαι βάττον ὡς ἐπὶ τοὺς δὲ συλλάμβανον, ἐν τοῖς τόκοις πυρότατοι μάλλον. καὶ τὰ σώματα δ' αὐτῶν ἀτελέστερα γίνεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ γηράσκει βάττον, τῶν τ' ἀφροδισιαστικῶν ἁρέμων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν τῶν τόκως χρωμέων πλεῖστων· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὖθ' ἀδέξιοι ἐτί γίνονται μετά τοὺς τρεῖς τόκους, and De Gen. An. 4. 2. 766 b 29, τὰ τε γὰρ νέα ἑλπιτόκα μάλλον τῶν ἀκμαζόντων καὶ γηράσκοντα μάλλον (τὰ πρεσβύτερα
μάλλον P, i.e. Vat. 1339): τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὕτω τέλειον τὸ θερμότ, τοῖς δ’ ἀπολείπει. Aubert and Wimmer, in their edition of the De Generatione Animalium, remark on this passage, ‘this appears from statistical investigations to be correct’; among other authorities they refer to ‘the very precise and interesting investigations of Quetelet, Sur l’Homme’: see also below on 1335 a 15. According to Aristox. Fragm. 20 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278), Pythagoras recommended (he probably referred to males only) complete abstinence till twenty, ὅταν δὲ καὶ εἰς τούτῳ ἀφίκηται, σπανίως εἶναι χρη
erstέων τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις: τούτῳ γὰρ πρὸς τε τὴν τῶν γεννώντων καὶ γεννησο-
mένων εὐεξίαν πολὺ συμβάλλεσθαι: see also below on 1335 b 37, ἔγειοις χάριν. At Sparta, care was taken that both bridegroom and bride should be in their bodily prime (Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 6: Plut. Lycurg. c. 15, cp. Num. et Lycurg. inter se comp. c. 4, where the custom at Rome is contrasted with the Lacedaemonian custom). It is evident from 28 sq. that Aristotle does not class a girl of eighteen among the νίαι, at all events so far as fitness for marriage is concerned.

13. ἀτελῆ, ‘imperfect,’ i.e. lacking some limb or organ, or with some limb or organ imperfectly developed, or lacking some sense, for instance the sense of sight or hearing (De An. 3. 1. 425 a 9 sqq.), or some power, for instance the power of movement (De An. 3. 9. 432 b 21–26) or speech, or the power to procreate (cp. Hist. An. 7. 1. 581 b 21 sqq., and De An. 2. 4. 415 a 26 sqq. and 3. 9. 432 b 21 sqq.), or possibly imperfect in mind (cp. 1335 b 29 sqq.), idiotic or the like. As infants born imperfect are not to be reared in Aristotle’s ‘best State’ (1335 b 20), and the offspring of the over-
young is often imperfect, much destruction of infant life would be saved by the prohibition of the marriage of those who are over-young.

μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ‘small in figure’ : cp. Pindar, Isthm. 4. 53, μορφὰν βραχύς. In 17 we have μικρὸ τὰ σώματα. To be small in person was to lack beauty (Eth. Nic. 4. 7. 1123 b 6 sqq.). ‘Ὁ μικρὸς was ‘a term of reproach at Athens’ (Liddell and Scott s.v.: Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 280, note : cp. also 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 3).

15. ἐν δεσιαι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Vict. ‘hoc autem vulgo de plebe Gallorum dicitur, apud quos mala haec consuetudo increbruit; unde notantur etiam voce ostendente erratum hoc ipsorum irre dentequo brevitatem corporis eorum et deformitatem.’ Among the States
other than Troezen to which Aristotle here refers, Crete should probably be included. Cp. Ephor. Fragn. 64 (Strabo, p. 482: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 251), γαμεὶν µὲν ἀµα πάντες ἀναγκαίονται παρ' αὐτοῖς οἱ κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων ἐκ τῆς τῶν παιδῶν ἀγέλης ἐκκρατεῖντες. The age referred to would be the expiration of the eighteenth year according to Dareste, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques, p. 408. The bride in Crete might be no more than twelve years of age (ibid. p. 407). The early age at which daughters were given in marriage at Troezen is probably an indication of material prosperity, for the father no doubt had to provide his daughter with a dowry. In Crete the bridegroom did not take his bride home till she was old enough to manage a household (Strabo, p. 482), and the actual provision of a dowry by the father may have been delayed till then. ‘In a meeting of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, M. Joseph Körösi, Director of the Buda-Pest Statistical Bureau, read a paper on the “Influence of Parents’ Ages on the Vitality of Children.” . . . M. Körösi has collected about 30,000 data, and has come to the following conclusions:—Mothers under twenty years of age and fathers under twenty-four have children more weakly than parents of riper age. Their children are more subject to pulmonary diseases. The healthiest children are those whose fathers are from twenty-five to forty years of age, and whose mothers are from twenty to thirty years old’ (Times, Jan. 14, 1889).

16. ἐπιχωριάζεται. Ἐπιχωριάζει would be more usual, but Liddell and Scott refer to Nymphis, ap. Athen. Deipn. 619 f, κατὰ την ἐπιχωριαζόμενην παρ’ αὐτοῖς συνήθειαν. See critical note.

18. διαφθείρονται, ‘die.’ Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares De Gen. An. 4. 4. 773 a 18 sqq.

 diá καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν κ.τ.λ., ‘the well-known oracle also’ (in addition to other things). For τὸν χρησμὸν, cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 30, ὅθεν τὸ ἄγος συνεβή τοῖς Συβαρίταις. P¹ and P² have preserved this oracle for us in their margins—τὸ μὴ τέμε νέαν ἄλοκα (see Sus.1). The literal meaning of these words was ‘let fallow land remain fallow, do not plough up uncultivated land,’ or in other words ‘let the land rest.’ The verb νέαν and the substantive νεατός (Xen. Oecon. 7. 20) were used of the ploughing-up of fallow land (see Liddell and Scott). Cp. also Anth. Pal. 6. 41, χαλκὸν ἄρτοτητῆς, κλασμβάλακα, νεστομῆ. As, however, the land which had been left for a time fallow was the land which would naturally be used for ploughing, the advice
of the oracle came in effect to this, that ploughing should cease for a time and that crops should not be raised. No wonder that men rejected this interpretation of the oracle and cast about for another—that given in the text. A third interpretation was, indeed, possible. The oracle might be understood as a warning against rash innovation: cp. Athen. Deipn. 461 e, καὶ κατακλύθησαν, ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὁ Πλούταρχος ἔφη, κατά τὸν Φλιάσιον ποιήτην Πρατίναν, οὐ γὰρ αὐλακσύνειν ἀρῶν, ἀλλὰ σκόφον ματεῶν, κυλικηγορήσων ἔρχομαι κ.τ.λ. For διὰ τοιαῦτην αἰτίαν, see above on 1284 a 23.

20. διὰ τὸ γαμίσκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας. Sepulv. ‘propterea quod adolescentulae nuptui traderentur’ (γαμίσκεσθαι being taken as passive: so Lamb. and Sus.), or ‘because the custom was to take the younger women to wife’ (γαμίσκεσθαι being taken as middle: so Liddell and Scott). Perhaps the words which follow, τὰς ἐκδόσεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέρας, where the act of the father, not the bridegroom, is referred to, make rather in favour of the former interpretation. Γαμίσκεσθαι is a rare word.

22. καὶ πρὸς σφαφεούνην, as well as πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιὴν (12).

τὰς ἐκδόσεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέρας, ‘to give away their daughters in marriage, when they are older’ (literally ‘to make their givings-away in marriage for girls when older’).


24. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄρρενων δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and the bodies of the males also are thought to suffer injury in respect of growth, if they have intercourse with females while the seed is still increasing, for the seed also [as well as the body, the increase of which has just been referred to] is subject to a fixed limit of time, which it does not overpass in its increase, or overpasses only slightly, [so that it is not an indifferent matter whether intercourse occurs at an earlier or later age].’ The editors from Vict. downward, so far as I have observed, with the exceptions of Reiz and Götting, read σῶματος in place of σπέρματος; and there is much doubt as to the correct reading. The words σῶμα and σπέρμα are occasionally interchanged in the MSS.—e.g. in De Gen. An. 2. 3. 737 a 11 we should probably read σῶμα with Aubert and Wimmer in place of σπέρμα, and in Chaeremon, Fragm. 13, I would read ‘Ωρῶν σπέρματι’ in place of ‘Ωρῶν σῶματι’. It is therefore not without hesitation that I retain σπέρματος in the passage before us. I do so for the following reasons: (1) It is the reading of all the better MSS., for even in P, which now has σῶματος, σπέρματος was the original reading;
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P1 has ἀλλος σώματος in its margin. Vet. Int. has 'corpe,' but whether he found σώματος in the Greek text used by him is doubtful, for he may well have translated a marginal reading. Sussemihl ascribes the reading σώματος to Leonardus Aretinus, but Schneider says (Politica, vol. ii. p. 436), 'Aldinum et plurium Victorii codicum scripturam spérmatos reddidit Aretinus,' and a manuscript of his Latin Translation belonging to Balliol College, Oxford (MS. Ball. 242)—I have not consulted any others—has 'ac masculorum corpora crescere impediuntur si adhuc augente semine consuetudinem ineant.' (2) If we read σώματος, it is not easy to see, as Schneider has already pointed out in his note on the passage, why Aristotle did not simply write καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄρρένων δὲ σώματα ἐξάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αἰθέραν, ἐὰν ἐτι αὐξανομένων (and not αὐξανομένον τοῦ σώματος) ποιῶνται τὴν συννοίξιν: Sepulveda, in fact (p. 240), found αὐξανομένου (not αὐξανομένον τοῦ σώματος or σπέρματος) in some MSS. and prefers this reading. Besides, the added remark καὶ γάρ—ἐτι seems rather otiose, if it refers to the body, for every one knows that the growth of the body ceases after a certain age. (3) The difficulty has been raised by Schneider that we nowhere read in Aristotle of a 'certus temporis terminus seminis augmento atque incremento definitus, ultra quem progradiatur nunquam, quoque intercepto corporis incrementum impediatur.' 'Corporis incrementum,' he adds, 'intra vigesimum fere annum aetatis consistere solet, seminis vero incrementum et copia pro cultura alimentorum aliasque per causas variatur usque ad annum sexagesimum.' The question is one for thorough students of Aristotle's physiology to decide, and I cannot pretend to be one of them, but it should be noticed that the expression φθίνοντος τοῦ σπέρματος occurs in De Gen. An. 3. 1. 750 a 34, ὡς ἐξαναλωσμένου τοῦ περιττόματος καὶ ἀμα τῆς ἡλικίας ληγούσης φθίνοντος τοῦ σπέρματος, in reference to the old age not indeed of a man, but of an animal, and if he believed in a decrease of the secretion after a certain age, he may well have believed in an increase of it up to a certain age. Some indications of his having done so are traceable, if we can trust the Seventh Book of the History of Animals, c. 5. 585 a 36, πλὴν οὖν ἀρχαμένων (sc. τοῦ σπέρματος καὶ τῶν καταμηνών) γόνιμα εἰδίπες οὖν ἐτι ἀλίγων γεγομένων καὶ ἀνθρώπων, and Probl. 20. 7. 923 a 35, ἢ ἅπαντα μὲν μέχρι τούτου ἀκμαίει, ἐος ἣν κατὰ τὸ σπέρμα ἀκμαίη, ἐτεῖ καὶ οἱ ἀνθρώποι μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν ἐπιδίδοσιν, ὅτε μὲν τῷ πλῆθει ὅτε δὲ τῇ παχύτητι. Compare what we read in Hist. An. 7. 1. 581 b 2 sqq. of the
effect on bodily growth of a discharge of τὰ λευκά in early childhood, for the catamenia in the female answer to the seed in the male (De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 2 sqq.)—τὰ δὲ λευκά καὶ παιδίων γίνεται νῖκα όντι πάμπαν, μάλλον δ’ ἂν ὑψωμένοι τροφῆς καὶ κόλλως τὴν αὐξήσει καὶ τὰ σώματα ἵπταντει τῶν παιδίων. For ὄρυχον ἄκρων, cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 22 and 3. 14. 1285 a 34. As to (ἡ μικρόν), see critical note.

28. διὸ κ.τ.λ. Διὸ is explained by ἐν τοσούτῳ γάρ κ.τ.λ., 30. We should have expected from Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 16—29 (quoted in part above on 11) that Aristotle would have delayed the age of marriage for women till twenty-one, but this would have involved a shortening of the duration of wedlock, as it is to close before the wife is fifty years of age. The male reaches the acme of his physical development between thirty and thirty-five (see vol. i. p. 186, note 2, and cp. 1335 a 32 sq.), so that Aristotle might well have placed the age of marriage for the male a little earlier than he does, but he probably wishes to make the duration of wedlock the same for husband and wife (about thirty-two years). As to the ages recommended by Plato, see vol. i. p. 183.

29. As to [ἡ μικρόν], see critical note.

30. ἐν τοσούτῳ, sc. χρόνῳ, ‘at an age no greater than this.’

ἀκμάζουσι τε τοὺς σώματι σύζευξις ἤσται, ‘coupling will take place while their bodies are in their prime.’ For the importance of this, cp. Plato, Rep. 459 B and Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 23.

31. συγκαταβήσεται, sc. σύζευξις, cp. 10.

32. τοὺς μὲν, the children, answering to τοὺς δὲ, 34, the fathers.

33. ἄρχομένους τῆς ἀκμῆς, cp. 1335 b 27, ἀρχεσθαι τῆς συζεύξεως.

34. ἡδή καταλευμίης τῆς ἡλικίας, ‘their period of vigour having now been brought to a close’ (cp. De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 8, and paûstai τῆς ἡλικίας ληγούσης τοῖς μὲν τὸ δύσασθαι γεννῶν, ταῖς δὲ τὰ καταμήνα, and Demosth. in Apatur. c. 4, οὕτω δ’ ἐτη ἐστίν ἐπτὰ ἀφ’ οὗ τὸ μὲν πλεῖν καταλύμα), or possibly ‘having now been wrecked.’ For πρὸς, ‘towards,’ see Bon. Ind. 641 b 9, where we find a reference among other passages to De Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 a 25, τὰ μὲν γὰρ (τῶν ζῴων) οὐ πολυούσιν πρὸς τὸ γῆρας ἐπιδήμους.

36. τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ἄραν χρόνοις κ.τ.λ. Cp. Philo, Mechan. Synt. p. 99. 11, δεὶ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ὑπορέξεσι τῶν τεχνῶν λαθραῖοι χράσθαι καθάπερ καὶ νῦν χρώσται μετακληώντες. Τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἄραν χρόνοις, ‘time in connexion with season,’ in contradistinction to οἱ περὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν χρῶνοι: cp. c. 5. 1327 a 8, τῆς περὶ ἔντα ἔνης, and for the distinction
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Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 19, ὃραι δὲ καὶ ἡλικία τῆς ὀχέιας ἐκάστους εἰσὶν ὀργιμέναι τῶν ζωῶν.

37. οἷς οἱ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. There is a tacit antithesis between οἱ πολλοὶ and οἱ ιατροὶ and οἱ φυσικοὶ, 40. In reference to the question of season, which is a very simple one, we need not have recourse to the opinion of learned men; the verdict of the many will suffice: cp. Top. 2. 2. 110 a 19, ὄψιν ὄγιενων μὲν ῥητόν τὸ ποιητικὸν ὄγιεια, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν πότερον δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ποιητικὸν ὄγιεια ἃ ὦ, οὐκετί ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ κλητέον ἄλλ' ὡς ὁ ιατρός. See vol. i. p. 187, note 1. The mention of οἱ πολλοὶ would seem to show that it was usual to marry in the winter throughout Greece and not merely in Attica. In ἀρίστωτες Aristotle probably refers to a custom or unwritten law. Pythagoras went further (Diog. Laert. 8. 9, καὶ περὶ ἄφροδισίων δὲ φθεῖν οὕτως: "ἁφροδίσια χειμῶνος ποιεσθαι, μή θέρεσιν φθειροπόρου δὲ καὶ ἱρος κονφότερα, βαρεά δὲ πάσαν ὥρην καὶ ἐς ὄγιειν οὐκ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι"; cp. Alcaeus, Fragm. 13, 39 with Bergk’s notes, and Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 32). ‘In 1876 Dr. Kulischer, in a paper in the Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, collected details of human pairing-seasons, as marked by festivals of plainly matrimonial intent, and brought forward still more distinct evidence from the statistics of births, which show maxima and minima pointing to two especial pairing-times, about New Year and in late spring. Dr. Westermarck’ [in his history of Human Marriage, Macmillan, 1891] ‘brings new evidence to bear on the subject’ (Prof. E. B. Tylor, Academy, Oct. 3, 1891).

38. τὴν συναυλίαν ταύτην, ‘this kind of dwelling together.’ Συναυλία in this sense is connected with αὐλή, not αὐλός, and is a very rare word, but Bekk. is no doubt wrong in following Lamb., who reads συνοισιαν. The word ὀμαυλία occurs in Aesch. Choeph. 599, ἔξυζοις δ᾽ ὀμαυλίας (‘wedded unions,’ Liddell and Scott), and Schn. points out that Plato (Laws 721 D) ‘caelibatum eodem modo μοσαυλίων vocavit.’ There were other kinds of συναυλία, e.g. those of ὁμέστιων and ὀμοτραπέζων, not ὀμοδεκτροί.

39. δεὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῶς ἤδη θεωρεῖν κ.τ.λ., ‘and the married couple also in turn’ (as well as the lawgiver, cp. 1334 b 33 and 1335 b 14) ‘should study the teaching of physicians and that of physical philosophers.’ For ἤδη see note on 1258 b 18: ἤδη here lends emphasis to a pronoun, as in that passage and often elsewhere (e.g. in 2. 8. 1268 b 21: 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 14: 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10). For θεωρεῖν τὰ παρὰ τῶν ιατρῶν λεγόμενα, cp. Metaph. M. I. 1076 a 12,
πρώτον τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων λεγόμενα θεωρητέων, and Meteor. 2. 9. 370 a 21, τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ βροτῆς καὶ ἀστραπῆς παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ταύτ' ἐστὶ, and see note on 1324 a 25.

41. οἱ τε γὰρ ἱστροὶ κ.τ.λ., 'for physicians state in an adequate way the favourable moments of the body [for the procreation of children].' Hesiod had recommended the time after a sacrificial feast (Op. et Dies 735,

μηδ' ἀπὸ δυσφήμου τάφου ἀπονοστήσαντα
σπερμαίνεις γενεήν, ἄλλ' άθανάτων ἀπὸ δαιτός),

but some were wholly against the time after a feast of any kind, even the ordinary διάτον, and among them was Epicurus (Plut. Sympnos. 3. 6: Usener, Epicurea, Fragm. 61, p. 117 sq.). Cp. Plato, Laws 674 B, Plut. Lycurg. c. 15, and Diog. Laert. 7. 18. We learn the opinion of the Athenian physician Mnesitheus (b. c. 400–350?) from Athen. Deipn. 357 c, τὸ δὲ τῶν μαθητῶν γένος, οἷα πουλυτόδων τε καὶ σηπιῶν καὶ τῶν τουτών, τὴν μὲν σύρκα δύσπεπτον ἐχει διό καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδισιασμὸν ἀρμόττουσιν. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶ πνευματῶδες, ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀφροδισιασμῶν καρδὸς πνευματῶδους προσδείτω διαθέσεως (cp. De Part. An. 4. 10. 689 a 29 sqq.). As to the dawn of day, see Aristoph. Lysistr. 966 Didot.


2. ποιῶν δὲ τινῶν κ.τ.λ. Here the question announced for consideration in 1334 b 31 is taken up, so far at least as relates to the body. Plato had already said something on the subject in Laws 775 B sqq.: cp. 779 D sqq. The view which prevailed at Sparta may be gathered from Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 4, ταῖς δ' ἐλευ-θέραις μέγιστον νομίσας (ὁ Λυκοῦργος) εἶναι τὴν τεκνοποίαν πρῶτον μὲν σωματικῶς έταξάν οὐδὲν ἤπτων τὸ δήλον τοῦ ἄρρενου φύλου ἐπειτα δὲ δράμου καὶ λαχίσου, ὄσπερ καὶ τοὺς ἀνδράσις, αὐτοῦ καὶ ταῖς θηλείαις ἁγνᾶς πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἑποίησε, νομίζου ἢ ἀμφοτέρων ἴσχυρὰν καὶ τὰ ἔγχυμα ἔρρω-

3. ἐπιστήμαςι μὲν κ.τ.λ. For the case of ἐπιστήμαςι, see note on 1275 a 16. Subjects often receive only a hasty consideration in the Fourth Book, a fuller treatment of them later on being promised: see vol. i. p. 296. What Aristotle means by ἐπιστήμαςι μᾶλλον (sc. τῶν λόγων, cp. Peri Ἑοῖς καὶ ὀμάντου 6. 470 b 5), we see from c. 17. 1336 b 25, ύπερον δ' ἐπιστήμαςις δεὶ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, ἐτη μὴ δεὶ πρῶτον ἐτη δεὶ διαπορήςας, καὶ πῶς δεὶ. Ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας, perhaps 'in the inquiries respecting the management of children,' rather than 'in the inquiries respecting the education of children,' which is the rendering of Sepulv., Vict., Lamb., and Liddell and Scott. Παιδονομία is used in a different sense in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 39 and 1323 a 4. It seems strange that Aristotle should intend to treat the question παιών τινῶν κ.τ.λ. in an inquiry respecting the management of children. He apparently designed to include a discussion of the subject in the Politics; no such discussion, however, finds a place in the work as we have it (for other cases of the same thing, see vol. ii. p. xxvii).

5. τίπω δε ἰκανὸν εἶπειν καὶ νῦν, 'but one should now also say what is adequate in outline.' Sus. inserts δεὶ after ἰκανόν, but, as he himself suggests in Sus.1, Addenda, p. lxiv, it seems likely that δεὶ is to be supplied here from λεκτέων, 4: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 3 sqq., where δεὶ must apparently be supplied with ύπάρχειν and δεὶ with τάττειν. Bonitz does not refer to the passage before us in Ind. 168 a 54 sqq., where he considers one or two other cases in which δεὶ may be thought to be omitted. Aristotle inherits the expression τίπω from Plato, in whose writings it occurs frequently. Α τίπως is the outline or περιγραφή (cp. Laws 876 D, περιγραφήν τε καὶ τοὺς τίπους τῶν τιμωρίων εἴπόντας) which an artist draws before filling in his picture: see note on 1263 a 31.

οὗτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 26, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἑπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τούτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπέιν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείον οὔτε ἑλάττω δεὶ ποιεῖν ὁδὸν ῥαθυμεῖν, ἄλλα τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος. As to ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἔξω, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10, ἀθλητικὴν ἔξω, Xenophon, Fragm. 2 Bergk, Eurip. Fragm. 284, and Plato, Rep. 403 E—407 E, where Stallbaum compares Plut. Philopoemen c. 3. What Plato objects to in athletes, however, is their sleepiness and inability to stand the rapid changes of diet which are inseparable from a soldier's life, whereas Aristotle rather objects to the tendencies impressed on their constitution by severe toil of one monotonous kind. For the order of the words in 5—8, see note on 1327 a 4.
6. *πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐεξίαν, 'with a view to the kind of bodily fitness that is useful to a citizen': cp. Xen. Oecon. i. 13.13. *Εὐεξία differs from strength, and it also differs from health; it is the business of a gymnastic trainer to produce *εὐεξία, just as it is the business of a physician to produce health (Top. 5. 7. 137 a 3 sqq.). But the *εὐεξία which Aristotle speaks of here is not gymnastic *εὐεξία, but the *εὐεξία which makes a man an efficient citizen, fit in body to bear the labours which fall to the lot of soldiers and citizens.


7. *κακοποιητική, 'unfit for labour,' 'labouring ill,' like κακόπτων, 'breathing ill,' or κακοδίκαστος, 'dying ill.'

8. *πεπονθμένην μὲν ὁδῷ κ.τ.λ. Ὅδῳ here contains an inference from what precedes, as in i. 1. 1252 a 7 (see note on that passage). Πόνος is the source of *εὐεξία (Phys. 2. 3. 195 a 8 sqq.: Metaph. Δ. 2. 1013 b 9 sq.: cp. Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 23 sqq.). Compare what Atalanta is made to say in Eurip. Fragm. 529,

ei δ’ εἰς γάμους ἠλθομ’, ο μὴ τύχοι, ποτέ, τῶν ἐν δόμοισι ἠμερευνοῦσον ἄει ἠλθτίον’ ἄν τέκομι δόμαισιν τέκναι· ἐκ γὰρ πατρός καὶ μητρὸς ὅτις ἐκπονεῖ σκληρὸς διάκτας οἱ γόνιοι βελτίωνες.

But Atalanta’s training had been that of a huntress, not that of an athlete. The toils which Aristotle would recommend to married women would, however, rather be the light and varied toils of the mistress of a household, as to which we learn much from the advice given by Ischomachus to his wife in Xen. Oecon. c. 10. 10 sq. For πόνους μὴ βιαίοις, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40, τὴν βίαιον τροφήν καὶ τούς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους.

9. *πρὸς ἐνα μάνον, sc. πόνον (Ridgeway and Sus.).

11. *ὁμοιος δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and these physical characteristics should be possessed alike by men and women,' so that women no less than men should ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν σωμάτων. (Ταύτα is in the plural because the characteristics are many.) Aristotle’s language is very similar to that of Plato in Laws 804 D, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ δὴ καὶ περὶ θηλείων ὁ μὲν
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έμως νόμος ἄν εἴτε πάντα, διασπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄρρενων, ἵστα καὶ τάς θηλείας ἀνείπεν δεῖν, but Plato goes much further both in Rep. 451 C—457 B and in Laws 804 C—806 C than Aristotle does here.

12. χρῆ δὲ κ.τ.λ. ‘Pregnant women also,’ as well as those marrying. Ἐγκύμων is the Attic word rather than ἔγκulos. Aristotle here follows in the track of Lycurgus and Plato: cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 3, αὐτίκα γὰρ περὶ τεκνοποιίας, ἵνα εἴ ἄρξη ἄρξομαι, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὸς μελλοῦσας τίκτειν καὶ καλῶς δοκοῦσας κόρας παιδεύεσθαι καὶ σίτῳ ἢ ἀνυστόν μετρωτάτῳ τρέψουσι καὶ ὅψω ἡ δυνατὸν μικροτάτῳ οἴνῳ γε μή ἢ πάμπαν ἄπεχομένας ἢ ἴδαρεῖ χρωμένας διάγωνοι, whereas Lycurgus ordered a different course, and Plato, Laws 788 D sqq. and 789 D, βούλευεθε ἀμα γέλωτε φράζωμεν, τιεῖτες νόμους, τὴν μὲν κύουσαν περιπατεῖν, τὸ γενόμενον δὲ πλάσσειν τε οἰνὸν κήρυν, ἢσι ἐγραφάν, καὶ μέχρι δυόν ἐτῶν σπαργανών. Not only would the unborn child profit by the exercise taken by the mother, but the mother herself would secure an easier delivery (De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 30 sqq.).

14. τοῦτο δὲ βράδιον τῷ νομοθετή ποίησαι, i. e. to secure that pregnant women shall not take little food and exercise.

προσσαζαντί κ.τ.λ. Τινά is of course to be taken with πορείαν. Aristotle here perhaps takes a hint from Plato, who in Laws 833 B had made a temple the goal of a foot-race: cp. also Laws 789 E. For ἐνώς τῶν εἰληξότων τήν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμῆν, where ἡ γένεσις = ‘partus’ (Bon. Ind. 149 a 3 sqq.), cp. Plato, Phileb. 61 B, έτει διώκοντος έτει ἦν υπερ τε &πον ταύτην τήν τιμήν εἰληξε τῆς συγκράσεως. Notwithstanding the gender of τῶν εἰληξότων, the gods referred to are no doubt Eileithyia (Hom. Il. 11. 270 sqq.: Paus. 8. 32. 4: Theocr. 17. 60 sqq.) and Artemis (Plato, Theaet. 149 B, αἰτιάν δὲ γε τοῦτον φαίον εἶναι τὴν Ἀρτέμιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὕσα τὴν νομίμην εἰληξε): perhaps also Demeter Calligeneia (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 56. 19) and at Athens the Τριποτόπορες (Phanodem. Fragm. 4: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 367). The temples of Eileithyia in the Peloponnesus were often just outside the city-gate (see note on 1331 a 26). Ἀποδερπασθαῖν, from ἀποδερπασθαίν, ‘to honour zealously’ or ‘completely’: cp. ἀποβάπτεσθαι (c. 17. 1336 a 16), ἀφιλάσκεσθαι (Plato, Laws 873 A), ἀποδέρωσθαι, and ἀποδειρεῖν. A daily offering at a temple would be an indication of zealous worship: cp. Plut. Nic. c. 4, σφόδρα γὰρ ἦν ὁ Νίκαιος τῶν ἐκπεπληγμένων τὰ δαμάνα καὶ θεωσμῷ προσκείμενος, διὸ φήσει Θουκιδίδης, εἶ δὲ τινὶ τῶν Πασιφώντων διαλόγιων γέγραπται, ὅτι καθ’ ἡμέραν εἴην τοῖς θεοῖς.

16. τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν κ.τ.λ. What is the construction of τὴν
delta

18. *apolaivonta...fainetai,* 'evidently are influenced by.'

19. *osper...tou...genni...* Cp. De Gen. An. 2. 4. 740 a 24, 25, 26, 27, and 3. 3. 754 b 1 are referred to.

peri *de...apodetheseus...* 'and with respect to the exposure or rearing of children, let there be a law that defective offspring shall not be reared, but that offspring shall not be exposed on the ground.
of an excessive number of children [as distinguished from that of imperfection], in case the customs of the State, as regulated by the lawgiver’ (literally, ‘the ordering of the customs’), ‘are opposed to an excessive number, for the amount of reproductive intercourse should be fixed, and if any parents have offspring in consequence of intercourse taking place beyond that limit, abortion should be produced before sensation and life develope in the embryo, for that which is holy in this matter will be marked off from that which is not by the absence or presence of sensation and life.’ See on this passage vol. i. p. 187 and notes 2 and 3. In Greece the poor were often unwilling to rear children, especially daughters: cp. Plut. De Amore Prolis c. 5, οἱ μὲν γὰρ πένητες οὐ τρέφουσι τέκνα, φοβούμενοι μὴ κ.τ.λ., and Poseidipp. 'Ερμαφρόδιτος Fragm. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 516),

υίον τρέφει πᾶς κἂν πένης τις ἃν τύχῃ,
θυγατέρα δ' ἐκτίθησι κἂν ἦ πλούσιος.

The Greeks noticed with surprise that in Egypt all children born were reared (Aristot. Fragm. 258. ι525 a 37 sqq.: Strabo, p. 824). In Aristotle’s ‘best State’ exposure would be resorted to only in the case of imperfectly developed offspring, or rather of offspring the imperfection of which was obvious at the moment of birth, for not all the kinds of imperfection noticed above on 1335 a 13 would be traceable at birth. The rule at Sparta was not to rear anything ἄγεννῆς καὶ ἀμορφῆς (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Seneca says of Rome (De Ira i. 15), liberos quoque, si debiles monstrosisque editi sunt, mergimus. I know not whether ἀπόθεσις in the sense of the ‘exposing of children’ occurs elsewhere. For ἡ τάξει τῶν ἐθῶν, cp. τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων, 2. 10. 1271 b 29, 32. Κωλύη, sc. πλήθος τέκνων (so Vict. ‘in illis locis ubi lege interdictum est ne quis pater alat plures liberos quam lex patiatur’): cp. c. 17. 1336 a 35, οἱ κωλύνοιτε ἐν τοῖς νόμοις. Ὄρισθαι γὰρ δεῖ κ.τ.λ., cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 6 sq. and 2. 7. 1266 b 8 sqq. Ἰν ἐὰν δὲ τισὶ γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, supply τέκνα with γίγνηται from what precedes, and take παρὰ ταῦτα (sc. τὰ ὄρισμα) with συνδυασθέντων, ‘in consequence of intercourse in excess of the legal limit’ (so Vict. and Stahr), or possibly ‘in contravention of the legal limit’ (cp. Plato, Polit. 300 D, where παρὰ ταῦτα = παρὰ τοὺς νόμους). For the use of ταῦτα here see note on 1252 a 33. For the case of συνδυασθέντων (one might expect συνδυασθείσιν), Reiz (quoted by Schn.) compares Hom. Il. 16. 531, ὅτι οἱ ὁκεῖ ἠκουσε μέγας θεός εὐξαμένω, and Odys. 9. 256, ἦμιν δ'
24. πρὶν αἰσθῆσαι ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζωῆν. Cp. De Gen. An. 5. 1. 178 b 32, εἰ δὲ ἔστων ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν αἰσθήσιν τὸ ζῶον, καὶ τότε πρῶτὸν ἐστὶ ζῶον, ὅταν αἰσθήσις γένηται πρῶτον κ.τ.λ., and Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 α 16, τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται τῶν ζῴων δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώπους δὲ αἰσθήσεως ἡ νόσεως. Contrast the view of Democritus, De An. 1. 2. 404 α 9, διὸ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ὄρον εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοῆν, which was also that of Diogenes of Apollonia (Fragm. 5: Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 1. 254). Aristotle is here speaking not of life in general, but of animal life, for plants also live, and in their case ζωῆν λέγομεν τὴν δὲ αὐτοῦ τιμοθῆν τε καὶ αὐδήσειν καὶ φθίσιν (De An. 2. 1. 412 α 14): cp. De An. 3. 12. 434 α 27.

25. ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεὶ τὴν ἁμβλωσιν. Bonitz (Ind. 243 b 17) takes ἐμποιεῖσθαι here as middle, but the verb seems to be rarely used in this sense in the middle voice, and perhaps Sus. is right in taking it as passive. In the ‘oath of Hippocrates’ which was sworn by aspirants to medical practice one of the promises made is that the taker of the oath will not produce abortion. The thing, however, was no doubt occasionally done not only by physicians but by midwives (Plato, Theaet. 149 D).

tὸ γὰρ δόσιν κ.τ.λ. As to the use of ὁχὶ ὅσιος and ἀνύσιος of violations of duty to near relatives, see note on 1262 α 28. The abortion of an embryo in which sensation and life had already developed would involve a violation of this nature.

26. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘but since the commencement of the fit age for marriage for man and wife has been defined’ (in 1335 α 28 sqq.), ‘and it has been settled at what age they should begin their union.’ As to the μὲν solitarium in ἡ μὲν ἀρχῇ, see notes on 1262 α 6 and 1270 α 34. The suppressed clause here is ‘but the end of it has not.’

28. λειτουργεῖν πρὸς τεκνοποίαν, ‘to serve the State’ in relation to the begetting of children, according to Liddell and Scott (so also Mr. Welldon): Sus., on the other hand, translates ‘sich diesem Geschäfte zu widmen’ (‘to devote themselves to this task’), and Stahr ‘dem Kinderzeugen obzuliegen,’ following in the track of Lamb., ‘liberis procreandis operam dare.’ Perhaps, as Plato speaks in Rep. 460 E of τίκτειν τῇ πόλει καὶ γεννᾶι τῇ πόλει, the first of these two interpretations is to be preferred. For πρὸς, cp. 6 (4). 4.
NOTES.

1291 a 35, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν. Ἀρμόττει is used in association with χρὴ here as with δεῖ in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 14.

29. τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβύτερων ἔγγονα κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 23 and Plato, Rep. 459 B. By ὦ πρεσβύτεροι Aristotle here means ὦ παρηκμακτὲς, i.e. those over fifty or perhaps fifty-five: cp. Rhet. 2. 13. 1389 b 13, ὦ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακτὲς. In Probl. 38. 9. 967 b 13 sqq. ὦ πρεσβύτεροι are apparently identified with ὦ γηρᾶσκοντες. See notes on 1329 a 13 and 1321 a 22. By ὦ γηρᾶσκοτές Aristotle may probably mean men over sixty, or sixty-five. Membership of the Lacedaemonian γερᾶσσα was confined to men who had passed their sixtieth year. When Aristotle says that the children of aged fathers are ἀσθενεῖς, he perhaps means more than that they are weak in body. ὦ ἀσθενεῖς are specially subject to emotion (see note on 1342 a 11).

32. διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμήν, sc. ὀρίσθω ὁ χρόνος τῆς τεκνοποιίας: so Lamb. 'quare id tempus praefiniatur, in quo mens maxime viget ac floret,' Coray, and others. Aristotle is speaking of the mental prime of the husband, not the wife. The bodily prime of a man falls between thirty and thirty-five (see above on 1335 a 28).

33. τῶν ποιητῶν τινές. Solon (Fragm. 27) is referred to. He however places the mental prime between forty-two and fifty-six. There is a further reference to these poets in c. 17. 1336 b 40 sqq.

35. ὡστε τέτταρον κ.τ.λ. Plato also in the Republic (460 E) closes the period of τεκνοποιία for the man at fifty-five, adding that in his case the mental and bodily prime lies between twenty-five and fifty-five. Sir Nicholas Bacon (born in 1509) was fifty-two years of age when his famous son Francis was born to him in 1561. Lord Chatham was fifty-one when William Pitt was born to him. Sir John Herschel (born in 1792) was born when his father Sir William Herschel (born in 1738) was fifty-four years of age. How many other great men have had fathers over fifty at the time of their birth, I am unable to say. For τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερὰν γεννήσεως, cp. Plato, Rep. 461 C, μηδὲ εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κύμα μηδὲ γ' ἓν.

37. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν κ.τ.λ. Compare Plato, Rep. 461 B sqq., where Plato does not impose this restriction on the intercourse of those over the legal age, if only they take care that no offspring shall see the light or, supposing it does, shall live.

ἄγγελας χάριν. Cp. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 8 sqq., 726 a 22. and 5. 3. 783 b 29 sq., and Probl. 4. 29. 880 a 22 sqq. See also

ἵ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύτης αἰτία, such as εἰδεῖα, which is often mentioned in conjunction with ὑγεία, e. g. in Phys. 7. 3. 246 b 4 : Plato, Rep. 559 A, Protag. 354 B. Cp. Laws 708 B, τισὶν ἄλλοις τοιούτοις παθήμασιν.

38. φαίνεσθαι δει ποιομένους τὴν ὀμιλίαν, 'ought manifestly to resort to the intercourse.'

περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον, sc. ὀμιλίας, 'but with respect to the intercourse of a husband with another woman than his wife, or of a wife with another man than her husband.' Aristotle has before him here Plato, Laws 784 E, ὅταν δὲ δὴ πιάδας γεννήσωμαι κατὰ νόμους, ἐὰν ἄλλοτρια τις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κοινων. γυναικὴ ἢ γυνὴ ἄνδρι, ἐὰν μὲν παιδοσοιμόμενος ἦτι, τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιζήμια αὐτοῖς ἔστω, καθάπερ τούτο ἐτὶ γενναμένοις ἐνμακαί μετὰ δὲ ταύτα ὃ μὲν σωφρονόν καὶ σωφρονοῦσα εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐστο πάντα εὐθάλους, ὃ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἐναντίον τιμᾶσθω, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀτίμαζέσθω, and 841 C sqq. Both Aristotle and Plato (in Laws 841 C sqq. at any rate, μὴ λαυθάνων ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναίκας πάσας) seem to confine themselves to the prohibition of unconcealed adultery. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 40. The writer of the First Book of the Oeconomics (c. 4. 1344 a 8-13) appears to go further. Contrast with all this the occasional permission to Spartan wives of intercourse with other men than their husbands (Plut. Lycurg. c. 15).

39. ἀπλῶς, 'broadly,' 'at any time,' in contradistinction to περὶ τῶν χρόνων τῶν τῆς τεκνοποιήσεως : cp. Anal. Pr. 1. 15. 34 b 7, δει δὲ λαυθάνειν τὸ παινί ὑπάρχου μὴ κατὰ χρόνων ὀρίσασθαι, οἷον νῦν ἢ ἐν τῶι τῷ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς.

40. ἀπτώμενον φαίνεσθαι, 'openly to touch': cp. Plato, Laws 816 E, μηδὲ τινα μανθάνοντα αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι φιλερόν τὸν ἑλευθέρων. Plato had already used the word ἀπτεσθαι in Laws 841 D, μηθενός ἀπτεσθαι τῶν γεναιῶν Ἵμα καὶ ἑλευθέρων, and this is no doubt one of the passages which Aristotle has before him here. Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares Probl. 4. 29. 880 a 28 sq.

μηθαμῇ μηθαμῶς occurs in Plato, Laws 777 E, and μηθαμῶς μηθαμῇ in Laws 820 B, but I know not whether μηθαμῇ μηθαμῶς occurs elsewhere in Aristotle's writings. The Index Aristotelicus omits the phrase, and indeed by some error the word μηθαμῶς. Πάντη
\[ \pi\varepsilon\upsilon\rho\sigma\varsigma \] is a phrase frequently employed by Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s.v. \[ \pi\upsilon\varepsilon\nu\tau\alpha\nu \]).

\[ \delta\tau\alpha\nu \varepsilon \varsigma \kappa\alpha\iota \pi\rho\sigma\sigma\alpha\gamma\acute{o}\rho\rho\epsilon\upsilon\eta\acute{t} \pi\acute{o}\acute{s}i\varsigma. \] Ka\i here probably means ‘or,’ as in 2. 3. 1262 a 8 (see notes on 1262 a 6 and 1303 a 20). The word \[ \pi\acute{o}\acute{s}i\varsigma \] is used here and in 1. 3. 1253 b 6 by Aristotle, but it is a poetical word, seldom used in prose. On \[ \pi\rho\sigma\sigma\alpha\gamma\rho\rho\epsilon\upsilon\eta\acute{t} \], see Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s.v. \[ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\rho\rho\epsilon\upsilon\omega. \]

C. 17. 3 sqq. Aristotle says little in this chapter which had not already been said by Plato, and throughout the whole of it he seems to write with the Seventh Book of the Laws before him, but he brings together, and thus makes more effective, what Plato had said in a scattered and often an incidental way. He sometimes differs from Plato; thus he is for rearing children under seven to a greater extent at home than Plato had proposed to do, he will not have their crying restrained, etc. In recommending, again, that children should be habituated from their earliest infancy to bear heat and cold, he goes beyond anything contemplated by Plato or practised at Sparta (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 4) or in Crete (Ephor. Fragm. 64: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 250), for neither the Spartans nor the Cretans seem to have begun this habituation in babyhood, and Plato speaks of \[ \epsilon\kappa \pi\alpha\beta\omega\nu \] (Rep. 403 C), not, like Aristotle, of \[ \epsilon\kappa \mu\kappa\rho\rho\omega\nu \pi\alpha\beta\omega\nu \], when he refers to the subject (Rep. 404 A); it is rather from some barbarian races, such as the Celts, that Aristotle learns this lesson, as indeed he himself tells us. He keeps the same end in view in his rules as to the rearing of children as he does in his rules as to marriage; he seeks in both to secure that the children shall be well-grown in body and sound in mind and likely to make good soldiers and citizens in after-years. Rearing comes first, covering the whole period up to seven years of age, and then comes education (c. 17. 1336 b 37 sqq.). Aristotle confines himself during the first two or three years of life to studying the physical development of the child in accordance with the principle laid down in c. 15. 1334 b 25 sqq., but after that age he pays attention to the development not only of the body, but of the \[ \delta\rho\epsilon\zeta\iota\varsigma \] and character. Till seven the children must necessarily in his opinion be reared at home, and consequentl must be more or less in the company of slaves, and he evidently fears that if they are much in the company of slaves at this impressionable time —the age at which permanent tastes are acquired, \[ \pi\varepsilon\upsilon\tau\alpha \gamma\acute{\alpha}p \sigma\tau\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\rho\gamma\gamma\rho\mu\epsilon\nu \tau\alpha \pi\acute{r}\omega\tau\alpha \mu\acute{a}\lambda\lambda\omicron \] (1336 b 33)—they may acquire a taint of
illiberal feeling and indecency of which it will not be easy to rid them in later life. This leads him to pay special attention to the years from two or three to seven.

Γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle reproduces the turn of the opening sentences of the Seventh Book of the Laws (788 A, γενομένων δὲ παιδῶν ἀρρένων καὶ θηλείων τροφὴν μὲν πον καὶ παιδείαν τὸ μετὰ ταύτα λέγειν ὀρθότατ' ἄν γίγνοις ἣµῖν). Δεῖ must be supplied with οἴεσθαι: Aristotle forgets that he has not used the word since c. 16. 1335 b 38, and that the imperatives ἐστώ (39) and ζημιοῦσθω (1336 a 1), which however contain in them much of the force of δεῖ, have intervened. Μεγάλην εἶναι διαφοράν, 'is a highly important determining influence one way or the other': we expect rather μέγα διαφέρειν (cp. 1. 13. 1260 b 16 sqq.) or μεγάλην ποιοῖν διαφοράν (cp. De Part. An. 2. 4. 651 a 15) or μεγάλην ἔχειν διαφοράν (Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 22), but that which produces a difference is often termed a διαφορά, just as that which produces fear is sometimes termed φόβος. Compare the construction noticed in the note on 1264 a 39.

5. φαίνεται τε κ.τ.λ., 'and evidently, if we investigate the question by a reference to the lower animals and to the barbarian nations which make it their aim to introduce the habit of body suitable for war, food abounding in milk is most congenial to the bodies [of infants], and with little wine in it on account of the diseases which wine produces.' With τὴν πολεμικὴν ἔξω contrast 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10, ἅθλητικὴν ἔξω. For ἄγεω see critical note. Φαίνεσθαι without an infinitive or a participle may mean either 'to appear' or 'evidently to be' (Bon. Ind. 808 b 52 sqq.); here it probably means the latter. The nom. to φαίνεται is ἢ τοῦ γάλακτος πληθύνα (οἱ πληθύνασα) τροφὴ ἀνωτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. For διὰ, see note on 1328 a 19. The nations referred to are no doubt those mentioned in c. 2. 1324 b 9 sqq., and especially the Scythians: cp. Antiphanes, Μισοπόνηος (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 85),

ἐλ' οὐ σοφοὶ δὴτ' εἰσιν οἱ Σκύθαι σφόδρα;
οἱ γενομέναις εὐθέως τοῖς παιδίοις
ἀδίδασθι ὑπὸν καὶ βωοὶ πίνειν γάλα;

We read of the milk-drinking Hippemolgi in Hom. Il. 13. 5. The Greeks, however, mostly used goats' milk (Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 313); they used ewes' milk but little (ibid.), and they regarded the milk of cows (Plut. Pelop. c. 30) and asses (Plut. Demosth. c. 27) as food for invalids. It was on goats' milk that Jupiter was reared as an infant (Manil. Astron. 1. 364 sqq.).
Compare the rearing of the infant Camilla (Virg. Aen. i. 1. 570 sqq.). But Aristotle is recommending the use of milk not merely in the case of sucklings, who indeed must use it, but in the case of children generally, or at any rate of children under three or thereabouts. The great physical strength of the Suebi was due in part to their use of milk (Caesar, Bell. Gall. 4. 1. 8 sq.). In the early days of ancient Greece infants were sometimes given honey, not milk (Schol. Aristoph. Thesm. 506). Phoenix gave the infant Achilles wine (Hom. II. 9. 489), and it was probably commonly given to infants (Dio Chrys. Or. 4. 155 R, ἣ σὺ ὀιεῖς λέγεις αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ βασιλέα τρέφεσθαι, ἀκούερ ὑπὸ τίθης γάλακτι καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ στρίφυς;), but Hippocrates (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 542 Kühn) advises, καὶ φημὶ ἀιμείον εἶναι τοῖς παιδίσιοι τῶν οὐρὸν ὡς ὑδαρέστατον διώναι ἤσσον γαρ τὰς φλέβας ξυγκαίει καὶ συναναίνει: one source of stone in the bladder was thus removed. According to Hist. An. 7. 12. 588 a 3 sqq., wine sometimes produced convulsions in infants (βλαβερῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ πάθος καὶ ὁ οὐρός ὁ μέλαις μάλλον τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ ὁ μή ὕδαρης, καὶ τὰ πλέοστα τῶν φυτῶν: cp. De Sommo, 3. 457 a 14, διὸ τοῖς παιδίσιοι οὐ συμφέρουσιν οἱ οὐροὶ οὐδὲ τοῖς τίθισι (διαφέρει γὰρ ἤσσος οὐδὲν αὐτὰ πίνειν ἢ τὰς τίθισας), ἀλλὰ δὲι πίνειν ὑδαρῆ καὶ διόγνον πνευματόδες γαρ ὁ οὐρός, καὶ τοῦτον μάλλον ὁ μέλαις). Compare also Plato, Laws 666 A and 672 B (together with Aristot. Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 19), and Athen. Deipn. 429 b.

8. έτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and further it is of advantage to have all the movements made [of the bodies of infants] that it is possible to have made in the case of creatures so young.’ Τηλικούτων I take to be in the genitive after ὅσα κυνήσεις. Ποιεῖσθαι is to be supplied with συμφέρει. Aristotle has before him Plato, Theaet. 153 A, 153 B, τί δὲ, ἢ τῶν σομάτων ἐξει ὦς ὑπὸ ἤσσων καὶ ἀργών ὀδυλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνάσιων δὲ καὶ κυνήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ σώζεται; and also Laws 789 E, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς τροφὰς ἀναγκάζωμεν νόμῳ ἤσσων τὰ παιδία ἢ πρὸς ἄγροις ἢ πρὸς ἣρα ἢ πρὸς οἰκεῖου ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἡφέσας, μέχριτε ἂν οἰκών ὡσαθαν δυνατὰ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τότε διευλαθομένως, έτι νέον οὖν μὴ τῇ βίᾳ ἤπειροι ὅπειροι στρέφεται τὰ κάλα, ἐπιστευόντας ἢ πρὸς τὰ νόμημα τούτο τὸ γενόμεναν; Συμφέρει, not merely πρὸς τὰς τούτων σομάτων ὀδοντά, as in 4, but probably also πρὸς τὴν ἀδήσησιν (cp. 34 sqq.); perhaps indeed in other ways too (cp. Plato, Laws 790 C sqq.).

10. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μή διαστρέφεσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 8, διὰ δὲ τὸ κυνείσθαι θραίνεται μάλλον: εὐϑαναστὸν γαρ τὸ νεών διὰ τὴν ἀσθενείαν. Plato was so much alive to this danger that he
recommended the use of swathing-bands, it would seem, during the whole of the first two years of life (Laws 789 E), though at Sparta they were not used at all (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16) and the general Greek custom (according to Blümmer, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 80 sq.) probably was to drop them at the end of the fourth month. Plato had also advised with the same object in view that the unfortunate nurse should carry the child in her arms till he was three years old (see above on 8). Aristotle is silent as to all this; he apparently hopes to secure the same result by adopting from barbarian nations the use of certain ὑργάνα μηχανη, which kept the body of the infant from being twisted. What these instruments were, it is difficult to say. Vict. compares the 'serperastra’ of Varro, Ling. Lat. 9. 5, which were knee-splints or knee-bandages for straightening the crooked legs of children. As to the swaddling-clothes used, see Blümmer, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 79 sq.

12. τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. ητικούτων. συμφέρει δὲ κ.τ.λ. The Spartans and Cretans sought to make their youth indifferent to heat and cold, but they do not seem to have begun their discipline in this respect as early in life as Aristotle recommends (see above on 1336 a 3 sqq.). As to its importance, see 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 22 sqq. and Fragm. Trag. Gr. Adesp. 461 (Nauck).

15. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς κ.τ.λ. See Göttling’s note, and that of Eaton, who adds references to Galen Περὶ Ὑγειεῖων, 1. 10 (vol. vi. p. 51 Kühn), Strabo, p. 165, where we read of the Iberian women, ἐν τε τοῖς ἔργοις πολλάκις αὐτὰ καὶ λοίσωσι καὶ σπαργανοῦσιν ἀποκλίνασαι πρὸς τί βέθρων, and Virg. Aen. 9. 603,

Durum ab stirpe genus, natos ad flumina primum
Deferimus, saevoque gelu duramus et undis.

See also the note of Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. p. 569, on the Greek proverb, ὁ Ῥήνος εὔχεξε τῶν νόδον, who quote Julian, Epist. 16. p. 383 D (cp. Or. 2. p. 81 D sq.), whence it appears that the dipping of the new-born babe in the Rhine was used as a test of its legitimacy, spurious offspring being held to sink and legitimate offspring to swim. They also refer to Valerius Flaccus, Argonaut. 6. 335, where we read of the Scythians on the Phasis,

Nunquam has iemies, haec saxa reliquam,
Martis agros, ubi iam saevo duravimus amne
Progeniem natosque rudes.

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They remark that neither Aristotle, who was, so far as they know, the first to refer to the custom, nor Galen says a word as to the use of the practice as a test of legitimacy. A few other references to a similar custom may be noted. Zeus was believed to have been dipped at his birth in the river Lusius, which flows through the Arcadian Gortyna and is the coldest of rivers (Paus. 8. 28). Thetis sought to make Achilles immortal by dipping him as an infant in the Styx, and the Styx was very cold (Hes. Theog. 785 sq.). 'The modern Beloochees plunge the new-born infant into a tub of snow-water' (Prof. Ridgeway, Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc. 2. 147). Compare also the proverb (Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 1189),

ἐν Παρίῳ ψυχρῶν μὲν ὑδῶρ, καλαὶ δὲ γυναίκες.

The Lacedaemonian practice was to bathe the infant after birth not in water, but in wine; this was held to be strengthening to healthy children (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Were all these customs connected with the wide-spread custom of infant baptism, which Mr. Whitley Stokes (Academy, Feb. 15, 1896) traces among the heathen Norsemen, the heathen Celts, two unconverted West African tribes, and lastly the Mexicans before the arrival of the Spaniards, referring also to the cases mentioned by Prof. Tylor in his Primitive Culture, third edition, vol. ii. pp. 430-433? Ἀποβάπτειν, 'to dip completely': see above on 1335 b 14, ἀποβαπτεῖαν.

17. τοῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Αὐτόποτα is a mere protection against cold, something much less elaborate than an ἰμάτιον. The Spartan youth were allowed an ἰμάτιον, though only one (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 4). Some modern physicians give very different advice. 'In infancy parents above all should not make the mistake of letting their infants be too thinly clad. . . . It was a monstrous mistake for parents to send out their children with bare necks and heads and bare legs. Children ought to be clothed from head to foot winter and summer' (Dr. Corfield, Address to Sanitary Institute, Times, Sept. 30, 1889).

18. πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Two interpretations of these words are possible. Lamb. translates, 'omnibus enim rebus quibus absuefseri possunt, statim ab ineunte aetate eos assuefacere melius est, dummodo sensim ac paulatim'; thus he takes πάντα to refer not to the beings which are to be habituated, but to the things to which they are to be habituated; and so Sus. 'zu Allem, wozu man Kinder überhaupt gewöhnen kann.' But it is also possible, and perhaps
simpler, to translate πάντα δ'α ε δυνατών εθιζην 'all things that are susceptible of habituation.' I am not sure whether I am right in inferring from the passages with which Bonitz (Ind. s. v. εθιζην) groups that before us that he takes the words in this sense. He refers, however, in the preceding line to Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 19—23 and Eth. Eud. 2. 2. 1220 b 1, where we learn that not all things are susceptible of habituation. The bodily habit of children, Aristotle goes on in 20 to tell us, is susceptible of habituation to cold. Μέν here, as often elsewhere (Bon. Ind. s. v.), 'non ei additum vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur'; it should have followed εὐθές δρχουμένων, not βέλτιον. 'Εκ προσαγωγής is 'frequent in Hippocrates' (Liddell and Scott) and a favourite expression with Aristotle, but it is apparently not used by Thucydides, or Xenophon, or Plato, or (in the sense at least in which it is used here) by the Attic Orators. Compare for the thought Hist. An. 6. 12. 567 a 5 sqq. and Xen. Cyrop. 6. 2. 29; and for the turn of the sentence De Part. An. 3. 14. 675 a 6, ὅστε διελείν μὲν δύναμαι, φαύλως δὲ διελείν.


21. τὴν πρῶτην, sc. ἡλικίαν, which must be supplied from 23. See note on 1281 a 26. The phrase occurs in Pindar, Nem. 9. 42 (ἐν ἡλικία πρῶτη), and in De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 19, ἐτε οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει σπέρμα οὔτ' ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἡλικίᾳ οὔτ' ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς ἀρωσίαις, but in a wider sense than in the passage before us, where it appears to refer to the first two or three years of life.

23. τὴν 5' ἐξομήνυν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle intended to say that the next period of life till five should be dealt with in a different manner, the child being now encouraged to play games, but his sentence breaks down in course of utterance, for Π1 Π4v. Bekk. are probably wrong in omitting δε, 26, which is needed to contrast δεὶ τοσάτης τυχχίνεσι κενήσεως with what immediately precedes. The accusative τὴν ἐξομήνυν ταύτης ἡλικίαν is thus left without anything to govern it: compare the position of the nominative ὑπομνηστευόμενος τις in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 14 sqq. For the thought, cp. Plato, Laws 793 E,
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τρέτει δὲ δὴ καὶ τετρατέτει καὶ πεντατέτει καὶ ἕτε ἐξετεί ἢθει ψυχής παιδιῶν δέον ἂν εἴη. For the child of six, however, Aristotle finds other occupation in 1336 b 35 sqq. Children under five are regarded by him as too young to be put to any study; it is not till seven that under his scheme of education children begin to learn what the gymnastic trainer and the παιδοτρίβης can teach them (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 6 sqq.), nor till after puberty apparently that they learn their letters (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.); among ourselves, on the contrary, to say nothing of the Kindergarten, children are taught their letters before five. The effect of hard physical labour in injuring growth is referred to in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10 sq. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 377 A, οὐ μαθάνεις, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοίς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τούτῳ δὲ ποιν, ὡς τὸ ὄλον εἰσέπν, ψεῦδος, ἐν δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ, πρώτερον δὲ μύθους πρὸς τὰ παιδία ἡ γυμνασίου χρώμεθα. Aristotle does not quite agree with the last sentence; he thinks that from two or three to five children should have nothing to do with γυμνασία involving ἀναγκαῖον πόνον, but he does not agree that they should have no γυμνασία at that age, but only stories. He provides a kind of gymnastic training for them in their pastimes and also in their διασώσεις καὶ λαυμβοί. He excludes γυμνασία involving ἀναγκαῖον πόνον because they check physical growth (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40 sqq.), and any checking of physical growth is especially out of place in the first five years of life, inasmuch as physical growth is the main business of these years; in fact, according to Plato, Laws 788 D, the human being grows in height during them as much as he does in the twenty succeeding years (ἢ πρώτη βλάστης παινῶς ζύφων μεγάλη καὶ πλήστη φύτει, διότι καὶ ἐρινν πολλοῖς παρέχει χρή γίγνεσθαι τὰ γ' ἀνθρώπων μήκη διπλασία ὅπο τέντε ἐτῶν ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἔσοιν ἔστειν αὐξανόμενα: cp. Aristot. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 23, εἰ ἐτεσί γὰρ πέντε σχεδόν ἐπί γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡμιν λαμβάνειν δοκεῖ τὸ σῶµα τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ γενομένου πάντως). For ὅταν διαφέσεις τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωμάτων, cp. Plato, Theaet. 153 B (quoted above on 1336 a 8).

27. ἢν, sc. κάνναν.

28. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς κ.τ.λ., 'and the pastimes also' (no less than the ἄλλα πράξεις) 'should be neither unbecoming for freemen nor laborious nor relaxed and effeminate.' Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 558 B, εἰ μὴ τε ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔχει, ὦποι ἂν γίνησθαι ἄνηρ ἀγάθος, εἰ μὴ ποῖς ὄν εὐθὺς παιζον ἐν καλοῖς καὶ ἐπιθετεία τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα. The pastimes of little boys in ancient
Greece were no doubt often faulty in the ways referred to by Aristotle. He has hitherto been concerned almost, if not quite, exclusively with the training of the body, which precedes that of the ὀρέξεις (c. 15. 1334 b 25 sqq.), but now he begins to provide for the training of the ὀρέξεις, and here, as in 1336 b 2 sqq., he seeks to exclude ἀναλειτουργία. Cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 19 sqq. Μήτε ἐπιπόνους, because toilsome games will check the growth of the body (cp. 25). Μήτε ἀνεμένας, Vict. 'neque remissas nimirum atque enervatas': for the contrast of ἐπιπόνους and ἀνεμένας, cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 33 sqq.

30. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just said by implication that the nature of the games which children over three should play is a matter to be attended to by those in authority, and now he adds the remark, 'Yes, and with regard to tales true and fictitious also,' etc. He here has before him Plato, Rep. 376 E, λόγων δὲ διδάξει εἴδος, τὸ μὲν ἄλληθε, ψευδός δὲ ἔτερον; Ναι. Παιδευτέιον δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ' ἐν τοῖς ψευδέσιν; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἐφι, πῶς λέγεις. Οὐ μανθάνεις, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοὺς παιδίους μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δὲ που, ὡς τὸ ὀλὸν εἶπεν, ψευδός, ἐνι δὲ καὶ ἄληθῆ: cp. Phaedo 61 B, where Stallbaum remarks, 'tenendum est λόγων esse vocabulum generis atque significarequamcumque orationem et narrationem, sive veram sive fictam; sed interdum, ubi opponitur μύθος, de narratione vera usurpari solet.' Λόγος is thus used in opposition to μύθος in Laws 872 D, Gorg. 523 A, Protag. 320 C, Tim. 26 E. It is probable therefore that περὶ λόγων καὶ μύθων in the passage before us means 'with regard to tales true and fictitious' (Sus. 'Erzählungen und Märchen'), though it should be noted that Vahlen (Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, i. 34) does not take this view and regards λόγων and μύθων here as synonymous, no less than in Poet. 5. 1449 b 8, where he interprets 'λόγων id est μύθων.' Aristotle is as careful as Plato (Rep. 377 B sqq., 381 E) not to leave it to the uncontrolled discretion of mothers and nurses what tales are told to children, but his object seems to be to exclude tales which do not prepare the way for the pursuits of after-life—tales simply frivolous and amusing, for instance, or unsuitable to future soldiers and citizens—rather than tales giving a false impression of the gods, which were those specially objected to by Plato. Does Aristotle intend any kind of religious instruction to be conveyed through these λόγων καὶ μύθων? If not, he does not seem to provide for any religious element in the education of youth.
32. πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'all the things we have mentioned,' παιδιᾷ, λόγου, μιδοῦ.

33. διὸ τὰς παιδιὰς κ.τ.λ. This is based on Plato, Laws 643 B, a passage which is probably present to Aristotle's mind in Poet. 4. 1448 b 5, τὸ τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφωνον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παιδιῶν ἑστὶ, καὶ τούτω διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μαθητικώτατον ἐστὶ καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις πνεύται διὰ μυθίσεως τὰς πρῶτας: cp. also Rep. 395 C. The Cretan lawgiver had already studied this (Ephor. Fragm. 64: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 250, ὅστερον δὲ καὶ συντάξαντα τὴν κληθέναι νὰ αὐτοῦ πυρρίχην, ὅστε μυθὲ τὴν παιδιὰν ἁμορφών εἶναι τῶν πρὸς τῶν πόλεων χρησίμων), and a saying was ascribed to Anacharsis, παιζεῖν δεὶ, ὅσας σπουδάσης (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. i. 233: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 33). Achilles as a child of six years had according to Pindar (Nem. 3. 43 sqq.) 'made mighty deeds his play.' The Tencteri learnt in the sports of childhood to become the formidable cavalry they proved themselves (Tac. Germ. c. 32). See also vol. i. p. 350, note 3, and cp. Plut. Sympos. 2. 5. 2 ini. Aristotle wishes the pastimes even of infancy to be a preparation for the life of the soldier and the citizen. Many of the games played by Greek children were 'games of imitation': on this class of games see Becq de Fouquières, Jeux des Anciens, p. 63 sqq., where the games of 'the King,' 'the Judge,' and 'the Architect' are described. Children's mimicries of riding, driving, building, and nursing are familiar enough to ourselves. The ways of Themistocles and of Cato of Utica as children in the matter of games may be studied in Plut. Themist. c. 2 and Cato c. 1. The late Rev. C. Kingsley is said to have preached to an audience of chairs at four years old.

'Even the games to which the little Chinese are addicted are always impregnated with the mercantile spirit; they amuse themselves with keeping shop and opening little pawnbroking establishments, and familiarize themselves with the jargon, the tricks, and the frauds of tradesmen' (Huc's Chinese Empire, Eng. Trans., 2. 149). These are exactly the sort of games which Aristotle would wish his infant citizen not to play.

34. τὰς δὲ διατάσεις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes naturally enough from παιδιᾷ, one means of producing movement, to διατάσεις καὶ κλαυθμοῖ, another and a more involuntary means of doing so. He had said in 25 that ἀναγκαῖον πῶνοι must be avoided in the years from two or three to five because they interfere with the growth of the body, and now he tells us that the διατάσεις καὶ
κλαυθμοί which he declines to follow others in checking are not open to this objection, for they contribute to the growth of the body. Thus they are in place at this age, while the ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι are not. Plato is referred to in the words οἱ κολάσσετε εἰς τοῖς νόμοις: cp. Laws 791 E sqq., where he follows a Spartan tradition, for the nurses at Sparta sought to check fretfulness and crying in infants (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Plato is apparently speaking of new-born babes (791 D); and this might tempt us to transpose (with Sus. and Welldon) τάς δὲ διατάσεις, 34—διατεινόμενοι, 39, to after 20, τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν ἁσκησιν, so as to group 34—39 with the part of the chapter which deals with infants (though even there the paragraph would not be in place, for it ought to follow the discussion of κυήσεις and to come after either συμφέρει, 10, or ἀστραβές, 12), but the transition from παιδία to διατάσεις is natural and easy, and, as I have pointed out, there is an evident reference in 34—39 to 25, οὕτε πρὸς ἀναγκαῖος πόνον, δος μὴ τὴν αὐξήσιν ἐμποδίσωσιν. I am therefore against any transposition. For the thought, cp. Plut. Sympos. 6. 1. 1, αὐτῶν τε ἐκαστὸν αὐτοῦ γυμνασία καὶ κραυγαὶ καὶ ὀσά τῷ κινέιν αὐξεῖ τὸ θερμὸν, ἥδινοι φαγεῖν ποιεῖ καὶ προβημότερον. The word used by Plato in Laws 792 A is κλαυθμοναί, not κλαυθμοί: κλαυθμός is a poetic word, 'rare in Attic Prose' (Liddell and Scott).

37. γίνεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for they come to be in a way exercise for the body [and exercise makes the body grow]' : cp. Probl. 21. 14. 928 b 28, αἱ μὲν οὖν ἑξεῖς γυμναζόμεναι αὔξονται καὶ ἐπειδιδάσκον. Γίνεται is in the sing. by attraction to γυμνασία: cp. Thuc. 8. 9. 3, αὐτῶν δ' ἐγίνετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χιών οὐκ εἰσῆτε τὰ πραομόμενα, οἱ δὲ ὅλιγοι καὶ ξυνεδότες τὸ τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμενοι ποιοπλέων ἔχειν κ.τ.λ.

ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεσις κ.τ.λ., 'for it is the holding of the breath [which accompanies exertion] that produces strength in those who labour [and therefore serves the same end as exercise], and this' (i.e. the holding of the breath) 'happens to children also when they exert themselves in crying [no less than to men taking exercise].' With Bonitz (Ind. 190 a 31) I take δ' to refer to ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεσις only, and not to the whole of the preceding sentence. For the use of διατείνομαι here of straining which involves the holding of the breath, Bonitz compares Probl. 19. 15. 918 b 14, ἡ δὲ οἱ μὲν νόμοι ἁγαναστῶν ἤσαν, δὲν ἦδη μιμεῖσθαί δυναμένων καὶ διατείνομαι ἡ φόδη ἐγίνετο μακρὰ καὶ πολυειδής: cp. also Plut. Timol. c. 27, where διατείνομενος is used of one who shouts ὑπερφυὲι φωνῇ
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καὶ μείζον τῆς συνήθους. As to the effect of holding the breath in increasing strength, cp. De Sommo 2. 456 a 16, ἵσχὺν δὲ ποιεῖ ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεσις (compared by Bonitz, Ind. 606 a 45), De Gen. An. 2. 4. 737 b 35 sqq., and 4. 6. 775 a 37 sqq. Τὴν ἱσχὺν, not simply ἵσχὺν, cp. Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 25, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἠ킩ὴν ἐκάστοις τῷ κατὰ φύσιν οἴκειον, and De Part. An. 2. 7. 653 a 10, ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν υπνοῦ τοῖς ζῴοις τύπτο τὸ μάριον τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἐγκέφαλον.

40. τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν, ‘the way in which these children pass their time.’ Διαγωγή is here used in a wider sense than the special one in which (in 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29) it is denied to children. τὴν τ’ ἄλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἰδίωτα μετὰ δοῦλων ἐσται. The sentence looks as if it was intended to run τὴν τ’ ἄλλην καὶ τὴν μετὰ δοῦλων and was only finished as it stands by an afterthought. For the thought, compare the saying of Isocrates ([Plut.,] Decem Oratorum Vitae, 838 A.), πρὸς δὲ τῶν εἰσόντα πατέρα, ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλ’ ἡ ἀνθράποδον συνέπεμψε τῷ παιδίῳ. Τουγαροῦν (ἐφη) ἀπῆκοι δύο γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἔστε ἄνθρώποδα, and Antiphanes, Μισσόπόννης (Meinecke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 85). At Sparta παιδαγωγοὶ were dispensed with (see Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 16, and vol. i. p. 351, note 2). But Aristotle is speaking here of an earlier age than that at which boys were commonly provided with παιδαγωγοὶ—they would hardly have παιδαγωγοὶ till they went to school at seven—and he must be thinking rather of slave-nurses and of the slaves, male and female, about the house with whom the child was likely to come in contact. At Rome in its early days, according to Tac. Dial. de Orat. c. 28, ‘suis suique filius, ex casta parente natus, non in cella emptae nutricis sed gremio ac sinu matris educabatur.’ The mother of Leopardi kept her children as much as possible out of the company of servants (see Macmillan’s Magazine, vol. 56, p. 90). Aristotle is evidently afraid that children under seven may pick up ἀνελθερία and αἰσχρολογία from the slaves about them, male and female. It must have taken imported slaves generally some little time to learn to speak Greek: even those employed as nurses and παιδαγωγοὶ, though they would commonly speak better Greek than most slaves, probably often spoke the language imperfectly (cp. Plato, Lysis 223 A): still they would speak it well enough to be occasionally guilty of αἰσχρολογία.

41. ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἥλικιαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαίων οἰκοτενα τὴν τροφῆν ἔχειν. Sus. understands τὴν before μέχρι referring to Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq., where among other passages Eth. Nic.
10. 2. 1174 a 10, ὅτι εἰσὶ των αἱρετῶν καθ' αὐτῶς (ἡδωνι) διαφερονται τῷ εἴδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν, is quoted. See notes on 1330 b 10 and 1334 b 12 for other cases of the omission of the article. It was not till the age of seven that the Spartan boy was placed in an ἀγέλη (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16), and this was the age at which the Athenian boy began to resort to a γραμματισθής and a παιδοτρίβης ([Plato,] Axioch. 366 D sq.), and the Persian boy to a riding-master (Alcib. i. 121 E), though Herodotus (i. 136) makes Persian education begin at five. Plato, on the other hand, in the Laws (794) had brought children from three to six years old together for games at the village-temples.

2. εὐλογον ὁὖν κ.τ.λ. The meaning is that, as children under 1336 b. seven must be reared at home, where there are slaves and where illiberality of mind may easily be learnt, it is reasonable to expect that even at that early age they may acquire a taint of illiberality from what they see and hear. Αὐλευθερία is used here in a wide and popular sense, not in the narrow and technical sense of αὐλευθερία περὶ χρήματα in which it is discussed in Eth. Nic. 4. 1–3.

3. ὄλως μὲν ὁὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν ὁὖν is taken up by εἰν δὲ, 8, the sense being, 'we banish indecent language altogether from the State, but if we do not entirely succeed in accomplishing that, and any person should be found saying or doing anything that we prohibit, then' etc. For the intervening μάλιστα μὲν ὁὖν, 6, occurring by way of correction in the middle of a sentence, cp. Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 a 32, καὶ τὸν ἱπτω τῷ κρείττονι ἄρμασιντες, μάλιστα μὲν ὁὖν τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. Bonitz remarks (Ind. 540 b 55) 'Ὀλας μὲν ὁὖν—μάλιστα μὲν ὁὖν—ἐὰν δὲ non debetant tentare Susemihl.' Ὀλας goes with ἐξορίζειν, as it probably also does in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 9, τοὺς δ' ἀνατόμους ὀλος ἐξορίζειν. For the distance at which it stands from ἐξορίζειν see note on 1255 a 21. For ὁσπερ ἄλο τι ('more than anything else'), cp. 7 (5). 8. 1307 b 31. Aristotle passes on from ἀνελευθερία to ἀἰσχρολογία, because he regards ἀἰσχρολογία as a form of ἀνελευθερία (cp. 12, ἀνθραποδωδιάς χάριν). In ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ ἑξερεύσα ἠργον κ.τ.λ. he probably has before him a saying of Democritus recorded in [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis, c. 14, καὶ μέντοι καὶ τῆς ἀἰσχρολογίας ἀπατεών τοὺς νικεί, λόγος γὰρ ἑργαν σκιή κατὰ Δημοκρίτου. Compare what we read of the Persians in Hdt. i. 138, ἁσσα δὲ σφί ποιεῖν ὁὐκ ἔξεστι, ταῦτα οὖν ἠργα ἠργον ἔξεστι, and of Archytas in Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 19. The sons of the ὀμάτιοι of Cyrus in the Cyropaedia of Xenophon are described as brought up at his court ἀἰσχρῶν μὲν μηδὲν μὴτε ὀρώντες μήτε ἀκούοντες (Xen. Cyrop. 7. 5. 86). Some may ask why Aristotle
does not banish comedy, in which αἰσχρολογία was common, from the State. That he does not do so, we see from 1336 b 20. The reason is that those below a certain age will be forbidden to witness comedy, and that those above it will be protected from injury by the education they have received (1336 b 20 sqq.).

6. μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νεών κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 729 B.

9. As to ἀπηγορευμένων, see Liddell and Scott, and Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s. v. ἀγορεύω.

τῶν μὲν ἑλεύθερον μῆτω δὲ κατακλίσεως ἐξωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις. As to the age at which the young freeman was allowed to recline, instead of sitting, at meals, cp. 21 sqq. The age intended may be twenty-one (cp. 1336 b 37 sqq.). It was probably at this age that the young Spartan became a member of one of the φθίται (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 66. 2). Sus.² (Note 966: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 558), however, regards the change as occurring in the seventeenth year, when the youths, as he believes (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.), begin to have syssitia of their own, though he allows that, as they remain outside the general syssitia till twenty-one, κατάκλισις will not commence for them there till that age. Κατάκλισις is associated in 21 sq. with μέθη, and Plato in Laws 666 B will not allow any of his citizens to share in μέθη till forty, but it is not likely that Aristotle intended to be equally strict.

10. ἀττίμαις κολάζειν καὶ πληγαίς. Not with blows only, like a slave, but with indignities and blows combined—the former because the offender is a freeman (cp. Demosth. De Chersoneso, c. 51, ὅτι ἐστίν ἑλευθέροις μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ μεγάστα ἀνάγκη ἢ ὑπὲρ τῶν γεγο-μένων αἰσχύνη, καὶ μείζω ταύτης οὐκ οἷον ἦντιν ἀν έποίη τις δούλω δὲ πληγαί καὶ ὁ τῶν σώματος αἰκισμός, and c. Androt. c. 55), and the latter because he is under age (cp. Plato, Laws 700 C, πασὶ δὲ καὶ πανάγωγοις καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὀχλῷ, μᾶβδον κοσμούσης, ἢ ψυχήτησις ἐγίγνετο). We read in Laws 721 B of offenders who are to be mulcted χρήματι τε καὶ ἀττίμια. Freedmen of full age, on the other hand, were to be punished ἀττίμαις ἀνελεύθεροι, i.e. with indignities usually inflicted not on freemen but on slaves. There were ἀττίμαι not ἀνελεύθεροι, such as the withdrawal of political rights. In Laws 946 C we read of βάσανοι ἑλεύθεραι. Charondas had made use of humiliating punishments (Diod. 12. 16. 1). See on the subject Prof. Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, ed. 1, p. 116.

14. ἢ λόγους ἀσχήμονας, 'or indecent speeches from the stage.'
Iambi and comedy are evidently referred to (cp. 20 sqq.). Prof. W. Christ (Gesch. der griech. Litteratur, p. 167. 4) takes λόγοι here to mean 'dialogue,' comparing the expression λόγοι Σωκρατικοί for Socratic Dialogues (see also Bon. Ind. 433 b 3 sqq.), but Aristotle must have objected to indecent monologue as much as to indecent dialogue. In speaking of the class of mimes called παίγνια, Plutarch (Sympos. 7. 8. 4) remarks, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ (i.e. most of those who introduce παίγνια at banquets), καὶ γυναικῶν συγκατακειμένων καὶ παιδῶν ἀνήθων, ἐπιδείκνυται μιμήματα πραγμάτων καὶ λόγων ἀ πάσης μέθης ταραχώδετωρ τὰς ψυχὰς διατίθησιν.

ἐπιμελεῖς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. οὖν here contains an inference, as in c. 16. 1335 b 8 and in I. I. 1252 a 7.

τοῖς ἄρχοσι, not the paedonomi probably, but rather the astynomia and agronomi (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 18 sqq.).

15. μηδὲν μὴτε ἁγαλμα κ.τ.λ., 'that there is no image or picture representing indecent scenes' (Welldon).

τοιοῦτον, i.e. ἀσχημάνων. Pictures and statues representing indecent acts or scenes must evidently have been visible in Greek cities, especially, it would seem, in connexion with the gods in whose worship τωθσαμός was used. It is not probably to the familiar Hermae that Aristotle objects, but rather to pictures and statues representing such subjects as the drunkenness of Dionysus: as to these cp. Athen. Deipn. 428 c, οὐ χαλῶς δὲ οἱ πλάττοντες καὶ γράφοντες τῶν Διόνυσου, ητί δὲ οἱ ἁγιόνες ἐπὶ τῆς ἀμάξης διὰ μέσης τῆς ἀγάρας ωνωμένου ἐπιδέικνυται γὰρ τοῖς θεαταῖς ὅτι καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ κρείττων ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τοῦ γυνὸς τοῦ οὐδὲν ὑπομείνειν. Others perhaps represented the amours of Zeus.

16. εἰ μὴ παρὰ τις θεοὶ κ.τ.λ. As to this 'consecratediscurity,' see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 4, 108, note (Part 2, c. 29): C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 29. 3 (who refers to Paus. 7. 27. 10), 2. § 56. 14, and 2. § 57. 20: Toepffer, Attische Genealogie, p. 93 foot. Compare also Athen. Deipn. 622 a–d, and the unfavourable view expressed by Xenocrates, the contemporary head of the Academy, of the gods in whose worship τωθσαμός was resorted to (Plut. De Iside et Osiride, c. 26, ὁ δὲ Ἑβενκράτης καὶ τῶν ἕμερῶν τὰς ἀποφράδας καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν ὡςα πληγάς τινα ὧ κοπτοῦσι ὡς ὑπετείας ὡς ὑποστηριάς ὡς αἰσχρολογίαν ἔχουσιν, ὅτε θεῶν τίμας ὅτε δαιμόνων ὅτε ἄθικτες χρηστῶν, ἀλλὰ εἶναι φύσεις ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι μεγίλες μὲν καὶ κακογείρας, δυσταύωσας δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπάς, αἱ χάρισι τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τυγχάνουσι πρὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο χαίρον τρέπονται: cp. Plut. De Defect.
Orac. c. 14. 417 C). Among the gods to whom Aristotle here refers are Dionysus, Demeter, and Corê (C. F. Hermann ibid.). But other gods also were thus worshipped, for instance Apollo Aeglêtês in Anaphê (Conon, ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 186. p. 141 b 27 sqq. Bekk., εἰν 'Ανώφη τῇ νήσῳ ... ἱερῶν Ἀπάλλωνος αἰγήτου θύρων, εἰν φ' σὺν τωβασμῷ οἱ ἐπιχόριοι θώνουσι δ' οἴειν τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ.). Here the τωβασμός was addressed by the worshippers to each other in commemoration of the jests exchanged between Medea and her attendant women on the one side and the Argonauts on the other, when the Argo was driven by a tempest to Anaphê. Καὶ τῶν τωβασμῶν, 'scurrilous jeering also,' as well as indecent statues and pictures. Ὅ νόμος, probably an unwritten law, like that referred to in c. 12. 1331 a 26 sqq.

17. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κ.τ.λ., 'and in addition to this the law allows them to do honour to the gods on behalf both of themselves and of their wives and children.' Cp. Cato, De Re Rustica, c. 143, rem divinam (villica) ne faciat, neve mandet qui pro ea faciat, inußus domini aut dominae. Seico dominum pro tota familia rem divinam facere. A saying of Pythagoras recorded in Diod. 10. 9. 7 is in a somewhat similar spirit, διὶ ὁ αὐτὸς (i.e. Πυθαγόρας) ἀπεφάνετο τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχεσθαι δεῖν τὰ ἁγάθα τοὺς φρονίμους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφρῶνων· τοὺς γὰρ ἀνυνέτοις ἀγνοεῖν τι ποτὲ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ κατὰ ἄληθειαν ἁγαθῶν. In Laws 909 D Plato goes farther and confines sacrificing, as distinguished from prayer, to priests and priestesses, οῖς ἁγνεῖα τούτων ἑπιμελῆς. Τιμαλφεῖν (a poetical word, 'rare in Prose,' see Liddell and Scott) refers probably especially to sacrifices. For καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν, see critical note on 1330 b 31.

20. τοῖς δὲ νεώτεροις κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle goes on to protect the young against λόγους ἀσχήμονας (cp. 14). As to iambi, see Stallbaum's note on Plato, Laws 935 E, ποιητῇ δὴ κομψίας ἢ τινὸς ἱάμβων κ.τ.λ. Iambi are iambic verses, often abusive and indecent (cp. 35, ἡ μοθηρίαν ἢ δοσμένων), declaimed by actors at festivals of Dionysus in which the phallus was introduced (Poet. 4. 1449 a 9-13). It was from iambi of this kind that comedy took its rise (Poet. 4. 1448 b 24-1449 a 15, and esp. 24 sqq. and 1449 a 2 sqq.). Iambi, however, did not pass away on the rise of comedy; we hear, in fact, that they were particularly popular at Syracuse (Athen. Deipn. 181 c). Iambi and comedy had this in common that they dealt in ψόνος (cp. Hor. Carm. 1. 16. 2, criminosis iambis), hence they are often named together, e.g. in Plato, Laws 935 E.
Whether Aristotle includes under iambi mimes written in iambic verse, like those of Herondas, it is difficult to say. As to comedy, compare Plato’s views in Laws 816 D sqq. The satyr-play which was added at the close of a tragic trilogy often contained indecent passages, but it does not seem to have been open to so much objection as comedy (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 447), and it probably savoured less of ψύγος and διασέμεια. It appears to be certain that boys were present at representations both of tragedy and of comedy at Athens (A. Müller, Die griech. Bühnenalt. p. 292. i). The bigger boys were very fond of comedy and older lads of tragedy (Plato, Laws 658 D). As to νομοθετήτων see critical note. If it is the correct reading, oὖν ἰάμβων οὖτε καμάδιας θεάτας νομοθετήτων must apparently mean ‘we must not legislate that the young shall be [admissible as] spectators of either iambi or comedy.’

21. πρὶν ἡ τῆς ἥλικίας λάβων κ.τ.λ. See above on 9. For πρὶν ἡ with the aor. subj. without ἀν, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19 sqq. and other passages collected by Bonitz, Ind. 633 a 2 sqq. Kaissling (Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia, p. 54) points out that πρὶν ἡ with the aorist subjunctive is not here preceded by οὐ πρῶτερον, as it is in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19 sqq. and 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 17 sqq.

22. τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. iambi and comedy.

24. The Index Aristotelicus (668 b 30) gives no other instance of ποιεῖσθαι τῶν λόγων followed by a genitive (we expect περὶ τούτων, but compare for the absence of περὶ c. 10. 1330 a 22, 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 33 sq., and 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 36, αἱ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον εἰσὶ τῶν κοίνων), nor does it give any other instance of παραδρομὴ or εὖ παραδρομὴ (245 b 36). Εὖ παραδρομὴ seems to be a rare expression.

25. εἰτε μὴ δεί κ.τ.λ., sc. νομοθετῶν τοὺς νεωτέρους εἶναι θεάτας ἰάμβων καὶ καμάδιας. Διαπορισάντας here = διελθόντας τάς ἀπορίας, like διαπορούντας in 3. 4. 1276 b 36 (Bon. Ind. 187 b 11). Πῶς δεί, sc. τούτο νομοθετῶν, i.e. by what provisions of law the exclusion of the νεωτέρων will best be effected.

26. κατὰ δὲ τὸν παράντα καιρὸν κ.τ.λ., ‘but in relation to the present occasion we have touched on it only in the way in which it was necessary to touch on it.’ For the suppression of ‘only,’ see note on 1282 a 36. Compare also Meteor. 3. 4. 374 b 17, νῦν δ’ ὄσον ἀδάγηκ, τοσοῦτον περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν, and for κατὰ τὸν παράντα
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καρῶν, Rhet. ad Alex. 1. 1421 a 24, ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτως ὅμως παραπλεῖνιν νομίζω καλῶς ἡμῶν ἔχειν κατὰ τὸν ἑπάρχουτα καρῶν.

27. ἰσως γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for perhaps Theodorus, the actor of tragedy, said not ill that which has just been said.' γὰρ introduces an explanation why it is not necessary for Aristotle to say more; Theodorus, in fact, had by his remark done much to solve the problem and to indicate the true course. Camerarius, however, asks, not without reason (Interp. p. 332), 'Quod vero hoc dictum est? Factum enim magis expolitor histrionis. Nisi aliquis conicturam de eo capere dicto posse videatur. Aut libeat suspicari ista esse mutila.' Coray's note is, 'ἐλεγε τὸ παραπλήσιον τούτῳ τῷ περὶ τῶν παίδων. Τι δὲ ἐλεγε; τὸ οἰκειούσθεν τούς θεατάς ταῖς πρώταις ἀκοαῖς, ὥς φαίνεται εἰ τῶν ἐξής.' If ἐλεγε is to be retained, the passage should probably be explained as Coray explains it, but, as Sus.8 says, 'ἐλεγε hauδ sine causa offendit Camerarium.' The only substitute for it which has occurred to me is ἐλω ('gave not ill a practical solution of the question which has just been mentioned'). For ὁ τῆς τραγῳδιᾶς ὑποκρίτης, which is added to distinguish this Theodorus from others of the same name, cp. Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 417, ὑποκρίτης τραγ[ωδίας], Athen. Deipn. 407 d, ὑποκρίτης ὁ τῆς κωμῳδίας ποιητῆς (ἣν δὲ καὶ τραγῳδιάς), and Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 40, Θεοδώρου τοῦ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητοῦ ὑποκριμομένου τῆς Ἀερόπολης. As to Theodorus, see Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 523, and Sus.2, Note 968 (Sus.4, 1. p. 558), and cp. Rhet. 3. 2. 1404 b 22 sqq., where the naturalness and charm of his voice are dwelt upon. He was one of the best tragic actors of the time immediately before that of Aristotle. How could Theodorus avoid being preceded by other actors on the stage, if he did not always take the part, perhaps an insignificant one, to which the first speech of the tragedy was assigned? Richards asks, 'Did he insist, when plays were competing, on being protagonist in the first, so that no other protagonist might win over the audience before him? Or does the statement about him refer to occasions when actors only (not plays or choruses) were competing, and when perhaps only scenes or single speeches were recited? See Haigh's Attic Theatre, p. 58.' Demosthenes acted in much the same way as Theodorus did, when he insisted on being heard by Philip of Macedon first of the Athenian envoys (Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 108, φάσκων γὰρ νεώτατος εἶναι πάντων τὴν τάξιν τοῦ πρῶτος λέγειν οἷς ἄν ἐφι παραλιπέναι, οὐδ' ἐπιτρέψειν τινι (αἰστότομον εἰς ἐμέ) προκαταλαβώντα.
29. οὐδενὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Εἰσάγειν is commonly used of the poet or chorègus bringing the chorus on the stage (as in Aristoph. Acharn. 11, εἰσαγεί, ὥς Θέονι, τὸν χορόν), but here προεισάγειν is used with some freedom of the actors bringing on the stage the parts represented by them (W. Christ, Gesch. der griech. Litteratur, p. 171. 2).

30. ὃς οἰκειομένων κ.τ.λ., 'holding that the audience is made friendly to' (or 'won to the side of') 'what it hears first;' Liddell and Scott compare Thuc. 1. 36, δὲ μετὰ μεγάλων καιρῶν οἰκειούτα τε καὶ πολεμοῦτα. Οἰκειομένων is interpreted by στέργομεν, 33.

31. συμβαίνει δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and this same thing happens both in relation to dealings with men, [which is what Theodorus had in view,] and in relation to dealings with things.' For πρὸς, cp. 38, and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 3. For τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ὁμᾶς, cp. Eurip. Phoen. 1329 Bothe (1408 Dindorf), ὁμᾶς χθόνος.

32. πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρώτα μάλλον, 'for whatever we first have to do with, we like better than anything else,' so that if iambic and comedy are witnessed in youth, they will be among the things liked best. Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 378 D, ὅ γὰρ νέος οἶχ οἷός τε κρίνει· δὲ τί τε ὑπόνοια καὶ τῇ μή, ἄλλῃ δὲ τῷ τιμιοῦτος ὄν λάβῃ ἐν ταῖς δόξαις, δυσέκνυστά τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γένεσθαι· ὑπὸ δὲ ἵσως ἔνεκα περὶ παντὸς ποιητέων δὲ πρώτα ἀκούσων ὅ τι κάλλιστα μενικθολογημένα πρὸς ἄρετην ἀκούειν. Compare Hor. Epist. 1. 2. 69 and familiar sayings like 'on revient toujours à ses premiers amours' and 'the child is father of the man.' 'The Jesuits used to say, "Give me a child till he is seven years old, and I will make him what no one will unmake"' (Miss E. Welldon in the Cheltenham Ladies' College Magazine, No. 18, p. 179). We may also explain in this way the tendency of men, as they grow old, to become 'laudatores temporis acti.' On the other hand, there is truth in Hom. Odysseus 1. 351, τὴν γὰρ ἀοίδὴν μάλλον ἐπικλείον' ἀνθρωποι, ἦτοι ἀκούοντεσσα νεοτάτη ἀμφιτέληται.

33. διὸ δὲι κ.τ.λ. Ποιεῖν ξένα, 'to make strange and unknown,' in opposition to οἰκειομένων. 30. Pythagoras (ap. Aristox. Fragm. 20: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 279) shows a similar desire to keep the young from all knowledge of evil. It was in a somewhat different sense that Antisthenes said (Diog. Laert. 6. 12), τὰ πονηρὰ πάντα νόμισε ξένα.
34. Μάλιστα δ’ αὐτῶν ὅσα ἔχει ἡ μορφήριαν ἡ δυσμένειαν. As αὐτῶν=τῶν φαίλων, it is clear that in Aristotle’s view a thing might be φαίλων without possessing μορφήρια. Cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1148 b 2, μορφήρια μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταύτ’ ἐστι διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἰτετῶν ἐκατόν ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτό· φαίλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταί αὐτῶν εἰσίν αἱ ὑπερβολαί. We see from Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 a 34, διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μορφήρια καὶ διαψευδεῖσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχὰς, what a strong term μορφήρια is. Aristotle probably regards iambi and comedy as not free from elements of depravity and malignity. Δυσμένειαν, the reading of Π Bekk. (as to the rendering of Vet. Int. see critical note on 1336 b 35), seems to be perfectly right, though Sus. would read δυσγένεια in place of it. Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Laws 934 D—936 A, where iambi and comedy are connected with ἔχθρα, Ἀθλησμία, and κακηγορία, and Philib. 48 A—50 A, where envy is implied to be an ingredient in comedy, for envy is nearly related to δυσμένεια, the words φθόνος and δυσμένεια being conjoined in Plato, Rep. 500 C, Phaedr. 253 B, and Protag. 316 D. Compare also Rep. 395 Ε, κακηγοροῦντας τε καὶ κωμικοῦντας ἄλληλοις καὶ αὐθορολογοῦντας, and Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 22, ὁργὴ δὲ χάριτος καὶ χῶλος εὐμενείας καὶ τοῦ φιλανθρῶς καὶ φιλόφρονος τὸ δυσμένεις καὶ παρακτικῶν ἀπώστατο τῇ φύσει τέτακται· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ δυνάμεως, τὰ δὲ αὐθενείας ἐστὶ καὶ φαίλωντο. Plato does his best in the Laws (792 B, D, Ε) to secure that the child shall be εὔθυμος, ἴλεος, and εὐμενής, and it is in the same mood (Rep. 496 Ε) that he wishes men to close their life. This is the mood of the Olympian Gods (see above on 1332 a 9), and according to Plutarch (Pericl. c. 39) it was the εὐμενής ὕδος of Pericles that justified the application to him of the epithet ‘Οlympian.’

35. διελθόντων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Θεωροῦν means ‘spectators,’ not ‘auditories,’ as Sus. explains the word in this passage (Ind. s.v.). Aristotle gets the hint of what he here suggests from Plato, Rep. 466 Ε, ὡς κωνή στρατεύονται, καὶ πρὸς γε ἄξονι τῶν παιδῶν εἰς τῶν πόλεων ὅσοι ἄδροι, ἵν’ ὅπερ οἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν θεῶν ταῦτα, τὰ τελευητὰς δείησι δημιουργεῖν ... ἡ οὖκ ἕστησα τὰ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, οἷον τοὺς τῶν κεραμέων παιδάς, ὡς πολὺν χρόνον διακονοῦντες θεωροῦντες πρὸς ἀπτεθανὸς τοῦ κεραμεύειν; Plato, however, is speaking here of older boys than those whom Aristotle has in view, and war would of course not be one of the μαθήσεις to which Aristotle refers. These μαθήσεις include probably gymnastic and music, especially the former. Plato in the Laws (794 C) had sent boys of six to
teachers of riding and of the use of the bow, the javelin, and the sling; Aristotle sends boys at seven to the gymnastic trainer and the 

\[ \text{παιδοτριβής} \] (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 6 sqq.); of riding he says nothing.

37. \[ \text{διὸ} \varepsilon\iota\varepsilon\iota\nu\varepsilon \ ήλικίαι κ.τ.λ. \] At this point we pass from τροφή, or rearing, to παιδεία, or education strictly so called, which is evidently conceived as beginning at seven years of age. We shall find in the sequel that, in accordance with the announcement made here, puberty forms a turning-point in the educational course, for till puberty no studies find a place in it but gymnastic, and that of the less laborious type (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40), whereas after puberty other studies are to be taken in hand for three years, and then the severe kind of gymnastic is to be commenced (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.). That the age of twenty-one, like puberty, marks a crisis in the physiological development of the human being, we see from Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 16–33. The meaning of \[ \text{μετά} \] in 38, 39, is by no means clear, yet the commentators say nothing about it. Is Aristotle’s meaning this, that a break is to occur in the education at two epochs—at the close of the period from seven years of age to puberty and at the close of the period from puberty to twenty-one, or in other words at puberty and at twenty-one? If this is so, it is manifest that Aristotle did not intend his education to cease at twenty-one, a conclusion to which other considerations also point (see vol. i. p. 370 and p. 358, note 2, and note on 1333 b 3). He apparently devotes the years intervening between three years after puberty and twenty-one to the severer kind of gymnastic training (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.). At Athens things were arranged quite differently. Young Athenians were enrolled in the \[ \lambda\xiαρχικοῖς \ γραμματείοις \] and became citizens on the completion of the eighteenth year (‘Αθ. Πολ. c. 42: the seventeenth according to Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 197, 310, but see Mr. R. W. Macan in Class. Rev. 19. 199 sq.), though they spent the two following years in military training, garrison-duty, and field-service as \[ \text{περίπολοι} \], and therefore did not discharge any strictly political functions till two years later. Aristotle does not arrange for the performance of any military service before the age of twenty-one. For \[ \text{πρὸς} \] \[ \delta\iota \], ‘in relation to which,’ cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11, \[ \text{διήρηται} \mu\nu\varepsilon \ οὖ\nu \ \text{τὸ} \ \text{βουλευόμενον} \ \text{πρὸς} \ \text{τὰς} \ \text{πολιτείας} \ \text{τῶν} \ \text{τρόπων}. \] In 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 37, on the other hand, we have \[ \text{πρέπει} \] \[ \gamma\alphaρ \] \[ \text{διηρήθαι} \ \text{kατὰ} \ \text{τὰς} \ \text{ηλικίας} \ \text{kαὶ} \ \text{τοῦτον} \ \text{τῶν} \ \text{κόσμων}, \] and in 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20, \[ \text{ἔστι} \ \text{δὲ} \ \text{kαὶ} \ \text{ταύτα} \ \text{φρεσμένα} \ \text{τὰς} \ \text{ηλικίας}. \]

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40. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἐβδομάδις κ.τ.λ.  See above on 1335 b 33.

1337 a.  
1. δει δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν.  Cp. De Caelo  
1. 1. 268 a 19, ταύτα δ', ὡσπερ έρηται, διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν οὕτω  
estάγειν ἀκολουθοῦμεν, and Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 36.  The phrase  
ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ φύσει occurs in Plato, Laws 836 C. Plato in the  
Laws (809 E sq.) had arranged his curriculum of study without  
reference to puberty by periods of three years from ten to sixteen.  
Aristotle follows the Lacedaemonian practice: cp. Phot. συνέφηβοι  
(quoted by Gilbert, Const, Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng.  
Trans., p. 63). Σπαρτιάται δὲ σιδεύνας (sc. τοὺς ἐφήβους καλοῦσιν):  
διέκρυνον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἄρα (ἀμαὶ) τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τουτέστιν περὶ πεντακιδέκα καὶ  
ἐκκαὶδέκα ἐτη γεγονότας, τῶν νεωτέρων παιδών, καὶ καθ’ εαυτοῦ ἴσικουν  
ἀνδρόφωσθαι.

πάσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία κ.τ.λ.  As art and education seek  
to complete nature, they should follow nature as far as she goes.  
Art seeks to complete nature because she takes the raw material  
furnished by nature—wool, or bricks, or human beings—and by  
completing what is deficient produces a garment, or a house, or a  
State: see Prof. Butcher, Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art,  
ed. 2, p. 118 sq., and compare (with Eaton) Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15, ἅλως  
te ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἡ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεὶ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μοιεῖται,  
and (with Congreve) Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 5 sq.  The same thing  
is true of education, for education starts with that which is furnished  
by nature (c. 13. 1332 a 40 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27 sq.), and  
completes it.  Τέχνη and παιδεία go together here, as τέχνη and μάθησις  
in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 9, where see note.  For πάσα παιδεία, ‘every  
kind of education,’ compare the use of παιδεία in the plural in Eth.  
Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 7 sq., Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 a 26 sq., and Thuc. 2.  
39. 2. The word προσλείπειν appears to be a rare one: Liddell and  
Scott compare C. I. G. 3935, τὰ προσλείπαντα τοῦ ἔργου.

3. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.  Aristotle has now reached the subject—  
that of education—to reach which he has been hastening forward  
so fast, postponing the full consideration of not a few questions,  
and he here resumes the use of the aporetic method, which he had  
laid aside since the commencement of the Fourth Book (vol. i.  
p. 352).  The first two of the questions here raised are easily  
answered, the first in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 11—21, and the second in  
1337 a 21—33, but the third question requires far fuller treatment;  
the consideration of it is not completed in what we possess of the  
Fifth Book.
4. κοινὸν... ἢ καὶ ἰδίων τρόπων, 'on a public footing or individually' (cp. 5 (8). i. 1337 a 24 sqq.). Aristotle has already said in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 29, κρατίστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὸν ἐπιμέλειαν (sc. τροφῆς τέ καὶ ἐπιτρεπτέουσά) καὶ ὀρθήν. For ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν, cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12 sq. and 7 (5). II. 1314 b 21 sq.

6. καὶ νῦν, 'even now' (cp. c. 16. 1335 b 5). Even in Aristotle's day not many Greek States made the superintendence of education the concern of the State.

7. ποιαν τινὰ δεῖ ταύτην, sc. τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι. This is explained by 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 34, τίς δ' ἐστιν ἡ παιδεία, καὶ πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δει μὴ λανθάνειν.

BOOK V (VIII).

11. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Two reasons are given for this conclusion—(1) attention to the education of youth is demanded in the interest of the constitution (12-18), and (2) it is demanded because some training is required before men can act virtuously (18-21).


14. δεὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι. See critical note.

τὸ γὰρ ἡθὸν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 544 D, οὐσθ' οὖν, ἢν δ' ἔγο, ὅτι καὶ άνθρώπων εἰδὴ τοσαίτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι δοσαντ' καὶ πολιτείων; ἢ οἰσεί ἐκ δρόου ποσεὶν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἡθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἀν δ' ἰσαμπερ ῥέσαντα τάλα ἐφελκύσῃσαι; Aristotle insists in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq. that the safety of constitutions is not secured by the mere making of laws, however excellent they may be; it is necessary to produce in the citizens the type of character which is favourable to the maintenance of the particular constitution. We read in Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 12 of τὰ ἡθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστης: cp. also Pol. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 39. As to the δημοκρατίκων ἡθος see Demosth. Ol. 3. 25 sq., where it is implied that one feature of it is a willingness on the part of the leading men of the State to be content with a mode of life not more splendid than that of their neighbours and a desire that not private buildings, but public should be magnificent. Aristotle, however, would probably find the δημοκρατίκων and ὀλεγαρχικῶν ἡθος in the kind of character which makes K k 2
in favour of the existence and continuance of a democracy and an oligarchy: cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 2 sqq. and see note on 1310 a 12.

17. ἐὰν δὲ κ.τ.λ., so that not only does the presence in the citizens of the type of character appropriate to a constitution generate that constitution, but a superior quality in the type generates a superior quality of constitution. For the form of the sentence cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 25 sq. and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 28 sq. For βελτιστων see critical note on 1337 a 18.

18. ἐτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Euripides had placed a different sentiment in the mouth of one of the characters of his Augé: cp. Diog. Laert. 2. 33, Εὐριπίδου δ' ἐν τῇ Λύγη εἰπόντος περὶ ἄρετῆς,
κράτιστον ἐλίκη ταύτ' ἐὰν ἀφειμένα, ἀναστὰς ἔξηλθε (Σωκράτης), φήσας γελάοιν εἰναὶ ἀνθρώποι μὲν μὴ ἐφυσκώμενον ἀξιοῦν ζητεῖν, ἄρετῆν δ' οὖτω ἐὰν ἀπολωλέναι. See also Plut. Virtutem doceri posse, c. 3. Not only is it necessary in the interest of the constitution that training likely to produce the required ἓθος should be given in youth, but training in youth is also necessary with a view to the practice of virtue. For previous training is desirable with a view to the practice of all δύναμες καὶ τέχναι, and virtue is a δύναμις (Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 a 36 sqq.: contrast Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1106 a 6 sqq.). Or the argument may be an a fortiori one. If previous training is necessary for the practice of an art, a fortiori it is necessary for action in accordance with virtue, for the successful practice of an art implies the fulfilment of fewer conditions than action in accordance with virtue (Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 a 26 sqq.). For δύναμες καὶ τέχναι see note on 1268 b 36 and Bon. Ind. 207 b 4 sqq., where Metaph. Θ. 2. 1046 b 2, διὸ πάσαν αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικα [καὶ] ἐπιστήμηι δύναμει εἰσίν' ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαί εἰσίν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄλλο, is quoted, and reference is made to Rhet. 1. 2. 1358 a 6 and other passages. For προπαιδεύσεως καὶ προεθίσεως, cp. Pol. 3. 18. 1288 b 1, καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθη, and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, εἰσεθισμέναι καὶ πεπαιδευμέναι. In 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10 sq., on the other hand, παιδεία seems to include τὸ ἐθίσεως. For πρὸς τὸ ἐκάστων ἐργασίας, 'with a view to the operations of each of them,' cp. Plato, Symp. 205 B, ὡςτε καὶ αἱ ἐπὶ πάσας ταῖς τέχναις ἐργασίαι ποιῆσαι εἰλί, and Gorg. 450 C.


ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle passes to the second question, whether education should be in the hands of the State or in those
of the private individual (i.e. the father, cp. 25, τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων). Two reasons are given why it should be in the hands of the State: (1) as the whole State (i.e. all the citizens) has one and the same end before it, the education given will be the same for all, hence its management should be in the hands of the State, and not in the hands of parents, as at present, training their children privately and in whatever subjects they please; (2) the individual should regard himself as part of the State, and the management of the part should be adjusted to the management of the whole [so that it should be in the hands which manage the whole, i.e. the hands of the State]. The first of these two arguments is hardly conclusive. The education given to all might be identical without being placed in the hands of the State. Against the second it may be urged that the welfare of the whole might be kept in view in the training of the part, even if education were not placed in the hands of the State. Compare with Aristotle's view that of Plutarch in Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 4. We learn from 2. 5. 1263 b 36 sq. that Aristotle looks to education to make the State one, and this is another reason why the State should take the charge of it into its own hands.


27. ἀμα δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and at the same time [so far from its being right to think that the individual citizen can justly claim to educate his children as he pleases], it is not even right to think that he belongs to himself; the true creed is that all the citizens belong to the State.' Aristotle inherits this view from others. Thus we read of the Spartans in Plut. Lycurg. c. 24, ὅλοι νομίζουσιν οὐχ αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ τῆς πατρίδος εἶναι διετέλευς, and in c. 25, τὸ δὲ ἤλων εἴδεξεν (ὁ Λυκούργος)
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τοὺς πολίτας μὴ βούλεσθαι μηδὲ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἵδιαν ζήν, ἀλλ' ... ὅλους εἶναι τῆς πατρίδος, and of the Athenians of the time of the Persian War in Demosth. De Cor. c. 205, ἤγετό γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐκαστος οὐχὶ τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ μόνον γεγενήσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι. Much the same thing, indeed, is said by the Corinthian envoys in Thuc. 1. 70. 6 of the Athenians at the outset of the Peloponnesian War. But what Aristotle has especially before him is the language of Plato in Laws 923 A, ἐγὼ γὰρ νομοθέτης ὤν ὁδόι ὑμᾶς ὑμῶν αὐτῶν εἰσαί τίθημι ὅστε τὴν οὐσίαν ταύτην, ἐξουσίωσε δὲ τού γένους ὑμῶν τοῦ τε ἐμπροσθεν καὶ τοῦ ἐπιτελεῖ ἐσομένων, καὶ ἐτὰ μᾶλλον τῆς πόλεως εἶναι το τε γένος πάν ἐκ τὴν οὐσίαν. Cp. Cic. De Fin. 2. 14. 45, ut ad Archytam scripsit Plato, non sibi se soli natura meminerit, sed patriae, sed suis, ut perexigua pars ipsi relinquatur, and De Offic. 1. 25. 85. To none of these authorities does it occur for a moment that the Greek citizen belonged to Hellas as well as to his own State. Isocrates may perhaps have remembered this (Jebb, Attic Orators 2. 44). Aristotle does not consider how far the citizen should carry his sense of belonging to his πόλις. Clearly he thinks that the citizen should subordinate his private preferences to those of his πόλις, but should he suppress conscientious convictions and sink his conscience in the will of the πόλις? Suppose the πόλις is under a tyranny or extreme oligarchy or extreme democracy? If the virtue of a citizen is relative to the preservation of the constitution (3. 4. 1276 b 27 sqq.), a good citizen must apparently do what tends to preserve the constitution, however bad the constitution may be, but what would Aristotle say that a good man ought to do in such a case? Subordinate his conscience to the maintenance of the constitution? If so, contrast the view of the Platonic Socrates in Plato, Gorg. 512 E sq.

29. μόριον γὰρ ἐκαστος τῆς πόλεως, and that which is a part of the State belongs to the State: cp. 1. 4. 1254 a 9, τὸ τε γὰρ μόριον οὔ μᾶλλον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλως ἄλλου.

ἡ δ' ἐπιμέλεια κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 13. 1260 b 14, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἄλλον δὲ ἔλθεν ἀρετήν. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Laws 903 B, πείθομεν τὸν νεών τούς λόγους, ὅς τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖμαι πρὸς τὴν συνθηρίαν καὶ ἀρετήν τοῦ ἄλλου πάντες ἐστὶ συντετειχμέα ... ὃν ἔν καὶ τὸ σῶ, ὃ σχέτλε, μόριον εἰς τὸ πᾶν έυνοιεῖ βλέπον ο郤, καίπερ πάρα συμμέρισμα δὲ, and Charmides 156 E, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ καὶ αὕτην εὖ τοῦ διαφεύγειν τοὺς παρὰ τοὺς ἔλλησαν ιατροῦ τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα, ὅτι τὸ ἄλογον ἄγνοιαν, οὔ δὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, οὔ μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀδίστατον.
5 (8). 1. 1337 a 29—2. 1337 a 38.

503, i.e. compare the teaching of Hippocrates referred to in Phaedrus 270 C, and see Stewart on Eth. Nic. i. 13. 7.

31. καὶ τούτῳ, ‘in this matter also,’ i.e. for attending to the education of youth and making it a matter of State-concern: cp. c. 4. 1338 b 9 sqq. The Lacedaemonians were praised for many other things (6 (4). i. 1288 b 40 sqq.). It will be noticed that nothing is here said of the Cretans, and that the compliment paid to the Lacedaemonians is not extended to them: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq. and contrast Eth. Nic. i. 13. 1102 a 10 sqq., where the Cretan lawgiver, no less than the Lacedaemonian, is said to seek to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws.

33. πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, ‘how one should have them taught,’ C. 2. cp. c. 3. 1338 a 38, and for πῶς c. 3. 1338 a 33, c. 4. 1338 b 38, ότι μὲν οὖν χρηστέον τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστέον, ὀμολογούμενον εἶστι, and c. 6. 1340 b 20, πῶτερον δὲ δεὶ μαθήματι αὐτοῦ ἄδουτάς τε καὶ χιερουργοῦντας ἡ μὴ . . . νῦν λεκτέον.

36. περὶ τῶν ἔργων, ‘sc. τῆς παιδείας, i.e. de isi rebus quas doceri iuvenes oporteat, opp. πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι’ (Bon. Ind. 286 a 33). For τῶν ἔργων in this sense cp. 1337 b 5 sqq. Π¹ Sus. read ἀλλὰ τῶν ἔργων, which Sus.² translates ‘thatssächlich’ (does this mean ‘practically’?), but it is difficult to believe that ἀλλὰ is the true reading.

37. οὐτὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐτὲ πρὸς τὸν βιὸν τὸν ἀριστον. For the distinction, cp. Eth. Nic. io. 1. 1172 a 24, πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐθαυμοῦν βιὸν, and Top. 3. i. 116 b 23, καὶ ὅλως τὸ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βιοῦ τέλος ἀρετῶτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἅλλο τι, οἷον τὸ πρὸς εὐθαυμοῦν συντειὼν ἢ τὸ πρὸς φρόνημαν. The study of music, we learn in the sequel, is of value both with a view to virtue and with a view to τὴν εὖ τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγήν, or in other words τὸν βιὸν τὸν ἀριστον, but the two ends are not to be confounded. Education in the ‘best State’ will naturally be adjusted to both, and hence the mention of them here. Aristotle points out that there was no agreement as to the training conducive to either. The Spartans, for instance, would say that gymnastic training was the road both to virtue (c. 3. 1337 b 26 sqq.) and to the life of empire, which they regarded as the best life (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 20 sqq.), but others would think differently.

38. οὐδὲ φανερὸν κ.τ.λ. As to this see vol. i. p. 354, note 2. For the distinction of διάνοια and τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔθος, Bonitz (Ind. 185 b 61) compares 3. II. 1281 b 7, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἠθή καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν: cp. also 1337 b 11, ἢ τὴν ψυχήν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν, and Plato, Laws
NOTES.

798 A, καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διανοίας τε ἀμα καὶ τὰς τῶν ψυχῶν φύσεις. For τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδος, cp. c. 5. 1340 a 11, b 11, De Part. An. 4. 11. 692 a 22, τὸ ἡδος τοῦ ζωῆς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, and Plato, Lysis 222 A, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ κατὰ τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἴδος, and Laws 793 E, εἴτει ἤδει ψυχῆς. Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδος is the disposition or character of the soul; the phrase is used not only by Plato, but also by Xenophon (Mem. 3. 10. 3), and there is nothing technical about it. Sus. (Ind. s. v. ψυχή) explains it as synonymous with τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν, but does it not rather mean the diathesis of τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν?

39. ἐκ τε τῆς ἐμποδῶν παιδείας κ.τ.λ., 'and if we take as the starting-point of our inquiry the education with which we are daily in contact, the inquiry proves perplexing.' For ἐκ, cp. De Part. An. 1. 5. 644 b 25, καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἄν τοις σκέψισι περὶ αὐτῶν . . . παντελῶς ἐστὶν ἀλήγα, and for ἐμποδῶν, cp. De Gen. et Corr. 1. 6. 323 α 26, καὶ γὰρ κινεῖ κινοῦμενα πάντα σχέδου τὰ ἐμποδῶν (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 243 a 61, who explains τὰ ἐμποδῶν as = τὰ παρ’ ἡμᾶς). Light is thrown on Aristotle’s meaning by 1337 b 21 sqq. Actual education had four branches—reading and writing, gymnastic, music, and drawing—and of these reading, writing, and drawing were studied for their utility, and gymnastic as contributing to virtue (c. 3. 1337 b 25 sqq.), while the study of music included the practice of τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περὶττα τῶν ἐργῶν (c. 6. 1341 a 11 sqq.), and was commonly pursued with a view to pleasure (1337 b 28). Some authorities favoured studies useful for life, others those contributing to virtue, and others those of an out-of-the-way kind. Aristotle’s own aim in planning the education of his ‘best State’ is to make his citizens men of complete virtue, fit in body, mind, and character to live in the practice of all the virtues and to rule and be ruled with a view to the most desirable life, the life in which work is crowned with leisure. Others had solved the question otherwise. Isocrates is on the whole in favour of useful studies, though he has something to say in defence of Eristic and Geometry and Astronomy, studies belonging to the out-of-the-way class (De Antid. § 261 sqq.: Hel. § 5). Of the Cynic Diogenes we read (Diog. Laert. 6. 73), μοναχῆς τε καὶ γεωμετρικῆς καὶ ἀστρολογίας καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἁμελεῖν, ἦς ἀχρήστου καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. For the views of Polybius see Polyb. 9. 20. 6 sqq. On the other hand, Lacedaemonian education was designed to develop virtue, though no doubt a one-sided kind of virtue (c. 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 16, γράμματα μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα τῆς χρείας
emancipanov, ἡ δὲ ἄλλη πάσα παιδεία πρὸς τὸ ἀρχεῖσθαι καλῶς ἐγκεντο καὶ καρτερεῖν πονοῦντα καὶ νικῶν μαχημένον}. As to the studies falling under the head of τὰ περιττά, see vol. i. p. 354, note 3. To the studies there enumerated should be added the wonderful feats of horsemanship which Cleophaintus, the son of Themistocles, learnt by his father’s wish to perform (Plato, Meno 93 D). Aristotle, however, probably refers especially to the study of Geometry, Astronomy, and Eristic Argument, subjects which had found their way in Isocrates’ day into the curriculum at Athens (Isocr. Panath. § 26: cp. Plato, Protag. 318 E, where Protagoras is made to sneer at λογισμοὺς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικήν as studies which Hippias of Elis taught and he himself did not, the wisdom which he taught being εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως). Both τὰ περιττά and τὰ χρήσιμα are here distinguished from τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετήν, but many advocates of the study of τὰ περιττά at any rate believed that it aided the development of virtue. Cp. Isocr. Busir. § 23, τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους ἀμελήσαντας τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπ’ ἀστρολογία καὶ λογισμοῖς καὶ γεωμετρίας διατρίβειν ἐπείξαν, ὅπως ἦσαν δυνάμεις οἱ μὲν ἂν πρὸς ἑτέρα χρήσιμους ἐπαινεύον, οἱ δ’ ὁσ πλείστα πρὸς ἀρετὴν συμβαλλομέναι ἀποφαίνειν ἐπιχειρούσων. Pericles had studied τὰ περιττά under Anaxagoras and is thought by Plato and Plutarch to have owed much of his greatness of soul to these studies (Plato, Phaedr. 269 E sq.: Plut. Peric. cc. 4–8). The virtuous Epaminondas had had a περιττὴ παιδεία (Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 3). It is with a view to virtue that Plato recommends the study of Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy (Rep. 525–530: Laws 818–822), and at a later age of Dialectic (Rep. 531 sqq.: Laws 965). For the contrast between τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τῶν βίων and τὰ περιττά, cp. Rhet. 2. 13. 1389 b 25, οὐδένος γάρ μεγάλον οὐδὲ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τῶν βίων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, and for the phrase τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τῶν βίων, Diog. Laert. 2. 25, καὶ συνεχεῖς ἐκείνα ἀνεφθέγγετο ἡ Σωκράτης τὰ ἰαμβεία, τὰ δ’ ἀργυρόματ’ ἐστὶν ἣ τε πορφύρα
eis tois traphfois χρήσμι’, ote eis toin bion,
3. 98, χρημάτων καὶ τῶν εἰς τῶν βίων χρησίμων, and Hyperid. Or. Fun. 3. 10. For δῆλον οὐδὲν (’nothing is clear’), cp. Plato, Theaet. 201 A, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν (’manentibus vero—nec amplius quae- rentibus—nihil erit perspicuum,’ Stallbaum).
NOTES.

1. 2. 405 b 8, πάντα γὰρ τὰ στοιχεία κριτὴν εἰληφὲ, πλὴν τῆς γῆς. 'Quid significet his locis formula εἰληφέναι κριτὴν apertum est, quomodo eam vim possit habere dubium videtur ... Equidem nomine κριτής, quoniam coniunctum est cum λαμβάνει, significari putaverim suffragium iudicis: unumquodque ex tribus illis elementis unius tult iudicis suffragium' (Bonitz on Metaph. A. 8. 988 b 22—989 a 19). See also Bon. Ind. s.v. κριτής.

1337 b. 2. καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κ.τ.λ. Thus the Spartans identified virtue with military virtue, which is only a part of it (2. 9. 1271 b 2 sqq.), and naturally erred in their ἀσκησις of virtue (4 (7). i5. 1334 a 40). Aristotle’s remark is perhaps suggested by that of Socrates in Plato, Laches 190 B, ἄρ’ οὖν τούτῷ γ’ ὑπάρχειν δει, τὸ εἰδέναι ὅ τι ποι’ ἔστων ἀρετή; ἐι γὰρ ποιν μὴ ἀρετήν εἰδεὶμεν τὸ παρᾶπαν ὅ τι ποτε τυχάναι δὲν, τίνα τρόπον τούτου σύμβουλοι γενονεῖθα ὁσφον, ὅπως ἁν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαυτο; 3. πρὸς, cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 31 and 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 33. 4. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 818 A, τῷ πληθεὶ δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν (i.e. Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy) ἀναγκαία ... μὴ ἐπισταθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρῶν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to reading and writing and a certain amount of arithmetic and geometry as necessary. At Sparta these necessary subjects were evidently insufficiently studied (c. 4. 1338 b 33). 5. ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα κ.τ.λ. Πάντα, sc. τὰ χρήσιμα, not τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. For instance, cookery should not be studied (c. 5. 1339 a 39 sqq.). The parenthetic clause, δηρημένων—ἀνελευθέρων, causes Aristotle to forget that he has begun his sentence with ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, and he proceeds in 6, φανερὸν ὅτι κ.τ.λ., as if these words had not preceded. Bonitz (Ind. 538 b 38) compares De Interp. 14. 24 a 6 sqq., referring to Waitz’ note on this passage. In De Interp. 14, however, we have merely a pleonasm of ὅτι, whereas in the passage before us there is a surplusage of an entire clause introduced by ὅτι. Still irregularities in connexion with ὅτι are common in Aristotle’s writings (see Bon. Ind. s.v.), and I think, on the whole, that Bekker, Bonitz, Sus., and the rest are right in leaving this awkward sentence as it stands. But a suggestion of Mr. Richards deserves mention, that καὶ should be added after φανερὸν.

6. τῶν τοιούτων, sc. ἔργων. Here ὅ τοιοῦτος does not, as it usually does (Bernays, Zwei Abhandlungen über die Aristotel. Theorie des Drama, p. 27), refer back to something preceding; on the contrary it refers forward to ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων κ.τ.λ. Compare its use in 12,
in c. 6. 1341 a 22 sq., in 3. 17. 1288 a 8, in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 18, and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 19 sqq.

8. Βάναυσος δ' ἔργων κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 6. 1341 a 5 sqq. and see vol. i. p. 111 sqq. Here and in c. 7. 1342 a 22, εἰς δ' ὄσπερ αὐτῶν (i.e. βανάυσων καὶ θητῶν) αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεσσι, Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 495 D, ὦ δὴ ἔφεμοι πολλοὶ ἄτελεις μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὅποι δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημοουργών ὄσπερ τὰ σώματα λειτούργηται, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένου τε καὶ ἀποτελθρωμένου διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν: cp. Laws 831 C, and Xen. Oecon. 4. 2 and 6. 5. As the term μισθαρμικαὶ ἐργασίαι (13) must include the work of the θῆς or day-labourer (cp. i. 11. 1258 b 25 sqq., where he is classed among οἱ μισθαρμοῦντες), his work is here described as βάναυσις in addition to that of δ' Βάναυσος τεχνίτης, to which the epithet is more commonly applied. In general, however, the θῆς and the βάναυσος are distinguished (cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 12, βανάυσοι καὶ θῆτες: 17, τῶν βανάυσων καὶ τῶν θῆτα: 21, Βιών βάναυσων ἡ θητικόν: 8 (6). i. 1317 a 25: 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 27 sq.: and 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 29, where we have τὸ τῶν βανάυσων καὶ μισθαρμοῦντων πλῆθος). Indeed, notwithstanding what is said in the passage before us, the distinction reappears in this very Book, for in 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 20 we have βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν (cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 13, διόπερ οὗ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὰν ἐργασίαν, ἀλλὰ θητικοῦταν καὶ βανάυσως δὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, where a difference is implied between θητικός and βάναυσος). Aristotle’s feeling probably was that though the work of οἱ μισθαρμοῦντες deserved to be called βάναυσος on account of its effect on the mind, the work of the βάναυσος τεχνίτης merited the epithet still better, because it injured the body (cp. i. 11. 1258 b 37, βαναυσόταται δ' (εἰς τῶν ἐργασίων) ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λέοβονται μᾶλλον). Καὶ τέχνη ταυτην καὶ μάθησιν εἰς καὶ βάναυσος τέχνην καὶ μάθησιν εἶναι ταυτήν. For τέχνη καὶ μάθησιν, cp. 18, πράττει τις ἡ μανδάνει, and 4 (7). 17. 1337 a 1, πάσα τέχνη καὶ παιδεία. Μάθησις is the wider term, for though in one kind of μάθησις the aim is the acquisition of an art (Metaph. Θ. 3. 1046 b 36), in another it is the acquisition of an extent of knowledge falling short of that possessed by the master of an art (c. 5. 1339 a 36—38: Plato, Protag. 312 B). For τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς (where τὰς χρήσεις = τὰς ἐνεργείας, as in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 38), cp. De An. 2. 4. 415 a 18, πρότερον γάρ εἰσὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνεργείαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις κατὰ τῶν λόγων, and Magn. Mor. I. 35. 1197 a 8, ἥπι δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν οὐχ ἔστιν ἄλλο οὐδὲν τέλος παρ' αὐτῆν τὴν πράξιν,
NOTES.

οίον παρὰ τὸ κιθαρίζειν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλο τέλος οὐδέν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τέλος, ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ πράξεις. The χρήσεις καὶ πράξεις τῆς ἀρετῆς to which Aristotle refers are probably those of the soldier and citizen (cp. c. 6. 1341 a 7). For τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς cp. c. 1. 1337 a 21.


13. τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας. 'Εργασία is a wider term than τέχνη: it is used, for instance, of such occupations as brothel-keeping in Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 33. It is not certain what occupations in addition to that of the day-labourer Aristotle intends to include under αἱ μισθαρνικαὶ ἐργασίαι. Does he include the work of a teacher of rhetoric like Isocrates, when done for hire? In Pol. i. 11. 1258 b 25 sqq. μισθαρνία is made to comprise both the μισθαρνία of the βάνανσοι τέχναι and the μισθαρνία of the unskilled θῆς: here, however, the phrase αἱ μισθαρνικαὶ ἐργασίαι is used in a sense exclusive of the βάνανσοι τέχναι. The form μισθαρνικός occurs also in Eth. Eud. i. 4. 1215 a 31 and Oecon. i. 2. 1343 a 29, but Plato uses the form μισθαρνητικός in Rep. 346 B, D, and (if the MSS. are right) μισθαρνευτικός in Soph. 222 D. See critical note on 1255 b 26.

14. ἄσχελον καὶ ταπεινὴν. Leisure was held to give self-confidence (c. 6. 1341 a 28 sqq.), and its absence to make men poor-spirited, because it made them like slaves, who have no leisure (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 20). The epithets θητικὸς and ταπεινὸς are interchanged in Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 1 sq.

15. ἦστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν κ.τ.λ., 'and as to some liberal sciences also, while it is not illiberal to study them up to a certain point, to devote oneself to the study of them in an over-accurate way is bound up with the injurious results already mentioned,' i.e. unfit the body for the pursuits of a soldier and citizen and makes the mind abject. For ἓνοχος in this sense see Liddell and Scott. For the view that there is something illiberal in too close a study of a subject compare the passage from the Erastae ascribed to Plato quoted on 1338 b 32. The study of music has an ill effect when carried too far (c. 6. 1340 b 40 sqq. and 1341 b 10 sqq.): compare Plut. Pericl. c. 1, 6 δὲ Φιλιππος πρὸς τῶν νῦν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν τινὶ πότῳ ψήλαντα καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐλέην, Οὐκ αἰσχύνη καλὸς οὖσα ψάλλων, and also that of gymnastic (c. 4. 1338 b 32 sqq.). Socrates had said that the study of geometry, astronomy, arithmetic, and medicine should not be carried beyond a certain
point by the ordinary citizen (Xen. Mem. 4. 7), and Isocrates says the same thing of astronomy and geometry (De Antid. § 264: cp. [Demosth.] Erot. c. 44), and Plato of γράμματα (Laws 810 B). There were those who said this of philosophy (Plato, Gorg. 487 C), but Aristotle would hardly agree. The Cynics probably inherited the feeling of Socrates on this subject: see as to the Cynic Onesicritus vol. i. p. 112, note 1. Plato, on the other hand, had recommended in the case of a few the advanced study of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy (Laws 818 A: cp. 967 D); it is not clear whether Aristotle would object to this. The term ἔλευθεροι ἐπιστήμαι in its Latin rendering ‘liberales artes’ had a long subsequent history (see Mr. H. Parker in Eng. Hist. Rev. vol. v. p. 417 sqq.). The Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in Aristotle’s writings.

17. ἕχει δὲ κ.τ.λ. This repeats with added details 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 6 sqq. Aristotle is preparing the way for his recommendation that boys shall be taught to sing and play: many regarded playing as χειρουργία (c. 6. 1340 b 20) and as fraught with βασανσία (1340 b 40 sqq.: cp. Plato, Symp. 203 A). But the singing and playing which Aristotle enjoins will be αὐτῶν χαράν and δὲ ἄρετήν (c. 6. 1341 b 8 sqq. and 1340 b 42).

19. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν χαράν ἢ φίλων ἢ δὲ ἄρετήν οὐκ ἄνελευθερον. As to αὐτῶν χαράν see note on 1277 b 5, and cp. Rhet. 3. 18. 1419 b 7 sqq., and Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25, ὅσπερ ἀνθρωπὸς φαμεν ἐλευθερος ὁ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλον ὑπὸ, αὐτῷ καὶ αὐτὴ μόνη ἐλευθέρα ὀδύσ τῶν ἐπιστήμων· μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ αὐτής ἔνεκέν ἐστιν. When Odysseus builds a ship (Hom. Odys. 5. 243 sqq.), it is for himself. As to φίλων, cp. Plato, Laws 919 D, Μαγνήταν... μὴ κάπηλος ἔκων μηδε ἄκων μηδεις γιγνέσθω μητὶ ἐμπόρος μὴτα διακοινών μητὶ ἢντα κεκτημένοι ἰδιώταις τοῖς μη ἔς ἢν έστω, πλὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ τούτων εἰς τὸ ἀνό γένεσι καὶ πάσι τοῖς αὐτῶν πρεσβυτέροις, ὡσι ἐλευθέρου ἐλευθέρως, and Symp. 184 B–C: cp. also Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 31, καὶ (μεγαλοψύχου) πρὸς ἄλλων μὴ δυνασθαι εἰν διάλ ἦ ἡ πρὸς φίλων δουλικών γάρ. See also the story told by Plutarch of Favonius and Pompey (quoted above on 1333 a 6). For δὲ ἄρετην, cp. c. 6. 1341 b 10 sqq. (which also illustrates δὲ ἄλλους, 20), and Plato, Symp. 185 A sq.

20. As to αὐτὸ τοῦτο and as to the displacement of πολλάκις, which belongs to δύοτειν ἄν, see critical note, and cp. Plato, Rep. 358 D, περὶ γὰρ τίνος ἄν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἐχων χαίροι λέγων καὶ
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άκονων; where πολλάκις belongs to λέγων καὶ ἀκόνων. For the conjunction of θρικών and δουλικών, cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 1 sq.

21. αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις κ.τ.λ., ‘the studies now commonly known and in use’ (literally ‘made public property’), ‘as has been said before’ (in c. 2. 1337 a 39), ‘point in two directions,’ i.e. they may be used in support of the view that useful subjects should be studied, or in support of the view that subjects tending to promote virtue should be studied (see note on 1337 a 39). For αἱ καταβεβλημέναι νῦν μαθήσεις, cp. c. 3. 1338 a 36 and Plato, Soph. 232 D, τὰ γε μὴν περὶ παισῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἐκαστὴν τέχνην, ἀ δὲι πρὸς ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἀντείπεις, διδαχομοιώμενα πων καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν (‘publice deposita sunt,’ Stallbaum, who adds ‘verbum καταβάλλειν propric dictur de ipsis quae deponuntur in tabulario publico, veluti leges, testimonia, alia monumenta litteris consignata’). For ἔπαμφοτερίζονσι, see note on 1332 a 42.

C. 3. 23. ἐστι δὲ τέταρτα σχέδων κ.τ.λ. ‘Usually three, γραφικὴ being omitted,’ as Eaton remarks, who refers to Plato, Protag. 325 D—326 C (where children are described as going successively to teachers of γράμματα, teachers of harp-playing, and παιδοτρίβαι), and Theag. 122 E. We see from Protag. 325 E sqq. that in learning γράμματα children learnt passages of epic poetry by heart, and that in learning harp-playing they learnt to sing to the harp passages of lyrical poetry, so that the study of poetry entered into the study both of γράμματα and of harp-playing. That the study of γράμματα included learning to write, we see from Laws 810 B. It is remarkable that arithmetic is not mentioned: Sus. 4. takes the elements of arithmetic to be included under γράμματα, but does not give any passage in support of this view. According to Blümner (Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 111), arithmetical instruction at Athens was given at home, not at school; this may possibly be the reason why nothing is said about it.

24. καὶ τέταρτον ἐνοι γραφικήν. Plato had learnt drawing (Diog. Laert. 3. 5) long before Pamphilius of Amphipolis (the teacher of Apelles, who was a contemporary of Philip and Alexander) had made the study fashionable first at Sicyon and then throughout Greece (Plin. Nat. Hist. 35. 76 sq.: see Overbeck, Ant. Schriftquellen, p. 330, and Brunn, Gesch. der griech. Künstler 2. 134 sqq.). Γραφική probably includes painting as well as drawing. Aristotle says nothing of sculpture.
25. τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν κ.τ.λ. Charondas had insisted on the many uses served by γραμματικὴ: cp. Diod. 12. 13. 1, τὴν γὰρ γραμματικὴν παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας μαθήσεις προέκρυψεν ὁ νομοθέτης, καὶ μᾶλα προσηκόντος: διὰ γὰρ ταύτης τὰ πλείστα καὶ χρησιμώτατα τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιτελείσθαι, ψύφους, ἐπιστολᾶς, διαθήκας, νόμους, τάλλα τὰ τὸν βίον μιλεῖτα ἐπανορθοῦντα, and Eurip. Fragm. 582, which is so similar in effect to the passage of Diodorus that one is inclined to ask whether Euripides had the words of Charondas before him. Cp. also 1338 a 15 sqq.

26. τὴν δὲ γνωμαστικὴν κ.τ.λ. So thought the Lacedaemonians (c. 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.), and also Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2. 91).

27. τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἡδὴ διαπορήσειν ἀν τις, i.e. as to the object with which it is taught. Here διαπορεῖν takes an acc. of the thing which causes perplexity, as ἀπορεῖν does in Meteor. 1. 1. 339 a 2, ἐν οἷς τὰ μὲν ἀπορούμεν, τῶν δ’ ἐφαπτόμεθα τίνα τρόπον. That Plato gives a wider meaning to μουσικὴ than Aristotle does, we have seen in vol. i. p. 405. Both agree that μουσικὴ is concerned with μελοποιία (c. 7. 1331 b 23 sqq.: Gorg. 449 D), but while to Plato (Rep. 398 D) a μέλος consists of λόγος ἀρμονία and μυθός, Aristotle distinguishes μελοποιία and λέξις (Poet. 6. 1449 b 33 sqq., 1450 a 13 sqq.).

28. ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν, sc. οὖσα: cp. 1338 a 13, ὡς ἀναγκαίας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων (sc. οὖσας). For the fact cp. Plato, Laws 655 C, καίτοι λέγουσι γε οἱ πλείστου μουσικῆς ὀρθότητα εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πορίζοσιν δύναμιν, and Tim. 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία ... τῷ μετὰ νοῦ προσχρωμένῳ Μούσαις οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡδονὴν ἄλογον, καθάπερ νῦν, εἶναι δοκεῖ χρήσιμος κ.τ.λ.

29. μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς, 'learn it,' cp. c. 2. 1337 b 6 sqq., and see note on 1339 a 14.

οἱ οἱ ἄρχησι, cp. 1338 a 14, οἱ πρότερον, and Probl. 30. 11. 956 b 16, διὰ τι οἱ οἱ ἄρχησ τῆς μὲν κατὰ τὸ σώμα χρωμάτις ἄθλον τι προῦταξαν, σοφίας δὲ οὐδεὶς ἐθέκαν;

ἐταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ, cp. 1338 a 14, εἰς παιδείαν ἐταξαν.

30. τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς ἔτειν κ.τ.λ. For the phrase cp. Hist. An. 9. 12. 615 a 25, ἡ γὰρ φύσις αὐτῆς ἔτειν το πρόσφορον, and Eth. Nic. 8. 6. 1157 b 16. Aristotle has not said before that Nature aims at this, but he has implied it in 2. 9. 1271 a 41 sqq. and 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2 sqq., passages in which he points out the disastrous consequences to the Lacedaemonian State of a forgetfulness of this.
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31. For the place of δύνασθαι cp. c. 5. 1339 b 1, and see note on 1281 a 26.

32. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἄρχῃ πάστων, Lamb. 'hoc enim omnium rerum agendorum principium est.' With Sus. I take Aristotle to refer in αὐτῇ to σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς, not to Nature (as Vict., Schn., and others). For the attraction of the pronoun into the gender of the predicate, cp. (with Sus.*) 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 41. For the phrase, cp. Plato, Phaedr. 237 B, peri παντός, δο παῖ, μία ἄρχῃ τοῖς μελλοντι καλῶς βουλεύεσθαι εἶδέναι δεὶ περὶ οὖ ἂν ἢ ἡ βουλή, ἢ παντὸς ἀμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη.

τάλων, for the lesson has already been taught in 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2 sqq.

33. εἰ γὰρ ἄμφω μὲν δεὶ κ.τ.λ. Γάρ introduces a justification of ὅν καὶ τάλων εἴπωρεν περὶ αὐτῆς. With δεὶ supply ἔχειν. For the thought cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16 sqq. The answer which is gradually given to the question in what activities leisure should be spent is, as we shall see, 'in activities desirable for their own sake.'

34. καὶ τέλος, 'and is its end': cp. 4. (7). 15. 1334 a 14 sqq. Mr. Welldon has anticipated me in retaining τέλος and placing a comma after it.


τέλος γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for then, [as leisure is the end of life,] play would necessarily be to us the end of life.' Sus. would read in place of ἀναγκάζον either ἄν ἀναγκάζον (Schn. had proposed ἄν ἂν ἀναγκαίον, vol. ii. p. 452) or ἀναγκαίον ἄν (with Spengel), but perhaps ἄν εἰπή may be supplied with ἀναγκαίον: cp. Xen. Οecon. 3. 13 and 4. 15. It seems to me more natural to supply ἄν εἰπή than εἰπή.

Many made play the end of life: cp. c. 5. 1339 b 31 sqq., and Ephor. Fragm. 82 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. I. 259), 'Εφόρος ἐν πέμπτῳ φραίνων τῷ Τιμαρνών καὶ τὸ παιζεῖν καὶ τὸ γελάων εἰς ἐξηλωκότας καὶ μεγάστην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦτο νομίζουσιν. A graffito on a pavement-slab of the forum of Thannyas or Timegad in Algeria runs 'venari lavari ludere ridere—oc est vivere' (Prof. Sayce, Algerian Notes, Academy, No. 780, April 16, 1887, p. 279).

39. τὸ δ’ ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας. Cp. Rhet. i. 11. 1370 a 11, τὰς δ’ ἐπιμελεῖς καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηρὰς.

41. καροφυλακῶντας τὴν χρήσιν. Pastime should be used ἐν ταῖς ἀσχολίαις, as a relief after toil (cp. 37).

ως προσάγοντας φαρμακεῖας χάριν. A drug differs from an article of daily food, in that it is only for occasional use: cp. Oecon. i. 5. 1344 b 10, προσδειροῦντας ὅτι ἡ τροφὴ οὐ φάρμακον διὰ τὸ συνεχεῖς, and Top. 2. i. 115 b 26, πάλιν ποτὲ μὲν συμφέρει φαρμακεύεσθαι, ὅλων ὅταν νοσή, ἀπλῶς δ’ οὐ. For the medical use of the word προσάγειν cp. Plut. De Adulatore et Amico, c. 28, ὥσπερ δειμοῦν καὶ δημοῦν ἀνθρώπων δυσπροσόν τις προσάγων, ὡσπερ δειμοῦν ἀνθρώπων καὶ φιλομαίνοντε, θεραπεύει μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἄφαιρε τοῦ λυπητοῦ, ὧργὴν δὲ τῇ λυπῇ προστίθησαι καὶ παροξυνεῖ τὸν ἀνώμονον.

42. ἀνείσις γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the movement of the soul to which we have referred' (that involved in play) 'is [remedial in character, for it is] a relaxation of strain and a remission because of the pleasure which accompanies it, and only in place at times when there is strain].'

For κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς, cp. Rhet. i. 11. 1369 b 33, ὑποκείσθω δ’ ἡμῖν εἰναι τὴν ἠδονήν κίνησιν τω τῆς ψυχῆς κ.τ.λ. and Plato, Laws 896 E sq.

1. τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν κ.τ.λ., 'but taking leisure [unlike working] is 1338 a. thought to have in itself pleasure and happiness and blissful life, [so that it does not need to be helped out with play, and we should not spend leisure in play].'

3. τοῦτο δ’ οὐ κ.τ.λ., 'and this' (i.e. happiness) 'does not belong to those who work, but [only] to those who are at leisure, for he who works works for the sake of some end as having it not, but happiness is an end, inasmuch as all think that it is conjoined not with pain but with pleasure, [and therefore, as he has not the end, he has not happiness].' That things conjoined with pleasure were commonly regarded as ends, we see from Rhet. i. 7. 1364 b 23-25. Aristotle's object in adding this remark is to point out that not only does leisure bring happiness with it, but that work does not; he thus prepares the way for the distinction which he proceeds to draw in i1 sqq. between studies which are preparatory for work and studies which are preparatory for leisure, the former being, like work, a means to an end, and the latter, like leisure, desirable for their own sake and an end in themselves. Sus. reads τοῦτο γὰρ in place of τοῦτο δ’, but in this Mr. Welldon does not follow him, and rightly, for τοῦτο δ’ οὐ κ.τ.λ. does not contain the proof that leisure is thought to have in it pleasure and happiness, but an added
statement carrying matters further. For ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἄσχολων ἐνεκά τινος ἄσχολει τελεύω ὅς οὐχ ὑπάρχως, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 17, αὕτω δ' (i.e. αἱ πολτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ πράξεις) άσχολοι καὶ τελευω τινὸς ἔφειται καὶ οὐ νῦν αἱρεῖται εἰσιν.

7. ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονήν κ.τ.λ., 'but [here their agreement ceases, for] all do not find the pleasure which accompanies happiness in the same pleasure.' Cp. Plato, Laws 658 E (quoted below on 1339 b 33), and Gorg. 448 C, ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνοντες ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλος, τὸν δὲ ἀριστών οἱ ἀριστοι.

8. For καθ' ἐστωτός ἐκαστος καὶ τὴν ἔξω τὴν αὐτῶ, where we expect ἐστῶν and αὐτοῦ, cp. Plato, Gorg. 503 E, ἡσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέποντες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργων ἐκαστος οὐκ εἰκῆ ἐκείγενον προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ.

9. ὡστε φανερόν κ.τ.λ., 'and so, [as leisure is the end], it is evident,' etc. Καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν, 'with a view to leisure spent in noble enjoyment also,' as well as with a view to work. For τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν, cp. c. 7. 1342 a 31, τὴν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβής. It is obviously strange that we should have τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν here and τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῆ in 21, and it is possible that τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν is a simple blunder, and that we should read τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῆ (with Cor.) in place of it. But Sus., following Prof. Postgate (Notes, p. 15), leaves the text as it stands, and I incline on the whole to do so too, though Bonitz adds a query to the words (Ind. 741 a 40) and Jackson would omit σχολήν as an interpolation and understand ἡδονή (Sus. 4 ad loc.). For looking to 1337 b 31, σχολάζων δύνασθαι καλῶς, and 1338 a 1, τὸ σχολάζων (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 9), we expect that the conclusion drawn in 1338 a 9 sqq. will be that it is well to study with a view to taking leisure, or taking leisure nobly, and τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν, 'leisure spent nobly in dialogê,' comes nearer to this than τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῆ. Not leisure spent anyhow, but leisure spent in dialogê is the end with a view to which Aristotle claims that study should be especially pursued. The words τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἄσχολαν (12) also, as Postgate points out, require πρὸς τὴν σχολὴν, and not πρὸς τὴν διαγωγήν, as their antithesis. For μαθῆναι ἄττα καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, cp. Theophil. Kιβαρφόδος Φραγμ. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 628), μέγας

βησαυρός ἔστι καὶ βέβαιος μουσική
ἄπαισι τοὺς μαθώσας παιδευθέσι τε.

Mαθῆναι is to learn, παιδεύεσθαι to be trained by another.
11. For the repetition of the pronoun in ταύτα . . . ταύτας see note on 1317 b 5.

12. τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν κ.τ.λ., 'and that studies preparatory for work are pursued as necessary and as being for the sake of other things.'

13. διό, 'hence,' i.e. because it is right that studies which contribute to the enjoyment of leisure should find a place in education.

15. ὡσπερ τὰ γράμματα κ.τ.λ. See note on 1337 b 25.

16. καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν, 'and for the acquisition of knowledge': cp. 39 sq. and Isocr. Panath. § 209, ὡστ' οἷδε γράμματα μαθήματος, ἀ τηλικά τινι ἐχει δύναμιν ὥστε τοὺς ἐπιστήμους καὶ χρωμένους αὐτοῖς μὴ μόνον ἐμπείρους γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἡλικίας τῆς αὐτῶν πραξικόπητος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πώποτε γενομένων.

17. δοκεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Learning to draw was evidently held by many to make men skilful in the purchase of works of art, furniture, and equipments of all kinds (1338 a 40 sqq.).

19. πρὸς ὑγείαν καὶ ἀλκήν, 'for health and prowess in battle.' Not every one would agree with Aristotle that learning music does not produce military prowess in the learner: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 21, μονοικωτάτους γὰρ ἁμα καὶ πολεμικωτάτους ἀποφαίνουσαν αὐτοὺς κ.τ.λ.: Athen. Deipn. 626 f, τὸ δ' ἀρχαῖον ἢ μονοική ἐπ' ἀνδρείαν προ- τροπή ἤν κ.τ.λ.: Plut. De Musica c. 26. And if the study of music does not produce health, listening to music was thought by Theophrastus to cure some diseases (Athen. Deipn. 624 a); indeed, a plague was thought to have been stayed at one time at Sparta by the Cretan musician Thaletas (Plut. De Mus. c. 42).

21. λείπεται τοῖνυν κ.τ.λ., 'it remains therefore that music is useful for rational enjoyment in leisure.' Aristotle has shown that the study of music is not useful for purposes connected with work, like learning to read and write and to draw, nor productive of bodily advantages useful for work, like gymnastic; hence he concludes that it is useful for leisure. He omits to inquire at present whether it is not productive of moral and intellectual virtues useful for work; we shall find later on that it is (c.5.1340 a 18 sqq.). This somewhat invalidates the conclusion which he arrives at here.

22. εἰς δὲπερ κ.τ.λ., 'into which they do in fact evidently introduce it.' Καὶ φαίνονται, i.e. not only may be inferred to introduce it, but manifestly do so: cp. καὶ συμβαίνειν in 2. 3. 1262 a 18 sq.
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For ὀπερ, not ἵπτερ, see Bon. Ind. 484 b 5, where Hist.: An. 2. 17. 508 b 13, ἀναδύσασθαι ἐχεῖ, ὁ ἀναλύεται εἰς ἐν, is referred to, and Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 24 (‘Aristotelem nemo nescit usum neutrius valde adamasse’) and 4. 1449 a 7. Aristotle takes no notice of the use of music in the worship of the gods.

ἡν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for they give it a place in that which they think is the form of rational enjoyment appropriate to the free’ (i.e. feasting), and therefore appropriate to those who are at leisure, for leisure belongs to freemen: cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 20, οὔ σχολὴ δωλος. Aristotle would hardly agree with their view that banquet- ing is ἡ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγή (see note on 1333 a 35). In c. 5. 1339 a 16 sqq. he treats conviviality (μέθυ) as a means of relaxation, not as διαγωγή.

24. διώπερ ὁμηρος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Hom. Odys. 17. 382,

τίς γὰρ δὴ ἡ ἑσίων καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν 
ἀλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἵ δημοσεροι ἔσαι,
μάντιν ἡ ἤπιτρα κακῶν ἡ τέκτονα δούρων,
ἥ καὶ θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὦ κεν τέρπησιν ἀείδων;

but the line first quoted by him, ἄλλ' ὁδὸν κ.τ.λ., finds no place in our text, any more than it does, as Sus.4 points out, in Plato, Rep. 389 D. Ἀείδων also takes the place of ἀπαντας in our texts (Sus.5, Note 997). Probably we should read μόνον in place of μὲν in ἄλλ' ὁδὸν κ.τ.λ. I take Aristotle’s text to have been—

τίς γὰρ δὴ ἡ ἑσίων καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν,
ἀλλ’ ὁδὸν μόνον ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαιτα ταλείης,
μάντιν ἡ ἤπιτρα κακῶν ἡ τέκτονα δούρων,
οἴ καλέονισιν ἀοιδόν, ὦ κεν τέρπησιν ἀπαντας;

It is just possible that οἴ in 26 is a false reading for καὶ, but there is no absolute necessity for any change. Spengel, followed by Sus., reads ὃδος καλοῦσιν or οἴ καλοῦται in place of οἴ καλέονισιν, and regards these words as not forming part of the quotation, but the form of the word καλέονισιν seems to show that it is quoted from Homer. As to the differences between our text of Homer and Aristotle’s quotations, see note on 1285 a 12. For the use of music at banquets, cp. Hom. Odys. 1. 152. Aristoxenus gave a fanciful reason for it, quite different to that given here (Plut. De Musica, c. 43: Aristox. Fragm. 91 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 291: cp. Plato, Tim. 47 D).
27. καὶ ἐν ἄλλωσ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Hom. Odyss. 9. 5 sqq. For (ὁ) ὀδυσσεύς see critical note.

32. πῶτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. This promise is not fulfilled in the Politics as we have it: see vol. ii. p. xxviii sq.

33. καὶ πῶς, ‘and how they are to be studied’: cp. c. 2. 1337 a 34 sq.

34. For the needless addition of περὶ αὐτῶν, cp. περὶ αὐτῆς, c. 5. 1339 a 15.

νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸ ὀδοῦ γέγονεν. Two different views have been taken of the construction of this sentence. Some have regarded τοσοῦτον εἶναι πρὸ ὀδοῦ as an accusative and infinitive dependent on γέγονεν, as in Luke 16. 22, ἐγένετο δὲ ἀποδανεῖν τῶν πτωχῶν, and Acts 21. 1 and 22. 17 (referred to by Hermann ad Viger. p. 231 note, cp. p. 749); the translation will then be, ‘but now it has happened that thus much profit has accrued to us.’ Others have taken τοσοῦτον εἶναι together in the sense of ‘to this extent at least,’ εἶναι being used as in such phrases as κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι (Plato, Protag. 317 A, where Stallbaum renders ‘quantum quidem ad hoc attinet’: see his note and Ast, Lex. Platon. 1. 625). Götting, who refers to Lobeck, Phyrn. p. 275, Stahr in his edition of the Politics, and Sus. appear to understand the passage thus. The translation will then be, ‘but now to this extent at least we have profited.’ I should prefer the second of these two interpretations if εἶναι followed τοσοῦτον immediately without the interposition of ἡμῖν.

In support of the first interpretation it may be noted that in Plato, Rep. 397 B we have γέγενει ταῖς λέγειν (Richards), and in Xen. Oecon. 17. 3, γέγενε ταῖς ὁμονεῖν (sc. πάντας τοὺς ἀκρότοις) : see also Xen. Cyrop. 5. 2. 12. There is a further difference as to the meaning of πρὸ ὀδοῦ, Sus. translating the sentence ‘für jetzt steht uns vorläufig nur so viel fest,’ and Welldon, ‘at present however we have advanced so far as to see that,’ etc., where ‘vorläufig’ and ‘advanced’ seem to represent πρὸ ὀδοῦ. My own rendering has been suggested by the meaning assigned to the word by Liddell and Scott.

35. δὲι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαῖων κ.τ.λ., ‘that from the ancients also’ (cp. 1337 b 29, οὐ εἴ ἀρχῆς) ‘we have a testimony derived from the established studies [that there are subjects which should be taught the young not as necessary but as liberal and noble].’ The ancients are regarded by Aristotle as the authors of the established curriculum.
37. τοῦτο, 'this fact,' i.e. that we have the testimony of the ancients to this effect.

ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Supply again τοσοῦτον ἡμῶν εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ γέγονεν. Όσον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν is added in illustration of τῶν χρησίμων τινά. Παιδεύεσθι is middle, as in c. 2. 1337 a 35. Τὸ χρῆσμον πρὸς τὸν βίον is contrasted with τὸ πρὸς μάθησιν συντείνον: compare the contrast in Plato, Rep. 527 A between studies pursued πράξεως ἐνεκα and γνώσεως ἐνεκα. As to ἕ τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησις cp. Menand. Monost. 657;

dεπλοῦν ὁρῶσιν οἱ μαθήτες γράμματα.


1338 b. 1. We expect ἄλλα or ἄλλα μᾶλλον in place of ἢ μᾶλλον, but ἢ μᾶλλον is substituted as less dogmatic, and partly also perhaps because ἄλλα has been used in the preceding line. "Ἡ 'modest affirmantis est' (Bon. Ind. 312 b 57 sqq.: cp. Trendelenburg on De An. 1. 1. 403 b 8). In 3. 1. 1275 a 25 and 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 28 ἢ takes the place of δέ.

ποιεῖ θεωρητικόν, cp. c. 7. 1342 b 26, βακχευτικὸν γὰρ ἥ γε μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. We expect θεωρητικόν rather than θεωρητικόν, but compare the change from the singular to the plural in c. 6. 1341 b 10–15 (ὁ πράττων, βακχαύτων). Θεωρητικόν, 'a scientific observer' (Welldon).

tοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. Cp. Plato, Symp. 210 B, τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος, and Critias 112 E, οὗτοι μὲν οὖν δὴ... ἐπὶ πᾶσαν Εὐρώπην καὶ Ἀσίαν κατὰ τα σωμάτων κάλλη καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν παντοτοίαν ἀρετὴν ἐλλαχίστως τοῖς ἤσαν καὶ ὄνομαστόστατοι πάνω τῶν τότε. Aristotle probably would not go so far as Diotima in Plato, Symp. 210 sqq., as to the results of studying τὸ ἐπὶ πάσι τῶν σώμασι κάλλος, but he apparently holds that the study of drawing helps to make men capable of diagnostē. We note that he says nothing of landscape beauty, or of the use of drawing in cultivating a perception of it. In τὰ σώματα he no doubt refers mainly to the bodies of animals,
and especially of human beings (cp. τῶν σωμάτων in c. 4. 1338 b 11). As to Aristotle's value for beauty, cp. Lucian, De Saltat. c. 70, κάλλους δὲ προσώπων καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀρχήμασιν εὔμορφίας, τί ἄλλο ἢ τὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐπαληθεύει, τὸ κάλλος ἐπαινοῦτος καὶ μέρος τρίτον ἡγουμένου τίγαθου καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι; (I do not notice that this dictum is included in Rose's collection of the Fragments of Aristotle, ed. 2, 1886.) For the phrase τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους, cp. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 34, τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὔπορίας, and 1327 a 8, τῆς περὶ ξύλα ἐλισ, and see note in Sus. 4.

3. τοῖς μεγαλοψυχοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις. Cp. Plut. De Amicorum Multitudine, c. 6 sub ἀπ., τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ γενναίοις, and Isocr. Areop. § 43, τοὺς ἐλευθέρους τεθραμμένους καὶ μεγαλοφρανεῖς εἰδοχείους. These passages show that there is no occasion to change ἐλευθέροις into ἐλευθερίας, as Sus. is half inclined to do. As to the μεγαλοψυχοῖς, cp. (with Eaton and Congreve) Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 11 sq.


6. δήλον ἐκ τούτων κ.τ.λ. In beginning the study of γυμναστική and παιδοτριβή at seven, Aristotle follows with some variation in the track of Plato, Laws 794 C, πρὸς δὲ τὰ μαθήματα τρέπεσθαι χρεῶν ἰκατέρους (after the completion of the sixth year), τοὺς μὲν ἄρρενας ἐφ' ἵπται διδασκάλους καὶ τόξων καὶ ἀκοντίων καὶ σφενδονήσεως κ.τ.λ. In the Republic, on the other hand, μουσική seems to precede γυμναστική (403 C, μετὰ δὴ μουσικὴν γυμναστικὴ θρεπτέοι οἱ νεανία: see Stallbaum on Protag. 326 B). At Athens boys began their studies by learning to read and write (act. 7–11); at about eleven they were sent to a harp-player to learn the harp; how early their gymnastic studies began is uncertain (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans. pp. 111–115). Aristotle postpones learning to read and write and learning to sing and play till puberty (c. 4. 1339 a 4 sq.) and puts the boys in charge of gymnastic trainers and παιδοτριβίας from seven till puberty. Till puberty they are to receive no literary training. His scheme of training resembles the Lace-daemonian more than the Athenian, but it avoids imposing on boys the severe physical toil imposed on them at Sparta, and it gives up three years after puberty to the exclusive study of subjects other than gymnastic. We may be quite sure that no young Spartan was permitted to drop gymnastic for three years.

7. τούτων γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 16 sqq., where it is implied that γυμναστική imparts a certain bodily ἔξισ and that παιδοτριβίκη imparts ἐπιστήμην τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγωνιάν. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 5.
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15. 1138 a 31, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ, and Isocr. De Antid. § 183, οἱ μὲν παιδοτρίβαι τὰ σχῆματα τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀγωνίαν εὐρημένα τοὺς φοιτῶντας διδάσκονται: also ‘Αθ. Πολ. c. 42, χειρο[τοι] δὲ (Ὀ δῆμος) καὶ παιδοτρίβαι αὐτῶν δύο καὶ διδασκόνταν [οἱ τινες ὀπλομαχεῖαν καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ακοντίζειν κ[αί] καταπέλτην ἀφεναι διδάσκονται, and Plato, Gorg. 456 E, τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς διδάσκονται μάχεσθαι. But of course the παιδοτρίβαις would teach boys of seven only easy accomplishments, such as shooting with the bow and throwing the dart. In Plato, Gorg. 451 E sq. and 452 B, however (cp. 504 A), the business of the παιδοτρίβαις is said to be to produce physical beauty and strength.

C. 4. 9. Νῦν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν has apparently nothing to answer to it in the sequel; the answering clause would have run, if it had not been suppressed, ‘but we must take quite a different course.’ Little is said by Aristotle in confutation of the first of the two errors here referred to, probably because it was generally felt to be an error, but the second is dealt with at some length, because the Lacedaemonian training still stood high in common opinion. Phocion, for instance, sent his son to Sparta to undergo the training (Plut. Phoc. c. 20). The late Mr. Mark Pattison notes in his copy of Stahr’s edition of the Politics on 1338 b 9–19, ‘Respicit hic locus ad Plat. Rep. libr. iii. et speciatim ad pag. 410 D.’

10. αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἔξω ἐμποιοῦσι. The Thebans are referred to (vol. i. p. 357, note 2: cp. also Plut. Sympos. 2. 5. 2, ἀθικοῖς τε χρήσασθαι καὶ περιτροπαῖς ἄλληλοιν, ὥ δὴ μάλιστα φασιν ἐν Δευτεροῖς τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων παλαιοτρικῶν δυνῶν καταβιβαθτίζαν), and also probably the Argives: cp. Aristophon, Ἰατρός (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 357), δὲ τιν’ ἄρασθαι μέσον τῶν παρακολουθῶν, παλαιστὴν νόμον Ἀργείων μ’ ὀρῶν,
and see Meineke’s note. The Cynic Diogenes agreed with Aristotle in objecting to this kind of training (Diog. Laert. 6. 30, ἕσειτα ἐν τῇ παλαιόστρα οὐκ ἐπέτρεπε τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ ἀθλητικὸς ἄγειν (τοὺς πᾶσας τοῦ ξενάδου), ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ ἐρυθηματος χάρων καὶ ἐυχεῖας). Cp. also Julian, Or. i. 10 D sq. It is to the habit of body characteristic of athletes that Aristotle objects, not to the practice of athletic exercises; the Spartan training included the latter, for instance boxing (cp. Plato, Protag. 342 B sq.), but it did not produce ἡ ἀθλητικὴν ἔξω. In 4 (7). 17. 1336 a 6 we have τὴν πολεμικὴν ἔξω. 'Ἀθλητικὴν, being placed before ἔξω, is emphatic.
The excessive labour from athletes would also tell on their physical growth, no less than the excessive amount of food they took: cp. Isocr. Ad Demon. § 12, ἀνδριάν ἀνδρείαν

12. θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἄνδριαν μάλιστα συμφέρον. Τοῦτο ἦν τὸ θηριώδες ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοῖς πόνοις. So Pericles says of the Spartans (Thuc. 2. 39. 2), καὶ εἰ ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν ἀπόσφοι ἀσκήσει εὑρέθη νῦν ὡς τὸ ἄνδρειον μετέρχονται, and Ephorus of the Cretans (Fragm. 64 Müller, ap. Strab. p. 480), πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ δειλινὰ ἄνδρειαν κρατεῖν, ἐκ παιδῶν ὅπλοις καὶ πόνοις συντρέφειν: cp. Eurip. Suppl. 858 Bothe (884 Dindorf), ἀγροῖς δὲ ναίαν σκηλρὰ τῇ φύσε ἄνδρειον

Hippocrates shared the view that hard physical labour produces courage (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 565 Kühn), καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν ἴσηχίς καὶ ῥαθυμίας ἡ δειλία αὔξεται, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ταλαπωρίας καὶ τῶν πόνων αἱ ἄνδρεια, and p. 566, ἐνσάθεα εἰκός εἴδεα μεγάλα εἶναι καὶ πρῶς ταλαπώρων καὶ ἄνδρειον εὖ πεφυκότα καὶ τὸ τε ἄγραν καὶ τὸ θηριώδες αἵ τοιαῦτα φύσεις οὐκ ἴσηστα ἴχθυνον. Ephorus regarded the Spartans as the reverse of θηριώδεις, for he says of Dercyllidas (Fragm. 130 Müller), ἦν γὰρ οὐδὲν εἰ τῷ τρόπῳ Δακωνίων οὐδὲ ἀπὸν ἤχουν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ τὸ πανούργον καὶ τὸ θηριώδες. Διὸ καὶ Σκύθων αὐτῶν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προσηγόρευον.

14. καίτοι κ.τ.λ. Here we have οὕτε taken up by οὗτε and in 16 by τε ('nay more'): see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 536. 3 a, and note on 1272 b 19.


15. πρὸς μίαν, ταύτην (Ridgeway). 'The extraordinary position of μάλιστα is probably due to the position of μίαν' (Richards). The sentence, if completed, would run, οὗτε πρὸς μίαν ταύτην οὗτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην. See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 452. 1 a.
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16. τούτο, i. e. το πρὸς ταύτην.

17. οὕτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It has not been noticed, so far as I am aware, that Aristotle here tacitly corrects a saying ascribed to Anacharsis in Diod. 9. 26. 3, ὀ δὲ Κροῦσος . . ἤρώτησεν Ἀνάχαραυν . . τίνα νομίζει τῶν ἄντων ἄνδρευτατον’ ὦ δὲ τὰ ἀγρίωτατα τῶν ζῴων ἔφησε, μόνα γὰρ προβούμω ἀποβηνήσκειν ἅπερ τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Does Aeschylus refer to this view of Anacharsis in Suppl. 760, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι φήμη τοὺς λύκους κρείσσους κυνῶν εἶναι βίβλιον δὲ καρπὸς οὐ κρατεὶ στάχυν?

Plato had already said in Rep. 430 B, δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι τὴν ἀρθήν δὰξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄνευ παιδείας γεγονοῦσα, τὴν τε θηρίωδῃ καὶ ἄνδρασπο-

δώδη, οὕτε τίνα νόμιμον ἤγείσθαι, ἄλλο τέ τι ἄνδρεαν καλεῖν. Brave and formidable men, however, were commonly likened to wild animals (Deinon ap. Athen. Deipn. 633 d sq.: Plut. Aristid. c. 18).

19. τοῖς ἡμεροτέροις καὶ λεοντόδεσιν ἠθεσιν. Heracles is called by Homer θυμολέων in II. 5. 639 and Odys. 11. 267 (cp. Hymn. Homer. 15, εἰς Ἡρακλεά λεοντόδομον, and see Liddell and Scott, s. v. θυμολέων). Among the lower animals the dog is probably referred to: cp. Plato, Soph. 231 A, καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγρίωτατον ἡμεροτάτῳ. For the gentleness ascribed to the lion cp. Hist. An. 9. 44. 629 b 8, καὶ γὰρ ὁ λέων ἐν τῇ βρώσει μὲν χαλεπώτατος ἦστι, μὴ πεινών δὲ καὶ βεβρωκός πραότατος: Anal. Pr. 2. 27. 70 b 26, ὁ λέων ἄνδρειον καὶ μεταδοτικόν: and Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b 16, τὰ δὲ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἄνδρεια καὶ εὐγενῆ, οἴον λέων. Plato also has a favourable opinion of the lion (Rep. 589 B). Yet Homer says of Achilles (II. 24. 41), λέων δ᾽ ὥς ἄγρια ὀλιγοῖν.

The authorities followed by Pliny ascribed clemency to the lion (Νatl. Hist. 8. 48, leoni tamant ex feris clementia in supplícies: prostratis parcit et, ubi saevit, in viros potius quam in feminas fremit, in infantes non nisi magna fame).

πολλὰ δ᾽ ἔστι κ.τ.λ. The sense is—and, so far from courage being the offspring of savageness, there are many very savage races which are wholly devoid of courage. The Achaei and Heniochi dwelt on the East coast of the Euxine. The Heniochi were believed to be an offshoot of the Lacedaemonians (Strabo, p. 496, Λάκωνος δὲ (αἰκίσαι) τὴν Ἡνιοχίαν, ὄν ἤρχαν Κράκας καὶ 'Αμφίστρατος οἱ τῶν Διοσκύρων ἤρμοξι, καὶ τοὺς Ἡνιόχους ἀπὸ τούτων εἰκὸς ἀναμισθαί); there is therefore some appropriateness in the reference to them here in an argument directed against Lacedaemonian customs. The wild races on the Euxine are described as θηριώδεις in Eth.
Nic. 7. 6. 1148 b 21 sqq. also. Cannibalism is a sign of ἀγνώστης (Ephor. Fragn. 76, τοῦς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι χαλεποὺς, ὥστε καὶ ἀνθρωποφαγεῖν: Aristot. Hist. An. 2. 1. 501 b 1, ἄγραν καὶ ἀνθρωποφάγαν).

22. τῶν ἰππειροτικῶν ἐθνῶν, 'continental nations,' as distinguished from nations inhabiting islands (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 12, μὴ εἰς νησίδα ἁπαξλέπτωνας, ἀλλ' ἰππειροτικὰ ἐθνὶς καρπομένους). Asiatic nations are probably especially referred to: cp. Isocr. Paneg. § 187, εἰ τῶν μὲν πόλεμον τὸν νῦν ὄντα περὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τοὺς ἰππειρῶτας ποιησάμεθα, τὴν δ' εἰδαμιώνων τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην διακομίσαμεν, and Philip. § 119, where we read of Jason of Pherae, ἐποιεῖτο γὰρ τοὺς λόγους ὡς εἰς τὴν ἰππειρὸν διαβησόμενος καὶ βασιλείς πολεμήσων. Continental races were perhaps regarded as wilder than island races; they were less in the way of intercourse with others.

23. λῃστρικά. Aristotele will not allow that these nations are πολεμικά: he slips in the word λῃστρικά instead: cp. Demosth. Phil. 1. 23, ἀλλὰ ληστεῖς ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦ πολέμου χρήσται τὴν πρώτην, and Strabo, p. 833, where we read of Masinissa, ἀντὶ τοῦ ληστεῖς διδᾶσα (τοὺς νομάδας) στρατεύειν. In Strabo, p. 508, certain ἐθνη are described as λῃστρικά καὶ máχαιma.

ἐστιν—μετειλήφασιν. For the use in the same passage of a singular and a plural verb after a neut. plur. nominative see Bon. Ind. 490 a 56 sqq.

24. ἐτι δ' αὐτοῖς τοὺς Λάκωνας κ.τ.λ. The sense is—besides, we need not go so far afield as to the races of the Euxine to prove that the Lacedaemonian system of gymnastic training is not the true means of producing courage, for the experience of the Lacedaemonian State has proved this.

25. ἐὼς μὲν αὐτοὶ κ.τ.λ. Αὐτοί, 'alone': see notes on 1252 a 14 and 1278 b 24, and cp. De Gen. An. 2. 8. 748 b 5. That the Spartans were thought to be φιλόποιοι, we see from Isocr. Archid. § 56, where Archidamus says, ὅδ' ἰπποὺν σχετιλώτατον, εἰ φιλοποιότατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν Εὐλίκην μαθημάτων τῶν ἄλλων βουλευσόμεθα περί τούτων.

26. νῦν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotele no doubt has before him in his reference to athletic contests the story told of Επαμινόνδας by Plutarch, Pelop. c. 7, 'Επαμινώνδας δὲ τὸν νέον πάλαι φρονήματος ἦν ἐμπεπληκτός· ἐκέλευ ἥρ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ παλαίες, εἶτα ὀρῶν ἐπὶ τῷ κρατεῖν καὶ περεύειν γυαλουμένους ἐπέπλησεν, ὡς αἰσχύνεσθαι μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς προσήκον, εἰ δουλεύοσα δὲ ἀνακριθέν ἦν τοσοῦτον ταῖς ρώμαις διαφέρονσιν. As to the superiority of the Thebans in battle, cp. Diod. 15. 87. 1. For the absence of ἑν
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before τῶν γυμνικῶν ἀγώνι καὶ τῶν πολεμικῶς, cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 33, ἵππηδέντες τῇ περὶ Ἑρετρίαν ναυμαχία, and c. 34. l. 4.

27. οὗ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Lord Macaulay says the same thing in his note, History of England, c. 23 (Cabinet Edition, vol. viii. p. 13), though he does not refer to the Politics. That at Athens there was no public training for war, we see from Xen. Mem. 3. 12. 5. Τῷ μονὸν μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦσας ἀσκεῖν = τῷ μονὸν πρὸς μὴ ἀσκοῦσας ἀσκεῖν, according to Bonitz (Ind. 539 a 42), who remarks, ‘interdum negatio universo enunciato vel enunciati membro praeponitur, cum pertineat ad unum quoddam eius vocabulum,’ and gives many other instances.

28. For τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον see note on 1281 a 21.

30. οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 357, note 3, and cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 a 25, διὸ καὶ οἱ ἄγριοι θηρεῖ ἀνθρεῖ δοκοῦσαν εἶναι, οὐκ ὅτε οὗτος ἦν γὰρ ἐκτόσι, τοιούτοι εἰσίν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνωμαλοὶ, ὅπερ οἱ θρασεῖ. It would seem from Plato, Laches 196 E sq. that everybody regarded wild animals as courageous (cp. Laws 963 E). Gryllus is made to argue to this effect in Plut. Gryllus, c. 4. 988 C sq.

οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων. For the gen. see note on 1259 b 24.


32. οὗ δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘but those who throw boys too much into these hard physical exercises and leave them untrained in necessary things make them in truth [not good men, but] sordid, for they make them useful to political science only for one task, and for this, as our inquiry tells us’ (cp. 27, λειτουργοὺς ἔτερον), ‘less well than others do.’ Cp. [Plato,] Erastae 136 A, καλὸς γε μοι, ἐφθήνοι καὶ κακοθείς, φαίνει υπολαμβάνει τὰ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπεικάσας αὐτὸν τῷ πεινάθλῳ ἄρτον ἄρεσκόντος ὅπως μὴ δουλεύειν μηδενὶ πράγματι μηδὲ ἐς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μηδὲν διατεπορηκότα, ὡστε διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐνότον τοῦτον ἐπιμείκον ἄλλων ἀπόντων ἀπολείπεθαι, ὡσπερ οἱ δημογοργοὶ, ἄλλα πάντων μετρίως ἐβῆναι. Cp. also Plato, Laws 644 A, τὴν δὲ δὴ χρήματα τείνοσαν (παύειν) ἢ τοια τὰ πρὸς ἴσχυν ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τὴν σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης βάναυσον τ’ εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρεῖτον καὶ οὐκ ἅξιον το παράπαν παύειν καλείσθαι. In τῶν ἀναγκάιων ἀπαίδαγγοις ποιήσατε Aristotle appears to imply that the Lacedaemonian State did not oblige the young Spartan to learn to read and write (see Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 100 sq.). Has
he in his mind the language used by Archidamus (Thuc. i. 84) not without reference to his own countrymen, πολύ τε διαφέρουν οἱ δὲ νομίζουν ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρώπου, κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι δῶτις ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις παιδεύεται? For εἰς ταύτα ἀνίστες cp. Hdt. 2. 165, ἀνέστη τοῖς τοῦ μάχισμον, and 167, τοῦ ἐς τῶν πάλευμον ἀνείμινον.

35. ὥσ φησίν ὁ λόγος, cp. Plato, Phaedr. 274 A, ὥσ ὁ λόγος φησίν, and Soph. 259 C, ὥσ ὁ νῦν λόγος φασί. ‘Formula ὁ λόγος σημαίνει apud Platonem creberrimi usus est’ (see Stallbaum on Plato, Polit. 275 E). In Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 21 we have σημαίνει ὁ λόγος οὗτος: cp. also Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 34, ἔσκε τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον κ.τ.λ.

36. δὲ δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and we ought to judge [whether they train them worse than others do]’ etc. This remark may probably have reference to a reply of the Lacedaemonians to the Thebans, when the latter bade them fight or acknowledge their inferiority to the Thebans; the Lacedaemonians answered, περὶ μὲν τοῦ πότεροι βελτίως τὰ πράξεις κρίνει τὰ ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἑκατέρως πεπραγμένας κ.τ.λ. (Aristid. Or. in Platon. 4. ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 248. 425 a 21 sqq. Bekker).

37. ἀνταγωνιστάς τῆς παιδείας, ‘rivals in gymnastic education’ (Sepulv. ‘concertatores et aemulos disciplinae’).

40. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡ βῆς κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον κ.τ.λ. Aristotle would no doubt exclude at this age the pancration and the pentathlon, which were among the βαρύτερα ἄθλα (Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 179: Paus. 6. 24. 1), and would probably desire that contests even in running and leaping should be made as little exacting as possible. In the Panathenaea at one time boys contended in the pentathlon, but later on this was dropped (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 373). See vol. i. p. 358, note 1, and cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 24 sq. In Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 26 sub fin. it is implied that ἀναγκαῖα ἄθλα are not suitable for a boy of fifteen.

τὴν βίαιον τροφήν, ‘the constrained diet of athletes’: see Liddell and Scott s.v. ἀναγκοροφέος, and cp. Hippocr. De Diaet. i. vol. i. p. 664 Kühn, γυμνασίον τῶν ἄπρο βίης γυμνείμων.

41. τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους. Cp. Rhet. i. ii. 1370 a 16, οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τούτων.

1. δίναται, sc. ἡ βίαιος τροφὴ καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνοι. If with 1339 a. P.23.4 Bekk. we read δίναται, we must supply τὰ ἀναγκαῖα γυμνάσια (cp. 4).
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ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὀλυμπιονίκαις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle would seem to have had a list of Olympic victors before him, and possibly not merely the list inscribed on stone at Olympia, but a list in the form of a book. 'With the year B.C. 776 began the list of Olympic victors used by the Alexandrian writers on chronology. A list of this kind was first published by the sophist Hippias of Elis, a contemporary of Socrates (Plut. Numa, c. i : cp. Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 61 and Zeller, Gr. Ph. i. 958. i). The list was later dealt with by Aristotle and others' (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, i. 585). See on this subject Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 109. i (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., i. 104. i): V. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 545 sqq.: Heitz, Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 254. Milo of Crotona was one of the exceptions; he won in the wrestling-match for boys at Olympia, and also won in the wrestling-match for men at six Olympic festivals between B.C. 532 and 512 (Holm, Gr. Gesch. i. 439). In Herondas i. 50 sqq. Gryllus, the hero of the piece, is said to have achieved almost as much.


4. ὅταν δ' ἡβης κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 358, note 2. The 'other studies' are reading and writing, music and drawing. Plato, on the other hand (Laws 809 E sqq.), allots three years (aet. 10-13) to reading and writing, and three more (aet. 13-16) to lessons on the harp. Aristotle evidently thinks it better to postpone these studies till after the attainment of puberty. His view is that mental work is not favourable to the body (1339 a 7 sqq.), and he desires that the important physical change involved in the attainment of puberty should have been safely and well achieved before any mental training begins. By ἡβης Aristotle evidently means (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1337 a 1, τῇ διαφέρει τῆς φύσεως) not the attainment of the age at which youths arrived at ἡβης in the eye of the law, but the advent of physical puberty, which seems to be placed in the fourteenth year in Hippocr. Coacae Praenotiones, vol. i. p. 321 Kühn. Aristotle appears to devote to the more exacting kind of gymnastic training all the years intervening between three years after puberty and twenty-one. He makes no provision for the military duties which occupied the young Athenian during his nineteenth and twentieth years (see note on
5 (8). 4. 1339 a 3—5. 1339 a 17.

1336 b 37). We do not learn when the youth of Aristotle's 'best State' were to begin their military training, but they would not do so apparently till after twenty-one. Plato in the Laws (833 D, 834 A) abolishes the heavier kind of gymnastic contests at festivals, such as wrestling and the pancration, but this is perhaps in part because he is legislating for Cretans.

7. ἀμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 359, note i. This rule does not seem to be observed among ourselves. Much hard work is done on the river and in the football-field by youths who are preparing for difficult examinations. In a lecture before the Sanitary Congress at Brighton in 1890 the late Sir B. Richardson pointed out that in those occupations in which 'mental and bodily work was combined, the strain was most intense, and that those sorts of work should never be carried into weariness' (Times, Sept. 1. 1890).

12. καὶ πρότερον, in c. 3. 1337 b 27 sqq.

13. For ἐνδόσιμον see Bon. Ind. s. v., where the passage before us is grouped with Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 a 5 sqq., in which passage ἐνδόσιμον = προσιμόν.

14. οὔτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Μετέχειν αὐτῆς, 16, is a vague expression, but probably means 'study it' (cp. παθένειν, 27, and see note on 1337 b 29). This question must be settled in order that we may ascertain how music is to be studied, for if it is to be studied for the sake of recreation, the tunes and rhythms to be practised by the pupil will be quite other than those which will be practised by him if it is to be studied for the sake of virtue or intellectual enjoyment. A classification of studies into αἱ ἁθοποιοί, αἱ πρὸς ἡδονή τινα καὶ χάριν ελευθέρων σπουδαζόμεναι, and αἱ εἰς σόνεσιν ἡ πράξιν λεγόμεναι is implied in Plut. Themist. c. 2—a classification which calls to some extent that in the passage before us. Compare also the witticism of Dorion, a musician and bon vivant of Aristotle's day, about a kind of lobster, τοὺς δὲ καράβους ἐφι τρία ἐξεν, διαγριθῆν καὶ εὔωχιαν καὶ ἱερώταν (Athen. Deipn. 337 ε).

17. καθάπερ ὑπνοι καὶ μέθης. As to sleep, cp. Rhet. i. ii. 1370 a ii, τάς 8' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τάς σπουδάς καὶ τάς συννοίας λυπηράς . . . τά 8' ἐναντία ἡδᾶ' διὸ αἱ μυρημια καὶ αἱ ἀπονίαι καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι καὶ αἱ παθίαι καὶ αἱ ἀναπούσεις καὶ 8' ὑπνοι τῶν ἡδῶν, and De Somno et Vigilia 2. 455 b 20 sqq.

ταύτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these things are not in themselves connected with virtue, but are pleasurable and at the same time "bid care to
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cease," as Euripides says, [and therefore they are used with a view to relaxation]." For τῶν σπουδαίων, cp. Theogn. 115,
oplois τοις πόσιοι καὶ βρώσιοι εἴσαν ἔταροι, ἐν δὲ σπουδαῖο πρῆγματι παιφότεροι,
and Plato, Symp. 181 A, ὡσ ὁ νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν, ἡ πῖνειν ἡ ἡδεῖν ἡ διαλέγεσθαι, οἷς ἐστὶ τούτων αὐτῷ καὶ αὐτῷ καλὸν οὐδεί, ἄλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει, ὡς ἐν πράξθη, τοιοῦτον ἀπείδη, and see vol. i. p. 359, note 2. For οὖτε followed by ἄλλα, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 11 sqq., Magn. Mor. 2. 6. 1303 b 10, 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 16. 1. 8, and with Kaibel (Stil und Text der Politieia 'Αθηναῖων, p. 158), Rhet. i. i. 1355 b 7 sqq. and 2. 21. 1394 a 22, where Roemer reads οὐ μέντοι οὐτε περὶ κ.τ.λ. In Metaph. θ. 3. 1046 b 33-36 οὔτε is taken up by οὕτως δὲ (see Bonitz' note on the passage in his edition of the Metaphysics). Aristotle has Eurip. Bach. 332 Bothe (377 Dindorf) before him, where we read of Bromius,

οὐ τάδ᾽ ἔχει
θησεύειν τε χοροῖς, μετὰ τ' αὖλοι γελάσαι
ἀποστάσαι τε μερίμνας, ὁπτὰν βρότους ἁλη
γάνον ἐν δαιτ θεῶν, κυστοφόρους δ' ἐν βαλλαῖς
ἀνδράσι κρατήρ ὑπνών ἀμφιβαλλη.

Here, as he says in 19-21, ὑπνοὶ μὲθή μονακίγι and ὄρχησις are all grouped together. The same is the case in Hom. II. 13. 636 (cp. Lucian, De Saltat. c. 23),

πάντων μὲν κόρος ἐστὶ, καὶ ὑπνοῦ καὶ φιλότητος
μολιπή τε γλυκερής καὶ ἀμόμωνος ὄρχησμοι,
and Odyss. 8. 248,

αἰεὶ δ' ἡμῶν δαίς τε ἕλη κάθαρις τε χοροῖ τε
εἰματά τ' ἐξήμιαβα λεστρά τε θερμά τε καινί.

Cp. also Athen. Deipn. 40a.

19. διὸ καὶ τάπτουσιν κ.τ.λ. Supply μετὰ πάντων τούτων from what follows. Cp. 1339 b 14, εἰλόγος δ' εἰς πάντα τάπτεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν (sc. πάντων), c. 7. 1342 a 14, where πάντα must be supplied with κοινφιεσθαί, 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 37, καὶ περὶ δὲν ὁ νόμος ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινώσων ἄλλ' ἀκολουθῶσι (sc. τῷ νόμῳ), and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 31, where εἰς τὴν σύνοδον ταύτην is suppressed after ἀπαγορεῦσι.

21. τίθεαι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις. This view implied that dancing is a cure for care. The sight of dancing must apparently be meant. Lucian says (De Saltat. c. 79), οὕτω δὲ δηλεῖ ὄρχησις, ὡστε ... λύπη ἐξομενός (τις) ἐξερχεται τοῦ θεάτρου φαυδότερος ὡστε τι φάρμακον ληθεδανόν καὶ κατὰ τῶν ποιητὴν νηπευθὲς τε καὶ ἄχωλον
πῶν. He goes further in c. 81, and claims that it has a good ethical effect on the spectator.

η μᾶλλον οἰητέον πρὸς ἀρετήν τι τεῖνει τὴν μουσικήν κ.τ.λ. This is answered in 1340 b 10 sqq. Ἀρετή, 'moral virtue,' is represented by παιδείαν in c. 5. 1339 b 13 (cp. c. 7. 1341 b 38), for education is commonly connected by Aristotle with the production of moral virtue: cp. c. 7. 1342 a 2, πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις (ἄρμονίας χρηστεύον).

26. φρόνησιν, 'intellectual culture': see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 772. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., 2. 309. 3), and Sus., Note 1023 (Sus., i. p. 585), who rightly defend the words καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν against those who would expunge them or change φρόνησιν into εἰφροσύνην. That the study of music may contribute to intellectual virtue is implied in c. 6. 1341 b 6 sqq., and that intellectual virtue is the ultimate end of education we see from 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 14 sqq. For the use of φρόνησις in this sense, see Bon. Ind. 831 b 4 sqq.

τρίτον τῶν εἰρημένων, 'third among the aims which have been enumerated': see Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 19.

ὁτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by ἄλλα μὲν, 29. Stallbaum on Plato, Protag. 326 A, compares Xen. Cyrop. 2. 2. 14, κλαύμαςι μὲν γε καὶ πατέρες νίκοι σωφροσύνην μηχανώσαν καὶ διδάσκαλοι παις ἄγα-θὰ μαθήματα. Is Aristotle here tacitly correcting Plato, Laws 819 B, πρὸςον μὲν γὰρ περὶ λογισμοῖς ἀτεχνῶ παις εὐεργεμένα μαθήματα, μετὰ παιδίασ τε καὶ ἰδιων μαθήσειν, and 820 D, ταῦτα τοῖν ἐν γω μὲν, καὶ Κλεανία, φημὶ τοῖν νόῦν δεῖν μαθάνειν καὶ γὰρ οὕτε βλαζέτα οὕτε χαλεπά ἄστι, μετὰ δὲ παιδίας ἀμα μαθαίνομεν ὁφελήσης μεν, βλάψει δὲ ἡμῖν την πόλιν οὐδέν; 29. ἄλλα μὲν οὖν διαγωγῆν γε παισιν κ.τ.λ. For ἄλλα μὲν οὖν ... γε, cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 30, ἄλλα μὲν οὖν ἀρχεῖν γε τοῦ τοιοῦτον, and 4 (7). Ι. 1331 a 7. Euicken (De Partic. Usu, p. 15) has anticipated me in comparing these passages.


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31. ἀλλ' ἵνως κ.τ.λ. The sense is—but perhaps the toils of boyhood in learning to play may, notwithstanding what has been said, be for the sake of pastime, not indeed for the sake of pastime in youth, but for the sake of pastime in manhood. The Lacedaemonian Leotychidas, the first in the royal line to bear this name at Sparta, in answer to the question, Τί δὲι μάλιστα μαθήματα τούς ἔλευθέρους πᾶιδας; said, Ταῦτα, δι' ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀφελήσειν ἄνδρας γενομένους (Plut. Apophth. Lac. Leotych. 3), and Aristippus replied to a similar question, ὅς ἄνδρες γενόμενοι χρήσονται (Diog. Laert. 2. 80).

33. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον κ.τ.λ., i. c. εἰ ἢ τῶν παιδῶν σπουδὴ ἐστὶ παιδίας χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ τελειωθείσιν. The supposition is somewhat of a paradox: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 32, σπουδάζων δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν παιδίας χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λιαν παιδικον' παιξεῖν δ’ ὅπως σπουδάζω, καθ’ Ἀνάχαρισθ'. Ὁδ' ἐξειν δοκεῖ. The Persian kings had μουσικὴν attached to their court (Xen. Cyrop. 4. 6. 11). Compare Plut. Pericl. c. 1, 6 ὁ δὲ τεῖταρος πρὸς τὸν ιόν ἔπειτα ἐν την πόλιν ψήλατα καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐπείν, "Οὐκ αἰσχύνη καλὸς οὔτω ψάλλων," ἀρκεῖ γάρ, ἃν βασιλεὺς ἀκροαθα ψαλλόντων σχολάζῃ, καὶ πολὺ νέμει τοῖς Μούσαις, ἐτέρων ἄγωνιζομένων τὰ ταῦτα θεατὴς γεγομένοις. Ἀυτὰ ποιοῦντα, i. e. χειροποιοῦντων, which is implied in μαθήματα αὐτοῖς (cp. c. 7. 1342 a 3). So we have in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 30, δριν αὐτὸ δύνασθα, and in Plato, Rep. 498 A, ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων.


39. τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'things such as have been mentioned,' but what things are meant? 'Things which will be a source of pleasure in after-years' (so Vict.), or 'things which afford pleasure' (Sus.), or 'musical performances' (Welldon)? The question is not free from doubt, but I incline to the third interpretation, as ταῦτα in 42 seems to mean 'musical performances,' and not τὰ δυναμένα τὰ ἦδη βελτίων ροιεῖν. 

καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄψων πραγματείαν κ.τ.λ. Richards is probably right in adding τὰ before περὶ (see critical note), though we expect τὰ ὄψα with παρασκευάζειν rather than the cumbrous periphrasis τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄψων πραγματείαν. If the reading of the MSS. is retained, ὄψα or some such word must be supplied with παρασκευάζειν. Bonitz
(Ind. s.v.) explains πραγματεία as 'rei alicuius tractatio via ac ratione instituta.' Παρασκευάζειν is especially used of cooks: cp. Plato, Gorg. 518 B, οὖν θαμασία γεγένασι σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτων θαμαστοῖς παρασκευάζεις, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον. Cookery no less than music is a source of refreshment and pleasure to grown-up men. But it was regarded by the Greeks as work for slaves (1. 7. 1255 b 23–27: Plut. Lycurg. et Num. comp. c. 2, ἀλλ' ἦν ἡ περὶ τὰ χρήματα κατασκευή δεδομένη δούλους καὶ Ἐξάσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ περὶ τὸ δίεισιν καὶ ὄψεν διακονία: Pomp. c. 73, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ τούτων περίποιων καὶ θεραπεύων δοκεῖ δεσπότας δούλων μέχρι νύσσεως ποδῶν καὶ διείσιν παρασκευής). Has Sextus Empiricus this passage of the Politics before him in Adv. Math. 6. 33, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ ποτὲ, ἐν τρόπον χωρίς ὀφαρτυνίης καὶ οἰνογευστικῆς ἱδρύμεθα ὄψον ἢ οἶνον γευσάμενοι, ὥστε καὶ χωρίς μουσικῆς ἱσθένειν ἢ τερπινοῦ μέλους ἀκούσαντες?

41. ἔχει, sc. ἡ μουσική.

42. ταύτα, i.e. musical performances.

1. ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, i.e. μανδάνειν δύνασθαι 1339 b. ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ ὀρθῶς κρίνειν, or in other words to learn to become better in character: cp. 1340 a 15, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν. For the place of δύνασθαι cp. 3. 1337 b 31, and see note on 1281 a 26.

2. ἔκεινοι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Athenaeus may have this passage before him in Deipn. 628 b, Δακεδαμάνοι δ', εἰ μὲν ἐμανθάνον τὴν μουσικήν, οὐδὲν λέγουσιν ὅτι δὲ κρίνειν δύναται καλὸς τὴν τέχνην ὁμολογεῖται παρ' αὐτῶν, καὶ φασὶ τρίς ἤδη σεσωκέναι διαφθείρομένην αὐτήν. The Spartans learnt to sing (Plut. Lycurg. c. 21), and we read in c. 6. 1341 a 33 of one Spartan at any rate who had learned to play on the αὐλὸς—indeed, the Peripatetic Chamaeleon, a pupil of Aristotle, asserted that at one time they commonly learnt to play on the αὐλὸς (Athen. Deipn. 184 d)—but it would seem that in Aristotle’s day they did not commonly learn to play on any instrument.

7. οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς κ.τ.λ. It is Apollo, not Zeus, whom the poets represent as singing and playing on the harp (Eurip. Ion 827 Bothe, 905 Dindorf, νῦ δὲ κιθάρα κλίζεις παιδῶσ μέλων). In the older poetic descriptions, however, according to Preller, Griech. Mythologie i. 215, Apollo does not sing but only plays, while the Muses sing to his playing (e.g. in Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 201 sqq.). For τοῖς ποιήσαι, see Kühner, Ausführli. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 423. 3, where Plato, Rep. 389 E, 'ομήρῳ, and Laws 706 D, αὐτῷ, are compared. Vahlen (Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 4. 417) compares Poet. 18.
1456 a 25, τὸν χορὸν δεί ... συναγωνίζεσθαι μὴ ὅσπερ Εὐρηπίδη ἀλλ’ ὅσπερ Σωφοκλῆ. Aristotle elsewhere uses the form ἄδειν: he may possibly use δεῖν here because he is quoting from a poet.

9. τοῦς τοιούτους, i.e. τούς ἀείδοντας καὶ καθαρίζοντας. In Hom. Odyss. 17. 382 sqq. the ἄδειος is counted among δημιουργοί. Compare Croesus’ advice to Cyrus as to the Lydians (Hdt. i. 155), προέτει δ’ αὐτοῖς κιβαρίζειν τε καὶ ψάλλειν καὶ καπηλεύειν παιδεύειν τούς παῖδας’ καὶ ταχέως σφέας, ὃ βασιλεὺς, γυναῖκας ἀντ’ ἀνδρῶν ὄψει γεγονότας, ὥστε οὖν ἔννοι τοι ἐστοὶ μὴ ἀποστέωσί.


13. παιδείαν. See above on 1339 a 21. Παιδείαν corresponds to τὰ ἡδή βελτίω ποιεῖν, 1339 a 41.

14. εἰς πάντα τάττεται. Cp. Eth. Nic. i. 9. 1099 b 7, ὅθεν εἰς ταῦτα τάττουσιν ἐνοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. Μετέχειν, sc. πάντων. See above on 1339 a 19. ὃ τε γὰρ παιδία κ.τ.λ., ‚for pastime [must be pleasurable, since it] is for the sake of relaxation and relaxation must be pleasurable, for it is a cure for the pain which is produced by toil, [and things are cured by their contraries].’ For the famous principle that things are cured by their contraries, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 17, ἱπτανυαν γὰρ τῶν εἰσιν, αἱ δε ἱπτανυα διὰ τῶν ἔναντιπ περακαὶ γίνεσθαι (see Stewart), and 4. 11. 1126 a 21 sq. Aristotle inherits this principle from Hippocrates: cp. Hippocr. Aphorism. vol. iii. p. 714 Kühn, ἀπό πλησιμονῆς οὐκαίναν νοσήματα γένηται, κένωσις ἤστα, καὶ ὄσκα ἀπὸ κενώσεως, πλησιμονῆ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὑ ὑπεναντίως, and De Natura Hominis, vol. i. p. 361 Kühn. Compare with τὴν δ’ ἀνάσημους κ.τ.λ. Pindar, Nem. 4. 1, ἀριστος εὐφροσύνα τῶν κεκρυμένων λατρός.

In the passage before us and in c. 3. 1337 b 36 sqq. we get a glimpse of Aristotle’s Theory of Relaxation, if he can—we said to have one. The essential thing about relaxation is that it must be pleasurable. Toil causes pain and pain is cured by its opposite; hence if the pain of toil is cured by relaxation, relaxation must be pleasurable. Play is a means of relaxation, but there are other means also—sleep and conviviality (1339 a 16 sqq.). Sleep and conviviality heal care as well as the pain of toil (ibid.); whether
play does so we are not told. Play, unlike sleep, involves movement (4. 7. 1336 a 26 sqq.); it may even be toilsome, though it is a cure for toil (1336 a 28 sqq.). Unlike sleep, again, it may be of a right or a wrong kind ethically; it may, for instance, be illiberal (1336 a 29: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 17 sqq.); hence it may affect the character for good or ill. In infancy no toil is undergone, so that the play of infancy does not come as a relaxation after toil. Aristotle distinguishes diagogê from relaxation, for though diagogê is pleasurable, it has in it an element of to kalôn which relaxation has not (1339 b 17 sqq.). We may probably infer that diagogê will not serve as relaxation. Does it need to be followed by relaxation as ἄσχολία does? Aristotle does not consider this question, but the answer to it is probably in the negative. It is true that the activities called into play in diagogê are activities of so high a kind (see note on 1333 a 35) that they may well cause fatigue needing to be removed by relaxation, but we must remember on the other hand that Aristotle regards them as pleasurable (c. 5. 1339 b 17 sqq.) and desirable for their own sake. ἄσχολία is accompanied by pain (c. 3. 1337 b 39), and hence the need that it should be followed by relaxation.

19. τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν κ.τ.λ., ‘for happiness, [which is an accompaniment of diagogê,] consists of both these things.’ See vol. i. p. 296, note 1, and cp. Stob. Ecl. 2. 6. 12, ἔδωσαν γὰρ τι καὶ κάλλιστον εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. That happiness is an accompaniment of diagogê, we see from c. 3. 1338 a 1 sqq.


21. Μουσαίος. See note in Sus. 4.

22. καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγαῖς. See critical note on 1330 b 31.

24. ᾧστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν κ.τ.λ. Ἐντεῦθεν, i. e. from the fact of its pleasantness. Παθεῖσθαι is probably middle: cp. 1340 b 13.

25. ὁσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for things harmlessly pleasant, [of which music is one,] are suitable not only for the end’ (i. e. happiness), ‘but also for relaxation.’ That the pleasure derived from music is harmless had already been said by Plato (Laws 670 D, ἰνα ... ἄδωνες αὐτοὶ τε ἤδωσα τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀσινεῖ ἤδωσαν κ.τ.λ.). Plato had also connected harmless pleasure with pastime in Laws 667 E,
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KL, ἀβδλαβὴ λέγεις ἡδωνὴν μόνον. ΔΘ. ναί, καὶ παιδιὰν γε εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην λέγοντε, ὅταν μῆτε τι βλάπτῃ μῆτε ὀφθελῇ σπουδής ἡ λόγου ἄξιων. For ἀρμόττεων πρὸς, cp. 8 (6). i. 1317 a 10, ποία μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποίαιν ἀρμόττει πάλιν, and Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 34.

27. For ἐν τῷ τελεί γίνεσθαι cp. Plato, Laws 635 C, γεγομένου ἐν ταῖς ἡδωναῖς (icum versantur in voluptatibus, Stallbaum), and 841 C, γεγονὸς ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, and Phileb. 35 E.

29. οὐχ δὲν ἐπὶ πλέον, apparently 'not merely with a view to a further end' (Vicr. 'non ut plus inde capiant'). I have not happened to meet with a parallel to this use of ἐπὶ πλέον. For οὐχ δὲν in the sense of 'not only,' cp. Thuc. 4. 62. 2 (Liddell and Scott).

30. διαναπαύειν, 'to let them rest awhile' (Liddell and Scott).

31. συμβεβηκε δὲ κ. τ.λ. The meaning is—but men are not content with using pastime as a means of obtaining the relaxation and pleasure of which they often stand in need; they fall into the error of confounding it with the end of life, and seek happiness in the pleasures arising from it. Pastime is χρῆσιμον (1339 b 30), or in other words a means to the end (Eth. Nic. 8. 2. 1155 b 19 sq.: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1096 a 7, χρῆσιμον καὶ ἄλλου χάριν), but instead of regarding it thus, they take it to be the end of life.

33. ἀλλὰ οὗ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, 'but not any chance kind of pleasure.' Prof. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 211), compares Poet. 14. 1455 b 10, οὗ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδωνὴν ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν, and 26. 1462 b 13, δεῖ γὰρ ὦ τὰ τυχοῦσαν ἡδωνὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς (i.e. tragedy and epic poetry) ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημεῖν. Aristotle perhaps has before him Plato, Laws 657 E, συνχωρεῖ δὴ τὸ γε τοποῦ καὶ ἐγὼ τὰς πολλὰς, δεῖν τὴν μουσικὴν ἡδωνὴν κρίνεσθαι, μὴ μέντοι τῶν γε ἐπιστραχῦν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐκεῖνην εἶναι Μοῦσαν καλλίστην, ἦτε τῶν βελτίστων καὶ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένως τέρπει. ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην κ. τ. λ., 'and seeking this' (i.e. the pleasure of the end) 'they take the other' (i.e. the pleasure of pastime) 'as being this.' Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 2, οἵ δ' εὐθὺς ὁδὸς ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἔξωθαν ὑπαρχοῦσαν, and see note on that passage.

36. οί τοιαῦτα τῶν ἡδωνῶν, 'the pleasures we have mentioned,' i.e. the pleasures of pastime. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 9, καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι (sc. καθ' αὐτὰς εἰσὶν αἴρεται) οὐ γὰρ δὲ ἐτέρα αὐτὰς αἱροῦνται, and 34, ἀναπαύεις γὰρ ἑαυτὲν ἡ παιδία, ἀδυνατοῦτες δὲ συνεχῶς ποιεῖν ἀναπαύουσας δένουσι. See note in Sus. 4.

38. For the needless addition of αἰτίαν in the relative sentence,
5 (8). 5. 1339 b 27—1340 a 5.

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40. περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν κ.τ.λ. Compare the similarly analogolthic sentence, 3. 16. 1287 a 8, περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλομένης, αὕτη δ' ἐστι καθ ἣν ἄρχει πάντα κατὰ τήν ἐαυτοῦ βούλησιν ο ἐβασιλεύως— δοκεῖ δὲ τινι οὖδὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τό κύριον ἔνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν. Sus. would supply (after θοικεῖ) εἰκότως ἢν τις ὑπολάβῃ ζητεῖσθαι (or γινεῖσθαι). Perhaps, however, it is simpler to supply ζητεῖσθαι, which comes to the surface, as it were, in the next sentence. Κοινωνεῖν τής μουσικῆς, 'have recourse to music': cp. c. 6. 1341 a 1, ποιῶν μελῶν καὶ ποιῶν ρυθμῶν κοινωνητέον. Οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην, σκ. τήν αἰτίαν.

42. οὐ μὲν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. Cp. Probl. 10. 42. 895 a 33, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν συμβεβηκεν, αἰτίων δὲ καὶ ταῦς γνωσείν ὅτι ἡ θερμότης κἀτῳ ὀρμῇ. A contrast is here drawn between the accidents of a thing and its nature or essence (φύσις = οὐσία, see Bon. Ind. 545 b 23 sqq., where Metaph. Δ. 4. 1014 b 35, ἐτι δ' ἄλλον τρόπον λέγεται ἡ φύσις ἡ τῶν φύσεως δυνών οὐσία, is referred to among other passages). For the contrast of οὐσία and συμβεβηκός, see Metaph. Π. 4. 1007 a 31 sqq.

2. καὶ δὲι κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 6. 1341 a 15 sqq. and Probl. 28. 7. 1340 a. 950 a 5, ἢ διὰ τὸ τάς ἀπὸ τούτων γιανομένα ἠδονίς κοινάς εἶναι ἢμῶν καὶ τῶς ἅλλος ἔφοι; ὃτε οὖν οὖσαι κοιναὶ άγιμόπαται εἶσαι καὶ μάλιστα ἡ μῶν ἐπονείδιστοι. The many know not what true pleasure is (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 15). For τῆς κοινῆς ἠδονῆς ἢν ἐχουσι πάντες εἴσασθεν, cp. Metaph. B. 2. 996 b 28, τὰς κοινὰς δόξας εἰ δὲ ἀπαντεῖς δεικνύωσιν. Aristotle implies that this κοινή ἠδονή does not affect the character or the soul; he probably regards it as pleasure of a merely physical kind. For the view that pleasure which comes by nature is common to all, cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 8, τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμίων αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἵδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι οἴον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική τᾶς γὰρ ἐπίθετε εἰ ἐνδεχεται ἡ ἕγραφ τροφῆ, ὅτε δ' ἄμφοι, Phys. 8. 7. 261 b 25 sqq., and Plato, Laws 963 E. Cp. also Diphilus, Πολυπράγμων Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 407).

τὰς ἀλλ' ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. Πολυβ. 'sed etiam videre numquid ad mores quoque animamque pertineat.' For σωτείνειν τρόφος, cp. Περὶ νεότητος.
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kai γήρος, 3. 469 a 20, διὰ τι δ' αι μεν των αἰσθήσεωι φανερῶς συντείνουσι πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν, οἱ δ' εἰσὶν εἰ τῇ κεφαλῇ ... τὸ αἵτων τοῦτων εἰς ἔτεροις εἶρηται χωρίς. Πρὸς τὸ θῆνος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν, cp. 11, τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἡθος, and see note on 1337 a 38: cp. also Plato, Symp. 195 E, ἐν γὰρ ἠθείᾳ καὶ ψυχώι θεῶι καὶ ἄνθρωπων τὴν ὄσκησιν ἦρωται ('Ερως). For συντείνει cp. De Part. An. 3. 4. 667 a 11, αἰ δὲ διαφορά τῆς καρδίας κατὰ μέγαθος τε καὶ μικρότατα καὶ σκληροτάτα καὶ μαλακότατα τείνουσι τῇ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἡθην. For the repetition of the preposition see critical note on 1331 b 24. Plato had already said in Rep. 401 D, ἀρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ Πλατόνος, τούτων ἑνεκα κυριωτάτη ἐν μονοετῇ τροφῇ, ὅτι μάλιστα καταλύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς δ' τε μυθός καὶ ἀρμονία καὶ ἐρωμενεύστατα ἀπετεῖν αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐχερείαν, καὶ ποιεὶ ἐνσεχισμον, ἐὰν τὰς ὀρθὰς τραφῆς, εἰ δὲ μῆ, τούσικτον; (cp. Laws 673 A), and in Tim. 47 D, ἢ δὲ ἀρμονία, ἔγγυεις ἵχουσα φορᾶς ταῖς ἐν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς περίοδοις, τῷ μετὰ νοῦ προσχρωμένῳ Μοῦσαι οὐκ ἢ λαλὴν ἀλογον, καθάπερ νῦν, εἶναι δοκεῖ χρήσιμοι, καλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν γεγονόταν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνάρμοστον ψυχής περίοδον εἰς κατακάσμησιν καὶ συμφωνίαν εὐαρτή ἐξωμαχοὶ ὑπὸ Μοῦσῶν δέσσοται. Both these passages are probably present to Aristotle's mind here.

9. διὰ τῶν Ὄλυμπου μελῶν. Eaton refers to Plato, Symp. 215 C, τὰ οὖν ἐκείνου (i.e. Ὅλυμπου), εὰν τε ἄγαθος αὐλητίς αὐλή εὰν τε φαύλη αὐλητρίς, μόνα κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοὶ τῶν τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν δεομένων διὰ τὸ θεῖα εἶναι. Bernays (Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, Note 5) uses the passage before us to show that, when in c. 7. 1342 a 8 sqq. Aristotle describes the effect of τα ἱππα μέλη, it is to these melodies of Olympus that he mainly refers. See as to them Sus. i. 621 sqq.

11. ὃ δ' ἐνθουσιασμὸς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has to prove that music affects τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡθος, therefore he has to prove that the ἐνθουσιασμὸς which it admittedly produces is an affection of τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡθος. Some may have regarded it as a σωματικὸν πάθος, like the πάθη referred to in Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 b 8 sqq., and others as a special condition of the νοῦς (cp. Plato, Ion 534 B, κονίβων γὰρ χρήμα ποιητῆς ἐστι καὶ πητόν καὶ λεγόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἴος τοὶ ποιεῖν, πρὶν ἐν ἔθεσιν τὸ γένεται καὶ ἐκφράω καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι εἰς αὐτῷ ἐξήγη, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 66, περὶ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν τὸν ἐνθουσιασμὸν ἐφῶρον), but Aristotle regards it as connected with an impulse to action (Magn. Mor. 2. 8. 1207 b 4, καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐνθουσιασμοὶ ἅνευ λόγου ὀρμην ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τί: cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 20. 1190 b 35 sqq.),
and this is perhaps the reason why he here traces it to τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥδος. For other πίθη τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥδους, Bonitz (Ind. 557 b 9) compares Rhet. 2. 9. 1386 b 12, where τὸ ἔλεεῖν and τὸ νεμεῦν are said to be καὶ ἵππῳ τὰ πίθη ἥδους χρηστοῦ. Some of the external symptoms of ἀνθωνιασμὸς may be gathered from Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 62. ταῦτα δὲ ἔλεγεν, οὖς ὁσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἐνθέων ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, ἀσθμαίουσα καὶ περιδυνώσα τὴν κεφαλήν καὶ πειρομένη δεινὸν ἐμβλέπειν, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἐγκρατῶς καὶ σωφρόνως.

12. ἐπὶ δὲ ἀκραώμενοι κ.τ.λ. Even mere imitative sounds without the aid of melody or rhythm call forth in every one the feelings which they imitate (see vol. i. p. 362, note 3). Thus a single note from the pipe-pipe of a slave was enough to restore calmness and gentleness to the tones of C. Gracchus' oratory when they became harsh and angry (Plut. De Cohib. Ira, c. 6). Aristotle has just been dwelling on the effect of the melodies of Olympus, and he now adds this remark in order to guard against the supposition that the effect produced by music on τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥδος is due not to its power of imitating ethical states, but to its accompaniments of melody and rhythm. Plato had spoken in Rep. 401 D (see note on 5) as if this was so. Aristotle appears to imply here that the musical imitation of ethical states is possible without the use of rhythm and melody; hence, when in c. 7. 1341 b 23 he speaks as if music was confined to μελοποιία and μουθος, we must suppose that he refers to music in a somewhat narrower sense.

14. ἐπὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν κ.τ.λ., 'but since it happens that music belongs to the class of pleasant things, [so that it calls forth feelings of pleasure, and pleasure may be called forth by the right or the wrong objects,] and virtue is concerned with taking pleasure aright and loving and hating aright, it is evident that we ought to learn and to be habituated to nothing so much as to judging aright and taking pleasure in good characters and noble actions, [because it is thus that men learn virtue].' Aristotle proceeds in what follows to show that music is capable of teaching men to take pleasure in noble characters and actions, or in other words to be virtuous (cp. 1340 b 10 sqq.). Μανθάνειν is distinguished from συνεδίδεσθαι in 16, whereas in 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐδεξίμην μανθάνοντες, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες, the word μανθάνειν includes both ἐδίδεσθαι and ἀκούειν.

18. ἐστι δὲ ὀμοιώματα κ.τ.λ., 'and in rhythms and melodies there are images, most nearly approaching the reality, of anger and
gentleness,' etc. It is thus that Sepulveda ('proxime ad veras naturas accedunt'), Vict. ('maxime secundum veras naturas'), Stahr, and Sus. interpret μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις: cp. Top. 8. 14. 164 b 19, ἐκ τῶν παρὰ πόδας, 'things close to the feet.' Compare Alcidamas, De Sophistis, p. 88, μμὴματα τῶν ἀληθινῶν σωμάτων, and for φύσεις (with Bon. Ind. 838 b 55), Phys. 4. 6. 213 b 24, οἱ διωρίζει τὰς φύσεις (i.e. τὰ δυντα, τὰ σώματα). Aristotle, who here has before him Plato, Rep. 399 A sqq. (where however only ἥδηρία and σωφροσύνη are referred to, not πράτης), and Laws 654 E, 655 B, and 798 D, appears to imply that the images of emotions and ethical states conveyed in melody and rhythm approach nearer to the original than those conveyed for instance in poetry, except so far as poetry is associated with melody and rhythm. The question might be asked why the young should not be taught to take pleasure in good characters and good acts by a training concerning itself directly with that subject-matter and not merely with images of it, but Aristotle would probably reply that there would not be the same pleasurableness in a training of that kind as there is in a musical training, and that it would not fulfil the end of accustoming the young to take pleasure in the right things.

20. καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτων. Aristotle implies that musical imitations not only of cowardice but also of ἀκολούθεια, the opposite of σωφροσύνη, are possible. Music can certainly at any rate imitate ὑδρία.

21. τῶν ἄλλων ἥδικων, sc. παθῶν καὶ ζέων τοῦ ἠθοῦ (Sus. Ind. s. v. ἥδικος).

22. μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν, i.e. we experience emotional change: cp. (with Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 336) Rhet. 2. 1. i 1378 a 20, ὅτι δὲ τὰ πάθη δὲ σαμεταβάλλομεν διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις, άις ἡπεται λύπη καὶ ἤδηρία, ἀντὶ ἄργη ἔλεος φόβος καὶ δόκα ἄλλα τούτα, καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐναντία.

23. τοιούτων, sc. ῥυθμῶν καὶ μελῶν.

25. οὗτοι εἰ τις κ.τ.λ. For the thought cp. De Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 10 sqq.

μὴ δὲ ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἄλλα διὰ τὴν μορφήν αὐτῆς is added, because if a man took pleasure in an image (for example) on account of the beauty or costliness of its material, he might not take equal pleasure in the thing of which it is an image. Cp. Poet. 4. 1448 b 15, διὰ γὰρ τούτο χαίρονσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὀρῶτες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν
kaι συλλογίζεσθαι τι έκαστων, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκείνος, ἐπεὶ εἶναι μὴ τώχη
προκειμένου, οὐ διὰ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἱδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν
"τήν χρώμαν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινά ἄλλην αἰτίαν.

27. αὐτήν ἐκείνην. Bekk. adopt the emendation of Lambinus and Scaliger, αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου, perhaps rightly. If we retain αὐτὴν ἐκείνην, we must supply τοῦτον as the antecedent to oὐ.

28. συμβέβηκε δὲ κ. τ.λ. Eaton and Prof. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 132 sq.) compare Probl. 19. 27. 919 b 26, διὰ τὸ ἄκουστὸν μάν ήσος ἡχεῖ τῶν αἰσθητῶν; καὶ γὰρ εἶναι ἀνεν λόγου μέλος, ὅμως ἡχεῖ ἡθος. ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ χρώμα οὔθε ἡ ἀσμὴ οὔθε ὁ χυμὸς ἡχεῖ. ἢ ὅτι κίνησιν ἡχεῖ μᾶνον... a) δὲ κινήσεις αὕτη πρακτικά εἶσαι, a) δὲ πράξεις ἡθος σημασία ἐστίν, and Probl. 19. 29. 920 a 3 sqq. Prof. Butcher points out that these passages exaggerate the true Aristotelian view, as they deny all ethical suggestiveness to sight as well as to taste and smell. 'Ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ('other sensible things than things audible') is taken up not by ἄλλα, 30, but by ἐν δ' τοῖς μέλεσιν αὕτης, 38.

31. σχήματα γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαύτα κ. τ.λ., 'for there are forms that have this power' (i.e. the power of imitating emotions and ethical states), 'but only to a small extent, and all, [even children and worthless men,] share in the perception just referred to.' The painter Parrhasius denied in a conversation with Socrates (Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 3) that painting can imitate the character of the soul (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡθος), but was led on by Socrates to a different conclusion (Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 5, ἄλλα μὴν καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων καὶ τὸ ταπεινόν τε καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ τὸ σαφρωνίκον τε καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ τὸ ὑβριστικόν τε καὶ ἀπειρόκαλον καὶ διὰ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ διὰ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐπτῶν καὶ καινο-
μένων ἀνθρώπων διαφαίνεται. Ἀληθῆ λίγεις, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ταύτα μιμητὰ; καὶ μέλα, ἐφη). Plato went further (Rep. 400 E sq.) and found not only painting, but also weaving, embroidery, building, and the forms of vessels and of animals and plants, full of ethical suggestiveness, but Aristotle rates the ethical suggestiveness of forms and colours lower and finds such suggestiveness, it would seem, only in the human body under the influence of emotion (compare the passage of Xenophon quoted above), or in representations of it. See vol. i. p. 363, note 5. As to καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνούσιν, see note on 1340 a 2, and vol. i. p. 363, note 3. Spengel and Sus. transpose ἄλλα εἰς μικρὸν to after κοινωνοῦσιν, 32, while E. Müller inserts oὐ before πάντες, 31. If any change in the text is necessary, of which I do not feel certain, I prefer the former change
to the latter, but it would also be possible to add a second ἐπὶ μικρῶν after πάντες, 31. Forms and colours are mentioned as examples of τὰ ὀρθά: cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 a 3, τοὺς διὰ τῆς ὀψεως, οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχῆμασι καὶ γραφῆς.

32. ἐπὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the distinction between copies and symbolic representations of an original, see Prof. Butcher, Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 124, who refers to Teichmüller, Aristotelische Forschungen, 2. 145-154, where the subject is fully discussed. ‘A sign or symbol has no essential resemblance, no natural connexion, with the thing signified.’ Aristotle does not say that painting and sculpture can give only symbolic representations of all that they imitate, but that it is only in this way that they can reproduce character. In τὰ γεγραμμένα σχήματα καὶ χρώματα Aristotle seems to refer to forms and colours in pictures and statues (for we read of painters in Poet. i. 1447 a 18 as μυστικοὶ καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα, cp. Plato, Rep. 373 B), not to attitudes and colours in living men. The words τὰ γεγραμμένα σχήματα καὶ χρώματα are added by an afterthought in explanation of τὰ τοῦτο very much as ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν is added in i. 9. 1258 a 16 sqq.: cp. also [Demosth.] c. Aristot. 2. 19, ἀλλὰ ταύτα γε νὴ τὴν Ἀθηναίων δυνάμει ἔστιν, ἄνδρες δικασταί, τὰ γεγραμμένα τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ τοῦ βῆματος. As to the repetition of τῶν ἡθῶν in 33 and 34 see critical notes on 1276 a 21 and 1319 a 33, and explanatory note on 1284 b 28.

34. καὶ ταύτ’ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τού σῶματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν. I now take this to mean, ‘and these indications of character occur [only] in the case of the body under the influence of emotions, [so that it is not forms in general, but only a particular kind of forms, that are even indications of character].’ I explained this obscure clause otherwise, though with much hesitation, in vol. i. p. 363. For the suppression of ‘only,’ see note on 1282 a 36. For ἐπὶ τοῦ σῶματος cp. Plut. Sympos. 9. 15. 2. 747 С, ὅταν Ἀπόλλωνος ἢ Παῦλος ἢ τινος Βάρχης σχῆμα διαθέτει ἐπὶ τοῦ σῶματος γραφικῶς τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἐπιμενώσει. For the fact, cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 5. 1147 a 14, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὀντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμία ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἕνα τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστάςιν. To many modern minds, however, there seems to be ethical suggestiveness in architecture.

35. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ὅσον διαφέρει κ.τ.λ., ‘not but that, so far as it makes a difference in relation to the contemplation of these things also [whether we contemplate one thing or another],’ etc. By ‘these things’ Aristotle means forms and colours.
36. deı μη τα Παυσωνος κ.τ.λ. Cp. Poet. 2. 1448 a 1, επεὶ δε μοιοίσιν αι μοιοίσιν πράττοντας, ανάγκε δε τούτοις η σπουδαίους η φαύ-
λους είναι... ήτοι δελτίους η καθ' ημας η χειρονας η και τουούτους, ουσπερ οι γραφείς, Πολυγνωσιος μεν γαρ κρείττους, Παυσωνος δε χεύρους, διοφύσιος δε όμοίους εικαζεν. In this, we learn from what follows, Polygnotus found a parallel in Homer and Pauson in poets far inferior to Homer. In the passage before us it is implied that Pauson was not ἡθικός, and according to Sus. 4, p. 624, Aristotle means by ‘an artist “full of character” (ἡθικός)’ one who ‘represents noble
characters.’ The word ἡθικός appears to bear this meaning here and in c. 7. 1342 a 3, 28, but in c. 6. 1341 a 21, ετι δε ουκ ἦστιν ο
αιλός ἡθικόν ἀλλα μᾶλλον οργιαστικόν, it evidently means simply
‘expressive of ethical character’ as distinguished from ‘emotional.’
In Poet. 6. 1450 a 26 we read of Polygnotus, οιον και των γραφέων
Σεβείως προς Πολυγνωσιον πέπουθεν ὁ μεν γαρ Πολυγνωσιος ἄγαθος ἡθυγράφος,
ἡ δε Σεβείως γραφὴ οιδίν ἤχει ἡθος. Lysippus may be among
the sculptors referred to as ἡθικόι: cp. Plut. De Alex. seu Virtute
seu Fortuna 2. 2, διο και μονον Ἀλεξανδρος ἐκεῖνε Δύστοπον εἰκόνας
αὐτοῦ δημιουργείν μόνος γαρ οὗτος, ὥσ τοιε, κατεμιᾶν τῷ χαλκῷ τῷ ἡθὸς
αὐτοῦ καὶ συνεξέφερε τῇ μορφῇ τῆν ἀρετὴν. As to the skill of Poly-
gnotus in portraying character, see Brunn, Gesch. der gr. Künstler
2. 40. There were paintings by Polygnotus at Athens in the Stoa
Poecilê, in the Anaceium, in a chamber of the Propylaea, and else-
where, so that his work must have been familiar to Aristotle’s hearers.
As to Pauson, see Brunn 2. 49 sqq. and Overbeck, Schriftquellen,
p. 212, both of whom take Aristophanes to refer to him in Acharn.
in, Thesmoph. 948 sq., and Plut. 602. If they are right in this,
Pauson would seem to have been a contemporary of Aristophanes.
38. ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς, ‘in melodies taken by themselves’
apart from anything else, apart from the person of the singer and
from the words sung. Forms and colours, on the other hand, are
suggestive of character only in the case of the body under the
influence of emotion.
40. ειθος γαρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for, to begin with, the nature of harmonies,
[which are elements in melody,] is different.’ Aristotle goes on to
show in 1340 b 7 sqq. that the same thing holds of rhythms, and
probably he regarded a melody as made up of harmony and
rhythm, just as Plato, who, unlike Aristotle (c. 5. 1339 b 20), did
not approve of ψυλή μουσική (Laws 669 D sq.), regarded it as made
up of words, harmony, and rhythm (Rep. 398 D). If harmonies
affect the ἰδεός of the hearer differently, it follows that they differ in ἰδεός and are μεμήματα τῶν ἰδεῶν. The word ἀρμονία had more meanings than one (Monro, The Modes of Ancient Greek Music, p. 56), but it is evidently used here of the Dorian, Phrygian, and other ‘modes,’ whatever we take their nature to have been. On this disputed question see (in addition to Sus.4, 1. p. 624 sqq.) the work of Mr. Monro just referred to, Mr. H. Stuart Jones’ review of it in Class. Rev. 8. 448 sqq., and Mr. Monro’s reply (ibid. 9.79 sqq.).

41. ἀλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μή τόν αὐτόν ἐχειν τρόπον. For the pleonasm cp. Poet. 1. 1447 a 17, τῷ ἐνέρω καὶ μή τόν αὐτόν τρόπον, and see Vahlen on this passage. For the fact cp. Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. 6. 48 (p. 757. 29 sqq. Bekker), οὗ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐν τρόπον ἄπαν διάστημα κατὰ μουσικὴν ἐν φθόγγοις ἐχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὔτω καὶ πάν ἰδεός. τό δ’ ἐστι τι γένος μελῳδίας. καθ’ ἑάν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἰδεῶν τινά μὲν ἐστι σκυθρώπα καὶ στειφαρώτερα, ὅποια τά τῶν ἄργαων ἱστοροῦσιν, τά δ’ εὐένδοτα πρὸς ἐρατα καὶ οἰνοφλυγιά καὶ ὀδυρμούς καὶ οἰμαγάς, οὕτω τίς μὲν μελῳδία σεμνά τινα καὶ ἀστεία ἐμποιεῖ τῇ ψυχῇ κυνήματα, τίς δὲ ταπεινώτερα καὶ ἀγκενή.

42. ἀλλά πρὸς μὲν ἑνίας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 398 D, ἀλλὰ μέντοι θρήναν τε καὶ ὀδυρμάν ἐφαμεν ἐν λόγους οὐδέν προσδείπται. οὐ γάρ οὖν. Τίνες οὖν θρηνώδεις ἀρμονίαι; λέγε μοι σὺ γάρ μουσικός. Μείζονυστι, ἐφί, καὶ συνυπολυνυστι καὶ τοιάζεται τινα. οὐκοῦν αὕται, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀφαιρετέαι, ἀχρηστοί γὰρ καὶ γυναικίν, ἄ δει ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, μή ὅτι ἀνθράσι (possibly a hit at Sappho, who is credited with the invention of the mixo-Lydian mode by Aristoxenus ap. Plut. De Mus. c.16), and Laws 800 D, πάσαν βλασφημίαν τῶν ἱερῶν καταχώσις, ρήμασι τε καὶ μυθοί καὶ γουδεστάταις ἀρμονίαις συντείνοντες τὰς τῶν ἀκρωμάτων ψυχὰς, καὶ ὅτι ἄν δακρύσας μάλιστα τὴν ψύσασαν παραχρῆμα ποίησις πάλιν, οὕτως τὰ νικηρία φέρει. He also has before him Pratinas ap. Athen. Deipn. 624 f (Pratinas, Fragm. 5),

μήτε σύντονον δίωκε μήτε τῶν ἀνεμεμέναν ιαστὶ μούσαν,

ἀλλὰ τῶν μέσαν... νεών ἀρουραν αἰόλιξε τῷ μέλει,

where, as Sus.4 points out, the Aeolian mode is described as intermediate between ‘high-pitched Ionian’ and ‘low Ionian.’ Pratinas, however, declares in favour, not of the Dorian mode, as Aristotle, but of the Aeolian, later called the hypo-Dorian according to Athen. Deipn. 625 a.

διωρικτωτέρως καὶ συνεστηκότας μάλλον. Grief was believed to compress and joy to expand the mind: cp. Eurip. Alcest. 771
Bothe (797 Dindorf), τοῦ φίλου σκυθρωποῦ καὶ ἐνυπότως φρενῶν, and Hippol. 937 Bothe (983 Dindorf), μένως μὲν ἐνυπότως τε σῶν φρενῶν, and Cic. Tusc. Disp. 4. 31. 66, codem enim vitio est effusio animi in laetitia quo in dolore contractio. So the Stoics defined λίπη as συνοδή ἄλογος and explained ἡδονή as ἔπαρσις (Diog. Laert. 7. 111, 114: see Pearson, Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, p. 180). In Laws 8. 8 D (quoted above) Plato had spoken of the ψυχή generally, but Aristotle here speaks more particularly of the διάνοια as affected by the various musical modes (cp. 1.340 b 2); he regards it as susceptible of compression and relaxation, two extreme states, and also of a mean state of calm. He was led by a false etymology of the Greek word ἐπιστήμη to connect wisdom and knowledge with a calm state of mind (Phys. 7. 3. 247 b 10, τῷ γὰρ ἡμείηται καὶ στήραι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπιστάσαθαι καὶ φρονεῖν λέγομεν, and 18 sqq.), and this is perhaps one reason why he selects the composed and collected Dorian mode for use in education. He feels that anything which calms is useful both morally and intellectually. In Aesch. Suppl. 69, τὸς καὶ ἐγὼ φιλόδυντος ἰαονίςκει νόμισεν δάστω τῶν ἀπαλῶν νειλοθερῇ παρειάν, the high-pitched variety of the Ionian mode is probably referred to. This variety, which some identify with the mixo-Lyidian (see Sus. 4, 1. 625 sqq.), appears to have been expressive of lamentation.

2. πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρας τῆς διάνοιας, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας. 1.340 b. Aristotle probably refers to the softer varieties of the Ionian and Lydian modes: cp. Plato, Rep. 398 E, where these varieties (if we follow Mr. H. Stuart Jones' interpretation of the passage in Class. Rev. 8. 449, note) are said to be μαλακαὶ καὶ συμποσικαὶ.

3. μέσως καὶ καθεστηκότως, 'in a midway state of collectedness and composure': cp. c. 7. 1342 a 10, καθισταμένους, and Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 32, καθεστηκότα, and for the conjunction of μέσως and καθεστηκότως, Eth. Eud. 7. 5. 1239 b 35, εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίσταται, and 1.240 a 2 sq. Καθισταμέθαι is conjoined with σωφρονίζεσθαι in Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 25. As to the Dorian mode, cp. c. 7. 1.342 b 12 sqq. Plutarch describes the songs sung by the Spartans as πολύ τῷ κόσμῳ ἐχοντα καὶ καταστατικοῖς (Lycurg. c. 4), and Heracleides Ponticus (ap. Athen. Deipn. 624 d) says of the Dorian mode, ἡ μὲν οὖν δόριος ἀρμοσία τὸ ἀνδρίδες ἐμφαίνει καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ οὐ διακεχαθέν οὐδ᾽ θλασίν, ἄλλα σκυθρωποῖ καὶ σφαδροῖ, οὔτε δὲ ποικίλον οὔτε πολύτροπον: cp. Plut. De Mus. c. 16, ἡ μὲν (δωριστι) τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ἄξιοματικῶν ἀποδίδωσιν.
4. ἐνθουσιαστικῶς δ᾽ ἡ φρυγιστή, sc. δοκεῖ ποιεῖν. Cp. 1340 a 10 and c. 7. 1342 b 1 sqq.

5. ταύτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle evidently takes his account of the mental effect of each of the harmonies from όι περὶ τὴν παθεῖαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφήκατε, 'those who had studied musical education.' Some musicians (Damon, for instance, as Sus. 4, p. 596, points out, referring to Plato, Rep. 400 B and 424 C) had probably done this, and also some philosophers (cp. c. 7. 1341 b 27 sqq. and 1342 a 30 sqq.). Among the philosophers would be Plato (Rep. 398 E—399 A and elsewhere) and some of his disciples (Plut. De Mus. c. 3 in init.), e.g. Heracleides Ponticus, and perhaps, as Eaton says, some Pythagoreans (cp. Plut. De Virt. Mor. c. 3. 441 E). It has been suggested by Mr. H. Stuart Jones (Class. Rev. 8. 450) that Aristotle's view of the mental effect of the various modes rests on a verbal basis, the word ἀνεμίσεως meaning both 'loosely strung' (or 'low-pitched') and 'soft, relaxed,' and the word σῶτον both 'highly strung' (or 'high-pitched') and the reverse of 'soft' and 'relaxed'; it appears, however, from the passage before us that his view comes to him from other authorities, so that the verbal confusion supposed to exist would be theirs rather than his. But indeed the emphatic statement in 6, λαμβάνοντι τὰ μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων, suggests that these authorities arrived at their conclusion inductively by watching the effect of the different modes on individual hearers.


8. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 3. 8. 1408 b 32, τῶν δὲ ρυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρῴδος σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικής ἀρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δὲ λαμβάς αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ λέξις τῶν πολλῶν... ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος κορδακικώτερος δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα, ἐστὶ γὰρ τροχεῖος ρυθμὸς τὰ τετράμετρα λείπεται δὲ παίδων: Poet. 24. 1459 b 34, τὸ γὰρ ἡρῴδων στασιμώτατον καὶ ὑγιωτάτατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστιν... τὸ δὲ λαμβάκων καὶ τετράμετρον κυηρικά, τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν. As the trochee is κορδακικώτερος, it is probably regarded by Aristotle as φορτικατέρας ἔχων τὰς κινήσεις: cp. Athen. Deipn. 631 d, ὁ μὲν κόρδαξ παρ᾽ Ἐλλησι φορτικός ἡ δ᾽ ἐμμελεία σπουδαία, and 629 b sq. Compare the striking picture in Plut. Sympos. 7. 5. 1 of the effect produced by a skilful συλλογὸς on the guests at a banquet—οὐδὲ γὰρ κατακεκυμένοι ἐτὶ βοῶν ἔχοικε καὶ κρουεῖ, ἀλλὰ τελευτώντες ἀνεπήδων οἱ πολλοὶ, καί
5 (8). 5. 1340 b 4—17. 545

5. Muller, cp. I N ras neXonoua cannot Se tvav dtavc ayT (01 jSi'atoi; pdvoLs TratStaiTf aire v^p€(os Ka\ avv€KivovvTO T€xvr) to beopfvov, KOKias, he was question rhv(Tpdruiv we Brjvai. music melody vflv Prof. f}8va-ix€v(ov, posing Vol. t\] all be 43, 10. 12. 16. 17. 19 p. 22. 1449 b 15 we read those de loupou p\nt e meXopouia me\gusted t\w h\dvm\tou, and Prof. Bywater (Journal of Philology, xiv. 1885, p. 42) would read h\dvm\tou here. 'A\h\dw\tou, however, finds a better antithesis in h\dvm\tou than in h\dvm\tou.

17. καὶ τις έδικε συγγένεια κ.τ.λ. Supply πρός τήν ψυχήν (see Vol. ii, p. lii, note 4). The sense is—and not only is music τῶν h\dvm\tow, but it is also akin to the soul (which is not the case with all h\dvm\tou), and therefore still more congenial to it than those h\dvm\tou which are not akin to it. I cannot follow Sus. in transposing 17—19 to after ελευθερωτέρας, 10. Cp. Plato, Tim. 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία, ξυγγενεῖς έχουσα φορᾶς ταῖς εὖ ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς περίοδοις, κ.τ.λ., VOL. III. N n
and Probl. 19. 38. 920 b 33, ῥυθμῷ δὲ χαίρομεν διὰ τὸ γνώριμον καὶ
tεταγμένον ἀρίθμῳ ἔχειν καὶ κωνίν ἡμᾶς τεταγμένοις' οἰκειοτέρα γὰρ ἡ τετα-
γμένη κίνησις φύσις τῆς ἀπάκτου, ὅστε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον. That which
is akin to the soul is likely to be suitable to it (cp. c. 7. 1342 a 25:
Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1178 a 5, τὸ γὰρ οἰκείον ἐκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ
ἡμιστὸν ἐστὶν ἐκάστῳ: Plato, Lysis 214 B, 221 E sq.).
18. διὸ πολλοί κ.τ.λ. The Pythagoreans held that the soul is
a harmony, and two of Aristotle's disciples, Aristoxenus and Dica-
archus, followed them in this opinion (see Sus.4, 1. 597, who refers
to Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 444 and 2. 2. 888, 890 (Aristotle and the Earlier
The view that the soul has harmony is that of Plato (Phaedo 93:
see Sus.4, ibid.). For the two views cp. De Caelo 1. 1. 268 a 4, τῶν
γὰρ φύσει συνεστῶτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σώματα καὶ μεγέθη, τὰ δὲ ἔχει σῶμα καὶ
μέγεθος, τὰ δ’ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἐχώντων εἴσοδον, and Plut. Camill. c. 20, κίνησις δὲ
tις ἡ σὺν τοῖς κανήσει πάντως ἡ γένεσις.

C. 6. 20. χειροπυργοῦτας takes the place of κιθαρίζοντας (c. 5. 1339 b 8),
partly because Aristotle does not wish to prejudge the question of
the αἴλός, partly because the use of the word χειροπυργεῖν serves to
place in a strong light the doubtfulness of the point, the Greeks
being prejudiced against χειροπυργία. We shall find in the sequel
that Aristotle seeks to confine χειροπυργία within as narrow limits as
possible (cp. 1340 b 35 sqq. and 1341 b 1). He nowhere considers
the possible alternative of teaching the young to sing but not to
play. The two things usually went together in ancient Greece, so
far at any rate as solo-singers were concerned; the singer was
expected to be able to accompany himself on the lyre.

21. πρότερον, in c. 5. 1339 a 33 sqq.
22. οὖκ ἔδηλον κ.τ.λ. This takes up 10 sqq., ἢ μὲν οὖν τούτων
κ.τ.λ. For ποιοῖς τινας cp. 3. 5. 1339 a 22, ὡς δυναμένην ... καὶ τὴν
μονοικὴν τὸ ἢδος ποιῶν τι ποιεῖν, ἐδίκουσαν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς. To
become ποιοὶ τινες is to acquire a certain ἐξίς (Categ. 8. 8 b 25,
ποιότητα δὲ λέγοι καθ ἢν ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι λέγονται' ἐστὶ δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν
πλευραχοῦσιν λεγομένων. ἐν μὲν οὖν εἰδος ποιότητος ἐξίς καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθω-
σαι), and it is by acquiring the appropriate δύνασις or ἐξίς that we
become able to judge of things (De An. 3. 3. 428 a 3). But the
ἐξίς is acquired by practice (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 31, τὰς δ’ ὀρετὰς
λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργῆσαις πρότερον, διαπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν κ.τ.λ.).
Aristotle's language here seems hardly consistent with his language
in Pol. 3. 11. 1281 b 7 sqq. He does not speak there as if it was
necessary to have learnt to sing and play in order to judge of music aright. We are told, again, in 3. 11. 1282 a 17 sqq. that there are arts in which the user is a better judge than the master of the art. Are we to infer that music is not one of these? Besides, Aristotle’s teaching in the passage before us appears to imply that we ought to practise in youth all kinds of music—not merely the ethical kind, which he alone recommends for use in the education of the young (c. 7. 1342 a 2), but also practical and enthusiastic airs, for otherwise how can we judge of these aright?—and indeed all arts of the products of which we desire to become good judges (e.g. poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture, to say nothing of the useful arts). This he does not seem to have observed. His experience as to music evidently was that those who did not practise the art up to a certain point were apt to rest content with music possessing merely a physical charm—the music which pleased slaves and children—and did not acquire a liking for noble music. By ‘good judges’ Aristotle clearly means not good judges of music from a technical point of view, but men capable of taking pleasure in ethically good music (cp. c. 5. 1340 a 17 and 1339 a 24).

The difference between γίγνεσθαι, 22, and γενέσθαι, 25, may be illustrated by Plato, Theaet. 155 C, ἂνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον (sc. εἰμὲ ἐλάστω): see also Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 97.

25. ἄμα ἰδὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς παιδας ἐχειν τινὰ διατριβήν. The value of education in keeping boys out of mischief is recognized by Isocrates in Panath. § 27 and Areop. § 45: cp. Plato, Protag. 326 A. ‘Children are sent to school as much to keep them out of harm’s way as to prepare them for after-life,’ observes a writer in the Academy for Nov. 9, 1895, who probably remembers and extends to all children a remark as to little children which has been pointed out to me in Spectator, No. 330 (March 19, 1712). ‘as little children are sent to school before they are capable of improvement, only to be out of harm’s way.’

26. τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλαταγῖν. As to the rattle of Archytas, cp. Plut. Sympos. 7. 10. 1, ei de μὴ, δοτέων ὀσπερ παισιν ἀτρέμειν μὴ δυναμένοις, οὐ δόρυ καὶ ἔφοι, ἀλλὰ πλαταγῖν καὶ σφαῖραν (cp. Anthol. Pal. 6. 309), ὀσπερ ὁ θεὸς τῶν νάρθηκα τῶς μεθόουσιν ἐνεχειρίας κοινφιτατον βέλος καὶ μαλακῶτατον ἀμυνθήριον, ὅπως, επεὶ τάχιστα παῖσιν, ἡκτα βλάστωσι: Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 213 (where however the invention is ascribed to an Archytas who was a τέκτων):
NOTES.

Lucr. 5. 229. Archytas was fond of playing with children (Aelian, Var. Hist. 12. 15: Athen. Deipn. 519 b). Πλαταγάλ, however, appear to have existed before the time of Archytas, for they were known to Hellanicus and to Pherecydes of Athens (see Göttling's note on the passage before us, and Hellan. Fragm. 61, Pherecyd. Fragm. 32 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 53, 78). As to the form Άρχύτου see critical note.


30. ή δὲ παιδεία πλαταγῆ τοῖς μείζοσι τῶν νέων. Are these words present to the mind of the writer of Virg. Catal. 7.

Et vos, Stiloque Tarquitique Varroque,

Scholasticiorum natio madens pingui,

Ita hinc, inane cymbalon iuventutis?

33. τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ μὴ πρέπον ταῖς ἡλικίαις κ.τ.λ. Here the difficulty raised in c. 5. 1339 b 8, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύσους καλοίμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ ἄνδρός μὴ μεθόντος ἴ παῖζοντος, is taken up and answered.

34. λύσαι, sc. τὴν ἐπιτίμησιν: cp. 40 sqq.

35. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for first, since it is [only] for the sake of judging of music that they are to practise playing [and not for the sake of perfect mastery of execution], on account of this they should indeed practise playing in youth, but as they become older, they should be released from playing, and yet be able to distinguish noble airs and to take pleasure in music aright, thanks to the training which they have received in youth.' Though it is provided here that, as men cease to be youthful, they shall be excused playing on an instrument, singing is apparently contemplated even in the case of aged men in c. 7. 1342 b 20 sqq., if this passage is genuine. Aristotle would seem to be less favourable to playing in the case of adult citizens than many were: not a few Pythagoreans played on the harp (Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5. 39. 113: Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 23), and on the αὖλος (Athen. Deipn. 184 e), and so did Epaminondas (Athen. ibid. : Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1. 2. 4). Socrates learnt the harp in old age (Diog. Laert. 2. 32: Val. Max. 8. 7. Ext. 8).
42. μέχρι το πόσου κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 2. 1337 b 15 sqq., and see note. This question receives an answer in 1341 a 5–17. Τοίς πρὸς ἀρετῆν παιδευμάτως πολιτικῆν, 'those who are being educated with a view to excellence as citizens,' and not with a view to excellence as musical executants. Πολιτικῆν is emphasized by its position in the sentence. So in De Part. An. i. i. 642 a 29 sqq. a contrast is implied between ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ (including perhaps ἡδικὴ ἀρετή and φρόνησις) and ἡ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀρετή. Cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 183, ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀντιποιομέναις, μὴ τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν ὁνομαζομένης καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς τῶν ἄνδρῶν εἰς τάς ἑυχαῖς μετ' ἐυσεβείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐγγιγμομένης, and see note on 1280 b 5.

1. καὶ ποιῶν μελῶν καὶ ποιῶν μυθωμῶν κοινωνιτέων. The question 1341 a. as to the melodies is answered in 1341 a 9 sqq. and in c. 7. 1341 b 19 sqq., but the question as to the rhythms is not answered in what we possess of the Politics (see vol. i. p. 367, and vol. ii. p. xxviii sq.). We may probably infer, however, from c. 5. 1340 b 7 sqq. that the rhythms used in education will be oi ἔχοντες ἡδος στασιμότερα.

2. ἐτὶ δὲ ἐν ποιοῖς ὄργανοις κ.τ.λ. Answered in 1341 a 17–b 8. 'Ev is used here of the 'medium' of instruction, as it is often used in the Poetics (e.g. in Poet. i. 1447 b 29) of the medium of imitation (see Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 24: Bon. Ind. 245 b 42 sqq.): cp. Plato, Laches, 182 A, oi ἐν τούτοις τοῖς περὶ τῶν πόλεμον ὄργανοις γυμναζόμενοι.

4. τρόπους τινὰς τὴς μουσικῆς, 'some kinds of music' (for the use of τρόποι in the sense of εἶδος see Bon. Ind. 772 b 30 sqq.). οἱ τεχνικοὶ τρόποι τῆς μουσικῆς, οἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἄγώνας (1341 b 10), are referred to: cp. 1341 b 14 sqq.

6. μὴτε ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς υστερον πράξεις. It is implied that the study of music might stand in the way of a citizen’s work in after-life without harming the body. It might do so if it lowered the character or enfeebled the intelligence (c. 2. 1337 b 8–11), and this result might well follow if music were studied as festival-performers study it.

7. μὴτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βάναυσον καὶ ἄρχηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἡδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις υστερον. By τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις Aristotle probably means 'military and civic training,' 'training designed to develope military and civic virtue': cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 5, μηδὲ ἡσυχήκαινεν μεθὲς ἄσκησιν ἐνεράν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς, 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 42, τοῖς
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πρὸς ἄρετὴν παιδευομένως πολιτικῶν, and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 8–11. The words πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἦδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ύστερον appear to be added in explanation and limitation of ἀρχηγοτὸν πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἁσκήσεις, but their meaning is by no means clear. Coray’s note on them is “οὐκ ἔρρωσα τὸ χωρίον.” Some explain τὰς χρήσεις (in the sense of doing the thing studied) as one form of the military and civic training referred to and τὰς μαθήσεις as another, and regard χρήσεις as preceding μαθήσεις, because in any training designed to produce good soldiers and citizens practice comes first and instruction in the theory afterwards (cp. c. 3. 1338 b 4, Metaph. Θ. 5. 1047 b 31 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 31 sqq. and 10. 1179 b 23 sqq.). But what χρήσεις πολεμικὰ καὶ πολιτικὰ can the boys to whom Aristotle refers be said to perform? Bojesen, on the other hand, followed by Sus., interchanges χρήσεις and μαθήσεις, reading πρὸς μὲν τὰς μαθήσεις ἦδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς χρήσεις ύστερον. Sus.2 appears from the translation which he gives of the passage to supply τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἁσκήσεων with μαθήσεις and χρήσεις, but the expressions τὰς χρήσεις τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἁσκήσεων and τὰς μαθήσεις τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἁσκήσεων seem rather strange. And, whether we supply these words or not, the question remains, to what μαθήσεις πολεμικά καὶ πολιτικά pursued in boyhood and youth does Aristotle refer? He must apparently refer to the ordinary education in gymnastic, music, etc., for we know of no other which he provides for the young. I am inclined, however, to suggest a different interpretation of the passage before us. Should we not supply τοῦ σώματος with τὰς χρήσεις (as Schneider appears to do, for he says, ‘χρήσεις sunt cum quis corpore vario modo utitur’), and explain the passage thus, ‘the study of music in youth must not render the body unfit for military and civic training either by rendering it unfit for such training in a purely physical way’ (literally, ‘unfit for the uses of the body’) ‘or by rendering it an unfit assistant for the mind in studies later on’? That the body may be a help or a hindrance to the use of the mind in study we see from Plato, Rep. 498 B and 536 B, and Protag. 326 B sqq.: cp. also Magn. Mor. 2. 10. 1208 a 12 sqq., quoted on 1333 a 21. For τὰς τοῦ σώματος χρήσεις cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 38.

10. τὴν μάθησιν, ‘the study of music’: cp. 6, τὴν μάθησιν αὐτῆς.

τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄγωνας τοὺς τεχνικοὺς συστείνοντα. Supply τῶν ἐργῶν from 12: cp. 1341 b 9, τῆς ἐργασίας. Does Aristotle refer to the same kind of performances which Plato rejects in Laws 812 D sqq.?
11. τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων κ.τ.λ. Compare a fragment of Anaxilas (Athen. Deipn. 623 e, f: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 352), ἡ μουσικὴ δ' ὦσπερ Διόνυσος πρὸς τῶν θεῶν ἀεὶ τι καῦνον καὶ ἐναιατοῦ θηρίων τίπτει, where Anaxilas has perhaps before him Plato, Laws 660 B, καὶ ἀεὶ ἀττα ἀεὶ γυμνόμενα περὶ τε τὰς ὀρχήσεις καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην μουσικὴν ξύμπασαν κ.τ.λ. These feats of execution in singing and playing are distinguished here from ordinary 'agonistic' performances; the nature of 'agonistic' music may be divined from Probl. 19. 15. 918 b 20 sqq. and Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 22 sqq. Does Aristotle refer to the musical innovations of Timotheus among others, as to which see Pherecr. Χείρων. Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 326 sqq.)? Cp. also Plato, Laws 812 D–E.

13. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τουαύτα κ.τ.λ., 'but practise even such music as we have mentioned' (i.e. music that is neither agonistic nor of extraordinary difficulty) 'only to the point at which' etc. For this limitation cp. Plato, Laws 812 B–E.


17. δὴ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποιοὶς ὄργανοις χρηστέων. They must not be instruments which serve for festival-competitions or in wonderful feats of execution (10 sqq.).

18. οὕτε γὰρ αὐλοῦς κ.τ.λ. Τεχνικὰ ὄργανα are instruments designed for use at festival-competitions (1341 b 10). It is implied here that learning to play on them would tend to make boys ill recipients of musical and other training. Why is this? Probably because learning to play on them trained the hand rather than the mind (1341 b 1, 6 sqq.). The cithara must have come by Aristotle’s time to differ a good deal from the lyre; still Plato retains (Rep. 399 D) both lyre and cithara, Ἀὐτῶν, 20, i.e. τῶν ὄργανων.

21. ἢτι δὲ οὐκ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. This is a second argument against the use of the αὐλός in education. It is not an instrument expressive of
ethical character (see above on 1340 a 36), but rather one for employment in orgiastic rites (compare the use of the word βαιχεία in c. 7. 1342 b 4 in connexion with ὀργαστικά καὶ παθητικά), one which produces that modification of emotion which orgiastic rites produce. For παθητικῶν is a wider term than ὀργαστικῶν: not all things that are παθητικά are ὀργαστικά. The use of the αἴλος in the worship of Dionysus (Virg. Aen. 11. 737, ubi curva choros indixit tibia Bacchi) and of Cybele (Hor. Carm. 4. i. 22, Berecyntiae tibiae) is well known. Cp. also Strabo, pp. 466, 468, and Plato, Crito 54 D. ‘One who listens to the remarkable music of the flute and cymbals at the dances of dervishes in Konia or Kara Hissar of Phrygia can understand the intoxicating influence which it had over the devotees and populace of antiquity’ (Prof. W. M. Ramsay in Journal of Hellenic Studies, 8. 510). Some light is thrown on the effect of the αἴλος in orgiastic worship by Plut. Sympos. 3. 8. 2, ὥσπερ ἡ θρηνοδία καὶ ὁ ἐπικίθεως αἴλος ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος καὶ ἕκαστον ἐκβάλλει, προέγευον δὲ τὴν νύχτην εἰς οίκτον, οὕτω κατὰ μικρῶν ἔξαρε καὶ ἀναλάγκη τὸ λυπητικὸν. As to κάθαρσιν cp. c. 7. 1342 a 8 sqq. and see note on this passage. Compare also Plut. Pelopid. c. 19 (quoted above on 1274 a 32), where however the αἴλος is regarded, not as a means of stirring, and so carrying off, emotion, but as a means of softening the untempered strength of the spirited element in the Theban character.

22. ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους κ.τ.λ. For τοὺς τοιούτους καρποὺς ἐν ὀἷς κ.τ.λ. see note on 1337 b 6. Bonitz (Ind. 329 a 43) appears to give ἡ θεορία here the sense of ‘spectaculum,’ to judge by the passages with which he groups the passage before us, as do also Sepulveda and some others, but it probably means much the same thing as ἡ ἀκράσια (Sus.3 Ind. s.v.); we must, however, remember that αἴσθησις was accompanied with certain bodily movements on the part of the performer (1341 b 18), so that there was something to be seen as well as heard. For the contrast between κάθαρσις and μάθησις here compare the contrast between παθεῖν and μαθεῖν in Aristot. Fragm. 15 in Rose’s second edition of the Fragments (Fragm. 45. 1483 a 19 in the first), καθάσπερ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀξίας τοὺς τελευτένους οὗ μαθεῖν τι δειν ἄλλα παθεῖν καὶ διακεχώρει, δηλοῦσθι γενομένως ἐπιτηδείους (Synes. Dion, c. 10). That μάθησις may be derived by persons of mature age from listening to music (and it is persons of mature age, not boys, that Aristotle has in view here) appears from c. 5. 1339 a 34 sqq.
24. προσθέμεν δὲ κ.τ.λ. In interfering with the use of language the use of the ἀυλός interferes with a means of education, for the air and the words sung exercise an educating influence on the singer. Cp. also De Part. An. 2. 16. 659 b 30, οἷς ἐνθρωποί μυλακαί καὶ σαρκωθέντες καὶ δυνάμενα χαρίζεσθαι (sc. τὰ χείλη ἔχουσι), φυλακῇς τε ἐνεκα τῶν ὀδύνων δισπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐτί διὰ τὸ εὖ πρὸς γὰρ τὸ κρίσθαι τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ταῦτα.

26. διὸ καλῶς κ.τ.λ. Ἄποδοκιμάζειν τὴν χρήσιν τοῦ ἀυλοῦ ἐκ τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων is a rugged expression, and I have not happened to meet with any parallel to it. There is less ruggedness in the language of Plutarch in Reip. Gerend. Pracc. c. 30, ἐσπερ οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἄφειλε τῶν παιδευομένων νέων τὴν ἀρμονίαν τὴν Λύδιον καὶ τὴν Φρύγιον κ.τ.λ.

27. καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρώτον αὐτῷ. We read of poets at a very early date who were also performers on the ἀυλός—Minnermus of Colophon and Smyrna at the end of the seventh century b.c. (Strabo, p. 643) and Sacadas of Argos at the beginning of the sixth (Plut. De Musica, c. 9). Compare Athen. Deipn. 184 c, ἐμελεῖ δὲ τοῖς πάλαι πάσιν "Ελληνικὰ μανικής" διόπερ καὶ ἡ αὐλητική περισσοῦσι τὸν. Χαμαλέων γυνῶν ὁ Ἦρακλεώτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ ἑτεραπτικῆς Λακεδαιμονίως φησί καὶ Θηβαίον πάντας αὐλεῖν μανθάνειν, Ἦρακλεώτης τε τοὺς ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ καθ᾿ ἐαυτῶν ἦτο, Ἀθηναίων τε τοὺς ἐπιφανεστάτους, Καλλίαν τε τὸν Ἰππονίκου καὶ Κρητίαν τὸν Καλλαίσχου. Athenaeus shows by quotations from the Δαιταλεῖς of Aristophanes (Fragm. 17 : Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 1037) and from the Ephialtes of Phrynichus (Fragm. 3: Meineke 2. 581), that the ἀυλός was commonly taught to boys in the days when these plays were performed. A reaction set in at Athens against the study of the ἀυλός, aided perhaps by the increased hostility to Thebes which must have resulted from the Athenian defeat at Delium (b.c. 424), and certainly by the influence of Alcibiades (vol. i. p. 365, note 3), but Archytas at Tarentum, among other Pythagoreans, and Epaminondas at Thebes are said to have played on the ἀυλός (Athen. Deipn. 184 e: see above on 1340 b 35), and we have already seen that at the Pontic Heracleia, a city in the population of which a Boeotian element was included (Paus. 5. 26. 7), the custom of learning to play on it still prevailed in the time of Chamaeleon (a little later than Aristotle), so that when Aristotle speaks of the study of the ἀυλός as 'rejected,' we may take him to refer to the general rule.
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28. σχολαστικῶτεροι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle appears to be speaking of the Hellenes of Greece Proper, for they alone took part in the repulse of the Persian invasion in B.C. 480 and 479, and it is of this that the expression τὰ Μῆνικά is commonly used (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 614. 1). When Aristotle looks back to an increase of wealth and leisure and a consequent widening of study at a date even prior to the invasion of Xerxes, he may be referring to the time of Anacharsis and to the story about him which Herodotus (4. 77) rejects, ὅσ... ὀπίσω ἀπονοηθῶς φαίνει πρὸς τῶν ἀποτέμψαντα Ἑλλήνας πάντας ἄσχηλους εἶναι εἰς πᾶσαν σοφίαν πλήν Λακεδαιμονίων, τούτοις δὲ εἶναι μούσικα σοφρόνως δούναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγων. After the repulse of Xerxes the Greeks of Greece Proper threw themselves with vigour into the study of painting sculpture and architecture; the dramatic art made a great advance, and many States began for the first time to strike coins. Cp. Diod. i2. 1. 4. A similar spirit shows itself, though less happily, in the determination of Themistocles and Thucydides, son of Melesias, that their sons should be made marvellous horsemen and wrestlers (Plato, Meno 93-94). Compare with Aristotle's picture of Greece after the Persian Wars what we read of the intellectual and artistic progress of the United Provinces after the War of Independence. M. Lefevre-Pontalis remarks in his Life of John de Witt (Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 12) that 'prosperity and freedom combined had been for the United Provinces the signal for a sudden blossoming of arts, sciences, and letters,' and illustrates his remark by enumerating the painters, jurists, philosophers, scholars, soldiers, and men of science who flourished in the United Provinces at this epoch. That leisure was thought to be favourable to high aims we see from c. 2. 1337 b 14 sq. and 7 (5). ii. 1313 b 1 sqq.


32. ἤγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις. Vict. 'adduxerunt in ordinem eorum quae discernentur.' Cp. 18, εἰς παυδελαῖα ἀκτέων.

33. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Λακεδαιμονὶ κ.τ.λ. The ordinary practice was that an aulētēs was allotted to the chorēgus to accompany the chorus, the aulētēs being commonly a man of inferior social
position (cp. Athen. Deipn. 624 b, διό καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τοὺς Ἐλλησον αὐλητὰς φρεγίον καὶ δουλοπρεπεῖς τὰς προσψηφορίας ἔχειν οἷός ἐστιν ὁ παρὰ Ἀλκιμῶν Σάμμας καὶ "Ἀδων καὶ Σῆλος, παρὰ δὲ Ἱπποφάνακτη Κίων καὶ Κώδαλος καὶ Βάσας), while the chorēgus was a man of wealth and rank, but in this instance the chorēgus himself acted as aulētēs. We learn from this passage that chorēgi existed in the Lacedaemonian State; their existence at Athens is a familiar fact, and they can be shown to have existed in other States also (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 372. 1). As Sus. (τ. 603) points out, the chorus at Lacedaemon here mentioned was probably not a dramatic but a lyrical chorus.

34. ἐπεχωρίασεν, sc. ἡ αὐλητική.
οί πολλοὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, 'most of the gentlefolks.' Οἱ ἐλεύθεροι are contrasted with δῆτες in 1341 b 13 sq., and with βάμνους and θῆτες in c. 7. 1342 a 18 sqq., where ἐλεύθερος is conjoined with πεπαυμένοι.

35. δῆλον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Chorēgi sometimes dedicated to Dionysus a tablet recording the victory of the poet whose play they had brought out: so we read of Themistocles in Plut. Themist. c. 5, ενίκησε δὲ καὶ χορηγῶν τραγῳδοῦς . . . καὶ πίνακα τῆς νίκης ἑφηκε, τοιαύτην ἐπιγραφὴν ἔχοντα, "Θεμιστοκλῆς Φρεάρμος ἐχορήγησε, Φρύνιχος εὐδίδακεν, Ἀδείμαινος ἡρξεν" (cp. Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. i. 108). See A. Müller, Die griech. Bühnenalterth., p. 418, who follows Bergk in comparing Theophrast.Char. 22, ὁ δὲ ἀνελεύθερος τουτοῦ τοῦς, οίος νικήσας τραγῳδοῦς ταυτίαν ἐξελίγαν ἀναβαίναι τῷ Διωνίσῳ, ἐπιγράφας μὲν (μόνον;) αὐτοῦ τῷ ὅρμῳ κ.τ.λ. The tablet mentioned by Aristotle here cannot of course have shown that most Athenians of respectability were able to play on the αἰλός: it can only have recorded the name of one such Athenian as having acted as aulētēs on this particular occasion. As to Ephantides, one of the earliest comic poets at Athens, see Sus. 4, and Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 35 sqq.

37. ὑστερον δὲ ἀπεδοκιμάσθη κ.τ.λ. Supply ὁ αἰλός. 'But afterwards it was rejected [as an instrument for the young and for gentlefolks] simply by force of experience.'

39. ὃδοις δὲ, sc. ἀπεδοκιμάσθη. It is evident that at one time not only the αἰλός, but also the five instruments mentioned here, together with others which, like them, required manual dexterity and skill, were used by the young and by gentlefolks, but that they were afterwards discarded, so far as these classes were concerned, because they were thought not to contribute to virtue. They were probably regarded as training the hand rather than the mind or
character, and of three of them—sambucae and triangular and septangular harps—we read that their strength lay in pleasing the ear of the listener, not in anything ennobling. Music, however, that is merely for pleasure is said to be no better than a 'plaything' by Plato (Polit. 288 C: cp. Gorg. 501 E and Laws 700 D sqq.); the best type of music leads on to the love of ἄοι καλάν (Rep. 403 C). As to the instruments here named see Sus.4, i. p. 632 sqq., and Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., pp. 312–314. The sambuca was high-pitched and piercing in tone (Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 101, τὴν δὲ σαμβύκην πρὸς θηλύτητα (ἀναλογούσαν), ἀγενής τε οὖν καὶ μετὰ πολλὰς ὀξύτητας διὰ τὴν μικρότητα τῶν χορδῶν εἰς ἔκλυσιν περιέγουσα; cp. Athen. Deipn. 633 f), whereas the lyre was deeper in tone (Aristid. Quint. ibid). Trigona and pectides (which were a kind of harp) had already been rejected by Plato in Rep. 399 C as being 'many-stringed and many-toned,' but the number of strings in the pectis seems to have varied (Sus.4, i. p. 632 sq.), and Aristotle does not name this ground for rejecting them. Opinion at Mytilene was probably favourable to the sambuca, for we read in Euphorion ap. Athen. Deipn. 182 f of a statue of one of the Muses there, who was represented holding a sambuca.

1341 b. 2. εὐλόγως δ' ἔχει κ.τ.λ. For this myth see Ovid, Fasti 6. 695 sqq.: Hygin. Fab. 165 (quoted in Bull. de Corr. Hellénique 12. 107): Paus. 1. 24. 1: Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 109. As Schneider points out, Aristotle evidently has before him the lines of Melanippides (Fragm. 2 Bergk) and the reply of Telestes (Fragm. 1 Bergk): see for both Athen. Deipn. 616 sq. Some, however, ascribed the invention of the αὐλός to Apollo (Plut. De Mus. c. 14). Τῶν αὐλῶν and τῶν αὖλων, because two pipes and not one were commonly used for playing in Greece.

4. οὗ κακῶς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. According to Melaniippides (Fragm. 2) Athena had said, when casting away the αὖλος,

εἶπεν' αὖσχεαι, σώματι κύρα,
οὗ μὲ τὰδ' ἐγώ κακότατι δίδωμι.

6. οὗ μὴν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably remembers an old saying (Athen. Deipn. 337 e),

ἀνδρὶ μὲν αὐλητήρι θεοὶ νόν οὐκ ἐνέφυσαν,
ἀλλ' ἄμα τῷ φυσὴν χῶ νόσο ἐκέπταται.

Cp. Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 109, ἀπορρίπτει τὴν θεῶν φασί τοὺς αὖλοις ὡς οὗ πρόσφορον ἡδονὴν ἐπιθερμωτας τοῖς σοφίας ἐφιμενοῖς: also
Plato, Laws 644 A, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρώματα τείνονταν ἡ τινα πρῶς ισχίν ἢ καὶ πρῶς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφιάν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δύσης βιάνασσον τ' εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παύθειν καλεῦθειν, and Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 16, ἔτι ἐμποδίου τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἱδῶναι, καὶ διὰ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. Ἡ γορταῖος ἁπλαῖα τίκτικα ἐν τῶν ἐπίκουροι ἄπιαν ἐστὶ πρῶς τὸ δεῖν ἠμᾶς ἀπίαναι, and Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 6, τὸ δὲ μηδὲν ἀδίκειν ὄδειν ἐστὶ πρῶς τὸ βαρρεῖν.

7. τῇ δὲ Ἀθηνᾶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην. ‘Science’ and ‘skill in art’ are mentioned together, just as we have in Plato, Ion 536 Ω, οὗ γαρ τέχνη ὀδὸ ἐπιστήμην περί ὑμηροῦ λέγεις ἰα λέγεις, ἀλλὰ θέα μορφὰ καὶ κατοκωχῖ, and in Theaet. 207 Β, ἅντι δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικοῦ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμου περὶ ἀμάξης ὑστίας γεγονέναι. In the passage before us καὶ τὴν τεχνήν is probably added in explanation and limitation of τὴν ἐπιστήμην, for it is the less wide term of the two: cp. de Soph. Elench. 6. 168 b 6, οἱ τεχνῖται καὶ διὸς οἱ ἐπιστήμονες. As to Athena cp. Hom. Odyssey 13. 297,

ἐπεὶ σὺ μὲν ἔσσει βροτῶν ὅχ' ἀριστος ἀπάντων ψιλὴ καὶ μουσίαν, ἐγὼ δ' ἐν πάσι θεοῖσιν μήτι τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσαν,


8. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The apodosis to this protasis virtually comes in c. 7. 1341 b 19, σκεπτέων δ' ἔτι κ.τ.λ., though by the time Aristotle reaches these words he has forgotten the existence of his protasis, owing to the interposition of the long parenthesis (10–18) in which he states his reasons for excluding a professional study of music. Compare 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq., where the same thing occurs.

10. τεχνικήν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἁγῷας. This is added because the word τεχνικός was commonly used in a different sense. Plato had already said of ἡ κεφαριστική ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἁγῶι that its only aim is pleasure (Gorg. 501 E), and Aristotle here has before him the whole passage, Gorg. 501 B–502 Α.
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έν ταύτη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Ἐν ταύτη = ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγώνας παιδείᾳ. Γάρ introduces the reason why Aristotle rejects study with a view to festival-competitions, not the reason why he calls this study τεχνική: hence the parenthesis which Sus. begins before τεχνικὴ should rather begin before ἐν ταύτη. The object with which an ἀλέθερος should study is his own improvement in virtue (c. 2. 1337 b 17 sqq.). The ἀλέθερος is defined in Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25 sqq. as ὁ αὐτὸς ἐκεῖ καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ἄν: it is characteristic of him not to live for the convenience of another (Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 a 31 sq.). To do things with a view to the virtue of others would be more befitting to him than to contribute merely to their pleasure (cp. Plato, Gorg. 500 Α sq.). Thus αὐτὸς and ἀρετῆς are both of them emphatic, and also τῶν ἀκούστων and τῆς ὁδοῦ.

14. For καὶ ... δή see note on 1253 a 18. We expect βάναυσον rather than βανάυσος, but see note on 1338 b 1.

ποιητῶς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς δὲν ποιοῦται τὸ τέλος, ‘for the object is evil with a view to which they select their end’ (cp. c. 5. 1339 b 31, συμβεβήκε δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖσθαι τὸ παιδία τέλος, and Rhet. 2. 18. 1391 b 16, ὁσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς ὅσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν τῶν θεωρῶν ὁ λόγος συνείστηκεν). Competitors at a festival play, or sing and play, in the way which is most likely is to please the less refined among their audience.

19. Σκεπτέον δ’ ἑτὶ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has finished what he had to C. 7. say about ὄργανα and ἐργασία, and now only one of the subjects mentioned in c. 6. 1340 b 41 sqq. remains to be dealt with, and this is ποιῶν μελῶν καὶ ποιῶν ρυθμῶν κοινωνητέον (i.e. τοῖς πρὸς ἄρετὴν παιδευμένοις πολιτεῖας). But in taking up this subject for consideration Aristotle gives a wider extension to it than he had led us to expect that he would, and announces that he will inquire generally περὶ τῶν ἀρμονίων καὶ τῶν ρυθμῶν, as well as with regard to their use in education. And in fact we find in the sequel that he inquires in this chapter not only what harmonies are to be used in education, but also what are to be used for the other purposes served by music. This is quite in accordance with c. 5. 1339 a 11 sqq., where the question proposed for discussion is the broad question, for how many purposes music is useful. We see, therefore, that the Fifth Book of the Politics is not exclusively concerned with questions relating to the education of youth, but occupies itself also with the question for what purposes music is to be used in adult life. As to the state of the text in 19—26 see critical note.


23. τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὀργῆν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ρυθμῶν οὖσαν. Sepulv. ‘musicam in cantus modulatione et rythmis consistere,’ and so most interpreters, but Vict. explains, ‘musicam exerceri colique et per cantus et per numeros,’ and perhaps he is right. Cp. 4(7). 2. 1324 a 15, ὁ δὲ τοῦ συμπολιτεύοντα καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως (βίος).

24. τούτων δ’ ἐκάπετον κ.τ.λ. What the difference is between the educational effect of rhythm and melody, Aristotle does not tell us, for the promise here given of a discussion of the subject is not fulfilled in what we possess of the Politics. We see from Plato, Laws 655 A, that ρυθμός makes men εὔρυμμοι and ἀρμονία makes them εὐάρμονοι, but Aristotle probably has in view some more tangible difference than this. The εὐρυβάς μουσική would be the better preparation for war (cp. Polyb. 4. 20. 6). But the key to the question which of the two kinds is the better for education will be found in the question which benefits the character most.

27. νομίσαντες οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1342 a 31 sq. Specialists in music (μουσικοί, cp. 1342 b 23, τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τινα) are distinguished here from philosophers who have received a musical training
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(c.p 1341 b 33, τινές τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, and c. 5. 1340 b 5 sq., and see below on 1342 a 31, and cp. for ἐκ Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 232). Works seem to have been in existence written by men belonging to each of these classes, which went into full detail both on the subject of harmonies and rhythms and on that of musical education. As to the persons referred to see note on 1340 b 5.

31. As to the meaning of νομικός see Sus,4 who renders the word 'formally,' and compares Metaph. M. i. 1076 a 27, ἀπλῶς καὶ ἄσον νόμων χάριν. But does not the word mean 'after the fashion of a law,' i.e. in a broad and general way, as a law does? C.p. 3. 15. 1286 a 9 sqq., and Plato, Laws 876 D, ὃς μὴ ἀλλ’ ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴπομέν τε καὶ ἐδράσαμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν νομοθετήσει νόμων, τὸ περιγράφῃ τε καὶ τοὺς τίτους τῶν τιμωρίων εἴπόντας δοῦναι τὰ παραδείγματα τούτοις δικαιαίως τῷ μὴ ποτὲ βαίνειν ἔξω τῆς δίκης κ.τ.λ.

32. ἐπει δὲ κ.τ.λ. The classification of melodies here given rests on the familiar distinction of ἡθη πράξεις and πάθη (cp. Poet. i. 1447 a 28), for ἐνθουσιασμὸς is a πάθος (Pol. 5(8). 5. 1340 a 11). Of the four kinds of tragedy mentioned in Poet. 18. 1455 b 32 sqq. one is ἡ ἡθική and another ἡ παθητική. Compare also Strabo, p. 15, τούναντιόν δ’ οἱ παλαιοὶ φιλοσοφίαν τινὰ λέγουσι πρότων τὴν ποιητικὴν, εἰσάγονσαν εἰς τὸν βίον ἡμᾶς ἑκ νέων καὶ διδάσκονταν ἡθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις μεθ’ ἠθικῆς. ‘Ἡθικὰ μέλη are those which imitate and mould to virtue (see above on 1340 a 36); as to πρακτικὰ μέλη, ‘melodies which imitate and stir to action,’ cp. Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 12, ἡθος δὲ ἔχει ἡ μὲν ὑποφρονυτὶ πρακτικῶν, διό καὶ ἐν τῷ Γηράμην ἡ ἔξοδος καὶ ἡ ἐξόπλισις ἐν ταῦτῃ πεποίηται, and Poet. 24. 1459 b 37, τὸ δὲ λαμβάκων καὶ τετράμετρων κινητικὰ, τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν. So in Aelian, Var. Hist. 2. 44 a trumpeter is described as playing τὸ παραμυθητικὸν μέλος, διάτορῳ τε καὶ γεγωνὸς ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ οὖν εἰς τὴν μάχην ἐγερθήμων. Πρακτικὰ μέλη seem to have been the favourites at Sparta: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 21, and Inst. Lac. § 14, ἐσποίδαζον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τὰς φώνας οὐδὲν ἤπτον κέντρον δ’ εἶχε ταῦτα ἐγερτικῶν θυμόν καὶ φρονήματος καὶ παραστατικῶν ὑμης ένθουσιώδους καὶ πρακτικῆς. Plutarch, however, gives a somewhat different account of Spartan songs in Lycurg. c. 4, λόγου γὰρ ἦσαν αἱ φώναι πρὸς εὑρεθεὶσαν καὶ δρομῶν ἀνάκλητικοι διὰ μέλων ἁμα καὶ πρόνυμων τὸ κόσμου ἐχώντων καὶ καταστατικῶν, διὸ ἀκρόμενοι κατεπράγματος λειτουργοῦσα τὴ ἡθη καὶ συνψυκτούσα τῷ ζήλῳ τῶν καλῶν. As to πρακτικὰ μέλη, which were of course not exclusively warlike, see vol. i. p. 367, note 1. Dr. Johnson describes in his Journey to the Western Islands (Works, 8. 279) how the strokes of
the reapers' sickles 'were timed by the modulation of the harvest-
song, in which all their voices were united,' and adds that 'they
accompany in the Highlands every action which can be done in
equal time with an appropriated strain, which has, they say, not
much meaning, but its effects are regularity and cheerfulness. The
ancient proceleusmatic song, by which the rowers of galleys were
animated, may be supposed to have been of this kind.'

33. ως is followed in 35 by καί. For instances of a similar
structure see note on 1313 b 13.

35. καί τῶν ἄρμονίων κ.τ.λ., 'and they lay down that musical
modes are appropriate in nature to each of these, one mode
answering to one kind of melody and another to another.' The
Dorian mode was the appropriate harmony for ἡδικὰ μέλη, the
Phrygian for ἑυθυναιαστικὰ, and perhaps the hypo-Phrygian (see
above on 32) for πρακτικά. Μέρος seems here to be used in the
sense of είδος (cp. διαίρεσις, 32): for this use of the word see Bon.
Ind. 455 b 46 sqq.

36. φαμέν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1339 b 14. Plato, on the other
hand, had spoken in Laws 659 D–660 A as if the ethical use of
music was its only use. For καί πλειώνων see note on 1287 a 34.

38. καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν καθάρσιν κ.τ.λ. See below on
1342 a 8. The promise here given of a full explanation of the
word καθάρσις is not fulfilled in the Poetics as it has come down to
us: see note in Sus.4. For other matters known to have found
a place in Aristotle's treatise which are wanting in our Poetics,
see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 107. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics,
Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 102. 2). 'We possess Aristotle's treatise,' he remarks,
'only in a text mutilated and in many ways corrupted.' For ἀπλός, 'in a general way,' cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 4.
1185 a 38, ἀλλ' ἵσως οüχ ἵπαν οüτως ἀπλός εἰπέων, ἀλλ' σαφέστερον
dιορίσαι δεί.

40. τρίτων δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν κ.τ.λ. Bernays translates in his
Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über
Wirkung der Tragödie, p. 7 (ed. 1880), 'drittens zur Ergötzung,
um sich zu erholen und abzuspannen,' but if, as he seems to think,
the words πρὸς ἀνεσίων τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν are added
in explanation of πρὸς διαγωγῆν, the word διαγωγή must here be used
in a different sense from that in which it is used elsewhere in the
Fifth Book, e.g. in c. 5. 1339 b 14, where it is distinguished from
παιδα. This is not perhaps impossible, but it is more likely that

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διαγωγή is used here in the same sense as in 1339 b 14, and that it is linked with ἄνεσις and τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσις because it has already been so linked in c. 5. 1339 b 15 sqq. Zeller, indeed, thinks (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 771. 1: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 308. 1) that Aristotle intends ἄνεσις and τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσις to come in as a fourth end and not as a part of the third, though the word τέταρτον is not used. Sus. would read ταύτης δ' ἢ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ἢ πρὸς ἄνεσιν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν partly for other reasons and partly because he regards it as inconceivable 'that the cathartic enjoyment could possibly be anything else but either that of pure amusement and sensuous delight or the genuine higher aesthetic enjoyment which is a part of the highest intellectual culture and rational satisfaction' (see Sus. 4, i. p. 638 sqq.), but if any change in the text is necessary, I should be content with the insertion of ἢ before πρὸς ἄνεσιν.

1342 a. 1. φανερὸν διὰ χρηστέων μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὗ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπων πάσαις χρηστέων. Aristotle probably refers only to the modes which are not παρεκβάσεις, yet he finds a use in 22 sqq. even for those which are. For the repetition of πάσαις see note on 1283 a 30.

2. πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἡθικώταταις. As to the meaning of ἡθικώταταις here and ἡθικοῖς in 28 see note on 1340 a 36. Aristotle may use the plural because he is prepared to approve, in addition to the Dorian mode, of the ὑποδωρωτί, of which we read in Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 14 that it is μεγαλοπρεπές καὶ στάσιμον, but perhaps it is more likely that he does not wish to exclude any modes which may be recommended as ἡθικώταται by οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβής καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μονοικίαν παιδείας (cp. 30 sqq.). He rejects without consideration the possible claims of πρακτικὰ καὶ ενθουσιαστικὰ μέλη to a place, however subordinate, in the education of the young, but he might well have considered whether they do not deserve to be occasionally used. Are not boys, or some of them at any rate, παθητικοὶ, and might not κάθαρσις by music be sometimes useful to such boys even educationally? Might not airs which stir to action also be a useful element in the education of some boys? It is not clear that Aristotle objects to the presence of boys at the performance of πρακτικὰ καὶ ενθουσιαστικὰ μέλη, any more than he objects to their presence at the performance of tragedies (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 20 sqq.), but he certainly allows no place in education to music of these two kinds.
4. καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. Sus. is probably right in translating these words ‘also the practical and the enthu-
siastic’: cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 14, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ ὅρλοιν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον
καὶ τὸ διαθερόν, ὅτε καὶ (‘also’) τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.

δ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See note in Sus. Aristotle seems to anticipate that
his recommendation of the use of the ‘enthusiastic’ modes, when
we listen to music played by others, will excite surprise, and hence
in 4–16 he justifies it at some length, though he adds no similar
justification of his recommendation of the use of the ‘practical’
modes under similar circumstances, probably because he does not
anticipate that any objection will be made to this.

7. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακώχημι τινὲς εἶσιν. Ταύ-
tης τῆς κινήσεως = τούτου τοῦ πάθους: cp. 5, πάθος, and Plut. De
Sanitate Tuenda c. 13, ἡδί δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματα τὸ σῶμα
μηνύει πρὸς δόσου ἐπισφαλῶς ἔχειν, ἄλογοι γὰρ ἵσχοιναι ἀδύνατα καὶ φάβοι.
For κατακώχημι see critical note on 1269 b 30. Κατέχεσθαί is the
appropriate technical term, cp. Plato, Symp. 215 C, and Aristid.
Quint. De Musica, p. 65, τοὺς δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ὀρμῆς καὶ ἐπιποίησις κατεχο-
μένους ὑπὸ ἐνθουσιασμὸν. As to the nature of ἐνθουσιασμὸς see note
on 1340 a 11. Of this susceptibility to ἐνθουσιασμὸς we have
a striking example in Olympias, the mother of Alexander (Plut.
Alex. c. 2, ἡ δὲ Ὀλυμπίας μᾶλλον ἐτέρων ξηλῶσα τὰς κατοχὰς καὶ τοῖς
ἐνθουσιασμοῖς κ.τ.λ.). Had Aristotle observed in her case the calming
effect of sacred melodies?

8. ἐκ τῶν δὲ ἵππων μελῶν κ.τ.λ., ‘and as an effect of the sacred melo-
dies we see these men, when they have used the melodies which fill
the soul with mystic excitement, brought back to a normal state as if
having received medical treatment and purgation.’ Sus. points out
that χρῆσθαι, like κίνησις, καθίστασθαι, and κοινοφίσεσθαι, is a medical
term. It seems likely that the patient both listened to and sang
the maddening melodies (see note in Sus.). Τῶς ἐξοργιάζουσι τὴν
ψυχὴν μέλεσι has been interpreted in many ways. Vict. explains
these words ‘cantibus expiando animo frangendisque vehementiobi-
bus illis motibus aptis,’ Lamb. ‘cantibus animum furor levantibus
ac purgantibus,’ and Liddell and Scott ‘melodies which purge by
mystic rites,’ but Sepulveda is probably right in translating ‘cantib-
bus animum concitabantibus’ (cp. 1342 b 3, ἀμφὶ γὰρ ὀργιαστικὰ καὶ
παθητικά). Bernays (followed by Sus.) renders the words in a not
very dissimilar way, ‘Lieder die eben das Gemüth berauschen’
(‘songs which intoxicate the soul’). Ὑπον — μέλεσι is bracketed by
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Sus. as a gloss on ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν (see Sus.¹, p. 640), but perhaps not all the ἱερὰ μέλη were ‘intoxicating to the soul’: cp. Plato, Ion 536 C, ὡσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιάντες ἐκεῖνον μόνον αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μελούς ὀξέως, δὲ ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἢ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τὸ μέλος καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ἰτμάτων ἐνυπογονέστερον, τῶν δὲ ἀλλῶν οὐ φροντίζουσιν. There may have been ἱερὰ μέλη introductory to the melody which produced the decisive effect. Τὴν ψυχὴν is emphatic: if the music does not go to the soul, it does nothing. For καθαρσιμένων see above on 1340 b 3. In ἱατρείας καὶ καθάρσεως the καὶ is explanatory, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 9, τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν κατηλκυρήν (see note on 1257 b 7). The action of the sacred melodies on the souls of persons naturally disposed to ἐνθουσιασμός is compared to the action of some cathartic medicine like hellebore, which removes the worst elements and leaves the best (Plato, Rep. 567 C, καλὸν γε, ἐφιπτάρμον. Ναὶ, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸν ἔναντίον ἢ οἱ ἱατροὶ τὰ σώματα οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ χείριστον ἀφαρώντες λείπουν τὸ βέλτιστον, ὃ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων). The following passages may be selected from many others as throwing light on Aristotle’s meaning—Plut. Sympnos. 6. 7. 2, καὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, δὲ φίλε, φρενετίζον καὶ μαυρώνεις (πλέον ἰσχυρεί) ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐλλεβορῷ χρησάμενος ἡ διαίτης καταστῇ, τὸ μὲν σφοδρὸν ἐκεῖνο καὶ σύντονον οὖθε τὸν ἐφιπτάρμον ἁγίουν ἐφιπτάρμον καὶ γέγονεν ἐξίηληπον. ἢ δ' ἀληθινὴ δύναμις καὶ σωφροσύνη παραγίνεται τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ὄστος δὴ καὶ η ἱατρός τοῦ ὄστου, τὸ πληροκλικὸν ἀφαρωτῶς καὶ μανικικόν, εἰς παραίδειαν ἐξίναι καὶ γναίνουσαν καθίστησιν: Strabo, p. 418, καὶ δὴ φαινεί ἐκαί (at the Malian Anticyra) τὸν ἐλλεβορὸν φώσθηκαν τῶν ἀστείων, ἐνταῦθα δὲ (at the Phocian Anticyra) σκευαζέσθαι βέλτιον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποδόμεται δεύορ (to the latter) πολλοὺς καθάρσεως καὶ καθαρσίας χάρων: and Plut. Coriol. c. 12, ἐδέξαμεν οὖν τοὺς νοῦν ἐχούσαν εἰς δέον γεγονέναι καὶ κατὰ καρδὶν ἥ χρεία τῶν Ὀὐελιτρανῶν διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν κούψιμου δειμένους, καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἄρα σκέφτεσθαι ἥμαλλον, εἰ τὸ δορυφοῦν μᾶλλον καὶ συνεπηρεμένον τοὺς δημαγωγοὺς ὡσπερ περίττωμα τῆς πόλεως νοσερῶν καὶ παραχάδει ἀποκαθαρθέι. That certain sacred rites produced a similar effect on the soul to that produced by cathartic medicines on the body, we see from Plato, Rep. 560 D, τούτων δὲ γε που κενώσαντες καὶ καθάρσαντες τὴν τοῦ κατεγείρειν τῇ ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχῆς μεγάλους τέλεσι, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 158, διὸ καὶ τὰς βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ὅσα ταύτας παραπλησίω χάγου τινός ἐχεστικαὶ φαινότατος. ὡς εἰ τῶν ἁμαθεστέρων παραφωτίζει διὰ βίον ἤ τύχην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελῳδίαν τε καὶ ὁρχήσεων ἄρα παιδίας ἐκκαθαρίστημι, where the purging influence of the rites is traced in part to the music by which they were accompanied. On the whole subject of the
katharsis effected by music and also by tragedy, see Sus.4, i. p. 641 sqq., and Prof. Butcher, Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, c. 6. We are not distinctly told in the passage before us that a katharsis παθημάτων occurs under the influence of the sacred melodies, as we are in the famous passage of the Poetics about tragedy (Poet. 6. 1449 b 27 sq.), but we can hardly be wrong in taking the musical katharsis to be a katharsis of παθηματα like the other. It should be noticed that music appears to purge all emotions, not merely, like tragedy, those of pity and fear, and also that the kind of music which produces a cathartic effect is by no means the willful kind characteristic of such modes as the mixo-Lyrian; music of this sort is charged with human feeling and essentially human, whereas cathartic music is full of a divine afflatus (Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 19, διὸ καὶ ἀριστεῖ τῷ χορῷ τὸ γοητῶν καὶ ἡσύχιων ἱδῶν καὶ μέλων· ἀνθρωπικὰ γάρ, ταῦτα δ’ ἔχουσιν αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι, ἥκιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ὑποφρύγατι· ἐνθουσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βασικὴ). In Milton’s Paradise Lost, i. 549 sqq., the ‘Dorian mood’ is said to inspire ‘deliberate valour’ ‘ firm and unmoved With dread of death to flight or foul retreat’ (cp. 1342 b 12 sqq.), and is also credited with a cathartic influence which Aristotle does not ascribe to it—

‘Nor wanting power to mitigate and swage
With solemn touches troubled thoughts, and chase
Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain
From mortal or immortal minds.’

Here the passage before us may be present to Milton’s mind. Julian perhaps refers to it in Epist. 56. 442 B, ὅτι γὰρ πρὸ ἡμῶν αὐτοῖ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑπὸ τῆς θείας μονικῆς καθαρθείνει ὑψηλοτρέπει, πιστευόν τῶν προαιρόμενοις ὀρθῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦτων.

11. ταυτὸ δὴ τούτο κ.τ.λ. Aristotle seems still to be speaking of the effect of the sacred melodies. They cannot fail, he thinks, to purge others besides those who are specially given to ἐνθουσιασμός—those who are specially subject to the emotions of fear and pity (two allied emotions, as we learn from Rhet. 2. 8), and indeed those who are subject to emotion of any kind, and also those who are not specially emotional, so far as they are accessible to emotion. Philoxenus had represented the Cyclops as ‘curing his love with music’ (Philox. Fragm. 7: Plut. Amat. c. 18), and anger also was thought to be soothed by music (Athen. Deipn. 623 f sq.). As to the specially emotional persons referred to, cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1228 b 35, οἱ μὲν οὖν νοσώδεις καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ
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καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχουσι τι, πλὴν βαθτῶν τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολloi, and Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 21, ἡ ἐκείστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ὑποφυγησία· ἐνθοσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βαβυκηκτικὴ. κατὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην πάσχομεν τι παθητικοῖ δὲ οἱ ἀσθενεὶς μᾶλλον τῶν δυνατῶν εἰσί.

13. καθ’ ὄνομα ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων ἐκάστω, 'so far as a share in the things mentioned' (i.e. emotions) 'falls to each': cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 22, καθ’ ὄνομα ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ξίνου καλῶς, and Plato, Rep. 421 C, ἑτάν οὖν ὅποι ἐκάστοις τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἢ φύσει ἀποδιδόμεν τῶν μεταλομβάνεων εὐδαιμονιῶν.

14. τινὰ κάθαρσιν. Bern.'irdgen eine Katharsis,’ and Prof. Butcher (Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 246, note 1) observes, ‘τινὰ κάθαρσιν implies that the katharsis in all cases is not precisely of the same kind,’ and (p. 247) ‘it is pretty plainly implied that the katharsis of pity and fear in tragedy is analogous to, but not identical with, the katharsis of “enthusiasm.”’ This may be so, but I am not sure that Aristotle means anything more than that all experience some purgation, though the amount of it varies with the amount of emotion by which they are severally possessed: cp. Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 9, δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κοινὰ (‘things which are shared by men in general’) μὴ παρορῶν, ἄλλα ἐν τινὶ λόγῳ τίθεσθαι. Τις, indeed, is sometimes added to a substantive merely to soften it, as in Xen. Oecon. 8. 3, καὶ γὰρ χρόνος ἐξ ἀνθρώπων συγκεῖμενος ἀετοῦ ἄλλα ὅταν μὲν ποιῶσιν δ’ τι ἀν τίχυ ἐκαστος, ταραχῇ τις φαίνεται καὶ θεάσαι ἀσφείτες, but I do not think that this is the case here.


15. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and similarly the cathartic melodies also’ (as well as the sacred melodies) ‘are a source to men of harmless pleasure.’ So Vict. ‘ut cantilenas illas sacras, quas docuit adhíberi solitas sua aetate ad expiandos lymphaticos, praeter fuorem quem levant affirmavit gignere voletatem, ita nunc testatur cantus purgandis animís factos, qui tamen non opitulantur ope divina valde commotís animo, sed concentu vocum sonorumque, apto illís motibus, prosunt, continere in se suavitátis plurimum.’ The fact that they are a source of harmless pleasure shows that they are well suited both for diagoge and for relaxation (cp. c. 5. 1339 b 25 sqq.). The cathartic melodies here referred to seem to be the
same as those which are called enthusiastic in 1341 b 34. I under-
stood this passage otherwise when I wrote (in vol. i. p. 366), ‘the
melodies also which purge emotion are similarly productive of
innocent pleasure.’ I should have written, ‘just as the sacred
melodies produce this effect, so the melodies which purge emotion
are similarly productive of innocent pleasure.’ [Since the fore-
going note was written, Sus.4 (i. p. 611) has rightly disagreed with
the view which I took of the sentence in vol. i. p. 366. I then
thought that it referred to cathartic melodies as distinguished from
cathartic harmonies, whereas I think now that it refers to cathartic
melodies as distinguished from the sacred melodies, whose effects
I take to be described in ἐκ τῶν δ' ἑρωίων μελῶν, 8—ἢδονὴς, 15. I am
still of opinion that καθαρτικά should be retained in 15, and not, as
Sus. suggests, discarded in favour of πρακτικά.]

16. διὸ κ.τ.λ. Μέν is taken up, not by δ' in 19, but by δ' in 28.
With Spengel and Sus. I insert (χρῆσθαι) before θετέων: cp. χρηστοῖον,
1342 a 1, 2, χρῆσθαι, 27, and χρηστοῖον, 29. For θετέων χρῆσθαι,
cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 1, ἐδηκε γὰρ θείων μὲν βασιλέα πρὸ τῆς πόλεως
tὰ δημόσια ἄπαντα. Διὸ—ἀγωνιστάς is virtually repeated in 26—28.

For ἔλευθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, see above on 1338 b 3.

19. δὲ δὲ φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναῦσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων
συγκείμενος. Sus.4 aptly compares Cic. De Fin. 2. 14. 44, cum
Epicuro autem hoc plus est negotii, quod e duplici genere volup-
tatis coniunctus est.

1323 a 1, πρὸς δὲ τούτους περὶ ἀγώνας ἐπιμελεία γυμνάκιοι καὶ Διωνύσια-
κοις, καὶ εἰ τινὰς ἐτέρας συμβαίνει τοιοῦτας γίνεσθαι θεωρίας, whence it
appears that a 'contest' was a kind of 'spectacle.' A dramatic or
musical performance would also be a 'spectacle.' Θεωρία is ex-
plained by Stallbaum to be used in the wider sense of 'festival' (ἰορθή)
§ 10, οὕτε θυσίαν οὕτε θεωρίαν οὕτ' ἄλλην ἔσχην υδεμίαν. We infer from
the use of καὶ in καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις that Aristotle is prepared to pro-
vide ἀγώνας and θεωρίας at which music of a higher type is performed
for the citizens of his 'best State.' It is remarkable that he should
expect day-labourers to care for music of any kind.

22. εἰςὶ δ' ὠσπέρ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ. As to the souls of
βίανωσι and θήκες cp. Plato, Rep. 495 D, quoted above on 1337 b
8. The position of εἰςὶ is strange; it seems hardly to belong to
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ὅσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ., and yet it can hardly belong to ὁστῳ καὶ κ.τ.λ., for that clause is already provided with an εἰσὶ. Did Aristotle originally intend the sentence to run εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρμονίων παρεκβάσεις and insert ὅσπερ κ.τ.λ. by an afterthought? Perhaps the repetition of εἰσὶ in 24 is to be compared with the repetition of δῆλον in 3. 13: 1283 b 17 and of ἔργον in 8(6). 5. 1319 b 35.

23. οὗτῳ καὶ τῶν ἀρμονίων παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ. Here the relation between the soul and an ἀρμονία dwelt on in c. 5. 1340 b 17 sqq. is again present to Aristotle’s mind. The μεξολυδιστὶ and συντονολυδιστὶ (Plato, Rep. 398 E) are probably among the modes referred to, and perhaps also the low-pitched Lydian and low-pitched Ionian (see note in Sus.4); at any rate both high-pitched and low-pitched modes are treated as παρεκβάσεις τῶν ἀρμονίων in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 24 sqq. The abandonment of the mixo-Lydian mode to βάναυσι καὶ βήτες is uncomplimentary to Sappho, its reputed inventress (see above on 1340 a 42).

24. καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα, ‘and of melodies those which are highly-strung and unnaturally coloured.’ Σύντονα is perhaps used here in opposition both to ἀνειμένα or μαλακά, as in 1342 b 21 and 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27, and to βαρέα, as in De Gen. An. 5. 7. 786 b 35, καὶ εὖ τῶι μέλει τὸ βαρύ τῶν συντόνων βαλτιων. The Cretans are said by Ephorus to have used in their songs the rhythms which are most σύντονοι (Fragm. 64: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 250). For the meaning of χρώμα in music see Liddell and Scott, s.v., and Sus.4, i. p. 636 sqq. Aristotle probably objected to the musical innovations of Timotheus, of whom we read in Pherecr. Χείρων, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 333), ὅστοι ἀπαντᾷ ὁσ ἕλγω παρελήλυθ’ ἄδων ἐκτραπέλους μυρμηκάς, ἐξαρμονίους ὑπερβολαίους τ’ ἀνοσίους, and also to the music of Agathon: cp. Plut. Sympos. 3. 1. 1, διαμάξω δὲ καὶ Ἐράτωνα τοῦτον, εἰ τὸς ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι παραχώσεις βδελυτῶμενοι καὶ κατηγορῶν τοῦ καλοῦ Ἀγάθωνος, ὃν πρῶτον εἰς τραγῳδίαν φασίν ἐμβαλεῖν καὶ ὑπομίξαι τὸ χρωματικόν, ὅτε τοὺς Μυσοὺς ἐδιδασκεῖν, αὐτὸς ἥμων, ὃς ὅρυτε, πουκιλῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ἄνθρωποῦ τὸ συμπόσιον ἐμπέπληκε καὶ τὴν διὰ τῶν ὅτων ἀποκλείει τρυφήν καὶ ἥδυπάθειαν κ.τ.λ. Compare also Philoch. Fragm. 66 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 395), where we read of Lysander of Sicyon, καὶ περελῶν τὴν συντονιὰν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν τοῖς ψυχοὶ φθαρσάτας, χρώματα τε εὖχροα πρῶτος ἐκθάρμοσε κ.τ.λ., and Pratinas, Fragm. 5, quoted above on 1340 a 42.
26. διόπερ κ.τ.λ. So Plato makes over θρίψιν for famous men to
women and worthless persons (Rep. 387 E).
28. ὡσπερ εἰρήται, in 1342 a 2.
30. καθάπερ εἰπομεν πρότερον, in c. 5. 1340 b 3 sqq.
31. οἱ κοινωνοὶ κ.τ.λ., 'those who have shared in philosophical
study and in musical education,' as distinguished from mere
musicians on the one hand and philosophers who have not studied
music on the other (see above on 1341 b 27). For the phrase
cp. Plato, Gorg. 487 C, κοινωνοῖς γεγονότας σοφίας: Laws 968 A,
pαιδείας ὁπόσης διελήθαμεν κοινωνῶν γενόμενον: Hipp. Minor 363 A,
οἱ μάλιστ' ἀν ἀντιποιμαίμεθα μετείναι ἡμῶν τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβής:
Theaet. 172 C, οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολῶν χρόνον διατρίβωμεν.
32. ὃ δ' εὖ τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης κ.τ.λ. Here begins a similar
review of the opinions put in Socrates' mouth by Plato in the
Republic to that which we find at the end of the Book on
Revolutions (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1 sqq.). As to these passages see
vol. i. p. 519, note 1. The passage in the Republic referred to is
Rep. 399 A sqq., where Plato seems to imply that the Dorian and
Phrygian modes inspire courage in war and temperance in peace.
Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that the Phrygian mode does
neither the one thing nor the other. Φρύγιοι should probably be
ἀφείλε τῶν παιδευμένων νέων τὴν ἀρμονιάν τὴν Λύδιον καὶ τὴν Φρύγιον, τὴν
μὲν τὸ θρησκείας καὶ φιλοσεβάς ἡμῶν ἐγείροντας τῆς ψυχῆς, τὴν δὲ τὸ πρὸς
ἡδονὰς ὀλισθήρον καὶ ἀκόλαστον αὐτούσαν: cp. Aristid. Quint. De
Musica, p. 22. For ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ cp. 2. 6. 1264 b 28, 6 (4). 4.
1291 a 11, and 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1, in all which passages the phrase
is used in close proximity to a mention of ὁ Σωκράτης, and 2. 5.
1264 b 24, ἡ πολιτείᾳ περὶ ἦς ὁ Σωκράτης εἰρήκειν. In 6 (4). 7.
1293 b 1, on the other hand, we have ὡσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις
(perhaps referring to the Eighth and Ninth Books of the Republic),
and in 2. 1. 1261 a 6, ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος.
34. ἀποδοκιμάσας, in Rep. 399 D.
2. αὐλός. For the absence of the article see note on 1255 b 36. 1342 b.
3. For the difference between ἀργιαστικά and παθητικά see above
on 1341 a 21.
δηλοῖ δ' ἡ ποίησις: πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεία κ.τ.λ., 'and poetry makes
this clear' (i.e. that the αὐλός and the Phrygian mode are similar
in effect), 'for every sort of Bacchic frenzy and all Bacchic agita-
tion of mind [when represented in poetry] find their fit expression in
the pipes more than in any other instrument.' In translating κίνσεις 'agitation of mind' and not 'bodily movement' I have followed Sus., who may probably be right (cp. 3, παθητικά, and c. 3. 1337 b 42), but I have done so with some hesitation, for Βακχεία is used of physical movement in Plato, Laws 672 B, τάς τε Βακχείας καὶ πάσαν τὴν μανίκην χορείαν, 790 E, καθάπερ αἱ τῶν ἐκφράσων Βακχείων λάσεις ταύτη τῇ τῆς κυνήσεως ὡμα χορεία καὶ μοῦσῃ χρωμευεῖ, and 815 B–C. For εὐσίν ἐν (= 'sitae sunt in'), see above on 1330 b 8, and cp. c. 6. 1341 a 3, and Plato, Protag. 354 E, 356 D (where see Stallbaum). It should be noted that in a letter (genuine or not) from Olympias to Alexander quoted in Athen. Deipn. 659 f she distinguishes between τὰ ὀργαστικὰ ιερά and τὰ Βακχικά, though in the passage before us Βακχεία is evidently connected with τὸ ὀργαστικὸν.

7. οἷον οἱ διδύραμβοι κ.τ.λ., 'as for instance the dithyramb, [which is an expression of Bacchic frenzy,] is generally agreed to be a Phrygian melody' (and to require the Phrygian mode).

8. σύνεσιν, not far in meaning from τέχνην: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 11, τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης.

9. διότι φιλόξενος κ.τ.λ. Vict. 'est autem molestum haec in parte quod legitur in media sententia accusandi casu μύδους.' Schn. 'Reizius latere nomen dithyrambi Philoxenei suspicatus est; et recte quidem. Equidem non dubito Μουσοῦ id fuisse, quo nomine fabulas tragicas ab Aeschyllo et Agathone publico in certamine Athenis commissas fuisse novimus.' Sophocles also wrote a tragedy thus entitled (see Nauck, Trag. Gr. Fragm., p. 175). Schneider's conjecture has been adopted by Coray, Stahr, Bekk., and Sus., and is probably right, if indeed τῶν Μουσῶν is not an explanatory gloss which has crept from the margin into the text. Bergk accepts the change (Poet. Lyr. Gr., Philoxenus Fragm. 20), and adds, 'hic refero Plut. De Mus. c. 33, δοτε οὖδε ζητεῖν παρὰ ταύτης τὸ διαγώναι δύναται, πότερον οἰκεῖος εἴληθεν ὁ ποιητὴς ὡς οἷον [ὅρων MSS. in place of ός οἷον] εἰτείν εἴ μοῦσην (corrige Μουσοῦς) τὸν ὑπόφωρον τόνῳ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἡ τῶν μεξιλίδων τε καὶ δόρινον ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκβασιν, ἡ τῶν υποφρύγιων τε καὶ φρύγινον ἐπὶ τὴν μέσην (τὸ μέσον ?). If τῶν Μουσῶν is correct, the dithyramb probably turned, like the tragedies of the same name by Aeschylus and Sophocles, on the story of Telephus. The mention of the title of the dithyramb is made somewhat abruptly, and also without necessity; still the title of a poem by Tyrtaeus is given, though less abruptly, in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 39. As to the subjects in connexion with which the Dorian mode was employed, it should
be noticed that, as Plutarch points out (De Musica c. 17), it was sometimes used for πραγμάτων ἀκτίτων and even for ἐρωτικά, subjects as alien to it, one would have thought, as a dithyramb. We see from Plato, Laws 669 C, that composers were not always successful in mating melody and words.


12. περὶ δὲ τῆς δοριστῆς κ.τ.λ. See above on 1340b 3.

13. ἢ δὲ ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. Is this a reference to Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106a 26 sqq., b 26 sq.? Cp. also Magn. Mor. I. 24. 1192a 6, ὁ ἄρα ὀλυθέρος, ἐπειδὴ ἐστιν ἑπανετός, μέσος τις ἄν εἰς τούτων.


15. ἢ δὲ δοριστῆς κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1340b 3 sqq.


17. εἰς δὲ δύο σκοποὶ—34. τὸ πρότυπον. Susemihl brackets this passage as an interpolation, and I incline now to think that he is right: I thought otherwise when I wrote vol. i. p. 366, note 1. It would seem that the writer of it seeks to qualify the decision just arrived at in favour of the use of the midway mode in education by pointing out that for certain ages the relaxed modes are the only possible and becoming ones, and also that there is something to be said for the use in education of such modes as the Lydian. It is hardly likely that Aristotle would do this, unless we suppose a change of mind on his part, for he would scarcely be willing to unsay what he has said against the relaxed modes in c. 5. 1340b 2, or to allow the boys for whose training he recommends the Dorian mode to be also trained in modes which he regards as soft and effeminate. Besides, as Sus.4 remarks (I. p. 616, note), after what has been said in c. 6. 1340 b 35 sqq. we do not expect to hear of old men singing, except perhaps on the occasion of some special festivity (c. 5. 1339 b 9 sqq.). The language of the passage recalls that of Plato in Laws 785 B, τὸ δύνατον καὶ πρότυπον ἑκάσταις προστάτεις μέχρι τῶν πεντήκοντα ἑτῶν, and 670 D, ἵνα καθορίστης τὰς τε ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ὄρθρους ἐκλέγεσθαι τε τὰ προσήκοντα οἷοὶ τ' ὄρθροι, ἄ τοις τηλεοικοῖοις τε καὶ
NOTES.

τοιούτοις ἄδεων πρέπον. We also hear a good deal about τὸ δυνατὸν and τὸ πρέπον, or rather τὸ ἀρμόττον, in the opening chapter of the Book which stands next to the Fifth, if we adopt the order of the Books which has been adopted in the present edition and place the old Fourth Book immediately after the old Eighth. It should further be noticed that Plutarch seems to have had 17–29 before him in An seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 18, ὡσπερ γὰρ, ἐὰν καθηκὼν ἦν ἄδοντας διατελεῖν, ἐδει, πολλῶν τῶν καὶ τρόπων ὑποκειμένων φωνῆς, ὦς ἀρμονίας οἱ μουσικοὶ καλοῦσιν, μὴ τὸν ἀξίν ἄμα καὶ σύντονοι διόκειν γέροντας γενομένους, ἀλλ' ἐν δὲ τὸ βάδιον ἐπεστὶ μετά τοῦ πρέποντος ἦδους. It is, however, possible that Plutarch had before him the criticism of the Republic by τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικήν τιμῆς which is reproduced here, and not its reproduction in the passage before us. In addition to the objections to the passage 17–34 to which reference has already been made, it may be noted that, as Sus. has pointed out, looking to the reference to τὸ δυνατὸν in 18 sqq., we expect to be told that the young should learn those melodies which are suitable to them and not beyond their powers, and not to be told, as we in fact are, that they should learn those melodies which will be the only ones suitable and practicable for them when they are past a certain age. Perhaps, however, the writer does mean that the relaxed modes are suitable both to the young and to the old; this seems to be indicated by his use of καὶ in ὁς τῆς ἐσομένης ἡλικίας, 'for the coming age also as well as for that of youth.' If this is his meaning, however, and there is nothing defective in the text, he must be allowed to have expressed it in a very imperfect way.

20. καὶ ταῦτα, i.e. τὰ δυνατὰ καὶ τὰ πρέποντα, as well as τὰ μέσα: cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 37, τῶν μέσων ἀναγκαίων βίων εἶναι βέλτιστων, τῆς ἐκάστου ἐνδεχομένης τυχείν μεσοτῆτος. Τὸ μέσον would not be exactly the same for boys and for men of full age and for old men.

οἷν τοῖς ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνον κ.τ.λ. Cp. De Gen. An. 5. 7. 787 b 10, ἦτε μὲν οὖν πάσιν ἡ ἱσχὺς εἰ τοῖς νεόροις, διὸ καὶ τὰ ἀκμάζοντα ἱσχύει μᾶλλον ἀναρθρα γὰρ τὰ νέα μᾶλλον καὶ ἄνευρα. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν νέοις οὖσώ ἐπιτέταται, τοῖς δὲ γεράκοσιν ἡδῆ ἀνείται ἡ συντονία διὸ ἄμφω ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἄδοντα πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν, and Plut. An seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 18, quoted above on 17–34. Οἱ ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνον (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 33) are distinguished from those who are in the same state from other causes: see Bonitz (Ind. 71 b 45), who groups with the passage before us Hist. An. 6. 18. 572 a 18, ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ τῶν πάνω.

25. ὡς μεθυστικᾶς κ.τ.λ., 'taking them as connected with intoxication, not conformably to the influence of intoxication (for intoxication makes men rather frenzied revellers), but as enfeebled and exhausted.'

27. ἄστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἑσομένην ἥλικιαν κ.τ.λ. This sentence seems to be modelled on 1342 a 28 sq. and to be intended to contradict it. Καὶ, 27, implies that the study of relaxed modes by the young (for with δεῖ we must supply τοὺς νέους or τοὺς νεοτέρους) will be useful to them at their actual time of life as well as with a view to the coming time of life (see above on 17–34). We expect not τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, but τὴν τῶν ἀπειρηκότων διὰ χρόνον, and we must not identify οἱ πρεσβυτέροι with οἱ ἀπειρηκότες διὰ χρόνον (cp. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 29 sqq.), but for some reason the wider term is preferred.

29. ἢτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here we pass from τὸ δυνατὸν τὸ πρῶτον (cp. 17 sq.) to the lacuna after ἀρμονίων, 33. It seems better to adopt this view (with Sus.) than (with Schn. Cor. and Göttling) to place a colon instead of a full stop after τοιοῦτων, 29, and to connect ἢτι δ' εἰ τις, 29–ἀρμονίων, 33, with what precedes. As to the lacuna after ἀρμονίων see critical note.

30. For τοιοῦτη followed by ἦ, see above on 1266 b 36.

31. κόσμον, probably 'orderliness': cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 7, πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κόσμον, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 4, quoted above on 1341 b 32.

33. τούτους ὅρους πρεῖς. For the absence of the article see above on 1253 b 11.
APPENDIX A.


I am indebted to the kindness of Mr. F. G. Kenyon for the following collation of Brit. Mus. MS. Harl. 6874.

The MS. contains the First Book of the Politics with the exception of the latter part of its last chapter, from 1260a 26, τῶ ἄρθρω-παγιν, to the end. It also contains 6 (4). 15. 1300a 24–1301a 12, beginning with the words κλήρον καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἀπάντων and ending with the word δημοτικά, and 7 (5). 1. 1302a 3–1302b 31, beginning with the words φαύλον. φανερῶν β’ and ending with the word Μεγαρέων. 'It is of octavo size, measuring 8½ in. x 5½ in. It is on vellum, written in a very neat hand, apparently of the first half of the fifteenth century. There is nothing to show how it came into its present fragmentary condition, as it was rebound when acquired by Lord Oxford' (Letter from Mr. Kenyon).

The MS. does not, as far as I see, contain anything new except in one passage, 1253b 8, where a 'lacuna quasi trium litterarum inter ποιον et δε' is noted. None of the seventeen MSS. examined by or for Susemihl in 1252–1254a 17 (see his edition of the Politics of 1872, p. xxviii) have any lacuna there. It is possible that τι has dropped out. But the MS. belongs to the better type of the second family and is nearly allied to P2,3 (especially to P9), two MSS. which, with Ms P1, the Vatican Palimpsest Fragments, and the Latin Translation of the Vetus Interpres, stand at the head of the authorities for the text of the Politics. Of course it has many errors of its own, and when it agrees with P2,3, some of the inferior MSS. often do so too, but sometimes it agrees with P2,3 where none of the inferior MSS. do so (this is the case in 1252a 15, 1253a 16, 1254b 2, 1257a 13, 16, 1300b 24, 26). I have
noticed only two or three passages in which it sides with inferior MSS. against P\textsuperscript{2}.\textsuperscript{3}— in 1252 a 26 it has ζυνδιάζεσθαι with Ms S\textsuperscript{b} Ub L\textsuperscript{s} pr. P\textsuperscript{3}, and in 1257 b 21 it has η with P\textsuperscript{4}\textsuperscript{s} Q L\textsuperscript{s} Ald., not η as Ms P\textsuperscript{1}.\textsuperscript{2}.\textsuperscript{3} T\textsuperscript{b}.

It often stands alone or almost alone in agreement with P\textsuperscript{3}:

1255 a 31 P\textsuperscript{3} has εἴσάμεν, and Harl. εἴσαμεν corrected into εἴσομεν prima manu,

b 2 εκ is omitted by pr. P\textsuperscript{3} pr. Harl.,

1256 a 17 πότερον Harl. pr. P\textsuperscript{3},

b 35 οὐδὲ μᾶς Ms P\textsuperscript{3} Harl.,

1258 b 33 ἐστι Ms P\textsuperscript{3} Harl.: ἐστι P\textsuperscript{2},

1259 b 8 αἴμασις Harl.: αἷμασις (‘ut videtur,’ Sus.) pr. P\textsuperscript{3},

10 ἐκ Π\textsuperscript{3} Harl.

But P\textsuperscript{3} has many false readings which Harl. has not, and in two passages Harl. shows a striking resemblance to P\textsuperscript{2}: thus in 1255 a 37 we find εκ γήνων in P\textsuperscript{2} Q M\textsuperscript{b} Harl., and in 1302 b 19 Ald. pr. P\textsuperscript{2} have ἐν ἔσονται (ἀνεύσονται ἀρ. marg. P\textsuperscript{3}), while Harl. has ἐν ἔσονται (marg. μὴ ἀνεύσονται prima manu). It is obvious, therefore, that Harl. is not copied from P\textsuperscript{3}.

The glosses found in Harl. in 1302 a 28 and b 4 are found also in red ink in the margin of P\textsuperscript{2} and in a later hand than the MS. in the margin of P\textsuperscript{3} (see Susemihl’s edition of 1872 in these passages). Harl. does not seem to have the glosses which are found in P\textsuperscript{2} but not in P\textsuperscript{3}.
APPENDIX A. 577

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>35. ἔστι</th>
<th>ἔστι.</th>
<th>36. ἀφροδίσια</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

b 2-4. περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν πρότερον κ.τ.λ. πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονο-
μίας εἰπεῖν πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πάλιν εἰς οἰκίαν οἰκονομίας δὲ
μέρη, εἰς ὃν πάλιν οἰκία συνέστηκεν. 8. ποίον δὲ εἴη;

lacuna quasi trium litterarum inter poion et deī. 11. ἐστωσαν ἐστωσαν. 25. εὑρ. MS. 28. τὰ 6' τὰ
dē. 35. αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ. 36. οὗ φησιν] οὗ φησιν.

1254 a 6. δέονται δὲ καὶ δέονται. 15. 16. ἀλλού δὲ ἐστὶν om. MS.

16. ἄνθρωπος ὁν] δῶλος ὁν, corr. ἄνθρωπος ὁν in marg.


32. ἔστις] ἔστι τίς. 33. ἐξωτερικώτερας] ἐξωτερι-
tέρας.


1255 a 2-4. καὶ δικαίων . . . τὸ δουλεύων om. MS. 5. καὶ post tis


26. τίς] τίς. 29. δούλου] δῶλος. 31. ἐπομεν (corr. ἐπομεν,

prima manu). 32. δούλου] λού-

λους. 33. αὐτοῦς] αὐτοῖς. 34. νομίζουσιν] νομίζουςι.

35. καὶ ἐλεύθερον] ἐλεύθερον. 36. ὄσπερ] ὄσπερ καὶ. 


ἐκ γωνίων.

b 2. ἐκ additur supra lineam prima manu. 7. τὸ ante

dεισποίζεται om. MS. 13. ἔστι τι] ἔστι τί. 18. ἔστιν

ἔστι. 24. τίς] τίς. 27. ἔτηρα] ἔργα. 29. διεστάθη 

dεισποίτης. 32. τῷ κτᾶσθαι] τῶν κτᾶσθαι. 38. τίς] τίς,
et ita saecp.


28. ἀλλ'] ἀλλά. 36. ἀλειάς] ἀλείας. 41. ἀλλαγής]

ἀλλαγής.

b 5. ἀνθρωπόν] ἄνθρωπον. 6. τοῦ] τῶν. 9. τελειοθείαν 


16. τῶλλα] τὰ ἄλλα. 28. ἔστι] ἔστι. 32. ἀγάθην]


41. χρηματιστικήν] χρηματικήν.

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APPENDIX A.

1257 a 13. γέγονεν γέγονεν. 26. ἐπὶ πλέον ἐπὶ λέον. 27. σῖτον σῖτον. 29. ἐστὶν ἐστὶν. 35. ἀναγκαῖον ἀναγκαῖον pr. manu, v additum est postea.


1259 a 3. ἐπιμέλεις ἐπιμελεῖς. 18. σπουδάζουσιν σπουδάζουσιν. 25. ἐμπορίῶν ἐμπορίῶν. 28. τοῦτο τοῦτο. 29. γ' γ'. 36. πόρων om. MS. 37. μέρη om. MS.


BOOK IV. c. 15.

1300 a 24. Incipit κλήρῳ καὶ ἥ ἦς ἄπαντων. 25. φυλᾶς φυλᾶς. φρατρίας φρατρίας. 26. πολιτῶν πολιτῶν. 28. ἐκ τινῶν ἐκ τινῶν. 29. ἐκ τινῶν ἐκ τινῶν. δ' δ'. 35. ἐκ τινῶν ἐκ τινῶν. 36. ἐκ τινῶν ἐκ τινῶν. 41. ἐκ τινῶν ἐκ τινῶν, et ita 1300 b 2-4, 17, 1301 a 2, 3, 8, 9.

b 4. τὸ δὲ ἐκ τινῶν τὸν ἐκ τινῶν. 7. οὕτων οὕτων. 10. τῶν προσόδων καὶ τὴν κυρίαν om. MS. 22. ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. 30. πόλεως πόλεως.

1301 a 4. δικαστηρίῳ δικαστηρίῳ. 7. συνδιαζύμενα συνδιαζύμενα. 9. δικαστηρίου δικαστηρίου. 12. Post verbum δημοτικά deficit MS.
APPENDIX B.

BOOK V. c. 1.

14. ἦ ἐκ τῶν ... ἦ om. MS. 16. γίγνονται γίνονται.
33. αὐτῶν] αὐτῶν.

b 2. Post ὑβριν iterantur verba δ’ αδικος πλεονεκτούντας τοῖς, sed ab ipso scriba error notatur.
4. Post τρόπον inseruntur verba ἐρίθεια ἡ φιλονεικία. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ματαρνία.
31. Post verbum Μεγαρίων deficit MS.

———

APPENDIX B.

On the use of Hyperbaton in the Politics.

Hyperbaton is much used in the Politics—more, I think, than in the Nicomachean Ethics—for the purpose of emphasizing a particular word or words.

Kühner's account of Hyperbaton (Ausführ. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 607. 1) is as follows—'In Hyperbaton two words forming together a unity are severed by the interposition of one or more less important words. By means of this severance prominence is given, as a rule, to one only of the severed words, that which stands first, but often also to both of them, especially when both are placed in emphatic positions in the sentence, for instance at the beginning or end of it.' In one particular this account is open to amendment. The severed words are not always only two in number; they are more than two, for instance, in Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 38, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐπεξελθεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους.

In the following passages the emphasis appears to fall on the first only of the severed words:—

4 (7). 1. 1323 b 39, ἑτέρας γὰρ ἐστιν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα,

4 (7). 2. 1324 a 21, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προηρήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν,

5 (8). 6. 1341 a 22, ὅστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καυρούς χρηστεον ἐν οἷς κ.τ.λ.

5 (8). 7. 1342 a 4, ὅ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβάλλει πάθος ψυχῆς ἴσχυρώς, τούτο ἐν πᾶσις ὑπάρχει.
In the following passages, on the other hand, the emphasis appears to fall on both, or all, the severed words:

4 (7). 1. 1323 a 16, ἀδὴλου γὰρ ἄτοσ τοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἄναγκαιον ἀδηλοῦ εἶναι πολιτείαν,

5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10, ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ὁ πρᾶττων οὗ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκονύτων ἔδονεις,

8 (6). 4. 1318 b 7, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τοῦτων ἑλέχθη λόγοις, 37, καὶ ἀρετουσὶ δικαίως διὰ τὸ τῶν εὐθυνῶν εἶναι κυρίους ἐτέρους,

8 (6). 4. 1319 b 23, φιλαί τε γὰρ ἔτεραι ποιητέα πλείους καὶ φρατρία,

8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14, δεὶ δὲ καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πάντας μάλιστα μὲν εὐνους εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας,

35, τεχναστέων οὖν ὅπως ἀν εὔπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος.

The following words are among those most often emphasized in this way—οὔδεὶς and μηδεὶς, πᾶς, πολὺς, οὔτος, ἑκαστὸς, εἰς, αὐτὸς and ὁ αὐτὸς, ἄλλος and ὁ ἄλλος, τοιοῦτος and ὁ τοιοῦτος, τίς and τις, πόσος, and πῶς.

Occasionally two sets of words are thus emphasized in the same sentence—e.g. in 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 3, ἡ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας, where both διέστηκεν πολὺ and ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας are emphasized by severance, and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 10, ἄπων γὰρ οἰκεῖον τοῦτο τῷ τοιοῦτῳ δήμῳ μᾶλλον, where both ἄπων τοῦτο and οἰκεῖον μᾶλλον are similarly emphasized.

Groups of words linked by καὶ or ἦ are often emphasized in this way: e.g. in

3. 5. 1278 a 6, ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ’ ἐνίοις ἦν δούλον τῷ βίαναυσον ἦ ξενικόν,

17, ὥστ’ ἐν μὲν τινι πολιτείᾳ τῶν βίαναυσον ἀναγκαίον εἶναι καὶ τῶν θήτα πολίτας,

19, ἐν ἦ κατ’ ἀρετῆν αἱ τιμαὶ διδόνται καὶ κατ’ ἀξίαν, 3. 10. 1281 a 24, ἀλλ’ ἀρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δῖκαιον ἀρχεῖν καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους;

8 (6). 3. 1318 a 15, ἐπειτ’ ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἴσους λαβώντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων.

It should be added that, though in nearly all the cases of the severance of connected words which have been examined by me in the Politics the aim evidently is to throw emphasis on particular words, I have noticed two or three passages in which this cannot
be said to be clearly the case. They are passages in which the relative is severed from its substantive. We have in

4 (7). 1. 1323 b 15, ἥνπερ εἶληφε διάστασιν ὅν φαμέν αὐτὰς εἶναι δια-
θέσεις ταύτας,

6 (4). 4. 1290 b 28, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἷς κυνεῖται μορίους ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν,
6 (4). 14. 1298 a 31, ἢππερ ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία νῦν διοικεῖται τρόπον
(contrast 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 24, ὃν τρόπον νῦν ἐκαστὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν τίκων κ.τ.λ.).

Is any emphasis intended to be thrown on the severed words in these three passages?

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APPENDIX C.

On the variations in the order of words in Π¹ and Π².

A considerable proportion of the variations in the order of words which we observe in Π¹ and Π² may be arranged in classes.

1. There are those in which Π² sever the adjective or pronoun from the substantive with which it agrees, while Π¹ place them together:—

1253 a 7, διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζήσῳ Π² (ζήσῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος Π¹),

b 7, περὶ τριῶν ἄν τούτων σκεπτέων εἶπ Π² (περὶ τριῶν τούτων σκεπτέων ἄν εἶπ Π¹),

1256 b 26, τούτων ὡστα τὸν πόλεμον Π² (ὡστα τούτων Π¹),

1270 b 28, κρίσεών εἰσι μεγάλων Π² (κρίσεων μεγάλων εἰσὶ Π¹),

1273 b 36, νομοθέτην γενέσθαι σπουδαίον Π² (γενέσθαι νομοθέτην σπου-

δαίον Π¹),

1274 a 17, κύριος ὃν ὁ δήμος Π² (ὁν ὁ δήμος κύριος Μσ Ρ¹ and

perhaps Γ¹),

1276 b 14, εἰς ἑτέραν μεταβάλη πολιτείαν Π² (πολιτείαν μεταβάλη Π¹),

1323 b 15, ὃν φαμέν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας Π² (εἶναι αὐτάς
taútaς δiαβέσεις Π¹),

1330 b 29, τὴν μὲν ὅλην ὡς πουεῖν κόλαν εὔτομον Π² (πολῖν ὡς πουεῖν
taútaς δiαβέσεις Π¹),

1335 a 38, τὴν συναυλίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταύτην Π² (ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συναу-

λίαν Π¹),
2. There are those in which \( \pi^2 \) sever words from the words they govern, while \( \pi^1 \) group the words together. A substantive, for instance, is often severed from the genitive it governs by \( \pi^2 \), where it is not so severed by \( \pi^1 \). Thus \( \pi^2 \) have in

\begin{align*}
1328 \text{b} 17, & \quad \text{έν δὲ τι τυγχάνῃ τούτων ἐκλείπων (τι τούτων τυγχάνῃ \( \pi^1 \)),} \\
1331 \text{b} 4, & \quad \text{τὸ πλῆθος διαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως (τῆς πόλεως διαιρεῖται \( \pi^1 \)),} \\
1337 \text{a} 2, & \quad \text{τὸ προσλείπον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν (τῆς φύσεως βούλεται \( \pi^1 \)),} \\
1340 \text{b} 29, & \quad \text{τοῖς υπότιας ἀρμόττουσα τῶν παιδίων (ἀρμόττουσα τοῖς υπότιας \( \pi^1 \)),} \\
1309 \text{b} 38, & \quad \text{οὐδετέρῳ μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν (οὐδετέρῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεται \( \pi^1 \)),} \\
1321 \text{b} 30, & \quad \text{άυτα μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ τούτων τρεῖς (τούτων καὶ τρεῖς \( \pi^1 \)).}
\end{align*}

A similar tendency appears in the following passages, though in a less marked degree:

\begin{align*}
1341 \text{a} 23, & \quad \text{κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἡ μάθησιν \( \pi^2 \) (δύναται μᾶλλον \( \pi^1 \) and possibly \( \rho \)),} \\
24, & \quad \text{συμβάζοις ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ πρὸς παιδείαν \( \pi^2 \) (αὐτὸ ἐναντίον \( \pi^1 \)),} \\
1295 \text{b} 31, & \quad \text{καθάπερ τῆς τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πέντες ἐπιθυμοῦν \( \pi^2 \) (καθάπερ οἱ πέντες τῆς τῶν πλουσίων ἐπιθυμοῦν \( \pi^1 \)),} \\
1302 \text{b} 17, & \quad \text{γίνονται γὰρ έσωθεν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων \( \pi^2 \) (γίνονται γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων εἰσώθε \( \pi^1 \) and possibly \( \gamma \)),} \\
1322 \text{a} 7, & \quad \text{κοινωνίᾳ ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις \( \pi^2 \) (κοινωνίᾳ ἀλλήλοις ἀδύνατον \( \pi^1 \)).}
\end{align*}

3. In all the above passages the order of words adopted in \( \pi^2 \) is more broken and more emphatic than that adopted in \( \pi^1 \), and

1 In 1302 b 5 all MSS. have τίναι ἔχουσι δύναμιν.
2 In 1338 a 25, on the other hand, \( \pi^1 \) have ἔπι διάτη καλεῖν θαλεῖν and \( \pi^2 \) καλεῖν ἐπι διάτη θαλεῖν, where \( \pi^1 \) are evidently wrong.
the following passages also show a leaning on the part of Π³ to a more emphatic order (in the first five the adjective is placed before the substantive by Π²):—

1276 b 40, οὐκ ἂν εἶν μια ἀρετῇ πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ Π² (ἀρετῇ μιὰ Π¹),
1280 a 15, φαύλαι κριταί Π² (κριταί φαύλοι Π¹),
1290 b 8, πλείονα μέρια Π² (μέρια πλείονα Π¹),
1294 a 22, ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετὴ Π² (ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος ἀρχαῖος Π¹),
1320 a 22, δει ποινὶ διὰ για ἐκκλησίας Π² (ἐκκλησίας διὰ για Π¹),
1327 a 14, φαμέν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν σπουδαίον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον Π² (εἶναι ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον Π¹),

Yet sometimes Π¹ place words in the more emphatic order. Thus they have in

1259 b 30, δεὶ τὴν γνωστα σώφρονα εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν (εἶναι σώφρονα Π²),
1265 b 15, ἀνέστοι τοὺς κλήρους εἰχὸν Μδ Π¹, ἀνέστοι εἰχὸν τοὺς κλή-

1280 b 30, οὐκ ἦστιν ἡ πόλις κοιμώμα τόπου (ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἦστι Π²):

1329 b 2, τῶν τρόπων τούτων Π² (τούτων τῶν τρόπων Π¹),
1301 b 26, ὥς τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτη Π² (ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ Π¹),
1330 b 27, τούτων ἀμφοτέρων Π² (ἀμφοτέρων τούτων Π¹),
1334 b 29, ὅπως βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα γίνεται Π² (ὅπως τὰ σώματα

1337 b 12, τὸ σώμα παρασκευάζοντα χείρον διακείσθαι Π² (παρασκευά-

4. In some passages the genitive is differently placed in Π¹ and

Π²:—
1326 a 20, πόλεως εἰςι μέρος Π², μέρος εἰςι πόλεως Μδ Π¹ and

perhaps Π,
APPENDIX D.

Reminiscences in the Politics of passages in the writings of Plato and other Greek authors and of dicta of notable men.

We are concerned in this Appendix not with explicit references, but with reminiscences, or apparent reminiscences, of a tacit kind. I have endeavoured to gather together in it those noticed in the commentary, or most of them, and a few which I have observed since I wrote it, beginning with reminiscences of Plato’s writings or dicta. Many reminiscences have no doubt escaped me, but those which are here pointed out may serve in some degree to throw light on the direction and extent of Aristotle’s reading in connexion with the Politics.

i. Plato.

2. 108 1252 b 5 sqq. Laws 805 D–E
     122 1253 a 8 Polit. 267 B sqq., 276 A?
     162 1255 b 20 sq. — 259 B
     177 sq. 1256 b 23 sqq. Sophist 222 B–C, Laws 823 B
     1258 a 10 sqq. Laws 962 A, Rep. 397 E
     224 1260 b 5 sq. — 777 E (cp. 720 B sqq.).
     260 1264 a 25 Rep. 422 E
     268 1265 a 23 Laws 625 C sq.
     270 b 1 sqq. — 928 E sq.
     271 7–10 Rep. 460 A
APPENDIX D.

2. 315 1269 a 34 sqq. Laws 776 C sqq.
       b 14 sqq. — 781 A sq., 806 C
317 1270 a 4 sqq. — 780-1, esp. 780 B and 781 A
322 b 34 sq. Rep. 548 B
337 1272 b 9 sqq. Laws 712 E
358

3. 163 1277 a 26 sq. Laws 643 E
       b 11 sqq. — 762 E?
169 24 sq. Meno 71 E
172 25 sqq. Rep. 433 C
189 1279 a 3 sq. — 341 C-D
196 b 17 sq. — 550 C
207 1280 b 20 sqq. — 369 A sqq.
212 1281 a 34 sqq. Laws 713 E sqq.
222 1282 a 15 sq. — 701 A
223 20 sqq. Rep. 601 D, Cratyl. 390
       25 sqq. Laws 945 B sqq.
225 sq. b 14 sqq. — 756 E–758 A, esp. 757 C,
       Gorg. 490 B sqq.
227 23 sqq. — 488 D
236 1283 a 40 sqq. — 489 E sqq.
238 b 23 sqq. Rep. 540 D
240 1284 a 3 sqq. — 445 D
285 1286 b 3 sqq. Polit. 298 A sq., 300 A
296 sq. 1287 a 38 sqq. Plato ap. Diog. Laert. 3. 18?
303 1288 a 4 sq. Polit. 292 B, E, 259 B
306 41 sqq. Apol. Socr. 29 D, E
311 1323 a 36 sqq. — 30 A sq.
322 1324 a 27 sq. Gorg. 500 C
323 32 sqq. Laws 637 D
326 b 9 sqq. — 704 C
331 41 sqq. Polit. 259 C, E
338 1325 b 21–23 Laws 709 C sqq.
341 40 sqq. Rep. 369 D
346 1326 b 2 sq. Same passage
347 7 sqq. Laws 738 D sq., 751 D, 766 E
348 14 sqq. — 704 C, Critias 110 E
350 26 sqq. — 737 D, Critias 112 C
351 30 sqq. — 705 A
358 1327 a 19 sqq.
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3. 520  1338 b 9 sqq.  Rep. 410 D  
529  1339 a 26 sqq.  Laws 819 B, 820 D?  
534  b 33  —  658 E sqq.  
536  1340 a 5 sqq.  Rep. 401 D, Tim. 47 D  
538  18 sqq.  —  399 A sqq.  
542  42 sqq.  —  398 D sqq.  
550  1341 a 10 sq.  Laws 812 D sq.?  
557  b 10 sqq.  Gorg. 501 B–502 A  
571  1342 b 17 sqq.  Laws 785 B, 670 D  

158  1290 a 30 sqq.  Polit. 291 D  
181  1292 a 31  Rep. 557 C sqq., Laws 712 E  
204  1294 b 18 sq.  Laws 712 D sqq.  
211  1295 b 4 sqq.  —  679 B sq., 728 D–729 A  
212  13 sqq.  —  728 D–729 A, 791 D  
213  21 sqq.  Menex. 238 E sq., Laws 756 E sq.,  
217  1296 a 8 sq.  712 E, Rep. 417 A–B  
286  1301 b 4 sq.  846 D sqq.  
290  26 sq.  —  757 A  
291  29  —  757 A sqq.  
309  1302 a 2 sqq.  —  757 E  
322  1303 a 25 sq.  —  708 D.  
336  b 28 sq.  —  792 C  
371  1306 a 19–31  —  551 D sq.  
376  1307 a 17 sq.  Gorg. 483 C  
409  1309 b 18 sqq.  Laws 701 E, Rep. 562'  
415  20 sqq.  Rep. 562 B  
409  1310 a 12 sqq.  —  552 E, Laws 793, 870 A  
415  34 sqq.  Laws 715 D  
442  1312 a 26 sqq.  Symp. 208 C sq.  

571  25 sqq.  —  691 D sqq.
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### ii. Isocrates.

| 2. 122 sq. | 1253 a 9 sqq. | Nicocl. § 5 sqq., De Antid. §§ 253–257 |
| 155 | 1255 a 14 | Philip. § 15 |
| 177 sq. | 1256 b 23 sqq. | Panath. § 163 |
| 228 | 1260 b 33 sqq. | De Antid. § 83 |
| 375 | 1274 a 14 sq. | — § 316 sqq. |

### iii. Xenophon.

| 2. 162, 164 | 1255 b 20 sqq., 33 Oecon. 13. 5, 21. 10 |
| 3. 172 | 1277 b 24 sq. | — 7. 25 |
| 210 | 1281 a 11 sqq. | Mem. 1. 2. 42 sqq. |
| 300 | 1287 b 26 sqq. | Cyrop. 8. 2. 10–12 |
| 344 | 1326 a 32 sqq. | — 8. 7. 22 |
| 365 | 1327 b 25 sqq. | — 1. 1. 4 |
| 414 | 1331 a 31 sqq. | — 1. 2. 3 sqq. |
iv. Homer.

The reminiscences of Homer noticed by me are more doubtful, but possible reminiscences of the Iliad are pointed out in 2. 257, 3. 214, 273, 295, 301, 343, 379, 436 (compare also 2. 5. 1263 a 11 sqq. with II. 1. 165–168), and of the Odyssey in 2. 239, 3. 177.

v. Reminiscences of the writings of the following authors also seem to occur in the Politics:—

- Aeschines 4. 198, 255? (see also 4. 214)
- Aeschylus 4. 460
- Aristophanes 4. 179, 510? (see also 3. 214 sq.)
- Democritus 3. 489
- Ephorus 2. 347–350, 4. 219
- Eubulus, the comic poet, 4. 462
- Euripides 2. 358?, 3. 459, 4. 211, 391, 460?, 461
- Herodotus 3. 326, 4. 461 (see also 3. 150 sq., 4. 208)
- Hippias of Elis 4. 297 sq.
- Melanippides 3. 556
- Pratinas 3. 542
- Solon 3. 169, 228, 350, 4. 139?, 290, 391, 408
- Telestes 3. 556:

and reminiscences of sayings ascribed to

- Alcibiades 2. 337
- Anacharsis 3. 522
- Epaminondas 3. 523
- the Lacedaemonians 3. 525
- Pelopidas 3. 423
- the Pythagoreans 2. 142 sq.:
APPENDIX D.

of other sayings 3. 556, 4. 321, 507; of proverbs 3. 238, 417, 461?, 598, 4. 226?, 290?

Reminiscences may also occur, though this is more doubtful, of the writings of

Anaxandrides 3. 201, 397
Antiphanes 2. 252
Archilochus 4. 465 (quoted 3. 368)
Eupolis 3. 429 sq.
Heraclitus 2. 153 (quoted 4. 474)
Lysias 3. 150, 4. 334
Phrynichus, the comic poet, 2. 120
Pindar 2. 131, 153, 157, 3. 399, 4. 182
Theognis 4. 226, 297, 321, 391
Thucydides 2. 308, 3. 525, 4. 294, 402, 416,

and of sayings ascribed to Aristides 4. 403, Aristippus, 2. 287, Socrates, 3. 217, 431, and Themistocles, 4. 403.
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS TO VOLS. I, II, AND III.

Vol. I.

P. 15, line 14, for παμπολλοι read πάμπολλοι.

P. 20, eleven lines from foot of page, for compounds formed read things constituted.

P. 34, line 14. A. Schmkel (Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, p. 375) takes the reference in the words 'docti homines' (Cic. De Rep. i. 24. 38) to be to Aristotle, while C. Hinze (Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit, p. 50 sq.) takes it to be to Panaeitus.

P. 148, line 9, for Hecuba read Helen.

P. 236, lines 15-27. See as to the two arguments here summarized the explanatory notes on 3. 4. 1276 b 37 and 1277 a 5 (vol. iii. pp. 157-159).

P. 237, five lines from foot of page, for from read after, and dele first.

P. 242, line 1 sq. As to this recapitulation, however, see note on 3. 5. 1278 a 34 (vol. iii. p. 182).

P. 243, line 8 sq. I have given a slightly different translation of this sentence in the explanatory note on 3. 6. 1278 b 8 (vol. iii. p. 184 sq.).

P. 264, six lines from foot of page, 'his disciple Dicaearchus'. See however below on vol. ii. pp. xiii and xiv.

P. 270, note 1. In the quotation from 3. 16. 1287 b 6 for ὡστε read ὡστ' et (see critical note on 1287 b 6).

P. 272, line 1, for compensation read return (see vol. iii. p. 282 sq.).

P. 278, lines 17-20, add a reference to Diod. 16. 92. 5 and 95. 1, and Stob. Floril. 98. 70.

P. 286, note. The term 'mortal god' is borrowed by Hobbes from Aristotle: see Cic. De Fin. 2. 13. 40, sic hominem ad duas res, ut al Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et ad agendum esse natum quasi mortalem deum (Aristot. Fragm. 48. 1483 b 15: Rose, Fragm. 61).

P. 290, line 14, for leadership read rule.

P. 297, note 2. Mr. Shute's essay 'On the history of the process by which the Aristotelian writings arrived at their present form' (Clarendon Press, 1888) has been published since my first and second volumes appeared. See p. 164 sqq. of the essay.

P. 299, note 1, first column, last line but two, for So read 81.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. 325, in the quotation from Ion of Chios (Fragm. 63 Nauck), after τιρ' add δι'.

P. 348, note 1, lines 1-2, read We find this many-sidedness and versatility more often realized, etc.


P. 366, line 1 sqq. See as to the passage here summarized the critical note on 1341 b 19-26 (vol. iii. p. 126 sq.).

P. 366, last line, for The melodies also read Just as the sacred melodies produce this effect, so the melodies. (See the explanatory note on 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 15 in vol. iii. p. 566 sq.)

P. 366, note 1, and p. 369, note. See the explanatory note on 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 17-34 (vol. iii. p. 571 sq.)

P. 375, line 24, for thus composed read composed of owners of complete lots.

P. 443, seven lines from foot of page, 'he abandons'. This is true, subject to what is said in p. 435; line 14 sqq.


P. 456, note. Add Plato, Polit. 299 B sqq. to the passages referred to.

P. 470, lines 20-22. See the explanatory note on 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 38 sqq.

P. 502, four lines from foot of page, 'the rich encroach', etc. See explanatory note on 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 11 for a closer rendering of this passage.

P. 508, note 2. Perhaps it is better to read ἡ πολιτεία in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8 than ἡ πολιτεία. See the critical note on 1298 b 8 and the explanatory note on 1298 b 5.

P. 509, lines 14, 15. This will not be so if I am right in bracketing ἡ ἦν τινῶν with Spengel in 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 35.

P. 513, fourteen lines from foot of page, 'from each tribe or section of the State'. Probably rather 'from the γρώμοι and δήμοι': see the explanatory note on 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 21.

P. 519, note, second column, line 4, add For other statements in this chapter inconsistent with statements made elsewhere in the Politics, see vol. iv. pp. 441, 485 sq.

P. 541, last line but one, 'worth or' should perhaps be omitted: see the explanatory note on 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 24.

P. 566, seven lines from foot of page, for nor again where a wealthy majority rules over a minority of poor read nor again an oligarchy where the rich rule, because they are in a majority, over a minority of poor. (See critical note on 1290 b 15 and explanatory note on 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 14.)

P. 573, line 18. 'This agrees sufficiently well with the account of aristocracy in the passage before us'. I have changed my opinion as to this, and now distinguish the aristocracy of the Third Book from that of the Fourth (old Seventh): see above, p. xxxvi, and vol. iv. p. ix.

P. 575, end of Appendix E, after Aristotle's? add It should not, however, escape notice that if this part of c. 10 (1329 a 40- b 35) is an interpolation, it is an interpolation of old date, for the author of the epitome of the Political Theory of the Peripatetics which is preserved in the Eclogae of Stobæus
(2. 6. 17) seems to have had it before him when he says of the distribution of functions in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book of the Politics between the young, the elders, and the old, παρά τινι δ' ἄρχαιν εἶναι πάνω τὴν διάταξιν, Αἰγυπτίων πρῶτων καταστηματίζοντων, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐχ ἤττον, which evidently refers, however inaccurately, to the views expressed in this part of c. 10.

P. 577, line 2 sq. Should τούτῳ οὖν ἵστιν ὅ διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνον be read?

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Pp. xii–xvi. So far as the question has been investigated at present, it seems likely that neither Polybius nor Cicero had a first-hand acquaintance with the Politics, and that any resemblances traceable in their teaching to that of the Politics are due to their use of a work by an authority—probably Panaetius—who had a first-hand acquaintance with the Politics. See A. Schmekel, Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, pp. 47–85 and 374–379. C. Hinze, Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit, pp. 11–21 and 29–55, and Sus. 4, vol. i, p. 660 sq.

P. xiii, last line but two, and p. xiv, note 3. See however as to Dicæarchus C. Hinze, op. cit. p. 23 sqq., where a different view is taken as to the probable subject of the Τρισδιάστικός of Dicæarchus.

P. xiv, note 1. See Mr. Shutte’s essay, p. 40 sq.

P. xvii, line 19, after the Politics add See also the explanatory note on 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 19 as to Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12.

P. xviii sq. For a fuller list of apparent reminiscences of passages in the Politics see the heading Politics of Aristotle in the General Index (vol. iv. p. 642).

P. xix, line 10, after this passage add See, however, the explanatory note on 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 38.

P. xix, line 20, after 1333 a 30 add (see also explanatory note on 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 38).

P. xx, four lines from foot of page. For the term πρώτοι λόγοι cp. De Part. An. 4. 5. 682 a 2 sq. and Isocr. De Antid. § 71.

P. xxviii, line 8, after περὶ add τῆς.

P. xxix, line 1, after 1338 a 32 sqq.: add 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 10 sqq.:.

P. xxix, line 2, after 8 (6). 1. add 1316 b 36 sqq. and after 1316 b 39 sqq. add 1317 a 13 sqq.

P. xxxix, twelve lines from foot of page, for ‘disiecta membra’ read pieces.

P. xl, line 5, after the Seventh add In one MS. of Pliny’s Natural History (the Pollingensis) ‘the first eighteen Books are wrongly numbered.’ (Class. Rev. 7. 452.)

P. xlvii, six lines from end of note 2, dele in 4 (7). 17—inducere.

P. li, note 4, line 3, dele 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 15 and, and after 1260 a 24 (line 4) add 3. 5. 1278 a 40 and 3. 13. 1283 a 49.

P. lvi, line 21, after 1269 a 18 read McP4 add τῆς before κινήσας: Π2 are probably right in reading simply κινήσας, which was the reading of Π also (see vol. iii. p. xxxv, and critical note on 1340 b 24).

P. lvii, dele lines 1–5 (see critical note on 1339 a 29).

P. 15, last line, for γάρ read γάρ.

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ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. 26, nine lines from foot of page. Should τοῦς be added before ἀμφιτρόπους? See vol. iii. p. 315.

P. 28, line 9, for ἢθει read ἢθει (see Class. Rev. 7. 307).

P. 54, fourteen lines from foot of page, for γενέσθαι νομοθετήν read νομοθετήν γενέσθαι.

P. 61, line 17, after Latin Translation add unless indeed, which is more probable, he copied the annotations from the MS. before him.

P. 76, eighteen lines from foot of page, read ὁρθοπραγείν.

P. 76, last line but one, after τοῦς ἀνδρόν) add In Demosth. Phil. 3. 54 Σ has λαιδορίας φόνου (I. φόνου) σκάμματος where other MSS. have λαιδορίας ἡ φόνου ἡ σκάμματος.

P. 78, eleven lines from foot of page, after 23. add 22. ἐκ om. Π'.

P. 80, line 19, for αὐσθεῖν read αὐσθεῖν.

P. 80, three lines from foot of page, before Almost add See vol. iii. p. xvii.

P. 81, twenty-one lines from foot of page, dele rightly—note). See above on p. 28.

P. 82, line 19, end of note on 1264 a 8, add Sus. reads φαρμᾶς, not φαρμᾶ.

P. 84, twenty lines from foot of page, after rightly add but see explanatory note on 1283 b 4.

P. 85, last line but two, after 35. add ἐκλίπειν Π²: ἐκλίπειν Μ¹ Π¹: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. derelinquere which reading he found in his text. See critical note on 1270 a 21.

P. 86, five lines from foot of page, after § 77 add (ed. 2, § 694 sqq.).

P. 86, last line but one, before 12. add 6. § after ἐπορκέων om. Π', § ταῦτα om. Λ² pr. Π¹ (corrected in Π¹ in paler ink than the MS.). τίθηι δὲ νόμον Π² Bekk.: τί δὲ νόμον τίθηι Π¹ Sus.

P. 87, fourteen lines from foot of page, after render it add 23. γένεσθαι Π² Bekk. Sus.: γενέσθαι Μ¹ Π¹ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. ἱερι.)

P. 87, four lines from foot of page, for (perhaps ... 1340 b 24) read (= κυήςας: see above, p. xxv, and critical note on 1340 b 24).

P. 87, last line, read in.

P. 88, line 10, after Vet. Int. add 6. περαβοῦθι Π² Bekk.: περαβοῦθι Π¹ Sus.: see Class. Rev. 7. 307 sq.

P. 92, line 22, after here add It is, however, so used in Eurip. Fragm. 795 Nauck (ed. 2).

P. 101, line 5. Τῆς τοιοῦτης may possibly refer forward and mean τῆς πολιτικῆς: see the explanatory note on 1337 b 6.


P. 106, last line, after here add As to did τὴν σωτηρίαν cp. c. 5. 1254 b 12 and Plut. Pelop. c. 24, ὁ γὰρ ὑπότατος, ὦ οὖν, καὶ κυριότατος νόμος τῷ σώζειθαι διερένθη τῶν σώζειν δυνάμενον ἄρχοντα κατὰ φόνου ἀποδίδωσιν.

P. 114, thirteen lines from foot of page, before Plato add Παιδᾶς τε καὶ παιδῶν παιδᾶς may possibly be added because διηγάλακτες standing by itself might be taken to refer only to children, and not to grandchildren also.
P. 114, ten lines from foot of page. It is probably from Panaetius that Cicero derives the views expressed in De Offic. 1. 17. 54: see C. Hinze, Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componentis adhibuerit, p. 50.

P. 115, thirteen lines from foot of page. The passage referred to is 7. 13. 11 is probably 6 (4). 13. 11. 1297 b 24 sqq.

P. 118, line 14, end of note, add Cp. also Xenophanes, Fragm. 5, 6 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 101 sqq.).

P. 118, seventeen lines from foot of page, add In illustration of έκ πλεύσων κωμών cp. Strabo, p. 336 sub fin.—337.

P. 123, five lines from foot of page, add 12. μέχρι γὰρ τούτου κ.τ.λ. For the phrase cp. Περὶ μακροδύναμως 6. 487 a 20 and [Plato], Epinomis 978 C.

P. 128, twenty-one lines from foot of page, after 29. add For ἡ θηρίων ἡ θείων cp. Plut. Publicola, c. 6, οὐδὲτερον δὲ μικρὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀνθρώπινον, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ θείων ἡ θηρίων. See also Plut. Aristid. c. 6 sub fin. and De Profect. in Virt. c. 1 sub fin.

P. 131, ten lines from foot of page, for The ellipse—πᾶσα μεταλλωτική read Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, ἑτέρων (sc. δικαιότριον) οὐκ εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φίλον, where περὶ ταῦτα must apparently be supplied before οὖν.

P. 133, seventeen lines from foot of page, after χρήσων add and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 16.

P. 138, twelve lines from foot of page. Prof. Bywater points out (Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Band ii. p. 504), no doubt rightly, that the article is used before Ἡραίαςτον because the Hephæstus of Homer's Iliad (18. 376) is referred to. It should be noticed, however, that in the Politics the article is almost always prefixed to the names of gods and goddesses. The phrase νὴ Δία is the only exception I remember.

P. 147, line 17, after cp. add Plato, Polit. 289 B, τὰ δὲ περὶ ζῷων κτῆσιν τῶν ἡμέρων, πλὴν δουλῶν κ.τ.λ.

P. 159, twelve lines from foot of page, add 87 sq. See explanatory note on 1275 b 21, and cp. Diod. 17. 77. 3 and Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6 (vol. iii. p. 605 Kühn), δοῦ δὲ μεγάλους μεγίδα καὶ τὰ ἐγγόνα γίνεται.

P. 164, line 15, end of note, add Cp. Soph. Philoct. 138 sqq. and Manil. Astron. 5. 739 sqq. (where atque omnā iusta priorum should be read).

P. 169, three lines from foot of page, before Their add and Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, c. 18 Kuehlewein (vol. i. p. 556 Kühn), μένουσι. δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον χρόνων, ὡσον ἀν ἀποχρῆ ἀπότοι τοῦ κτήσεως τὸς χόρτων ὑπόταν δὲ μηκὲ, ἐς ἐτέρων χώρων ἐρχονται.

P. 171, line 5, before Giph. add Vet. Int. 'quicunque quidem sponte natam habent elaborationem':

P. 171, line 9, after betreiben 'add J. C. Wilson, 'the industries of which spring up of themselves', a rendering which resembles that of Vet. Int.

P. 171, line 11, for vita read ἐγκαταστάων.

P. 171, line 22, end of note, after c. 12 add I am not disposed to be dogmatic in support of Victorius' interpretation of the rare word αὐτόφωρος in the passage before us, but I still incline to think that it is right. See for J. C. Wilson's view Class. Rev. 10 (1896), p. 187 and Archiv für Gesch. der Phil. 11. 260 sqq. The meaning of αὐτόφωρος may be studied in Pindar, Pyth. 3. 47, where

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it seems to mean 'self-engendered' ('self-caused', as Liddell and Scott, not 'sponte natus', as Boeckh): cp. Polyb. II. 11. 25. 2 Hultsch, τα ἓ τῶν σωμάτων γενώμενα φύματα καὶ νόσους. Its meaning is still clearer in Dio Cass. 44. 37. 2. Here αὐτόφυος is contrasted with ἄνδρομάτου and explained by ἐκ παρακενθής συγγενοῦς, and it seems to mean 'self-bred', 'self-engendered', i.e. engendered by the stock of which the person comes ('bon chien chasse de race'). 'Ευρέφυτον δένδρον is 'a grafted tree', i.e. a tree not self-engendered (Theophrast. ap. Julian, Epist. 24, referred to by Liddell and Scott). Cp. also the use of αὐτόφυης in Plato, Laws 794 A, where it is explained by ἃς ἐπειδὰν ἐνελθοὺς αὐτοὶ σχεδὸν ἀνεφίλουσι. If αὐτόφυος in the passage before us meant 'springing up of itself', we should expect that exchange (ἀλλαγή), if not carried too far, would be described by Aristotle as αὐτόφυος, for he says in i. 9. 1257 a 18 sq. that exchange not carried beyond a certain point is necessary. Yet he nowhere describes the kind of kind exchange as αὐτόφυος.

P. 172, after line 13, add οἱ μὲν νομαδικῶν ἁμα καὶ ληστρικῶν. That these lives were often conjoined we see from Strabo, p. 511.

P. 172, nine lines from the foot of page, after 1216 a 7 add Cp. also [Plato,] Alexieus 366 D, οὗ κατὰ μὲν τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν τὸ μήπισ αλαίει;


P. 179, sixteen lines from foot of page, after συνέστηκεν ἔδει καὶ in . . . 1253 b 3).


P. 187, end of note on τοῦ πλοῦτου καὶ χρημάτων, add For the account of χρηματιστικὴ here given cp. Plato, Gorg. 452 C, where the χρηματιστικὴ claims to be πλοῦτον δημοιουργὸς.

P. 188, line 12, before Eryxias add the saying of Solon to Cresesus reported in Diod. 9. 27. 2, of Plato, Rep. 521 A and Laws 742 E, and of.

P. 193, line 8, add 12. ἄλλα τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ' ὑγίαν. Aristotle here probably has before him Plato, Laws 962 A.

P. 201, lines 3-5. I prefer to the interpretation of this passage given here that given by Sus., and independently with greater fullness and clearness by J. C. Wilson in Class. Rev. 10 (1896), p. 184 sqq. and Archiv für Gesch. der Phil. 11. 246 sqq. and 12. 50 sqq. The latter explains δυσα ἀπὸ γῆς by δυσα μέρη χρηματιστικὴς χρηματίζεται ἄπο γῆς, comparing Oecon, i. 1343 a 26, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ γεωργικὴν προτέρα καὶ δευτέρα δοσά ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, οἷον μεταλλευτικὴ καὶ εἰ τίς ἁλῆ τοιοῦτη, and translates the whole passage 'all the forms of acquisition (or all the industries) which make their profit from minerals and from things growing from the earth which, though not edible (or fruits), are still useful.' One difficulty in connexion with this rendering should be noticed. In the short phrase δυσα ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γενομένων the words ἀπὸ γῆς occur twice, and one would expect them to be used in the same sense in both places, but in the first place we have to translate them 'from minerals' (i.e. from rock, metal, soil, sand, etc.) and in the second 'from the earth' (i.e. from soil, but not from rock, metal, or sand). We need not make too much of this difficulty,
but it seems to me to exist. It appears also to be implied, which we hardly expect, that agriculture οὐ χρηματίζεται ἀπὸ τῆς, though it obviously derives food from that source (Oeccon. 1. 1343 a 30 sqq.; cp. Plut. Numæa, c. 16, where γεωργία is described as δ ἀπὸ τῆς Βίος), but this is implied in Oeccon. 1. 1343 a 26 sqq. also, so that this passage is open to the same objection.

P. 203, line 5, after 1256 b 26 add and cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, ἔτερον (sc. δικαστήριον) οὐ εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν φίλει, where we have to supply ἐν τῇ τάφα or something equivalent before οὐ.

P. 203, last line but one. I have here taken λαβώνται in τὰ σώματα λαβών- ται as passive and τὰ σώμαta as the nom. to it, but it is more likely that λαβώνται is middle, and that the words should be construed, 'men injure their bodies'.

P. 206, lines 10–12, δελε ἀλλὰ μὴ—1339 a 29.


P. 209, twenty-one lines from foot of page, after 1253 b 4 sqq. add for though, as Sus. has pointed out, it has not been said there or in any preceding passage that the rule of the husband over the wife is a political rule and the rule of the father over the child a kingly rule, it has nevertheless been implied in c. 3. 1253 b 4 sqq. that these two kinds of rule are two and not one. Aristotle perhaps adds ἀλλὰ . . . βασιλικῶς somewhat unguardedly in his eagerness to explain at once how the one kind of rule differs from the other. A similar inexactness of reference occurs in i. 5. 1254 b 3, ὣςπερ λέγομεν (see also explanatory notes on 1312 b 34 and 1321 b 5), and it is not, I think, necessary to suppose (with Sus.) a lacuna before the words καὶ γὰρ κ. τ. λ. These words, as Vict. has seen, are closely connected with what precedes. See J. C. Wilson’s remarks in Archiv für Gesch. der Phil. 12, 52 sqq.

P. 210, lines 16–20. Perhaps it is better (with Sepulveda) to supply τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θηλυ with συνέστηκεν than to take συνέστηκε as impersonal, as I have here done.


P. 219, fourteen lines from foot of page, after ἄρχιτεκτονας add and Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 12, οὐ γὰρ τοῦ ὁργάνου τὸ ἐργόν, ἀλλ’ οὐ καὶ τὸ ὁργανὸν ὃς ἥρται πρὸς τὸ ἐργόν. P. 223, line 13, after with him add Cp. Athen. Deipn. 262 b, ταύτα γὰρ (sc. τὰς λαξιμεῖας) ὑπερορθάζων (οἱ δοῦλοι) οὐ μόνον διὰ φοβοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ διδασκαλίαν, οὐ τὴν ἐν δωδεκασκάλλῳ Φερεκράτους, ἀλλὰ ἰδιαυτήνες.

P. 223, fourteen lines from foot of page, after πείθεαθαι add and Xen. De Recuestri 8. 13. I incline now to follow Stahr, not Bonitz, in his interpretation of λόγος in this passage.

P. 238, lines 3–5. Prof. Robinson Ellis adds other Greek examples to those given by me—Xen. Oeccon. 6. 14, τοῦ ἔχοντας τὸ σεμνὸν ὄνομα τούτο τὸ καλὸς
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te καγαθός, and 6, 15, προσέκειτο τὸ καλὸς τῷ ἄγαθῷ—and supplies me with closer Latin parallels—Ovid, Met. 15. 96,

At vetus illa aetas cui fecimus Aurea nomen, and Plin. Epist. 3. 2, cum dico princeps ('where J. E. B. Mayor has a learned note'). See Prof. Ellis' commentary on Catull. lxxxvi. 3 (ed. 2).

P. 239, ten lines from foot of page, for is probably read may be.

P. 239, seven lines from foot of page, after p. 79) add But Hecataeus and others had written γῆς περίοδου (Bywater).

P. 242, eighteen lines from foot of page, after εἰς δελε 3. 4 . . . ταῦτα, and.

P. 243, eight lines from foot of page, add 28. εἰς τοὺς φύλακας and 27. εἰς ικεῖνους. 'We often find εἰς used of movement to persons, for instance in De Caelo 1. 3. 270 b 20 and Pol. 2. 4. 1262 b 26, 27' (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 33).

P. 248, lines 16–20, for but ἐπειδα . . . χρωμάνων read probably rightly: see my remarks on the passage in Class. Rev. 7. 307.

P. 254, line 16. I do not feel sure that Sus, intended to render καί by 'gerade', and I doubt whether it can bear this meaning here. Perhaps καί means simply 'also', and the sense is 'since we see that those also quarrel who own property in common, as well as owners of several property, and indeed that the former quarrel more than the latter', etc.

P. 254, line 25, after p. 54. 2 add See as to these cases of undivided property Dio Chrys. Or. 38. 2, 151 R. Cp. Lucan, De Bell. Civ. 1. 84,

Tu causa malorum

Facta tribus dominis communis, Roma.


P. 256, nine lines from foot of page, add τοῖς δ' οὗ χρωμάνων γυνώσκοντες.

P. 267, twenty lines from foot of page, end of note on 1265 a 12, add This was proverbial: cp. Demosth. Prooem. 42, p. 1450, ἵσωσ μὲν οὖν, ἵσωσ πρότερ' ἵδια βάλον ἐστιν ἤπαντ' ὄρθως πράττειν, οὕτως οὖν κανίν.

P. 267, line 26. I have here taken τὸ νῦν ἐπημελεῖν πλῆθος as an 'anticipatory accusative', but it may be, as Prof. R. Ellis points out, the direct subject of λανθάνειν.

P. 269, twenty-three lines from foot of page, after using property add Cp. also Cic. De Offic. 1. 27. 96, ut in eo moderatio et temperantia apparent cum specie quadam liberali.

P. 269, fourteen lines from foot of page, after μετρῶτης add See Class. Rev. 7. 309.

P. 270, line 20, after § 41. 4 add (ed. 2. § 216).

P. 271, line 4, after 1335 b 22 sq. add Τένων must be supplied with πλέονα from τεκνοτοιαν (see Bon. Ind. 239 a 39 sqq.).

P. 275, last line but four, and p. 277, line 9, 'checked by an approach to the principle of the lot'. See below on p. 335, last line.
P. 283, twenty lines from foot of page, after given add (see explanatory note on 7 (5). 5. 1304 b. 31).

P. 293, line 5, after name add See Sandys' note on 'Ath. Pol. c. 28, l. 20, τὴν διωβεῖαν.


P. 298, line 10, after 1326 a 32) add Hippodamus' wish to be learned about Nature as a whole reminds us of the similar teaching of Hippocrates referred to in Plato, Phaedrus 270 C. See also Stewart on Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 7. 1102 a 19.

P. 304, line 7, after κοινωνίαν add See, however, vol. iii. p. xviii.


P. 308, line 20, after e.γ. dele in 3. 9 . . . σχεδὸν γάρ, and.

P. 309, line 26. Μαρτύρων τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγενῶν is probably intended to be emphasized by hyperbaton, the words οἱ διώκον τῶν φόνον being interposed after μαρτύρων: see vol. iii. Appendix B.

P. 314, line 5 sqq. It is likely that the Polities were not written, not before, as I have implied here, but after, the Polities.

P. 316, nineteen lines from foot of page, after τὴν γὰρ add 40. For the change of construction in τὰς γειτνίωσις πόλεις . . . μηδεμίαν cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 15 sqq., where see note.

P. 318, line 8. Prof. R. Ellis much prefers Victorius' way of taking the passage, 'We ought to think that a city approximates to a division into equal halves as divided into men and women'.

P. 319, line 2, after Σωφρόνατῳ add Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 122 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 460), ταῦτα δὲ γνωσίς (Σωφρόνατῳ) πάντα πείθοντα ὅσ δεσποιναῖς, Strabo, p. 165, as to the Cantabri, and Plut. Cato Censor, c. 8, as to the Romans.

P. 323, line 5 sq. See above on p. 314, line 5 sqq.

P. 334, line 10, for According to Plutarch read We read of Agesilaus in Plut. Ages. c. 4, δόκιμοι δὲ τέχνοι καθόμενοι εν τῷ βασιλικῷ θώρῳ καὶ χρηματίζων, ἐποίησι τῶν ἐφόροις ἐπεξαντατο. 

P. 334, line 25, after 1266 b 23 add Contrast the view of Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 29, ἡ γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων κατάστασις οὐκ ἀνέσει ἂν, ἀλλ' ἐπίτατο τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ δοκοῦσα πρὸς τοῦ ὁμοῦ γεγονόναι σφαδορέερᾳ ἐποίησε τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν.

P. 335, last line. It has been pointed out by Mr. J. Solomon (Class. Rev. 3. 295; see Susenmühl, Jahresbericht für Altertumswissenschaft, 1891, Bericht über Aristoteles, etc., für 1887-1890, p. 124) that this expression of Plato refers not to the ephorate, as Stallbaum and others have thought, but to the kingship.

P. 338, line 3, before For add Mimnermus had said of old age (Fragm. 5 Bergk),

βλάπτει δ' ὁφθαλμοὺς καὶ νόον ἀφρικαθέν.

Cp. Herondas 1. 67 sq. and Hdt. 3. 134.

P. 339, note on 1271 a 14. I am inclined still to read τοῦτῳ, but to interpret it in a slightly different way from that in which I have interpreted it in
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P. 350, fourteen lines from foot of page, add 38. τᾶς δ' ὕσσεν. 'Ceos is called by Bacchylides (2. 8) Ἐξαντίς νάσος, a title hitherto unknown, but evidently implying a claim to have been colonized by the son of Minos' (Kenyon, Poems of Bacchylides, p. xxvii).


P. 358, line 4, for of read ascribed to.

P. 359, line 19, after στάσιν) add Cp. also Plut. Cato Minor, c. 45, where Cato says of Pompey, αὐτὸς δὲ τῇ πόλις παρακινήτης στάσεις ἀγαθοθέτων ἐν ταῖς παραγγελίαις καὶ θυρίσμοις μηχανώμενος, εἰ δὲν οὐ λέληθη δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς μοναρχίαν λαύτῳ μηρεσινόμενος, and Justin 16. 4. 6.

P. 361, four lines from foot of page, dele c. 12. 1274 a 2.

P. 362, five lines from foot of page, dele the parenthesis, 'cp. ... changes', and see critical note on 1299 b 27.

P. 366, nineteen lines from foot of page, for all magistracies read all magistracies empowered to try cases.

P. 371, note on 1273 b 19. I incline now to adopt the reading τῷ πλουτίζειν. P. 373, fifteen lines from foot of page, for as he found them read in existence.

P. 374, nineteen lines from foot of page, note on 1274 a 2. Τὸν δῆμον καταστήσας probably means not 'set up the demos', as I have interpreted it in this note, but 'set up the democracy' (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 22, οἱ τῶν δήμων καθιστάντες).

P. 375, line 10. As to the meaning of the expression τὰ Μηδικά, see vol. iii. p. 554.

P. 376, line 18, for The fact ... 1537 a 20 sqq.) read See 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 7, l. 9 sqq.

P. 379, line 4, after latter add and which represented the Chalcidian Charondas as a disciple of Zaleucus, the lawgiver of the Italian Locri, a not too friendly rival of the Chalcidic colonies of Italy and Sicily.

P. 384, line 3, after 155 E add 'In inscriptions of the Attic period there is no trace of an exception to this rule' (Prof. Bywater, Archiv für Gesch. der Phil. 2. 504). See on this subject Sus.¹, vol. i, p. 682.

P. 384, thirteen lines from foot of page, add 23. ἐγένετο δὲ κ. τ. λ. We notice that one and the same lawgiver gave laws to all the Thraceward Chalcidians—an early indication of the tendency to unity which they afterwards displayed in grouping themselves round Olynthus—and that this lawgiver was a citizen of Rhegium, itself a colony of Chalcis.

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P. xix, end of note, add and in 1312 a 11, 18 all the MSS. have τοῖς μονάρχας.

In 1295 a 13 also Ms P¹ have μονάρχας with Π².

P. ii, line 1, colon in place of full stop.
P. 11, line 17, colon in place of full stop.
P. 21, line 9, for 'tōur read 'tōur'.
P. 37, line 13, dele comma.
P. 89, line 1, for ac si read ac si utique.
P. 91, line 4, after ἵπερίχοντας add See on the subject of this note vol. iii.

Appendix C.
P. 93, last line, for have read sometimes show. See vol. iii. Appendix C.
P. 100, last line, for ἰχθῶιος read ἰχθῶιος.
P. 101, fourteen lines from foot of page, after Musurus add See critical note on 1311 a 36-39.
P. 104, line 17, after δόο? add Yet compare 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 37, where we have λέγοντε δὲ τέτταρας, not τὰς τέτταρας.
P. 105, eleven lines from foot of page, after in place of it add (with Madvig, Adversaria Critica, 1. 468 sq.).
P. 117, line 5, after ἐπιχωρίαται add In 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 34, however, Vet. Int. renders ἐπιχωρίαις by devenit, if the text is correct.
P. 126, line 20, for ἠλλανοκρῖτας read ἠλλανοκρῖται (see vol. iv. p. 431).
P. 126, line 21, after -as add and -es.
P. 144, seven lines from foot of page, read κίσσωντες.
P. 156, three lines from foot of page. This is one of several passages in which it is doubtful which word in the sentence is the subject and which the predicate. Among these passages are the following—3. 6. 1278 b 11, 3. 7. 1279 a 26 sq., 3. 13. 1283 b 42 sq. I have followed most of the translators and commentators in the view I have taken on this question in my notes on these passages, but there is much to be said for the opposite view, and I do not feel sure that I am right. In 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 18, ἀναγκαίον γάρ εὐπορίαν ἰπάρ-χειν ταῖς πολιτείαις, πολίται δὲ οὕτω, the word πολίται seems to be the predicate (see also 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 5 sq.); yet in 3. 1. 1275 a 22 sq., where τῶν ἀπλών πολίτην is taken up in πολίτης δὲ κ.τ.λ., πολίτης is clearly the subject of the sentence (see also 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 7 sq.).
P. 186, line 4, Sus. supplies πολιτείαις, not πόλεις, with ταῖς δημοκρατικαις, perhaps rightly (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 33 sq.).
P. 189, fifteen lines from foot of page, dele comma.
P. 191, line 4, after Hdt. 1. 97. 2 add and Plato, Rep. 347 A-D.
P. 191, three lines from foot of page, after conduct add (This remark is borrowed from Hobbes, Leviathan, c. 19, 'Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects', etc.).
P. 196, seven lines from foot of page, after preferred add The next ἀποφθαίρεσις is whether the version of justice put forward by the partisans of oligarchy and democracy is satisfactory. This ἀποφθαίρεσις is discussed in c. 9.
P. 199, line 12, after προστίθηναι add For ἀφαιροῖτις cp. Περὶ ἀναποφίλης 2. 471 a 6, πρῴτου μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡμῶν τοῦ πράγματος ἀφαιροῖτι.
P. 204, line 18, for Cf. read Cp.
P. 206, seventeen lines from foot of page, dele Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36.
P. 210, line 6, after force add comma.
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P. 220, line 10, after the true one add A distinction is, in fact, drawn in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8 sqq. between αἱρετοὶ and αἰσχροὶ ἐκ προφήτων.

P. 238, line 15, after πάντοθεν add Cp. Aristoph. Eq. 384 sq.

P. 258, eight lines from foot of page, add In Nympsis, Fragm. 15 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 15) we read Παυσανίας ... τὰ τῆς Σπάρτης ἐξελθὼν νόμιμα.

P. 260, eleven lines from foot of page, after Kingship? add It would seem from Diod. 15. 60. 5 that the office of the ταγόι might be so classed.

P. 264, eight lines from foot of page, see above on p. 260.

P. 267, seventeen lines from foot of page, for Ἐπιμενῆς read Ἐπιμένης.

P. 272, line 19, after 31 sqq. add In this passage Aristotle is speaking of Kingship in both πόλεις and ἐθνὶ (cp. 7. (5). 10. 1310 b 35), whereas in the passage before us he seems to refer only to Kingships in πόλεις (cp. 1285 b 13, τὰ κατὰ πόλεις, and 16, ἐν τοῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, and also c. 15. 1286 b 7–10).

P. 272, six lines from foot of page, for τὸν read τῶν.

P. 288 (and p. 418), page-heading, after NOTES add full stop.

P. 301, eleven lines from foot of page, after rule) add and Polyb. 6. 2. 14 Hultsch.

P. 308, line 2, for ὑπαρχόντων add ὑπαρχόντων.

P. 312, line 1, for peri read peri.

P. 317, twelve lines from foot of page, after Protag. 323 D sq. add and Seneca, Epist. 123, nemo est casu bonus.

P. 318, line 11, before latter add the.

P. 342, line 6. Perhaps it is more likely that Megalopolis was founded in b.c. 370 than in b.c. 369. See Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10. 319, note 5 (Part 2, c. 78), and Frazer, Pausanias 4. 307.

P. 345, line 8, end of note, add Cp. also Plin. Epist. 1. 20. 5.

P. 362, eighteen lines from foot of page, for θυμοειδέως read θυμοειδέως.

P. 363, twenty-two lines from foot of page, after τούτων add and Peri αἰσθήματος 2. 439 a 5, ἐστιν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαρισμένα.

P. 370, five lines from foot of page, after military duties add and provides in the Laws (see vol. i. p. 446) that the Nomophylakes are not to remain in office after they have attained seventy years of age.

P. 385, line 5, for διεξελθέων read διεξελθὼν.

P. 386, seven lines from foot of page, after other laws also add For τῶν ἀντ' ἐκεῖνου τινές cp. Plut. Solon, c. 12, τοὺς ἀντὶ τοῦ Μεγακλέους.

P. 387, three lines from foot of page, *all other*. It is possible that τὰ ἄλλα means here *other things than τὰ περὶ τὰς πολυτείας (30)*, and not, as I have taken these words to mean, *other things than syssitia and the division into classes*.

P. 414, line 17, after Greece add But Aristotle’s main object is to place the gymnasium of the elders in the immediate neighbourhood, and under the eye, of the chief magistrates. It must, therefore, be situated, like the agora, under the hill on which the chief magistrates dwell.
P. 418, eighteen lines from foot of page, after contracts add at any rate those which were made in the agora.

P. 428, line 3, after δαναρων add For the thought cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1100 b 35 sqq.

P. 428, line 18, after 116 b 8 sqq. add and Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 3 sq.

P. 433, thirteen lines from foot of page, for άκονοντεν read άκονοντες.

P. 434, line 4, for διείκτει read διείκτει.

P. 475, line 11, after 1. 254) add In Περί νεώτητος καὶ γήρως 1. 467 b 11, άμα δὲ καί Περί ἀπαντήσεις ἀναγκαίως τὰς αίτια εἰπεῖν. ένιος γὰρ τῶν ζωῶν (cp. Περί ἀπαντῆς 1. 470 b 9 sqq.) διὰ τούτο συμβαίνει τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ μὴ ζῆν, and 21. 480 b 12, 19 sq., Aristotle seems to make some concessions to this view.

P. 483, ten lines from foot of page, after life add Cp. also Περί ὑπνοῦ 3. 457 a 3 sqq.

P. 487, nineteen lines from foot of page. My rendering of γίνεται γάρ κ.τ.λ. is that of the translators generally, but it would be possible to translate the words, ‘for in a way exercise results to the bodies [of the children]’. Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 3, γίνεται κατάλυσις, and 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 30, γίνεται σωτηρία ταῖς τυραννίσι.

P. 491, nine lines from foot of page, before Compare add and Frazer, Pausanias 2. 492.

P. 497, twenty lines from foot of page. We need not perhaps interpret διηκαται so strictly as to infer from it, as I have done here, that Aristotle intended the education of his future citizens to be carried on beyond twenty-one, though it is on other grounds not improbable that he did so.

P. 500, line 12, for εἶπ' read εἶπ'.

P. 500, line 20, after 1366 a 36 sqq. add and see explanatory note on 1258 a 10.

P. 505, line 1, for εμάνθαναντον read εμάνθανον.

P. 507, line 2, after 1319 b 19 sqq. add Cp. also Thuc. 8. 89. 3 (τῷ τοιοῦτῳ . . . ἐν διπς).

P. 507, twelve lines from foot of page, after μάθησαν add comma.

P. 509, fourteen lines from foot of page, after himself add (cp. Athen. Deipn. 18 a sq.).

P. 509, last line but one, for ἄν read ἄν.

P. 524, line 2, after c. 34. 1. 4 add and c. 48. 1. 16, ταῖς d[γορ]; added.

P. 524, line 7, for μη read μη.

P. 525, nine lines from foot of page, after fifteen add As to light and heavy gymnastic exercises see Frazer, Pausanias 4. 103.

P. 535, line 4, after 503 a 23 sqq. add Περί ὑπνοῦ 1. 454 a 26, ὅταν ὑπερβάλλη τὸν χρόνον ὑπόνατα χρόνον τι ποιεῖν.

P. 545, seventeen lines from foot of page, for Muller read Müller.

P. 548, three lines from foot of page, dele the first comma.

P. 557, line 11, for τῇ read τῇ.

P. 559, four lines from foot of page, add As to rhythm and melody see Abert, Die Lehre vom Ethos in der griechischen Musik, pp. 53–56.

P. 575, nineteen lines from foot of page, read 58.
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